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THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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The Paris Peace Conference, 1919

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The Council of Ten: Minutes of Meetings February 15 to June 17, 1919:

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February 15, 3 p.m. (BC–33)

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[1] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/40

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/40

BC–33

[Document 1]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. House	The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M. P.	M. Pichon
	Secretaries	
Mr. L. Harrison	Lt. Col. M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
	Mr. Norman	M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Sonnino	H. E. Baron Makino
M. Crespi	H. E. M. Matsui
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi	
M. Bertele	

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE

Lieut. Burden	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.	Captain Portier

ITALY	JAPAN
Major Jones	M. Saburi

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Gen. T. H. Bliss	Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B., D. S. O.	M. Alby
		M. Bertin
		Major Aublet

ITALY
General Cavallero

(PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF QUESTION I "SYRIA")

FRANCE	LEBANESE DELEGATION
Captain Coulondre	Daoud Bey Mammom
M. Gout	Negile Bey Abdel Malek
	Abdel Halim Hajjar

Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the Meeting opened, asked that the Members of the Lebanese Delegation should be admitted.

Syrian Question (Daoud Bey Mammom, President, Negile Bey Abdel Malek, Druse Delegate, and Abdel Halim Hajjar, Mussulman Delegate, then entered the Council Chamber.)

M. Clemenceau called on Daoud Bey Mammom to make his statement.

DAOUD BEY MAMMOM then read the following statement:—

(a) Statement by Daoud Bey Mammon, President of the Great Administrative Council of Mt. Lebanon "Our Delegation holds its mandate from the Great Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, our national Parliament, elected on democratic bases by the suffrage of the whole nation of Lebanon.

In the fullness of its rights, the said Council has nominated the Delegation of which I am the President, and on behalf of which I am now speaking, to place before the Peace Conference, the claims of the nation of Lebanon.

Mount Lebanon has always been autonomous. Its autonomy has been maintained under Arabian, Turkish and Egyptian domination. At times it has even appeared as possessing a complete independence, which was recognised by Turkey itself.

Consequently [*sic*] to the incidents of 1860, Europe has sanctioned this autonomy and gave it, through the 1861–1864 treaty,[1] with her guarantee, a modality, a form which is special, but definite. One only bond of vassalage bound it to Turkey. Now, as a consequence of the fall of the Sublime Porte, Lebanon finds itself independent, with a National Government and an elected Parliament. Its wish is to recover, together with the recognition of its independence, its historical and natural frontiers which had been encroached upon by the Turks.

The territories within the said frontiers are necessary to our existence; without them, no commerce, no agriculture is possible for us and our populations remain under obligation to emigrate; the mere closing of our frontiers, through administrative measure would drive us, as has been during this war, to actual starvation.

Besides the great majority of the populations living on these territories also ask to be attached to Lebanon. Their wishes are to be found in petitions addressed to the French Government.

By giving them over to us, the Conference will perform a deed of justice and reparation, while according to the principle of the peoples' own wish.

In the course of this war, by the part it has taken in it, Lebanon has acquired claims on the goodwill of the Entente. The participation, however modest, has been none the less actual.

From the very beginning of the war, the people of Lebanon have not feared, in spite of the worst reprisals which their isolation could bring on them, to take side resolutely for France and her Allies. They offered themselves by thousands to go and fight for a common ideal on the battlefield of Europe, but special circumstances and the assurance which was given them, that they would eventually [be] made use of on the spot, made it impossible for them to bring about their plan. Nevertheless, a certain number of them, joining their foreign brothers, went at once to enlist individually in the French Army, and later, in the American Army, distinct contingents, definite units were even constituted, which took part in the liberation of their country and have thus, still more officially, taken part in the war.

As for the sacrifices Lebanon made because of its having from the first taken side with the Entente, they are plain to everyone.

Over half its population was wiped out through exile, hanging and systematic famishing at the hands of the Turks. With due proportion, this country is among those which suffered most owing to the attitude it adopted and preserved until the end.

The Government of Mount Lebanon, enlightened by experience, its soil having been trampled on for over half a century through the numerous and consequently rival influences, and having realised the immense harm caused to the country and with a view to obtain a much desired union as well as preserve its dignity, intends to avoid in future the errors of the past.

Conscious of the inability of the country, especially at the start, to develop its resources unaided, deprived as it is of financial means, and technical advisors, the Government has sought the collaboration of a great power. One only could be thought of, France. Her liberal principles, her time honoured traditions, the benefits Lebanon never failed to receive from her in hard times, the civilisation she diffused throughout made her prominent in the eyes of all the inhabitants of

Lebanon. Consequently the Administrative Council faithfully expressing public opinion, unanimously requested the collaboration of France.

In our opinion such a collaboration does not imply the least abandonment of our rights, the slightest abdication of our independency. The help thus given us will be that of a long experience, sparing us the mistakes which a newly-born community is unavoidably liable to make, giving us an umpire whose decisions will be accepted by the various groups in our country, and lastly safeguarding our independency from any possible attempt.

We must say a few words about our relations with Syria.

Between the two countries interests are closely connected. Syria requires our ports and mountains, we require her plains. Absolute separation would be detrimental to either. And yet Lebanon could partake of the Syrian integrality, while retaining a distinct personality, only under the condition that Syria should profit by the same French collaboration. Lebanon would prefer the danger of its isolated position to the double peril of being drawn into the track of a country deprived of Government traditions and much less advanced in its evolution, or to be the possible sufferer in the quarrels that would unavoidably arise from a dual collaboration.

We ardently desire to strengthen the various ties which join us and our neighbours. This wish will be accomplished when the new Government of Syria gives satisfactory tokens of vitality, ability and tolerance. The only means to this end seems to reside in entrusting one Power only with this collaboration.[”]

M. CLEMENCEAU then called on Negile Bey Abdel Malek to speak.

NEGILE BET ABDEL MALEK, then read the following statement:

(b) Statement by Druse Delegate “As a Druse Delegate, I beg to be allowed to add a few words to the declaration which has just been made on behalf of the whole delegation, in order to render more precise the sentiments of my fellow believers.

We ardently wish for our country to be independent under recognition of our rights and prerogatives. On the other hand we know the advice and experience of a friendly and unbiased power to be necessary to our evolution.

With the conviction that any Government based on theocratic principles, while putting us in danger of being absorbed in a majority of a sectarian nature, would be particularly detrimental to us, we ask that the necessary help should be given us by a power whose liberalism and spirit of tolerance would constitute a guarantee to us.

Moreover we are anxious to see Lebanon partake of the Syrian integrality, while retaining a distinct personality, in order that the bonds should be tightened, which must of necessity bind her to Syria and that those of us who live there could come in close contact with their fellow believers. In order to achieve this result we are of the opinion that the collaboration of France, especially qualified to conciliate the various tendencies and interests non [*now*] existing side by side, must not be confined to Lebanon, but must extend to the whole of Syria. On this unity of collaboration it will depend that our national aspiration come to reality.[”]

M. CLEMENCEAU next called on Abdel Halim Hajjar to address the Conference.

ABDEL HALIM HAJJAR, Mussulman Delegate, read the following statement:—

“The claims that our delegation has been entrusted with defending before the Peace Conference in the name of the people of Lebanon have been clearly explained by our President.

As a Mohammedan Delegate, I wish to make more precise, on certain points, the sentiments of my fellow believers.

(c) Statement by Mussulman Delegate We are of opinion that it is necessary for our country to be helped by a friendly power in order to achieve its full development.

On the other hand, we are convinced that such a help would only completely satisfy our aspirations, if it made itself felt within recognition of our independence and in the direction of a democratic Government, free from any religious and theocratic form. The spirit of liberalism and religious tolerance in France prompts us to trust this power and beg for its help.

We are moreover convinced that France's collaboration must extend to the whole extent of the Syrian territory. We are of opinion that the unity of collaboration is necessary to the evolution of the various groups of which it is constituted towards the national unity of the country."

(The Delegates, having been thanked by M. Clemenceau for their statements, then withdrew.)

2. MR. LANSING said that he had certain additional remarks to offer in regard to the question which had been discussed the previous day, relating to the passage of troops and supplies through Holland.[2] He would call on General Bliss to make a statement on his behalf.

Passage of Troops and Supplies Through Dutch Territory: GENERAL BLISS said that after referring to the documents in the American archives relating to this question, he found that he had yesterday correctly stated the facts of the case. The question of the passage of troops and supplies through Holland had first been mentioned in a letter addressed by General Pershing to Marshal Foch on January 15th last. In that letter General Pershing had submitted a request that all the Allied Armies of occupation should obtain, firstly, the right to transport supplies of all sorts through Holland, including gasoline, oil, etc., but not including military munitions, and, secondly, the right to withdraw their forces, military equipment and supplies via Rotterdam. (a) Concessions Granted by Holland to U. S. A.

When the question had been taken up with Holland, sufficient stress had not been laid on the second point, and, therefore, the Government of the United States had taken up the question direct with the Dutch Government, through their representative at the

Hague. As a result of the latter *démarche*, on the 15th February a telegram had been received by the American Headquarter Staff stating that the two requests made by the United States of America had been accorded by the Dutch Government, namely: the transport of supplies (not including material of war) through Holland, and the withdrawal by the Rhine of troops and war material. The American Government thus obtained permission to use Rotterdam as a base for the supply of materials, but the American Government was not thereby accorded the right, desired by Great Britain, of conveying troops and munitions of war through Holland to Germany. Consequently, no precedent had been created, and the demands of the Allies in this respect could not be based on the concessions already accorded to the United States of America.

(b) Draft Telegram to Holland MR. BALFOUR remarked that nothing could be clearer than General Bliss' statement—it was clear that the concessions made by Holland to America were less than Great Britain demanded. On the other hand, the British authorities held that it would be impossible for them to maintain their forces in the occupied areas along the Rhine unless the right of importation was granted, as well as that of exportation. He did not himself feel competent to argue how far that necessity existed, but he would call on the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff to put the military case to the Conference.

GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON said that the British authorities wanted permission to bring troops up the Rhine as well as down the Rhine. The congestion on the railways was such that it was impossible either to demobilize or to forward reliefs to the British forces on the Rhine. The British had some 70,000 to 80,000 young troops to send to the occupied areas, and unless this could be done, it would be impossible for the British troops to be ready to march into Germany should the necessity arise.

MR. LANSING said he appreciated the situation in regard to the replacement of troops. Everyone was anxious to aid in every way to make it easy to send troops. The last two paragraphs of the draft,[3] however, were so worded as to give the impression that something was being asked as a matter of right, whereas it was not a matter of

right. The paragraphs appeared to contain a threat, and, therefore, in his opinion, required some amendment.

MR. BALFOUR expressed a doubt as to whether the last two paragraphs were really open to that interpretation. He did not pretend to judge international questions, but the appeal made was not to the technicalities of international law, but to the consideration of a situation without precedent. To obtain a durable peace an armistice had been made, which Germany had accepted. The armistice involved the necessity of moving troops, and this could not be done unless the Dutch yielded on the point in question. Should the Dutch entrench themselves behind the duties of Neutrals and refuse to facilitate a military action by nations, who, as a matter of fact, were still belligerents, he could give no good answer. But he would appeal to the Dutch to take a broader view. It was true the Allies were not at peace with Germany, but if Holland wished to facilitate an early peace, it could do so by helping in the manner suggested. Consequently he did not think the Allies went beyond the moral principle of the matter in telling the Dutch that "the matter was so grave and urgent that the Five Powers must express the earnest hope that the Netherland[s] Government will consider the question of giving their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the state of things which might ensue, and which might endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government".

This message only stated the fact that if the Dutch adhered to their view, a very serious situation would thereby be created.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the vital question had not yet been put to the Dutch. Holland had accorded to the Americans the right of passage for supplies, and she would no doubt extend the same right to all the Allies. But, in regard to the transport of troops, the question had still to be put to Holland. Should Holland refuse, it would be difficult to see how pressure could be applied without violating those very principles for which the Allies had fought, namely, the integrity of neutral territories. The only reason that could be given for putting pressure on Holland was "Necessity", but no neutral need recognize

that reason. The humanitarian side of the question, namely, the transport of food and other supplies, had been accepted by Holland. But as regards the military question, it would only be possible to urge the reasons given by Mr. Balfour, that is to say, that a refusal would result in a prolongation, of the war. It would, however, be impossible to go beyond that, though possibly in international law some distinction did exist between the transport through neutral territory of troops, arms, munitions and supplies.

MR. CHURCHILL wished to insist on the practical side of the question. If 80,000 troops could not be sent by the Rhine route, a lesser number of troops would have to be maintained in the occupied territories, and the promises made to Marshal Foch would not be fulfilled. That would be the inevitable result. The Dutch Government had in principle accepted all that was asked for. It did not object to troops being sent down the river, why should it, in logic, object to troops being allowed up the river? The principle was, therefore, already accorded. Obviously the Allies could not go to war with Holland on that question, but she would, by her refusal, have placed herself in antagonism with the Allies, a position which she could not well afford to maintain.

MR. BALFOUR thought that he could perhaps suggest certain slight alterations in the last two paragraphs of the draft despatch, which would meet Mr. Lansing's difficulties.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, for his part, he would be sorry to see any toning down of the text of the telegram. As Mr. Churchill had said, Holland could not appeal to the question of principle, because she had already allowed troops to be moved in the opposite direction. The fact could not be overlooked that Holland had allowed 2/300,000 Germans to cross the province of Limburg. These 300,000 Germans would now have been prisoners of the Allies but for the action of the Dutch. Holland greatly feared the consequences of the act she had thus committed. She feared the Allies might call her to account, especially in view of the claims to Limburg so ably set forth a few days ago by M. Hymans.[4] It would not be necessary to pursue the argument, but it should not be lost sight of. Holland would not forget it. About a fortnight ago influential members of the

Dutch Government, in conversation with members of an Allied Government, whose names need not be mentioned, had displayed considerable anxiety about Limburg, and had begged that Holland should not be made to pay for her act. They had even offered to bring a certain person to Paris to give evidence on the subject before that Conference.

It would not be necessary to recall the incident in writing to the Dutch Government, but he thought that in the present state of mind of the Dutch, the demands of the Allies would quickly receive satisfaction. For that reason he (M. Clemenceau) strongly supported Mr. Churchill's proposal, and asked his colleagues to do the same. The question was a serious one. It was well known how great were the difficulties, and the congestion of traffic in the North. It was not intended to commit any warlike act. It was not intended to reinforce the Allied troops in Germany. It was merely intended to substitute units in order to carry out certain demobilisation arrangements. He (M. Clemenceau) therefore urged that the text proposed be adhered to. Should Holland refuse, the Allies would be in a position to bring forward further arguments, without actually resorting to threats. The Dutch felt guilty and feared the consequences. And, when the time for making territorial adjustments came, there would be ample opportunities for obtaining satisfaction. But he thought that a simple and rather discreet allusion to the Limburg incident would suffice to obtain the desired concessions.

MR. LANSING held that his reason for objecting to the despatch being sent was that it constituted an admission that the Limburg act was right, since the Allies proposed to do the same.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he could not accept Mr. Lansing's contention for two reasons. Firstly, the substantial reason, that the course proposed by the Allies would cause no injury to Germany, whereas the act of Holland had caused an injury to the Allies by depriving them of 300,000 prisoners. Secondly, a request was being made to Holland, whereas the Limburg act had been carried out by the Dutch on their own authority.

COLONEL HOUSE enquired what alterations Mr. Balfour proposed to make in the draft telegram.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had made certain alterations in the last two paragraphs of the telegram, which would now read as follows:—

> "In these circumstances the five Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, earnestly request the Netherlands Government to cooperate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purpose agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.
>
> The matter is so grave and so urgent that the five Powers must express the earnest hope that the Netherlands Government will see the necessity of giving their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government."

He suggested that the text of the telegram as amended should be accepted.

MR. LANSING said he would accept the telegram as amended.

M. CLEMENCEAU laid particular stress on the fact that he accepted the amendments introduced by Mr. Balfour with regret, and wished that his regrets should be recorded.

BARON MAKINO pointed out that this was the first time he had seen the draft telegram. He was only too ready to associate himself with the Allies, but before engaging his Government he would like to obtain the views of his military advisers.

M. CLEMENCEAU held that the matter was one which called for immediate action. He thought, therefore, the four Powers should act

at once without awaiting the results of Baron Makino's reference to his Government.

BARON MAKINO agreed to this procedure being followed.

It was agreed that the four Allied and Associated Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy), should forward the following despatch to their representatives at the Hague for presentation to the Dutch Government:—

> "The four Allied and Associated Powers consider it of vital importance in the interests of the general peace which they are earnestly striving to conclude at the earliest possible moment, that the preliminary arrangements already entered into with the enemy to this end, shall be effectually carried out.
>
> Those arrangements provide, among other things, for the occupation of the German territories left of the Rhine by Allied and Associated troops, and necessarily cover all measures which are essential for the purpose of effecting and maintaining such occupation, including the actual transport of the troops and supplies to their destination.
>
> Owing to the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France the most serious difficulties are being encountered in carrying out the arrangements which have been agreed upon by both parties and which cannot be allowed to fail except at the risk of gravely imperilling the early establishment of a satisfactory peace.
>
> A ready means exists to meet this difficulty; and that is the utilisation of the communications by rail and by water across Holland.
>
> The German Government having assented to the arrival of the troops on German territory cannot be, and in fact are not, interested in the routes to be followed in journeying to the Rhine, and no question of an infringement of any rule of

neutrality therefore arises out of the transit of the troops across Dutch territory.

In those circumstances the four Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, earnestly request the Netherlands Government to co-operate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purposes agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the four Powers must express the earnest hope that the Netherlands Government will see the necessity of giving their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government."

3. M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that General Alby or General Wilson should, in the first place, give some explanation regarding the military situation in Russia.

The Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in Russia: (a) Military Situation in Russia MR. CHURCHILL agreed and asked that General Alby be permitted to make his statement.

GENERAL ALBY then read the following statement:—

I

NORTHERN FRONT (ARCHANGEL REGION AND MURMAN REGION)

The Bolshevik forces, assuming a vigorous offensive have forced the Allied contingents to fall back considerably between the Vologda railway and the Dvina. Although the British C.-in-C., General Ironside, states that he is master of the situation,

the latter continues to be rather disquieting and reinforcements have had to be hastily brought up from the Murman district. Their arrival to the South of Archangel can only be late and scattered, owing to the distance and the difficulties of communication.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:—

	Archangel region	*Murman region*
Allies	15,000	13,000
Bolsheviki	21,000	3,000

II

Western Front (Baltic, Lithuanian and Polish Regions)

In the Petrograd region and on the Finnish frontier, the Bolshevist forces are few in number and not of much military value. General Mannerheim[5] considers that he can easily take Petrograd unassisted, if the Allies were prepared to support him and to provision the city.

In Esthonia the Bolsheviki, after having taken nearly the whole of the country, have suffered an absolute defeat. Local contingents, reinforced by Russian and Finnish volunteers, have thrown them back beyond the Narva and beyond Valk.

In Courland and Lithuania the Bolsheviki, having taken Riga, Evinsk and Vilna, are marching on Kovno and Grodno and approaching the German frontier. It appears to be certain that they are working in agreement with the Germans, following close on the heels of their retreat, without hastening it. The Germans are now [*not?*] only supplying them with arms and war material, but are preventing the local (Lithuanian and Polish) contingents from defending their country.

Further South, the Bolsheviki have taken Pinsk and are advancing on Brest-Litovsk.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:—

	Petrograd-Esthonian region	*Courland-Lithuanian*
Anti-Bolsheviki	32,500	?
Bolsheviki	20,000	55,000

III

Southern Front (Ukraine Don-N. Caucasus-Caspian)

In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviki are advancing rapidly and without difficulty, and have already taken Kieff, Harkoff, Ekaterinoslav, and a large portion of the Donetz: They may soon meet the Franco-Greek troops occupying Odessa and Herson. The Ukrainian (Vinichenko-Petloura) Directorate, whose contingents have mostly dispersed or gone over to the Bolsheviki, is about to take refuge in Galicia.

Further East, the left wing of Krasnoff's troops—which have hitherto fought well against the Bolsheviki near Veronej and Tsaritzin—has had to fall back on Novo-Cherkask and Rostoff (which are now threatened), in order to avoid being caught in the rear by the Bolshevist advance in the Donetz region.

The Volunteer Army alone has been able to maintain its position favourably in N. Caucasus, but General Denikin, who has just become C.-in-C. of all the anti-Bolshevist Russian forces in South Russia, will now be obliged to use them for reinforcements to strengthen Krasnoff's seriously threatened left wing.

On the Caspian, the British—who have taken Baku and Krasnovodsk (the Trans-Caspian railhead)—appear to have assured naval supremacy by means of their armed steamers. They are trying to get into touch with the anti-Bolshevist Cossacks in the Urals, via Gourioff. The Bolsheviki have, on the other hand, taken Astrachan, on the mouth of the Volga.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:—

Allies 130,000	156th French Division	10,000	The 7,000 remaining men of the Division are about to be transferred.
		3,000	
		60,000	
		50,000	

Bolsheviki From 180,000 to 200,000.

The Allies could, however, bring up to this front:—

2 French	Divisions	(from Roumania)		About 100,000
2 Greek	”	”	Salonika	
1 Italian	Division	”	Bulgaria	
1 English	”	”	Salonika	

and also various Roumanian divisions, now doing nothing in Bessarabia and Roumania, which could furnish a further 100,000 men.

IV

Eastern Front (Urals and W. Siberia)

The Siberian victory at Perm was not followed up. The Red armies again resumed the offensive on the entire front, and, by taking Orenburg, were able to separate Doutoff's[6] Cossacks from the bulk of the Siberian Army and to link up with the Soviet forces from (*in?*) Turkestan.

The situation is causing General Janin[7] anxiety. The Siberian troops are insufficiently trained and their moral[e] is weakening. The officers are poor or undisciplined.

The best elements (the Czecho-Slovaks) had to be sent to the rear to rest and to guard the Trans-Caspian railway, which was threatened by Bolsheviki in Siberia.

The forces now opposing each other on this front (excluding Turkestan) are as follows:—

Allies	120,000
Bolsheviki	from 130,000 to 140,000

V

To sum up, the Red forces are at present advancing on all fronts, with the exception of Esthonia. By these successes the Bolsheviki are gaining:—

(*a*) very decided moral advantages;
(*b*) a very considerable amount of supplies, (agricultural products in the Ukraine and in Turkestan, and minerals in the Donetz).

These successes are due to:—

(*a*) the superiority of the Red armies both as regards men and matériel.
(*b*) their undoubted improvement as regards organisation and discipline.
(*c*) lack of cohesion in the opposing forces, which are badly equipped and of poor moral[e].
(*d*) systematic propaganda for which no expense is spared, and which everywhere precedes military action.

There are, however, irremediable sources of weakness in the Red Army, such as:—

(*a*) The lack of any nobler feeling, terror and the hope of loot being the only means of making the men obey orders.
(*b*) A High Command and General Staff of very unequal quality, with gaps in various ranks and services.
(*c*) Very inadequate communications.
(*d*) Insufficient technical equipment (heavy artillery, aircraft, &c.), owing to lack both of experts and of raw materials, which renders manufacture or even repairs impossible.

> Thus the Red Army owes its success to the fact that, up to the present, it has never encountered adversaries superior to it as regards either numbers, supplies, or moral[e].
>
> Being better officered and equipped, even though numerically inferior, regular Allied troops would easily defeat it. Such a success could be won at very slight cost, provided that powerful technical means (such as armoured cars and bombing aeroplanes) were employed, which equipment the Bolsheviki entirely lack and the action of which their unequal moral[e] would make it impossible for them to withstand.

(On the suggestion of M. Clemenceau, it was agreed that General Alby's statement should be circulated to the Conference).

(b) Prinkipo Conference MR. CHURCHILL said that everyone there present knew the reasons which had led the Conference to adopt the policy of Prinkipo. Since then a month had passed and no decision which made any effect on the forces of the Allies had yet been reached. On the other hand, as General Alby's statement had shown, very disastrous events had been taking place in Russia during that period. In his opinion, it was essential to try and bring the faction[al] war in Russia to an end, and Great Britain adhered entirely to the position previously taken up. But if Prinkipo was not going to come to anything, the sooner it could be got out of the way the better. At the present moment all military action was paralysed by suspense, and there was very grave danger that as a result, the Allied and friendly armies would gradually melt away. The British Government held the view that that process of disintegration was proceeding very rapidly, and that the existing friendly armies would probably be the last, which it would be possible to raise against Bolshevism. Consequently, it was essential, either to carry Prinkipo through to a definite result, or to get it out of the way. With this object in view he had drafted a wireless message which he submitted for discussion. This telegram would, he thought, have the desired effect of settling affairs within a certain limit of time. The effect hoped for would be either to bring about a discussion at Prinkipo and a cessation of fighting in Russia, or the field would be left clear for such action as the Allies might wish to take.

Mr. Churchill then read the following text of the draft telegram:—

> "The Princes Island proposal of the Allied Powers has now been made public for more than a month. The Bolsheviks have replied by wireless on the 6th instant[8] offering to meet the wishes of the Allied Powers as regards the re-payment of loans, the grant of concessions for mineral and forest rights, and to examine the rights of eventual annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers.
>
> The Allies repudiate the suggestion that such objects have influenced their intervention in Russia. The supreme desire of the Allies is to see peace restored in Russia and the establishment of a Government based upon the will of the broad mass of the Russian people.
>
> It is solely with this object that the Princes Island proposal has been made. It is not essential to that proposal that any conference should be held or that representatives of the various Russian forces in the field should meet around a common table. But what is imperative is that fighting should stop and stop forthwith. The Bolshevik Government while verbally accepting the invitation to Princes Island have, so far from observing a truce of arms, taken the offensive in many directions and are at the present time attacking on several fronts. In addition they have called up new classes and expedited and expanded their military preparations.
>
> It is therefore necessary to fix a precise time within which the Princes Island proposal must be disposed of. Unless within 10 days from the 15th instant the Bolshevik forces on all fronts have ceased to attack and have withdrawn a distance of not less than 5 miles from the present position of their adversaries' outpost lines, the Princes Island proposal will be deemed to have lapsed. If, however, within 5 days a wireless notification is received from the Bolshevik Government that they have so ceased attacking, so ceased firing and so withdrawn, and if this is confirmed by the reports received

from the various fronts, a similar request will be addressed by the Allies to the forces confronting them.

It is in these circumstances only that a discussion at Princes Island can take place."

Mr. Churchill, continuing, said that simultaneously with the above message, or something like it, he would propose the immediate setting up of an Allied Council for Russian affairs. This Council should have political, economic and military sections, with executive powers within limits to be laid down by the present Conference. In that way continuity of policy, unity of purpose and control would be obtained. He thought the council should get to work during the period before the Prinkipo proposal could be disposed of one way or another, for the proposed Council would be useful whatever happened in regard to Prinkipo. The Council would receive general directions from the Allied Governments in the light of what happened at Prinkipo, so that there would be no delay. But he laid stress on the fact that the military section should be formed and should get to work at once. If the Bolsheviks continued to attack and to drive back the Allied and friendly forces, a definite military policy would be required, and it would then be necessary to know what action was possible with the available resources. The military section of the proposed Council should, therefore, be asked at once to draw up a plan for concerted action against the Bolsheviks. The details in regard to the organization of the Council could naturally be worked out in a variety of different ways: But it was essential to have a body whose duty it would be to study the situation and to estimate the forces the Allies disposed of for the purpose of waging war against the Bolsheviks. Then, if the Prinkipo proposal gave no results, the Supreme War Council would be in possession of a definite war scheme, together with an appreciation of the situation and an estimate of the chances of being able to carry through to success the suggested plans. The Supreme War Council could then make their choice: either to act, or to withdraw their troops and leave everyone in Russia to stew in their own juice. But in any case, the Supreme War Council would have been placed in a position to enable) it to arrive at a decision. His proposal, therefore, contained two definite lines of action. Firstly, that a wireless message be issued with the

object of bringing the Prinkipo proposal to an issue. Secondly, that a scientific and careful study of the situation be carried out in order to be ready with a plan of action in the event of the Prinkipo proposal falling through.

In conclusion he wished earnestly to bring the following facts to the notice of the Conference. A month ago a meeting had been held in London at which it had been decided that the Russian situation was so serious as to demand the immediate acceptance of a policy. A month had passed, and no decision had been reached. The situation in Russia did not brook delay. It was essential that some policy should be laid down. The alternatives were these—either to prepare some plan of military action in Russia, consistent with the resources available, or to withdraw the armies and to face the consequences of abandoning Russia to her fate. Before the war Russia was the counterpoise of Europe. Now the balance was maintained by large British and American armies. The British forces were being demobilised and the American forces were going home. He himself did not believe that Germany could resume war at the present moment, but he begged his hearers to consider what the position would be in five or ten years' time. The population of Germany was twice that of France. The number of conscripts annually available would be almost three times as great. If, in addition, the Allies abandoned Russia to her fate, would it be possible to make sure that Germany would do the same? Would it be possible to make certain that Germany, either by alliance with the Bolsheviks or with the other parties at present friendly to the Allies would not in the near future become the supreme influence in Russia? It was only from Russia that Germany could derive those resources which she had lost through the loss of her colonies and through her defeat on the Western front. But should Russia fall into her clutches, Germany would thereby become stronger than ever. In his opinion Russia was the key to the whole situation, and unless she formed a living part of Europe, unless she became a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers, there would be neither peace nor victory. He would therefore implore the Conference to take up the Russian question and to pursue it unceasingly until a policy was agreed on. The terrible situation which faced the Allies in Russia compelled him to speak in very direct terms.

MR. LANSING agreed that with a few changes in the text the message could be sent, but as regards anything like the formation of a policy or the creation of a Council, he thought no action should be taken until an opportunity for consultation had been given.

MR. CHURCHILL expressed the view that the creation of the Council might be postponed, but he considered it essential that the military section should forthwith be constituted.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that the Supreme War Council could, without any inconvenience, call upon its military advisers to study the question.

COLONEL HOUSE proposed that a decision in regard to the creation of a Council should be postponed until Monday next. He was willing to agree, however, to the immediate despatch of the proposed wireless.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that there were two questions to be decided. A military question and a question which entailed negotiations. As regards the military question he agreed that it was most urgent; that a policy was essential and that delay would be very dangerous. In his opinion it was not a question of what would happen in five or ten years' time. The danger to be faced would have immediate reaction in all Allied countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the military question should be considered at once as being most urgent.

MR. HOUSE proposed that the military question should be adjourned until Monday, and that the Conference should confine itself to a consideration of the cable.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been completely opposed to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, but he had accepted it in order to avoid the introduction of elements of discord into that Conference. But the fact must now be recognised that the original wireless message had not been a great success, either in Europe or elsewhere. The people whose greatest interest it would have been to support the proposals therein contained (he was now speaking of the Russian political

refugees of all kinds who continually visited their offices, with petitions for guns, munitions and money)—those people had gone off in a bad temper, instead of taking the unique opportunity offered them by the Conference of indicting Bolshevism and its abuses before the whole world. These people had refused to go to Prinkipo, whilst the Bolsheviks had offered the Allies money. When people got into an awkward situation, they usually made an effort to get out of it. The Conference should not attempt to deceive itself, for that was what it was now trying to do. He thought that it should get out of its troubles as discreetly and as simply as possible. No further reference should be made to Prinkipo. He was not altogether opposed to Mr. Churchill's draft message, but what was said in two pages could be put in ten lines. It would be very simple to summarise it. Personally, he would prefer to say nothing, but if the Conference insisted upon sending a message, it should be as simple as possible. Why should the whole world be told that this plan had failed. That was already known. Mr. Churchill had described the Allied situation in Russia as cruel and terrible, but he had described it truly. He himself agreed with all that Mr. Churchill had said; and he attached a great importance to the creation of the proposed Council. He did not favour the policy of leaving Russia to her own devices, because she would rapidly fall a prey to the Germans. He favoured the policy of encirclement: the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia. The results of such a policy would be that in the end the Russians would ask the Allies to intervene.

That very moment a telegram had been received to the effect that the Germans had, in spite of the orders issued, attacked the Poles on a wide front, and had already taken two towns. The Germans were endeavouring to meet Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact. He would speak of this matter again presently, because a decision would have to be taken. But he wished to mention it at once, because the Russian policy must be examined in its entirety and Poland was concerned in that policy.

He did not oppose the sending of a new message about Prinkipo. But he foresaw grave troubles, and a decision in regard to military policy in Russia should be reached without further delay. He himself was

ready to make new sacrifices, but he did not court defeat in Russia, after having been victorious on the Rhine.

MR. HOUSE thought the question to be decided was how to finesse the situation against the Bolsheviks. In England and America the Russian question had created a very serious situation and the Prinkipo proposal had produced a good effect in circles hostile to the Government. The point to be decided was how best to defeat the Bolsheviks and the German purpose. Unless tact were used, all people east of the Rhine might be thrown against England, the United States of America, and France. It was already being said that England and America were using France as an instrument for obtaining Anglo-Saxon supremacy throughout the world.

MR. BALFOUR thought it was necessary to take steps to put the Bolsheviks in the wrong, not only before public opinion, but before those who held the view that Bolshevism was democracy gone astray with large elements of good in it. Personally, he thought Bolshevism was the worst form of class tyranny. M. Clemenceau held the view that public opinion in France was unanimous against Bolshevism, and that any truck with it meant trafficking with the powers of darkness. But other views existed and could not wholly be ignored. He himself had never been sanguine about the issue of the discussions at Prinkipo; but he had perceived certain benefits arising out of the Allies' declaration of an endeavour to secure peace in Russia. In any case, the Allies had embarked on the Prinkipo proposal, and, if abandoned as M. Clemenceau had proposed, all the advantages gained by the original proposal would be thrown away. Therefore, it would merely be worldly wisdom, having once invested money in Prinkipo, to extract all that was possible from the debacle. He thought, therefore, some sort of message should be sent to the Bolsheviks, which would compel them either to cease hostilities or to refuse negotiations. Such a message would put the Bolsheviks on the horns of a dilemma, and at the same time place the Allies in a better position in regard to public opinion.

MR. HOUSE said that he had never been in favour of the Prinkipo proposal, but it had been embarked upon, and therefore they must go along with it and, if eventually the Allies were compelled to

embark on military operations, they would do so in a stronger and better position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he knew quite well that his proposal to take no further action in regard to Prinkipo would not be accepted. For that reason he had suggested shortening and simplifying Mr. Churchill's draft. He thought it right to mention that French opinion had throughout been unanimously opposed to the Prinkipo policy, and the protests had not been limited to France. A violent protest had been received from Admiral Kolchak, who had accused the Allies of having thereby practically disarmed his troops. Were not the Allies responsible to some degree for the recent failures in Russia? The soldiers in the line did not know whether they ought to fight or to await the next armistice. The Allies should not lose sight of that. He (M. Clemenceau) was not reproaching them, but it was nevertheless a fact.

As Colonel House and Mr. Balfour had remarked, the Allies had got into this Prinkipo business, and now they had got to get out of it. He merely asked them to get out of it in as simple a manner as possible. He had no objections to offer to Mr. Churchill's draft, but he would like it to be made simpler and shorter.

M. SONNINO agreed that the Allies would have to get out of the Prinkipo business. He himself had been opposed to it from the commencement, and he had then expressed the opinion that the Bolsheviks would be the only ones to accept the Allies' invitation, as it gave the Bolsheviks the means of enhancing their prestige. His predictions had come true, and today the Allies possessed good grounds for abandoning the whole project. It could truthfully be said that the Bolsheviks had ignored the Allies' requests and had not ceased hostilities, and that the other Governments had not accepted the Allies' invitation. The matter should therefore be ended. It was proposed to send another message, with a short time limit for reply, say ten or fifteen days. It was said that procedure would lead to no harm. But it would do harm, if by enhancing still more the prestige of the Bolsheviks, the Allies increased still further the state of demobilisation of the friendly Russian forces, and of the Entente troops operating in Russia. Mr. Balfour had said "We must compel

the Bolsheviks to acknowledge their errors". The Bolsheviks would never do that, and ten days hence the Allies would find themselves assailed by new and innumerable difficulties. The Bolsheviks would put forward many excellent reasons to prove that they had been compelled to attack in self-defence, and meanwhile the situation would have become worse, the Allies would have gained no benefits whatever, and the Allied troops would have become even more demoralised.

The Conference wished to create a Council to draw up a military plan of action for these troops, and at the same time measures were proposed which would still further demoralise those same troops. Prinkipo had failed: there was no doubt whatever about that. Prinkipo had, however, proved to the world the friendly desire of the Allies to be at peace with Russia. The Prinkipo policy had been a failure, and the less said about it the better: and the proposed Council should now be asked confidentially to suggest other solutions.

He would accept the proposal to send another message, but the offer to meet at Prinkipo should not be renewed.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed his desire to support Baron Sonnino's proposal.

MR. CHURCHILL said that Mr. Lloyd George was very anxious, should the Prinkipo policy fail, for the Allies to be ready with another policy. But the British Cabinet would never agree, having gone so far, to break off the Prinkipo policy without making it quite clear to the world that that proposal had been sincerely put forward and sincerely pressed, as long as any chance of its succeeding existed. He thought the dignity of the Conference demanded the acceptance of that procedure. The Conference had unanimously adopted the proposal which had been put forward by President Wilson himself. No one should be able to say "You made a false movement, and you abandoned it. The Bolsheviks were about to accept, and you withdrew." The British Government wished it to appear that they had acted fairly by the Bolsheviks. He had put forward proposals for a military enquiry to be held, but he did not pre-judge the decision. It

might be that as a result of that enquiry, no action might be found possible. But, in any case, until the military experts had reported, it would not be wise brutally to brush aside the Prinkipo proposal until alternative plans were ready.

M. SONNINO enquired what would be the result if the Bolsheviks stated that they would stop all hostilities and come to Prinkipo. In ten days' time it would be impossible to ascertain whether hostilities had really been stopped. On the other hand, the effect would have been to disorganise still further the Allied forces in Russia. His thesis was this: The Bolsheviks had been given a period of time up to the 15th February in which to comply with the conditions contained in the original wireless. The Bolsheviks had not complied with those terms and conditions (the Bolsheviks had continued their offensive). Why, therefore, prolong by ten days the period already granted? The Bolsheviks could not do more than fail to comply, as they had done, with the conditions of the Allies, and in ten days' time the Allies would be faced with the same situation; but with the additional disadvantage that their own forces would have become further disorganised. He begged the members of the Conference to realise what effect this policy would have, not only in Russia but in Allied countries. The prestige given to Bolshevism was a real disaster in its effect on Allied countries. Consequently, no good effect could be obtained by granting the Bolsheviks this added prestige. The Bolsheviks had been given a chance; why should they be given a second and a third and a fourth chance? He strongly opposed the sending of the proposed message.

BARON MAKINO said that he also had received messages from Siberia bearing out the statements made by M. Clemenceau as to the disastrous effect the original wireless had created in the minds of all friendly groups in Siberia. At the time that the invitation had been issued to the various groups in Russia, no such consequence had been anticipated. If now a second telegram were sent, it was most important that its intent and purpose should not be misunderstood by the friendly forces in Siberia.

MR. BALFOUR wished to ask the military authorities a question of fact. It was being said that the Bolsheviks had pretended to accept,

but they had not in reality done so, because they had not complied with the fundamental condition in regard to the cessation of hostilities. But had the Allied troops abstained from hostilities? Or, to put his question in another way: had all the Allied military operations been defensive in their character?

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that during the interval between the dispatch of the invitation and the present moment, the Bolshevik forces had made the most heavy attacks on all fronts.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that a good many points of great difficulty had been raised that afternoon. He proposed therefore that the further consideration of the two questions: the dispatch of the message and the creation of a Council on Russian Affairs, should be adjourned till Monday afternoon.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Monday, 17th February, at 3 p.m., the further consideration of the two questions relating to the situation in Russia, namely:—

(1) The wireless message in regard to Prinkipo, and
(2) The creation of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked permission to read the following telegram, dated Warsaw, February 14th, 1919, which had been received from M. Paderewski:—

> Situation in Poland "German troops have commenced offensive on a large scale in German Poland. They have occupied the towns of Babimost and Kargowa. Their initiative will place them in an advantageous military situation before anticipated cessation of hostilities. Germans are making considerable use of asphyxiating gas. The Polish forces, numbering 25,000, only 10,000 being engaged, are insufficient to stop this offensive. The situation is grave. It is urgent that situation be placed immediately before Allied competent authorities.
>
> (Signed) Paderewski."

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that he had prepared a draft reply which he submitted for the acceptance of his colleagues.

(It was agreed that the following telegram should forthwith be sent to Marshal Foch:—

> "The Supreme War Council urgently draws Marshal Foch's attention to the following message received from the Polish Government. It is evident that the Germans have hastened their offensive in order to present Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact.
>
> The Supreme War Council holds the opinion that the line of demarcation between the German and Polish troops fixed by Marshal Foch must be maintained.")

(The Conference adjourned to Monday afternoon, February 17th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

FEBRUARY 16, 1919.

[1] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LI, p. 287 and vol. LXI, p. 1023.
[2] See BC–32 (SWC–8), vol. III, p. 1040.
[3] For the text of the telegram as finally agreed upon, see p. 9 [*Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 1*].
[4] See BC–28, vol. III, p. 963.
[5] Gen. Carl G. E. Mannerheim, Regent of Finland.
[6] A. I. Doutoff, Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.
[7] Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, Supreme Commander of the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia.
[8] See telegram of February 4, 1919, from the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 39.

February 17, 3 p.m. (BC–34)

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[2] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 17th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/41

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/41

BC–34 SWC–9

[Document 2]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 17th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Mr. R. Lansing	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
Mr. E.M. House	The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M. P.	M. Pichon
	Secretaries	
M. G. Auchincloss	Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Dutasta
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. E. Phipps	M. Berthelot
		M. de Bearn

ITALY	JAPAN
H. E. Baron Sonnino	H. E. Baron Makino
	H. E. M. Matsui
Secretaries	
Count Aldrovandi	
M. Bertele	

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Col. U.S. Grant	Captain E. Abraham	Captain A. Portier

Italy	Japan
Major A. Jones	M. Saburi

Also Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Gen. T. H. Bliss	Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B., D. S. O.	Marshall Foch
	Vice Admiral Sir M. Browning, K. C. B., M. V. O., R. N.	Gen. Belin
	Rear Admiral W. G. P. Hope, C. B., R. N.	Gen. Alby
		Gen. Weygand
		Col. Gallini

Italy

General Diaz

General Cavallero

Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch had returned that morning from his journey into Germany with the signature of the Germans to the Armistice conditions agreed on by the Supreme War Council.

Report of Marshal Foch on Renewal of Armistice Marshal Foch said that he had met the German plenipotentiaries at 3 p.m. on the 14th. He had put before Herr Erzberger the convention decided on by the Powers. Herr Erzberger had taken the text, and, in reply, had handed in a declaration covering 23 pages. (For text of which see Annexure "A".) This declaration contained a justification from the German point of view of the execution of the terms of the original armistice. The two principal demands made related:—

(1) To the repatriation of prisoners.
(2) To the action taken by the French in Alsace-Lorraine against German industrialists holding property removed from France and Belgium.

In respect to the first, Marshal Foch had addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:—

> (a) Repatriation of German Prisoners "In reply to your communication of February 3rd, I have the honour to inform you that the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considers the repatriation of German prisoners of war impossible for the moment; but these Powers will see to it with the greatest care that all the seriously sick and wounded are repatriated with the least possible delay.
>
> Consequently, France is actually taking steps to begin the immediate repatriation of about 2,000 German prisoners of war besides the prisoners of war already sent to Germany or Switzerland. Great Britain is disposed to proceed in the same manner as rapidly as possible."

(b) Restoration of French & Belgian Property In respect to the second, Herr Erzberger's view was that proceedings could not be taken against private individuals holding property removed from France and Belgium during the war, because they had received it from the German Government. The restoration of this property must therefore be a matter for negotiation between the Governments. The Allied point of view was that these goods could be recovered wherever found. Marshal Foch had, therefore, addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:—

> "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum contained in your letter of the 27th January.
>
> In this connection, I would remind you that in the course of the last interview at Trèves, I stated that I could not accept the view of the German Government; that is to say, that German subjects who had carried away and taken in charge industrial apparatus coming from the occupied territories should benefit by the terms of Article 6 of the Convention of 11th November,[1] as having participated in acts of war.

I merely undertake to transmit to the competent judicial authorities the special cases which you may think it your duty to submit to me.

I have, therefore, forwarded the memorandum to the said judicial authorities, who will decide on this particular question of law."

(c) German Reluctance To Sign New Armistice Conditions Continuing, Marshal Foch said that on the 15th the German Plenipotentiaries alleged that, by reason of the slow communication with Berlin and Weimar, they could not say when they would be able to sign the Armistice. Further they wished to modify and extend the text of the Convention submitted to them. Marshal Foch, on the 16th, had sent them the following communication:—

"In reply to your letters of the 15th February, I have the honour to inform you that:—

(1) The text of the Convention which was handed to you yesterday was drawn up by the chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments.

I can neither change it nor add to it.

(2) As the Armistice expires on the 17th February at 5 o'clock in the morning, the latest hour for signing a new extension is 18 hours on the 16th February, —in order to give time for communicating orders to the troops.

If the Convention be not signed at the latter hour, I shall be obliged to leave Treves and the Armistice will cease to operate at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 17th February."

After this, the conditions of the new Armistice were signed with a slight alteration respecting the line of demarcation between German and Polish troops. This modification affected the Silesian frontier, where, as there were no Poles, it was decided to adhere to the prewar frontiers. (For final text, see Annexure "B.")

After signing the Convention, Herr Erzberger had handed to Marshal Foch a declaration from Herr Scheideman, in the following terms:—

> "The German Government recognises the grave nature of the consequences which would be involved both by the acceptance, and particularly by the refusal of the Convention. When it gave instructions to its delegates to sign it, it did so feeling convinced that the Allied and Associated Governments were going to make a serious effort to give to the world that peace which is so ardently desired, during the short period for which the armistice was being prolonged.
>
> Nevertheless, the German Government feels obliged to indicate its own point of view as regards the three conditions imposed in the Convention, by making the following observations:—
>
> I. The agreement ignores the fact that the German Government has been constituted by the popular will, in an orderly manner. The agreement imposes on the Germans, in the form of orders and prohibitions marked by harshness and favouring the rebelling Poles, the necessity of evacuating a number of important places such as Birnbaum and the town of Bentschen without any delay. These places are in German hands, their population is mostly German, and they are particularly important in regard to the intercourse with Eastern Germany. In addition to this, the Allied and Associated Powers do not even guarantee that the Poles, on their side, will abstain from preparing or undertaking further attacks, or that they will treat the German population with humanity—a population, the protection of which we are forced to give up: or that they will release the German hostages, the retention of whom has now no object; or that they will keep up the supply of food from the west in the same way as has been done up to the present.
>
> Although we are ready to cease all military offensive action in Posnania and in other regions, and to accept the present military situation in these countries as a basis of negotiation,

we really must be able to expect the Poles in revolt also to respect the line of demarcation. If they do not, we ought to be permitted to defend ourselves by force of arms.

II. Germany is able to prove that she has striven to carry out the clauses of the Armistice until her economic strength was completely exhausted and until her transport services gave way. Now, once again, she will undertake to fulfill the conditions which she has not up to the present succeeded in carrying out, but at the same time she feels justified in assuming that her undertakings will not receive any interpretation inconsistent with the principles acknowledged by the two parties before the President of the United States of America and rendering nugatory the idea of a peace founded on right.

III. The fact that Germany is granted only a short undefined renewal terminable at the will of one party only at three days' notice instead of an Armistice containing a fixed time limit enabling her to take the necessary dispositions to execute the clauses is the very thing to jeopardise quietness and order in Germany and constitutes an unjustifiable aggravation of our constitution. We cannot give up the hope that the Allied and Associated Governments will consider it possible to open negotiations on the German counter-proposals and to renew the Armistice until the Preliminaries of Peace."

(d) Allied Commission in Warsaw To Supervise the Execution of the Armistice Terms in Relation to Poland MARSHAL FOCH said that, to ensure the execution of the terms of the Armistice relating to Poland, he suggested that the co-operation of the Allied Commission in Warsaw should be obtained. To this end, he proposed the following telegram:

"I send you below the text of Article 1 of the Armistice Convention signed on February 16th:

'The Germans must immediately desist from all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of

> Posen or any other region. With this object, their troops are forbidden to cross the following line:—The former frontier of East and West Prussia with Russia as far as Luisenfelde, then from this point the line:—West of Luisenfelde, west of Gross Neudorff, south of Brzoze, north of Schubin, north of Exin, south of Samoczin, south of Chodziensen, north of Czarnikow, west of Mialla, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawicz, south of Krotoszyn, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Vieruchov, then the frontier of Silesia.'

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw should at once inform the Polish Government and Command of this Convention, reminding them that all hostilities must cease on the Polish side as on the German.

The Commission must make sure that this injunction is observed on both sides.

It will settle on the spot the difficulties of detail which cannot fail to arise, the line of demarcation fixed serving as the basis of its decisions.

The German delegates have asked Marshal Foch that rules may be laid down for the protection of the 400,000 German subjects living in territory occupied by the Poles, for communication between this territory and the rest of Germany and for the rolling stock of railways. (*sic*)

Marshal Foch has been unable to treat from a distance these questions of detail which can only be settled on the spot. The Allied and Associated Governments instruct the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw to decide them.

With this object, the Commission should establish relations with the German Government and High Command through General Dupont at Berlin.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw will keep the Governments constantly informed of the progress of its work."

(It was decided that this telegram should be sent by Marshal Foch.)

2. ADMIRAL BROWNING said that, as the provisions of Article 22 of the Armistice had not been completely fulfilled, he had had a meeting on the 14th with the German naval representative. The latter had been informed of what was required to complete the fulfilment of that Article. He had replied that Germany was disposed to bring to an end the submarine question once and for all. There were two classes of submarines:— Disposal of German submarines

(*a*) Those to be surrendered.
(*b*) Those to be broken up in Germany.

Of the former, 45 still remained to be handed over, and the latter comprised all the surplus. The German naval representative had accepted the conditions laid down. Admiral Browning had also pointed out that, of the batch due for surrender in the previous month, two had been alleged to have sunk at the mouth of the Elbe. He had pointed out to the German representative that, whether this was due to negligence or bad seamanship, the Allies were not prepared to allow a repetition of such events. The Allies would require in exchange for any submarine lost a complete set of engines and electrical and other plant. The German naval representative had agreed. The Germans had also agreed to send to Great Britain special submarine docks and lifting vessels. Any in process of building would be destroyed and no further building would be undertaken. Dates had been fixed for the surrender of the material, with a small margin allowing for bad weather.

3. ADMIRAL BROWNING had, further, drawn the attention of the German naval representative to the spreading of German propaganda by German Wireless Stations. The latter had asked whether this enquiry was intended to convey a warning. Admiral Browning had replied in the affirmative. German Wireless Propaganda

4. ADMIRAL BROWNING had further pointed out that the apparent reluctance of Germany to surrender her merchant shipping, until minor points of finance had been settled, did not harmonise with the alleged desperate straits for food in Germany. The naval representative had agreed to convey these remarks to Herr Erzberger. Surrender of German Merchant Shipping

5. MR. BALFOUR said that he had shown the Chairman the telegram from the British Admiralty requiring a decision by the Supreme War Council. He therefore wished to bring it to the notice of the meeting. He then read the following:—Question of Permitting the Transfer by Sea of German Troops to East Prussia and Latvia

> "Instructions should be obtained from Supreme War Council as to whether Blockade of Germany should be relaxed in so far as is necessary to permit maintenance of German armies in Latvia and East Prussia.
>
> Many requests are being received from Admiral Goette for free passage by sea from Western German ports to Dantzig, Pillau, Memel and Libau, of individual ships carrying troops military supplies and coal for railways.
>
> A decision in principle is required observing the German troops are engaged in operations against Bolshevists as well as against Poles and that in no case is it proposed to grant general permission."

He suggested the matter should be referred to the Military and Naval Experts, of the Supreme War Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it would not be better to refer it to the Blockade Committee.

COLONEL HOUSE expressed the opinion that the questions involved were military rather than commercial.

M. CLEMENCEAU then suggested that this telegram should be sent, at the same time, to the military and naval Advisors and to the Blockade Committee.

(It was decided, after some discussion, that the telegram should be referred, at the same time, to the military and naval Advisors of the Supreme War Council, and to the Blockade Committee, for reports.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he must inform the meeting that he had received a letter from M. Pachitch to the effect that the Serbian Government proposed to submit their case against Italy to arbitration by President Wilson. He stated that he merely reported this as a statement of fact. Question of Arbitration Between Italy and Serbia

BARON SONNINO said that he thought it his duty, after hearing the communication made by the Chairman, to state that the Italian Government regretted that it could not accept any proposal for arbitration on any question for the solution of which Italy had engaged in war, and waged it for three and a half years in full agreement with her Allies, and the examination of which by the Peace Conference was pending.

7. A discussion on the policy to be pursued in Russia ensued, and after an exchange of views, it was decided to postpone the resumption of the discussion until later in the week. Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in Russia

8. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that the Serbian statement would be heard on the following day if there were no objection. Serbian Statement

BARON SONNINO said that the position of the Italian Government in relation to the Serbs was a delicate one. The Italian Government did not wish to enter into a polemic at the Conference. He, therefore, suggested that the Serbs should be heard in the absence of the Italian Delegates, or that if heard in their presence, no discussion should ensue.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the last proposal was in accordance with precedent. The Serbs would be heard, and the Meeting would be adjourned.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 17th February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

[*Declaration Handed by the Head of the German Armistice Commission* (*Erzberger*) *to the Allied Armistice Commission, February 14, 1919*]

GENTLEMEN: For the third time, we have to meet again at Trèves to negotiate the prolongation of the Armistice. The prolongation of the Armistice until the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries as considered in Article I of the convention of 16 Jan. 19,[2] has unfortunately not met with the approval of the Allied Government, any more than the promise of 13 Dec.[2]

Armistice New Source of Hatred Among Peoples I ask why our people have the impression that this prolongation of the Armistice has but one aim; to impose upon us new and heavy conditions and prejudice peace. Thus the Armistice becomes a new source of distrust, of hatred between peoples, and even of despair.

By that, the Allies are preparing the way to Bolshevism. On the contrary, the German people is trying hard to repulse this Bolshevism—At this very moment the German National Assembly is sitting; it has considered as the first and most pressing of its duties to constitute a Government in conformity with the result of the elections. Germany has a democratic and parliamentary government, which personifies and warrants the will of the people to arrive without delay to a peace of reconciliation. The new government rests on a broader basis than any other government in the world.

Value of Surrendered Material The German people has been obliged to buy the Armistice and its successive prolongations until today, by enormous sacrifices. It has abandoned to you property of a huge value. You have received German war material valued at more than a billion. The value of the warships which were delivered, amounts to

more than a billion and a half. In the delivery of transportation material, Germany has gone beyond the limits of what she could do. The Prussian-Hessian State Railways alone have delivered more than two and a half billions of railway material. Up to 5 Feb. we have delivered to you 4,137 locomotives and 136,398 cars. Up to 11 Feb. 10,263 locomotives, and 216,072 cars had been turned over.

Demobilisation The demobilisation of the Army is complete. We have at our disposal in round numbers, 6,000 officers of the active army, less than in peace time in 1914. A very high percentage of the available officers is either sick or wounded. And from the discharge of the majority of the former officers of the Active Army who were mobilised, and of the reserve officers, we have released already, since the armistice, more than 200 general and field officers of the regular army, without any new promotion taking place.

As for enlisted men, at the end of February all classes will have been demobilised except one. And this class has sustained heavy losses during the campaign. If, in spite of that, the effectives and expenditures are still high, it is due on the one hand to high cost of living, and on the other to the large number of sick and wounded who are still treated in the hospitals—in round numbers, 200,000—and finally to the large number [of] unemployed soldiers, who according to regulations are still allowed to remain for four months at most on the pay roll of the troops, while looking for employment. This delay will only begin to come to an end during the following months. Enlisted men of this category are worthless in the military sense of the word; their only duties in their garrisons, and only in order to earn their salary, are solely fatigue work and guard duty. Men retained in military service are likewise, for the most part, worthless as soldiers on account of the revolution and local disorders which are still resulting.

Consequently, for the upkeep of order and the protection of the frontiers, we have been obliged to call upon volunteers. But, on the whole, they came only in small numbers. In order to allow the Government of the Empire to fulfill the duties which are absolutely necessary, it has been necessary, later on, to call back, in the eastern part of the country, men who were in their homes. The total strength

of the units which can be used is so low that it is impossible on account of its weakness, to make an extensive use of this force. Taking into account the volunteer units in course of formation, the strength (which is, however, subject to constant changes on account of their formation) can be estimated, for the present, in the following figures, figures which are likely to be modified later because of the poor system of military information.

	Strength
For the protection of the western frontier round numbers—on a line of about 600 km	10,000 men.
For the protection of the Eastern frontier, in Courland, Silesia and Saxony, about 1800 Km	100,000 men.
Inside the empire—round numbers	70,000 men.
	180,000 men.
Troops returning from Russia, in round figures	20,000 men.
(Besides isolated troops in the South-East or otherwise useless in round figures 60,000 men.)	
Total of usable men, in round figures	200,000 men

That is, one-fourth of the old German Army in peace-time. And of this strength 30 to 40% do not do real front-line service.

Repatriation of Enemy Prisoners of War The repatriation of Allied war prisoners for the west was already in progress at the time of the last negotiations for the prolongation of the armistice at Treves. The Serbian and Roumanian sick and seriously wounded were evacuated in hospital trains. The other Serbian prisoners of war have also been transported to Agram. However four of their trains had to be unloaded on German-Austrian territory owing to lack of coal. The War Ministry has immediately taken the necessary steps to insure the continuation of transportation by providing the necessary coal. The Roumanian prisoners of war will be evacuated later.

Restitution of Enemy Securities The general office of the Armistice commission, created for the prompt restitution of securities and documents according to article XIX has worked successfully since the last negotiations. Independently of the securities previously delivered, there have been returned 778,348,237.12 marks worth and 4,171,165 francs worth. The securities removed from Belgium and placed on deposit with the general war fund in Munich have been covered in lists which have been submitted. The work of the German commissioners in Brussels and in France is under way and progressing satisfactorily in agreement with the French and Belgian authorities. They have even been concluded for the most part. At Mayence, there are now being returned to France the securities paid or found which have been placed on deposit with the General War fund in Berlin and Munich, amounting in round figures to 120 boxes; a balance of two millions of local paper money (municipal bonds) is also being returned. The evacuation of the bank securities taken from France and deposited in Liege has begun during the last few days. According to the closing protocol of 1 Dec. the list has been supplied for all the works of art taken from Belgium and known at the present time. The greater part of the lists relative td works of art removed from France, has also been furnished; as regards collection of works of art themselves, the one in Brussels has been entirely delivered and a receipt has been given.

Delivery of Agricultural mechinery Thus Germany has employed all her forces to honour her engagements ensuing from the treaties. This is also true as regards the clause for delivery of agricultural machinery imposed by the treaty of 16 Jan. However, the difficulties which occur on this point cannot be overcome unless the supply of raw materials and partly manufactured products coming from the territories on the left and the right bank of the Rhine, promised by Marshal Foch on the 6th, can be assured in a large measure, if we obtain deliveries of coal from the Sarre, and if shipments from the left bank to the right bank are authorised.

Continuation of the Delivery of Locomotives Cannot Be Carried Out Within the limits which are marked out for her by the Allied powers, and by present circumstances, which create almost insurmountable difficulties, Germany has done all in her power, and has called all her

forces into play. The delivery of locomotives now under way has reduced the park of locomotives fit for service on the Prussia-Hessian railway system to such an extent that the maintenance of even the most miserable economic life is compromised. The stocks of coal for the use of the railways have been impoverished to a menacing degree. The supply for the gas plants and electric stations has failed. Owing to the impossibility of transporting the raw materials and partly manufactured products, unemployment is increasing. Our railways are completely worn out. If we go on with the delivery of engines, we may foresee with certainty an early discontinuance of the whole transport service. I do not need to explain in more detail what this means in the present situation of the coal and food supply. It is impossible to estimate the consequences. This is why no one in Germany can take the responsibility of continuing the delivery of engines. At the same time you forbid us coast navigation on the North Sea and Baltic,—a navigation which we urgently need to relieve our railways, and you maintain the blockade, which leaves us without the raw materials we need to make repairs. Nevertheless, with regard to the values in question, we wish to fulfil the obligation we have contracted. Germany will execute in an entirely loyal manner the engagements which she has assumed. But, on this point, you must allow us to make an exchange. From 600 to 700 locomotives are still missing. I declare myself ready to put at your disposal, after detailed agreement, a certain number of railroad cars in exchange, and I propose that you institute without delay a subcommission for the settlement of this question.

Restitution of captured Material In compliance with article VI of the Convention of January 16th 1919, relative to the restitution of machinery and material taken from Belgium and France, we entered into negotiations, at Spa, with the Industrial Sub-Commission of the Allies and we have fixed by a Protocol, the conditions of execution. Immediately after, the creation of a “bureau” has been undertaken at Francfort-sur-le-Mein, as contemplated in these conditions of execution. Conferences have taken place at Spa, as well as in Berlin, with the Representatives of the Allies, relative to the wording of the books of questions to be used in tracing up the machinery in question. An ordinance has been published with a view to

ascertaining the declaration, the careful keeping up and restitution of this machinery.

Delivery of the Submiarines Now that the naval clauses of the Convention of November 11th 1918 and of the first prolongation of the treaty of Armistice have been complied with in the requested time-limit, the demands formulated in the second prolongation of Armistice are being given satisfaction. Admiral Browning has recently stated his demands anew, by giving the exact indication of the various submarines. The list furnished by him, is not in accordance with the list which has been drawn up on the German side.

Consequently, a delay ensued, for which Germany is not responsible. Another delay might be caused by the fact that the situation of ice hinders the concentration of the tugs. We will fulfil our engagements as soon as possible. Admiral Browning now demands that the submarines of new construction be also delivered into English ports. We have promised the delivery of the docks for submarines and of the mine sweepers, as demanded in the Convention of January 16th. However, this delivery cannot actually be effectuated until atmospheric conditions make it possible for these ships to travel, which are not equipped for sea journeys. All the submarines which have not yet been delivered, new constructions included, will be entirely dismounted, this work is already being executed. The internment of all ships, requested by the Allies, replacement of ships included, according to English informations, has taken place at Scapa Flow. Up to the present time, the protestation made by Germany against the non-observation of the Armistice by England who has not even tried the internment into neutral ports, has received no answer.

Immediate Restitution of German Prisoners of war While Germany makes the greatest efforts to prove, in a loyal manner by the execution of the conditions which have been imposed upon her, that she is ready to make heavy sacrifices for her aspirations towards Peace, I regret to be obliged to note again, in the face of the world, that the attitude of Allied Governments always remains in contradiction with the spirit of a future of Peace. The History of the

world will record, as an example of the most extreme brutality, the fact that our prisoners of war are still pining away in the hands of the Allies. Since the beginning of negotiations relative to the Armistice, I have always requested that the restitution of the prisoners of war be considered as a measure admitting reciprocity. In a manner, incomprehensible for this German people, who has been slandered and treated as barbarous, you have taken advantage of the superiority of the forces on your side, to oblige us to send your prisoners back to you, while you were keeping ours. On my pressing request, you declared yourself ready, that is true, to recognise that the question of our prisoners' return was to be settled at the time of conclusion of preliminaries of peace. But that act of consolation has not occurred. Nobody, in Germany, could think that the preliminaries of peace would be so long delayed. On the other hand, the decision thus taken, did not prevent you from yielding to a human thought of which you consider yourself as guardians and especial protectors, and to send our prisoners back to us after you had received yours. Your prisoners have long gone back to their homes already. They are in their families and can, in the midst of those that are dear to them, resume their civilian occupations. The sentiment, natural to any man, considers as an act of barbary that, though you make for yourself a condition of armistice of the restitution of these prisoners, you would have refused to apply the same consideration to our prisoners and looked on their restitution as a condition of Peace. The records of negotiations of Armistice and Spa negotiations are full of requests, asking you to listen at last to the voice of humanity. The most we ever obtained were promises. And so, the time has come when we have lost faith in such promises. We want to see action. On no point relative to the Armistice does the German people show as feverish an emotion, as on that question of the prisoners. A wave of indignation and despair goes through the whole country. From the smallest villages from the north, south, east and west of Germany I receive daily numerous letters and telegrams from the parents of prisoners who pour out their desperate hearts in earnest and often profoundly touching words. Children cry for their fathers, wives for their husbands; aged parents have but a single desire, to see their child once more before dying. Organisations have been established to defend the cause of our prisoners of war.

Our people rightly declares that it is absurd at the approach of peace to maintain from a single side a war measure. It is only by asserting your predomination that you keep our compatriots far from their country. We have sufficient proof that a great number of them are on the way to physical and moral ruin. I ask you: Where do you obtain the moral right to expose thousands of Germans to this danger? Where do you obtain the right, at the moment when the world wishes to establish a peace of right, where it is a matter of eliminating the principle of violence from the common life of nations, to keep thousands of men, women and children far from their human attachments? The Allies must be convinced that the reconciliation is not aided by this means. The German people resents this means of barbarous constraint as it would a blow in the face. If you believe that you can inflict this disgrace upon the German people without reaction you are mistaken. The preponderance of power is at present upon your side, but in spite of that you will have to reckon and work with the German people in common if European peace is to last. Therefore I ask once more that you render aid. Return our prisoners to us at once. Deliver them from captivity, permit their depressed spirits to return to life. If you do not do it for the men do it for the children of whom there are many who no longer know their father. Do it for the women that they may anew consecrate themselves to their family, while the father takes up the task of the protection and the support of the family. Do it for the parents who, deprived of their children by the war, deplore each of the days which delays the return of their beloved children now that the noise of arms has ceased. Finally fulfil the promises by which you have awakened and at the same time deceived our hopes. Marshal, it is to you especially that I address this urgent prayer, because it is you to whom people will listen when the Allied Governments take refuge behind the fears for military order. The German people do not think of taking up war again. The German people requests by my mouth the immediate return of these prisoners of war and these civilian prisoners. A certain number of severely wounded have been returned only by the American and British Governments and these small bits are all that have been given us. But the requests for an amelioration of the lot of the civilian prisoners and prisoners of war have been refused. What will the civilized world say when it sees that not even German chaplains, doctors and nurses are permitted to visit them? History

will one day reproach you severely if you have the intention of allowing this state of affairs to continue until the conclusion of the peace preliminaries. It is not a question of criminal prisoners. Therefore give the order that the German civilian and war prisoners be liberated from all the Allied countries. First send back all the wounded and sick, the interned civilians and the war prisoners who have been in the hands of the enemy for more than 18 months, especially the fathers of families. Marshal Foch himself has designated these categories as those which inspired the most sympathy. Until their situation is decided grant to all the civilian and war prisoners an alleviation of their situation. Give them a greater liberty of movement outside the camps, until nightfall. Remunerate their labour, exactly like that of your own workmen. Abolish the postal censorship and the systematic delay in the sending of mail, for which there is no longer a military reason. Extend the rights of correspondence. Have all mail sent immediately through the occupied territories and have the sealed cars containing packages coming from Germany taken as far as the camps. Give them the same food as your own population. Give them the opportunity of buying food freely. Improve their clothing. Free them from the green uniform of those condemned to forced labour and from the stigma of the "P. G."[4] Soften the disciplinary measures for punishable acts committed up to the day of the new prolongation of the Armistice. Permit immediately the chaplains, doctors & nurses & delegates of the German Red Cross to enter the Prisoner of War camps in all the Allied countries, to restore the broken spirits of the German prisoners of war and civilians.

I have a special word to devote to the Medical personnel. Article 12 of the Geneva Convention[5] stipulates the immediate return of the doctors and of the sanitary personnel whose services are no longer necessary. Numerous members of the sanitary service are in this position, having been left with the wounded and sick in the evacuated territories. I expect this article of the Geneva Convention to be followed. The least that one can demand is that personal liberty be accorded the sanitary personnel until their repatriation. Grant them the pay and the allowances which are due them by virtue of Article XIII of the Geneva Convention and give them the freedom of postal service.

Gentlemen, I cannot leave the chapter of our prisoners of war without once more expressing the unanimous request of the whole German people. Begin the evacuation of our prisoners of war at once. At the first news appearing in the press on the subject of the renewal of the armistice manifestations have come to me as I have explained from all parts of Germany. They are summed up in the cry: "Immediate return of our prisoners of war". The German National Assembly, the legitimate spokesman of the German people adopted a resolution containing the same request. I request that the seriousness and the humane motives of this movement, with all its lasting importance, be grasped. The German people requests foremost and expects with certitude from the present negotiations that the retention by force of our prisoners of war be terminated. I can content myself neither with the assurance that this question will be considered by the Allies nor with the assurance of Marshal Foch that he will support this request to the Allied Governments. I must have the assurance that the evacuation of the German prisoners of war will commence immediately. No one with humane sentiments can demand of me that I take the responsibility of formulating another demand in this question than that which I set forth.

Closing of the Occupied Territories Since one has seen manifested in the occupied territories the effort made to deprive them of normal relations with the unoccupied territories, the German Armistice Commission has drawn attention to the serious injury to the whole German economic life which will be caused by this separation between regions important for production and consumption. Although promises have always been given us at Trèves and Luxembourg, normal relations have nevertheless not been re-established. At the last negotiations in Trèves, I remarked that the freedom of relations could not in any way endanger the safety of the Allied arms. This is especially true for the liberty of economic exchanges. The authorisations of exchanges given in cases of specie can in no wise satisfy the existing needs. It is only a general suspension of the stopping of exchange of products from the left bank to the right bank of the Rhine and vice-versa which can create the situation in which the economic life can maintain itself and attain its goal. Numerous exploitations will have to follow them shortly if there is no change. This is true of the factories of the right bank as

much as those on the left bank, according to the location of the sources of their raw materials and of the region where they send their products. Marshal Foch himself has indicated the results of the dismissal of workmen during the course of the preceding negotiations at Trèves. If it is the intention of the Entente to prevent the Bolshevist disorders and intrigues, freedom of circulation can contribute a large part. I emphasise also the detriment to the spring planting as a result of the fact that the arrival of seeds has become almost impossible. Many small market gardeners and workmen of the occupied zone must count upon the sending of small quantities of grain from the non-occupied territory. As long as these shipments of grain by postal packages are not assimilated to packages of food an unendurable situation will last. It is also necessary that the circulation of persons between the occupied regions and the non-occupied regions be rendered freer. I understand perfectly that Marshal Foch wishes to prevent the introduction of germs of Bolshevism into the Allied armies. But there is nothing to prevent guarantees against this possibility from being found. Moreover it is an indignity for a civilised people to be submitted after the end of a state of war to such restraints in its relations by railroad and by mail with the territories belonging to its country as is actually the case here. Family and business relations are rudely interrupted. The youth in the schools in certain parts of the occupied territory must needlessly lose the necessary time for their instruction, because there exists no faculty in the occupied territory where they live and because they are prevented from going to another school. These are infringements of the right of free personal disposition and find no justification in the treaty of the Armistice of November 11th. I therefore request that this unendurable state of affairs end and that the economic and postal as well as personal circulation between the occupied and the unoccupied regions be made free.

Permission of Permanent Circulation for the Members of the National Assembly I request for the Members of the National Assembly a permanent permission to travel in either direction without hindrance and I request also for them the freedom of postal relations.

(Illegible) I cannot commence these negotiations moreover without making a vigorous protest against the new excess of power on the part of the Allies, Although Marshal Foch had declared at Trèves January 16 that no owner of mechanical material bought a second time (verb left put), a certain number of directors of factories, and managers have been arrested and punished. Contrary to Marshal Foch's conception, according to which the guarantee provided by Article VI of the agreement of 11 Nov. applies only to espionage, I have succeeded, opportunely, in having this point of view applied as a guarantee covering also the buyers of machines coming from seizures in the occupied territories, and covering persons charged with the execution of liquidation procedure. I maintain this point of view, and raise a protest against the arbitrariness with which these arrests have been made. In order to avoid all pretexts of arrests, the decree above-cited was issued to obtain the restitution of the machines. You expressly assured us that there would no longer be this question of new arrests of industrial persons as soon as such a decree had been promulgated. The persons in question are innocent, and justice forbids punishing the innocent. I therefore request the immediate liberation of those who have been arrested and condemned.

(Illegible) The Allies have not ceased in their attempts to give a wide interpretation to the financial agreements arrived at, especially regarding that of 13 Dec. 18,[6] attempting to extend para. 4 of this agreement to cover all Germany. If this interpretation is desired for the said para., it can be done only on the principle of reciprocity. Moreover: this is not part of the armistice. I am ready to accept the immediate establishment of a commission to treat this question independently of the armistice. For the protection of private property is to the interest of both parties.

Alsace-Lorraine The Expulsion of Germans from Alsace-Lorraine continues. Those expulsions have meanwhile reached such a number that they justify the conception of "evacuation", even in the French acceptance of the word with which Germany cannot entirely agree. In these circumstances women are treated in a way that is truly revolting. Alsace-Lorraine throughout is hermetically sealed. In this country, the near relative of a person in the unoccupied zone may be

ill, or may die, without this person receiving the least word. Thus tragedies are taking place daily which will cause their full share of pain to the interested persons and to the whole world, but only when these barriers have once again been reopened. There is no reason for this state of things. I must raise a particularly keen protest against the fact that the French have confiscated private property of Germans (and to a large extent have put it under an organ for sequestration) in the territories occupied by them. The state of an armistice, which should be the beginning of a state of peace, furnishes no justification whatever for this measure. I raise a protest also against the fact that the National Assembly had to open without the presence of the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine to transmit the wishes of their country. The legal situation of Alsace-Lorraine is not modified by the fact of an armistice. Contrary to Germany's authorizing the Alsatians in 1871 to take part in the elections for the French National Assembly, France did not permit the elections for the German National Assembly in Alsace-Lorraine.

Defence Against the Polish Ambitions for Conquest I find myself obliged to make a most serious protest against the attitude of the Allies towards the defence of Germany against the ambitions of the Poles for conquest of certain parts of Germany.

It is unheard-of that the German authorities in the territory coveted by the Poles in the East of Germany be prevented from taking part in its public life. Such an attitude is one the [*that*] leaves a person without knowing whether to attribute it to a complete misconception of conditions in the East, or to regard it as the final straw of foreign intermeddling with the interior independence of a people. The subject of Polish intrigue and ambition is being struggled for on German soil. It is not we who are the aggressors, but the Poles, who, in Posen, have everywhere assumed the offensive militarily. The best proof of the absence of any aggressive intention on the part of Germany is the absence of any military preparation on their side. For this sole reason, the Poles were able to obtain certain successes. The menace that the Poles are developing against the most important railroad lines of the East, confirms their very broad, offensive intentions. The objection that the Poles are a bulwark against Bolshevism is rendered untenable by the fact that Polish agitation

especially in upper Silesia, but also in the provinces of the North, is working in close communion with Bolshevism. The Bolshevist agitators are, almost without exception, Poles. The Poles seem to have the intention of creating a state of general insecurity to have the pretext of intervention for the sake of re-establishing order. The German people cannot permit itself to be deprived of the right, and will not permit itself to be deprived of the right to protect itself against the insolent encroachments of the Poles on its own territory, with what forces it possesses. Germany has accepted the 14 points of Wilson, but the Allies have too. But the 11th point does not say that Germany has bound itself to stand aside inactive if the Poles attempt to appropriate by violence portions of German territory. The 11th point no more gives the right to the Allies of forbidding the German people to defend themselves from similar encroachments. The right of the German people to the undiminished possession of its entity within the framework of Wilson's points, and to defend this entity against all attacks, remains eternal and unassailable.

Retention of German Ships I raise still another protest against the fact that, among the ships used for the evacuation of French prisoners of war, the restitution of which had been guaranteed us by the Allies, 5 have been taken away from us simply without a word of explanation, and contrary to the previous assurances. The agreement regarding navigation of 17 Jan. at Trèves gives the Entente no right to seize German ships by violence.

Agreement Regarding Navigation In the Agreement regarding navigation of Trèves, the German people put at the disposition of the Entente its merchant fleet, to help the food-supply of the world, and to secure its own food-supply. The Allies have already bound themselves, in the agreement of 11 Nov., 18, to accept the duty of turning over the food necessary for Germany throughout the duration of the armistice. Since then, long negotiations have been carried on. The Germans have always repeated their request that the contractual obligations of the Allies be performed. Already three months have gone by since the 11th of November, and one month since Germany consented to put her fleet in the general "pool" of the world. Throughout this period, and up to today, the German people

have not had the benefit of one gram of food, of fats, or of milk, more than they formerly had.

German Assistance to the United States Do not make it too difficult for the German people to appease its hunger for bread and for work. In 1862–65, during and for some time after the Civil War, the United States of North America found themselves in a position similar to states that of Germany to-day. At this time, American exchange was at 30–40% (greenbacks) and American 6% loans at 48–50%.

England was on the side of the "Confederates" (the South). Then it was that Germany came to the help of the United States giving them not only money, but also clothes, shoes, machines, etc. and making possible their economic recovery. To-day, 50 years later, the facts are reversed. Germany needs America to furnish her grain, fats, meat, oil, cotton, copper, and her own exchange has fallen. If the United States would to-day come to the aid of Germany as she came to their aid 56 years ago, they could furnish food and raw materials against German loans, and thus permit Germany to reconstruct itself by its own work, and could pull a good deal in the bargain.

Food Gentlemen, Germany can no longer live on the assurances that are offered her, nor can she live on long drawn-out negotiations in which more or less large figures are cited which make her mouth water. Here too I request Action. The German people are tired of always making gifts. At present they want to hear from the other side of the bargain. In the widest circles, Germans ask themselves with justice: "What do the Allies want of us?" We make sacrifice after sacrifice, and in giving up our goods we are reaching the very limit of poverty. We do not want the food that we need as gifts; we want to buy it. Nevertheless its delivery is always postponed more and more, and we are suffering from hunger. If the Entente wishes to annihilate us, it at least ought not to exact us to dig our own grave. Physicians have recently published the statistics of the victims of the blockade and of hunger. These figures had been hidden from the public during the war. They amount to hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, dead of lack of nourishment, or of diseases resulting from the lessening of their powers of resistance. You have in your hands the means of putting an end to this horrible state of affairs.

Immediate Deliveries in the City of Paris After the Armistice in 1871
In this connection, I appeal to you, sir. When the Franco-German armistice was concluded 48 years ago, Jules Favre—on the 28th January 1871—laid before Bismarck frankly the situation of the food-supply of Paris, which he had carefully concealed up to that moment: Paris had bread for only a few days longer. Bismarck was visibly moved; he immediately granted all imaginable facilities to bring about the arrival of transportation, and he offered Favre all the available food in the German stores. Favre recognised this fact with gratitude, and said: "If the Prussians had not given us flour, we should have died of hunger."

Then it was ourselves who had the greater power. At present it is you who hold it. Make a good use of your power. Use it in such a way that you can stand before the conscience of the world after the lapse of several generations. For all power gives an eternal responsibility. Remember that hunger gives birth to destructive bacilli. Remember that if these bacilli develop and propagate themselves, the greatest dangers will arise for your own people as well. Despair is the mother of Bolshevism. It is a disease of physical and moral hunger. The best remedy is bread and justice. You have the same interest as ourselves in relieving the world from the disease of hunger with the least possible danger. Then bring it about that the German people may finally participate in the food-supply of the world which you hold in your hands. Give us too our inalienable right, guaranteed by you as well, to a peace of reconciliation among peoples. Those who sow hatred among peoples, reap Bolshevism.

Peace Once again the appeal of the German people for the conclusion of peace has remained without echo. For four years and more the world has lived bearing an enormous weight on its moral and material powers of resistance. You desire rest and work, you people as well as the German people. If the striving toward peace shows itself with more force and intensity among us, this is because of the formidable exhaustion of the forces of our people. Do you desire the complete reduction of the German people, who has just now entered in the ranks of democracies under its new form of existence? The chariot of the world cannot drive onward if one of its horses pulls with force and vigour, while the other is exhausted and limps. It is

only when the civilised Nations are together, side by side, almost in step, that the common happiness of all peoples is to be found. Renounce your policy of using force without scruples; think how such a policy is bound to have its cruel punishment in the life of peoples, as it has in the life of individuals. Violence is a weak foundation for the life of peoples. The German people has gone sufficiently far on the road of sacrifices and of suffering. The cry of indignation caused by the numerous severe conditions that you have imposed on us, rings as well in your ears. If you do not wish to hear these cries of pain, you are sinning against the happiness of the entire world, even against your own people. The first duty of the conqueror is to grant the peace that is requested.—However, for what will soon be 5 months, this obligation has not been fulfilled by you, but this war without the spilling of blood has gone on with new victims. I serve you notice.—

Annexure "B"

[*Additional Armistice Convention, Signed February 16, 19119*]

(Translation)

CONVENTION

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, Admiral Wemyss being replaced by Admiral Browning, Major General von Winterfeldt being replaced by Major General von Hammerstein and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberndorff by Minister Plenipotentiary von Haniel given the powers in virtue of which the armistice convention of 11 November was signed, have concluded the following additional convention:

I

The Germans must immediately cease all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of Posen or in any other region. With this end in view their troops are forbidden to cross:

The line: former frontier of East Prussia and of West Prussia with Russia, as far as Luisenfelde, then from this point the line west of Luisenfelde, west of Gross Neudorff, south of Brzoze, north of Schubin, north of Exin, east of Samoczin, south of Chodziensen, north of Czarnikow, west of Mialla, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawicz, south of Krotoszyn, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Vieruchov, then the frontier of Silesia.

II

The armistice of 11 November prolonged by the conventions of 13 December 1918 and 16 January 1919, until 17 February 1919, is again prolonged for a short period without date of expiration, to which the Allied and associated powers reserve the right to put an end after a notice of three days.

III

The execution of the clauses of the convention of 11 November and of the additional conventions of 13 December and 16 January incompletely realised, will be carried on and finished during the prolongation of the armistice under conditions the details of which will be fixed by the Permanent Armistice Commission, according to the instructions of the High Command of the Allies.

Signed: **F. Foch**
M. E. Browning
Erzberger
Von Haniel
Von Hammerstein
Vanselow

Trèves , 16 February, 1919.

[1] For text, see vol. II, p. 1.
[2] Vol. II, p. 11.
[2] Vol. II, p. 11.
[4] Abbreviation for “prisonnier de guerre.”

[5] Red Cross convention of 1906 for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded of the armies, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1024

[6] Vol. II, p. 541.

February 18, 3 p.m. (BC–35)

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[3] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 18th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 18, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/42

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/42

BC–35

[Document 3]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 18th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 18, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
The Hon. R. Lansing
The Hon. H. White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G.

Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. Lunt
Mr. Dulles
Maj. D. W. Johnson

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Colonel Heywood
Mr. A. Leeper

FRANCE
General Alby

ITALY
M. de Martino
M. Galli

FOR THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES
M. Patchitch
M. Vesnitch
M. Trumbitch

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Dr. Zolger

Secretary

M. Vosniak

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier
ITALY	Major A. Jones
JAPAN	M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) M. CLEMENCEAU in opening the meeting asked the Serbian Delegation to make its statement.

Statement of Case for Yugo-Slavia: (a) Causes of the Great War M. VESNITCH said that he must begin by an apology. It had not, up to the present, been possible to supply the Conference with a full memorandum. There were certain difficulties due to distance, bad communications, etc., which had rendered this impossible. A memorandum giving general considerations had been supplied. Separate memoranda of a more technical order would be prepared subsequently.

In order to present the problem fully he wished first to draw the attention of the meeting to the origin of the war. This question had been dealt with publicly, but nevertheless he felt it must again be asserted before the Conference that the real cause of the war was the German tendency to expand towards Asia Minor and thereby to acquire dominion of the world. In its road this movement encountered a number of obstacles, the first of which was the Yugoslav people. Hence it was decided in Berlin and Vienna that this should be the first fortress to be taken.

(b) Eastward Trend of German Policy The time-honoured German policy was well-known. Since 1848 and especially since 1878 Vienna under the direction of Berlin had sought to bring under its rule all the Serbians not yet included in the Dual Monarchy. This policy had involved the Great Powers. Since 1848, Great Britain, France and Italy had struggled to preserve the peace of Europe. One stage on this road to the East had been marked by the absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another critical moment was the Balkan War. Serbia issued from it victorious and became the centre of attraction for all the Yugo-Slav peoples. The enthusiasm shown in Bosnia, Croatia, Slavonia and the Banat was even greater than that in Serbia proper. This had been carefully noted at the Ballplatz, where it was decided that the future must be secured as early as possible. This also was incontestably the reason which had rendered futile all the efforts of the Liberal Powers of Europe to find a peaceful diplomatic issue with the nations of Central Europe. The latter were determined to overcome the obstacle and to set forward on their march Eastwards in the quickest possible time. It had been impossible to stop them—hence the Great War.

(c) Action of Yngo-Slars in the War The Yugo-Slav troops of the Dual Monarchy from the very first day of the war began to hamper the purposes of the Central Powers. When other means failed, they surrendered in large numbers on the Russian and Serbian fronts, and at a later stage, on the Italian front. They felt that this was a war of extermination for their people. Encouraged by the promises made by the Great Liberal Powers, especially by the declaration that the war was waged for the liberation of oppressed peoples, they had contributed by every means in their power to the victory of the Allies.

They were now inspired by the confident hope that their expectations of the fulfilment of the promises made by the victorious Allies would not be disappointed, and they felt that their services to the common cause had earned recognition.

(d) Principles for Which the Allies faught Since the very beginning of the war the Great Liberal Powers, France, Great Britain, and with them Russia, had proclaimed that they were not fighting for individual national advanteges, but for certain principles. These principles were stated publicly and solemnly and were the three great principles of (1) Nationality, (2) the right of self-determination, and (3) freedom of the small Nations. After the signature of the first Armistice, M. Clemenceau, when welcoming the delegates of all the Allied Powers, had said that from that moment there was no difference between great and small nations, as the small nations had been as great as the greatest during the war. He wished to recall this expression to make clear the difference between the principles of the Allied Powers and those of the Central Powers. Before the war there had been a conversation between Herr Von Jagow[1] and M. Jules Cambon.[2] The former had declared that there was no more room in the world for small nations. This was fully in accord with the feelings of his nation. What M. Clemenceau had expressed to the Allies was the principle which had encouraged the Nations to group themselves and to bring about the triumph of something far higher than the self-interest of individual nations. It was in accordance with this spirit that the peace of Europe and the League of Nations must be brought about.

(e) Attitude To wards Secret Treaties Adhering to this spirit, the delegation he represented regarded the right of self-determination as an inviolable right. It could not recognise any treaty, public or secret doing violence to these principles, proclaimed by the Allies and latterly endorsed by the United States of America. The Delegation he represented therefore regarded as null and void any agreement disposing of the Yugo-Slav people without its consent. He felt obliged to make this declaration in the name of his Government and of his colleagues present in the room. Had he not made it, he would have betrayed his obligation to the Yugo-Slav people. It was not in the habits of this people to sing its own praises, but it must be declared

that if this people had endured martyrdom to assist the Allies, it was because their leaders had assured them that these sufferings were absolutely necessary, that it was probably the last effort required of them, and that the open declarations of the Great Allied Powers were a complete guarantee of the future. The leaders of the people had made themselves responsible for the execution of these promises. The Yugo-Slav people, through them, had put complete trust in the Powers whom he now begged to do nothing which might cause disappointment to the legitimate hopes aroused, and thereby sow the seeds of future deplorable conflict.

(e) [*sic*] Question of Future Frontiers of Yugo-slavia M. Vesnitch continuing, said that, if it was in order, he would approach the subject of the future frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. The Yugo-Slav people was in a peculiar situation. It had to delimit its territory with six or seven nations. On a former occasion explanations had been given concerning the problem to be solved with a friendly country. In tracing the boundaries separating them from enemy countries it was likely that no great difficulties would arise. But there was another friendly country with which there were problems to discuss. The Delegation would ask that it should be treated on a footing of equality with its Italian friends. He felt that in making this request he was not exceeding the limits of his rights and his duties. He hoped that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider this fair and practical and likely to ensure good understanding between two countries which were to be neighbours, and between which it was desirable that no germ of discord should arise.

(f) Southern Frontier M. Vesnitch explained, with the help of a map, what he proposed should be the future frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. On the south the boundary marched with that of Greece. It was not proposed in any way to alter the boundary laid down by the Peace of Bucharest.[3]

(g) Eastern Frontier On the east the frontier was to be determined with Bulgaria. The behaviour of the Bulgarians towards the Serbians, even before they entered the war, was well-known, hence certain alterations of frontier were demanded.

(h) Northeastern Frontier The Yugo-Slav arguments concerning the boundary to be drawn in the Banat had been heard on a previous occasion. Failing all other means of settlement, the Delegation for which he spoke was ready to allow the populations to make a free choice of allegiance. He would like to point out that all invasions of Servia throughout history had come from that quarter. The latest examples furnished in the course of the late war were enough to prove his point. There were also ethnological, geographical and economic reasons. The divisions of the country made for administrative purposes by the common enemies of Serbia and Roumania were evidence in his favour. No less well-wishing judges could be found than the Magyars towards the Serbian people, nevertheless the division of the country made by them showed the Serbs to be in the majority.

(i) Northern Frontier In the North the Delegation proposed a frontier which corresponded not only to ethnic, but to geographical realities.

Dr. Zolger, continuing, explained that the proposed boundary with the Germans and Magyars was drawn in such a way as to include all the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes along the Drave. The frontier would not accord with the results of the Austrian census. This census could not be trusted. It did not record nationality, but professed to record the spoken language of the people. Workmen serving German employers and communicating with them in German would be represented as Germans. Even German authorities admitted that this method was deliberately devised in order to favour Germanisation. The Delegation therefore proposed to neglect the Austrian census and pin its faith to certain other means of obtaining information. Among these he would cite the ecclesiastical parish registers published yearly, showing the language used in the parish for confessional purposes. The language to which it was necessary to resort to spread the Gospel must be the spoken language of the people. A hundred villages shown in the Austrian census as German were proved by the parish registers to speak Slovene. There were other documents which might be consulted such as the census of 1849–51. This census had been conducted in a less partial manner than its successor, for since 1870 the Pan-German idea had become the official doctrine of the Central Governments.

(j) German Attempt to Reach the Adriatic In pursuance of this doctrine the most consistent efforts had been made to establish German contact with the Adriatic. In this process the Slovenes had fared perhaps worse than any other Yugo-Slav nation. The process had begun in the 18th Century. The danger had been realised by Napoleon, who had set up the Illyrian Province after the peace of Schoenbrunn,[4] comprising all Slovene lands, to block the way from Vienna to the Adriatic and to guard the road to the East.

(k) Claims in Carinthia The frontier suggested in Carinthia gave to Yugo-Slavia certain areas in which the Slovenes were not a majority in the population. The justification of this was the forcible germanisation practised since 1850. Dr. Zolger drew attention to a work called "The Vilayet of Carinthia",[5] published before the war. In this work it was shown that every means had been adopted of destroying Slovene nationality and the Slovene language. For instance, all writers, even the Germans, admitted that Celovec (Klagenfurt), was in 1850, two-thirds Slovene. At the present time the Slovenes were in the minority. This had been brought about by the educational policy forced on the country. Children were only taught the Gothic script. Where there had been a hundred Slovene schools, there were now but three. From all branches of the public service Slovenes had been extruded. The last Slovene judge died some ten years ago. The last Slovene notary was removed during the war. Barristers were not allowed to plead before the Courts in Slovene. Only one Slovene Deputy was sent to the Reichsrat, though on the population basis there should have been three. The people were afraid of speaking their own language, and a man had been arrested for demanding a ticket at a railway station in Slovene. The war had been used to give the death blow to Slovene life in Carinthia. It was therefore fair to say that the reduction of the Slovene element was not a process of natural evolution, but the work of a deliberate and forcible policy, carried out in contempt of all morality and law. In fixing the frontier between Yugo-Slavia and German Austria, the result of this policy should not be perpetuated. Wherever it was possible to show that 50 years previously the Slovenes had been in possession, he claimed that they should have ownership restored to them. The frontier suggested would be some compensation to the Yugo-Slav people for their losses in the long struggle with

Germanism. He would point out that in the course of centuries the Slovenes had lost not only part of Carinthia and Styria, but also the Eastern Tyrol and Lower Austria. Wherever it was possible to establish an ethnic claim, he thought that it should be admitted.

(l) Western Frontier M. TRUMBITCH said that in the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he would place before the meeting briefly, the claims made on the subject of the western frontier, and he would explain the grounds on which the claims were based.

The area in question was that part of the ancient Austro-Hungarian monarchy situated on the Adriatic Sea or gravitating towards it, and inhabited by a Yugo-Slav population. As had been repeatedly proclaimed in public manifestations by official representatives of the people, the territorial claims were based on the rights of nationalities and on the principle of self-determination. It was on this basis that the new state laid claim to countries, the population of which was of Yugo-Slav nationality, desiring to enter into the community of that State. In a general way it must be observed that from the point of view of spoken language and national sentiment, the whole Adriatic Coast of the former Austria-Hungary from Monfalcone as far as Spizza was inhabited by Yugo-Slavs, in a compact and continuous mass. The whole countryside and hinterland of this coast, with the sole exception of five Italian villages north of Pola, were Yugo-Slav. In most of the towns the Slav element was in the majority, save in some isolated towns such as Gorizia, Trieste, towns on the Western shore of Istria, Lussin, Fiume, and Zara, where the Italian element predominated. The Italian element, therefore, represented enclaves or oases in Slav surroundings, without any national continuity binding it to the Italian peninsula.

The Yugo-Slav majority had always been oppressed. This had been its fate during more than four centuries of Venetian domination. The Slav element, deprived of all national rights, was unable under that rule to obtain any school in its own language whether in the towns or in the villages. Nevertheless, Venetian domination had not succeeded in Italianising any area, and only left behind it along the Adriatic coast a few families and some vestiges of the Venetian dialect, as was

the case also in the islands of the Ionian Sea and of the Aegean Sea, where the Venetian Republic had once ruled.

Austria in this province had continued to apply the system she found there. The Austrian regime was anti-democratic, based on the division of classes and nationalities in respect to civil and political rights. Hence, the Yugo-Slav element had always been oppressed and systematically neglected, while the Italian element in the towns received privileges. When, in 1907, universal suffrage was introduced throughout Austria, the first elections showed that the Yugo-Slav element was much stronger than appeared on the surface. The national revival of the Yugo-Slav masses began after the introduction of the constitution in 1861. It was then that the political struggle began between the Yugo-Slav and Italian elements. The Yugo-Slav population, being democratic, had struggled for the freedom of their language and political and social rights. In this struggle the Yugo-Slavs, day by day, obtained further successes and made progress in the acquisition of those rights.

Turning to the application of the principles of nationality and of the right of self-determination, he wished to refer to the regions now under consideration. For greater clearness, he would first mention the regions of the Adriatic Coast from Cape Promontore along the Eastern coast of Istria, past Fiume (Rjeka) and along the remainder of the Croatian coast-line, the Dalmatian coast as far as Spizza (the Southern frontier of Dalmatia), and all Quarnero and Dalmatian islands which, from every point of view, formed an integral part of this coast.

The coast-line just described was almost exclusively inhabited by Yugo-Slavs, both as regards hamlets and villages and most of the towns. There were sporadic groups of Italian-speaking inhabitants in certain towns, but their number was so small that this factor would have no influence whatever on the national character of such coast-line and islands.

The Yugo-Slav population, which formed the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants, had a high regard for its national unity and was imbued with the unshakeable desire to remain within the bounds of

their State as already constituted. Wherefore, in the name of the principle of nationality, they begged that this entire coastline, with its islands, should be joined to their State.

It had to be remembered that all these regions were poor and incapable of development apart from the State of which their Hinterland would form a part. All the national, economic and commercial life of the majority of the provinces of their State gravitated towards the coast—i. e. of Croatia-Slavonia, Backa, the Banat, Northern Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Montenegro, all of whose existing roads and railways led to the sea. The islands on their coast sold all their export produce to the coast towns.

Austria's economic policy did not allow railways to be built in this transverse direction, as would have been to the interests of these regions, but commercial routes were created longitudinally from North to South, with the idea of penetration into the Balkans. It would be the duty of their State to alter this entirely and to build transverse roads and railways which would contribute to the development of commercial relations beyond the sea and primarily with Italy.

The only commercial railway was that which, starting from Fiume, crossed Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hungary. It was built by the Hungarian Government with money belonging to the common Hungaro-Croatian State, at the time when (by falsifying the laws of 1868) Fiume was torn from the Croatians. This port was, therefore, even now the only commercial access to the sea for all these regions, which could not develop normally without Fiume.

To-day, when the Peace Conference was concerned with guaranteeing commercial outlets to the sea even to nations having no direct access thereto, it would be incomprehensible if an attempt were made to take from their nation the ports situate in its territory and on its own coast-line. For these reasons they requested that the whole of the coast-line, including the islands already referred to, might be acknowledged to form part of their State.

The provinces of Gorizia, Gradisca, Trieste with its suburbs, and the Western portion of Istria were situated in the basin of the Upper Adriatic.

The province of Gorizia-Gradisca was composed of two parts, totally different both from the national and economic points of view The Western part, which extended as far as the line Cormons-Gradisea-Monfalcone, had its own life and constituted an economic unity. According to the language spoken in this region, it contained 72,000 Italians and 6,000 Slovenes, whilst from the geographical point of view it was simply a prolongation of the Venetian plain. As these territories, called the Frioul, belonged according to the principle of nationality to the Italian nation, they did not claim them in any way. The remainder of that province, to the East and North of the line Cormons-Gradisca-Monfalcone, which included the mountainous region, was inhabited by 148,500 Slovenes and 17,000 Italians, 14,000 of whom formed half the population of the town of Gorizia. This town was the economic and intellectual centre of that region.

The Slovenes were a highly cultured people and possessed a deeprooted consciousness of their national unity with the other Yugo-Slav peoples, and they therefore demanded that this country be united with their State.

Geographically, the town of Trieste and its immediate surroundings formed an integral part of territories which, beyond these limits, were purely Slav. The majority of the population of the said town was Italian—two-thirds, according to statistics—the remainder being Slavs. The Slav element played an important part in the commercial and economic life of Trieste. Furthermore, if national continuity with Italy prevailed in Trieste, they would recognise the rights of the majority in the name of the principle of nationality; but the entire Hinterland of Trieste was purely Slav, and 20 kilometres of Slav coast separated the said town from Italian territory. The question of Trieste had, however, to be considered firstly from the point of view of its commercial and maritime importance. Commercially, Trieste was a world port. Its trade was linked with its Hinterland, which stretched as far as Bohemia, and in particular with its Slovene Hinterland, which absorbed one-third of the total trade of Trieste.

Trieste was dependent on its Hinterland, and vice versa. Should Trieste become annexed to Italy, it would be separated politically from its commercial Hinterland, which separation would of necessity prove detrimental to its trade. Since the collapse of Austria as a sovereign Power, the natural solution of the problem of Trieste lay in its reunion with their State, and that was what they now asked for.

The population of Istria was partly Slavonic and partly Italian. According to the latest statistics there were 223,318 Yugo-Slavs and 147,417 Italians, the Slavs inhabiting Central and Eastern Istria in a compact mass. There were a few isolated Italian groups in certain small towns. Judging from the vast majority of the population Central and Eastern Istria were essentially Slav.

The Italian population was most numerous on the Western Coast of Istria, chiefly in the towns, where it occupied only five villages North of Pola. These were the only Italian-speaking villages on the entire Adriatic Coast from Monfalcone as far as Spizza. The Slavs constituted part of the population of some coast towns and of all the remaining villages. Thus the Italian sections of the population could claim no territorial unity. For these reasons, and also because the Istrian peninsula was united geographically with Carniola and Croatia, whilst separated from Italy by the Adriatic, it followed that this peninsula should be recognised as part of their State—which was what they now demanded.

Generally, it should be noted that none of the regions on the Adriatic coast between Monfalcone and Spizza had any vital interests in common with Italy, but rather with their regions, with which they were geographically united. This most important argument should be taken into consideration when this problem was being settled.

After concluding his statement, M. Trumbitch said he would like to add a few words about the population statistics of the areas mentioned. These statistics were made under Austrian rule by the communal authorities. In most cases where the population was partly Italian and partly Yugo-Slav, the communal authorities were Italian. In these cases, consequently, the statistics could not be accused of bias in favour of the Yugo-Slavs.

(At this stage the Delegation withdrew.)

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU said that a request had reached him that M. Tchaikowski of the Archangel Government, should be heard by the Council. He thought it might be of interest at the next meeting to hear a statement by M. Tchaikowski on the state of Northern Russia.

Agenda for Conversation: (a) Question of Statement by M. Tchaikowski MR. BALFOUR said that he did not wish to object, but he would like to know whether this was part of a systematic endeavour to obtain evidence from all parts of Russia, or was it merely a suggestion that M. Tchaikowski should be heard because he happened to be in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there were two or three Russians in Paris, who might have interesting statements to make, for instance, there was M. Sazonoff. In his case, however, there might be some objection, lest it be alleged that the Conference was conspiring with Tsarism.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought some investigation should be carried out, but in accordance with a settled plan.

MR. LANSING agreed, as he thought there was a danger that only one part of the evidence would be heard.

M. PICHON pointed out that M. Tchaikowski belonged to the same group as M. Sazonoff; in fact, the request that M. Tchaikowski should be heard was signed by both of them.

MR. BALFOUR said that on reflection he thought it was perhaps inopportune to accord a hearing to representatives of Governments which had refused our invitation to proceed to Prinkipo.

MR. LANSING observed that as the Council was in the midst of considering its Russian policy, it should avoid the suggestion that its decisions had been influenced by any one party in Russia.

M. SONNINO proposed that the military advisers should be heard first and the policy could then be devised. After that, the Council could

consider whether certain Russians should be allowed to make statements. He suggested that the request made by M. Tchaikowski should be adjourned.

(It was decided that the question of hearing a statement by M. Tchaikowski or any other representative of a Russian Government should be adjourned.)

(b) Procedure Regarding Yugo-Slav Claims MR. BALFOUR said that the Council had now heard the evidence of the Yugo-Slavs. Similar evidence had been heard from other nationalities, and in most cases the problems raised had been referred for examination to a Committee without power to decide on solutions, but with a Commission to report on the facts. In the case of the Yugo-Slav statement, he admitted that there were difficulties, especially by reason of the treaty commitments of some of the Powers present. He wished to ask what should now be done. Was the matter to be left just as it was?

M. SONNINO said that the subject was a difficult one. He wished to be quite frank. Italy could not take part in any Commission or in any discussion outside the Conference, or allow any Committee to make recommendations, regarding questions outstanding between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs. He would also oppose any Committee which was to examine collectively all questions raised by the statements heard that day. The question between the Yugo-Slavs and the Roumanians was already being sifted by a Committee. To this he had no objection.

MR. BALFOUR then asked Baron Sonnino to state what procedure he did recommend. He understood that Baron Sonnino would raise no objection to a Committee on the subject of the Northern and Eastern frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. But he would refuse to be a party to any discussion of the frontiers between Italy and Yugo-Slavia outside the Conference. He would point out that the object of a Committee was to furnish the Council with facts, in order that the Council should be in a position to discuss the matter with full knowledge.

BARON SONNINO said that each Delegation was accompanied by its experts and he felt quite sure that at least eight members of the

Council must have already consulted them.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Baron Sonnino whether he raised no objection to the formation of a Committee to investigate the other frontiers claimed by the Yugo-Slavs.

M. SONNINO said that he raised none, provided that the questions pending between Italy and Yugo-Slavia were excluded.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a Committee should be set up and that the Dalmatian Coast should be excluded from the terms of reference. He thought it impossible to entrust this question to any Committee or Commission, by reason of the commitments of the Powers and certain difficult political aspects of the question. This question resembled that of the Rhine, which also could not be entrusted to a Committee. Such questions must be dealt with in the Council, which was not ill-supplied with the necessary statistics. In this matter, therefore, he agreed with Baron Sonnino. He proposed to name a Committee to deal with the problems raised, with the exception of those pending between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs.

MR. BALFOUR then read the following draft resolution:—

> "It is agreed:—
>
> That the questions raised in the statements by MM. Vesnitch, Zolger and Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbian Delegation on the Serbian territorial interests in the peace settlement (excepting only the question in which Italy is directly concerned) shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee similar to that which is considering the question of the Banat.
>
> It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.
>
> The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

MR. LANSING suggested that this question be referred to the same Committee as was dealing with the Banat.

M. PICHON said that some of the questions raised were different to the one under discussion in that Committee. It might, however, be convenient that the Committee on these other questions should be composed of the same members.

BARON SONNINO said that he supported Mr. Lansing's proposal as questions of reciprocal concession might arise.

(It was therefore decided that the above Resolution be adopted and that the Committee be the same as that appointed to deal with the Banat) (See I. C. 130)[6]

Interval in Conversations M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that there should be no meeting on the following day as he wished to devote the whole day to thought on the Russian question.

(This was agreed to.)

(3) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he found some difficulty in fixing the Agenda for the next meeting. In addition to the military questions pending with Germany there was the Russian problem.

Questions for Future Discussion: (a) Morocco Among other questions that might be raised was that concerning Morocco.

MR. BALFOUR asked in what manner this question concerned the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it involved an agreement with Germany which France wished to revise. France desired to abolish some of the stipulations of the Treaty of Algeciras.[7] He did not mean to raise any question as between France and Spain.

M. PICHON pointed out that eleven Powers had signed the Treaty of Algeciras. Its reconsideration would, therefore, affect them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish to surprise the meeting and would give full time for each delegation to reflect on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR said that there remained a subject of some interest, that of Schleswig Holstein. This was not like other questions, as it concerned a neutral.

(b) Schleswig Holstein M. PICHON observed that before discussing the Danish question he must ascertain whether the Danes had any representative in Paris ready to defend his case. He pointed out that the question of the Aaland Islands which would have to be discussed also involved neutrals.

(c) Albania BARON SONNINO said that the Albanian question still remained to be discussed. There were also the Armenians of the Erivan Republic. (d) Erivan Republic

(4) MR. LANSING said that he wished to ask informally whether in the opinion of the Council it would be wise to send an Inter-Allied Commission to Syria. Question of Inter-Allied commission to Syria

(This question was postponed.)

(5) SIR ROBERT BORDEN said it had occurred to him that possibly time might be saved if the Council made up its mind what questions could suitably be sent to Committees in anticipation Committees of hearing statements. A list of such questions might discussion in be established beforehand and thereby in each instance a meeting of the Council might be saved. Reference to Committee Before Discussion in Council

Mr. LANSING observed that this had been discussed before the departure of President Wilson. It had been thought that many delegations anxious to make statements would be dissatisfied if referred direct to Committees.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that his suggestion only had in view the saving of time. In the same order of ideas he would suggest that statements reduced to writing should not be read aloud before the Council.

(6) MR. BALFOUR submitted the following list of questions which it would be necessary to discuss:— List of Subjects Awaiting Discussion

Schleswig Holstein.
The Baltic Provinces.
Poland (Delimitation).
Luxemburg.
Albania.
Zionism.
Armenia.
The report of the Economic Drafting Committee.

BARON SONNINO suggested the hearing of the Persian statement.

(a) Persian Statement MR. BALFOUR pointed out that as Persia was not a belligerent the case did not arise.

(b) Recognition of Polish Government M. CLEMENCEAU said that another item on the list should be the question of recognising the Polish Government.

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that at the following meeting the question of the recognition of the Polish Government and the question of Danish claims in Schleswig Holstein should be discussed. Agenda for Following Meeting

(This was agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, February 19th, 1919.

[1] Gottlieb E. G. von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1913 to 1916.
[2] French Ambassador at Berlin from 1907 to 1913.
[3] For the text of the treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 1913, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

[4] G. F. Martens, *Nouveau recueil de traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve*, vol. I, p. 210.

[5] Apparently a reference to the book entitled *Aus dem Wilajet Kärnten* (Klagenfurt, 1913).

[6] BC–20, vol. III, p. 851.

[7] General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras, April 7, 1906, *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

February 21, 3 p.m. (BC–36)

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[4] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 21st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/43

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/43

BC–36

[Document 4]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 21st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
The Hon. R. Lansing
Mr. H. White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Mezes
Dr. Day
Dr. Haskins

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Lt. Col. Cornwall
Mr. Akers-Douglas

FRANCE
M. Klotz } For Items
M. Clementel } 2, 3 and 4 only.

ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi
M. de Martino
Count Vannutelli-Rey

DANISH DELEGATION PRESENT FOR QUESTION 5

M. de Bearn

M. Bernhoft, Minister for Denmark in Paris

M. Clausen, Attaché, Danish Embassy, Paris

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino

H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi

M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino

H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN	M. Saburi

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

1. On the proposal of MR. LANSING, Mr. Pichon was asked to take the chair during the temporary absence of M. Clemenceau.

Election of Chairman M. PICHON, having thanked his colleagues for the honour conferred upon him, said that he had seen M. Clemenceau a few hours ago. He was progressing very satisfactorily and hoped to be able to take his place at the Conference on Monday next. Though this might not be possible, his return could, nevertheless, be expected shortly.

2. The first question to be discussed related to the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania, and he would call on M. Tardieu, the

Chairman of the Committee on Rumanian Affairs, to make a report.

Report From the Rumanian committee on Transylvania M. TARDIEU said that the Committee on Rumanian Affairs had reached the conclusion that the question of Transylvania should be referred back to the Conference for settlement, for the following reasons. When the General Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the East had signed the Armistice with Hungary,[1] Rumania had not yet re-entered the war and no reason had then existed for fixing a definite line of occupation between Rumania and Hungary. Hungarian troops, therefore, remained in occupation of Transylvania. These troops had been accused by M. Bratiano, in a report dated 9th February, 1919, of having committed acts of cruelty; and, consequently, Rumanian troops had moved forward with the intention of occupying the whole of that region up to the line fixed by the Treaty of 1916.[1a] On February 14th, 1919, General Franchet d'Esperey had cabled that the Rumanian troops were continuing their advance into Transylvania and had already reached the line:—Maramaros-Sziget, Zilak, Czucza, Nagy-Szebecs, Zam.

Now, the final frontiers of Rumania had not yet been fixed by the Committee on Rumanian Affairs, who were still engaged in studying that question. But, owing to the advance of the Rumanians, it was possible that serious conflicts might take place at any moment between the Rumanian and Hungarian troops; an incident which would be doubly regrettable, seeing that the question in conflict was now under consideration. The Committee, therefore, had considered it expedient to report the situation to the Conference in order to avoid any conflict taking place in that region, and a proposal had been submitted four days' previously, suggesting:—

(1) The fixation of two lines at a certain distance from each other beyond which the Hungarian and Rumanian troops should not be permitted to advance, and
(2) The establishment of a neutral zone between the two proposed lines, to be occupied by Allied troops with a view to preventing the spreading of Bolshevism, which was prevalent in Hungary.

During the last two days, the Committee had received reports from General Alby, the French Chief of Staff, and from the military advisers of the Italian Peace Delegation in Paris. M. Bratiano had also forwarded a note on the subject, and in addition, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d'Esperey, had just returned from those regions and submitted a report on the situation. Taking these facts into consideration, it was thought by the Committee that the military advisers of the Conference should be asked to fix the lines of extreme occupation above referred to and decide whether or not the intervening neutral zone should be occupied by Allied troops, in view of maintaining order against possible Bolshevist attempts.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether M. Tardieu's Committee had heard any military experts on the question under reference.

M. TARDIEU replied in the negative, and explained that the Committee had merely read General Alby's report. They had purposely refrained from obtaining military advice, as the Committee might thereby have been led into a discussion of purely military questions, which were outside the terms of reference.

MR. BALFOUR enquired how order would be maintained in the neutral zone if a neutral zone were constituted. Was that purely a military question?

M. TARDIEU replied that in principle the maintenance of order in a neutral zone was not purely a military question, and for that reason the Committee had enquired into the matter. It had, however, been found that all sorts of military questions were involved—for instance: were Allied troops available for the occupation of the neutral zone? For that reason it had been decided to refer the question back to the Conference.

LORD MILNER enquired whether it was intended that the question should be referred for report to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

M. TARDIEU replied that that was the intention of the Committee.

(It was decided to refer to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the questions raised in the following recommendation made by the Committee on Rumanian Affairs on February 17th, 1919:—

> "The Commission on Rumanian Affairs beg to draw the attention of the Supreme Allied Council to the following situation:—
>
> (1) General Franchet d'Esperey sent a wire dated February 14th, 1919, saying that the Rumanian troops were continuing their advance into Transylvania and had already reached the line Maramaros-Sziget, Zilak, Czucza, Nagy-Szebecs, Zam.
> (2) The Rumanian Government (letter from M. Bratiano to the President of the Peace Conference dated February 9th) justifies such advance by the acts of cruelty committed by the Hungarians in that region.
> (3) The Commission on Rumanian Affairs is at the present time studying the line to be drawn as a frontier between Rumania and Hungary, and wishes that no armed conflicts should take place in that region.
>
> For the above reasons the Commission on Rumanian Affairs asks the Supreme Council if the present situation does not seem to warrant the fixation of two lines beyond which the Hungarian and Rumanian troops should not go, a zone free of military occupation being thus established between the two proposed lines:—
>
> (A) 10 kilometres, west of general line running from Vasaros Nameny, point of confluence of the two Keres, Algyo north of Szegadin; as regards Hungarian troops.
> (B) 10 kilometres east of line Szatmar-Nemeti, Nagy-Varad, Arad, as regards Rumanian troops.
>
> It is for the Supreme Allied Council to decide whether or not the zone forbidden to Hungarian and Rumanian troops

should be, in view of maintaining order against possible Bolshevist attempts, occupied by Allied troops.")

(3) M. PICHON said that the question of the recognition of Poland had been before the Allies for a considerable time. At the request of M. Paderewski, M. Dmowski had recently submitted the following Note, dated Paris, February 7, 1919:— Recognition of Polish Government

> "I beg to bring to the notice of your Excellency that M. I. J. Paderewski, Prime Minister and Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has requested the Polish National Committee to inform the Allied and Associated Powers' Governments of the Constitution of his Ministry and to ask that the Sovereign State of Poland should be officially recognised by the respective Governments of those Powers.
>
> The Polish National Committee, as official representative of the Polish government, beg to support that application to the Government of the French Republic.
>
> At the same time the National Committee take the liberty to call the attention of Your Excellency on the following facts: the Allied Powers, by their declaration of Versailles, June 3, 1918,[2] have recognised Poland as an independent and unified State; on the other hand, M. Paderewski's Government have the support of the great majority of the nation of the whole of Poland."

M. Pichon, continuing, said that he thought the moment now appeared to be opportune to give satisfaction to the Polish wishes. He pointed out that a short time ago General Pilsudski had resigned and handed over his powers to the Polish Diet. He had now been reinstated by acclamation. His Government could, consequently, be considered as firmly established, and could be recognised by the Allied Governments.

MR. BALFOUR concurred as far as Great Britain was concerned.

M. PICHON remarked that the Allied and Associated Governments had already recognised the Polish National Committee and the independence of Poland. Official confirmation was, therefore, now merely asked for.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the United States of America had recognised M. Paderewski's Government about ten days previously.[3] He saw no reason for renewing the recognition.

M. MATSUI said that his Government had not yet recognised either the Polish Government or the Polish National Committee. He was therefore not authorised to do so without reference to his Government.

M. SONNINO was prepared, on behalf of the Italian Government, to accept the proposal before the Conference.

(It was agreed that the Great Powers would recognise M. Paderewski's Government, taking note of the reservations made by the Japanese Representative.)

4. MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the fact that the English and French texts of the draft terms of reference to the proposed Economic Commission of the Peace Conference, as agreed by the Economic Drafting Committee, (see Annexure "A"), were not identic. The original text had been drawn up in English, and consequently, if any discussion were to take place, it should be made on the English text. Report of the Economic Drafting Committee: (a) Acceptance of Terms of Reference

M. CLEMENTEL explained that the text had been prepared in the two languages, (French and English), in parallel columns, and it was in that form that it had been signed by all the Delegates.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that the report of the Economic Drafting Committee should be accepted, on the understanding that the French text should be made to agree with the English text.

MR. LANSING said that he could not agree to accept the report, as suggested by Mr. Balfour, because he had not seen it before; he had had no time to study it or to obtain the advice of his experts. He proposed, therefore, that the further consideration of the report in question should be adjourned to next Session.

M. KLOTZ asked permission to invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that the draft in question was not an agreement or convention which might commit the representatives of the Great Powers to some definite line of policy. The Conference was merely asked to accept a questionnaire, addressed to a Committee whose constitution had still to be decided; and the various countries represented reserved to themselves full right of making their suggestions and observations when the proposed Committee came to be appointed. Today, no question of principle was involved, but merely a question of procedure.

M. CLEMENTEL pointed out in support of the statement made by M. Klotz that the Economic Committee to be appointed would have a very big programme to carry through, and any delay at the present moment might have serious consequences. M. Baruch had, before leaving Paris for Brussels, particularly asked that the terms of reference to the proposed Economic Committee should be settled with as little delay as possible.

MR. LANSING said that he would not, under the circumstances, insist on an adjournment.

M. CRESPI remarked that an Italian text of the terms of reference was being prepared and would be circulated shortly.

(The Terms of Reference to the proposed Economic Committee of the Peace Conference as agreed by the Economic Drafting Committee were approved, subject to the French and English texts being brought into accord.)

LORD MILNER enquired how the Economic Committee was to be formed.

(b) Transitory Measures Referred to Supreme Economic Council M. CLEMENTEL replied that the composition of the proposed Economic Committee would have to be decided by the Conference.

LORD MILNER said that the British Dominions felt that this was a question in which they were particularly interested. The Dominions possessed very distinctive interests, which were not always identical with those of Great Britain. It would therefore be only right and reasonable to give direct representation to the Dominions; and if it were decided to give two delegates for each of the Great Powers, as is usually done, and five representatives for the Smaller Powers, he would suggest that two representatives should be allotted to the British Dominions and one to India.

MR. LANSING said that he understood Lord Milner's suggestion to be that a Commission of 18 members should be appointed, of which the British Empire would have five.

M. KLOTZ drew attention to the fact that on the proposal of President Wilson a Supreme Economic Council had been created, consisting of five representatives of each of the Great Powers. Why should not the various questions dealt with in the terms of reference be referred to that Committee, who would be instructed to carry out the work entailed by the creation of sub-Committees, the procedure to be followed being left to the Committee itself to settle?

MR. LANSING enquired whether the Supreme Economic Council gave representation to any but the five Great powers.

M. KLOTZ replied in the negative, and said that provision would have to be made for the smaller Powers to be represented when questions affecting them came up for discussion. On the other hand, the representatives of the British Dominions could form part of the five representatives allotted to each of the Great Powers.

LORD MILNER agreed that if the question were to-be referred to the Supreme Economic Council, the special views of the British Dominions could be represented among the five British Delegates. He wished to lay stress, however, on the fact that the British

Dominions occupied a very distinct position, especially as the interests of the Dominions frequently conflicted with those of Great Britain. He thought that was a solid reason. It was desirable to have all points of view represented. It was not merely a question of giving the British Dominions a stronger position.

M. PICHON reported that he had received a request from Mr. Hughes to the effect that Australia should have separate representation, and that he (Mr. Hughes) should be the selected representative for Australia. He (M. Pichon) thought that the representation of the British Dominions was legitimate, but he thought the smaller powers should also receive due consideration.

M. CLEMENTEL thought that the draft submitted by the Economic Drafting Committee contained two very distinct parts. A first part, dealing with all transitory measures, such as: the supply of materials for the restoration of the devastated areas, the economic restoration of the countries which had suffered most from the war, and the supply of commodities to neutral and ex-enemy countries. All such questions, in his opinion, could be referred to the existing Supreme Economic Council. Secondly, all permanent questions relating to the future, which really constituted economic questions connected with the Treaty of Peace, such as: future permanent commercial relations, contracts and claims, and the abrogation or revival of economic treaties. These questions should, in his opinion, be referred to a special Economic Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, which would have to be created.

(c) Permanent Measures Referred to an Economic Committee to be Created M. KLOTZ agreed, and asked that the five signatories of the report of the Drafting Committee should be instructed to draft a plan of procedure for the new Committee, sub-Committees being formed therein, and to make suggestions regarding its composition.

LORD MILNER accepted this proposal and expressed the hope that the Committee would consider the point he had tried to make for proper representation of the British Dominions.

(It was agreed that the first part of the terms of reference under the heading "Transitory Measures" should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council, and that the permanent subjects mentioned in the report should be referred to a special Commission of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

It was further agreed that the five signatories of the report of the Drafting Committee should meet to consider and report as to the procedure and method of work of the Economic Commission, and on its composition, having in mind Lord Milner's request that the Dominions and India should be accorded separate representation and that the small Powers should also be represented.)

(At this stage MM. Klotz and Clementel withdrew. M. Bernhoft, Danish Minister in Paris, and M. Clausen, Attaché of Danish Legation in Paris, entered the Council Chamber.)

5. M. PICHON said he had been asked in the first place to distribute a letter, dated 6th February, 1919, addressed by M. H. A. Bernhoft, the Danish Minister in Paris, to M. Clemenceau, Ger President of the Peace Conference. (For full text see Annexure "B.") Readjustment of the Danish-German Frontier

A *mémoire* by Mr. Jonas Collin, Professor at the Academy of Surgery in Copenhagen, one of the representatives of the Central Schleswig Committee, had also been forwarded to the Secretariat-General and would be distributed. The conclusion reached in this *mémoire* was that Central Schleswig up to the Sli-Danevirke-Husum frontier should be ceded to Denmark.

He would now call on M. Bernhoft to make a statement.

(a) Statement by M. Bernhoft M. BERNHOFT then read the following statement. (See Annexure "C.")

MR. LANSING enquired up to what line the German troops should be withdrawn, if such a proposal were agreed to.

M. BERNHOFT replied that there were five German Garrisons at present in Northern Schleswig, and he thought the German troops

should be withdrawn to the Southern line of Central Schleswig.

MR. LANSING enquired who would maintain order in these territories after evacuation by the German troops.

M. BERNHOFT expressed the view that the population would be able to govern themselves to a certain extent. He thought that the German civil authorities and priests and schoolmasters should be allowed to remain, because the people themselves were strong enough to keep these down. The Danish workmen in this region were so strongly organized that small controlling Committees had already been appointed to supervise the work of the Landrats and of the local Police Officials. The only danger spot was at Flensbourg, a town of 67,000 inhabitants, which contained anarchical elements, and there a strong military force might be required to maintain order.

MR. LANSING further enquired whether any arrangement was contemplated for the assumption of part of the German National debt.

M. BERNHOFT replied that Denmark had hoped that if the country were restored to Denmark, it might come back without a debt.

MR. LANSING asked whether that would be an inducement for the German population to remain and form part of Denmark.

M. BERNHOFT agreed that that would probably be the case.

(The Danish representative and the Experts withdrew.)

(b) Committee on Belgium to report on Danish-German Frontier MR. BALFOUR said he had intended, as in previous cases, to move a resolution for the appointment of a new Committee to enquire into the Danish claims. Mr. Lansing had, however, suggested to him that this enquiry could best be carried on Committee already occupied in considering Belgian questions. He wished, therefore, to propose the following resolution:—

> It is agreed that the questions raised in M. Bernhoft's statement on the Danish territorial interests in the peace

settlement shall be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining the Belgian problems.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.

M. PICHON said he had no objection to make to the proposal, except that the Kiel Canal question was involved. This was a very important matter, and he felt some doubt as to whether the existing Belgian Committee were the best prepared to advise on that question.

MR. BALFOUR said he had reason to believe that the members of the Belgian Committee were fully qualified to report on the question to be referred to them.

(It was agreed that the questions raised in M. Bernhoft's statement on the Danish territorial interests in the peace settlement shall be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining the Belgian problems.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee shall be authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.)

6. MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the statement of the Albanian claims would be heard on the following day. He wished to give notice that he proposed to submit to the Conference a resolution on the general conduct of business, which would be circulated to the Conference that evening. He thought the time had now come to take a survey of the immediate task of the Conference. Agenda for Next Meeting

(It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the meeting to be held at 3.0 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, the 22nd February, 1919:—

1. General conduct of business.
2. Statement of the Albanians' Claims. (Hearing of Albanian representatives.)

(The Meeting then adjourned to Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3.0 p.m.)

PARIS, 22nd February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

The President of the Commission Charged With Laying Down the Programme of the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference to the President of the Peace Conference[4]

The Commission named on the 27th January,[5] for the purpose of drawing up a programme of questions of which the study and preparation were to be entrusted to the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference, has carried on, between the 5th and the 11th of February, the exchanges of view which have resulted in the scheme which it has the honour to lay before you herewith.

This draft has been elaborated with the double object in view of exactly defining the elements of the task which will devolve upon the Economic Commission, and, while ensuring any necessary cooperation, of also preventing the Commission's functions from encroaching upon those of other special Commissions: the Financial Commission, the Commission on Separations, on Transport, on the League of Nations, etc.

Along with this draft which has received the unanimous assent of the delegates of the five Powers represented, it has seemed useful to send you, as documents, the preliminary drafts worked out by the French,[6] English, and American delegates.

If the programme, which is proposed to the Conference, receives its approval, it would be desirable that the Economic Commission be constituted without delay, since its labours, which require the collaboration of many technical subcommissions, are concerned as much with the period of transition as with the permanent order following the war.

CLEMENTEL

[Enclosure to Annexure "A"]

Draft Terms of Reference to the Proposed, Economic Commission of the Peace Conference

I. TRANSITORY MEASURES

To consider what economic measures, if any, should be taken in common during the period of reconstruction following the war, with a view to ensuring:

a) The due supply of materials and other commodities necessary for the restoration of the devastated areas;
b) The economic restoration of the countries which have suffered most from the war;
c) The supply of neutral and ex-enemy countries without detriment to the supply of the needs of the Allies and Associated countries.

II. PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

To consider what common measures are possible and desirable with a view to the removal of economic barriers and the establishment on an equitable basis of the principle of Equality of Trade Conditions in International Commerce.

Under this heading will arise such questions (among others) as customs regulations, duties and restrictions; the treatment of shipping, including port facilities and dues; unfair methods of competition, including false trade descriptions and indications of origin, "dumping", etc.; and the exceptions and reservations,

transitory or otherwise, which may be found necessary to meet special circumstances.

III. Contracts and Claims

To consider:—

(1) What provision should be made with regard to pre-war contracts agreements and commercial obligations to which subjects or citizens of belligerent States were parties;
(2) Whether claims should be admitted on either side for damage or injury arising out of the requisition, liquidation, sequestration or sale of enemy property or businesses, or the treatment or use of patents, trade-marks, trade descriptions, or designs or copyrights, or regulations relating to Trading with the Enemy, and, if so, on what basis.

IV. Ex-Enemy Aliens

To consider what common action, if any, should be taken by the Allied and Associated Governments to prohibit or regulate the carrying on either individually or through Companies, of certain businesses and occupations by ex-enemy aliens during the period immediately following the war.

V. Abrogation or Revival of Economic Treaties

To consider what Treaties and Conventions of an economic character to which Enemy States were parties should be revived or abrogated respectively.

(Under this heading will be considered, among others, the Conventions relating to Industrial Property, Copyright, Posts and Telegraphs, etc.)

Note.

The Economic Commission, before formulating proposals as to any economic questions having a special aspect in regard to which other Commissions have been or may be set up by the Peace Conference,

should consult the competent Commission; and on the other hand such other Commissions should, in the same circumstances consult the Economic Commission before formulating any proposal relating to one of the above classes of questions which fell within the scope of the Economic Commission.

Clementel
Baruch
Crespi
H. Llewellyn Smith
Fukui

Annexure "B"

Danish Legation,
Paris 6th February, 1919.

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference.

Mr. President: The triumph of the principles proclaimed by the Allied and Associated Powers having been assured by the victory of their Armies, the Association of Danish Electors in Northern Schleswig, led by their former members in the German Legislative Assembly, proclaimed, on behalf of the Danish population of Northern Schleswig, their desire, unchanged since 1864, of rejoining Denmark, at a Meeting held at Aabenraa on the 17th November last.[7]

This resolution was communicated to the Danish Government on the 18th of the same month, and they were asked to take the necessary steps with the Peace Conference to obtain recognition of their rights and their return to Denmark. The Danish Government readily accepted this commission, and sent a formal request to the representatives of France, England, the United States and Italy to be allowed to raise the question at the Peace Conference.[8] Later on, the Danish Government received a request from the Danes of Central Schleswig.

Soon after these resolutions, the Soldiers' Councils exhibited a very liberal spirit in regard to the national claims of the Danes in Schleswig, but very soon their German sentiments came to the surface, and their attitude was modified. Since then, the German Soldiers' Councils, elected in the towns, (Haderslev, Aabenraa, Toender, Soenderburg and Flensburg) sought to intimidate the Danes by every possible means, and have made them subject to all kinds of provocations, particularly in Flensburg, where the population contains a large element of Germans. The Soldiers' Councils have both tolerated and encouraged anti-Danish demonstrations, prevented Danish meetings, allowed windows of Danes to be smashed, failed to protect the Danes against menace of assault, etc.

The Danes in Schleswig are willing to preserve for the present all German laws, courts, systems of education and administration, so as to avoid all danger of anarchy. Nevertheless, the Councils of Workmen and Peasants, which the Danes in Schleswig have elected, have placed Danish controllers over the magistrates (*Landrat*) and over the local Police authorities (*Amtsvorsteher*). The German civil authority is thus kept under control. The Soldiers' Councils have acted quite differently. They rely on armed force, and the Danish population of Schleswig has no means of defence against their exactions. It is the unanimous desire of this population that the Soldiers' Councils and the German troops, who have elected them, shall be removed. The intellectual, moral and social level of the population of Schleswig is high enough to ensure order being maintained there without the necessity of replacing the German troops if they are withdrawn.

Flensburg alone, a town of some 67,000 inhabitants, contains turbulent elements from whom disorder may be feared if there is no military protection. In the present circumstances, whilst the question of Danish Schleswig is being considered by the Peace Conference, this protection could hardly be asked from Denmark, but the presence of an Allied man-of-war would suffice to put down any inclination to violence.

Not only are the Germans trying to terrorise the Danish population, but they are also committing acts of plunder. Although 6,000 out of 25,000 combatants have been killed in a war in which they have been forced to fight under the German flag, the Danish Schleswigers find themselves subjected to heavy taxes and to pitiless requisitions of cattle, wheat, butter and other agricultural products. These requisitions have now become exorbitant. Live stock is especially affected. They propose to take one cow out of four. If this threat is carried out, the stock of milch cows, which forms the basis of the country's agricultural industry, will be reduced to such a state that it will take years to build it up again. Moreover, these requisitions are paid for at ridiculously low prices, and even not paid for at all in regard to some of the more recent requisitions. The presence of the German troops ensures the execution of these requisitions, and these troops, who come from the German industrial districts, are particularly interested in watching that nothing escapes the requisition of food stuffs destined for their own country.

In the near future, the burden of taxes in Germany will be greatly increased, including possibly the confiscation of capital. It would seem unfair that a population which is on the eve of separation from Germany should have to submit to these taxes.

If the German troops and the Soldiers' Councils could be removed from Schleswig, the people would be in a position, without fear of violence from the Germans, to take a plebiscite by which they desire to make known their attachment to Denmark, whilst the Peace Conference, before whom they have pleaded their just cause, will fulfil their most ardent desire to go back to their old fatherland without being completely impoverished.

In the name of the Danish population of Schleswig, I have the honour, Mr. President, to beg you to submit to the Peace Conference, their position to be delivered from the armed German forces which oppress them, by insisting on the withdrawal of the garrisons of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Flensburg, Soenderburg and Toender, and of the German Fleet at Flensburg and Soenderburg, so that Northern and Central Schleswig may no longer be under the direct influence of German armed forces.

If, in addition, the Peace Conference would decide on the sending of an Allied man-of-war to Flensburg, and possibly another to Haderslev or to Aabenraa, the Danish population of Schleswig would feel that their liberties were assured.

These measures would be welcomed with the most profound thankfulness by all Danes, both by those of the Danish Kingdom, and by those of Schleswig.

Receive, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) **H. A. Bernhoft**
Danish Minister

Appendix "C"

Re-adjustment of the Danish-German Frontier

(Statement by M. Bernhoft)

We have the honour to approach your Excellencies not only as representatives of the Danish Government, but also as Danes of Schleswig.

In the sitting of 23rd October, 1918, of the German Parliament, the Danish Deputy Konna [*Hanssen?*], associating himself with his colleagues from Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, once more claimed the right of self-determination for the Danes of Schleswig. He cited Art. 5 of the Treaty of Prague in 1886 [*1866*],[9] which on the initiative of France, promised that the Danes of Northern Schleswig should resume their original nationality if, as the result of a free ballot, they expressed the wish to be reunited to Denmark. This promise has never been fulfilled and Art. 5 was declared abolished in 1878 by a Treaty between Germany and Austria,[10] but the promise of the various nationalities expressed therein served as a basis for the political protests made by the Schleswigers, and they have never ceased to claim the right it conferred upon them.

On the same day, both Chambers of the Danish Parliament passed a unanimous resolution expressing the desire that our national aspirations might be realised in conformity with the right of self-determination of nations. But it was not until the victory of the Allied and Associated nations had assured the triumph of that principle, that the Schleswigers were able to take their cause into their own hands. On the 16th November, the Council and Governing Committee of the Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig passed the following resolution, which was ratified next day by a Grand Assembly of the Danish population:—

"(1) We desire that the question of Northern Schleswig should be settled by considering it a political unity, the population of which is free to decide by vote whether it wishes to be reunited to Denmark.

"(2) Northern Schleswig is that part of the Duchy of Schleswig, situated to the North of a line starting from the Southernmost point of the Island of Als, following the Flensburg fjord as far as Koober-mölle and thence along the valley of the river Krusaa, passing to the south of Froslev, so that Padborg forms a frontier station, following the boundary between the jurisdictions of Slogs and Kaer, the small stream called the Skelbaek, and the rivers Sonderaa and Vidaa as far as the point where the latter turns northward, and from that point to the North Sea and north of the northernmost point of the Island of Sild.

"(3) All persons over 20 years of age shall exercise the franchise, provided:—

"(*a*) that they have been born and are domiciled in Northern Schleswig;

"(*b*) or that they have lived in Northern Schleswig at least 10 years;

"(*c*) or that they were born in Northern Schleswig but were expelled by former Governors.

"(4) The ballot shall be taken in writing and shall be carried out by methods guaranteeing freedom of vote to everyone. The late authorities shall have no influence on the voting.

"(5) It is understood that the neighbouring districts of Central Schleswig, if they so demand, shall be entitled to make

known by a separate vote whether they wish to be restored to Denmark.

"(Signatures)"

The signatories hereof associate themselves with the foregoing resolution with the reservation that:—

(*a*) In their opinion Flensburg forms part of Danish Northern Schleswig;
(*b*) Any ballot taken in the neighbouring districts, should, in their opinion, be taken simultaneously with the voting in Northern Schleswig.

The Association of Electors addressed a petition to the Danish Government, praying that their cause might be laid before the Peace Conference and their interest might be there represented. Which request the Government had great pleasure in granting.

The aggression of Prussia and Austria against Denmark terminated in the Peace of Vienna on 30th October, 1864,[11] by which Denmark was forced to give up Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. The two latter provinces were and always have been German, Holstein having been annexed to the Danish Crown in 1460 and Lauenburg in 1815; the King of Denmark was Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, and, in that capacity, was a member of the Germanic Confederation. Schleswig, on the contrary, has belonged to Denmark ever since the latter country existed, and has never formed part of the Germanic Confederation.

The question of Schleswig has often been compared to that of Alsace-Lorraine: the questions are similar but not identical. Whilst the whole of Alsace-Lorraine from Altkirch to Wissembourg protested in 1871 against separation from France, only the Northern half of Schleswig was annexed by Prussia in 1864 against its will. Southern Schleswig separated itself from Denmark of its own free will: it was already German or germanized, and had aimed at separation from the Danish Monarchy and annexation to Germany long before 1864.

If Southern Schleswig were now to be incorporated with Denmark, there would be a striking difference between that annexation and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. On the one hand, France, a great country with 40 million inhabitants, would receive about 2 million new citizens, who would throw themselves with joy into the arms of their former mother-country, to whom they are attached by the strongest ties. On the other hand, Denmark, a little country of 3 million inhabitants (including the Danish Schleswigers) would have its population increased by about 300,000 foreigners, whose sympathies would be with Germany, which they would not cease to consider as their real home.

It is unnecessary to point out that Northern Schleswig has remained Danish notwithstanding 55 years of Prussian domination. A Memorandum which we shall shortly have the honour to lay before the Conference and which unfortunately is not yet ready, will show that the spirit of Danish nationality has grown more accentuated among the Danes of Northern Schleswig than it was at the time of the separation in 1864. The stubborn and incessant fight waged against germanization by the Danes of Schleswig for 55 years has rendered them worthy of the sympathy of France. They have not given up hope that justice would triumph and that they would one day be restored to their own country.

The Danish peasants of Schleswig have derived the strength to sustain this unequal conflict against oppression from their high moral and intellectual culture. The population of Schleswig which has remained Danish now cherishes its nationality more deeply, with more understanding and firmer will, than did the population which passed under Prussian domination in 1864. The younger generation, to whom the future belongs, has remained Danish in spite of German schools, military service and the attraction that Germany could exert over characters ambitious of power, honour or money.

The Danes of Northern Schleswig have, so to speak, had to form a State within the State, with their own laws and their own institutions. Their principal means of action have been the press and their associations.

It is difficult to appreciate the high level of that press without knowing the Danish language, but it is possible to demonstrate by statistics its increasing circulation, of which the three maps annexed hereto[12] attempt to give some idea. The first shows how the circulation of newspapers is distributed over the various districts; the second and more interesting map shows how many individual subscribers there are to each paper in the same districts, and the third gives the increase in the number of subscribers in the 11 years from 1901 to 1912. The war created an unusual situation and the Danish press has been the victim of a great deal of chicanery, merciless censorship, and numerous confiscations. Taken together, the three maps give an idea of the extent and intensity of Danish feelings towards the South. In the rural districts of Northern Schleswig each copy of a paper is read by between 6.9 and 12.9 individuals, including immigrated Germans and persons of German sympathies speaking the Danish language who, not knowing German, read the Danish newspapers. In how many countries, even the most civilized, is this proportion attained? In the towns, whose inhabitants number many German officials, the corresponding figures are lower (between 7.9 and 25.9 [*5.9?*]). Danish newspapers also penetrate into the districts of Central Schleswig adjoining Northern Schleswig. Further South, in the Angel region, and towards the town of Schleswig, Dannevirke and the Schleswig fjord (the Sli), where the Danish language disappeared many generations since, and in Friesland, where Danish has never been spoken, the Danish newspapers have no subscribers. The three maps show clearly what is the southernmost limit of the territory in which there is any possibility of restoring Danish nationality. In Schleswig, the Dane-Schleswig press had 12,678 subscribers in 1901 and 19,278 in 1912.

As it was almost entirely impossible to assemble for meetings and lectures at the inns and other public halls, the Danes built 52 clubhouses, their strongholds, which for the most part have been erected during the last few years, as shown by the annexed map. Four new houses were being built when the war broke out. Vast club-houses have, moreover, existed for many years at Haderslev and Flensburg, but none in other parts of Schleswig. The Schleswiger population itself subscribed one million Marks for the construction of these houses.

Map No. — shows the growing number of libraries during the last few years. Out of 170 libraries, those founded since 1909 are underlined. They have been founded by the "Association for the Preservation of the Danish Language in Northern Schleswig", and number approximately 100,000 volumes. Between 1890 and 1911 the said Association also distributed 255,000 books, maps and pictures.

When the Danish language was completely prohibited in the schools, the "School Association" was founded with the object of sending youths and girls without means to schools in Denmark after they had passed through the German schools. The parents teach them to read Danish, and in Denmark they learn to write it and to know the history and geography of their own country. It was from the parents of these young scholars that the Prussian Government wished to take the right of guardianship; it recognised the danger to the germanisation of the younger generation of these studies in Denmark, since they stultified all the work of German teachers and were both superior in their methods of instruction and liked by the young people for the very reason that they were Danish. The pupils who left the Danish schools formed the armament of the rampart raised against Germanism.

These two great Associations and the "Association of Electors" numbered 26,000 members in 1914, that is to say, one out of every six inhabitants in Northern Schleswig, including the officials and the German population.

When danger directly menaced their own country, the Danes of Schleswig gave a final proof of their energy and self-sacrifice. A portion of the sum destined to rob the Poles of their land was placed at the disposal of the Prussian authorities in Schleswig. The Prussian Government purchased estates; the system of "Benteguter" was established, under which land was purchased by a society corresponding to the "Hakatist" society in Prussian Poland. The Danes however faced the danger and (in their usual unostentatious way) founded a rival organisation, which in 1910 became a public institution, and took the form of an Agrarian Bank. They were not unsuccessful in the struggle. The Prussian Government then adopted the same line of action as in Poland. It took measures to prevent any

estate purchased by a German from returning into Danish hands. The Schleswigers themselves founded in every parish a new Association, the members of which pledged themselves not to sell their land to Germans. When war broke out these parochial associations were banded together in one large Association with 402 confidential agents. Thus nearly the whole of Northern Schleswig was secured against Prussian designs upon the land.

Such was the defensive organisation of the Danes of Northern Schleswig at the outbreak of the war; taking effect in the economic sphere through their Banks, Savings Banks, Agricultural Associations and Co-operative Societies, founded on the Danish model; politically through the "Associations of Electors"; on the land, both politically and economically, through the Association for preventing the re-purchase of land and the Agrarian Bank; in the intellectual sphere through the Association for the Preservation of the Danish Language, the School Association and the club-houses and finally through the press.

After half a century's struggle against a powerful and unscrupulous Government, this small peasant population emerged with all the greater consciousness of nationality, well organised, and subject to its own self-imposed discipline, thanks to a will-power which affords splendid proof of the vitality of the Danish race and its capacity for development.

Was the object of the efforts above described merely that of defence against German supremacy within German territory? No, the struggle was maintained by the Schleswigers in order to preserve their Danish nationality until the day when they should see a possibility of returning to their own country. Never during the 55 long years since the separation have they ceased to hope for the eventual triumph of justice. To-day the realisation of their hopes is assured through the victory of the Allied and Associated peoples, and the Peace Conference has summoned all oppressed peoples before its tribunal. The Danes of Schleswig confidently submit their righteous cause to its decision. They have experienced the tragic fate of shedding their blood on behalf of their oppressors, thirty thousand having been forced to fight by the side of those whom they felt to be

their enemies and more than five thousand having fallen for a cause, the defeat of which they desired. All those who were able to do so fled to Denmark, but the majority shared the cruel fate of so many Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Italians and Roumanians, who were forced to bear arms against those whom they considered their friends. The noble peoples of France and England understood that the small isolated population of Schleswig was entitled to their sympathy, which they showed by granting Schleswig prisoners special treatment in separate camps. For this Denmark of the future, which will include Schleswig, will always owe them a debt of gratitude.

The Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig has itself defined the boundaries of that country (Kortet)[13] which extends over an area of 3,994 square kilometres, and contains a population of 166,966. It includes the districts of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Sonderborg, half the district of Toender, and a small portion of the district of Flensborg. The rural districts North of this line are Danish, and most undoubtedly they desire re-union with Denmark (Kort).[13] In the towns of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Toender and Sonderborg, Danish is the language of the majority. According to Danish statistics Danish is the native tongue of three-quarters of the population (not including the officials) and is understood by everyone. According to German statistics, the Danish language predominates in the following towns: Haderslev, 5,679 as against 3,448, and Aabenraa, 3,489 as against 3,405. At Toender according to German Statistics, German speaking inhabitants number 2,953 as against 1,117 speaking Danish, but such statistics must be accepted with caution considering the manner in which they are compiled; at Toender the majority of the population speak Danish and all understand it. At Sonderborg, German is at present predominant owing to the fact that a Naval station has been established there, but this preponderance will disappear when the said station is abandoned.

At the elections of 1867, 27,488 Danish votes were recorded, of which some 23,000 were from North Schleswig. At the elections of August, 1867, Danish majorities were returned in all the towns (except Toender), all the boroughs (except Hoyer), and in all the rural constituencies.

In 1884 by reason of emigration and of inclination only 14,447 Danish votes were recorded, but from 1884 onwards a Danish reaction set in which has continued up to the present day. In 1912, 17,293 Danish votes were recorded, 16,500 of which were from Northern Schleswig, this being the most favourable election since 1877. The elections of 1912 resulted in a German majority in the four towns, some of the boroughs, and two or three rural constituencies, and a German majority is driving in a wedge between Toender and Flensborg. An analysis of the election results shows that the German majority is due to the German officials; if these are excluded, the votes are about equal; when the votes of Danish officials were included and those of persons now calling themselves German but who would assuredly welcome Danish rule, only a German minority would remain. Even at Toender where the richer citizens have always been Germans, a Danish nucleus has persisted, and there has never been so large a number of Danish voters at Toender as during the last few years. By way of recapitulation, it may be stated that German voters have never had a majority in rural constituencies. A really German majority among the owners of the soil only exists in the town of Toender, and the borough of Augustenborg (Als) the home of the family of the German ex-Empress.

The position of Northern Schleswig is so clear that there seems nothing to prevent the immediate institution of a plebiscite there. At least three-quarters of the voters may be relied on to declare in favour of returning to Denmark. The Danish population is becoming anxious and the Germans have recovered from their first despondency and are resuming their former arrogance of manner. Soldiers' Councils and officials annoy the population, requisitions impoverish the country, heavy war taxes threaten its prosperity at a time when the people of Schleswig consider that they are *de facto* separated from Germany. On the other hand, the Germans are already endeavouring to meet the loss of Schleswig by placing their capital there and by establishing commercial branches, in the hope of escaping to some extent from the financial ruin of Germany. We therefore earnestly commend to the Conference the desire of the Danes of Northern Schleswig to be allowed their plebiscite as soon as possible.

It might perhaps be said that Denmark could accept Northern Schleswig without a plebiscite, since there is no doubt of the Danish sympathies of its population. But the Danes of Northern Schleswig are eager to give themselves freely to Denmark; they long for the day of that great manifestation of their nationality, of their triumph over the Germans who will then have no excuse for attempting annexation in the future.

Middle Schleswig includes those regions south of Northern Schleswig in which Danish is spoken, or partly spoken, or in which Danish sympathies still exist. These two standards exist separately or together. These districts differ from Northern Schleswig in that they were subjected to German influence much earlier and on a much larger scale. Danish sympathies are not so widespread. A display of them may lead to unpleasantness, and as German has been used for several centuries in churches and schools, Danish culture has not been able to penetrate. But while the Danish language is still known, or Danish sympathies still exist as a tradition dating from before 1864, it is possible for the population to become pro-Danish once more, even in a country where German is spoken. The Danish Government, as well as the Danes of Northern Schleswig, desire therefore that central Schleswig may be allowed to vote, if it expresses a desire to do so. This desire has been expressed in petitions signed by 4,277 persons. All the petitions have not yet come to hand. The resolution of Aabenraa, of 16th November states:

> "It is evident that the districts adjoining central Schleswig be entitled, if they claim the right, to proclaim by separate vote if they desire to return to Denmark";

and, in a subsequent resolution of 30th December the Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig declared (*inter alia*) as follows:—

1. "The German authorities in Central Schleswig are endeavouring to oppose liberty of assembly and of petition, and also to prevent the Danish population of those districts from establishing the conditions necessary for a free ballot; we protest energetically against this conduct.

2. “We affirm that these proceedings of the Germans render the right of self-determination a fallacy for the time being in Central Schleswig.
3. “We request the Danish Government, when it lays our interests before the Peace Conference, to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that, in these conditions, the Danish population of Central Schleswig cannot hope to obtain its national right by means of ballot.”

Thus the conditions necessary for a plebiscite are already present in Northern, but not in Central, Schleswig. There are good reasons for holding the plebiscite immediately in Northern Schleswig, while Central Schleswig, on the other hand, should be allowed time to weigh the pros and cons and to form an opinion.

The Central Schleswig in question does not include the districts of Danevirke, the fjord or town of Schleswig, the district of Angel, nor the Frisian district to the west. The town of Schleswig has been German for many generations, Angel for two or three; the Frisian district was never Danish. No voice has been raised in these districts to ask for return to Denmark.

The southern boundary of that part of Central Schleswig in which there is a possibility of finding or awakening Danish sympathies includes those parishes or communes in which the Danish language still survives and those which showed a Danish majority in the first elections to the German Parliament in 1867. For topographical and economic reasons this zone should include the parishes of Adelby, Munkbrarup and Glücksbourg, forming the southern coast of the Flensborg fjord and in which the Danish language has not completely disappeared. For topographical reasons and to allow the Danish elements of the islands Foer and Amrum to vote without risk of being isolated, the plebiscite should take place over the whole Toender district.

Central Schleswig in which there can be question of a plebiscite would include the southern half of the Toender district (which does not belong to Northern Schleswig), part of the district of Flensborg, the town of Flensborg and the parish of Hjoldelund, or about Km.

1300 with a population of 101,500, of which more than 60,000 are at Flensborg.

At Kaerherred Danish is spoken by the people, but not by immigrants.

Laek, although chiefly German, belongs naturally to these districts; some Danish sympathies also remain on account of the railway to For and Amrum; if these islands pronounce in favour of Denmark, they will bring with them the northern parts of the Frisian district, with the river Soholmaa as a natural frontier.

The western part of the island of For and a part of the island of Amrum, together with the north of the island of Sild, are still inhabited by a population speaking Danish and with sympathies which are Danish for historic reasons. They belonged to the Duchy of Ribe and were always under Danish influence.

The population of these islands is only 4,000 persons speaking Frisian and Danish, but Danish is stronger wherever both languages exist. It should also be pointed out that at the beginning of the war the German Government had begun the construction of a dyke at Klangsbol, doubtless with the intention of joining up with the railway on the island of Sild, by establishing a station of Marines in Sild bay.

In the parishes of Hanved, Valsboel, Haksted, Vi and Oversoc, together with Hjoldelund, German[y] has made progress, but an active Danish minority has always existed there.

Some 90 percent of the inhabitants of Flensborg speak German, but, on the other hand, its connection with Denmark is vouched for by its history, the celebrated men it has given to Denmark. its traditions, the memory of its ships flying the Danish flag for centuries, and the graves of thousands of Danish soldiers fallen in our wars against Germany. There is a very active Danish minority with a paper ("Flensborg Avis"), a Club, a Lecture Society (1000 members), a Young People's Union (250 members), and a church (1923).

Wholesale Trade. Its chief market is Northern Schleswig; towards the South, competition from Hamburg, Lübeck and Kiel is met with. The Commercial Association states that, from reports received from its branches, from 25 percent to 80 percent of the town's trade is deflected towards the North. Many clerks and dock labourers are employed.

Retail Trade. Chiefly in the town, but also along the fjord and towards the West.

Industry. Ship-building yards (third on the entire European continent); give employment to about 10 percent of the population.

Large working population. Socialists, having voted for the Socialist candidate without having been given the option of voting for a German or a Dane. It is difficult to prophesy which side it would take, but the more favourable conditions for workmen in Denmark must not be forgotten.

The town of Flensborg has petitioned the Danish Government to be attached to Denmark. This petition, however, was only signed by 3,401 men and women above 20 years of age, whereas the number of men and women voters was 38,000, which corresponds to barely 10 percent. On the other hand, the population is under the tyrannical régime of the German authorities and Soldiers' Councils, and it is presumed that a free vote would be more favourable for the Danes. Up to 1885, Danish sympathies were in the ascendant, but German sympathies have since gained the upper hand. Is an awakening of the former sentiment in favour of Denmark now taking place, even among people who have considered themselves German up to the present?

Only the people of Flensborg can answer this question.

Conclusion

1. That the population of Northern Schleswig, considered as a single group, be allowed to decide positively by ballot, as soon as possible, whether they desire to be re-united to Denmark or not.

2. That those districts of Central Schleswig bordering on Northern Schleswig (including the town of Flensborg) which evince a desire to do so, be called upon to express by an individual plebiscite, voting in districts, whether they wish to return to Denmark.
3. That the conditions necessary for freedom of voting be ensured by the evacuation of the districts in question by German military forces, and by the setting up of an International Convention to safeguard the preparation and direct the carrying out of the plebiscite.

[1] Vol. II, p. 183.

[1a] Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 809.

[3] See *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, p. 741.

[4] Translation from French text supplied by the editors.

[5] See BC–11, vol. III, p. 730.

[6] French text, arranged in parallel column with English text, not printed.

[7] See vol. II, pp. 450 ff., and *infra*.

[8] Vol. II, p. 457.

[9] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LVI, p. 1050.

[10] *Ibid.*, vol. LXIX, p. 773.

[11] *Ibid.*, vol. LIV, p. 522.

[12] Not filed with the minutes.

[13] The maps referred to are not filed with the minutes.

[13] The maps referred to are not filed with the minutes.

February 22, 3 p.m. (BC–37)

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[5] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 22, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/44

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/44

BC–37

[Document 5]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 22, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. E. M. House
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B.
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE

M. Pichon
M. Tardieu
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

M. O. T. Crosby

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B.

FRANCE

M. Klotz

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
France	Captain A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi
Japan	M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) Mr. Balfour said he wished to raise a small matter which required decision. The Portuguese Government had expressed to him its very strong feeling of pain that it was the only nation, which had suffered at the hands of Germany, and yet had no representative on the Allied Commission on Reparation. The coasts of Portugal had been bombarded; Portuguese ships had been sunk; and the Portuguese African Colonies had been overrun by the enemy, consequently, Portugal had claims against Germany, and it was extremely hard that she was not represented on the Allied Commission which had been appointed to examine and report on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay.
Claims by Portugal for Representation on Allied Commission on Reparation

M. Pichon confirmed the fact that Portugal had submitted a complaint as soon as the composition of the Allied Commission on Separation had been announced. He (M. Pichon) personally had no objection to Portugal being duly represented.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether under the circumstances Brazil also should not be granted representation. Brazil had lost ships, sunk by

German submarines. It would be difficult, therefore, to grant representation to Portugal without at the same time doing the same for Brazil.

BARON SONNINO enquired what was the composition of the Allied Commission on Reparation.

M. KLOTZ explained that in accordance with the Resolution passed by the Conference on Thursday, January 23rd, 1919,[1] it was decided that a Commission should be appointed of not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Serbia and Roumania. Subsequently, both Portugal and Czecho-Slovakia had claimed the right of representation. The Conference had decided to admit the claims of Czecho-Slovakia, but not those of Portugal, and accordingly two Czecho-Slovak representatives at present formed part of the Commission. Should the Conference now decide to accede to Portugal's request she should be given two representatives; the number allotted to all other small Powers represented.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that the claims of Portugal were as great as, if not greater than, those of Bohemia, which had been granted. Bohemia had not become a belligerent until the very end of hostilities; whereas Portugal had fought throughout the war, and had suffered just those kind of damages which called for reparation.

(It was agreed that Portugal should have the right to nominate not more than two representatives to serve on the Allied Commission on Reparation.

It was also agreed that an invitation should be sent to Portugal to attend the next meeting of the Allied Commission on Reparation to be held on Monday next, February 24th, at 10.30 a.m.)

(2) MR. BALFOUR asked permission to move the following resolution: —

"(1) Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace, to Germany at an early date, the Conference agrees that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of other preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed. Procedure of Conference: (a) Mr. Balfour' First Proposal

(2) The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the Naval, Military and Air Conditions, shall cover the following points:—

(*a*) The approximate future frontiers of Germany:

(*b*) The financial arrangements to be imposed on Germany:

(*c*) Our economic relations with Germany after the war:

(*d*) Responsibility for breaches of the Laws of War.

(3) In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of Peace with Germany."

A general feeling of impatience was now becoming manifest in all countries on account of the apparent slow progress the Conference was making in the direction of Final Peace. It would be folly to ignore altogether the danger that feeling might produce. It would be realised that abstract questions, (such as the Financial Arrangements and Economic Relations), did not touch the hearts and interests of families; but the question of demobilisation did touch them very nearly. Now, the progress of demobilisation depended very largely on the final Military Terms to be imposed on Germany. A short time ago the Conference had agreed that it could not continue to add month by month new terms and conditions to the Armistice. It had been agreed that the Military Terms to be imposed on Germany should be

drawn up in the form of a final scheme, which would definitely regulate her future armament. That problem had been occupying the attention of the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council who were now almost prepared to present their final report. He realised that it would probably take some time for the Conference and for the Governments of the Great Powers to consider the military report. Nevertheless the Naval and Military Terms of Peace appeared to be in advance of all other questions, such as frontiers, future economic relations, and attempts to bring to justice criminals, who had abused the Laws of War. That being the case, if the final Military Proposals were shortly to be ready for consideration by the Conference, should not advantage be taken of that fact to obtain an important instalment of the Preliminary Peace? If that instalment were carried, it would be possible for the Allies subsequently to impose on Germany all the other terms that might be considered just and fitting. His proposal did not imply that he did not consider it to be of the first importance to press on all the other enquiries mentioned in his draft note, namely:—

The approximate future frontiers of Germany,
The Financial Arrangements to be imposed on Germany.
Economic Relations with Germany after the War, and
The Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War.

In fact, in order to help on the acceleration, which he desired, the last paragraph of his draft note proposed that the various Commissions dealing with those questions should send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. He was in no way prejudiced as regards the date given, but from the information which he had received it appeared very hopeful that by the 8th March next the various Commissions would be in a position to submit their reports.

In conclusion, he wished to add that he had that morning, in company with M. Pichon, discussed the question with M. Clemenceau, who inclined to the view that the Naval and Military Terms of Peace should not be separated from the other aspects of the case. M. Clemenceau was extremely anxious to expedite matters but he thought that end would be best obtained by waiting until a

conclusion had been reached on all subjects. M. Clemenceau held the view that if the stimulus towards a rapid decision were removed by the acceptance of the Naval and Military Terms by Germany, the other questions would be delayed for an infinity of time by small controversies. M. Clemenceau held, therefore, that the end desired would best be obtained by treating all questions abreast rather than by taking up questions one by one as they reached maturity. Personally, he (Mr. Balfour) was in favour of his own proposal, but he would be glad to hear the views of his colleagues. Perhaps M. Pichon would confirm his report of M. Clemenceau's views.

M. PICHON agreed that Mr. Balfour had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau's views. M. Clemenceau held that the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms should be pressed forward with as little delay as possible in order to take full advantage of the present situation in Germany. In this opinion M. Clemenceau was supported by Marshal Foch and his military advisers.

MR. HOUSE said he was very glad to see that the Conference intended to bring about as soon as possible a Preliminary Peace. In his opinion, the Peace Negotiations should have commenced on November 11th last, directly after the signing of the first Armistice. He had always felt that delay could only be favourable to Germany, and the longer the signing of Peace were postponed, the more chance would there be of circumstances becoming less favourable to the Allies. In regard to the two proposals now before the Conference, very severe military terms would have to be imposed on the Germans. And, he thought, the Germans would be more inclined to accept those conditions if, at the same time, the whole Peace Terms were made known to them. The Germans would then be made fully cognisant of their position.

M. SONNINO said that he had no objections to raise against the proposal to speed up as much as possible the settlement of Peace Preliminaries. But he must draw attention to the fact that Germany alone had so far been mentioned (e. g. the military conditions to be imposed on Germany, the economic, financial conditions to be imposed on Germany, &c.), and all other questions were presumably to be adjourned indefinitely. Now, the other questions were

frequently just as complicated and contained elements even more dangerous than those included in the German settlement. In the case of Germany, as a matter of fact, the Allies were faced by one enemy only with whom an Armistice had been signed, with whom negotiations were being carried on, and by whom certain terms had already been accepted. For Italy, the Austrian question was more complicated in that the former Austrian Empire was now divided into various states, some of whom were friendly, others semi-friendly and others hostile. The Austrian question was, therefore, a delicate and awkward one to settle.

Should the military, economic and financial conditions to be imposed on Germany first be settled, what would happen to the other questions requiring settlement? He felt compelled to ask that question in the interests of his own country. Germany was an enemy of Italy, and the Italians had fought against her. But Italy also had another enemy, Austria and in fighting her she had borne the full burden of the war. The Russian question, which had given rise to an infinity of dangers during the last few months must also not be lost sight of.

What guarantees, what pledges would Italy have that all these other questions would be dealt with? It seemed to him that Mr. Balfour's proposal would have the effect of adjourning all those other questions indefinitely.

Mr. Balfour had said that the German question should first be settled and then demobilization could proceed. But when the British Army had been demobilized, and the American Army had gone home, Italy would be left to face alone a difficult situation. What would she be able to do? Whatever conditions the Allies might impose on Germany, she would be able to start again as soon as she saw fit, and no-one would be there to prevent her doing so. He (M. Sonnino) agreed that everything possible should be done to hasten the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. Some time had perhaps been wasted. That had been inevitable. But, in his opinion, the conditions of peace to be imposed on all enemy countries should be drawn up as quickly as possible and presented for acceptance. Otherwise, a separate peace having been made with Germany, the Allies might a

few days later find themselves at war with half of Austria and perhaps also with Russia. What forces would the Allies then possess with which to defend themselves and what would be the final consequences?

MR. LANSING expressed the view that it would be a mistake to treat the military terms of peace as distinct from the other terms of peace. He would prefer to embody all the terms of a preliminary peace in one document: a separate Treaty being made with each of the enemy countries on identic lines.

As soon as the future frontiers of the territories of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey had been fixed, the state of war with the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs would *ipso facto* also cease and, at the same time, peace would have been made with the principal enemies.

He was strongly of the opinion that when peace terms came to be discussed with Germany, a complete document should be presented including everything and not merely a few Naval, Military and other conditions. He thoroughly agreed with M. Clemenceau's viewpoint.

M. TARDIEU said that Baron Sonnino had displayed considerable anxiety at the proposal that the final military terms of peace should be forthwith imposed on Germany, for the reason that demobilisation in that quarter would ensue. That question had already been considered by the Supreme War Council and their military advisers were about to produce a definite scheme. The Conference was now asked to decide whether other questions, financial and economic questions, should be added to the military terms in order to present to the Germans at one time the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms. In his opinion, the military situation would remain the same whether the financial or economic conditions were added to the military terms to be imposed on Germany, or not. He agreed with Baron Sonnino that after the conclusion of the preliminary peace with Germany, difficult questions would still remain to be settled with other enemy countries. Nevertheless it would be agreed that all other problems would become easier of solution once peace with Germany had been concluded. For instance,

the question of German Austria would become easier to solve after the frontiers of Germany had been fixed. Similarly, the conclusion of peace with Germany would remove one of the disturbing factors in the Russian situation. Consequently, he thought it would be possible to reconcile the two proposals before the Conference, namely, Mr. Balfour's proposal for a separate peace with Germany, and Baron Sonnino's desire to include all enemy countries. Meanwhile, he would urge all the commissions and Committees to expedite the submission of their reports with as little delay as possible.

ME. BALFOUR pointed out that the third paragraph of his draft note covered the last point raised by M. Tardieu.

MR. HOUSE enquired whether the final military terms would be embodied in the Armistice, or in the Final Peace Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. House's question did not arise out of the proposals now being discussed, since the present Armistice could be terminated at three days' notice.

M. PICHON thought the Conference should consider first of all the German question, because it was, as M. Tardieu had said, the principal and the essential question . . . . . .

M. SONNINO here interjected "for you".

M. PICHON, continuing, said that he thought it was the principal and essential question for the Italians also, because Germany was the principal enemy. Furthermore, the conditions under which the last armistice had been renewed must be considered. Germany had been told that the Armistice would be renewed for a short term only, and the Allied military experts had been instructed to draw up and submit the final naval and military Terms of Peace, for the consideration of the Conference.

Mr. Balfour's proposal, which he (M. Pichon) thoroughly approved of, could very well be said to cover the points raised by M. Sonnino. The sole object of Mr. Balfour's proposal was to complete the military terms to be imposed on Germany by the addition of

economic and financial clauses, the whole of which document would thus constitute the Preliminaries of Peace. The whole situation with Germany was, at the present moment, extremely serious and delicate, and it might become very unfavourable to the Allies if, after having announced to the Germans the fact that the final conditions would shortly be sent, the Allies found themselves unable to do so. Further, public opinion expected that this should be done, and great disappointment would arise should the Conference fail to keep its engagements, for the public considered that all other problems were bound up in the settlement of the German question. He thought it would be impossible to settle all the peace questions relating to every enemy country at one time. But as soon as the German question had been settled, he agreed the Conference could at once devote its attention to the settlement of the problems relating to Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary; though, as regards the latter country, which had no Government, he did not know with whom the Allies could discuss conditions. To sum up, however, he thought the Conference should at once settle the German problem, and immediately afterwards the Austrian. In his opinion, the Conference would only be complying with public opinion, and with the necessities of the present moment by adopting the procedure suggested by Mr. Balfour.

MR. HOUSE enquired whether the Conference agreed to accept M. Clemenceau's proposal that all the terms of Peace should be dealt with together, instead of first dealing with the Military Terms.

MR. BALFOUR said he would be prepared to accept that proposal provided it expressed the unanimous view of the Conference.

BARON SONNINO said that when last treating the question of the Armistice, the Conference had decided to invite the Allied military advisers to propose final Military Terms of Peace. The reason then given for agreeing to that procedure had been the desire to settle the military question with as little delay as possible. Firstly, in order to remove once for all, the necessity for the constant renewal of the Armistice and, secondly, also because once the military terms had been accepted by Germany it would be easier later on to impose all other necessary conditions. On that occasion, M. Orlando supported

by President Wilson, had asked that the same procedure should be followed in regard to Austria-Hungary. That proposal had also been accepted, and consequently no distinction had then been made between the two cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The two cases could not, therefore, now be separated, thereby creating a dangerous distinction. He, M. Sonnino, fully agreed that everything should be done to speed up the settlement of all questions. He would prefer first to get the military conditions out of the way, after which all the rest could be examined together. But, if the Conference decided to make a distinction and to separate the German question from the Austro-Hungarian question, and let everything else slide, the situation so created would spell revolution in Italy. Such a procedure would mean an indefinite prolongation of the Peace Negotiations with all other enemy countries: Italy would be obliged to keep up armaments whilst the other Allies were demobilising, thus bringing about in Italy a state of general discontent which could not with safety be allowed to continue.

In order to show a conciliatory spirit, he would be prepared, however, to accept the proposal made by Mr. Balfour on the understanding that whenever the word "Germany" appeared in his draft note, the words "and Austria-Hungary" should be added. Otherwise the words "enemy powers" should be substituted for "Germany". As far as the military conditions were concerned, he held the view that it would be preferable to settle the military terms at once, as the allies would then be in a position to impose on the enemy the economic, financial and other conditions which might be considered just and equitable.

MR. HOUSE thought that the peace terms to be imposed on all enemy Powers should be worked out simultaneously. Eventually, when the Conference met to decide the final Peace Terms, all the belligerents would be able to attend at the same time.

M. SONNINO agreed to accept that proposal. He asked that the words "Austria-Hungary" should be added after the word "Germany" wherever it occurred in Mr. Balfour's note. Otherwise, "enemy countries" could be substituted for "Germany."

(b) Mr. Balfour's Second Proposal MR. BALFOUR said that the Conference had a most important question to decide. He fully agreed with Baron Sonnino that other questions should not be delayed, whilst the questions with Germany were being settled. All he pleaded for was that the Conference should at all events get through with Germany with all due speed: that the settlement of Germany should not be held up until the more complex problems of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had been solved. The latter questions were, no doubt, fully as important, but the German question was more ripe for decision. Baron Sonnino had expressed the view that after Germany had been got out of the way, serious military troubles would arise with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In his opinion that was a delusion. It was very difficult to believe that military troubles would arise in those countries once peace had been concluded with Germany. He (Mr. Balfour) was willing to accept any course that would not delay peace with Germany. If other cases could be got ready at the same time, so much the better: but it was essential that settlement with Germany should not be postponed until all other questions were ripe for settlement. In conclusion, he wished to ask the Conference to accept the following re-draft of his note:—

"1. Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present naval, military and air conditions of peace to Germany at an early date, the Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of enemy countries;
   (*b*) the financial arrangements to be imposed on enemy countries;
   (*c*) our economic relations with enemy countries after the war;
   (*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will

send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.

4. The Conference are of opinion that the question relating to the preliminary peace with Germany shall not be held up till the questions relating to other enemy countries are determined."

BARON SONNINO said he had two observations to offer to Mr. Balfour's proposal. He would first deal with a question of secondary importance, but it would be recollected that the Conference had decided on M. Orlando's proposition, to instruct their Military Advisers to draw up the final Military and Naval terms with Germany and Austria-Hungary. He would therefore ask that the first paragraph should be made to read as follows:—"Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air conditions of Peace to Germany and Austria-Hungary at an early date, the Conference agree, etc."

The second and more important question he wished to raise had reference to paragraph 4. He could only see in it an invitation to all Commissions to expedite the solution of questions dealing with Germany to the exclusion of all other questions. If paragraph 4 had any meaning at all, it could only mean that henceforth the Conference would push on Peace with Germany and the rest could wait. Otherwise it had not *raison d'être*. In his opinion, it was an invitation to the Conference to postpone all other questions with the exception of those relating to Germany.

(c) Mr. House's Proposal MR. HOUSE said he would suggest going back to Mr. Balfour's original proposition regarding Germany, and similar proposals would be drawn up for the other enemy countries, with such alterations as might be necessary. The Conference would then, without delay, appoint the necessary Committees to deal with

the various questions which still required to be examined and reported on.

M. TARDIEU thought that M. Sonnino was mistaken in his interpretation of paragraph 4 of Mr. Balfour's new draft proposal. It was not suggested that settlement with Germany should be expedited to the exclusion of a settlement with other enemy countries. It would be relatively easier to make peace with a country like Germany, which still existed as a whole, rather than with Austria-Hungary, which had now disintegrated into a number of entities, partly friendly, partly hostile. For this reason he wished strongly to support Mr. House's proposal.

M. SONNINO held that the same result would be obtained by accepting Mr. Balfour's amended text with the omission of paragraph 4.

Mr. LANSING suggested that the first paragraph of Mr. Balfour's first proposal should be made to read as follows:—

> (d) Mr. Lansing's Proposals "The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed."

If so corrected the whole note would yield a text that would be made to apply to all enemy countries, a separate resolution being drawn up for each country.

M. SONNINO said he would gladly accept the first paragraph as just amended by Mr. Lansing. That being done, he would further be prepared to accept Mr. Balfour's original draft, provided the words "enemy countries" were substituted for "Germany" in paragraph 2 and provided the last two words "with Germany" were omitted from paragraph 3. He clearly understood that under these conditions paragraph 4, proposed by Mr. Balfour, would disappear. In his opinion, there was no reason why Germany should go ahead of all other enemy countries, though it would be in the competence of the Conference at any moment to dispose of any set of subjects which

might be ripe for solution. The inclusion of paragraph 4, as he had already stated, could only be interpreted as an invitation to delay all other subjects except those dealing with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not admit the inference. Paragraph 4 of his Draft Resolution did not imply that the Conference took no further interest in Austria-Hungary. It merely said that the Conference was of the opinion that the questions relating to the preliminary peace with Germany should not be held up until the questions relating to other enemy countries were determined. The view therein expressed in reality constituted the main part of the policy he wished to recommend to the Conference. Paragraph 3 of the Draft Resolution laid down that the consideration of all subjects should be speeded up. But, on the other hand, it was most important to get a preliminary peace with Germany as soon as possible. He felt that on that point Baron Sonnino and he himself held quite different views. The arrangements to be made with other countries should not be stopped on account of Germany; but, on the other hand, other countries should not prevent a settlement being reached with Germany.

M. SONNINO said that all he asked for was that no statement should be made to the effect that German questions should have preference over all others. Naturally, when reports were submitted by Committees, the Conference could decide to dispose of them irrespective of the enemy country involved. Otherwise, he feared the Committees would be influenced by the adoption of any resolution, such as had been proposed by Mr. Balfour.

MR. LANSING thought that the Conference had lost sight of his proposals to have separate identic resolutions in respect of each enemy country.

MR. BALFOUR understood that to mean that separate Commissions would have to be appointed dealing with each enemy country. He wished to enquire whether it would be possible to man all such Commissions, not only as regards the settlement of frontiers, but also as regards economic, finance and other questions.

MR. HOUSE said the American Delegation would be in a position to do so.

M. PICHON said that it was highly desirable to hasten on as soon as possible the settlement of all questions with Germany. That was the basis of the proposal made by Mr. Balfour. All information received from sure sources in Germany seemed to point to the fact that the present moment was particularly favourable for an immediate settlement. Therefore the present opportunity of reaching a settlement with Germany should not be allowed to pass, and it was essential that the various Commissions dealing with financial, economic and all other questions should also submit their reports without delay.

M. Sonnino had said that the Allied military advisers were ready to submit the final military terms to be imposed on Germany. He thought that only emphasised the fact that the other Commissions should rapidly come to a conclusion, so that, with as little delay as possible, the Allies might be in a position to present their preliminary peace terms to the Germans. That would not, however, in any way retard the examination of problems concerning Austria-Hungary and other enemy countries.

He (M. Pichon) thought M. Sonnino was mistaken in thinking that the Conference proposed to separate the two problems of Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to hasten the solution of the one at the expense of the other. He thought, however, the proposition that all questions concerning Germany should come first would be unanimously accepted, both on account of its situation and on account of promise made at the last renewal of the armistice.

These, then, were the reasons in favour of giving the German question priority; these were the reasons which had led Mr. Balfour to make his proposal. The Conference had never for a moment dreamt of adjourning or retarding the consideration of all other questions. But the settlement of the German question was urgent.

M. SONNINO said that the Allies had only had one front during the war; were now two or three fronts to be created during the peace? He

could not consent to that. He quite understood the necessity for pushing on the settlement of the final terms to be imposed on Germany; but if the German question were detached from the rest of the questions which called for settlement, that would be like constituting a second front, and he could never accept a proposal of that kind. Such a procedure would have most deplorable and most disastrous results in Italy, for it would be impossible to keep such decisions from the ears of the public.

If the Conference persisted in its intention, he (M. Sonnino) could not prevent it: each member must vote as he thought best; but he could not approve a decision which would constitute a positive menace to his own country.

He would not be opposed to priority being eventually given to the German questions, if those were the first to become ripe for solution. But he could not agree that a condition to that effect should be made in advance.

LORD MILNER enquired whether it would not be more important than anything else for the Conference to devote its time to a consideration of the final naval and military terms with Germany, provided the reports of the military advisers were ready. Once an agreement was reached on that subject, one compartment of the peace work would be finally dispensed with, even though the decisions reached were not at once presented to Germany.

MR. HOUSE persisted in his opinion that the Conference should go back to Mr. Balfour's original proposal as regards Germany, and then pass similar resolutions as regards Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He thought no one could object to that procedure.

MR. BALFOUR thought that a decision had been reached that the Conference would not proceed with the military terms of peace as a separate proposition, and he regretted that M. Sonnino had again referred to that proposal. M. Clemenceau objected to it, and he (Mr. Balfour) did not wish to insist. In any case, it was a relatively small matter. The question of real importance was whether the Conference should decide to press on all questions leading to peace with

Germany without getting entangled with all other questions relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He felt very strongly on that point and urged his colleagues to accept the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of his revised note.

M. SONNINO enquired whether Mr. Balfour would agree to accept Mr. House's and Mr. Lansing's proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said he preferred his own draft, but he would accept Mr. House's proposal merely with a view to reach a unanimous agreement.

M. PICHON said he would accept Mr. House's proposal for the reason given by Mr. Balfour.

M. SONNINO also expressed his willingness to accept Mr. House's proposal as an act of conciliation. He understood that four texts would be prepared, identic in form, except that a different enemy country would be mentioned in each. The note would, in each case, commence with the words: "The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary peace terms, etc."

BARON MAKINO enquired whether the approximate future frontiers of Germany, referred to in paragraph 2 (*a*), included the German colonies.

Amendments to Paragraph 2 of Mr. Balfour's First Proposal MR. BALFOUR replied that it was intended to include the colonies.

BARON MAKINO thought that, in that case, leased territories of Germany should also be included.

MR. LANSING proposed that paragraph 2 (*a*) should be made to read "The approximate future frontiers of Germany and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe", the words "and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe" being omitted from the texts relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING further proposed that the first part of paragraph 2 should be made to read as follows: "The preliminary peace terms, other than naval, military and air conditions, should cover, *inter alia*, the following points."

(This was agreed to.)

M. KLOTZ suggested that paragraph 2 (*b*) should be made to read: "the financial conditions to be imposed on. ..."

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING next proposed that paragraph 2 (*c*) should be made to read: "the economic conditions to be accorded to. ..."

(This was agreed to.)

M. MATSUI enquired, with reference to paragraph 2 (*a*), whether that would include all rights, such as rights over the railways and mines in China acquired by Germany.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the words "*inter alia*" would cover such questions.

MR. LANSING agreed, and remarked that the words "*inter alia*" would also cover the question of prisoners of war, which he had intended to raise separately.

(It was agreed that texts of the following draft Note, relating respectively to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, should be prepared and distributed that evening, for consideration at the next meeting of the Conference:—

> "1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary peace terms with ... and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover *inter alia* the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of . . . . . (*for Germany only:* and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe);
   (*b*) the financial conditions to be imposed on . . . . . ;
   (*c*) the economic conditions to be accorded to . . . . . ;
   (*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating those subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in those cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with . . . . . ")

3. M. PICHON suggested that the statement of the Albanian claims should be heard on Monday, as well as a French statement relating to Morocco.

Agenda for Next Meeting MR. BALFOUR said that he wished another question to be entered on the agenda for the next meeting, namely, the sending of troops to Poland. Very strong recommendations had been received on this subject from the British members of the Allied Commission in Poland.

M. PICHON pointed out that this question had been referred to the Polish Commission sitting in Paris. The reports received from the Polish Commission in Poland had been transmitted to the Commission in Paris, which had been created with a view to co-ordinating the information received from Poland.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that the Commission on Poland in Paris were ready to submit a report on the subject of the

sending of troops to Poland.

M. PICHON agreed that under the circumstances the Committee would be invited to bring their report on the despatch of troops to Poland on Monday, as well as any other questions ready for discussion.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be placed on the Agenda Paper for the Meeting to be held on Monday afternoon, February 24th, at 3 p.m.:—

1. Procedure of Conference.
2. Statement of the Albanian claims.
3. Despatch of troops to Poland.

(4) On the proposal of MR. LANSING, the following resolution was accepted:—

> Creation of a Neutral Zone in Carinthia "In view of the fact that disorders have arisen in Carinthia as result of the absence of a definite boundary between the territories of the German-Austrians and the Yugo-Slavs,
>
> *It is agreed*
>
> That the question of the establishment of a neutral zone between the two peoples be referred to the same Military Committee charged with the investigation of establishing neutral zones in the Banat and. Transylvania, (Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles)."

(The Meeting then adjourned until Monday, February 24th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

PARIS , February 23rd, 1919.

[1] See BC–8, vol. III, p. 698.

February 24, 3 p.m. (BC–38)

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[6] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/45

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/45

BC–38

[Document 6]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT	ALSO PRESENT	
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	
Mr. R. Lansing	Dr. Mezes	
Mr. E. M. House	Dr. Day	
Secretaries	Mr. Dolbeare	
Mr. A. Frazier	Mr. Beer	
Mr. L. Harrison	BRITISH EMPIRE	
Mr. Auchincloss	Sir, Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.	
BRITISH EMPIRE	The Hon. H. Nicholson Lt. Col. W. H. Gribbon, C. M. G.	} For Albanian question only.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.		
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	Sir W. Tyrrell, K. C. M. G., C. B. Lt. Col. Kisch, D. S. O.	} For Poland question only.
Secretaries	FRANCE	
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Marshal Foch	
The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	General Weygand	

FRANCE	M. J. Cambon M. Hermitte M. Degrand Lieut. de Percin } For Poland question only.
M. Pichon	
M. Tardieu	
Secretaries	
M. Berthelot	
M. de Bearn	ITALY
ITALY	H. E. M. Crespi
H. E. Baron Sonnino	Col. Castola } For Albanian question only
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi	M. Galli
Secretaries	Marquis della Torretta } For Poland question only.
Count Aldrovandi	
M. Bertele	ALBANIAN DELEGATION
JAPAN	Touran Pasha.
H. E. Baron Makino	Mehemid bey Konitza
H. E. M. Matsui	M. Louis Gouracontchi

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(1) M. PICHON having declared the Meeting open, asked permission for Mr. Balfour to put a question, which was not on the Agenda Paper.

Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons Due 1st March, 1919 MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India and

a member of the Committee for drafting terms of reference to the Financial Committee, had asked him to bring to the notice of the Conference a matter which the British Treasury and the British Finance Authorities regarded as of pressing interest to all the Allied and Associated Powers. The coupons of the Austrian Debt would fall due for payment on 1st March next. The representatives of all the fragments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire were about to meet at the Ballplatz, Vienna, to consider what should be done in regard to this and other matters.

If the coupons in question were not paid on the 1st March next, and Austria were prematurely declared bankrupt, a general distrust of credit would result, followed by the closure of all banks and a general disturbance of business. If that were to happen, how was the food, which Mr. Hoover was arranging to supply, to be paid for? Although it might be impossible to make any definite arrangements to prevent the eventual bankruptcy of the fragments of the Austrian Empire, nevertheless the British Financial Authorities held the view that that was a situation which should be gradually prepared for. If that situation were suddenly sprung on the public, disaster would follow. Therefore the British suggested that a joint letter should be addressed by the Allied [and] Associated Powers to the Financial Authorities now assembled in Vienna to say that it was very important that the coupons due on 1st March should be paid, but the various countries that had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not thereby assume any obligation in regard to the future apportionment of the debt. He understood that this was merely a temporary method of getting over the immediate crisis. It was, however, a very pressing case which the Conference should forthwith discuss with its financial advisers and decide.

MR. HOUSE enquired what was the amount of the interest involved, and when would the next instalment fall due.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he could not answer that question, but he presumed the interest would be payable quarterly.

M. SONNINO was under the impression that the subject had already been discussed by the Financial Committee, and enquired whether

any decision had been reached.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the Committee itself would not in any case be in a position to send the letter suggested, but M. Klotz, who was Chairman of the Committee in question, could be invited to attend on the following day and give the necessary explanations.

M. CRESPI said that he was a member of the Finance Committee and in a position, therefore, to give some explanations. The question under reference had not yet been discussed by the Financial Committee, but would come before it that afternoon. He could positively state that there were sufficient funds available in Vienna to pay the Coupons. The representatives of the different parts of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire had, however, stated that they would not agree to the payment of the interest due unless the question raised by Mr. Balfour were first settled, namely the future distribution of the Austrian Debt amongst the various new States to be constituted. Consequently, if a letter were sent to Vienna, as suggested by Mr. Balfour, stating that the payment of the March coupons would in no way prejudice the final apportionment of the debt of the late Austrian Empire, payment would, he thought, easily be made. On the other hand, the repudiation of the debt would be most disastrous, both to the various new States and to the Allied countries. He would, therefore, strongly support Mr. Balfour's proposal, and he hoped the matter would at once be referred to the Finance Committee for report.

M. PICHON enquired whether Mr. Balfour's resolution was accepted. If so, M. Crespi would perhaps inform the Finance Committee at the Meeting, which he would attend that afternoon: and the whole question could then be discussed by the Conference tomorrow afternoon.

(It was agreed that the question relating to the payment of the coupons of the Austrian Debt, due for payment on 1st March next, should forthwith be referred to the Committee for drafting terms of reference to Financial Committee, whose recommendations would be considered by the Conference on the afternoon of Tuesday, February 25th.)

2. M. PICHON said that the four texts had been circulated in accordance with the Resolution passed on Saturday last,[1] and he called on M. Sonnino to make his remarks.

Procedure to Expedite Business of Conference: (a) Amendment to Clause 2 (a) M. SONNINO called attention to the fact that the words: "and the renunciation of Colonies and territorial rights outside Europe" had been omitted from paragraph 2 (*a*) of the Resolution relating to Austria-Hungary. He agreed that Austria-Hungary had no Colonies, but Austria certainly had certain territorial rights outside Europe. He proposed, therefore, that the paragraph in question should be made to read as follows:—

> (*a*) The approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe.

(This was agreed to.)

(b) Proposed Amendment to Clause 1 M. PICHON pointed out that considerable objection had been raised to the use of the words "Preliminary Peace Terms" in Clause 1 of the Draft Resolutions. The view was held that those words implied that whatever might be done under the heading of Preliminary Peace Terms would in some cases, (as in the case of the United States of America), entail a reference to the national legislature. He proposed, therefore, to use the words "Preliminary Conditions" instead of "Preliminary Peace Terms".

MR. LANSING enquired what was meant exactly by the words "Preliminary Conditions."

M. PICHON replied that his definition would be conditions, which did not form part of the Peace Terms. That is to say, the conditions would in reality form part of the Armistice.

MR. LANSING said that he would very strongly object to any such change.

MR. BALFOUR said that he shared Mr. Lansing's view. But M. Pichon's contention was that in the case of the United States of

America, decisions taken under the heading: “Terms of Peace” would have to be referred to the Senate.

MR. LANSING explained that in America only a final and negotiated Treaty, after having been signed by the President, had to be submitted to the Senate for approval, before the exchange of ratification. In regard to the provisions inserted in the Resolutions, if those were finally negotiated with Germany, the document containing these conditions would become a Treaty of Peace and *ipso facto* would have to be submitted to the Senate. Had he wished to raise an objection, it would have been to the use of the word “Preliminary”, but he did not wish to press that point.

(It was agreed to retain the words “Preliminary Peace Terms” in paragraph 1.)

LORD MILNER said:—

(c) Naval, Military and Air Conditions “Speaking for myself, personally, I still think that the final disarmament of Germany, I mean our bringing her down to that degree of strength for war purposes which we are willing to allow her permanently to maintain, is extremely urgent, that it is a step which we ought to take as soon as we possibly can, and that it is a step which when taken, will greatly expedite the acceptance, not only by Germany but by all our enemies, of all other conditions of peace. It is also an absolutely essential preliminary to our own demobilisation on anything like the scale on which we all hope to demobilise.

Till Saturday last I thought we were all agreed upon this. Now I feel some doubt about it. I do not wish to raise any further discussion over the Resolutions which we are just about to pass. But I hope I am justified in assuming that the passing of these Resolutions does not preclude us from proceeding at once to impose upon Germany those final military, naval and other conditions of a like nature, which Marshal Foch and his colleagues are at present discussing, if when we see them, they commend themselves to us. I hope in other words that it still remains free to any one of us to raise at that juncture the question of their immediate presentation.”

M. SONNINO said that he had himself made the same proposal yesterday and it had been opposed.

M. PICHON thought that paragraph 2 gave complete satisfaction to Lord Milner's opinions, since the naval, military and air conditions had been specially excluded. He thought that in accordance with the decision reached on Saturday last, military terms could be discussed and settled as soon as they could be presented by the Commission appointed to draw up the necessary recommendations.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the military conditions would merely define Germany's military situation for the time being. Certain military conditions would be imposed on Germany: but in three or four months when the other conditions would have to be imposed, the moment might be less favourable to the Allies; for whatever military conditions might be imposed on Germany she would still be in a position in due course to reconstitute her army, material means to that end being still available. In addition to the military clauses, it was essential that other clauses relating to frontiers, indemnities, etc., should at the same time be imposed on Germany. That is to say, a summary of the Peace Treaty should forthwith be drawn up and presented to Germany. Otherwise, when the time came to present the final peace terms, the Allies who would have continued to demobilise, would find themselves unprepared to face a re-constituted German army.

M. TARDIEU thought that in reality no contradiction existed between Marshal Foch's and Lord Milner's views. He thought the military terms would be ready for discussion in a few days' time, and in accordance with the Resolutions the rest of the conditions would be submitted to the Conference by the 8th March next, so that only a short interval of time would elapse between the settlement of the two sets of questions.

MARSHAL FOCH explained that all he had meant to say was that a connection between the two sets of questions would be necessary.

MR. HOUSE expressed the view that in reality no difference of opinion existed between the Members of the Conference. He

suggested that further discussion could be deferred to the time when the necessary reports of the Committees would be received.

(It was agreed to accept the four sets of Resolutions relating to the procedure of the Preliminary Peace Conference, as amended.

For full texts see Appendices A(i), A(ii), A(iii) & A(iv).)

(Members of the Albanian Delegation and the experts entered the council Chamber.)

(3) TOURAN PASHA read the following statement:—

(Note—The Statement will be inserted later.)[2]

Statement of Albaninan Claims (The Delegates and experts then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that the questions raised in Touran Pasha's statement on the Albanian territorial interests in the peace settlement should be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining Grecian problems.

It should be the duty of the Committee to reduce questions for discussion within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee should be authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The representatives of the Allied Commission on Poland entered the Council Chamber.)

(4) M. PICHON said that it would be within the knowledge of the Conference that M. Noulens, the Chairman of the Allied Commission to Poland, had telegraphed to ask that a division of General Haller's Army[3] should be sent to Poland as soon as possible, together with complete equipment and a reserve stock of ammunition. The question had been referred to the Polish Liaison Committee, who

had submitted the following report:— Poland: Despatch of General Haller's Army

> "After taking notice of the telegrams 8 and 9 from M. Noulens, the Committee for Polish Affairs in their meeting of February 20th, have been unanimous in expressing the opinion that there was occasion to send to Poland within the shortest possible delay, General Haller's division, as per request of the Inter-Allied Committee of Warsaw.
>
> General Le Rond observed that, in order that the transportation of the Polish troops might be effected, it was absolutely necessary to occupy Dantzig, the only possible landing base, and the railway lines Dantzig-Thorn (doubled by waterway) and Dantzig-Mlawa. He recalled that the principle of this occupation had been already agreed to previous to the departure of the Inter-Allied Mission for Warsaw.
>
> He ended by saying that pending the settlement of the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the best way to ensure the occupation of Dantzig and of the rail-and-water ways would be to exact from the Germans the withdrawal of their troops on this side of a line to be determined: on one hand west of the Dantzig-Thorn railway line, on the other hand East of the Dantzig-Mlawa railway-line according to the procedure which has been applied in Posnania, as the Committee have given their support to the views expressed by General Le Rond, the matter should be referred to the Supreme Allied Council that Marshal Foch may receive instruction."

M. JULES CAMBON said that he had little information to add to that contained in the report just read. He had communicated to the members of the Liaison Committee the contents of the telegram received from the Allied Commission in Poland. In addition, General Le Rond, who had attended the meeting as the representative of Marshal Foch, had explained the military situation in Poland. General Le Rond had been asked whether General Haller's troops could be sent to Poland by land by the southern route. He had replied in the negative, and insisted that the only possible route was

the one by Dantzig. To proceed from Dantzig into Poland two lines of railways could be used: the Dantzig-Thorn line, and the Dantzig-Mlawa line. These two railway lines represented a length of some 160 miles, and would have to be militarily occupied. He (M. Cambon) used the word "occupation" to cover any means which might be devised for ensuring security. As a result of General Le Rond's report, the Committee had reached the conclusion set forth in the report read by M. Pichon, as affording the only practical means of obtaining the desired result.

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch might perhaps be able to give the general military point of view.

MARSHAL FOCH said that to constitute Poland, an army must be sent. In order to send General Haller's army, the Allies have reserved to themselves the right by the terms of the Armistice to use the Dantzig-Thorn railway line. That railway line was at present in the occupation of the Germans and therefore, though apparently unavailable for the free transportation of troops, it was in fact the only possible means of communication. Consequently, steps must be taken to make that route available, and only one measure was possible, namely: Allied military control of the line.

On the 11th January, 1919, the Military High Command had suggested to the Supreme War Council the occupation by Allied contingents of the railway lines in question. But the proposal had been rejected, and the Conference of the Great Powers had eventually decided to send an Allied Commission to Warsaw to enquire and report on the possible measures to be taken. So far no definite proposals had been submitted, and the only possible solution appeared to be the following: the eastern boundaries of Germany should forthwith be determined as a line passing to the west of the Thorn-Dantzig railway and at the next meeting with the Germans, they should be required to accept that frontier line and to withdraw their troops behind it. In that way free transit over the Dantzig railway lines would be obtained.

MR. BALFOUR said he wished to put a question to Marshal Foch. On the 11th November, 1918, the Allies had obtained the right to use the

railway line in question for the purpose of maintaining order in Poland. Consequently, the Germans had no right to take any action along the Dantzig-Thorn line, which would prevent the free exercise by the Allies of the rights granted them. It was therefore merely a case of making the original armistice effective. Consequently, he wished to enquire wherein the difficulty really lay.

On the other hand, he feared another difficulty might arise in connection with the transport of troops to Poland by sea. So far, no mention had been made of that question, either by M. Cambon, or in the report which had been submitted by the Polish Liaison Committee. He wished to enquire, therefore, what decision, if any, had been reached on that point.

M. JULES CAMBON replied that the question had been discussed by the Polish Liaison Committee, but Sir William Tyrrell had pointed out that the question had already been studied by the Maritime Transport Council, whose report should be awaited.

MARSHAL FOCH explained that in theory the Allies did possess the right to use the railway lines in question, but in practice a base would in the first place have to be established at Dantzig and, in order to establish a base, some territory would have to be occupied by the Allies. The Allies, however, were not, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, entitled to the occupation of any territory at Dantzig, and the Germans would only grant the request under compulsion. Furthermore, in order to transport the troops, trains would have to be secured, and those would have to be obtained from the Germans, who would probably express their inability to supply them. Finally, the passage of the trains along the railway line would have to be assured, and that implied the military occupation of the railway line. In a word, all these things were unrealisable unless effective occupation were undertaken.

That was the reason why the Military High Command had submitted in January last a proposal to the effect that Allied troops should be sent to that region to supervise all such works. But the Governments had refused.

MR. BALFOUR found some difficulty in reconciling the various statements which had been made. Apparently it appeared to be possible to send Allied troops to Dantzig to occupy the town and the railway lines between Dantzig and Thorn without first establishing a base. That being the case, why could not the same thing be done by Polish troops? The Military experts agreed that Allied troops could be sent, followed by Polish troops. Why could not Polish troops be sent straight away?

MARSHAL FOCH explained that it was evident the Germans would never dare to interfere with Allied troops for fear of energetic retaliatory measures on their western frontier. On the other hand the Germans would naturally raise very violent opposition to an occupation of the line by the Poles, with whom they were at war, especially in view of the fact that the Polish troops were not fully organised.

MR. BALFOUR suggested, for the consideration of the military authorities, that a very small contingent of American, French, British and Italian troops should accompany General Haller's forces. The Germans would then realise that any attack on these forces would immediately be followed by reprisals on their Western front.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that Mr. Balfour's plan would no doubt help to make a start. But the best and most effective solution of the difficulty would be, as he had already stated, to fix straight away the Eastern frontiers of Germany, thus freeing the town of Dantzig and the railway lines leading from that port into Poland.

MR. HOUSE stated that it would be necessary for the American representatives to discuss the whole question with General Bliss, and he suggested an adjournment.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the case should be postponed for two reasons. In the first place, it would be necessary to await the report of the Maritime Transport Council, and in the second place, for the reason given by Mr. House. In the face, therefore, of these military and naval reasons, an adjournment became inevitable; but he trusted

the matter would be finally disposed of with as little delay as possible.

SIR WILLIAM TYRRELL explained that General Le Rond had promised to submit a report relating to the transportation of the troops without delay, but, so far, the report in question had not been received.

M. CAMBON said that he would undertake to obtain the report from General Le Rond for to-morrow's meeting, if possible.

M. PICHON, summing up, said that there were two proposals before the Conference, namely:—

(1) Marshal Foch's proposal to fix, as soon as possible, the temporary Eastern boundaries of Germany, and
(2) The immediate despatch of General Haller's Army, provided necessary transportation could be made available.

(It was agreed to adjourn the consideration of these two questions to the Meeting to be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

5. M. PICHON suggested that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on the following day:—

(1) Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next. Agenda for Next Meeting
(2) Poland.
(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

MR. LANSING enquired how the Moroccan question was to be presented, as it was of importance that his delegation should know what character the discussion would take.

M. PICHON said that a memorandum on this question had been circulated by the French Government, and read the following extract:—

> "In the treaty of Peace with Germany, the settlement of the Moroccan question is of especial importance to France. France requests that in the articles of the Peace Treaty, there be stipulated: Firstly, the Repeal of the Algeciras convention imposed by Germany; Secondly, the necessary guarantees to make it impossible for Germany to resume the policy which she has for ten years pursued against France in Morocco."

MR. LANSING enquired what was meant by the words "imposed by Germany". The Allied and Associated Powers had all participated in the Algeciras Conference and could hardly claim that its terms had been imposed on them by Germany.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on Tuesday afternoon, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.:—

(1) Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next.
(2) Poland.
(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, February 25th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Appendix A (i)

RESOLUTION NO. I

(*Relating to Germany*)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover *inter alia* the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of Germany, and the renunciation of colonies and territorial rights outside Europe;
   (*b*) the financial conditions to be imposed on Germany;

(*c*) the economic conditions to be accorded to Germany;
(*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.

PARIS, 22 February, 1919.**Appendix A (ii)**

RESOLUTION NO. II

(*Relating to Austria-Hungary*)

(As Amended—See I. C. 148 [BC–38], Minute 2)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Austria-Hungary and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover *inter alia* the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe;
   (*b*) the financial conditions to be imposed on Austria-Hungary;
   (*c*) the economic conditions to be accorded to Austria-Hungary;
   (*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it

is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Austria-Hungary.

PARIS, 22nd February, 1919.**Appendix A (iii)**

RESOLUTION NO. III

(*Relating to Bulgaria*)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Bulgaria and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions should *inter alia* cover the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of Bulgaria;
   (*b*) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Bulgaria;
   (*c*) the economic conditions to be accorded to Bulgaria;
   (*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Bulgaria.

PARIS, 22nd February, 1919.**Appendix A (iv)**

RESOLUTION NO. IV

(*Relating to Turkey*)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Turkey and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover *inter alia* the following points:—
   (*a*) the approximate future frontiers of Turkey;
   (*b*) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Turkey;
   (*c*) the economic conditions to be accorded to Turkey;
   (*d*) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Turkey.

PARIS, 22nd February, 1919.**Addendum**

ALBANIAN CLAIMS

Statement by Tour an Pasha

Refer to Page 8,[4] BC–38, Report for February 24, 1919

The Albanians base all their hopes on the justice of this High Assembly, on whom they rely utterly. They trust that the principle of nationality so clearly and solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson and his great Associates will not have been proclaimed in vain, and that their rights—which have, up to now, been trampled underfoot—will be respected by the Congress whose noble mission it is to dower humanity with a peace which, to be durable, must be based on right and justice.

It was the Congress of Berlin which first of all denied the rights of the Albanian nation. The reasons therefor are explained by the fact that Albania, unlike other Balkan nations, has never had any protectors, and also by Albania's very advantageous geographical position,

which has from time immemorial excited the cupidity of her neighbours.

The Treaty of Berlin[5] deprived Albania of the territories of Antivari, Hoti, Grouda, Triopchi, Kichi, Podgoritza, Plava and Goussigne, to the benefit of Montenegro; and of a part of Southern Albania (Epirus) between the Gulf of Proveza and the Kalamas River, to the benefit of Greece. This flagrant injustice led the Albanians to form the Prizrend Patriotic League, which opposed the handing over of the territories of Plava, Goussigne, Hoti, and Grouda by force of arms. The Great Powers thereupon gave Montenegro the port of Dulcigne in compensation for those territories, which the Albanians retained. This compensation was carried out by means of a naval demonstration, well known under the name of "Dulcigne Naval Demonstration".

In the south, the Prizrend League made the same energetic resistance. The International Commission which came to Preveza to carry out the transfer of Albanian territory to Greece met with popular resistance, and had to leave the country without fulfilling its ungrateful task. On the strength of its report, the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Berlin were obliged to acknowledge as Albanian the region which they had decided to cede to Greece, and fixed the Greek frontier at the Arta River.

The Treaty of Berlin has justly been called "Albania's Funeral Treaty". Nevertheless, the mutilations made by it might be called scratches, when compared with those later inflicted on Albania by the Conference of London of 1913. This Conference not only settled the Kalamas line (repudiated by the Albanians, as stated above), but also gave Greece the whole region from Arta to Cape Stilos. This region, which is known as the Chameria and is between 30 and 40 kilometres long, had a population of 63,000 before the Balkan War—40,000 being Albanians, 14,000 Christian Albanians, and 9,000 Greeks (or speaking Greek among themselves).

To the North, the Conference gave Montenegro and Serbia the territories of Kraya and Anamalit and the clans of Hoti and Grouda, the districts of Plava, Goussigne and Ipek, the Eastern part of the

Mitrovitza district, the districts of Prichina, Guilan, Ferizovitch and Kachanik, part of the Uskub district, and the districts of Prizrend, Kalkandelen, Gostivar, Karcheva, Dibra, Strouga and Ochrida. The Albanian population of these districts, which are situated in the ancient vilayets of Kossova and Monastir, forms an 80% majority over the Slav elements. We therefore claim all these territories, which were torn from us by the Treaty of Berlin and the Conference of London of 1913.

Kossovo, also known as Old Serbia, has been inhabited by Albanians from time immemorial. The Serbs only appeared there in the 7th century, but could never establish their mastery owing to continual insurrections by the Albanians and to Bulgar rivalry.

Serbian preponderance in the Kossovo region has always been transitory, and in spite of Serbian oppression and persecution the large majority of its population has always been Albanian. The Serbian population which has penetrated there forms a minority of only 15%.

During the last few years and especially in 1910, 1911, and 1912, the Albanians attempted to regain their independence by insurrections. In 1912, 18,000 Albanians of Kossovo captured the town of Uskub after a desperate struggle against the Turkish Army, and compelled Turkey to grant them certain concessions.

The Ottoman Government was about to own the justice of Albanian aspirations by granting autonomous administration to part of Albania comprising the vilayets of Kossovo, Scutari and Yaninia, and part of the vilayet of Monastir. The Balkan States realised the weakness of a Turkey unable to subdue the Albanians, and feared the creation of an autonomous Albanian state in territory which they had long desired to possess. They therefore hastened to declare war against Turkey, and so the Albanians were unable to benefit by the concessions which they had won by armed force.

At the time of the territorial readjustment of the Balkans in 1913, our country was sacrificed for the sake of its neighbours, because the imminent danger of a European conflagration had to be averted at all

costs. But now that the conflagration is over and the questions connected therewith are being settled by the triumph of the rights of nationalities, we are fully convinced that the rich districts which are wholly Albanian and as such necessary to the existence of Albania, will in justice be restored to their mother country.

Even though small foreign minorities must inevitably be included within the boundaries of the State of Albania, large groups of Albanians will, on the other hand, remain outside its boundaries.

The Conference is certain to appreciate the difference between our own legitimate desire for the return of brother Albanians to the Albanian family and the unjust claims of our neighbours, who, not content with having snatched from us so much wholly Albanian territory by force, now ask permission from the Congress to take yet more away.

Thus Greece claims the part of Southern Albania called Northern Epirus, arguing that it has a population of 120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians. We dispute these figures, and maintain that the pro-Greek population of that region does not exceed 20,000 inhabitants. These 20,000 inhabitants live in the valley of Drinopoli and the plain (Vource) of Delvino; they are farmers who possess neither fields nor houses, but cultivate the land belonging to the Albanians.

It is also argued that all orthodox Albanians should be considered Greeks, regardless of nationality. This empty claim has naturally induced the Greek clergy to make their religion an instrument of oppression and tyranny.

The League of Prizrend had wrung from Turkey permission to open an Albanian school at Koritza; but the Greek clergy excommunicated orthodox parents who sent their children to this school, and denounced them to the Ottoman Government as conspirators against the State.

By this means they procured the deportation and imprisonment of many heads of Albanian families and led to the said school being

closed.

As the Ottoman Government, for its part, brought the same pressure to bear on Mussulman parents to prevent them from sending their children to the Albanian school, the Greek clergy were in this instance allies of the Ottoman Government against patriotic Albanians.

Those who consider orthodox Albanians as Greeks urge that it would be unjust to attempt to subject a Christian majority, with a superior civilisation, to a Mussulman minority with an inferior civilisation.

There can be no question of a difference of civilisation between children of the same race who live together under the same conditions, speak the same language, and have the same customs. If orthodox Albanians have attended Greek schools, Mussulman and Catholic Albanians denied the right to be taught in their native tongue have, on the other hand, attended Turkish, French, Italian, English and American schools.

Much emphasis is laid on the Greek sympathies of orthodox Albanians. In contradiction to this we bring forward the opinion of Lord Hobhouse, who accompanied Lord Byron to Albania and at the beginning of the 19th century wrote as follows concerning the populations forming the Ottoman Empire:—

> "Only the Albanians are conscious of nationality; all the other peoples of the Empire are grouped according to religion".

Monsieur Aubaret, French delegate on the Commission for Eastern Roumelia, says in a Memorandum presented to the said Commission on August 13th, 1880:—

> "They (the Albanians) live in complete unity; they are Albanian before everything else. If it is true that the Catholics are warmly attached to their religion, it is not less true that both they and their Mussulman fellow-countrymen value national consciousness, love of the soil and respect for old

> customs very highly, and put them before all other considerations."

In "L'Illustration" of 7th April, 1917, M. Vaucher writes concerning the Koritza district:—

> "Albania for the Albanians is the motto of all the inhabitants of this rich plain of Koritza ...
>
> "For two months (as a Republic) the Albanians have ... shown that they are capable of living on good terms with one another. There are no more religious quarrels, for the excellent reason that there is nobody now to stir them up."

Our opponents claim precisely that part of Albania which was burnt out by the Cretan bands of Zographos and disguised Greek soldiers under the command of Greek officers. This is clearly shown by the sketch which I have the honour to submit to you,[6] and which gives the names of the villages concerned.

It is a curious fact that the Greeks set fire to precisely those villages which they considered and still consider Greek. On this subject M. Vaucher, correspondent of "L'Illustration," writes:—

> "The whole region of Kolonia has been laid waste since Greek bands passed through it in 1913. Names marked on the map are merely memories, for in reality they are only represented by shapeless ruins marking the site of Mussulman villages."

The Greeks are probably claiming Northern Epirus in order to intimidate the Albanians and make them renounce their just claim to Southern Epirus and especially to the Chameria district, which is essentially Albanian.

At a time when our opponents maintain that the orthodox Albanians of Northern Epirus desire to be united to Greece, the Vlachs of Pindus (who, nevertheless, have experienced Greek rule) are asking for union with Albania. How can these two desires be reconciled?

How can one admit that the Albanians wish to disown their fellow-countrymen, when a foreign community like the Vlachs, which has lived under Greek rule, asks nothing better than to be united to Albania?

Taught by suffering, Albania in her reconstituted form will feel it incumbent upon her to live in perfect unity, in a spirit of wide tolerance, and she will allow foreign minorities all rights granted to them by the most civilised countries.

The southern boundary line of Albania seems to have been drawn by nature; it is the chain of the Gramos and Pindus mountains. This is the only boundary corresponding to the defensive and economic requirements of a country as weak as Albania.

If Albania had been free to act, she would certainly have offered to help the Allies by every means in her power. Until the country was invaded by the enemy she put all available resources at the disposal of the Allies, by helping and feeding Serbian troops during their retreat through Albanian territory.

This help given to Serbian troops gains a new significance in view of the atrocities and systematic massacres perpetrated on the Albanian population of Kossovo by those same Serbian troops during and after the Balkan wars. They also burnt numerous Albanian villages, as all European press correspondents reported at the time.

The Albanians were of the greatest assistance to the Italian and French troops after their arrival in Albania, and furthermore refused to form auxiliary Albanian corps in Southern Albania, in spite of all the promises made them by Austria and a Balkan State.

The Conference desires to lay the foundations of a lasting peace. There can be no such peace in the Balkans unless the rights of nationalities are respected.

If, for instance, the Congress, contrary to this principle, were to confirm the dismemberment so unfortunately effected in 1878 and 1913, the country would never enjoy the peace which is essential to

its economic development. Such a proceeding would, moreover, give rise to periodical crises in Greece and Serbia, neither of which could absorb an Albanian majority so proud of its independence and so deeply attached to its national traditions. Such a situation would stir up continual disturbances along the frontiers of the Albanian State.

The excesses and massacres suffered by the Albanian populations inhabiting districts annexed by the above-named States give just cause to fear the fate in store for them, and their only hope of peace would be emigration or death.

The probable fate recalls the words of Tacitus: “Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant”.

[1] See *ante*, p. 83 [*Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 5*].
[2] It appears as an addendum, p. 111 [*Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 6*].
[3] Polish army in France.
[4] See minute 3, p. 104 [*Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 6*].
[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.
[6] Not filed with the minutes.

February 25, 3 p.m. (BC–39)

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[7] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 25, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/46

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/46

BC–39

[Document 7]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 25, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing
Hon. H. White
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. G. M. G.
Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Pichon
M. J. Cambon
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ALSO PRESENT

PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1, 2, AND 3

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. Mezes
Mr. Beer

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
M. de Peretti

ITALY

M. Galli

JAPAN

M. Otchiai

PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 ONLY

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. E. M. House

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi

M. Bertele

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

General Tasker H. Bliss
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir W. Tyrrell, K. C. M. G., C. B.
Lt. Col. Kisch, D. S. O.

FRANCE
M. Degrand
M. Hermitte
Lieut. de Percin

ITALY
H. E. General Diaz
General Cavallero

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 1 ONLY

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.

FRANCE
M. Klotz.

ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 2 ONLY

ITALY
Marquis della Torretta.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 3 ONLY

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Col. R. Meinertzhagen, D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Chester Burden
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O
France	Captain A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi
Japan	M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) M. Pichon called on M. Crespi to report to the Conference the results of the reference to the "Committee for drafting terms of reference to Financial Committee" relative to the payment of the March Coupons of the Austrian Debt.

Austrian Debt Payment of Coupons Due 1st March, 1919 M. Crespi said that the question had been raised yesterday by Mr. Balfour and the broad facts of the case were therefore well known to the members of the Conference. The coupons, which fell due for payment on 1st March, 1919, represented a sum of Two Hundred and Righty Millions of Crowns. The Committee for drafting terms of reference to the Financial Committee had prepared the following draft telegram to be addressed to the late Austrian Empire Financial Conference about to be held at the Ballplatz, Vienna:—

> "The Allied and Associated Governments are informed that there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments.
>
> The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to

> the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt."

A copy of the telegram had been circulated in English, French and Italian, the English being the original official text.

MR. BALFOUR said he had nothing to add to what had been stated by M. Crespi. He was perfectly agreeable that the proposed telegram should be sent: but he did not pretend to be an expert on the subject. He wished to enquire, however, who would send the telegram.

M. PICHON said that the telegram would be sent by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers. In addition, each Great Power could, if it so wished, send a copy of the telegram to its own representatives in Vienna.

MR. BALFOUR agreed and said that the British Government would forward a copy of the telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.

(It was agreed that a copy of the following telegram[1] should be addressed by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers to the Gesamter Konferenz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ballplatz, Vienna:—

> "The Allied and Associated Governments are informed that there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments.
>
> The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace

Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt."

The British Delegation would also send a copy of the same telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.)

(2) M. CAMBON informed the Conference that no report had yet been received on the subject of the transportation of General Haller's troops by sea to Dantzig. Apparently some misunderstanding had occurred yesterday. The question was being studied by the Allied Maritime Transport Council in London, and not by the International Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission in Paris. General Weygand would, however, be able to make a statement on this subject. Poland (a) Despatch of General Haller's Army

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the question of the transport of troops by sea to Dantzig had formed the subject of a study by the French General Staff. To give some indication of the magnitude of the shipping problem involved, he would quote the following figures:— suppose twenty ships of 5,000 tons each could be made available, the transfer of the four Polish Divisions, now in course of formation, would take three months, provided a continuous circulation of the ships were arranged. On the other hand, if transport of the troops were to be completed in two months, the period required for the complete organisation of the four Polish Divisions, twenty-seven ships of 5,000 tons each would be required for the purpose. Those figures would provide a basis for an appreciation of the problem. The problem, however, was far more complex. Provision would have to be made for the transport of the necessary horses required by the four divisions. But, if horses could be found in Poland, then with the same twenty ships the transport could be completed in two months instead of three months. Furthermore, the harbour accommodation at Dantzig must be sufficient to cope with the requirements of the case. In his opinion the Allied Commission in Poland should be asked to report on the following two questions, namely:—

1. Number of horses obtainable in Poland to meet requirements of General Haller's Divisions.

2. The accommodation available for disembarkation of troops at the Port of Dantzig.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that an enquiry to that effect should be sent to the Allied Commission in Poland. In addition, however, he thought that an enquiry should be sent to the Allied Maritime Transport Council in London regarding the supply of the ships required for the transport of the troops in question.

M. PICHON expressed the view that a question of principle still remained unsettled, namely, the military conditions to be fulfilled. The view had been expressed by Marshal Foch that the military occupation of the railway line between Dantzig and Thorn by Allied troops would be necessary, otherwise the Poles would always be liable to attack by the Germans. A question had been put by Mr. Balfour as to whether small Allied contingents could not be sent to accompany the Polish troops. Thereto Marshal Foch had replied that such an arrangement would undoubtedly help matters; but it would not guarantee the safety of the Polish troops. Consequently, the question as to what could be done to secure the safety of the Polish troops in transit from Dantzig to Poland still remained to be settled. Marshal Foch had expressed the view that the best plan would be straightaway to fix the Eastern frontier of Germany.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that that would undoubtedly be the best solution. Whatever measures might be taken to ensure the transport of the troops by sea to Dantzig, the Allies would still be faced with other problems connected with the disembarkation of the troops at Dantzig, and their transport along the railway lines from Dantzig to Thorn, and from Dantzig to Mlawa, since the Port of Dantzig and the railway lines were under control of the Germans. The Port and the railway lines could be occupied by the Allies, but that solution would cause great difficulties, would entail great expense, and would not appeal to all of the Allied nations. Consequently, it was not a practicable solution. The second solution would be to fix the Eastern Frontiers of Germany at the next meeting with M. Erzberger, and so free the Port and the railway lines of all German control.

The present difficult situation of the German Government was well known; internal troubles were daily increasing; at Mannheim, Carlsruhe, Baden and Düsseldorf, the Soviet movement was rapidly extending. At the present moment Germany would therefore accept any terms that the Allies might demand. The German Government only asked for a Peace. That was the only thing that would satisfy the people and enable the Government to master the situation.

(b) Settlement of Situation on Western Front Before Proceeding With Eastern Problem In his opinion, whatever attempt might be made to settle the situation in the East would be fruitless until the Western question had been settled. It was imperative, in his opinion, that the account with Germany should forthwith be settled in summary manner by fixing the Frontiers and by assessing the sums due on account of indemnities and reparations. It should be realised without disillusions that in the year 1918 a favourable situation on the Western Front had only been created as a result of victory; but since the Armistice had been signed, the Allies had been marking time in the West, and they had lost ground in the East. Consequently, the situation on the Western Front should forthwith be settled so that all the resources in men and material thus set free could be made available for the solution of the Eastern problem.

In Russia at the present moment Bolshevism and complete anarchy reigned, and sooner or later these Russian questions must be solved, otherwise the fruits of victory would be lost, either through the cementing of an alliance between Germany and Russia, or through the spread of Bolshevism in Germany. On the other hand, if carefully considered, the Eastern problem would not be more difficult to solve than the Western problem. From 1812 up to 1917, Russia had ever been the burial ground of every government and of every army that had attempted to enter the country without first establishing sufficient bases and sufficient lines of communication, and without an adequate number of men. A war in that country had to be carried on under very special difficulties, due to the enormous extent of country that had to be penetrated, occupied, and defended.

MR. LANSING, intervening, enquired whether when Marshal Foch had spoken of settling the Allies' difficulties in the West, he had

meant that the Allies should forthwith enter into a Treaty of Peace with the Germans.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that what he had meant had been that the Preliminaries of Peace must be signed, and that could be done with Germany alone in a fortnight's time: and the same thing could be done as soon as possible with the other enemy countries. In other words, his plan would be to settle all the important outstanding questions on the Western side in order to enable the Allies to use the resources thus made available for the solution of the Eastern questions.

The difficulties which the Allies had to face in Russia were due, not only to the enormous distances, to which he had already referred, but also to the nature of the enemy that had to be dealt with. The enemy might be badly organised, but he was scattered over an enormous territory, acting like a violent virus. Now to fight against such an enemy, troops of a particular composition were required; and in great numbers in order to cover the whole territory involved. But those troops need not be strongly organised or of superior quality. The necessary conditions would be fulfilled by the employment of such armies as might be raised locally in the countries of Eastern Europe. For instance, the Polish troops would be quite able to face the Russians, provided the former were strengthened by the supply of modern appliances and engines of war. But great numbers were required, which could be obtained by mobilising the Finns, Poles, Czechs, Roumanians and Greeks, as well as the Russian pro-Ally elements still available.

These young troops, in themselves not well organised, (though better organised than the Bolsheviks), would, if placed under a unique command, yield a total force sufficient to subdue the Bolshevik forces and to occupy their territory.

If this were done, 1919 would see the end of Bolshevism, just as 1918 had seen the end of Prussianism. But in order to attain that object, just as the Allies had a base on the Western front, the Rhine, which enabled them to impose their will on Germany, so would it be necessary to constitute a similar base on the Eastern side, consisting

of a chain of independent states—the Finns, the Esthonians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Greeks. The constitution of such a base would enable the Allies to impose their demands on the Bolsheviks.

Finally, to enable the Allies to transfer their resources from the Western base to the Eastern base, an end would have to be put to all further discussions on the West by imposing on Germany the Preliminaries of Peace, which she would be bound at the present moment to accept.

MR. HOUSE enquired from Marshal Foch whether he thought a preliminary peace with the Germans should be hurried on, to include the determination of the eastern boundaries of Germany besides including a summary decision of the military conditions, and questions relating to frontiers, finance and reparation; the whole to be disposed of simultaneously.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that Mr. House had correctly stated his views.

MR. BALFOUR said that everybody must admit that Marshal Foch had made a speech covering a wide field and of far reaching importance. On the other hand, the proposition which he (Mr. Balfour) had moved yesterday was that the Polish division now in France should be sent to Poland: a small and modest suggestion involving no particular question of principle at all. On that narrow foundation Marshal Foch had started out to build a great plan stretching from the Rhine to Vladivostock, which involved the immediate conclusion of the preliminary terms of peace with Germany.

He (Mr. Balfour) was most anxious to hasten the conclusion of the preliminary terms of peace. He had, himself, moved a proposition with that object in view. He could not, therefore, be accused of hampering the attainment of that object. But when Marshal Foch asked the Conference to defer the sending of a Polish division to Poland until the preliminaries of peace had been concluded with Germany, he evidently underrated the difficulties of the latter task. A discussion with a view to bringing about a preliminary peace could hardly be brought to a satisfactory conclusion unless three or four

such questions as the following were first settled, that is to say: financial questions, the question relating to the left bank of the Rhine, the question of Dantzig, etc., questions which could hardly be settled before President Wilson's return to Paris. No doubt other questions connected with the future frontiers of Germany could practically be settled in President Wilson's absence. For instance, the frontiers between France and Germany, the frontiers between Denmark and Germany and the frontiers between Poland and Germany excluding Dantzig.

On the other hand, the Conference could not move a step until the reports of the Allied Commissions, which were now at work on these problems, had been received. Those reports could not, however, be expected before the 8th March next. The Conference would then have a week to consider those reports before the return of President Wilson, and during that time no doubt some spade work could be done. It was evident, however, that, if the dates suggested by him were correct, it would be impossible to have the preliminary terms of peace ready, covering finance, disarmament, future maritime conditions, the question of the left bank of the Rhine, territories adjoining Alsace-Lorraine, Dantzig, etc., regarding which well-informed people held very divergent views. It would be impossible to draft a peace, involving all these questions, at the earliest before the end of March, and even that would be a very sanguine estimate. He would, therefore, press for the acceptance of his original proposal. It would be impossible to wait five or six weeks, which appeared to be the shortest time within which the preliminaries of peace could be drawn up, before sending to Poland the Polish troops which were so urgently required.

As regards Marshal Foch's plan to mobilise the whole of Eastern Europe, the Finns, the Esthonians, the Poles, the Roumanians and the Greeks into a great anti-Bolshevik army to be hurled against Russia, he had no objections to offer, as he was not qualified to express an opinion. But the plan undoubtedly dealt with tremendous issues: it could not be regarded as part of the accepted policy of the five Great Powers, and the Conference could not be asked to settle that question before deciding to carry out the small and most desirable operation of sending General Haller's army to Poland. He

fully agreed with Marshal Foch that not a single hour should be lost in settling the preliminary terms of peace, since a settlement of that question would help to solve all other problems. On the other hand, the question of sending troops to Poland must, for the moment, be dissociated from the greater question of policy raised by Marshal Foch: a question which must await the receipt of the recommendations of the various Allied Commissions and the return of President Wilson.

MARSHAL FOCH said he did not object to the idea of sending a division to Dantzig with as little delay as possible. But, at the present moment, the wish could hardly be realised, as the gates of Dantzig were closed. The Allied Commission in Poland could be asked if the thing were possible. But he, himself, could not see how the Poles, who were at war with Germany, could disembark in a German town. He quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that troops should be sent, but for the moment he failed to see how it could be done, and some other solution of the difficulty might have to be found.

LORD MILNER enquired whether it would not be possible to open the gates of Dantzig, if closed, by giving an order to Germany to open them. Marshal Foch had stated that on the west front an effective source of pressure on Germany could be exercised, especially as Germany would be unable to refuse to accept demands, which the Allies had a perfect right by the terms of the Armistice to make. Would it not, therefore, be sufficient to say to Germany: "Let these Polish troops through, or we shall attack on the western front?"

(c) Proposed Telegram to Allied Commossion in Poland MR. HOUSE expressed the view that it would be well to ask the Allied Commission in Poland, who were in touch with the Germans, to report exactly what views the Germans held regarding this matter. He thought a dispatch should be framed to the Allied Commission asking for a definite answer.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed, and said that he had himself intended to propose the despatch of a telegram to the Allied Commission in Poland, embodying, *inter alia*, the following four questions:—

1. Whether the transport of troops by the Dantzig-Thorn route was possible without previous occupation of the port of Dantzig and the railway lines by Allied contingents.
2. The capacity and resources of the port of Dantzig for disembarkation of troops.
3. Transport facilities and rolling stock available on the Dantzig-Thorn and Dantzig-Mlawa railway lines.
4. Whether horses could be obtained in Poland to meet the requirements of the troops to be despatched.

As the Allied Commission in Poland was in touch with the Germans, it would be in a position to reply after consulting the latter.

M. PICHON understood that Marshal Foch's proposal was accepted. Under the circumstances, he would ask Marshal Foch at once to draft the necessary telegram, which would be sent in the name of the five Great Powers to the Allied Commission in Poland. At the same time, he would point out that the Commission would only be in a position to supply information; it could not carry on negotiations. The question to be put to the Germans could, however, be based on the terms of the armistice which permitted the Allies to use the railway lines in question. Negotiations could only be carried out by Marshal Foch.

M. SONNINO invited attention to the fact that certain Polish contingents, numbering some 10,000 to 12,000 men were now in Italy. The question did not perhaps arise at the present moment, as it was intended merely to ask for a report on the possibilities of the Dantzig route to Poland. He wished, however, to bring the fact to the notice of the Conference.

M. CAMBON suggested that, in drafting the telegram, the Allied Commission should be invited to carry out the necessary enquiries through the medium of General Dupont, the Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin, as he was already on the spot, and had ready access to the competent German authorities.

(After a short interval, Marshal Foch submitted the following telegram to be despatched to the Allied Mission in Poland. The

telegram was approved, Marshal Foch being requested to forward the same:—

> "In accordance with the terms of Clause XVI of the Armistice of 11th November, 1918, the Allies have free access to all territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern front, either by way of Dantzig or by the Vistula, both for the purpose of sending supplies to the populations and for the purpose of maintaining order.
>
> Taking advantage of this clause, the Allied and Associated Governments intend shortly to transport to Poland the Polish troops now in France and in Italy. These troops will disembark at Dantzig, whence they will proceed by rail via Thorn and Mlawa.
>
> The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw is requested to inform the Allied and Associated Governments:—
>
> (1) Whether the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig and their transportation by rail can be guaranteed by the German Government without the necessity of securing this guarantee by a previous occupation of Dantzig and of the railways by Allied contingents.
> (2) What are the capacities of and the material facilities available at the port of Dantzig, both as regards the establishment of a base and the disembarkation of troops.
> (3) What quantity of transport is available, especially as regards rolling stock on the Dantzig-Thorn and Dantzig-Mlawa lines, and also on the Polish lines connecting with them.
> (4) As the transport of Polish troops could be greatly expedited by the enclusion of horses, it is important to know whether any of the horses required could be obtained in Poland.
>
> The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw should, as in the case of previous negotiations, avail itself of the services of General Dupont as intermediary.")

(d) telegram to Allied Maritime Council in London MR. BALFOUR enquired whether a telegram should not also be sent to the Allied Maritime Council in London, asking it to furnish a plan in the event of the transportation of troops by sea being decided on.

It was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the War Cabinet by the British Delegation for communication to the Allied Maritime Council in London:—

> "The Council at the Quai d'Orsay this afternoon decided to refer to the Allied Maritime Transport Council the preparation of a plan for the shipment at an early date, of General Haller's Polish army from France to Dantzig en route to Poland. The Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers in Poland has been instructed to communicate details as to the capacity of the port of Dantzig and the railways serving it. I understand that the Ministry of Shipping are in possession of the facts regarding the numbers of General Haller's army but the number of horses to be shipped will depend on information to be furnished by the Commission in Poland. Please ask Secretary, Allied Maritime Transport Council, to take the matter up. The Proces-verbal of this part of the meeting will in due course be sent to the Secretary, Allied Maritime Transport Council.")

(3) M. PICHON called on M. de Peretti to explain the views of the French Government on the Moroccan question with special references to the Act of Algeciras.[2]

Morocco: The Act of Algeciras M. DE PERETTI then read the following statement:—

(Statement will be circulated later.)[3]

MR. WHITE said that as a signatory of the Act of Algeciras he had listened with great interest to M. de Peretti's statement and, as far as his knowledge went, the facts appeared to him to have been fairly and accurately stated. In signing the Act of Algeciras the United States had made the following reservations:—

> "The Government of the United States of America had no political interests in Morocco and had taken part in the present Conference with no other desire or intention than to assist in assuring to all the nations in Morocco the most complete equality in matters of commerce, treatment, and privileges and in facilitating the introduction into that Empire of requirements which should bring about a general state of well-being founded on the perfect cordiality of her foreign relations, and stable internal administrative declarations:— that in subscribing to the regulations and declarations of the Conference by the act of signing the General Acts subject to ratification according to constitutional procedure of the additional protocol and in consenting to the abrogation of American rights and interests in Morocco, it assumes no obligation or responsibility as to the measures which may be necessary for the enforcement of the said regulations and declarations".

He had heard with great pleasure the statement made by M. de Peretti that France intended to observe the open door in Morocco. M. de Peretti had also made a statement to the effect that France would demand compensation for her sacrifices. He wished to enquire whether that meant that France would require special concessions for herself. However: as long as the open door was maintained, the United States had no objections to offer in principle to the proposals made by France. She would, however, reserve her final adhesion until the wording of the clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty had been made known.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would perhaps be unnecessary for him to say anything concerning the interests of Great Britain in Morocco, because her special interest in that country had ceased after the signing of the Treaty of 1904.[4] Furthermore, Great Britain did not now wish to take advantage of any conditions which Germany might now be compelled to renounce, to extract advantages which Britain had deliberately given up by the earlier treaties. He was glad to hear that it was the fixed intention of France to perpetuate the policy of the open door which would be extended to all countries, including Great Britain. It was not, however, from the point of view of Great

Britain that he wished to put a question on the international aspect of the case. It was possible he might have misunderstood some of the details of the case: but the Treaty under consideration was apparently one in which many Powers, both Allied and Neutral, were concerned, other than those represented at the Conference.

In regard to a Treaty in which so many parties were concerned he did not know what international rule would apply when one or two of the parties in question had gone to war. It was clear that Germany and Austria could no longer possess any rights; and no one would wish to defend rights which Germany had obtained by abusing her power and threatening the world with war.

In regard to the exact relation, which the proposals made that afternoon would have in connection with other parties such as Spain, he would like to enquire whether the Peace Conference had any right without consulting Spain to remove or abrogate a Treaty in which Spanish interests appeared to be very intimately concerned.

It had been stated that by one or other of the Treaties France had been given the protectorate over the whole of Morocco including the Spanish sphere of influence and Tangiers. That might be so, but by those same instruments, Spain had also been given a sphere of influence in which she had similar rights to those claimed by France elsewhere. He could not say which view was right, but Spain conceived herself to have claims equal to those of France and other countries in Tangiers. Whether Spain exercised those rights to the benefit of mankind, whether the laxity of her administration had permitted the Germans to make Morocco a base for submarine warfare, he did not know. But did the Assembly of the five Great Powers now meeting in Paris to deal with problems between the Allies and the Central Powers, have the right to deal with claims which Spain possessed under those Treaties with which it was proposed to deal so drastically.

The five Great Powers were there as guardians of the Treaty rights of the world. Therefore he would deeply regret if anything were done which might have the appearance of an attempt to impose conditions on neutrals, apparently depriving them of their rights.

It was imperative, therefore, that great care should be taken in moving in the matter. He did not know what form of conclusion should be reached. But it was impossible that day to deal with other parts of the proposal beyond these which took away from Germany and Austria the things they had legitimately lost. In any case, the consideration of the parts dealing with international and allied parties would have to be postponed until the Conference had time to consider the proposals put before them.

In conclusion he wished to make one more observation. He was reminded that the Spanish sphere and the internationalisation of Tangiers did not depend on the treaties of 1905,[5] 1909,[6] 1911,[7] and 1912,[8] but on the treaty between France and Spain of 1904.[9] Under Article 1 of that Treaty Spain adhered to the terms of the Anglo-French Treaty; Article 2 defined the Spanish sphere of influence and Article 9 dealt with the town of Tangiers. Those Treaties could not be said to have been forced on Spain, France and Europe since the claims of Spain against France and Great Britain went back to the Treaty of 1904.

M. DE PERETTI expressed his satisfaction at the complete agreement which appeared to exist between Great Britain, America and France on the question of the clauses concerning Morocco to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Germany. For the moment the French Government did not ask for anything more. In reply to Mr. White's enquiries in Regard to the privileges which France claimed, he could assure him that he had merely referred to those moral privileges which devolve on a well-educated country in its relations with a less educated people. No other privileges were claimed by France. Mr. White had also expressed his approval of the maintenance of the "open door". Not only did France intend to maintain this, but no discrimination would be shown between one country and another, all being placed on an equal footing.

The statements made by Mr. Balfour were quite correct, and the French Government held exactly the same views. There was no question of imposing anything on any country not represented at the Conference. All that France asked was that the Powers represented at the Conference should voluntarily renounce the privileges which they

had acquired by the Act of Algeciras, which privileges would be accorded to them by the declaration he had that afternoon made on behalf of the French Government. The rest merely concerned France and Spain.

Mr. Balfour had referred to the Treaty of 1904. That Treaty had, however, been modified by the Franco-Spanish Treaty signed on the 27th November, 1912, which defined the Spanish sphere of influence within the French Protectorate. France had every intention of adhering to the terms of that Treaty. The Sultan of Morocco recognised only one protectorate in Morocco, namely, the French protectorate, and it was only by an agreement entered into between France and Spain that the Spanish sphere of influence came to be recognised.

In regard to Tangier, Mr. Balfour had referred to Clause IX of the secret Treaty of 1904 between France and Spain, wherein it was laid down that the town of Tangier should be subjected to a special régime, owing to the presence there of a diplomatic body. Now, in the statement which he had made that afternoon, he had informed the Conference of the intention of the French Government to establish a special régime at Tangier, not an international régime, but something in the nature of a municipal régime. The British Minister at Tangier had expressed his approval of these proposals.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether there had not been an exchange of notes between France, Great Britain and Spain, laying down that Tangier should be granted an international régime.

M. DE PERETTI agreed, and said that in 1914 France and Great Britain had agreed upon a plan for an international statute to be applied to Tangier.

MR. BALFOUR, intervening, remarked that the agreement relating to the application of the international régime at Tangier had been agreed to by Great Britain in 1912.

M. DE PERETTI, continuing, explained that though the agreement with Great Britain had been signed in 1912, discussions with Spain

had subsequently lasted for two years, before Spain had agreed to consider a definite plan. That plan had been submitted to the Spanish Government in December, 1914, but so far no reply had been received. A few days ago M. Romanones[10] had stated in the Cortes that the war had prevented the Spanish Government from signing the agreement. As he had already stated, all that France asked, however, was that certain clauses which concerned Germany should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with that country. Although every question relating to Allied and Neutral countries could not be embodied in the Peace Treaty, France hoped that the question could be profitably discussed during the presence of the representatives of those countries in Paris.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the best plan would not be that a definite resolution embodying the general views of the French Government should be drawn up and circulated for discussion at a future meeting.

(It was agreed that a draft resolution embodying the views of the French Government on the Moroccan question, with special reference to the Act of Algeciras, should be drafted and circulated by M. de Peretti, and the question would be discussed by the Conference at an early meeting.)

(4) Agenda It was agreed that the following questions would be discussed at a meeting to be held on Wednesday afternoon, February 26th, 1919, at 3 o'clock:—

(1) A statement by M. Tardieu, Chairman of the Allied Commission on Belgium, on behalf of that Commission.
(2) The report of the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, on the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania.
(3) Armenian Claims.

(The Conference then adjourned to Wednesday, February 26th, 1919.)

PARIS, 26th February, 1919.

Addendum

The Moroccan Questions

Statement by M. de Peretti

(Circulated with reference to Section 3, Morocco, The Act of Algeciras, Page 13,[11] BC–39, Report for Tuesday February 25, 1919)

The task of dowering Northern Africa with modern civilization has been laid upon France by the force of circumstances.

In the first instance, France was compelled to obtain a footing in Algeria in order to protect her trade against the attacks of the Barbary pirates. Then the same reasons which drove her to intervene in Tunisia, where the unsettled situation was a menace to Eastern Algeria, forced her to enter Morocco, to stamp out a hot-bed of anarchy which threatened Eastern Algeria.

Since 1905, Germany has hindered France in the fulfilment of this task. Germany, whose hope of universal hegemony was thwarted by France, thought Morocco would provide an opportunity of opposing such a troublesome neighbour. She had no interests of any kind there, and even seems to have insisted on the fact that she only interfered in Moroccan affairs because it pleased her to do so. For ten years they provided her with a weapon against France, and the German Government used this sharp sword, this dry powder, whenever wishing to deal a blow to France.

In 1908 [*1905*] the Emperor William landed at Tangiers. The Moroccan Government at once invited the Powers to an International Conference to discuss reforms to be introduced in Morocco, which were precisely those which a French Mission to Fez was attempting to carry into effect at the time.

France was thus deprived of the position she had assumed in Morocco with the consent of England and Spain, and which fell naturally to her on account of the connection between her interests and those of the land ruled by the Shereef. Moroccan affairs were put

under international control instead of being directly controlled by France. As soon as invitations [to] the Conference were issued by the Sultan, the German Government, who had suggested them and made them their own, supported the suggestion in diplomatic circles.

The French Government, whose intentions were peaceful, did not attempt to question German interference in a discussion which did not concern her, nor to urge that the French right was universally recognised. Its conscience was clear, for it had no hostile intentions towards Germany in Morocco, and only desired peace and security for French possessions in Northern Africa. It therefore agreed to confer not only with Powers such as Spain and Great Britain, who had special interests in Morocco, but with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia and Sweden, who had none at all.

The Algeciras Conference came to an end on 7th April, 1906, when a general Treaty was signed. During the proceedings the Powers bound to France by previous agreements adhered strictly to them, and the remainder maintained a correct and friendly attitude; no attention was paid to German advances, and Germany was isolated in her campaign against France. Towards the end Austria-Hungary certainly pretended to side with Germany as a splendid second, but this was less to support her ally than to help her out of an awkward situation.

Germany was therefore defeated at Algeciras. Her attitude towards France found no support, and her aggressive policy was universally condemned. The Conference achieved her moral downfall. But the German Government had attained its ends, holding that the Algeciras Conference had not decided the Moroccan question. On the contrary, although it recognised the exceptional situation and special rights of France and Spain, the general Treaty of 7th April, 1906, provided the German Government with the weapon they sought against France, by creating international institutions, by burdening the administration of the country with complicated and detailed regulations controlled by the Diplomatic Corps at Tangiers, and by the power of daily interference in local affairs thus given in theory, to

all the Powers, but in reality to Germany alone, since the others had no desire to exercise it.

From the end of the Conference to the war of 1914, events have shown how often the German Government made use of these weapons, how frequent were the blows it was able to strike at France, and what advantages it gained through them. In this way to [*sic*] German policy first proclaimed in the speech made by William II at Tangiers has become daily more clearly defined: it aimed at keeping an open sore in the side of France, and at preventing the wound from healing so as to be able at pleasure to harass the Government of the Republic and thus to influence its general policy.

The French Government, led by force of circumstances to occupy part of Morocco, was faced at every step by fresh difficulties created by Germany, but instead of seeking excuses for quarrelling, it took every opportunity of showing an extremely conciliatory spirit, so great was its desire to maintain peace in Europe.

The French Government, moreover, sought later to justify German interference by deliberately creating German interests in Morocco for this purpose.[12] This was its reason for the Agreement of 8th February, 1909, and the Contract of 17th February, 1910.[13] Indeed, if the stipulations thereof had been carried out, the Germans would have possessed real interests in Morocco, but these would have been compatible with French interests and would have united nationals of both countries in a common task. The Berlin Cabinet had to admit that German interests would have been inaugurated in Morocco by the means we suggested, but it wished them to be separate from and entirely opposed to French interests. Both the Agreement and the Contract therefore remained a dead letter.

After this failure, the French Government made another attempt to maintain peace; it offered to make sacrifices in the Congo to compensate Germany for renouncing her claims in Morocco. By the Franco-German Agreement of 4th November, 1911, Germany at last acknowledged that France had a right to carry out reforms in Morocco, and that she must therefore establish a protectorate over the whole of Morocco.

This agreement was a bargain; the German Government accepted the sacrifices made by France and endeavoured to make them as painful as possible by sending the "Panther" to Agadir, where she remained till negotiations were at an end. But Germany gave nothing in exchange. After taking possession of the stipulated Congo districts, she did not disarm in Morocco, but adopted an attitude which, during 1912 and 1913, became more bitterly hostile than ever before.

Notwithstanding her recognition of the French Protectorate in Morocco, Germany had no intention of refraining from fostering disorder and anarchy in the Shereef's kingdom, provoking fresh insurrection and strife, or causing "incidents" within the country and beyond its boundaries, thus attacking France in her vital operations by imperilling her possessions in Northern Africa, without exposing German interests to any counter-attack. She continued this practice until the day when, having provoked the world-war, she bore down upon Paris with the massed forces of von Klück's and von Bülow's armies.

Since the war, Germany has created a battle-field against France in Morocco. She has assisted rebels (making use of the Spanish zone as a base for operations), furnishing them with money, arms and ammunition, thus compelling France to maintain a force of 80,000 men on this front.

Since the signing of the Armistice, the French Government has received irrefutable proof of the fact that Germany has continued to subsidise Moroccan rebels.

Through the victory of the Allies, which has cost France so dear, that country is now free from the German menace which confronted her unceasingly in Morocco. She is now justified in insisting on her legitimate claims at the Peace Conference.

By the Treaty of Peace with Germany, all conditions and charges which hampered the French Protectorate after German intervention must be removed. This is but right and proper. Further, Germany must henceforward play no part in Morocco.

Penalties must be exacted from her for the past and guarantees demanded for the future; she must not be in a position to recommence her old tactics.

The Treaty of Peace must, therefore, stipulate that the German Government shall accept the abrogation of the Treaty of Algeciras, the Franco-German Agreements of 2nd February 1909 and 4th November, 1911, as also of all treaties and agreements in force between Germany and the Kingdom of the Shereef. The German Government, which duly acknowledged the establishment of the French Protectorate over the whole of Morocco, shall agree to accept all consequences resulting therefrom, and in particular the absolute cancellation of all capitulations. It shall pledge itself to take no part in any negotiations which may arise between France and other Powers on the subject of Morocco.

Special clauses must be included in the Treaty of Peace concerning property belonging to the German State or its nationals, the admission of Germans into Morocco, as also concerning mining disputes and the Moroccan State Bank.

These clauses shall be defensive in character. Germany, who had no interests in Northern Africa, merely entered these regions in order to hinder France in her work of civilisation; she must therefore be kept at a distance until the said work is so advanced that it cannot be checked or hindered by any malevolent influence.

Germany's Allies, like herself, must renounce all advantages which have accrued to them under treaties dictated by Germany, and must recognise all conditions resulting from the French Protectorate in Morocco. There is no reason, however, why the said defensive clauses should apply to them, for they have not played the same part as Germany in the past and do not, like Germany, threaten to hinder France in her future schemes for civilisation.

As regards the other signatory Powers of the Treaty of Algeciras, whether Allies of France, Associates or Neutrals, they cannot refuse to recognise the injustice of maintaining a state of affairs created through the malevolent intervention of Germany. They have all

either already renounced the system of capitulations as regards Morocco, or are prepared to do so. It would be unjustifiable for them to take advantage of the Treaty of Algeciras. They will most decidedly follow the example of Great Britain, who has already declared herself ready to adopt the point of view of the French Government; for the British Government merely asks for a return to the Franco-British Agreements of 1904, which guaranteed to British nationals in Morocco all privileges compatible with the French Protectorate. The French Government is pursuing no selfish aims with regard to Morocco; in guiding that country along the path of progress, it merely wishes to reserve therein some compensation of French sacrifices, but is far from desiring in any way to close this country to foreigners and claim monopoly thereof. The regime of the open door will prevail in Morocco, for France has not made this country accessible with the intention of closing it to those who desire to work therein on an equal footing with the French.

The repeal of the Treaty of Algeciras would, therefore, in no way prejudice the Allied or Neutral Powers. But the Treaty of Algeciras concerned the whole of Morocco; its abrogation would be felt not only in the French zone of the Shereefan Empire, but also in the Spanish zone and that of Tangiers.

As regards the Spanish zone, it is evident from the declarations made to the Cortes by the Spanish Government, that it intends to cause that zone to benefit by the cancellation of the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Algeciras. Does the Spanish Government also wish to renounce the rights admitted, by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27th November, 1912, to belong to it in its zone of influence? Will it listen to the protests of the Sultan of Morocco, who complains, in the name of the guiding principles of the League of Nations, that the national integrity of the Shereefan Empire has been assailed, by releasing certain portions of that Empire from his authority? Those are questions which do not come before the Peace Conference and only concern France and Spain, by whom they might, if necessary, be settled by amicable negotiation.

It is otherwise in Tangiers. The abolition of the Treaty of Algeciras would alter the present situation in Tangiers. France demands that

the new position created in that town by the abolition of the regulations prescribed at Algeciras should be recognised by the Powers who were parties to that Treaty. The maintenance of the present situation in Tangiers would, moreover, enable Germany to return to Morocco and resume the policy which she pursued there for ten years, greatly to the peril of the peace of Europe.

What is the present position of Tangiers, in point of law and of fact?

In point of law, the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 30th March, 1912, which established the French Protectorate over the whole of Morocco, and the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27th November, 1912, which delimited the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco within the French Protectorate, both made a special reservation regarding the Statute of Tangiers. The town of Tangiers and its suburbs were to be given a separate constitution, the form of which was to be determined subsequently, by reason of the presence of the various International Commissions created or maintained under the Treaty of Algeciras.

The draft of an International Statute, prepared for Tangiers in 1914 by the French and British Governments, remained a dead letter, as the Spanish Government neglected to adopt it.

In point of fact, no stable administration can be established in Morocco by any Protecting Power which does not dispose freely of Tangiers. It is the old diplomatic capital of Morocco, it is the gate which opens Morocco to Europe. To refuse Tangiers to France, who has charge of Morocco, would be to refuse her the key to the house in which she lives. Now, up to the present Tangiers has remained in the same condition as that of the whole of Morocco before the Protectorate Treaty. It is a veritable diplomatic Tower of Babel, in which no one governs, where every kind of intrigue is fostered, where the administration is anarchical and every ancient abuse is perpetrated under cover of the capitulations and the Treaty of Algeciras.

This state of things could not endure without great danger to Tangiers, Morocco, France, and Europe generally.

For these reasons, *de jure* and *de facto*, France asks her Allies, in so far as they are severally concerned, to recognise that, after the abolition of the Treaty of Algeciras (which imposed upon Morocco an internationalisation directed against France), Tangiers can no longer be subject to international administration. Tangiers, which in point of law forms part of France's Protectorate, must be, in fact, annexed to the French zone. France, moreover, desires nothing more than to seek to institute the special administration provided for in the Franco-Spanish Treaty, an administration which would be in no wise international, but would give satisfaction to all rightful interests existing in the town.

To sum up, it is indispensable to France that the Treaty of Peace should provide for the cancellation of all international guarantees (*Hypothèques?*) now burdening Morocco by the action of Germany; to this intent, various clauses must be inserted into the Treaty after having been considered and drafted by a Special Commission, which the Supreme Council of the Allies is asked to constitute at the earliest possible moment from among the delegates of those Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras.

[1] The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC–39a) and the telegraphic report of the meeting from the American Mission to the Department of State give the address and text of this telegram as follows:

> "Gesandten Konferenz, p. a. Staatsamt des Auesseren, 1 Ball Platz, Vienna.
>
> The Allied and Associated Governments understand that there is some risk that the coupons payable first March on the Austro-Hungarian loans will not be paid, owing to inability of the Austrian, Hungarian and other governments concerned to arrive at an agreement as to their respective liabilities to contribute towards payment.
>
> The Allied and Associated Governments declare that so far as they are concerned any action taken now with regard to the payment of the March coupon from the common fund will not prejudice the settlement at the Peace Conference of the distribution of the liability for the Austro-Hungarian debt."

(Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/46)

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

[3] See addendum, p. 131 [*Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 7*].

[4] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XCVII, p. 39, and vol. CI, p. 1053.

[5] Franco-Spanish treaty of September 1, 1905, E. D. Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy* (London, 1912), p. 248.

[6] Franco-German declaration of February 8, 1909, Great Britain, Cd. 6010. Morocco No. 5 (1911).

[7] Franco-German convention of November 4, 1911, *ibid.*, No. 6.

[8] French-Morocco treaty of March 30, 1912, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVI, p. 1023; Franco-Spanish treaty of November 27, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 1025.

[9] Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 2 (1911).

[10] Alvaro de Figueroa y Torres Romanones, Spanish Prime Minister from December 3, 1918, to April 15, 1919.

[11] See minute 3, p. 127 [*Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 7*].

[12] The portion of M. de Peretti's statement comprised in this and the three following paragraphs appears to be substantially a translation of pp. 200–202 of a work by Louis Maurice, *La Politique marocaine de l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1916).

[13] For a description, see *ibid.*, pp. 136–156.

February 26, 3 p.m. (BC–40)

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[8] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 26 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/47

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/47

BC–40

[Document 8]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 26 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	present during question 1
Hon. R. Lansing.	Great Britain
Hon. H. White.	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Secretary	Italy
Mr. L. Harrison.	H. E. M. Crespi.
British Empire	present during question 2
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	America, United States of
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.	Dr. C. H. Haskins.
Secretaries	Great Britain
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps.	Italy
France	H. E. M. Crespi.
M. Pichon.	present during question 3
M. Tardieu.	America, United States of
Secretaries	Dr. C. H. Haskins.
M. Berthelot.	Great Britain
M. de Bearn.	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino.

H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi.

M. Bertele.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.

H. E. M. Matsui.

Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.

Brig. Gen. H. W. Studd, C. B., D. S. O.

FRANCE

General Belin.

Maj. Lacombe.

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi.

Gen. Cavallero.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 4

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. W. L. Westermann.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Toynbee.

Lt. Col. Gribbon.

FRANCE

M. Gout.

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi.

M. Galli.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 5

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi.

ARMENIAN DELEGATION

Boghes Nubar Pasha.

A. Aharonian.

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF — Lieut. Burden.

British Empire	Captain E. Abraham.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi

(1) M. Pichon said that before beginning the Agenda Mr. Balfour wished to make a proposal.

Frontier Between Poland & Germany Mr. Balfour said that the matter to which he wished to draw attention was one of some importance. The Conference was anxious to make all possible arrangements for completing a speedy Preliminary Peace with Germany. One of the matters requiring settlement was the frontier between Germany and Poland. He had supposed that a Committee was dealing with this matter, but on enquiry he had found that he was mistaken. He therefore suggested, either that a Committee should be employed to investigate this question, or that it should be added to the labours of an existing Committee. For instance, that dealing with Polish affairs. If this were accepted M. Jules Cambon would be the President. He then read the following draft terms of reference to the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs:—

> "It is agreed:—
>
> That the question of the boundaries of the Polish State shall be referred for examination and report by the Committee set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris for the consideration of Polish affairs.
>
> The Committee is instructed to report on the boundary between Poland and Germany not later than March 8th."

M. Pichon asked whether Baron Sonnino agreed.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that the frontiers of Germany in general had not been handed over for discussion to any Commission. Nevertheless, the other frontiers would also have to be dealt with. The various Commissions, it had been agreed, were to be asked to

make their reports by March 8th. On March 8th, therefore, the Conference would have before it material concerning portions only of the frontiers requiring definition. There would not be on that date any report concerning the frontier of Germany with Austria-Hungary.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the land frontiers of Germany marched with Denmark, Belgium, France, Switzerland, German-Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. In all cases, save that of German-Austria, the question was being dealt with mostly by Commissions. The question raised by Baron Sonnino referred to the frontier with German-Austria. Was it proposed that there should be a Commission on this subject?

MR. LANSING said he thought there was to be a Commission on the approximate frontiers of Germany as a whole.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that co-ordination of all the reports of the Commissions could take place after they had been received.

BARON SONNINO said that he did not care whether a Commission was appointed to deal with the frontier of German-Austria or not, but if the Council was to be in a position to settle frontiers on March 8th, it was clear that the present procedure would not furnish material for a general discussion. Part of the work had been farmed out to Commissions. Was the rest expected to settle itself, or to be dealt with by each delegation separately?

MR. WHITE questioned whether any alteration was foreseen in respect to the frontier between Germany and German-Austria.

BARON SONNINO said that perhaps there would be no need to alter this frontier, but there were many other questions not being dealt with by Commissions. For instance, the frontiers of Bulgaria and Turkey.

M. SALVAGO RAGGI said that it was important to decide whether such questions were to be dealt with separately by delegations, or collectively in Commissions.

M. PICHON pointed out that there were Commissions on Greek, Roumanian, Serbian and Yugo-Slav questions.

M. SALVAGO RAGGI said that there [is] none on Turkey.

M. PICHON suggested that the Greek Commission might be charged with this question.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it would be a mistake to entrust the big political question connected with Asia Minor to any Commission.

BARON SONNINO asked in what other manner it would be possible to deal with Greek aspirations in Asia Minor.

MR. LANSING suggested that all boundaries not specially referred to Commissions or Committees should be entrusted to a co-ordinating committee to be formed at a later stage. The frontiers of Germany which were more particularly under discussion might be dealt with by that co-ordinating body. He said he would have something to propose on the following day on this subject and suggested that the discussion be postponed.

BARON SONNINO concurred with this proposal.

(It was then decided that the discussion on boundaries in general should be postponed until the following day, but that the question of the boundary of the Polish State should be referred for examination and report by the Committee set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris for the consideration of Polish Affairs. The Committee is instructed to report on the boundary between Poland and Germany not later than March 8th.)

(2) M. TARDIEU said that the Commission at the outset had been stopped by certain hesitations and doubts which it had decided to submit to the Council. He then read the following statement:—
Statement by M. Tardieu on Behalf of Belgium Commission

> "At the first meeting of the Committee, the following opinions were expressed:—

(1) It is difficult to state an opinion regarding possible compensations in favour of any Power without recording, in that respect, the opinion entertained by the Power under consideration.
(2) It is difficult to express any opinion regarding possible compensations without having first studied what these compensations are to make up for.

Now:

(1) On the first point, the Committee is unanimously of opinion that under present conditions it is not entitled to ask the representatives of Holland to give evidence.
(2) On the second point, several members of the Committee believe that the Committee does not hold any brief from the Supreme Council to take up that study.

Under these conditions, the Committee begs to submit to the Supreme Council the following questions:

(1) If the Committee is entrusted only with the study of the compensations to be eventually granted to Holland in exchange for territories eventually transferred by Holland to Belgium, is the Committee authorised to hear the representatives of Holland, and in what way shall this hearing be called for?
(2) Is the Committee authorised, under the reservations resulting from the present situation, to study from the ethnical, political, economic and military point of view the territorial claims of Belgium on the left bank of the Scheldt and on the southern part of Dutch Limburg?

(Note: The above text is the English text as furnished by the Secretariat General.)

M. PICHON said that the proposal leading to the creation of the Commission had been made by Mr. Balfour. Subject to any explanations Mr. Balfour cared to make, it appeared to him that the Commission should be empowered to examine Dutch witnesses.

M. TARDIEU said that Dutch delegates on receiving an invitation from the Commission might attend, but it was not unlikely that they would say that they had no explanation to offer. Should they refuse to make any statement, the work of the Commission would not be much assisted. His own suggestion was that the Commission should be empowered to study the Belgian claims. Without knowing what they were the Commission could not decide what ought to be given to Holland by way of compensation.

MR. BALFOUR said that if he were appealed to for a statement of the position he would say that Belgium had no claim, in the ordinary sense, to any territory belonging to a neutral and friendly State. The sort of question that arose between Roumania and Hungary did not arise as between Belgium and Holland. The Conference had no power to ask Holland, a friendly and neutral State, to cede any portion of its territory; and if this were admitted, as he thought it must be admitted, the question for the Commission was a purely practical one. The Belgians said that certain portions of Dutch territory were very inconvenient to Belgium, interfering with their waterborne traffic or rendering their strategic defence risky. No right to an alteration was alleged, but it was suggested that certain territories, now under German sovereignty, but Dutch in sympathy, language and tradition, might be so much desired by Holland, that their cession would incline the Dutch to offer Belgium the territories she desired. This he understood to be the Belgian argument. The Commission had not been asked to adjudicate on the value of the exchange. Only the Dutch could decide whether it satisfied them. But there were certain questions on which the Conference should obtain data before contemplating any such exchange between Holland and Belgium. It would be manifestly wrong to hand over unwilling German populations to Holland. The problem was to know whether they were willing to be Dutch. Such a problem was quite outside the scope of the question raised by M. Tardieu. On this subject he thought it right to inform the Council that the Dutch Minister in London had called on him in a state of considerable agitation after reading in the newspapers that the question of taking Dutch territory and giving it to Belgium had been discussed before the Council. The Dutch Minister had said that nothing would induce Holland to give up an inch of its territory. Mr. Balfour had not thought himself

justified in mentioning the question of an exchange of German territory for territory ceded to Belgium. He had said that the Conference did not consider it any part of its functions to offer territory belonging to a neutral and friendly State to another State.

M. PICHON said that the Dutch Minister in Paris had come to see him on a similar errand. M. Pichon had replied very much as Mr. Balfour had. He had said that the Belgian Delegation had suggested a possible exchange, but that the Council had not made any decision on such a subject, and certainly would do nothing without the knowledge and consent of Holland. The Dutch Minister had left a formal declaration by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs that Holland would not consent to yield any portion of its territory.

M. TARDIEU said that according to Mr. Balfour's interpretation, all the Commission could do was to gather information about Frizia and Guelderland; respecting the language, race, economical situation, etc. of the populations. Even this he thought would be difficult, unless the Commission knew roughly the extent of territory over which their investigation must be carried out. The extent of this territory would no doubt be governed by the amount of compensation required to satisfy the Dutch. The view expressed by Mr. Balfour had been the view of the British and American Delegates on the Commission, but, as there had not been complete agreement, it had been decided to refer the matter to the Council. As Chairman, he could now make the position quite clear to the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the scope of the Commission must remain somewhat vague. The limits could not be laid down exactly.

MR. LANSING said that the Commission must take into account the views of the populations in the territories to be surrendered by Germany to the Dutch and also by the Dutch to the Belgians.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it was hardly necessary for the Commission to investigate the feelings of the population of Maestricht and on the south bank of the Scheldt.

LORD MILNER remarked that it seemed unnecessary to disturb the minds of those people.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to make an observation not as Chairman of the Commission, but as a member of the Conference. He admitted that the Belgians had no territorial claims in the ordinary sense, but the underlying principle of their whole demands was that the régime of neutrality set up in 1839 had been destroyed by the war. Belgium did not wish to return to that status. Two of the signatories of the Treaty of 1839—France and Great Britain—supported Belgium in this, and President Wilson had declared himself in favour of complete sovereignty for Belgium. But as long as the Great Powers had not declared openly that a new régime must be substituted for the old, the work of the Commission would continue to be hampered. It would have doubts as to whether it could deal with one subject or another. It would be involved in diplomatic difficulties, especially in dealing with Holland. He thought that not only in the general interest, but in fairness to Belgium, this question should be decided once and for all. If it were declared that the 1839 Treaty had ceased to exist, it would follow that fresh negotiations between the signatories of that Treaty had become necessary.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was quite of M. Tardieu's view. He felt inclined to suggest that the Commission over which M. Tardieu presided should be asked to consider the question. He would suggest some such terms of reference as the following:—

> "Inasmuch as circumstances have, in the opinion of the Conference, profoundly modified or destroyed the Treaty of 1839, the Commission should consider what steps ought to be taken to put the status of Belgium on a new basis."

MR. LANSING said that he had no wish to disagree, but he doubted whether the Treaty had been destroyed merely by the outbreak of war. As between the belligerents, the Treaty might have come to an end, but it was unlikely that the war terminated it between Belgium and neutrals.

M. TARDIEU said that this was an additional reason for his statement that revision was necessary. So long as the treaty remained unrevised, Belgium remained bound to Holland, even though she and the Allied Powers were anxious to be free from this old arrangement.

MR. LANSING said that he was raising no objection to the reference of the question to the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Commission had no right to abrogate a Treaty.

M. TARDIEU enquired whether there was any objection to hearing Belgian representatives before the Commission to assist in the study of this matter.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that this might be troublesome, in as much as the Commission had no right to call Dutch evidence.

M. TARDIEU then suggested that without hearing any evidence, Dutch or Belgian, the Commission should give its own view of the neutrality Treaty. After hearing the report, the Conference could then consider what decision should be taken. After a decision had been taken, the Council would be in a position to call witnesses from all countries interested.

(It was decided that the Belgian Commission should examine the question of the neutral status of Belgium as established by the Treaty of 1839, and make recommendations to the Council concerning modifications of this status.)

(3) At M. Pichon's request, GENERAL BELIN read the following report: —

> Creation of Neutral Zone in Transylvania "The Military Representatives of the Supreme War in Council, after taking cognisance of the decision reached by the Prime Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on the 21st February, 1918 [*1919*],[1] concerning the delimitation of a

neutral zone in Transylvania between Hungarians and Roumanians:

After hearing in succession

The Roumanian General Coanda on the general conditions, historical, moral, political and ethnographical relating to these questions:

The Roumanian Colonel Dimitresco on the strategical conditions required to place the Roumanian armies in a position to defend themselves against all eventual aggression by Hungarian troops:

Dr. Vaida, Roumanian Minister, on the general internal conditions of Transylvania:

General Henrys, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the Orient:

General Charpy, Chief of Staff of the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in the East, on the possibility of the occupation by these Armies of the neutral zone to be defined;

Agree:

On the principle that the proposals which they submit to the Conference of the Prime Ministers relate only to provisional measures of occupation, without prejudice in any manner to the final attribution of the occupied regions.

The Military Representatives further consider:

That the advance of Roumanian troops to contact with Hungarian troops may have the consequence, among others, of causing serious conflicts between them;

That it is desirable to take all measures to avert such conflict as would impede the work of the Peace Conference and create

between the peoples destined in the future to live side by side profound causes of hostility likely to disturb the peace.

The Military Representatives therefore conclude:—

That it is desirable to create in Transylvania between Hungarians and Roumanians a neutral zone free from all Hungarian and Roumanian troops, the important points in which should be occupied by Allied troops (approximately 2 infantry battalions with some squadrons or 1 regiment of cavalry) with the mission of maintaining order and tranquillity in this zone, with the assistance, if necessary, of Inter-Allied Commissions whose function it will more particularly be to control the various administrative offices, the administration of the territories continuing to be carried out in accordance with the conditions fixed by the Armistice with Hungary.

They propose that the zone should be defined as follows:—

Eastern or Roumanian Limit: The main road from Arad to Nagyszalonta thence the railway Grosswardein (Nagy Varad) —Nagy Karoly, Szatmar Nemeti. All localities mentioned to be excluded from military occupation by the Roumanians but, together with the railway, to be available for the use of the Roumanian troops and inhabitants, under Allied control, for economic purposes.

Northern Limit: The River Szimos.

Western or Hungarian Limit: A line 5 kilometres west of the treaty line of 1916.[2]

Southern Limit: The armistice line of November, 1918 (River Maros), Arad and Szeged being occupied by Allied troops to the exclusion of both Roumanian and Hungarian troops."

M. PICHON asked General Belin whether he felt sure that the Inter-Allied Control could be organized.

GENERAL BELIN replied that this question had been put to General Charpy, who thought that General Berthelot's army could spare the two battalions required. There was not between the Hungarians and Roumanians any very notable tension, and a very small force would apparently suffice to maintain order. This had been found to be the case at Arad and at Szegedin, where one squadron of cavalry and one company respectively had been stationed. He had since heard that a report from General Pathé stated that General Berthelot could not furnish the two battalions. The Military Representatives, therefore, only stated that two battalions were required to keep order and left it to the Governments to find them. General Charpy, however, had told him that, if the Allied Governments decided to adopt the recommendations made by the Military Representatives, he felt sure General Henrys would contrive to ensure order.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to draw attention to a small point in the drafting of the report. The western limit of the zone was described as a line 5 kilometres West of the Treaty line of 1916, There had been a great deal of discussion as to whether this treaty had or had not been abrogated by the agreement made between Roumania and the enemy. This discussion had caused considerable excitement of public opinion in Roumania. It was perhaps desirable not to allude to it in such a document. He would suggest, therefore, that the geographical description of the line should be substituted for the description given.

(It was agreed that the draft should be altered accordingly.)

M. TARDIEU asked whether so small a force as that suggested would be able to occupy the railway effectually.

GENERAL BELIN explained that a company would be situated at each of the main junctions, together with a "Commission de gare" which would regulate the working of the line. The line would be used to furnish the necessary supplies to the Roumanian forces and to the local populations, under Allied control. Any trouble occurring between these occupied points could be dealt with rapidly by small flying columns. Very little trouble was anticipated. The same arrangements were contemplated on the Hungarian side, and a

company would be stationed at Debreczen. In addition to the troops on the south, this force would be able to police the whole zone.

M. SALVAGO RAGGI pointed out that mention was made in the document of an armistice with Hungary. He suggested that the words "with Hungary" be deleted.

(This was agreed to.)

He further suggested that in the last paragraph, for the words "the armistice line of November, 1918 (River Maros)", the words "the line of the River Maros" should be substituted.

(This was agreed to.)

(With the alterations noted above, the report of the Military Representatives was adopted. For Final text, see Annexure "A".)

(The Military Representatives then withdrew.)

(The Armenian Delegates then entered the Room.)

(4) M. AHARONIAN read the following statement:—

Statement of American Deputation "As representatives of the Armenian Republic—which has been regularly constituted for a year in Transcaucasia, with Erivan as the seat of its Parliament and Government—we have the honour to lay the following facts before the Conference and to make the following request:—

Before the war of 1914–1918, there were about 2 million Armenians in Transcaucasian Russia, to say nothing of Armenians in Turkey and Persia, A fifth of these were scattered in the big cities, especially Tiflis, Batum and Baku, and the remainder, i. e. more than a million and a half, lived as a compact community in the districts of Erivan, Kars, Chucha, and Alexandropol, which have been the dwelling-place of our race for two or three thousand years and where the Supreme Head of the Armenian Church, the Catholicos of all Armenians, lives in his monastery of Echmiadzin.

At the beginning of the war, our nation not only forgot all grievances against Tsarist rule and rallied whole-heartedly to the Russian flag in support of the Allied cause, but our fellow-countrymen in Turkey and all over the world offered to the Government of the Tsar (the archives of the Russian Embassy at Paris prove this) to establish and support Armenian legions at their own expense to fight side by side with Russian troops under the command of Russian generals.

The Tsar's Government stated, through its Ambassador in Paris, that it would be preferable if individual Armenians enlisted in the Russian Army. They at once did so and during 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917 Armenian volunteers from all parts of the world fought for the Allied cause side by side with their fellow-countrymen who were regulars in the Russian Army; more than 180,000 Armenians defended the freedom of nations, and this devotion to the common cause called down on the Armenian people the hatred of Ottomans and Young Turks, which gave rise to massacres lasting two years and laid waste all the Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1917, when the Russian revolution summoned the Constituent Assembly, the Armenian deputies (who had been freely elected by our nation) received a mandate to fight to a finish and to help loyally in the organisation of a Russian Republic based on a Parliamentary constitution and federative rule. Russia had no more faithful helpers during Kerensky's rule than our nation, either on the battlefields of Europe and Asia or in any administrative offices of the capital or provinces.

In the Autumn of 1917, when all Armenian territory and the Ottoman vilayets freed by the combined efforts of Russia and Armenia, as well as the provinces of Transcaucasia, were exposed to the Turkish invasion owing to Bolshevist defection, the leaders of our people, both laymen and Churchmen, begged the authorities and the Russian Command not to forsake them and renewed their offers of help to continue the struggle. But the Russian generals themselves were forsaken by their men, and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk handed over to Turkey the western half of Caucasian Armenia, including the gate of Kars which laid all Transcaucasia open to invasion.

In order to oppose this invasion and still remain faithful to the Allied cause, the Armenian people in the Caucasus summoned the National Congress on 20th October, 1917; 125 delegates duly elected by the Armenian people, appointed a Council, or rather a Government for National Defence. I became its President, and the mandate given to its 15 members was to resist the Turkish invasion by all possible means and to replace the collapsed Russian front in Asia by an Armenian front.

From October 1917 to June 1918 this Government, under my direction, reorganised and maintained an Armenian army with the help of Armenian resources alone without any help from Russia (which we considered from then onward as a foreign country) or the Allies, who were too far away from us to send more than encouragement and promises. Even Armenian soldiers serving with the Russian armies on the European front could not rejoin us, and Armenian volunteers still fought in the Allied ranks in Palestine.

Through the French Consulate at Tiflis, the French Government sent us a telegram from His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha (head of the Delegation sent to the Allies by the Armenian Catholicos), in which our fellow-countrymen throughout the whole world urged us to hold on whatever happened and not to abandon the cause of the Entente.

On behalf of the National Council, I replied, through the French Consulate at Tiflis:—

(1) That the Armenian Nation was ready to do its supreme duty, as it had done since the beginning of the war;
(2) That it counted on the material, moral, and, if possible, military help of the Allies.
(3) That it asked them to acknowledge the independence of Armenia.

In reply to this telegram, I received a second communication from His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha (still through the French Consulate) in which the promise of help and assistance was renewed to us.

As regards the independence of Armenia, we were told that the declarations made in the British House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies were of such a nature as to satisfy our claims.

Although we did not know what the text of those declarations was, the Armenian Nation rallied round its National Council, in order to fling itself yet again into the struggle against the Turks. A *leveé en masse* was decreed, and an army of 50,000 men organised in the latter months of 1917, notwithstanding the endless difficulties created by the antagonism which our various Caucasian neighbours manifested against us and against the Entente.

The Tartars and the Kurds, siding openly with Turkey, organised themselves at our rear and did whatever they could to hamper us. The Georgians—with whom we had been linked in the past by the common bond of religion and of suffering—did not consider it their duty to side with us. Though far from the Allies and without their promised help, alone, abandoned and even harried by our neighbours, we nevertheless threw ourselves once more into this supreme struggle, intending, even if we could not be victorious, to stop the Turkish advance towards the interior of the Caucasus, whilst awaiting that Allied victory as to which we never cherished the least doubt.

General Nazarbekian—whose military skill had been greatly appreciated in the Russian Army—was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and the renowned Andranik, who had fought Abdul Hamid and Turkish tyranny for 30 years, was placed at the head of a division of Turkish Armenians. It was this Armenian Army which entered the front abandoned by the Russians, and held it from Erdinjan to the Persian frontier.

This unequal struggle against a greatly superior enemy lasted 7 months. The most sanguinary battles took place at Erdinjan and at Van. There were encounters at Erzerum, Sarikamish, the fortress of Kars, Alexandropol, Sarderabad, and Karaklis, when the Turks lost very heavily. I myself went to Sarikamish, in order to reestablish moral[e]. It was this heroic Armenian resistance which not only prevented the Turks from advancing into the interior of the

Caucasus, but also, by holding back their army, prevented their descent into Mesopotamia for 7 months and helped General Allenby to victory in Palestine by deflecting a large proportion of Syrian forces.

In the meantime, German troops having reached the Caucasus, Georgia declared its independence under German military protection. Tartary, with the help and support of the Turkish army, also declared its independence under the name of Azerbaijan. Caucasian unity was thus destroyed. It was then that the Armenian National Council proclaimed the independence of Armenia.

Our Republic has been in existence for nearly a year. She has repulsed Tartar and Georgian aggression, and has maintained a regular and disciplined army approximately 40,000 strong. We have been untouched by Bolshevism and any other demoralising taint, and have kept perfect order over a territory of 60,000 square kilometres.

It is on behalf of the Armenian Republic that I now make the request set forth below:—

In view of the fact that Russia abandoned the Armenians to their fate, in spite of their entreaties, allowed a war beyond their strength to devolve on them alone, and that, moreover, without even consulting them, she handed over to Turkey by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk[3] the Armenian provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Kaghisman, and so ruined hundreds of thousands of Armenians; that by these very acts she broke all ties which bound her to the Armenian nation, the Armenian Republic asks for recognition of the independence it won on the battlefield, and which the success of its arms has forced even our enemies to acknowledge. In view of the sacrifices which Armenia made, without bargaining, for the cause of the Allies, I have the honour to demand, on behalf of the Armenian Nation, that it should be given, through its delegates, a well-merited seat at the Peace Conference.

The Caucasian Armenians ardently desire reunion of the republic with the Armenian provinces of Turkey, for the following reasons:—

(1) Because the two main sections of the nation, Turkish Armenia and Caucasian Armenia, though separated from each other in an entirely arbitrary manner are identical as regards essential characteristics, speaking the same language, and possessing the same traditions and customs, religion, church and ecclesiastical head—the Catholicos of all Armenians.
(2) Both sections of Armenia represent a single geographic and economic whole, extending from Lori [*Gori?*] and Borchalu in the north down to the Mediterranean and, in the south, to the Armenian Taurus.
(3) This national unity is imperative not merely by reason of historical rights, but also by reason of present necessity, for Caucasian Armenia, which is civilised and powerful and possesses a population of nearly 2,000,000, would be the only sufficient basis for the reorganisation and restoration of Turkish Armenia, now depopulated and ruined by the Turks.
(4) The desire of the Caucasian Armenians to be united to their compatriots in Turkey is all the more intense and justifiable from the fact that a large portion of the population of Caucasian Armenia originated in Turkish Armenia, and was transplanted by the Russians during the last century. In fact, the districts of New Bayazet, Kaghisman, Kars, Alexandropol and Akhaltzikh are populated almost exclusively by Turkish Armenians.
(5) The ecclesiastical centre for all Armenians is situate within the territory of the Republic at Echmiadzin, on the banks of the Arax. Within this territory are also to be found nearly all the capitals of the various dynasties of Great Armenia, i. e. Armavir, Vagharchapat, Dvin, Artachat, Yervandakert, Yervand achat and Ani.
(6) The valley of the Arax which is the centre of Armenia—has also from time immemorial been the centre of Armenian culture and civilisation. The ruins of the capitals above mentioned bear witness thereto.
(7) Armenian unity is necessary, for should the two sections of the people remain divided, such division would give rise to an undying desire for union, which desire would inevitably cause disturbance and unrest.
(8) The union of Turkish and Caucasian Armenia is already an accomplished fact, for within the territory of the Armenian

> Republic there are at present from 400,000 to 500,000 Turkish Armenians who have escaped massacre by the Turks during the war, and the younger generation of which has fought for the conquest of liberty on all our battle-fields.

The Caucasian Armenians, for their part, have during the last thirty years continually sent the best of their youth, under the leadership of such glorious chiefs as Durman, Vartan, Dro, and many others, to fight against Turkish tyranny and deliver Turkish Armenia from the Ottoman yoke.

Our history has proved that unity and independence alone have served the Armenian Nation."

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA made the following statement:—

"I shall try to be as brief as possible in order not to tax your patience. I think it is needless to recall the numerous promises of reform made by the Porte since the Congress at Berlin. These promises were never fulfilled. Nor need I recall the massacres and deportations concerning which you have full knowledge. You also know by official evidence, which has been published, the unheard of crimes surpassing in horror all that history has registered hitherto, the victims of which reach and even exceed one million.

I wish, however, to recall that at the beginning of the War the Turkish Government had offered to grant the Armenians a sort of autonomy, asking from them in exchange, volunteers to rouse the Caucasus against Russia. The Armenians rejected this proposal and placed themselves without hesitation on the side of the Entente Powers from whom they expected liberation.

The Armenians have fought at the side of the Allies since the first days of the War, until the signature of the Armistice on all fronts.

I shall not repeat what they achieved in the Caucasus. M. Ahrounian, President of the delegation of the Armenian Republic has just given you a long account far better than I shall be able to do.

I would like to mention, however, that in Syria and Palestine, in the Legion d'Orient where Armenian Volunteers, in accordance with the invitation made by the French Government to the National Delegation in 1916—when the agreement between the Allied Powers was signed—gathered to the number of five thousand forming more than half the French contingent and took so brilliant a share in the great Palestine victory, which liberated Syria, that General Allenby sent them an official congratulation.

Lastly, in France, in the Foreign Legion, a crack Corps which has covered itself with glory, Armenian Volunteers gained a special distinction for bravery and endurance. Of 800 recruits at the beginning of the campaign, scarcely 40 have survived. All the rest fell facing the enemy.

This Military contribution has been officially and warmly appreciated by the Allied Governments and I need not press the matter further. All that I wish to indicate is that this attachment of the Armenians to the cause of the Entente was one of the motives of the massacres and deportations.

The Armenians, therefore, have been belligerents. The complete victory of the Allies has finally liberated Armenia from the Turkish yoke. That is an accomplished fact. We would add that, if to the victims of massacres and deportations, be added our losses on the field of battle, it will appear that the tribute of life paid by Armenia is heavier than that of any other belligerent nation. Her losses reach more than one million lives out of a total population of 4½ million souls. Armenia has earned her independence by the arms and the blood of her children.

I have two kinds of observations to present. I wish first to speak of the delimitation of the future Armenian State as we understand it. I shall then give you some details concerning the population.

Delimitation.

Our claim is that independent Armenia should comprise all Armenian territory and should be formed of:—

1. Cilicia (with Sandjak of Marash) the six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekr, Kharput, Sivas and a portion of the vilayet of Trebizond giving access to the Black Sea.
2. The territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus the population of which demands union with its brothers in Turkey under one single Armenian State.

It has sometimes been said and written that we wish to include within the limits of this State the future Armenian State territories which are not Armenian. This is untrue. Not only do we not make any such demand, but on the contrary, we ask that the final frontiers be fixed not by us but by a mixed Commission which shall work on the basis of historical, geographical and ethnical rights. The present administrative limits of the provinces or Armenian vilayets are arbitrary and false. They were drawn by Abdul-Hamid for the purpose of his policy in such a way as to include capriciously non-Armenian regions, in order to bring about a Mussulman majority. Our request is that these outlying regions, generally Kurdish or Turkish, should be detached.

Thus, the whole of Hekkiari and the South of Diarbekr which are mainly Kurdish should be excluded from Armenia; similarly the Turkish region west of Sivas and many others. As to Trebizond we recognise that the population is mainly Greek, but the Port of Trebizond is the only considerable outlet for the whole of Upper Armenia on the Black Sea. Our claim is moreover in accord with the declaration made by M. Venizelos who treated the question in a broad spirit of equity, which I am happy to recognise, in his Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference.

As to our border with Syria, our Syrian neighbours have latterly put forward very unjustifiable claims to the major part of Cilicia which they would include in Syria.

This pretension cannot be maintained. Cilicia is an essentially Armenian Province. It was for four centuries until 1375 the State of the last kingdom of Armenia. Some parts of it, such as the region of Zeitun maintained up to our time a semi-independence under Armenian Princes. At Sis, capital of Cilicia, the Catholicos, religious

head of all the Armenians of Turkey, has, from time immemorial up to the present day, maintained his pontifical seat.

As to the population the great majority is Armenian and Turkish. The Syrian element is insignificant. Before the war, there were in Cilicia only 20,000 Syrians as against 200,000 Armenians. No atlas of the ancient or modern world includes Cilicia in Syria. Geographically, historically, ethnically, Cilicia is an integral part of Armenia and its natural outlet in the Mediterranean.

The North frontier of Syria is the chain of the Amanus, not that of the Taurus, as represented in the publications of the Syrian Committee with the object of including Cilicia in Syria.

Population.

A few words now on the subject of population. I would like to say at the outset that there have never been exact statistics in Turkey. The Turkish Government always falsified those returns intentionally with the object of proving that the Armenians were an insignificant minority. I wish to cite a few examples of these falsifications. The Turkish Government showed the Armenians of the vilayet of Van as numbering 80,000. Now there is certain evidence that the number of Armenians from this vilayet who took refuge in Russia exceeds 220,000.

At the other extremity of Armenia in the whole of Sandjak of Marash the Turkish Government reckoned about 4,200 Armenians; now in the town of Marash alone according to Elysée Reclus there were more than 20,000 Armenians, half the population of the town. Zeitun in thfe Sandjak of Marash with its eight villages had, in accordance with statistics made on the spot in 1880, 27,460 Armenians and 8,344 Mussulmans.

It has been alleged that there are no Armenians left in Armenia since the massacres and deportations, or at all events that those who remain form an insignificant minority. Happily this is untrue.

Firstly, according to principles no-one today disputes, the dead must count as much as the living. It would be intolerable that the unspeakable crimes committed against a whole race should benefit their author's. But the purpose of exterminating a whole people was not achieved. After this War the Armenians will be, as before it, more numerous than the Turks and even than the Turks and Kurds combined.

In fact, although the losses of the Armenians were very great, those of the Turks in the course of the war have not been less. A German Report gives 2½ millions as the total losses of the Turks by war, epidemic and famine, which have caused terrible havoc owing to improvidence and shortage of hospital personnel and medicines. At least half of these losses have been sustained by the population of the Armenian provinces, which have been practically the only recruiting grounds for the Turks, and which have been invaded both by Russian and Armenian armies. If, therefore, it is admitted that the Turkish population has at least sustained equally heavy losses, the Armenians are still in the majority after the war, as they were before it. But this majority will be still greater when the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus is united to Turkish Armenia to form one State, as both the Armenians of the Caucasus and those of Turkey ardently desire.

M. Abrounian [*Aharonian*] has just laid the case before you and I support all he has said. I cannot overstress the point that this is a matter of the greatest importance for the Armenians, because the two groups of Armenians are interdependent. The Caucasian Armenians are more numerous than the Turkish Armenians. The latter, however, are more favourably situated as regards fertile land.

As has already been said (and it is perhaps unnecessary to repeat it) there are bonds of race, blood, religion and language between the two groups. We are, in fact, brothers. The Armenians in the Caucasus have established themselves in that country to escape from Turkey. They have now only one desire, to return to their native land. During the massacres before the war it was due to the Caucasian Armenians that the Russian and Allied Governments were asked in 1915 and 1914 to approach Turkey in favour of the Turkish Armenians.

I wish now to say a few words with regard to the position of the Armenians in the East and in the Ottoman Empire. I shall demonstrate by a few facts that they are quite capable of governing themselves when the time comes for them to set up an independent State.

Just to give some idea of the economic activity of the Armenian element in Turkish Armenia, I will quote some figures, taken from pre-war commercial and industrial statistics of the Vilayet of Sivas, which I have produced at previous negotiations in Paris in 1912 and 1913.

The Vilayet of Sivas is the least Armenian of the six Vilayets, but if you look at the figures relating to imports you will see that out of 166 wholesale merchants, 141 were Armenians and only 13 were Turks. In the export trade there were 127 Armenian merchants and 23 Turks. Out of 37 bankers and capitalists, 32 were Armenians and 5 only were Turks. It appears, furthermore, according to the book recently published by M. Leipzius, that out of a total population of 20,000,000 inhabitants, of whom 2,000,000 were Armenians, the latter held some 80 to 90 percent of the commerce in their own hands.

M. Leipzius, after his enquiry at Constantinople in regard to the Massacres, stated that the result would be very detrimental financially to Germany and Austria, because, all commerce being in the hands of the massacred Armenians, the Germans and Austrians would be unable to recover their debts.

I will quote a passage from a book by Dr. Rohrbach, a well-known pan-Germanist, who desired to see Germany annex Armenia, and this will give you an idea of the German opinion on the Armenians before the war:—

> “In present-day Turkey, reduced almost entirely to its Asiatic possessions, the Armenians carry much more weight than their numbers would seem to warrant. Owing to their high intellectual and commercial standards, they are without doubt the most active people among Eastern nations. In fact it might

> be said that they constitute the only people in those regions who are imbued with what might be called national qualities. The Armenian has that energy and tenacity of purpose which are quite contrary to the usually accepted attributes of the Eastern character".

That is the opinion of a German, and it is simply because the writer is a German that I have made the quotation.

It remains for me to address you on Armenian policy, claims and aspirations. I have already told you what is meant by the Armenian State from a geographical standpoint. I must now point out that, from the political point of view, our programme has not varied in any way as far as the national delegation is concerned. This programme, which I have already had the honour to explain to the Great Allied Powers, may be summed up in three points:—

1. Liberation from the Turkish yoke.
2. It is not sufficient to liberate the Armenian people who have been in bondage. As they will now find themselves in an inferior position I asked for the joint protection of the Powers. I have not asked for joint rulership, to which I already knew the meeting would be opposed. There had already been unfortunate examples of condominium, and I know that the meeting would not feel disposed to make one more example. As an Egyptian, I know exactly what it means.

By joint protection of the Powers I mean that kind of protection which would prevent aggression from outside, and not an intermeddling with internal political and administrative affairs.

3. From the first I have also asked that the Great Protecting Powers should give a mandate to one or other of them to administer and organise Armenia.

That is the programme we adopted in 1915. We modified it when the idea of a League of Nations was formulated by President Wilson, and we adapted our programme to the new ideas.

The first point of our programme is now realised, since we are freed from the Turkish yoke. The two other points are realised also, if the

newspaper reports are correct, since the Peace Conference has already decided to place the peoples oppressed by the Turks under the protection of the League of Nations with a Power as mandatory. We therefore have the firm hope of seeing our aspirations realised.

We need only entrust ourselves to the sense of justice of the Peace Conference, and we have no doubt but that the Conference will approve the programme of our national claims. The Powers now know and can trust the Armenians, whose national feelings, vitality and warlike valour have been strikingly revealed in the course of the war.

The Powers can rest assured that, with the qualifications all now recognised, the Armenians, under a régime of peace, justice and liberty, and under the tutelage of the League of Nations, will soon form a flourishing and prosperous State, and will be one of the most powerful factors of peace and civilisation in the East."

M. PICHON thanked the Armenian Representatives, and the Armenian Delegation withdrew.

(5) On M. Pichon's proposal, it was decided that the following questions should be discussed at the next Meeting to be held on Thursday, February 27th, at 3.0 p.m.:—

1. —Proposal by Mr. House for a Commission to deal with delimitation of frontiers. Agenda of Next Meeting
2. —The Zionist question.

(The Meeting adjourned to Thursday, February 27th, at 3.0 p.m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27th February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Report on the Creation of a Neutral Zone Between Hungarians and Rumanians in Transylvania

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council after taking cognisance of the decision reached by the Prime Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on the 21st February, 1919, concerning the delimitation of a neutral zone in Transylvania between Hungarians and Rumanians;

After hearing in succession

The Rumanian General Coanda on the general conditions, historical, moral, political and ethnographical relating to these questions;

The Rumanian Colonel Dimitresco on the strategical conditions required to place the Rumanian armies in a position to defend themselves against all eventual aggression by Hungarian troops;

Dr. Vaida, Rumanian Minister, on the general internal condition of Transylvania;

General Henrys, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the Orient;

General Charpy, Chief of Staff of the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in the East, on the possibility of the occupation by these Armies of the neutral zone to be defined;

Agree:—

On the principle that the proposals which they submit to the Conference of the Prime Ministers relate only to provisional measures of occupation, without prejudice in any manner to the final attribution of the occupied regions.

The Military Representatives further consider:—

That the advance of Rumanian troops to contact with Hungarian troops may have the consequence, among others, of causing serious conflicts between them;

That it is desirable to take all measures to avert such conflict as would impede the work of the Peace Conference and create between the peoples destined in the future to live side by side profound causes of hostility likely to disturb the peace.

The Military Representatives therefore conclude:—

That it is desirable to create in Transylvania between Hungarians and Rumanians a neutral zone free from all Hungarian and Rumanian troops, the important points in which should be occupied by Allied troops (approximately 2 infantry battalions with some squadrons or 1 regiment of cavalry) with the mission of maintaining order and tranquility in this zone, with the assistance, if necessary, of Inter-Allied Commissions whose function it will more particularly be to control the various administrative offices, the administration of the territories continuing to be carried out in accordance with the conditions fixed by the Armistice.

They propose that the zone should be defined as follows:—

Eastern or Rumanian Limit: The main road from Arad to Nagyszalonta thence the railway Grosswardein (Nagy Varad) —Nagy Karoly, Szatmar Nemeti. All localities mentioned to be excluded from military occupation by the Rumanians but, together with the railway, to be available for the use of the Rumanian troops and inhabitants, under Allied control, for economic purposes.

Northern Limit: The River Szimos.

Western or Hungarian Limit: A line leaving the Theiss 5 Km. North West of Vasaros-Nameny passing then 5 Km. to the West of Debreczen to 3 Km. West of Deva-Vanya, and continuing to the West of Gyoma, 5 Km. West of Oroshaza, Hotmezo-Vasarhely and Szegedin, then rejoining the Southern frontier to the South of Szegedin.

Southern Limit: The line of the River Maros, Arad and Szeged being occupied by Allied troops to the exclusion of both Rumanian and Hungarian troops.

Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council
Gnl. Belin
Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council
Cavallero
Major-General,
Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council
C. Sackville West
Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council
P. D. Lochridge

[1] See BC–36, p. 58 [*Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 4*].

[2] For the French text of the treaty of August 17. 1916, between Roumania and the Allied Powers, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d' Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, p. 442.

February 27, 3 p.m. (BC–41)

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[9] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/48

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/48

BC–41

[Document 9]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 27, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. H. White.
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE

M. Pichon.
M. Tardieu.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.

ALSO PRESENT

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 2

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. David Magie.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M. P.
Lt. Col. W. H. Gribbon, C. M. G.

ITALY

M. Galli.
M. Piacentini.

ZIONIST MISSION

Dr. C. Weizmann.
M. N. Sokolow.
M. Sylvain Levi.
M. Spire.
M. Ussischkins.

M. de Bearn.
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. PICHON, circulated a copy of the following Resolution, which had been received from Colonel House, for formal acceptance by the Conference, and said he understood an agreement had already been reached on the subject:— Draft Resolution in Regard to the Procedure for the Determination of Frontiers: (a) Colonel House's Resolution

> "It is agreed that:—
>
> In order to expedite the work of the Conference in defining the approximate future frontiers of the enemy countries in the preliminary treaties of peace a Committee composed of one representative, each, of the United States of America, the

British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed with the following terms of reference:—

(*a*) to draw up for the consideration of the Preliminary Peace Conference the frontiers based on the recommendations of the territorial Commissions which have been, or may be, appointed.
(*b*) to make recommendations as to any part of the frontiers of enemy States which are not included in the scope of any Commission, excepting such frontier questions as any of the Powers concerned may reserve for discussion in the first instance at the Quai d'Orsay Council."

(b) M. Sonnino's Proposal Regarding: Number of Representatives M. SONNINO thought it would not be sufficient to have only one representative of each of the Great Powers on the Committee. It might not always be possible for the same representative to attend and, though he might be replaced by a substitute, the latter would find great difficulty in taking part in the deliberations, owing to his not having kept in touch with the previous proceedings. Colonel House had, he believed, originally proposed three representatives. He (M. Sonnino) had agreed that that number was probably excessive, but he thought that each Power should certainly have the right to appoint two representatives, in order to ensure the proper continuity of the work.

MR. LANSING said that his own preference would be for a small Committee of five members, with the power of introducing as many experts as might be thought useful. Consequently, a representative could always be replaced by one of his experts, should the necessity arise.

M. SONNINO said that he would not press the matter, but he certainly thought one representative would be too few.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would not, himself, fight one way or the other. He enquired, however, whether the difficulty could not be overcome by allowing one representative, with power of substitution.

(c) Proposed Appointment of Permanent Assistant Delegates M. TARDIEU pointed out that the power of substitution already existed. He would suggest, therefore, that each representative should be permitted to have one permanent assistant delegate, who would have the advantage of following the discussions day by day.

M. SONNINO enquired whether the permanent assistant delegate would have the power of taking part in the discussions. He wished to point out that the proposed Committee would not merely be a co-ordinating Committee; it would also have the duty of taking the initiative on all questions which had not been referred to a Commission.

MR. LANSING, intervening, said that his purpose in suggesting five representatives had been to avoid discussion by a large number of people.

(d) Division of Co-ordinating Committee To Be Submitted to Conference of Great Powers M. SONNINO, continuing, said that it was understood the decisions of the proposed Committee would come before the Conference of the Great Powers before being submitted to a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

(It was agrees that:—

In order to expedite the work of the Conference in defining the approximate future frontiers of the enemy countries in the preliminary treaties of peace a Committee composed of one representative, each, of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed with the following terms of reference:—

(*a*) to draw up for the consideration of the Preliminary Peace Conference the frontiers based on the recommendations of the territorial Commissions which have been, or may be, appointed.
(*b*) to make recommendations as to any part of the frontiers of enemy States which are not included in the scope of any Commission, excepting such frontiers questions as any of the

Powers concerned may reserve for discussion in the first instance at the Quai d'Orsay Council.

It was also agreed that each of the five representatives of the Great Powers should have the right to bring an Assistant with him, in order to ensure continuity in the proceedings.)

(At this stage the Zionist Representatives and the technical experts in Zionism entered the Council Chamber.)

2. M. PICHON, having welcomed the Zionist Deputation, called upon M. Sokolow to address the meeting.

Statement by Zionist Representatives: (a) Statement by M. Sokolow, Member of Zionist organisation M. SOKOLOW introduced himself as representing the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish population of Palestine. He had prepared a printed "Statement of the Zionist Organisation regarding Palestine,"[1] and he asked permission to distribute copies of the same to the members of the Conference.

Continuing, M. Sokolow said that the Conference would understand his emotions, now that the solemn hour awaited during 18 centuries by the Jewish people had, at length, arrived. The Delegates had come to claim their historic rights to Palestine, the land of Israel, where, in ancient times, the Jewish people had created a civilisation which had since exercised an enormous influence on humanity. There they had lived happily until the country had been lost; since when a long continued martyrdom had been suffered. Now this people possessed no land and no national power. Undoubtedly, happy groups of Jews lived in the countries of Western Europe and in the United States of America; but those where, comparatively speaking, only small groups. The great majority of the Jewish people did not live in those countries and the problem of the masses remained to be solved. The Jews would never forget that France had been the first to recognise the rights of man and personal liberty, and it was under that influence that the Jews had obtained rights of citizenship in other countries. It was in Great Britain that the ancient traditions of Zionism first took root. It was in Great Britain, and especially in the British Colonies, that the Jews had been able to establish prosperous

settlements. In Italy, the Jews had taken an important part in the wars of liberation: the Jewish people there were happy, well organised and able to take a part in the government of the country. In the United States of America, 3,000,000 Jews enjoyed the rights of citizenship. Mere rights of citizenship, however, were not sufficient to satisfy the ideals of the Jews, who craved for a national existence. Consequently, for the great suffering majority of the Jews, living in Eastern Europe, a place would have to be prepared where they would be at home and among their own kind. During the late terrible war the Allies had promised to help the Jews to found a Jewish national centre, where the real home of the Jewish people had always been. This was the only possible solution of the Jewish problem. Sustained by that promise, the Jews had been able to organise and to support the Great Powers loyally by creating an entente of all the Jewish parties within the Entente of the Great Powers. Now, a victory of great ideals and of justice having been gained, the hour of deliverance of his unhappy people had struck: and the old Jewish traditions could again be introduced in the land of their ancestors, combined with the ideals of New Europe, thus leading to a re-constitution of a people and the transformation of a country. The memoir which he had circulated merely gave the Zionist plans for the realisation of the hopes of the Jewish people, and, with the permission of the Conference, he would read the following extract:—

> "The Zionist Organisation respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference:—
>
> 1. The High Contracting Parties recognise the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.
> 2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the schedule annexed hereto.
> 3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
> 4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to

mandates as are suitable to the case).

5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:—

   (1) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

In conclusion, he would be ready to answer any questions that might be put to him, but he would, in the first place, ask the Conference to hear his colleague, Dr. C. Weizmann, the President of the Enquiry Committee sent to Palestine on behalf of the Zionist Executive Committee, who would give practical information on the subject of the realisation of the Zionist programme.

(b) Statement by Dr. Weizmann, Member of the Zionist Organization

DR. WEIZMANN pointed out that the war had left the Jewish people weaker comparatively than any other people in the world. Before the war, six to seven million Jews in Russia had been systematically oppressed but that oppression had possessed the grandeur of a great tragedy, which had acted as a source of inspiration to all Jews. Now, even the grandeur had disappeared, and the community was being ground down by the political machinery which had been set up in Russia. It was impossible for him to make any forecasts, but even the most sanguine would agree that those parts could not settle down for many years to come. Meanwhile the Jews, as the most feeble element, would suffer most, and as a result Jewish emigration, which before the war had reached the figure of 250,000 a year, would increase enormously, whilst at the same time the power of absorption in the countries of Western Europe and of America would considerably decrease. The Great Powers would naturally scrutinise every alien who claimed to enter their countries, and the Jew would be regarded as a typical wandering alien. As a result the Jews would find themselves knocking around the world, seeking a refuge and

unable to find one. The problem, therefore, was a very serious one, and no statesman could contemplate it without being impelled to find an equitable solution.

In his opinion, the solution proposed by the Zionist organisation was the only one which would in the long run bring peace, and at the same time transform Jewish energy into a constructive force, instead of its being dissipated into destructive tendencies or bitterness.

Palestine possessed great possibilities. The country was not very densely populated: There were some 600,000 to 700,000 people occupying 40,000 square kilometres, which gave a population of 10 to 15 per square kilometre. On the other hand, in Lebanon, which resembled it in many aspects, the density of the population was 160 per square kilometre. Consequently, in Palestine there was room for an increase of at least four to five million people, without encroaching on the legitimate interests of the people already there.

The Zionists wished to settle Jews in the empty spaces of Palestine, organising the settlements to be created by the expenditure of their own money and the exercise of their brains.

The Zionist Association demanded, in the name of the people who had suffered martyrdom for eighteen centuries that they should be able, immediately peace was signed, to tell their co-religionists in the Ukraine, in Poland, and in other parts of Eastern Europe, that they would be taken to Palestine, there to be put on the land. That was the essence of what the Zionists required, and with that object in view they had taken the liberty of drawing up the following resolution:—

> "To this end the Mandatory Power shall *inter alia:*—
>
> (*a*) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.
> (*b*) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish

National Home in Palestine and entrust the organisation of Jewish education to such Council.

(*c*) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant."

In conclusion, he would add that he spoke in the name of a million Jews who, staff in hand were waiting the signal to move. It would be the duty of the Zionist Association to organise immigration successfully, but the Jewish leaders would be faced with a far greater catastrophe if they found themselves unable to tell their people to wait until they received the signal. For the fulfillment of their plans the Jewish Associations required the support of the Great Powers, and in full hope they left their case in their hands.

(c) Statement by M. Ussischkins, Member of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Association and President of the South Russian Jewish National Assembly M. USSISCHKINS said that he appeared before the Conference in his capacity as a member of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organisation, and also as President of the National Assembly representing 3,000,000 Jews of South Russia, an Assembly which, in the month of November last adopted a resolution proclaiming the historic rights of the Jewish people to Palestine. It was his earnest desire to support the claims submitted by the two previous speakers, the representatives of the Zionist Organisation.

(d) Statement by M. Spire, on behalf of the French Zionist M. SPIRE said that he spoke in the name of the French Zionists, who were not in the majority amongst the Jews in France. He wished to associate himself entirely with the claims put forward by the Zionist Organisation. He felt certain that France, which had ever defended the rights of the oppressed, would support these claims. Furthermore, it was only natural for a French Jew to express those views. It was only on one point that the Zionist movement could disturb the French, namely, on the question of the ancient privileges which the French had always enjoyed in Palestine. In regard to that question, the French Zionists trusted to the justice of the Conference,

feeling confident that the mandate would be granted to the country most competent to exercise the power, not only in its own interests, but in the interests of all nationalities.

(e) Statement by M. Sylvain Levi, Professor at the Collège de France, Paris M. SYLVAIN LEVI said that his only claim to speak was that he had accompanied, on the invitation of the Zionist Association and at the request of the French Government, the Zionist Committee of Inquiry, sent from France to Palestine to report on the Zionist movement. He greatly appreciated the honour which had thereby been accorded to him, since he was not himself a Zionist, and only a Jew by origin, that is, Jewish in sentiment, but French above all.

He had devoted much time to the study of this question, and for that reason wished to present certain aspects of the case to the Conference. It would not be necessary for him to call the attention of the Conference to the situation of the Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. His colleagues had already drawn a picture of the indescribable misery which the Jewish people were there suffering. Millions of men who were not at home in the countries in which they lived, felt that they possessed no mother country, and that their national life was confined to intercourse amongst themselves. For these people Palestine was the "country of their ancestors"; the country of their dreams—a sort of terrestrial paradise; and it was there that they thought they would best be able to develop their national energies. That feeling was so strongly implanted in the minds of the Jewish people that it could never be uprooted. The only question was: how could those national ideals best be satisfied? The Zionist movement in Palestine did not propose to initiate an entirely new work; a beginning had already been made, and magnificent results had already been achieved. It would be unnecessary for him to point to the splendid Jewish colonies already established in Palestine under the auspices of Baron Rothschild: Colonies which formed veritable oases in the middle of the surrounding desert. Furthermore, the "Universal Jewish Alliance", which had been in existence for over 50 years having been founded on the true principles of the French Revolution, had begun its work in Palestine by the establishment of an agricultural school in 1876. Subsequently, other schools had been opened in other localities, such as Jerusalem,

Jaffa, etc. each of which had rendered the greatest service to the people. In the end, Zionism had arisen. To that movement he was legitimately entitled to pay a high tribute, as he did not himself belong to it. Its great merit lay in the fact that it had raised the Jewish moral[e] in those countries of Eastern Europe, where the moral[e] had been fast sinking, by supplying spiritual food and by engendering a true religious feeling. As a result of the feeling so engendered, the desire for Palestine was born. The special task which Zionism had set for itself was to direct a flow of Jewish immigration towards Palestine, especially from Eastern Europe. That was the problem for which a solution now had to be found. With the permission of the Conference he would talk with the frankness of a historian, who desired to face the problem honestly and squarely, without attempting to hide any of the difficulties.

The first difficulty lay in the great disproportion which existed between the area of Palestine and the millions of people who might want to go there from Eastern Europe. In the second place, the actual condition of the country, which was at present able to maintain only a small population owing to the climatic and other causes brought about by the action of men and the misgovernment of the authorities. At the present moment, some 600,000 or 700,000 Arabs only dwelt in that country, but it would be impossible for an equal number of Jews to adapt themselves to the same conditions of life, since they had in Europe, and especially in Western Europe, acquired certain methods of life which would not be satisfied by the conditions which were sufficient for the Arabs. In the third place, the masses of people who might wish to return to Palestine, would largely be drawn from those countries where they had been persecuted and ill-treated, and the mentality which such a regime was likely to engender could be easily realised. Those people would carry with them into Palestine highly explosive passions, conducive to very serious trouble in a country which might be likened to a concentration camp of Jewish refugees. The Conference that had created the League of Nations would easily understand that nations could not be created at will, and the realisation of a certain number of aspirations would not suffice to create a national entity. The problem was an extremely difficult one, especially as it would concern Jewish people drawn from so many countries such as

Poland, the Caucasus, Balkans, Morocco, Spain, etc.; the fusion of all these people would take time, and the time required might be lengthy. This difficulty had been fully recognised by the Zionist Organisation, which had attempted to find a solution. A solution had been found and put forward consisting in the creation of an International Jewish Council, which by some means or other (about which he was not quite clear) would act both as the guardian and the political ruler of Palestine. The idea was an ingenious one, but, as a Frenchman of Jewish origin, he feared the results. It would be dangerous to create a precedent whereby certain people who already possessed the rights of citizenship in one country would be called upon to govern and to exercise other rights of citizenship in a new country. In other words, an attempt would be made to apply the principles of the law of Delbrück to the Jews, already sufficiently suspect; and it would in his opinion be a sad beginning to inherit anything of the kind from Germany. In this way people possessing dual rights of citizenship would have been created able to exercise their rights in the country of their residence and also in Palestine, in which they had no rights and which they did not inhabit.

The Zionist Organisation, however, placed their confidence in the mandatory system, provided the Jews who decided to settle in Palestine could little by little be granted the right of self-government. The Jewish groups already settled in Palestine clearly showed how quickly they could enter into municipal life, and solve the most difficult problems; some of the Jewish municipalities having even joined together to form, as it were, small autonomous republics, which had only been molested by the Turkish authorities. Having visited the country, he was able to realise that this municipal activity could become national, as soon as the country was occupied by a large Jewish majority.

He (Mr. Levi) had previously referred to the spirit of the French Revolution which had led to the creation of the Universal Jewish Alliance. To this spirit all its members adhered. For many years the Jews had, in the countries inhabited by them, claimed equality of rights, but those claims had not yet everywhere been admitted. Under the circumstances, it seemed to him shocking that the Jews, as soon as their rights of equality were about to be recognised in all

countries of the world, should already seek to obtain exceptional privileges for themselves in Palestine. Privileges so obtained as a rule did not profit either the giver or the receiver. He had sufficient confidence in the activities and driving force of the ideals of the Jews of Eastern Europe to believe that they would never abandon the attainment of their goal, and even if their other aspirations were to weaken, the time would come when violent upheavals would again cause a flow of emigration towards Palestine, which must, sooner or later, become a purely Jewish territory. He was not in a position, neither was he entitled, to find a solution, but it appeared to him that it might be possible to create some large Jewish Committee by grouping together all the interested parties, whose function it would be to supervise emigration, to act as bankers, to buy and distribute land, to organise public works, to undertake sanitary measures and to take charge of education, etc., but without possessing any political rights.

In conclusion, he wished to place on record the great part played by France in the organisation of the Jews in Palestine. Whatever country might eventually be appointed the Mandatory in Palestine, he trusted France would be permitted to continue her beneficent educational work, by maintaining the schools which had been of such inestimable value to the peoples of Palestine. France and Palestine were both Mediterranean nations, and both, in their own time, had had a great influence on the development of civilisation throughout the world. Leaving out of consideration the political aspect of the case, he would remind the Conference that a very serious and important problem required solution. He neither over-estimated nor under-estimated the virtues of national groups. But it would be admitted that the Jewish race had, during the period of its martyrdom, displayed a magnificent resistance and proved its constant passion for civilisation, high culture and science. It was the Jews in Palestine who first proclaimed those ideals towards which the world was still endeavouring to advance. For those ideals Jews had suffered persecution and death, and they believed that on the shores of the Mediterranean they would find the realisation of their hopes. They believed that, if restored to the conditions which had enabled their ancestors to give rise to the great Hebrew movement,

they would again be able to recover their past splendour and to contribute their share towards the regeneration of mankind.

MR. LANSING asked Dr. Weizmann to clear up some confusion which existed in his mind as to the correct meaning of the words "Jewish National Home". Did that mean an autonomous Jewish Government?

DR. WEIZMANN replied in the negative. The Zionist organisation did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Association would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals.

The Zionist Association fully realised the great difficulty of the problem, and, in fact, had the problem been an easy one to solve, it would never have been submitted to the Conference of the Great Powers. On the other hand, the solution suggested would be easier than the solution of the difficulties which would arise if the Jews were left in Russia. The formation of a Jewish organisation had been proposed, embracing all elements that would co-operate in solving the problem to be faced. That Council would have no political rights. Consequently the fear that the Jews would be accused of double allegiance was groundless. On the other hand the Jews outside Palestine must supply the money and the men, and the Council would have to be organised for that purpose and for that purpose only. A similar Council had already existed in the creation of the Jewish Alliance, which had been an international organisation created for the express purpose of establishing schools in Palestine.

As a Russian Jew, he was entitled to say that the Jews in Russia lived in an atmosphere which was not conducive to quiet thinking. On the

other hand the colonies in Palestine which had been described in such glowing terms by Professor Levi had been created by Russian Jews, and they had succeeded in transforming deserts into flourishing gardens, even under the Turkish yoke.

In conclusion, at the present moment Palestine could not hold a large number of people. The Conference had no doubt noticed the discrepancy between the figures which he had given as representing the possible population of Palestine and the number of emigrants, 50,000 to 60,000 per annum, which he had subsequently suggested. That was due to the present condition of the country. But the Association desired to transform the country, to make it capable of supporting a much larger number of inhabitants, just as had been done in California and in Tunisia. In the latter country in 1882 around Sfax only 45,000 olive trees were to be found, whereas in 1914, 8,000,000 olive trees had been planted. What had been done in Tunisia might be done even better in Palestine, since the climate and soil in the latter country were infinitely superior. With the help of Jewish funds an Association had been formed to carry out that programme, and it would undoubtedly achieve success. The difficulties to be met with in attempting to solve these problems were nothing if compared with the difficulties to be faced by the Jews living in Eastern Europe, who constituted 96% of the total number of Jews in Europe.

In making his statement he spoke for 96% of the Jews of the world, who shared the views which he had endeavoured to express that afternoon.

(The Zionist Mission and Experts in Zionism then withdrew)

3. M. PICHON suggested that the following questions should be considered at the next meeting to be held on Saturday next, March 1st:—

(1) Report of the Financial Drafting Committee. Agenda for Next Meeting (a) Subject for Agenda, Paper Proposed by M. Pichon
(2) Report of the Economic Drafting Committee.
(3) Report on Morocco.

(4) Statement by the representatives of the Island of Aaland.

(b) Morocco MR. BALFOUR said that he had only received a copy of the resolutions concerning Morocco late the previous evening. The question was a very difficult and complicated one, and it would be necessary for him to obtain papers from London. Under these conditions he suggested that the discussion of that question should be adjourned until the following Monday.

(This was agreed to.)

(c) Aaland Island MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that in regard to the Aaland Islands he understood the people of Aaland wanted to be joined to Sweden. Technically, they were Finnish at the moment, though they had been Russian before Finland became a separate country. He wished to enquire whether it was a matter which the Conference had either the right or the competence to determine.

M. SONNINO said that Finland had not been recognised by Italy, so that from the Italian point of view the Islands were still Russian.

MR. WHITE reported that the representatives of the Island of Aaland had been to see him, and had stated that they wished to join Sweden, for the reason that modern guns would be able easily to reach Stockholm from the Aaland Islands.

But Mr. White had enquired from the representatives how they thought the Conference could deal with the question. They had replied that the Islands of Aaland now formed part of Finland, and Finland had previously belong[ed] to Russia.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that the Conference had agreed to reserve all questions appertaining to Russia, such as those relating to the Esthonians, Lithuanians, Lettians and Ukrainians, until the Russian question came under discussion. Only one exception was made, in the case of Poland, because Russia herself, when an Ally, had recognised the independence of that country.

Taking these facts into consideration, he thought it would be better to study the whole Russian question at one and the same time,

especially as in the case of the Aaland Islands the Conference was being asked to take something from someone and give it to a third party.

As a matter of fact, he thought the question fell outside the competence of the Conference, though it might be taken up by the League of Nations.

M. PICHON said that the representatives of the Aaland Islands had also been to see him, basing their request for annexation to Sweden on the ground of the right of peoples to self-determination as enunciated by President Wilson.

The representatives of the Aaland Islands had also submitted a *memoire*. The Swedish Government had also asked to send representatives to the Conference to discuss this same question. He thought the question of the Aaland Islands should be adjourned until a decision had been reached on the question of Russia.

(It was agreed to postpone consideration of the question relating to the Aaland Islands.)

It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the next meeting to be held on Saturday, March 1st, 1919 at 3 o'clock p.m.:—

(1) Report of Committee of the Financial Drafting Committee. (d) Agenda for Meeting on 1st March
(2) Report of the Economic Drafting Committee.

4. MR. BALFOUR enquired what action had been taken on the resolution reached the previous day in regard to the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania. Who would be responsible for carrying out the policy decided upon? Neutral Zone in Transylvania

M. PICHON replied that a despatch had already been sent by the French Government to General Franchet D'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient, calling on him to take the necessary action.

(The meeting then adjourned to Saturday, March 1st, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

PARIS, 28th February, 1919.

[1] The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC–41a) and the telegraphic report of the meeting by the American Mission to the Department of State give the text of this statement as follows:

> "1. The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.
>
> "2. The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below:—
>
> "Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity
>
> South of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr el Karaon, thence to El Bire, following the dividing line between the two basins of the Wadi el Korn and the Wadi el Tiem, thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity West of Beit Jenn, thence Eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.
>
> "In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Akaba.
>
> "In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government.
>
> "In the West the Mediterranean Sea.
>
> "The details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall be settled by a Special Commission on which there shall be Jewish representation.
>
> "3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatary of the League.
>
> "4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)
>
> "5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:
>
> "(I) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
> "(II) To this end the Mandatary Power shall *inter alia:*

"(*a*) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

"(*b*) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organization of Jewish education to such Council.

"(*c*) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for public works or for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant.

"(III) The Mandatary Power shall encourage the wisest measure of self-government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country.

"(IV) There shall be forever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine. There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, or of race.

"(V) (Provision to be inserted relating to the control of Holy Places.)"

(Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/48)

March 1, 3 p.m. (BC–42)

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[10] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1st March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/49

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/49

BC–42

[Document 10]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1st March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. R. Lansing

Mr. E. M. House

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier

Mr. L. Harrison

Mr. G. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries

Lieut. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Baruch

Mr. Strauss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Klotz

M. Luquet

M. Clementel

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
} For question 1 only

ITALY

M. Crespi

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. C. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting opened, enquired whether the Conference would agree to consider the report of the Committee, appointed to draft the Naval and Military Peace conditions to be imposed on Germany, on Monday afternoon next. The Military conditions had been submitted by Marshal Foch yesterday, and copies had been distributed to the representatives of the five Great Powers. The principle involved had been duly accepted both by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. Consequently, he thought that a decision might be reached without delay. When the Armistice had last been renewed, no term had been fixed. The Great Powers had reserved the right to terminate the Armistice at three days notice, and the Germans had been given to understand that the

final military Peace conditions would be presented to them with as little delay as possible. The Allied and Associated Powers would, therefore, place themselves in an awkward position if the final Military Peace terms could not be presented within the period of one month from the date of the last renewal of the Armistice. Naval and Military Conditions to be Imposed on Germany

MR. BALFOUR felt some difficulty in accepting M. Clemenceau's proposal. He thought that some confusion of idea appeared to exist. He quite agreed that the object of the Conference had been to come to some preliminary arrangement with Germany, as soon as an agreement had been reached on the Naval and Military Peace terms to be imposed on Germany. He himself had, in fact, proposed at a previous Meeting that the Military instalment of the preliminary Peace should be presented to Germany separately. But, he thought M. Clemenceau had objected to that procedure; and in the absence of M. Clemenceau and in deference to his view, the Conference had agreed that the Preliminary Peace with Germany should not only include the final Naval and Military terms, but also territorial questions, financial arrangements and questions relating to the economic future of Germany. That decision in his opinion meant that whether the Military terms of peace would be decided on Monday or not, it would make no difference in regard to the termination of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that no preliminary Peace terms could be presented to Germany until the territorial, financial and economic questions had also been settled. The Conference could, however, only take up one subject at the time. The Military question should therefore be settled first, and then the other questions could be taken up in succession, with as little delay as possible.

MARSHAL FOCH pressed for an early decision to be reached on the final Naval, Military and Air conditions to be imposed on Germany. He enquired whether the Allied Military Advisers, as well as the Naval Experts, should attend the Meeting on Monday next. He understood the Naval clauses would then also be ready for consideration by the Conference.

(It was agreed that the Naval, Military and Air preliminary conditions of Peace should be discussed on Monday afternoon next, and Marshal Foch was requested to invite the Naval and Military Experts to attend.)

2. M. Crespi, who had acted as Chairman of the Financial Drafting Committee in the absence of M. Salandra, read the following report, dated February 26th, 1919:— Report of the Financial Drafting Committee: (a) Report of Drafting Committee

> "Several questions which the Financial Drafting Committee might have included in the programme of financial questions to be considered by the Financial Commission fall within the competence of other Commissions already appointed by the Conference and are being considered by them.
>
> The Financial Drafting Committee has therefore excluded them from the list which they now submit.
>
> They recommend that when another Commission or the Supreme Conference itself is dealing with a question which has a financial aspect it should seek the advice of the Financial Commission.
>
> Questions To Be Dealt With in the Treaties of Peace
>
> *A. Financial Questions.*
>
> 1. In cases where an Enemy State cannot meet all its obligations the question must be considered whether the State should be allowed to choose for itself the order in which they shall be met or whether the Allies should insist on settling the order. The matter must be considered in connection with, *inter alia:*—
>
> (1) Reparation demands.
>
> (2) Public debts and other obligations incurred prior to the War.
>
> (3) Public debts and other obligations incurred during the War.

(4) Debts and obligations internally held.
(5) Debts and obligations externally held.
(6) Liabilities incurred during the Armistice.

2. The question must also be considered whether in any circumstances the debtor State shall be allowed or obliged to modify the rights of creditors holding security for the payments of their debt.
3. Question of the liability of Allied nationals to contribute to special war taxes levied or imposed in the enemy countries.
4. In cases of territorial re-adjustment, the following questions arise:—
   (*a*) The re-apportionment of any part of the public debt.
   (*b*) The re-apportionment of any part of the other debts or obligations of the State.
   (*c*) The assumption of any liability or obligation in connection with the currency organisation. (See also Monetary Questions).
   (*d*) Terms of transfer of State or other public property in the ceded area, and re-apportionment of debts or obligations of public bodies other than the State.
   (*e*) Financial measures to be adopted as to public utility enterprises, such as railways belonging to private companies operating in the ceded territory.

B. Monetary Questions.

1. The currencies in which any new national obligations created by the Peace Settlement must be stated should be determined.
2. It must also be decided whether the currencies in which existing national obligations are expressed should be modified.
3. Currency questions arising out of territorial re-adjustments.
4. The effect of any forced surrender of gold upon the currency of enemy countries.

Other Questions Which Have Been Raised

1. Inter-Allied agreements as to the consolidation, re-apportionment, re-assumption of War Debts.
2. Temporary Inter-Allied agreements for the support of the foreign exchanges.
3. Credits requested by certain Allies secured on the reparation payments to be exacted from the enemy.
4. Inter-Allied co-operation in seeking credits from neutrals.
5. Allied financial interests in Russia.
6. Protection of rights and interests of Allied holders of concessions in enemy countries:—
   (*a*) Preservation of pledges and guarantees.
   (*b*) Problems arising out of the internationalisation of ports, waterways and railways.
7. The elimination of enemy elements from the international organisations for control now existing in various countries (such as Turkey, Morocco, China).
8. Settlement of pre-war debts between Allied and enemy nationals.
   (*a*) Question of establishing a clearing house.
   (*b*) Disposition of the proceeds of liquidations of businesses and of sales of enemy property and interests.

SUBJECT TO ADDITIONS

The Committee will report separately at a later date on Mr. Klotz's project for a Financial Section of the League of Nations."

LORD MILNER said he wished to make an observation which he thought would apply equally to the financial and to the economic commission. The programme which each Commission had to work through was very large and very important, and it was necessary that the questions to be dealt with should be settled promptly. Many of those questions, however, concerned the Allies among themselves far more than the enemy. The Commissions would eventually have to decide all those questions, but he thought they should, in the first instance, devote themselves entirely to those points which would have to be embodied in the preliminary Peace. He, therefore, asked the Conference to accept the following resolution:—

> "The Commission is instructed to report not later than March 22nd, on all matters on which it is necessary to include in the preliminaries of Peace."

MR. HOUSE suggested that the Commission should be instructed to report not later than March 15th, instead of March 22nd.

M. CRESPI agreed. There were not many financial questions to be included in the preliminaries of Peace. He thought, therefore, that a report could be submitted by March 15th.

(It was agreed to accept the following resolution:—

> "The Commission is instructed to report not later than March 15th on all matters which it is necessary to include in the preliminaries of Peace.")

(c) Commission of Financial Commission MR. MONTAGU invited the attention of the Conference to the fact that the Financial Commission had not yet been appointed. It still remained to be decided who would sit on that Commission. If it were agreed that the 5 members of the Financial Drafting Committee should now constitute the new Financial Commission, he thought one delegate from each of the five Great Powers would be too small an allowance, especially if the final report had to be submitted not later than March 15th next. Moreover, some representation would have to be given to the smaller Powers.

M. KLOTZ thought the question could with good practical results be referred to the Financial Drafting Commission, but the Commission thus constituted should have power to appoint Sub-Commissions who should be empowered to hear experts, as well as the representatives of the smaller Powers, whenever any question affecting them came up for consideration.

MR. HOUSE said he accepted M. Klotz's proposal. In his opinion, the work would be carried out far more expeditiously with a Commission of 5, with power to appoint Sub-Commissions.

MR. LANSING proposed that the present Financial Drafting Committee should constitute the Financial Commission, containing

the same personnel, with the power of appointing Sub-Commissions from outside their number, as they thought fit.

MR. MONTAGU, whilst agreeing that it would be a good arrangement to have Sub-Commissions to represent special interests, thought that the questions to be considered were so important that one representative of each of the five Great Powers would not be sufficient. Should the one representative, for instance, be ill, either one Power would remain unrepresented, or everything would have to be held up. Therefore, whilst keeping the proposal for Sub-Commissions, he would propose that the number of representatives of the main Commission should be increased to two.

LORD MILNER said that, in order to reconcile the various opinions expressed, he would suggest that the proposal, contained in the report of the Economic Drafting Committee, which would be considered that afternoon, should also be accepted in the case of the Financial Commission. That is to say, that the Commission should be constituted of two members for each of the five Great Powers, together with five members elected by the remaining States. There would, therefore, be 15 representatives on the Financial Committee, 10 to represent the Great Powers, and 5 the remaining States.

(It was agreed that the Financial Commission should be constituted of 2 members for each of the five Great Powers, together with five members elected by the remaining states.)

(It was agreed that the members of the Financial Drafting Committee should form part of this Commission and that the names of the remaining five representatives of the Great Powers should be handed in to the Secretary-General on or before Monday next, March 3rd, 1919.)

(It was also agreed that the Secretary-General would invite the small Powers to meet on Monday next to elect their five representatives to serve on the Financial Commission.)

3. M. KLOTZ, Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparation read, with the permission of the Conference, the following resolution

adopted by the Commission at a meeting held on February 19th, 1919:— Reference by the Allied Commission on Reparation

> "The question having been submitted to the Committee for Reparation of Damages as to what principles Reparation should [be] based on.
>
> The French Delegation having presented the following motion:
>
> "The right to reparation of the Allied and Associated Powers is entire."
>
> "The enemy must repair all damage, a right of priority being reserved to certain claims."

and, concerning the first part of this motion, the question having been put and discussed as to whether the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to include in their claim for reparation all war costs be limited by the American note under date of November 5th, 1918,[1] to the German Government and by the Memorandum of the Allied Governments therein included.

The Committee have unanimously agreed to submit to the Supreme International Council of War such as it was constituted on November 4th, 1918, together with the proceedings of the Committee, the following question:

> "Would the acceptance of the first part of the Motion of the French delegation to wit: 'the right to reparation of the Allied and Associated Powers is entire' be contrary to the intentions of the principles of the Supreme War Council (constituted as it was at that date) as they have been expressed in the memorandum reproduced by the American note of November 5th, 1918?"

M. Klotz, continuing, said that it would be impossible for the Commission to apportion among the interested Allied and Associated Powers the total sum to be paid by Germany, unless a

ruling were obtained as to the interpretation to be given to the word "reparation": that is to say, whether damage suffered by private individuals alone should be included, or whether State losses and war costs should also be taken into account.

MR. HOUSE held that the question of the allocation between the Powers of the lump sum to be paid by Germany on account of reparation for damages could be settled at a later date, as no allusion would have to be made to the matter in the preliminaries of Peace. He would, therefore, prefer that the consideration of the question should be adjourned until President Wilson's return.

MR. LANSING suggested that alternative texts should be prepared for inclusion in the Articles of Peace, embodying the two hypotheses suggested by M. Klotz.

MR. BALFOUR said that the preliminary Peace would give merely the lump sum to be paid by Germany, the dates of payment and the manner in which payment should be made. No mention of the eventual distribution of this lump sum amongst the Allies would be made in the preliminary Peace. Consequently the question raised by M. Klotz would in no way delay the work of the Commission, since it merely had to decide what was the maximum amount that Germany could pay. In his opinion, there would therefore be no objection whatever in adjourning the question raised by M. Klotz until M. Orlando, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were here.

M. KLOTZ said he was willing to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal that two texts should be drafted giving effect to the two suggested interpretations of the word "reparation". He would report that decision to his Committee.

(It was agreed that the Commission of the preliminary Peace Conference on Reparation be instructed to prepare its report on the alternative hypotheses that war costs are or are not included in the claim of the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation.)

4. Reports of Economic Drafting Committee M. CLEMENTEL said that at the meeting of the Conference of the great Powers held on 21st

February, 1919, (I. C. 146, Minute 4),[2] it had been agreed that the first part of the terms of reference of the Economic Drafting Committee, under the heading "Transitory Measures", should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council, and that the "permanent subjects", mentioned in the report, should be referred to a special Commission of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

It had further been agreed that the five Signatories of the report of the Drafting Committee should meet to consider and report as to the procedure and method of work of the Economic Commission, and on its composition, having in mind Lord Milner's request that the Dominions and India should be accorded separate representation and that the small Powers should also be represented. In accordance with that decision the members of the Economic Drafting Committee had met together and prepared the following report:—

> "As regards the composition of the Economic Commission it was stated on behalf of the British Empire Delegation that they did not press any suggestion for separate representation of the British Dominions and India. We accordingly recommend that the Commission should be constituted of two members for each of the five Powers, together with five members selected by the remaining States. We consider, moreover, that it is essential that the members of Sub-Committees dealing with technical subjects should not necessarily all be members of the main Commission. We think it desirable that the Commission, when established, shall have freedom to set up any Sub-Committees which they think necessary, as is the case with the other Commissions of the Conference, and we consider that, in the interests of speedy work, all the Sub-Committees should be as small as possible.
>
> As regards the work of the Economic Commission we attach the programme already approved by the Delegates of the Great Powers at their meeting on Friday 21st, February, after excluding the transitory measures which have been transferred to the Supreme Economic Council."

Terms of Reference to the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference

(As Agreed by the Economic Drafting Committee)

I. PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

To consider what common measures are possible and desirable with a view to the removal of Economic barriers, and the establishment of an equitable basis of the principle of Equality of Trade Conditions in International Commerce.

Under this heading will arise such questions (among others) as Customs regulations, duties and restrictions; the treatment of shipping, including Port facilities and dues, unfair methods of competition, including false trade descriptions and indications of origin "dumping" etc., and the exceptions and reservations, transitory or otherwise, which may be found necessary to meet special circumstances.

II. CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS.

To consider:—

(1) What provision should be made with regard to pre-war contracts, agreements or commercial obligations to which subjects or citizens of belligerent States were parties;
(2) Whether claims should be admitted on either side for damage or injury arising out of the requisition, liquidation, sequestration or sale of enemy property or businesses, or the treatment or use of patents, trade marks, trade descriptions, or designs or copyrights, or regulations relating to trading with the enemy; and, if so, on what basis.

III. EX-ENEMY ALIENS.

To consider what common action, if any, should be taken by the Allied and Associated Governments to prohibit or regulate the carrying on, either individually, or through companies, of

certain businesses and occupations by ex-enemy aliens during the period immediately following the war.

IV. ABROGATION OR REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC TREATIES.

To consider what Treaties and Conventions of an economic character to which enemy States were parties should be revived or abrogated respectively.

(Under this heading will be considered, among others the Conventions relating to Industrial Property, Copyright, Posts and Telegraphs etc.)

NOTE:—

The Economic Commission, before formulating proposals as to any economic questions having a special aspect in regard to which other Commissions have been or may be set up by the Peace Conference, should consult the competent Commission; and on the other hand such other Commissions should, in the same circumstances consult the Economic Commission before formulating any proposal relating to one of the above classes of questions which fall within the scope of the Economic Commission.

(It was agreed to approve the recommendations of the Economic Drafting Committee and the Terms of Reference to the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference, as above given.)

On the proposal of MR. HOUSE, the following resolution was adopted: —

"The Economic Commission is instructed to report not later than March 15, on all matters which it is necessary to include in the Preliminaries of Peace."

(It was agreed that the Financial [*Economic?*] Commission should be constituted of 2 members for each of the five Great Powers, together with 5 members selected by the remaining States.

It was agreed that the members of the Financial [*Economic?*] Drafting Committee should form part of this Commission and that the names of the remaining 5 representatives of the Great Powers should be handed in to the Secretary General on or before Monday next.

It was also agreed that the Secretary General would invite the small Powers to meet on Monday next to elect 5 representatives to serve on the Economic Commission, as well as 5 representatives to serve on the Financial Commission (see item 2 (*c*) above).)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 2nd March, 1919.

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 468.
[2] BC–36, p. 62 [*Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 4*].

March 3, 3 p.m. (BC–43)

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[11] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3rd March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/50

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/50

BC–43 SWC–10

[Document 11]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3rd March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Admiral W. S. Benson
Hon. E. M. House	General Tasker H. Bliss
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Brigadier General D. Nolan
Mr. L. Harrison	Colonel W. S. Browning
Mr. G. Auchincloss	Captain F. H. Sehofield
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.	Major General W. Thwaltes, C.B.
Secretaries	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C.M.G.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.	Brigadier General P.R.C. Groves, D.S.O.
Mr. H. Norman	Brigadier General H. W. Studd, C.B., C. M.G., D.S.O.
France	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N.
M. Clemenceau	Paymaster Captain B. St. G. Pollard, C.B., R.N.

M. Pichon	France
M. Tardieu	Marshal Foch
Secretaries	General Weygand
M. Berthelot	General Belin
M. Arnavon	Comdt. Lacombe
M. de Bearn	Italy
Italy	Admiral Grassi
H. E. Baron Sonnino	General Cavallero
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi	Japan
Secretaries	Admiral Takeshita
Count Aldrovandi	General Nara
M. Bertele	Colonel Nagai
Japan	Capitaine Fujioka
H. E. Baron Makino	Capitaine de Vaisseau Nomura
H. E. M. Matsui	Capitaine de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Captain E. Abraham
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau asked whether the Powers were ready to nominate their delegates for the Financial and Economic Commissions.

Nomination of Delegates for Financial and Economic Commissions
Mr. Lansing, on behalf of the United States, asked for a day's delay for decision.

(It was that the names of the delegates should be communicated to the Secretary-General and that the Commissions should meet forthwith, without awaiting the nomination of all the members.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had summarised the report of the Military Commission in a short document, which he would read to the meeting.

Military, Naval and Air Conditions of Peace: (a) Summary of Marshal Foch Relating to Germany MARSHAL FOCH then read the following document:— (distributed in English as here recorded.)

> "I have the honour to forward herewith the Regulations concerning the definitive military and aerial Statutes of Germany.
>
> These regulations have been formulated by the Inter-Allied Committee comprising three representatives of each Government designated in the report of February 12th, 1919,[1] and working under me as president, and are based on the decisions of the Supreme Allied Council which met at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 12th, 1919. The decisions were arrived at after consulting the Commanders-in-Chief.
>
> These regulations provide for the military and aerial statutes of Germany, under the principle that Germany will only keep the forces necessary to ensure order and to police the interior of her territories.
>
> They decide therefore:
>
> (1) The maximum aerial and military strength.
> (2) The staffing of this strength within a certain number of large units: Infantry divisions, Cavalry divisions, Army and Army Corps H.Q.
> (3) The method of recruiting of this strength (officers and men).

(4) The armament, the war machines and the ammunition that the Germans will be authorised to keep, to maintain and to manufacture.
(5) The controlling measures which should be taken in view of the limitation of the strength and of the armament of the Germans.

(*1*) *Strength.*

All the delegations agreed to admit:

(*a*) that the land forces of Germany shall not exceed a strength of 200,000 men (officers not included)—that the number of officers and those assimilated from the land forces shall not exceed 9,000;
(*b*) that the air forces shall not exceed 1,000 men (officers included) and that these forces shall not be maintained after October 1st, 1919.

(*2*) *Staffing of large units.*

All the delegations agreed to fix the maximum number of the large units and staffs for the above strength at 15 Infantry divisions and 5 Cavalry divisions, 5 Army Corps H. Q. and one Army H. Q.

(*3*) *Method of recruiting the strength.*

The principle of permanent armies is applied to the officers and to the non-commissioned officers of the land forces; they are recruited voluntarily under the obligation to serve a long term, i. e. 25 years for the officers and 15 years for the non-commissioned officers.

The men of the land forces are, on the contrary, taken exclusively in each class of recruiting by drawing numbers, or by any other method chosen by Germany, under the reserve:

(*a*) that the total length of these men's service shall not exceed one year and that the service shall be continuous;

(*b*) that the number of trained men, in each class of recruiting shall not exceed 180,000.

The British delegation was of opinion that a voluntary service for a long period would have been preferable; but they accepted the above conditions in order to arrive at a decision.

(*4*) *Armament, war machines and ammunition.*

The armament, the war machines and the ammunition left to the Germans are settled according to the quantities that are necessary for an army of 200,000 men staffed as indicated in paragraph (2), taking as a basis the armament of the German divisions shortly before the armistice.

The surplus armament, war machines and ammunition shall be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless.

All the delegations agreed upon these questions.

(*5*) *Controlling measures.*

All the delegations also agreed to establish a Committee of Control with the object of supervising the execution, of the reductions imposed upon Germany as regards her strength and her armament within the prescribed period.

It has been unanimously admitted that this Committee will cease its duties at the end of such period, it being understood that in future the control will be continued by such means and such body as the League of Nations may deem necessary."

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not propose to criticise the work of the Military Commission. He thought, however, that there were probably some points on which all the military authorities were not agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was one such point.

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that there were also points which the civilian representatives would have to examine and that they would have to ask a number of questions to help them in their examination, which, if stated in the present meeting, might waste an undue portion of the Council's time. He would like, himself, to have the opportunity of going over the proposals clause by clause with his own military advisers, and to resume the discussion in the Council after completing this preparatory examination.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he specially wished to draw attention to the fact that all the Delegations had reached a unanimous agreement. The only exception was that the British Delegation had expressed a preference for a voluntary system of enlistment as the basis of Germany's future military law. This, however, had not been pressed. The result, therefore, was the expression of a unanimous verdict.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was not possible to refuse the extra time required by Mr. Balfour for consideration. All he would ask Mr. Balfour to say was on what approximate date he thought the discussion could be resumed.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it not unlikely that Mr. Lloyd George would like to examine the report. As far as he was himself concerned, a very few days would be enough. One of his objects was really to save time. Some of the questions he would wish to ask would be answered with less loss of time to the business of the Conference by a meeting with his military advisers outside the Council. For instance, he gathered from the document that it was proposed that every officer in the future German army was to serve until he had reached the age of 45. He quite understood the object of this provision, but he had considerable doubt about its practicability. He had been told that there was a network of strategic railways on the left bank of the Ehine answering to no commercial necessity whatever. If this was so, it might be desirable to destroy them. On this point he required enlightenment and would prefer to discuss the question with his military advisers. He had also been told that there was a divergence of opinion between the Naval and Military Commissions. There should be harmony between them. He further noted that Admiral Benson dissented from some of the naval

proposals on important issues. This also he would like to discuss outside the Council.

(b) Conditions for Austria-Hungary M. SONNINO remarked that the military representatives had been asked to make recommendations concerning the final military conditions of Austria-Hungary. He enquired whether any results had been obtained.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had prepared a note on this subject. The note was then distributed. (See Annexure "A.")

MR. HOUSE suggested that this matter should also be deferred, according to Mr. Balfour's proposal.

(c) Time Within Which Military Terms Must Be Settled MARSHAL FOCH said that the present rate of demobilisation in the Allied Armies required that the discussion with the Germans should not be delayed after 1st April. The Allies could impose their will on Germany until that date. If were to be in a position to impose their will on Germany after that date, the whole plan of demobilisation would have to be altered. He, therefore, begged the Council to agree upon the terms early enough to allow of a meeting with the Germans by March 20th. He considered that the period between that date and April 1st would not be too long for the discussion that would ensue with the Germans.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Council had ever laid down the principle that the terms of peace were to be ready by April 1st. He had no recollection of any such decision. The military delegates, however, appeared to have assumed that there was some such undertaking. They had, it seemed, so ordered demobilisation as to fit in with this plan. In effect, they wished to force the Council to settle peace by that date under pain of not being able to enforce their will upon the enemy. This was equivalent to holding a pistol at the head of the Council. If this were so, President Wilson would only have four days after his return to examine the conditions and to agree to them. This policy, Mr. Balfour added, was a complete novelty to him.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to correct what seemed to be an error in Mr. Balfour's statement. The American military authorities did not understand that there was such a policy; but they considered that these terms were final and evidently the Council could not be expected to settle the final peace terms by March 20th.

MR. BALFOUR said that if he understood Marshal Foch aright, his view was that the terms must be ready by March 20th, or, failing that, that the Allies would not be able to enforce them. He felt it would not be right to put President Wilson in the dilemma of choosing to decide so important an issue in four days, or allowing it to go by default.

MR. HOUSE suggested that, as the Council was awaiting reports from various Commissions on March 8th, this question might also be left over, at least until the return of Mr. Lloyd George.

LORD MILNER observed that two of the Commissions set up had not been asked to report until the 15th. Some portion of the peace terms, therefore, could not be settled until after that date.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the subject had been placed on the Agenda. Nevertheless, he was ready to put off the discussion until Thursday, if Mr. Balfour and Mr. House maintained their proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought it would be wise to decide to do this. He had only received the resolutions on the previous day. There were in them certain large questions which did not exclusively affect one or other of the fighting services. There was, for instance, one question which might be discussed immediately, namely, the question of the period during which the various proposals were to be enforced. The Aviation authorities wished to enforce their terms until the final conclusion of peace. The Naval authorities wished to enforce theirs until Germany had fulfilled all the terms of the armistice. The Military authorities wished to enforce theirs for all time. It might be desirable, therefore, to discuss the principle there and then in the Council.

(d) Duration of Terms to be Imposed on Germany M. CLEMENCEAU said that an abstract discussion of this kind might not lead to useful results. The duration of the conditions could not be fixed without considering the nature of the conditions themselves. If this matter were discussed out of the relations to the conditions, it might be necessary to discuss it again in connection with the conditions themselves.

MR. BALFOUR said that he saw the force of the suggestion, but he begged to submit that the Council should lay down some principle for the guidance of the experts. He thought it would not do to say to the Germans: "Here are aerial terms to last a short time, naval terms to endure for perhaps a generation, and military terms to last until the Day of Judgment." He thought that the task of the experts would be made easier if they were told exactly what they were to provide for.

MR. HOUSE said that the air terms referred to were, he understood, contrived to meet the purpose of seeking out mines, and October was set as the time limit for this purpose. As far as he could see, no conflict arose from these terms.

MARSHAL FOCH said that from a report he had seen of the proceedings of the Council on February 12th, both Mr. Balfour and President Wilson had expressed the view that the final military condition of Germany was to be laid down. If this was so, it was unnecessary to discuss what principle was to be adopted, as the principle had been fixed on February 12th, and had remained unchanged since then.

LORD MILNER enquired whether, in Marshal Foch's opinion, the resolution taken on that date implied that the terms to be imposed on Germany were to last in perpetuity.

MR. BALFOUR said that this point ought to be cleared up by the Council at once. For his part, he did not agree with Marshal Foch's interpretation of the decision of February 12th. The word "final" he thought could not be held to convey the meaning of perpetuity. It had not been so interpreted by the Naval authorities and by the

Aviation authorities. The Naval Terms, requiring a limitation of forces until certain undertakings had been carried out, were final terms, but not terms laid down to last for ever.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if a definition of the term "final" were to be sought, it should be sought in the statements made on the 12th February by President Wilson.

(He then read certain extracts from an account of the proceedings of February 12th made by the French Foreign Office.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood the discussion of the naval, military and air terms was postponed until the following Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

The question of the meaning of the word "final" could, if Mr. Balfour so desired, be discussed immediately.

MR. HOUSE drew attention to Marshal Foch's suggestion in the concluding paragraph of his statement, vesting the power of enforcing the continuance of the limiting clauses in the League of Nations. He thought that if this suggestion were adopted, the naval and military terms would be in harmony.

MR. BALFOUR said that during the discussion he had composed a draft, which he thought contained practically the same suggestion as Mr. House's. He proposed the following draft:—

> "The limitation on German armaments, whether military, or naval, or aerial, shall last until Germany has fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the Peace Terms, and thereafter for as long as, and with such modifications as, the League of Nations may determine."

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the Naval Advisers had not interpreted the terms of reference in the same manner as the Military Commission, because they had not had the advantage of having before them the proceedings of February 12th. They had therefore not worked on the same basis as the Military Commission. There was not, however, any

essential divergence of view between the naval and military authorities.

MR. LANSING called attention to certain of the proposed naval terms, which were evidently intended to be of indefinite duration, for instance, the dismantling of Heligoland, and of coastal forts denying access to the Baltic and the Kiel Canal.

MR. BALFOUR said that his proposal referred only to the limitation of armaments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this did not dispose of the seriousness of the question. Naval Powers had means of defending themselves which were not open to land Powers. He was not content to tell Germany to limit her forces until Peace Terms were fulfilled, and to leave the future at the mercy of events.

M. SONNINO said that on the 12th February the settlement of naval, military and aviation conditions had been referred to Commissions. These Commissions had worked independently, and, in consequence, the results obtained were not in complete harmony. Co-ordination of the results should have been obtained by Marshal Foch as Chairman of the Main Commission. Had this been done, the question of the period of enforcement would certainly have been discussed. The alternative now before the Council was either to decide this matter in principle or refer it to Marshal Foch to settle, together with the co-ordination of the three Reports.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Baron Sonnino's suggestion that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their results, was accepted.

LORD MILNER said that he thought the Council should lay down the principle on which the Commissions should proceed. Either the terms should be imposed on Germany until she had fulfilled the Terms of Peace, or they should be imposed unconditionally for ever.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that President Wilson in that very room had declared that Germany must be disarmed. He did not say that

Germany must be temporarily disarmed. Other countries might be content with transitory naval terms. He himself was not prepared to sign an invitation to Germany to prepare for another attack by land after an interval of three, ten, or even forty years. He would not be prepared to sign a Peace of that character.

MR. BALFOUR said that before asking Marshal Foch to undertake co-ordination of the various Reports, some general direction should be given to him. He noticed that in the Naval Report, Admiral Benson had on four occasions made reservations relating to the period of enforcing the terms on Germany.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that he understood that the German Fleet was to be reduced to a fixed strength and kept there for an indeterminate period, and that the continuance of this régime was to be assigned to the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this might meet the case, provided the constitution of the League of Nations was satisfactory.

M. SONNINO suggested that Mr. Balfour's proposal should be referred to the three Commissions, which were to meet to co-ordinate their reports.

MARSHAL FOCH said he therefore understood that the Commissions would have to study the question of enforcing certain terms pending the execution of the conditions of Peace. If so, this represented an abandonment of the policy sketched by President Wilson on February 12th.

MR. HOUSE proposed that the discussion be adjourned until the following Thursday.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but suggested that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their Reports in time for the renewal of the discussion on Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

M. SONNINO asked whether the terms to be imposed on Austria and Hungary would also be discussed.

(It was agreed that the Note put forward by Marshal Foch—Appendix "A"—should be submitted to the Council on Thursday.)

MARSHAL FOCH asked that the question of Germany's future frontiers should also be taken up.

(e) Delimitation of German Frontiers M. CLEMENCEAU said that in the absence of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson, it would not be possible to undertake the discussion of this question.

3. GENERAL BELIN begged to submit a Joint Note of the Military and Naval Advisers to the Supreme War Council on this subject, in pursuance of the reference made on the 17th Feb. (I. C. 144, Minute 5.)[2]

Question of Permitting the Transfer by Sea of German Troops to Eastern Prussia and Latvia (For Joint Note see Annexure "B".)

(After some discussion the Joint Note was accepted, and Marshal Foch was requested to communicate the result to the Germans.)

4. M. SONNINO proposed that the Montenegrin case should be heard.

Agenda for Next Meeting. Montenegro (It was agreed statement on behalf of Montenegro should be heard on the following Wednesday, at 3 p.m.)

(The Military, Naval and Air conditions of Peace were postponed until the following Thursday, and the question of Russia to a later date.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 4th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Note Concerning Limitation of Armaments in Austria-Hungary

The Military and Aviation members of the Committee appointed by the Supreme Allied Council to define the limitation of armaments, after examining the very detailed proposals of the Italian Delegation concerning the armaments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, beg the Supreme Council of the Allies to re-examine the question as a whole. They further express the view that frontiers should be laid down as speedily as possible between the various States which are to be set up in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Once this delimitation has been made, the members of the Committee will make recommendations similar to those made for Germany for such of those States as are considered enemy States.

The Naval Delegates have agreed to the text attached to this Note.

Appendix "B"

NAVAL AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES,
VERSAILLES, 3rd March, 1919.

Report on the Question of Permitting Transport by Sea of German Troops to East Prussia and to Latvia

(In Execution of the Decision of the Supreme War Council of 17–2–19.)[3]

The Naval and Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council,

After taking cognizance:

A. Of the request of the German Government for:

Free passage by sea between German ports in the West and ports of the Eastern shores of the Baltic for ships carrying troops, military stores and coal, in order to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks on the frontiers of East Prussia and in Latvia;

B. Of the opinion expressed by the Blockade Committee at their Meeting of February 24th to the effect that the Naval and Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council were alone competent to express an opinion;

Considering further:

(*a*) That the request of the German Government described above is contrary to Articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Convention concluded on the 11th November 1918 with Germany;
(*b*) That Marshal Foch has already, on several occasions, refused to comply with a German demand for the rearming of certain Naval Units, notably on the 24th January, 1919 and on the 13th February, and that a similar refusal was made by the Naval Armistice Commission;
(*c*) That the authorisation for the Government of Germany to transport troops and material beyond the pre-war frontiers of Germany would lead to the sanctioning of co-operation in a common struggle against the Bolshevik of German forces on the one hand and of Russian contingents on the other, for whose up-keep and supply the Allies will be answerable;
That from this state of things might arise claims made by the German Government and even discussions with that Government likely to impede the work of the Peace Conference;
(*d*) That the Germans have already attempted to re-establish commercial relations in the Baltic, contrary to all the rules of the Blockade and specially to Article 8 of the Armistice Convention of January 16th last, which provides for the delivery to the Allies of the whole German Commercial Fleet for use in re-victualling Europe;

The Naval and Military Representatives are of opinion

1. That there is no ground for granting the German request to transport troops and supplies in the Baltic from West to East.
2. That the Blockade of Germany should be maintained in full force as at present in the Baltic.
3. That in order to prevent the Germans from representing this denial as an abandonment by the Allies of the Baltic provinces to

the mercy of Bolshevism, it is urgently necessary to examine the question of furnishing support to such local contingents as may be in a position to resist the Bolshevik troops.

[1] See BC–29 (SWC–6), vol. III, p. 971.
[2] See BC–34 (SWC–9), p. 27 [*Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 2*].
[3] See BC–34 (SWC–9), p. 27 [*Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 2*].

March 5, 3 p.m. (BC–44)

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[12] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, March 5, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 5, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51

BC–44 SWC–11

[Document 12]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, March 5, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 5, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. E. M. House.
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. G. B.
Mr. E. Phipps.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.

ALSO PRESENT

PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1 TO 7

FRANCE

Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 6

FRANCE

M. Jules Cambon.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 7

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Davis.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. McCormick.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Lord Robert Cecil.
Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clementel.
M. Seydoux.

M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. M. Crespi.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 9
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Lybyer.
BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. Leeper.
FRANCE

M. Delaroche Vernet.
ITALY
Colonel Castoldi.
MONTENEGRIN DELEGATION
M. J. Plamenatz.
Dr. P. Chotch.
General A. Jvozdenovitch.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU opened the Meeting with a statement that he had an application from the Belgian Delegation to be given representation in the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Nations when the subject of preliminary peace terms was being discussed. Belgium, claimed to be as vitally interested in the terms formulated as any other nation represented in the Council, and he thought it would be difficult to refuse her request. Admission of Belgium to Deliberations Concerning Preliminaries of Peace in the Supreme War Council

MR. BALFOUR agreed that a refusal would be very difficult, but he asked the Council to consider the consequence of admitting Belgian delegates. It would set a precedent which would give rise to claims by the other small Powers, some of whom were equally interested, as for instance the Poles, the whole future of whose country depended on the terms that would be considered.

MR. LANSING suggested that the Bohemians might well claim an equal interest.

MR. HOUSE thought the difference between the Belgians and the other cases mentioned was, that the latter were newly created States while the Belgians had waged the entire war with the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR was not sure that the distinction could be sustained. Poland had been acknowledged and had representatives on an equal footing in the Plenary Conference. It might be difficult to justify any discrimination between her status and that of Belgium. The same question might then arise in regard to Serbia, Greece, Portugal, etc. He would like to have representatives of all of them present were he assured that their presence would not materially reduce the Council's ability to do business.

M. CLEMENCEAU called attention to the fact that a rule had already been adopted in the regulations for the Conference, which provided that delegates of every nation should be admitted when a subject was being discussed in which they were interested. Belgian representatives must, therefore, be admitted when such a subject as the West frontier of Germany was under discussion, while Polish representatives would have to be admitted under this rule when the Eastern frontier was being discussed.

(It was agreed that the light of the Belgian Government to be represented on the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers during the discussion of the Preliminary Peace Terms should be limited to the occasions coming within the regulations for the Peace Conference, viz., when terms in which Belgium was specially interested were under discussion.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Danish House of Representatives had sent a special Delegation to be heard in the matter of Schleswig. As the Danish Minister had already been heard, he suggested that this Danish Delegation be referred to the special Commission on Belgian Affairs, to which the Danish claims had been referred. Hearing of a Danish Delegation

(There being no objection, the above suggestion was adopted.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that Luxemburg had requested to be given a hearing. Luxemburg was not an Allied Power (if a power at all) but neutral or possibly enemy. The present Government in Luxemburg had not been officially recognised. He thought, therefore, that Luxemburg need not be heard for the time being. Hearing of Luxemburg

(It was agreed that Luxemburg would not be given a hearing for the present.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that Marshal Foch had submitted a Report of financial rather than military interest on the subject of the cost of maintaining the Allied Army of occupation in Germany. As this report had only just been distributed, it could not be advantageously discussed immediately, but would be referred to the Finance Committee or put on the Agenda of a future meeting. Cost of Maintenance of Army of Occupation

(It was agreed to put discussion of this report on the Agenda of a future meeting.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received from the American Delegation a proposal requiring that the Commissions and Committees should attach to their Reports, to be handed in on the 8th or 15th March special drafting for such articles as were to find a place in the preliminary Peace Treaty.[1] He suggested that examination of this proposal, which he understood was due to Mr. Lansing, should be postponed to the meeting on Thursday, March 6th. American Proposal in Regard to Drafting by committee and

Commissions of Recommendations Concerning Preliminary Peace Terms

(This was agreed to.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a Report from M. Jules Cambon regarding a request by the Powers with special interests. He would ask M. Cambon to explain the matter.

Request of Powers With Special Interests for Increased Representation on Financial and Economic Councils M. JULES CAMBON said that in pursuance of the Order of the Council he had on Monday, 3rd March presided over a Meeting of the Delegations of the smaller Powers.[2] These Delegations were to nominate five Members to serve on the Financial and Economic Councils in accordance with the decision of March 1st. At the beginning of the Meeting the principal representative of Brazil, M. Epitacio Pessoa, read the text of a declaration drawn up that very morning in an informal meeting of the small Powers demanding that the Council should allow them 10 representatives instead of 5 in each of these Bodies. They further declared that they would abstain from nominating any representatives until this request had been granted. M. Cambon had reminded them of the precedent of the 2nd Plenary Session in which they had nominated 5 representatives though expressing at the time the wish for more, a wish which had subsequently been taken into account. He had also pointed out to them that the form of their decision was somewhat discourteous. In this he had been supported by some Delegates especially those of the smaller European Powers. These Delegates after the meeting had informed him that the opposition was not directed so much against the decision of the great Powers as against the alleged privileged treatment of the smaller European Powers. In the end the meeting had not maintained its refusal to nominate Delegates. It had adopted a list of ten States requiring representation on each of the Councils. These lists had been drawn up in alphabetical order and from them when the number of Delegates had been fixed a choice would be made. As Chairman he had been asked to support this suggestion before the present meeting. The list was as follows. For the Financial Council:—Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Hedjaz, Poland,

Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia. For the Economic Council:—Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, Poland, Roumania, Serbia, Hedjaz and Czecho-Slovakia. M. Cambon concluded by asking that the matter be settled as soon as possible in order that he might inform the Delegations of the smaller Powers.

MR. HOUSE expressed the view that the original decision for 5 representatives should be adhered to.

MR. LANSING agreed as he thought this the best means of minimising conflict. He observed that Bolivia and Peru asked for inclusion in the Economic Commission and that Ecuador was a candidate for the Financial Commission. None of these States had been at war with Germany. Cuba and Nicaragua on the other hand, which had declared war on Germany, were not included. The Hedjaz representing a few hundred thousand men figured in both lists. He thought, therefore, there would be more confusion in allowing ten members than in maintaining five.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as no objection was raised Mr. Lansing's proposal was adopted.

(It was therefore decided that the former decision be maintained; that the Powers with special interests should be represented on the Financial and Economic Councils by 5 Delegates. M. Jules Cambon was requested to inform the representatives of these States of this decision.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had had this subject placed on the Agenda after a conversation with Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. They had all agreed that the matter was urgent, and that it was incumbent on the Allied Powers to show goodwill to the German Austrians, in particular with a view to preventing them from throwing themselves into the arms of the Bavarians and Germans of Germany. This preamble was made for the benefit of Baron Sonnino who had not been present at the consultation. If he also agreed that it was advisable to discuss this matter at once, the discussion might proceed. If he preferred to think it over, the discussion might be delayed, but it would undoubtedly be advantageous to get the

Germans in Austria in a good temper. Re-Victualling of Austria (a) Financial Proposals of Economic Council

BARON SONNINO said that he had no objection to immediate discussion. Italy had always done her utmost to feed Austria.

M. CLEMENTEL said that before producing the conclusions of the Supreme Economic Council, he wished to say that he had only heard on the previous night that the question was to come up before the Council. He had called together the four Secretaries, and between them, they had drawn up the Procès-Verbal of the Session held on the 3rd March. The text he was about to read had therefore been arrived at by Agreement of the four Secretaries but had not been formally passed, as was usual, by a subsequent meeting of the Council itself. In practice however, the text drawn up by the Secretaries was always passed without objection.

M. Clementel then read the following extracts from the Minutes of the fourth Session of the Supreme Economic Council:—

Credits to enemy countries other than Germany.

> 1(ex 3) "That credits to enemy countries other than Germany be granted only in the event of no cash assets being available for payment: that the best available non-liquid assets be taken as collateral security against such credits: and that their repayment be a first charge on the future resources of such country ranking in front of any payment for reparation or indemnity. The above principle is established in respect of credits not exceeding $60,000,000 in the first instance."

Agreed with the following reservations:

1) That the U. S. Treasury is not empowered to make such loans excepting insofar as the Christian population of Turkey is concerned.
2) The Italian and French Delegates agreed to this only in this specific case which should not be construed as a precedent in other cases.

Finance of Supplies for Austria.

> 3(ex 5) "In order to secure immediate action for the finance of food supplies required in German-Austria to prevent extreme hardship and starvation and the spread of anarchy the following arrangement is proposed:
>
> *a*) "That Great Britain, France and Italy agree to advance credits in equal thirds up to a maximum of $30,000,000 between now and the next harvest, to finance such food supplies as may be consigned to German-Austria under the direction of the Supreme Economic Council inclusive of those already provided under provisional arrangements, it being clearly understood that the above figure is a maximum and that the question of actually opening credits up to this amount depends on the progress of events and the decisions of the Economic Council from time to time."

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 6 was amended and agreed in the following form.

> 3 *b* (ex 6).
>
> *b*) "That as security for such credits the Austrian Government should formally agree to place at the disposal of a Commission or Commissioners representative of the three leading powers a suitable lien on (*a*) the salt mines in Austria, (*b*) the properties of the City of Vienna, and (*c*) such other assets as may be agreed upon, in Austria, immediate steps being taken in the case of the salt mines to clear these mines of all prior claims."

Paragraph 7 was amended and agreed in the following form:—

> 3 *c* (ex 7).
>
> *c*) "That an Interallied Commission be appointed of three or four members with a view to taking the necessary steps to

make arrangements for due repayment of the credits out of the income of the above properties or otherwise."

3 *d* (ex 8).

d) "That the repayment of such credits be a first charge on the future resources of Austria, ranking in front of any payment for reparation."

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 15 was amended and agreed as follows:—

4 (ex 15)

"The associated Governments are prepared to allow imports of cereals from the Argentine into German-Austria up to a maximum of 30,000 tons, provided German-Austria is able to make its own financial arrangements subject to the approval of the financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

"The Associated Governments are prepared to transmit through the Wheat Executive to addressees in the Argentine cable messages from the Austrian Government properly and necessarily arising out of the proposed transactions. In the event of contracts being arranged by Austria the Associated Governments will as far as possible facilitate shipping arrangements, any cost being charged by the Associated Government providing the Shipping against credits available for the purpose accruing to the Austrian Government in respect of the Austrian mercantile marine under the management of the Associated Government."

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that the texts read by M. Clemenceau represented the financial clauses of the scheme for revictualing Austria. These clauses had been adopted on the advice of the Financial Advisers of the Council. If the clauses were accepted by the Powers the financial side of the matter was disposed of, but there were other difficulties of a material nature which the Supreme

Council would have to settle. He referred especially to railway transport between the ports and the countries for which the food was intended.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that before proceeding to deal with that aspect of the matter, it might be well to dispose of the financial clauses. He asked whether there was in any quarter any comment to make on them.

(No objection having been raised, the clauses above mentioned were adopted.)

(b) Executive Power of Supreme Economic Council MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection to raise but would like to make a remark concerning the resolution just taken before proceeding with the most difficult part of the problem. He thought it was unnecessary that every proposal of the Supreme Economic Council should be referred for sanction to the five Powers. The Economic Council had, he understood, executive authority within the terms of its reference.

This principle was accepted.

(c) Railroad Transportation of Food Mr. Balfour said that the difficult question remained of finding means to convey the corn shipped from America, from the Adriatic ports to the consumers in Germany, Austria, Bohemia and Hungary. He did not know exactly what the obstacles were that impeded this process, but he was assured that they were producing very grievous results, and that before long these results would be even more grievous. He would suggest that Mr. Hoover be asked to furnish the Council with an explanation of these difficulties.

MR. HOOVER then read the following statement:—

> The chaotic political and economic conditions in the states of the old Austrian Empire render the solution of the food problems extremely difficult. The newly constituted governments jealously guard their own supplies of food and coal and have created artificial barriers in the distribution of

such native products as exist, and have made the distribution of imported foodstuffs extremely difficult by the disintegration of railway management and barriers on coal movements.

While the states comprising Czecho-Slovakia and the old state of Austria and some portions of Jugo-Slavia near seaboard are dangerously short of food, there are apparently sufficient surplus supplies in the interior of Jugo-Slavia and in the Banat to supply a sufficiency for some months to the interior of Jugo-Slavia, to Hungary and to Northern Serbia.

The problem, therefore, of maintenance of human life and the preservation of order through adequate food supplies not only revolves upon a large amount of imports with the proper finance and overseas transportation thereof, but also upon the organisation of some kind of economic unity amongst these states in respect to the distribution of supplies which they have available, and of transportation, and coal.

The total amount of imported food supplies required for these states as from the first of March until next harvest is approximately 185,000 tons per month of breadstuffs and 15,000 tons of fats per month. The total cost of such a programme will amount to approximately $50,000,000 per month. Of this amount, the American Relief Administration has arranged directly for about $14,000,000 to Czecho-Slovakia and Greater Serbia. A provision of approximately $8,000,000 per month has been arranged for the State of Austria through advance of England, France and Italy against securities, these countries in turn receiving an advance for the cost of food supplies purchased in the United States from the United States Government. Further finance from England, France and Italy is necessary for the other states. Recently the British Treasury has made an appropriation for these purposes but as yet no definite programme has been defined.

The overseas shipping, as to the American programme, has been undertaken by the United States Shipping Board.

Further provision must be made from Allied shipping.

In an effort to secure some economic unity, a commission of the Associated Governments has been established at Trieste, through whom it is hoped that an adequate inter-change of such surplus commodities as there are in the different states could be secured.

During the month of February, the American Relief Administration provided approximately 70,000 tons of food-stuffs at various Adriatic ports for distribution into this area and the Allied Governments provided by advances from Italy approximately 20,000 tons; but, owing to inherent transportation difficulties and more particularly to the disturbances at Lubiana, which resulted in the Italian Government establishing a blockade against the Jugo-Slav area, it has been impossible to secure distribution of more than 30,000 tons during the month. This blockade has, I am informed, been raised yesterday.

Further arrivals by the American Food Administration make it possible to give a distribution of approximately 90,000 tons during the month of March, if transportation difficulties can be solved. Double this amount is needed but the balance must await arrangements by the Allied Governments. Aside from the arrangement of these further supplies, action by the Supreme War Council is critically necessary in the matter of control of interior transportation.

The solution which I propose, after elaborate investigation by American Railway Engineers, is one that I not only believe is feasible but will meet the various exigencies of the political situation. To this end the following plan is proposed: (*a*) AH the states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling stock; (*b*) This rolling stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and used solely for its purposes; (*c*) The Director General of Relief should be made the mandatory for

the disposition of this rolling stock; (*d*) A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the necessary programmes of food to the different localities; (*e*) This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services; (*f*) The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory regardless of nationality or political boundaries; (*g*) Definite portions of j)ort facilities should be assigned to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consummation of these ends; (*h*) The rolling stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped; (*i*) That the railway officials of each state and port officials in each port should be called upon to co-operate in maintenance of this service.

With reference to the 7th. paragraph of this statement, Mr. Hoover pointed out that the main line to Prague and Vienna had been cut off by the blockade. This had led to serious disturbances in Yugo-Slavia and in Austria. The Italian Government had made efforts to relieve the situation by using the Udine line, but this line could only convey about 800 tons of food a day, whereas to save the situation, 3,000 tons were required.

Mr. Hoover added in regard to his recommendation (*c*) that he proposed that one person should be, made Director-General, because he did not think that any inter-allied body could give the requisite executive punch to a situation of this kind.

M. CLEMENTEL said that the Economic Council had reached a somewhat similar conclusion but instead of proposing to hand over the control to a single director it had instituted a sub-section of Military men with railway experience, one British, one French, one American and one Italian. This sub-section was already at work and it was somewhat difficult to supersede it by a single director, unless the execution of the director's decision be left to them.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that he entirely agreed with M. Clementel's account of what the Council had proposed. The four railway experts

on the sub-section were dealing with communications and were doing admirable work but the real lever in our possession to deal with the situation in Austria was food. It would, therefore, be necessary that the authority dealing with food should control this section. He would therefore suggest that in place of paragraph (*c*) of Mr. Hoover's recommendations the following should be substituted: —

> (*c*) The Director of Relief, working through the communications section of the Supreme Economic Council, should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this railway stock.

M. CLEMENTEL said that this proposal would satisfy him. He pointed out that there might be a conflict for instance for priority between troops and food on the railways. If the principle of absolute priority for food were accepted, a principle embodied in the decision to give the supreme directorate to the Food Controller, while the execution of his orders remained in the hands of those dealing with the transport of troops, no trouble ought to arise.

M. CRESPI said that as Minister of Supplies in Italy he was in a position to give the Council some interesting details. Immediately after the Armistice, Italy began to send food to the ex-enemy countries beyond her frontiers. This was done gratis and out of Italian stocks. Food had gone to all nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire including the Yugo-Slavs. As soon as agreement had been reached with the Allies, Italy was charged with the revictualling of Austria. By the first agreement Italy supplied Vienna with 24 thousand tons of food. In this matter Mr. Hoover and himself had worked in complete accord. The undertaking was fully carried out. Meanwhile, Mr. Hoover employed other stocks accumulated at Trieste for Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. The trains passed through Innsbruck, Tarvis and Lubiana. Vienna was satisfied with what had been done. He had himself received a report on the previous day that, though the food situation remained critical, the supplies sent from Genoa had afforded great relief. He had received a similar letter from M. Benes, thanking the Italian Government for the help sent to Bohemia, especially to Prague. As regards Yugo-

Slavia, with Mr. Hoover's consent, Italian trains were employed to carry food through Lubiana or Fiume. Traffic through Fiume still continued. It had been suspended through Lubiana owing to unfortunate incidents. On February 12th a train of Italian refugees was attacked by soldiers in Serbian uniform near Lubiana. Many were wounded; Italian flags were burned. Italy had asked for an apology from the provincial authorities. This had been followed on the 20th February by a demand that the Italian Armistice sub-Commission at Lubiana should withdraw immediately. This Commission was a branch of the Commission established in Vienna in accordance with Article 7 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti. The officers composing it had called on the local authorities, and the Commission was fully recognised and well established. Nevertheless it was compelled to leave Lubiana. The pretext alleged was that Lubiana was situated in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to which the Armistice could not apply, since the Entente Powers had recognised Yugo-Slavia. No such recognition in fact had been made. One of the officers composing the Commission was ill at the time and permission for him to remain was requested. This was denied, unless he submitted to medical examination by a local Doctor. This insult could not be overlooked by the Italian Government, which had in consequence closed the frontier line of the Armistice by way of protest. A Commission from Trieste was at that time in Rome, being received by the Italian Government. The English Delegate on this Commission, Mr. Butler, took it upon himself to go to Lubiana to settle the difficulty. Two days ago a report had been received that a settlement had been reached. The settlement was to the effect that the Italian Commission should return to Lubiana and should be honourably received. In consequence Baron Sonnino and he thought that the incident was closed. Mr. Hoover had said that the blockade had been raised on the previous day. Neither Baron Sonnino nor he had previously been aware of this, but they were glad to hear it. Nevertheless the Council must understand that the political situation remained very strained and that Mr. Hoover's proposals required very careful consideration. The Italian Government had tried to relieve the situation in Bohemia through Tarvis and General Badoglio had just telegraphed that three trains a day were going to Prague. Attempts were being made to increase this number to five.

Mr. LANSING enquired how much food was represented by three trains.

Mr. HOOVER said that the maximum delivery of three trains was about 800 tons, whereas 3,000 represented the minimum requisite

M. CRESPI said that he thought three trains could carry as much as 1,000 tons. The whole situation was governed by the dearth of engines, Austria up to date having failed to supply what was required of her by the Armistice. It was only on the 28th February that deliveries of engines had begun at Vienna.

MR. HOUSE said that he thought M. Clementel's suggestion was a good one and might be adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the amendment proposed by Lord Robert Cecil had been accepted by M. Clementel.

M. SONNINO said that the proposals put forward were of the greatest importance and could not, in his opinion, be adopted there and then. M. Clementel had confessed that they involved political questions. Italy could not allow a mandate to be given to any one man to override all national services, all political considerations, all military necessities, to establish complete priority for one kind of traffic, and to employ agents of all nationalities. M. Crespi had given some details about the Lubiana incident. Italy had done all it could to mitigate the consequences of the insult received. Italy had shown the greatest forbearance and had agreed to accept the solution proposed by Mr. Butler. He did not yet know what were the results of Italy's effort at reconciliation. Before knowing it, he was asked to hand over the whole control to a single director. He could not do so. When at the beginning of the discussion he had said that he had no objection to talking over the question, he thought only the financial proposals of M. Clementel were to be brought forward. This was a far wider proposal and he must emphatically oppose its adoption at that sitting.

MR. BALFOUR said that the position appeared to him to be very serious. Most of the delegates, except M. Sonnino, were agreed that

the proposal suggested by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, and M. Clementel, furnished adequate machinery for the conveyance of food to Austria. It appeared to him that no other machinery would do this. M. Sonnino objected that the Yugo-Slavs had behaved extremely badly, whereas Italy had shown a very conciliatory spirit. The situation was such that of the two possible railways by which food could go to German Austria, the larger was closed for political reasons. He, of course, accepted M. Sonnino's account of the event, but he felt that the results of this incident were of extreme gravity. We could only send 800 or at the most 1,000 tons of food a day to a country that needed 3,000 to live. Could M. Sonnino offer any other solution than that proposed by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil and M. Clementel?

M. SONNINO said that he had already accepted the solution arranged by Mr. Butler. He was not prepared to accept the other proposal without an adjournment.

MR. BALFOUR suggested a resolution that the question of opening the railway from Trieste to Vienna through Laibach (Lubiana) is one of the most pressing urgency, on grounds not only of humanitarian, but also of political importance; that every hour's delay may produce consequences of an incalculable character; and that no temporary or local difficulties should be permitted to interfere with the opening of the main line for the transport of supplies.

MR. HOUSE said that the question should be settled either at once or on the following day. All reports indicated that the sending of food to German Austria would weigh heavily in the scale when the German-Austrians came to decide whether or not they would throw in their lot with Germany. This was the political aspect of the case.

M. PICHON said that he wished to support Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. It appeared to him most urgent to revictual German Austria, and not only German Austria, but Hungary. German Austria was about to take a decision regarding its adhesion to Germany. There was a possibility of influencing the decision. This was a question of general policy and of great interest to the whole of the Alliance. Similar considerations applied to Hungary. He understood M.

Sonnino's scruples, but he would ask that the question be settled on the following day.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Agenda for the following day contained the Naval and Military terms of the Preliminary Peace with Germany. This matter had already been once adjourned. He, therefore, suggested that the question now before the Council should be dealt with on Friday at the beginning of the Agenda for that day.

M. CRESPI said that he thought there was some misunderstanding. German Austria was being re-victualled via the Brenner and not via Lubiana. Italy entirely agreed with the sentiment just expressed and had always done its utmost to serve the same ends. He, himself, had been seeking to arrange the question of credit since the 17th February, and he had only succeeded in obtaining a reply on the 5th March. It was, therefore, a little surprising to be told that the matter was so urgent that an hour's delay was dangerous. He wished to draw the attention of the Council to the very sensitive condition of Italian public opinion since the incidents at Lubiana and Spalato. The Italian Delegation would agree to discuss the question on Friday, provided they had time to communicate with the President of the Council in Rome.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that delay appeared to be dangerous.

M. SONNINO said that no notice had been taken of the far simpler solution proposed by Mr. Butler. As a provisional measure it appeared to him to be the most appropriate suggested. He would accept the discussion for Friday, provided he had time to obtain news and to communicate with the President of the Council in Rome. In the meanwhile, the Economic Council might study the means of mitigating the proposal put forward. He thought that a political consideration which was really foreign to the discussion was being used to establish its urgency and the Council was forgetting that it ran the risk of causing great offense to Italian public opinion.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would have liked the Council to adopt as a resolution what he had proposed before.

M. SONNINO said that, as the matter was to be decided on Friday, he begged Mr. Balfour not to insist on putting this forward. The reasons for requiring an early and effective solution of the problem had been heard. He had agreed that a solution should be found on Friday. He deprecated any resolution taken in anticipation which could, in any way, pre-judge the decision to be taken on Friday. He, personally, would certainly resist any such anticipated resolution.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that he had no wish to make any statement affecting policy but he would like to impress on Baron Sonnino the extreme urgency of sending food to Austria, and of getting the railways into working order for that purpose. He thought it was impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation. People were dying of hunger, not only in German Austria but in Bohemia. If this state of things continued, it would cause disaster, not only in the countries directly affected but throughout Europe. Unless the Allies were ready to put the transportation of food on a business footing, the direst consequences would result in all the Allied Countries. All that was proposed was that a certain quantity of rolling stock should be ear-marked, and given priority over other means of transport. Even the Germans had done as much for the civilian population of Belgium though they were in a state of war with that population. Even if the Council could not see its way to accept the proposal at once, he suggested that it should express general approval and remit the means of execution to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LANSING said that after hearing this, he would withdraw his proposal that the discussion should be delayed until Friday. He suggested that it be resumed at the beginning of the next day's meeting.

BARON SONNINO said that he regretted Mr. Lansing's change of mind. The Italian Delegation must have an opportunity of consulting Rome. The proposal, as it stood, put all the guilt on Italy, and by implication exonerated the Serbs from responsibility for the unjustifiable insult suffered by Italy. He requested that the resumption of the discussion be delayed until Friday. Each Delegation could make a firm resolve that a solution of the problem should be found on that day. There was of course another possible

solution, namely, the military occupation of Lubiana. This could be done at any moment, but the Italian Government did not wish to proceed to that extremity on its own undivided responsibility.

LORD MILNER asked whether the Italian Delegation would not be able to communicate by telephone with Rome.

M. CRESPI explained that the Italian Government in Rome would have to communicate with Trieste.

LORD MILNER observed that people were dying for want of food.

M. CRESPI expressed the view that this was an exaggeration. In any case, the situation was governed by the absence of rolling stock. Even the opening of ten lines of railway would not improve matters unless rolling stock could be found.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in his view the disquieting feature of the discussion was that, to safeguard Italian susceptibilities, a delay was being agreed to, which might endanger the whole European situation, and compromise the results of the war. He quite understood national susceptibilities, but in certain circumstances they must not be given precedence over other considerations. Baron Sonnino was well aware that France had suppressed her feelings on more than one occasion; notably in relation to certain Naval occurrences in the Adriatic. Baron Sonnino, to save Italian susceptibilities wished the discussion postponed until Friday. If on Friday, the Yugo-Slavs had not given satisfaction to Italian sentiment, what was to happen? France was ready to advise the Yugo-Slavs, and had already done so, to be as conciliatory as possible. He felt that an urgent decision should not be postponed for a question of sentiment.

BARON SONNINO said that he did not ask for delay for any such reason. He agreed that the matter should be decided finally on Friday. He had explained his reason for the delay. He must consult the President of the Council in Rome, and he must ascertain what had taken place. He would further point out that no notice had been given him that this matter would be discussed.

M. CRESPI begged to read a letter dated March 1st, from M. Benes. He had previously mentioned this letter but thought it would interest the Council to hear it read. (For text see Annexure "A.") He wished to add that on the previous day he had received a similar expression of thanks from M. Cramarz. In view of these expressions of gratitude he thought that the fears expressed on that day were exaggerated.

MR. BALFOUR said that as Baron Sonnino had appealed to him and represented his proposed resolution as directed against Italy, he must express his regret that this interpretation should have been put upon it. Such had not been his intention, nor did he think that his words really suggested it. On the understanding that the question would not only be discussed but also solved on Friday, Baron Sonnino asked him to withdraw the Resolution. He recognized that the Italian Delegation had a right to consult the Government in Rome, and in view of tins, he would reluctantly withdraw the Resolution, provided Baron Sonnino undertook to inform Signor Orlando that the other Powers represented were very strongly of the opinion which he had attempted to put into words in his proposed Resolution.

(Baron Sonnino undertook to do this. The discussion was accordingly postponed until Friday.)

8. MARSHAL FOCH drew attention to a request received from the German Armistice Delegation to the effect that German troops be allowed to cooperate with the Poles in their resistance to Russian Bolshevik Forces, and that maritime transportation towards Libau should be authorized for that purpose. German Cooperation in Resistance to Bolsheviks

(For text of communication see Annexure "B".)

(It was agreed that the discussion of this request should be taken up at a subsequent Meeting.)

9. GENERAL JVOZNENOVITCH then read the following statement:—

Statement on Behalf of King of Montenegro Gentlemen,

We consider it our duty to speak here, as we think we are entitled to address you on behalf of Montenegro.

Notwithstanding the intrigues and wiles of our adversaries (who are, alas! allies and brothers) we are the only official, legal and legitimate Government of the country.

Moreover, our existence is not denied by you, but rather clearly recognised—seeing that the Great Powers continue to accredit diplomatic representatives to the Royal Government, and that the Federal Republic of the United States recently approved the creation of a Royal Legation at Washington.

As a legitimate Government recognised by the Allies, the Royal Government considers that it has claims upon your good-will. Can you forget that it was its Head who, from the very beginning, wished to fight side by side with the Entente?

But, despite its heavy sacrifices and cruel sufferings during the war, Montenegro is the only one of your Allies—and even of your enemies—against whom the doors of the Conference have been closed.

The Royal Government has not been asked to name a representative for the seat reserved for it, because in your opinion the position of our country required explanation.

May we be permitted to say that its position is neither obscure nor confused? A perfidious propaganda has tried to make you believe that our country as a whole wished to be absorbed by Serbia, and Serbia has tried to do this by one audacious and forcible *coup*. But Montenegro opposed this arbitrary and impudent annexation. She cried aloud despite the gag; her defenceless hands smote the fresh oppressors still armed with weapons you had given them against a common enemy. That is the outline of what occurred. However telling it may be, permit us to add some details thereto.

The scheme of an official Serbia (which is only a part of the Imperialistic dreams of certain of its politicians) had been long in preparation, and in their haste since 1916 to carry them into effect

gave rise to the amazing Corfu Agreement,[3] which, without a single Montenegrin being consulted disposed of Montenegro from July, 1917 onwards.

This agreement was not only opposed to the laws of every age and country, but was also an insult to the high principles which the Allies have made their own.

In France, where the Royal Government received hospitality, in Italy, in England, in the whole of America, a fierce campaign was waged against us, our deeds and our persons—a campaign so false and mean that it stooped to any means of injuring us.

The word treason was repeatedly used. Without compunction King Nicholas was reproached for asking for peace in December, 1915 (in obedience, so it was said, to certain secret engagements). We state clearly that this rumour was the work of Serbian Agents. Such insults can best be answered by an authentic document. From the beginning of the war, the King decided to entrust the command of the Montenegrin armies to Serbian Staff Officers; their Chief, the Serbian Staff Colonel Pechich, was the real Commander-in-Chief of our troops.

When the Austrians advanced and lack of food and ammunition made it impossible for our soldiers to hold their positions, Colonel Pechich proposed asking for an armistice. When the Supreme Austrian Command answered this request with the utmost harshness and cruelty, Colonel Pechich advised the King to make peace.

In our memorandum you will find the text of this letter, written on 31st December, 1915, (13th January, 1916) and received by King Nicholas on the same day at 7 a.m.

The two most important passages are:—

> "Sire, the Officers in Command of the Army on the Western Front declare that our Army is so demoralised that the enemy can no longer be resisted. ...

> "... Having shown you the true state of affairs in the army, I have the honour to point out to Your Majesty that it is utterly impossible to carry on the struggle under such conditions, and that, without delay and as quickly as possible, we must (1) ask to make peace with the enemy, since he would not accept the proposal for an armistice made two days ago by the Royal Government. ..."

Peace was asked for, or, to be more exact, King Nicholas resigned himself to sue for it at the pressing request of his Government and of the Serbian Colonel Peter Pechich. The reply of the Austrian Government is well-known, it was of such a nature that the Montenegrin Government decided to break off negotiations, the King preferring exile to dishonour.

Serbia, in her desire to forget the part she played in this affair, has continually tried to distort the facts, to alter texts and destroy all memory of the sacrifices and the heroism of Montenegro. She made unscrupulous use of calumny in order to further this secret design which she was pursuing and which events soon permitted her to bring about.

In October, 1918, after the evacuation of Albania by Austrian troops, the Eastern Army advanced towards Montenegro, and the Serbian troops which formed part thereof rapidly poured over our territory. Our compatriots, glad to meet men of their race, greeted them joyfully; their welcome however met with no response.

The Serbs immediately assumed the attitude of conquerors, overthrowing established institutions and imposing their own authority by means of intimidation and bribery. They were dealing with a starving population, whose consciences it was not hard to corrupt. The Serbian Government considered that the time had come for the annexation it had premeditated. By means of bribery a number of persons of all descriptions were suborned and persuaded to act as an artificial skupchina. It will be remembered that at the very first meeting, the illegal assembly at Podgoritza, after making a pretence of deliberation proclaimed the union of Montenegro with Serbia, and the abolition of the Dynasty.

Mere villages had been permitted to elect four deputies, while entire districts had only sent one or two representatives. Out of fifty of the King's former Ministers, only two voted against him. Not a single officer or priest voted for the abolition of the Dynasty. Out of the 56 Deputies elected by the people to the Parliament of 1914, only 5 declared against Nicholas I.

Events had developed too far and too rapidly. Such shameless juggling with a regularly established Kingdom could not be accepted by an intelligent population, proud of its history and traditions and conscious of its individuality and need for liberty. Discontent rapidly developed into indignation, which indignation manifested itself both against the Serbian troops and the Montenegrins in the pay of Serbia.

In Paris, the Royal Government protested to the Allies against the violence done to our country, against this contempt of all rights. Our complaint has hitherto met with no response. The Serbs are still in Montenegro, pursuing their aims by armed force. Martyrs fall each day; but it has at any rate been proved before the whole world that the will of Montenegro has not been freely manifested.

We most earnestly desire that our protests shall not be misinterpreted. We will not permit Montenegro to become a Serbian province and be ruled by princes neither of her own choice nor her own royal line. It affords us satisfaction to consider that our country has firmly resisted such brutal and humiliating annexation. We are conscious, however, of all that we owe to our race and our people. We will not set our faces against a confederation of the Jugo-Slav countries, the States constituting which league would retain full and complete autonomy. Thus it is evident that we are merely claiming for Montenegro a right which is now recognised as legitimate for all people—that of self-determination. If this right is to be exercised, an end must be made to the rule of terror and despotism from which our country has suffered so much. After investigation by you, the Serbians must be asked to evacuate Montenegrin territory at once. Their gold and their bayonets must affect us no longer.

Then the task which it has consoled us to think of during defeat and exile can be fulfilled; Montenegro can be restored, as we have been solemnly and repeatedly promised by the great Allied statesmen, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Poincaré, Mr. Briand, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, whose eloquent telegram, dated July 1918, we here beg to record:—

> "I thank Your Majesty sincerely for the courteous greetings you so kindly despatched to me on July 4th,[4] which I value highly. I deeply sympathise with Your Majesty in the calamity which has overtaken Montenegro by the invasion of a ruthless force. I trust that Your Majesty and the noble and heroic people of Montenegro will not be cast down, but will have confidence in the determination of the" United States to see that in the final victory that will come, the integrity and rights of Montenegro shall be secured and recognised."

The logical result of this restoration is the return to Montenegro of its lawful Government, which would ensure the working of its constitution and restore the country to normal conditions. We venture to hope that you will help us in this peaceful task.

Montenegro would then be free to express its aims, through the Parliament provided by its constitution, but for the present we can make known to you its fair and moderate claims.

Montenegro was poor, very poor; the present war has made it poorer still, and has deprived those who dwell in its mountains of the slight agricultural and commercial resources with which they were content. The losses caused by 18 months of fighting and 34 months of occupation must be made good. Its want is fearful. Montenegro is deserving of your help.

To allow of the restoration of the country, and to ensure its development and safety, its frontiers should be more logically connected with historical facts and natural features. We shall make known to the Peace Conference what we hold to be the legitimate frontiers of Montenegro, allowing her to exist peacefully without fear of compromising the independence so dear to her and which has

been maintained since the 5th century by the heroism of our ancestors.

We have tried to express our views shortly, knowing only too well how precious is the time of the great Council which has given us a hearing; but in a memorandum which we take the liberty of presenting to each one of you you will find more detailed explanations of the questions which we have raised, together with documents justifying our statements and proving our good faith.

(M. Clemenceau thanked the Delegation, which then withdrew.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 6th March, 1919.

Annexure "A" to IC–154 [BC–44]

PARIS, March 1, 1919.

[*The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs* (*Benes*) *to the Italian Ambassador in France* (*Bonin-Longare*)][5]

EXCELLENCY: I have just received the report of Commandant Fierlinger on his return from Trieste where he had been sent to make contact with the Italian authorities with regard to the shipment of supplies for the Czechoslovak countries by way of the port of Trieste. The Royal Government of Italy was good enough to agree that our shipments of food stuffs be sent by the Udine-Tarvis route, on account of the recent closing of the railways in the south. Although the overloading of that route permits the passage of only a very limited number of our supply trains for Bohemia, there is hope of increasing their number as soon as the situation will permit.

I venture to ask, therefore, Your Excellency, that you will kindly be the interpreter to your Government of our warm gratitude for the measures mentioned above, which will greatly assist in bringing help to our populations at a critical moment, and also for the extreme good will with which the Royal Government of Italy so kindly carried

out all the measures taken on our behalf in connection with this important matter.

Please accept [etc.]

E. BENES

Annexure "B" to IC–154 [BC–44]

SPA, March, 1919.

Messages, General Nudant, President Cipa,[6] to Marshal Foch, 4 bis, Boul. Invalides, Paris[7]

No. 649. Wako[8] has delivered long note on Bolshevism and necessity help of Entente to ward it off. First, to send supplies, then to help in establishing front against bolshevik offensive expected in Spring. German Supreme Command puts to Entente following plain question: Are Governments interested, yes or no, in having our troops fight Bolshevism? If yes, that transportation be authorized to the region of Libau, so as to constitute in East Prussia a front continuing that of the Poles. I remind you:

(1) That the Germans had prepared five boats for such transportation, but that Allies forbade sailing;
(2) That quarters for a German army corps are at Libau.

[1] The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC–44a, SWC–11a) gives the text of this draft resolution as follows:

> "Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers."

(Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51)

[2] For minutes of this meeting, see vol. III, pp. 456 ff.

[3] The text of the Corfu agreement is printed in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. v (London, 1921), p. 393. For a discussion of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 828–831.

[4] *Official U. S. Bulletin*, July 12, 1918, p. 6.

[5] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[6] Abbreviation for *Commission interalliée permanente d'armistice* (Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission).

[7] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[8] Abbreviation for *Waffenstillstandkommission* (German Armistice Commission).

March 6, 3 p.m. (BC–45)

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[13] Minutes of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Thursday, March 6, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 6, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/52

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/52

BC–45 SWC–12

[Document 13]

Minutes of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Thursday, March 6, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 6, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing.	General J. J. Pershing.
Hon. E. M. House.	General Tasker H. Bliss.
Secretaries	General Andrew [*McAndrew?*].
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Major-General M. N. Patrick.
Mr. L. Harrison.	British Empire
British Empire	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Major-General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Secretaries	Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Brigadier-General H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.
Mr. H. Norman	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
France	Paymaster Commander H. Miller, D. S. O.
M. Clemenceau.	France
M. Pichon.	M. Klotz.

Secretaries	M. Tardieu.
M. Dutasta.	Marshal Foch.
M. Berthelot.	General Belin.
M. Arnavon.	General Degoutte.
M. de Bearn.	General Weygand.
ITALY	General Duval.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.	Admiral de Bon.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.	Comdt. de V. Levavasseur.
Secretaries	Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.
Count Aldrovandi.	ITALY
M. Bertele.	Admiral Grassi.
JAPAN	General Cavallero.
H. E. Baron Makino.	JAPAN
H. E. M. Matsui.	Admiral Takeshita.
	General Nara.
	Colonel Nagai.
	Captain Fujioka.
	Captain Nomura.
	Captain Yamamoto.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting open, said that a draft resolution containing instructions to Commissions and Committees, whose reports were due on March 8th and March 15th, had been

handed in by the American Delegation. He asked the American Delegation to explain the exact scope of the resolution.

American Proposal in Regard to Drafting by Committees and Commissions os Recommendations Concerning Preliminary Peace Terms MR. HOUSE explained that the resolution had been drafted with a view that all proposed Preliminary Peace terms submitted by Commissions and Committees should be framed in such legal form that no re-drafting would become necessary.

(The following resolution was duly approved:—

> "Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers."

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had just received a message, telephoned from Spa, to the effect that negotiations relating to the supply of food and stores to Germany, and the surrender of merchant ships by Germany, had been broken off.[1] The Germans had refused to surrender any ships without a firm guarantee that food supplies would be furnished up to the time of the next harvest. This condition the Allied Delegates felt unable to accept. They were returning tonight to Paris and would be able to report the facts of the case to the Conference tomorrow. A Reports Armistice Commission for Supplies

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had so far received no communication on the subject from Spa.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to the meeting to be held on the following afternoon, March 7th, 1919.)

3. MARSHAL FOCH said that in accordance with the decision reached by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held on 3rd March, 1919, he had again assembled the Military, Aerial and Naval Advisers in order to co-ordinate their work. The revised texts of the Military, Aerial and Naval Clauses, which had that day been circulated, gave the

conclusions reached by the Military, Aerial and Naval experts. No attempt had been made to define the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany. Military Conditions of Peace With Germany: (a) Revised Drafted Regulations

(For full text of draft regulations concerning a definitive Military status of Germany, see Appendix "A".)

Mr. BALFOUR said that the difference between the revised text, now submitted, and the one considered on Monday was that the Military, Naval and Air Departments, each of whom had originally given different periods of time for the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany had now come to an agreement. That agreement had, however, only been reached by omitting all reference to any period of time. With that exception, he understood, all the clauses remained as previously submitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that that was not quite the case. He would call on Marshal Foch or General Degoutte to explain wherein the differences between the two texts lay.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE said that no essential differences existed between the first text and the final text, now submitted. The Military, Naval and Aerial Advisors had merely met to arrive at an agreement on special points, and to give effect to the conclusions reached, it had merely been found necessary to make slight alterations in certain sentences. He would point out, however, that the Military Advisers had from the beginning been in complete agreement as regards the principles advocated.

As regards the minor amendments now introduced in the text he would invite attention to the following:—

(*a*) In Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1, for "The total effectives of the German land army", the following words had been substituted, namely:— "The total effectives of the land army of the States both present and future constituting Germany".
(*b*) In Chapter 1, Article 6, Paragraph 1, instead of:— "the Staff Officers of the Ministry of War, and of the administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2 and

shall not exceed 300 officers", the following words had been substituted: "The Staff Officers of the Ministries of War and of the German States and of the administrations directly attached to it shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2 and shall not exceed 300 officers".

(*c*) In Chapter 1, Article 7, Paragraph 2; for "In consequence, the War Academy, and the different schools of officers, students, etc.", the amended paragraph read: "In consequence the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, students, etc."

(*d*) In Chapter 2, Article 8A, an attempt had been made to define more precisely the works to be disarmed or dismantled by Germany. The paragraph which in the original text read as follows:— "All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts at a distance of less than 50 kilometres from the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled," had been amended to read:— "All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts which are situated in German territory west of the line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled."

(*e*) Finally, on the suggestion of the American representatives, Chapter 5 had been amended to read as follows:—

> Article 1 (*a*). All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.
>
> (*b*) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed the Convention with her.
>
> (*c*) The execution of these clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or create.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that from what had been said the two texts were substantially identical. He thought, therefore, that the draft regulations could now be taken up and discussed one by one.

(b) Regarding Limitation of Effectives MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that before the text came under discussion, he wished to ask a few

questions. Moreover, he thought that the text itself should not be discussed before so large a Meeting

The British Delegates could not see their way to accept the terms as they appeared at the present moment without large modifications; but those were questions which the Delegates themselves could alone discuss, as they alone would be responsible for the final decisions taken. On the other hand, in the draft resolution certain fundamental questions had been raised regarding which he would like to have explanations or enlightenment. He would, therefore, like to put certain questions to Marshal Foch before the text itself came under discussion.

He would ask Marshal Foch to explain how he proposed that the Germans should raise their army. The maximum army proposed had been fixed at 200,000 men. How were those men to be raised?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the 200,000 men could be raised by annual recruitment, which could be either voluntary or by drawing lots or by any other system. He would point out, however, that the men so recruited would only serve for a period of one year.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in accordance with that scheme, the total length of service being restricted to one year, 200,000 men would be recruited and trained annually, so that in ten years 2,000,000 men would have been trained, in 15 years 3,000,000 men and in 20 years 4,000,000 men. Was that really Marshal Foch's proposal?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that it was evident that by renewing the personnel annually, soldiers of a sort would be produced. But in an Army it was not the common soldier that constituted the quality of an Army, but the "cadres". In accordance with the proposal made by the military advisers a large number of soldiers would undoubtedly come under training, but there would be no corresponding staffs; that was the weak point of the system that was to be imposed on Germany. On the other hand, even a small standing army represented ready-made cadres for the training of a vast force. He would quote the words of Marshal Bugeaud, who, early in the nineteenth century, had stated that it would be better to have an army of sheep commanded by a lion than a number of lions commanded by an ass. By that he meant that it

was the staff that was of importance and not the common soldiers; and the system which the military advisers had proposed to impose on Germany prevented the Germans from constituting staffs which would, after a period of years, enable them to gather and drive the large flocks of sheep which would still be found in Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, with all due respect to Marshal Foch, he did not think the reply given met the real difficulty. Marshal Foch had said that the Germans would have no officers to lead the large Army of men available. Trained officers were, however, already plentiful in Germany, and would be for the next twenty-five years. He himself knew many distinguished officers who had fought both in the war of 1870 and again in the present war, and yet an interval of 46 years had elapsed between those two dates. In Germany at the present moment scores of officers and non-commissioned officers existed who had fought in this war and would be ready to come forward, thirsting for revenge, at the first opportunity. He would ask: Why should the Allies present Germany a scheme which would enable her to raise four or five million men in the next twenty years? Both England and America had had some experience of what that meant. Before 1914 Great Britain only had an army of some 200,000 men. Had she had an army of 2,000,000 men, besides the officers and non-commissioned officers whom Germany now had, results would have been very different. Outside the small regular army Great Britain had merely possessed a few territorial officers, that is to say, civilians who did a little training every Saturday evening. Nevertheless, three months after the declaration of war these men were fighting in the trenches and had given a very good account of themselves. On the other hand, under the proposed scheme, Germany would have an Army of three to four million trained men led not by donkeys, but by officers who had had considerable war experience. Surely that could not be called disarmament. He himself would be very sorry to leave France after the signing of peace with that threat facing her across the Rhine.

MR. LANSING remarked that in order to avoid any confusion Mr. Lloyd George should recognise that two or three million trained soldiers already existed in Germany. Consequently, the whole question was really one of disarmament, that is to say, the Germans must be made to surrender their surplus arms and armaments.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that in reality the Allies had to deal both with the present situation and with a future situation in Germany. No doubt to-day Germany had millions of men, besides officers and non-commissioned officers who had been trained and could be brought to the colours very rapidly. Consequently, for some time to come Germany would have at her disposal all the elements of a well-organised army. That could not be prevented. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the trained officers and non-commissioned officers would remain available for 25 years and more. In his opinion, that would certainly not be the case. The men now demobilised would in three or four years' time be of little value, owing to the interruption of their training. Germany owed her great strength before the war to the large body of 120,000 professional non-commissioned officers, who formed the backbone of the army. Under the proposed scheme that backbone would be broken. If Germany were now to be allowed to raise a permanent standing army consisting of even 40,000 or 50,000 men, that would mean practically 40,000 or 50,000 possible non-commissioned officers available for training large armies. No doubt "cadres" at present existed, but these would daily lose their value if demobilised as proposed. Mr. Lloyd George had spoken about the organisation of the British Army. That army had certainly not been a large one, but it had contained a comparatively large number of permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, serving in the Colonies and at home, who became available for training new armies. On the other hand, if the cadres were split up, and if the officers and non-commissioned officers were prevented from training after being demobilised, that would be the best method of dissipating an existing army.

(c) Mr. Lloyd George's Proposition Regarding Limitation of Effectives

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said lie would not dare to enter into a military argument with Marshal Foch; but he would point out that what had enabled Great Britain to train the new armies had been the old non-commissioned officers and the old officers, who had returned to the colours on the outbreak of the war, and a similar state of affairs would exist in Germany for many years to come. He would enquire, therefore, why a present of this great force should be made to Germany. He thought history would be repeating itself, and the Allies would be doing exactly the same thing as Napoleon had done after the Battle of Jena. The annual renewal of the whole army as suggested

merely meant in the course of years the creation of an enormous army. That was a mistake which should not be repeated.

The British point of view, however, was the following: Germany should not be permitted to maintain a bigger army than Great Britain possessed. Great Britain had no idea of having an army of 4,000,000. Consequently, the regulations should lay down that Germany should not maintain a bigger army than Britain. It was useless to say that the Germans would not have the "cadres", for, with millions of trained ex-officers and ex-non-commissioned officers burning with a desire to avenge their defeats, cadres would undoubtedly be raised somehow or other. He would therefore ask permission to make a suggestion, namely that an opportunity should be given to him to put a new proposal before the meeting. He suggested therefore, that the debate on the military terms should be adjourned to enable him on the morrow or the next day to submit an alternative proposal limiting the German army much more effectively than in the draft regulations now under consideration.

MARSHAL FOCH asked permission to invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that the regulations presented to the Conference had been unanimously accepted after consulting all the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, Marshal Haig, General Pershing, General Diaz, as well as other specially chosen military experts. The regulations did not therefore reflect merely his own personal views, but the agreement reached by all the Allied Military experts.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he fully realised that fact. On the other hand, the question was not wholly a military one; it was also a political one and, therefore, the Heads of Governments were entitled to express their view on the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and said that it would be the duty of the Heads of Governments finally to decide the whole question. He suggested that the further consideration of the question should be adjourned until the next meeting of the Conference, and he proposed that the Naval Clauses should at once be taken under consideration.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the draft regulations concerning the definitive military status of Germany until

the next meeting of the Conference, to be held on Friday afternoon at 15 o'clock.

It was understood that the British representatives would then submit an alternative proposal relating to the limitation of effectives.)

4. M. LEYGUES said that before the Naval Conditions for Peace with Germany came to be discussed clause by clause, he wished to be permitted at once to raise a question which the French Government considered to be exceedingly controversial. The Naval Clauses for Terms of Peace with Germany contained a condition which should never have been entered, and regarding which he had made certain important reservations. He referred to the proposal that the ships which would definitely be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America should be broken up or destroyed in the shortest possible time. In his opinion, it would be sufficient to tell Germany that she must surrender so many ships, but it was unnecessary and inexpedient to state what was to be done with those same ships. That was a question which only concerned the Allies, and a decision could be reached separately and at a later date. Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany: (a) Proposed Destruction of German Ships

His proposal therefore was that this question should not come under discussion on that date. If this were done the work of the Conference would be greatly simplified, and he thought the remaining Naval Clauses could be disposed of that afternoon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed as far as that afternoon was concerned, but he would press for a final decision on the question to be reached as early as possible. In his opinion, the sooner the question was settled, the better it would be for the Allies. He did not despair about coming to an agreement, but the question was a very important one, at all events as regards the future peace of the world. He was quite willing, however, that the question should be reserved for a few days. The Admirals would have time in the interval to look into the matter again, and to decide whether the ships should be broken up, sunk, or distributed among the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether, in Mr. Lloyd George's opinion, any reference should be made in the Peace Treaty with Germany, to the

manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by her.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would rather not discuss that point for the moment. He would not say that he disagreed, but he would reserve his decision.

(It was agreed to reserve for the moment the question relating to the disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany.)

M. CLEMENCEAU then called on Admiral Wemyss to read through the Naval Conditions, clause by clause.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS then read the Naval Conditions for the Terms of Peace with Germany, clause by clause. (For full text, see Annexure "B".)

Chapter I. Clause 1 (a) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to raise exactly the same question here as he had done in the case of the military terms. He was not prepared to agree to 15,000 men being trained every year.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS pointed out that Clause XI (i) qualified Clause I (*a*). It was therein stated that the personnel for the German Navy would be recruited on a long service system.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished nevertheless to suggest that the whole question should be reserved until to-morrow afternoon, so that the question of personnel could be considered together, both as regards the Army and the Navy.

(This was agreed to.)

Clause 1 (b). Note ADMIRAL BENSON explained that the reason for the reservation he had made to this clause was that no period of time had been given for the Imitation of the strength of the German Fleet.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it had not been intended to leave all such questions to the Conference to decide.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that M. Sonnino had made a suggestion that the Naval experts should advise the Supreme War Council on that

question. And, since no reference had been made to it in the draft regulations, he wished to place his views on record. If the Conference wished to erase his note from the document, now that he had had an opportunity of making his statement, he was ready to agree.

MR. BALFOUR said he quite saw the force of what Admiral Benson had said. He wished to suggest that the duration of the terms, both naval and military, should be reserved until the terms themselves had been finally agreed. As soon as the conditions had been fixed, it would be possible to settle a reasonable period for the execution of the Naval conditions, and also to decide what action should be taken after that period had elapsed. The matter could then either be referred to the League of Nations to impose further limitations, or Germany could be granted complete freedom of action. In his opinion, that was the only business way to settle the matter.

(It was agreed to reserve all questions relating to the duration of the Naval conditions for Peace with Germany.)

Clause 2 (a)
" 2 (b) (Clauses 2 (*a*) and 2 (*b*) were accepted subject to a decision being reached on the question of the duration of the Naval Conditions. See Clause 1 (*b*).)

Clause 3 (a) M. LEYGUES said that the reservations which he had made earlier in the meeting relating to the destruction of the ships to be surrendered by Germany, applied to each of these clauses, which should therefore be reserved.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS thought that the conference should straight-way approve the principle that the ships were to be definitely taken away from Germany. The question as to what should be done with them should alone be reserved for the moment.

(Clause 3 (*a*) was accepted, the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

(Clauses 3 (*b*) and 3 (*c*) were accepted.)

Clause 3 (b)
“ 3 (c)
Clause 4 (Clause 4 was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Clause 5 MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the following paragraph, namely: “With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value”, and he enquired why the Allies should give to the Germans material of commercial value.

(It was agreed to delete the paragraph in question.)

(Clause 5 as amended was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Clause 6 (Clause 6 was accepted.)

Clause 7 M. LEYGUES expressed the view that this Clause also should be reserved for further consideration. It was inexpedient to prejudge what should be done with the materials resulting from the breaking up of German vessels of war, especially as it might eventually be decided that they should not be destroyed.

(It was agreed, for the present, to reserve Clause 7.)

Clause 8 MR. BALFOUR said he could not altogether understand the meaning of paragraph (*b*). Supposing a light cruiser, for instance, went down, a new light cruiser would be built, and, in his opinion, it would be absurd to say that it could only be replaced by something designed purely for coast defence. He thought Clause 8 (*b*) should be re-drafted.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said the second question related to paragraph 8 (*d*). According to that paragraph the birthday of a ship counted from “the first year in which credit would be taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship, which was to be replaced”. That pre-supposed that Parliamentary arrangements in Germany would be the

same as those, for instance, in Great Britain. If Germany, however, had a law which did not impose an annual Budget, the Naval Condition in question could be evaded. He thought, therefore, a more rigid date was required.

M. LEYGUES suggested that the date on which the ship was placed on the stocks should be taken.

(It was agreed to re-draft Clause 8 (*d*).)

(Clause 8 was approved subject to paragraphs 8 (*b*) and 8 (*d*) being re-drafted.)

Clause 9 M. CLEMENCEAU said that this Clause would have to be reserved until the constitution of the League of Nations had been decided.

(This was agreed to.)

Clause 10 MR. BALFOUR said that presumably the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material to be surrendered by Germany should be reserved.

M. LEYGUES agreed.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. BALFOUR said that he noticed a note to the effect that Admiral Benson did not agree to the final paragraph relating to preventing the manufacture in Germany of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines, torpedoes or their parts, or naval war material of any description. He should have thought that condition was in agreement with the views of the American Delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the hope that the American delegates would see their way to withdraw their objection. If Germany were able to manufacture for foreign countries, a very serious situation would be produced. Germany would be able to say that she did not want any ships, that she was merely manufacturing for other countries, and, then, when war came, she would do exactly what England had done

and requisition all these ships for her own use. Unless a condition of this nature were inserted the whole of the attempt to disarm Germany would be futile. The question under reference was not a League of Nations business; it was an essential part of the programme of the disarmament of Germany. He sincerely hoped the American delegates would allow this Clause to remain.

MR. LANSING agreed to withdraw his reservation.

(Clause 10, as amended, was accepted, the Note by Admiral Benson being deleted: the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material, including mines and torpedoes to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in accordance with the statement he had previously made, the whole of this Clause should be reserved until the question of the personnel for the German Navy had been further considered.

Clause 11 (It was agreed to reserve Clause 11 for further Consideration.)

Clause 12
" 13 (These Clauses were approved.)

Part II. Clause 1 MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he noticed a suggestion that the disposal of the islands would be decided by the Final Treaty of Peace. That was a question of great importance to Great Britain, and, in his opinion whatever happened to the islands of Heligoland and Dune, he was anxious they should not be left in the hands of the Germans.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS said that he did not mind what happened to the islands, as long as they did not revert to Germany.

(It was agreed to reserve this Clause for further consideration.)

Clause 2 (This clause was accepted.)

Clause 3 MR. LANSING said that his Naval advisers held the view that this Clause was more an Army than a Naval question. Naval armaments were being limited; why then should Germany not be allowed to defend her own coasts? In his opinion, it would be very difficult to prevent a nation from doing that, and he thought the Conference was going beyond reason. In his opinion, Germany should be permitted to defend herself.

MR. BALFOUR held that the fortifications referred to in the Clause under consideration were not for defensive purposes; they were in reality Naval Bases to be used for offensive purposes, that is to say, centres from which offensive naval operations could be undertaken. He thought it would be admitted that the coast could best be defended by guns disseminated about the coast. In the Military Conditions for Peace with Germany, provision had been made for the destruction of all fortifications situated 50 kilometres East of the Rhine, and when that Condition came up for consideration he intended to ask why a similar' condition should not be imposed as regards the Eastern frontier.

To sum up, if the fortifications in question were of value only for defensive purposes, he would at once accept the American view. But under present conditions of Naval warfare, fortified bases merely became jumping-off places for offensive operations.

MR. HOUSE enquired why the clause should not be limited to defensive bases only.

MR. LANSING held that once the enemy vessels had been reduced to the smaller number proposed, Germany was entitled to keep any bases she might have for the protection of her Navy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that there was a good deal of force in the contention of the American delegates that Germany should not be deprived of such defences. It would be unwise to give the impression that the Allies had been merciless and had displayed a spirit of revenge. On the other hand, in his opinion, the fortifications should be given such a character that they could not be used as bases for attacking other countries. But as regards bona-fide trading ports, Germany should be allowed to defend them to the best of her ability.

He proposed, therefore, that the Clause should be referred back to the Admirals to be so drafted as to distinguish between fortifications maintained for offensive and those maintained for defensive purposes.

MARSHAL FOCH insisted on the application of the principle contained in this clause. Otherwise, the fortifications of Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven, for instance, would not be destroyed.

(It was agreed to refer this Clause back to the Admirals for further examination with a view to separating the defensive from the offensive fortifications.)

Clause 4 MR. BALFOUR said he did not know what principles had guided Admiral Benson in making his reservations. The importance of the Kiel Canal question was, however, very great. If Germany were permitted to continue to hold the Canal under the present conditions, the strength of the German Fleet would be doubled, the Baltic would be a German lake, the freedom of Sweden and Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Esthonia, and even of Russia, would be jeopardised, if the last ever again became a maritime power. Consequently, from an international point of view, the question was of extreme importance. The use of the Canal for purely strategic reasons must be restricted as had been done in the case of the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, where the provisions now suggested were already in operation.

MR. LANSING said he was not unmindful of the arguments in favour of the provisions contained in the clause under consideration, The strategic advantage to Germany of the Kiel Canal was great; it could double the power of Germany to transfer ships from the Baltic to the North Sea. But he did not see why the same purpose could not be accomplished by destroying the fortifications of the Kiel Canal and at the same time preventing their reconstruction. Furthermore, he failed to see why all commercial ships of other countries passing through the Kiel Canal should be given special privileges. The same privileges might be asked in the case of the Cape Cod Canal, in the United States of America. He could see little justice in allowing the proposed clause to remain, in view of the fact that the German Fleet was to be reduced to very small figures, combined with the destruction of the fortifications in the Kiel Canal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he failed to see any injustice to Germany in saying that she must allow ships of all nations to pass through the Kiel Canal, which was no more than was done in the case of the Panama and Suez Canals. Far from being a disadvantage or injustice to Germany, the traffic so created would be of great benefit to her ports.

M. TARDIEU remarked that equal rights to all nations could not be interpreted as an injustice.

MR. HOUSE proposed that the question should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.

(It was agreed that the question of the Kiel Canal should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.)

Clause 5 Mr. LANSING suggested that the word "final" should be omitted from Clause 5 (i) and (ii). He did not know what it meant, as qualifying the words Treaty of Peace.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if the word "final" were omitted, the Clause would have no meaning. The document under consideration was a Treaty of Peace, and consequently should not contain clauses becoming inoperative at the moment of signature.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS pointed out that the document under reference had been termed a "Convention". The use of the word "Treaty" had purposely been avoided.

MR. LANSING said that as far as phraseology was concerned, the question of using an adjective to qualify the term "Peace Treaty" should be reserved until the question of the number of Peace Treaties to be signed with Germany had been decided.

(It was agreed that the qualifying adjective to be employed in connection with the term "Treaty of Peace" should throughout the draft Naval conditions for peace with Germany be reserved.)

MR. LANSING drew attention to paragraph 4 of Clause 5 and enquired how that Clause would be applied. Who would select the one

government to represent all the independent or semi-independent states into which Germany might be divided?

(Clause 5 was agreed to, subject to the above reservation.)

Clause 6 MR. LANSING enquired whether the German cables therein enumerated were to be taken over as an indemnity due by Germany or on other grounds.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS said that the capture of enemy submarine cables was a legitimate application of the use of sea-power, and could be secured by the use of no other agency. Submarine cables must be considered as instruments of warfare and therefore subject to such action as might be taken in the case of naval, military, and aerial armaments. The cables in question had been cut on the outbreak of war. Large portions of them had since been diverted, taken up, or relaid, for use *in situ* by the British and French Governments. Their possession and use by the enemy would have enabled him to affect to a large extent the effects of the economic blockade.

ADMIRAL BENSON pointed out that only a certain number of these had been captured during the war. He did not agree that they were subject to capture and permanent retention in the same way as ships of war. At all events, that question had never been decided in international law. He would be willing, as no precedent existed, that the question should be referred to a Prize Court.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that as far as the French Government was concerned, the question was perfectly clear. Submarine cables were undoubtedly considered to be instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages. Their value was evidenced by the care Germany had taken to maintain her cable lines via Spain. As a naval war operation, ships had run considerable risks in attempting to cut the enemy submarine cables, and, in fact, one French boat had been sunk whilst employed on that duty. Consequently, as far as France was concerned, there was no doubt that submarine cables were considered to be war material, and fair prize, resulting from war operations. Such cables belonged to France just as much as telegraph wires captured on the battle-field. From the military point of view, the Allies acted within their rights in seizing

these cables and in utilising them, and would be justified in keeping them. He fully realised, however, that the question had never been discussed from an international point of view, and if the Meeting insisted, a judicial Commission should be appointed to consider the whole question.

MR. LANSING held the view that the question involved was one not only of international law, but also of policy. Had anyone the right to take enemy property lying on the highways open to all nations? He agreed that the cables could have been taken out of the ocean, and destroyed, but they could not be kept *in situ* and confiscated. They could be taken as an indemnity by agreement, but not as a capture of war. In his opinion, the very fact that the naval authorities had found it necessary to include these clauses showed that they were not sure of their ground.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS replied that as far as the naval experts themselves were concerned, they had no doubts as to what should be done, but he agreed that no international law appeared to cover the question.

ADMIRAL DE BON pointed out that in many places the French had removed the cables and relaid them elsewhere, so that they had done the very thing which Mr. Lansing considered a sign of capture. He agreed, however, that the question could be referred to a judicial body on the condition that the naval authorities were called in to give their views, and that the naval point of view was not overlooked.

M. SONNINO thought that in referring the question to a legal commission a distinction should be made between cables which had been seized and those which had not been seized.

Mr. LANSING agreed to the question being referred in the first instance to a judicial committee, but he felt compelled to point out that in his opinion a very large question of policy was also involved.

M. TARDIEU agreed that the question of the capture 01 the cables should be settled by the Law committee. But there was a further question to be settled, namely, whether these cables should be restored to the German owners or not.

MR. LANSING remarked that that was the very question of policy he had himself referred to.

BARON MAKINO said that some of the cable-lines in question were at the present moment held by the Japanese Government. They had been taken over because they were being used for the purposes of naval warfare. The Japanese delegates had agreed to the clause under consideration for the reason that they thought the cables in question were not to be returned to the Germans. But as regards their future disposal, the Japanese had their own views, which he did not think it necessary to express that day. The meeting should therefore agree that the cables must be taken from Germany. But as regards their future disposal the question should be reserved.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that the whole question could be summed up in two very concise propositions.

Firstly, was it in accordance with the spirit of international law that all submarine cables captured should, or should not, be taken from Germany? That was a purely legal question. If answered in the affirmative, namely, that Germany should be deprived of all or of some of the cables, then . . . . . .

Secondly, what should be done with them? That was a question of high policy and not of law. It was a question analogous to the one dealing with the disposal of the money or ships to be taken from Germany, and it should be referred to some other commission. Finally, he thought the further discussion of the whole question should be reserved until the two questions he had propounded had been reported on.

MR. LANSING agreed, but he would also like to refer, in connection with question 1, whether any international right existed to seize the cables in question either as prizes of war or as indemnities.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that Mr. Lansing should be asked to draft the terms of reference. He thought that a committee would have to be created to report on the question with one representative for each country.

(It was agreed that terms of reference for a Commission to consider the question of the submarine cables referred to in Clause 6 should be drafted and submitted by Mr. Lansing at the next Meeting to be held on Friday afternoon, March 7th.)

(It was also agreed that a Committee should be appointed to consider the question of international law, to consist of one representative of each of the Great Powers, whose names would be handed in on the following afternoon.)

Appendix to Part II MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired why this question should be brought into the naval convention. It was purely a question of reparation, and, in his opinion, should be referred to the Allied Commission on Reparation without note or comment.

(It was agreed to refer the question of the reparation for Allied shipping losses to the Allied Commission on Reparation.)

Part III. Clause 1 Mr. LANSING said that Admiral Benson had made certain reservations in connection with the appointment of Commissions for the execution of the naval terms, as there was no indication of the length of time these Commissions would have to act.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not quite know what Mr. Lansing had in his mind, but if he would submit counter-proposals, the question would be made quite clear.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lansing should draft and submit an alternative reading of Part III, Clause 1.)

Clause 2 (Clause 2 was accepted without discussion.)

ADMIRAL WEMYSS then read the following statement:—

> "The Admirals understand that the German Colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and, on that hypothesis, have not included the subject in the Naval conditions."

The Naval clauses for the Conditions of Peace with Germany were approved, subject to the following reservations:—

I. That the following questions be reserved for further consideration:—

Part I. Clauses 3 (*a*), 4, 5, 7 & 10 The manner of disposal of ships to be surrendered by Germany, and of the material arising from the vessels broken up, and of other Naval war material.

Part I. Clauses 1 (*a*) and 11 The strength of the personnel of the German Navy.

Part I. Clause 1 (*b*) The duration of the Naval Conditions of Peace with Germany.

Part I. Clause 9 Prohibition of the construction of submarines.

Part II. Clause 1 Final disposal of Heligoland and Dune.

Part I. Clauses. Part II. Clause 5 Use of the word "final" before "Peace Treaty" throughout the Naval conditions.

Part III. Clause 1 Commission for the execution of the Naval Terms of Peace with Germany.

II. That the following question be referred back to the Allied Naval Commission for re-drafting:—Construction of Vessels of war by Germany. Part I. Clauses 8 (*b*) and 8 (*d*)

III. That the following question be referred to the Inter-Allied Naval Commission:—To separate the coast fortifications maintained by Germany for offensive purposes from those maintained for defensive purposes. Part II. Clause 3

IV. That the following questions be referred to Special Committees:—

Part II. Clause 4 Kiel Canal to be referred to the International Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission.

Part II. Clause 6 The German submarine cables to be referred to a special judicial committee to be created.

Appendix to Part II. Reparation for Allied shipping losses to be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Friday, March 7th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

PARIS, 7th March, 1919.

Appendix "A" to IC–155 [BC-45]

Draft Regulations Concerning a Definitive Military Status of Germany

CHAPTER 1.—LIMITATION OF EFFECTIVES

Article 1.

The total effectives of the Land Army of all the States both present and future, constituting Germany, fixed so that Germany can ensure order and police control within her territory, does not exceed 200,000 men (not including Officers.)

The non-commissioned officers and men in excess of this figure shall return to civil life.

Article 2.

The total effectives of Officers shall not exceed 9,000, including the staffs of Commanders of fortresses, garrisons, etc.

Article 3.

The German Army shall consist of not more than 15 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry.

Article 4.

These divisions may be formed with not more than 5 Army Corps Staffs and 1 Army Staff.

The formation of forces differently grouped and of other organisations of command is forbidden.

Article 5.

The composition of the divisions and that of Army or Army Corps Staffs is given in Table No. 1.

The number of small units of infantry, artillery, engineers, and of technical services and troops, provided for the divisions, as well as the effective[s] allowed for these small units, technical services of troops, must not be exceeded.

Article 6.

As the German Army can have no other duty than the maintenance of internal order, and, in cases of necessity, the police control of the frontiers, the High Command of the Army is confined to functions of an administrative character. The Staff of Officers of the Ministries of War of all the German States and of the Administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effectives given to Article 2, and shall not exceed 300 officers.

No organisation shall exist intended to prepare troops for employment in any warlike operations, and in particular, the German Great General Staff or similar formations shall be dissolved and cannot be reconstituted in any other form.

Article 7.

Only the number of military schools strictly indispensable to the recruitment of the officers of the units to be maintained, shall continue to exist.

In consequence, the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, officer-students, cadets, non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officer students, shall be suppressed; the only schools authorised shall be those intended for the recruitment of the officers of each arm in the proportion of one school for each arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the lectures in these schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled up in the cadres of officers, students and cadres being included in the effectives mentioned in Article 1.

Manoeuvres of cadres and troops of a strength exceeding that of a regiment are suppressed.

Article 8.

All the measures prescribed in the present chapter must be carried out within two months at the most.

Chapter 2.—Limitation of Armaments

Article 1.

The Units forming the German Army shall have an armament the total amount of which shall not exceed that stated in Table No. 2.

Article 2.

The German Army may have besides, at its disposal, to provide for eventual replacements, an amount of material equal to l/25th part for small arms and to l/50th part for cannons of the quantity provided for in the preceding Article.

Article 3.

The German Army may have at its disposal stocks of munitions the amount of which shall not exceed that fixed by Table No. 3.

Article 4.

These stocks of munitions shall be stored at points fixed by the German Government of which it shall inform the Allied and Associated Powers.

Apart from these depots it shall be forbidden to form stocks, depôts or reserves of munitions.

Article 5.

Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.

Article 6.

The manufacture of armoured cars or of any similar machines which can be used for military objects is forbidden.

Article 7.

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall be permitted only in a very limited number of factories, the exact names of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers with a statement of the amount of material ordered.

No other establishment having for its object the design, preparation, manufacture or storage of munitions or any war material whatever shall exist.

In particular, the arsenals shall be suppressed, unless they are used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions. The personnel of the suppressed arsenals shall be dismissed.

Article 8.

(*a*) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts, which are situated in German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

(*b*) The *status quo* is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

(*c*) The armament of the fortified works, fortresses and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain shall never exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those existing at the date of the signature of the present Convention, which number and calibres shall at once be communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be maintained at the following uniform rates, 3,000 rounds apiece for those the calibre of

which is 10.5 cm. and under: 1,000 rounds apiece for those of higher calibre.

Article 9.

No military force or establishment shall exist on the left bank of the Rhine and till further orders police control shall be ensured by Allied troops.

Article 10.

All German arms, munitions and war material existing in Germany, including those mentioned in Articles 5, 6 and 7, in excess of the quantities allowed by the present regulations shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers at points to be fixed in German territory, with a view to their being destroyed or rendered useless.

The same shall be done in the case of special machinery intended for the manufacture of war material in excess of that recognised as necessary for the manufacture authorised.

War material of all sorts, even if not in working order, or origin other than German, shall be sequestrated; the Allied and Associated Powers shall decide as to its disposal.

Article 11.

Germany is forbidden to manufacture war material for other countries.

The German State or States or German private individuals shall not receive by purchase, exchange or cession of any sort war material coming from abroad.

Article 12.

The measures prescribed by Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 of the present chapter shall be carried out within one month.

The measures prescribed by Articles 7 and 8 of the present chapter shall be carried out within 3 months.

Chapter 3.—Limiting Clauses Concerning German Military Laws

Article 1.

Clauses of the following article shall form an integral part of the German Military Laws.

These laws moreover shall not include any provision in contradiction of the clauses contained in the different chapters of the regulations. They shall on the contrary prescribe the abrogation of all previous legislative, financial, or administrative measures which may be in contradiction with these clauses.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and promulgated within three months.

Article 2.

The total number of 200,000 men, given in Article 1 of Chapter 1, includes:

(*a*) The number of these enlisted or re-enlisted (non-commissioned officers included) which shall not exceed 20,000;
(*b*) The number of those called up in each class of recruitment.

Beyond this number of men, no military force shall be raised in Germany either in the form of a militia or any other form.

Article 3.

The total number of these called up in each class of recruitment who shall receive any military instruction shall be less than 180.000 men.

The men of the contingent embodied shall, after their service be definitely freed from all military obligation.

Men not embodied shall not be obliged to fulfill any military obligation.

The total length of the service of those called up must not exceed 1 year and their service must be continuous.

Article 4.

Officers who have previously belonged to any military formations and who are not included in the units the maintenance of which is authorised, shall not participate in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and shall not be liable to any military obligation.

Officers kept in the Army shall serve at least till the age of 45 years.

Officers newly commissioned shall sign an engagement to serve on the active list for at least 25 years.

No officer shall leave the army without being pronounced unfit on grounds of health. If, by an exception, he is authorised to do so, his place shall not be filled before he has reached the age of 45 years or the period of service of 25 years provided for is ended.

The proportion of officers thus pronounced unfit on grounds of health shall not exceed in any one year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in Article 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 5.

Those who have re-enlisted (non-Commissioned officers and men) shall be obliged to serve for at least 15 years. Before the end of that time they shall only leave the army under the conditions fixed for Officers.

Article 6.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for.

In no case shall troops, services, or staffs include supplementary cadres.

No census or classification of horses shall be made for the requirements of the Army.

Article 7.

The following units may have a depot of their own:

A regiment of Infantry,
A regiment of Cavalry,
A regiment of Field Artillery,
A battalion of Heavy Artillery,
A brigade of Horse Artillery,
A battalion of Pioneers.

The effectives of the depôts of the German Army included in the total figure given in Article 1 of Chapter 1.

Article 8.

The administrative services the staff of which are neither officers, non-commissioned officers or men, shall have their effectives reduced for each category, to the fifth part of those provided for in the Budget of 1913. They are not included in the effectives indicated in Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 9.

Public servants such as Gendarmes, Custom House Officials, Forest and Coast Guards, and Local and Municipal Police Officials, shall never be assembled to take part in any military training.

Article 10.

Societies of retired soldiers, rifle, sporting or touring clubs and, in general, associations whether incorporated or not, whatever may be the age of their members, shall not concern themselves in any military question. They shall, in particular, be forbidden to instruct or exercise, or to allow to be instructed or exercised, their members in the vocation of war or use of weapons of war. The same rule applies to Schools or Universities not provided for in Article 7 of Chapter 1.

These Societies, Associations or Schools shall have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other Military Authority. They shall have no military instructors.

Chapter 4.—Control

Article 1.

The provisions of all Articles of Chapter 1 and of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 of Chapter 2 will be carried out under the control of a special Commission, delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers. That Commission will work until the provisions of the Articles mentioned above are carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if, for any reason, any one of those provisions be not carried out within the allotted period, the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring those facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments, who will give them new instructions.

This Commission shall be established at the seat of the Central German Government, but will be able to send Sub-Commissions or delegates to any other part of German territory.

Article 2.

The German Government undertakes to facilitate so far as possible the exercise of this control, especially from the point of view of military and financial measures, and to communicate to the Commission in its entirety the War Budget.

It undertakes also to communicate to the said Commission all orders given by it for the carrying out of the provisions of the present regulations and to furnish, moreover, on questions which may be put to it, all information which may be asked.

Article 3.

The destruction and putting out of action provided for in Chapter 2 will be carried out by orders of the German authorities, under the supervision of the delegates of the said Commission.

Article 4.

The Allied and Associated Powers reserve to themselves the right of exercising their control over importations of raw material, which

might be used for the production of war material.

Chapter 5

Article 1.

(*a*) All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.
(*b*) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed this Convention with her.
(*c*) The execution of these Clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or to create.

Table No. 1

State and Establishment of the Army and Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of Units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

I. ARMY AND ARMY CORPS STAFFS

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Men
Army Staff	1	85	400
Army Corps Staff	5	60	500

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Constituent Unit	Max. No. of such unit in a single	Maximum strength of each unit

	division	Officers	Rank & File N. C. O.'s & Men
Staff of an Infantry Div	1	25	70
Staff of Divisional Infy	1	4	30
Staff of Divisional Arty	1	4	30
Regiment of Infantry	3	70	2300
Each Regiment comprises:			
3 Battalions of Infantry.			
Each Battalion comprises:			
3 Companies of Infantry & 1 Machine Gun Company.			
Trench Mortar Company	3	6	150
Divisional Squadron	1	6	150
Field Artillery Regiment	1	85	1300
Each Regiment comprises:			
3 Groups of Artillery.			
Each Group comprises:			
3 Batteries.			
Foot Battln (3 Batteries)	1	32b	600
Pioneer Battalin	1	12	400
This Battalion comprises:			
2 Companies of Pioneers.			
1 Pontoon Detachment.			
1 Searchlight Section.			
Liaison Detachment	1	12	300
This Detachment comprises:			
1 Telegraph Detachment.			
1 Microphone Section.			
1 Carrier Pigeon Section.			
Divisional Medical Service	1	20	400
Parks & Convoys		14	800

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAVALRY DIVISION

Staff of a Cavalry Division	1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment	6	40	800
Each Regiment comprises:			
4 Squadrons.			
Horse Arty Group (3 Batteries)	1	20	400

IV. HORSE ESTABLISHMENT

	Saddle	Draught		Saddle	Draught	Total
Infantry Div	977	2531	15 Infantry Div	14655	37965	
Cavalry Div	8333	456	5 Cavalry Divisions	26665	2280	81565

Table No. 2

Tabular Statement of Armament Establishment for a Maximum of 15 Infantry Divisions, 5 Cavalry Divisions and 5 Army Corps Staffs

	Infantry Division	For 15 Infantry Divisions	Cavalry Division	For 5 Cavalry Divisions	5 Army Corps Staffs	Total of columns 2 4 and 5
Material	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rifles	12,000	180,000			This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.	180,000
Carbines			6,000	30,000		30,000
Heavy machine guns.	108	1,620	12	60		1,680
Light machine guns.	162	2,430				2,430
Ordinary trench mortars.	9	135				135
Light trench mortars.	27	405				405

77 mm. guns.	24	360	12	60		420
105 mm. Howitzers.	12	180				180
150 mm. ”	8	120				
105 mm. Heavy guns.	4	60				60

TABLE NO. 3

MAXIMUM STOCKS AUTHORISED

Maximum number of arms authorised			Establishment per unit		Maximum Totals
Rifles		130,000		400 rounds	84,000,000
Carbines		30,000			
Heavy machine-guns		1,680		8000 rounds	32,880,000
Light machine-guns		2,430			
Ordinary Trench Mortars		135		400 rounds	54,000
Light Trench Mortars		405		800 rounds	324,000
Field Artillery	77 mm. Guns	420		1, 000 rounds	420,000
	105 mm. Guns	180		800 rounds	144,000
Heavy Artillery	150 mm Howitzer	120		600 rounds	72,000
	Heavy 105 mm. Gun	60		600 rounds	36,000

Conditions To Be Imposed on the German Government in Regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics

Article I.

The effectives of the German Air Service in material and personnel shall be reduced to the following figures:—

(1) Material.

(*a*) Aeroplanes.

The military forces of Germany having to be limited to the necessary minimum to allow her to maintain order in the interior, must not comprise any military aeroplanes.

(*b*) Hydroplanes.

Germany can for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919, maintain a total of 100 hydroplanes or water gliders for the purpose of seeking out submarine mines, with the necessary equipment, but without armaments, munitions or bombs.

(*c*) Motors.

In addition to the motors mounted on hydroplanes, and water gliders mentioned above, one motor may be allowed for each hydroplane or water glider.

(*d*) Dirigibles.

No dirigible balloons shall be kept.

(2) Personnel.

(*a*) Land Aviation.

Land aviation being suppressed, no personnel is allowed under this heading.

(*b*) Naval Aviation.

A total number of 1,000 men for the whole of the cadres, navigating and non-navigating personnel of all formations and establishments.

(*c*) The whole personnel, excepting a total of 1,000 men mentioned in Paragraph I (2) (*b*) figuring at present on the control lists of the German land and sea forces will be demobilised or sent to other arms or services, (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Naval Statute must not be exceeded).

Article II.

No aviation ground and no shed for dirigibles must be maintained or established:—

(1) to the East of the Rhine, at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that river.

(2) to the West of the Eastern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from that frontier.

(3) to the North of the Southern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from the frontier of Italy or of Czechoslovakia.

All grounds now existing which do not satisfy these conditions are to be immediately placed out of use. The sheds are to be dismantled and the earth is to be ploughed up.

Article III.

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article IV.

The manufacture of parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors shall be forbidden in the whole of German territory until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace.

Article V.

The material now existing in the German land and sea forces or in process of manufacture, in excess of the figures given under Article I shall be handed over to the Allies. In that material must be comprised in particular:—

complete aeroplanes and hydroplanes, as well as those in process of manufacture, repair, or of being put together;
dirigible balloons able to take the air in process of manufacture, repair or being put together;
machinery for the manufacture of hydrogen;
dirigible sheds and every kind of shelter for balloons or dirigibles.

Pending their delivery dirigible balloons are to be maintained blown out with hydrogen at Germany's expense and the apparatus for the manufacture of the hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigibles may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the moment when the dirigibles are handed over.

Motors.
Cells.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb throwers, torpedo throwers, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).
Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded and unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).
Instruments for use on aeroplanes.
Wireless apparatus; photographic or cinematograph apparatus.
Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

Article VI.

Any movement of material mentioned in Article V shall be forbidden without special authorisation by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article VII.

The terms of the various articles of the present Convention shall be carried out under the control of a Special Commission delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This Commission shall work at the seat of the Central German Government, but shall be able to send a sub-Commission or delegates to any other part of German territory.

This Commission will have every power to settle directly and without appeal any disputes which may arise in regard to the execution of the present Convention.

The German Government will immediately hand over to it:—

(1) A numerical list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services and of the existing material as well as that in process of manufacture or on order.
(2) A complete list, with their position, of all establishments working for aviation, and of all landing grounds and sheds.

The German Government will immediately place at the disposal of this Commission all documents relating to the German Air Service.

The German Government will give to all the delegates of this Commission every facility to carry out their mission, and in particular:

—

to effect over the whole extent of German territory a census of the material mentioned under Article V;
to inspect, whenever called upon, aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and arms, munitions and explosive factories, aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depôts.
to take any photographs and sketches.

The German Government will immediately hand over to this Commission all the information and documents set forth in Articles V and VII, and all the material mentioned in these Articles shall be handed over as rapidly as possible, and before the 1st October, 1919, at latest.

Article VIII.

Directly Germany has fulfilled the conditions stipulated in the present convention, the Commission instituted under Article VII shall be suppressed.

Article IX.

The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace.

NOTE—The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards Aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.

Appendix B to IC–155 [BC–45]

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

In pursuance of the instructions of the Supreme War Council, the proposed Naval Clauses are resubmitted in three Parts, I., II. and III.,

as set out in the attached schedule.

2. With regard to the reservations noted at the foot of some of the purely Naval subjects, the Admirals desire to point out that they are in complete accord on the main issue, viz., the extent to which the German Fleet should be reduced.
3. The Admirals understand that the German colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and on that hypothesis have not included the subject in the Naval Conditions.
4. As it is important from the Naval point of view that full reparation should be exacted for the shipping losses of the Allies and the United States of America, the Admirals have appended to Part II. a draft containing their views, in order that these may be embodied in the Reparation clauses of the Convention.

Signed by	For
Admiral Benson	United States of America
Admiral Wemyss	British Empire
Vice-Admiral de Bon	France
Rear-Admiral Grassi	Italy
Vice-Admiral Takeshita	Japan.

[Enclosure]

PARIS, 5 March, 1919

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

SCHEDULE OF CLAUSES

PART I. *Purely Naval Subjects.*

1. Strength of German Fleet.
2. Disposal of Surplus.
3. Submarines.
4. Surface vessels-of-war now interned.

5. Further reduction of surface vessels-of-war.
6. Vessels-of-war under construction.
7. Materials arising from vessels broken up.
8. Future construction of vessels-of-war.
9. Prohibition of submarine construction.
10. Naval war material.
11. German Naval Law.
12. Merchant cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries.
13. Minesweeping.
Appendix. Nominal list of Merchant Cruisers and Auxiliaries.

PART II. *Subjects intimately connected with Naval matters on which the Admirals deem it essential to present their views and recommendations.*

1. Heligoland.
2. Routes into the Baltic.
3. Coast fortifications.
4. Kiel Canal.
5. Wireless telegraphy.
6. Submarine cables.
Appendix. Reparation for Shipping Losses.

PART III. *Execution of Terms.*

1. Appointment of Commissions.
2. Conventions.

NAVAL CLAUSES FOR TERMS OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

PART I

Clause 1. Strength of German Fleet.

(*a*) Personnel.

The total personnel for Naval purposes, including the manning of the Fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, shall not exceed 15,000 (officers and men of all grades and

corps included), of whom not more than ten per cent shall be officers and warrant officers.

(*b*) Seagoing Fleet.

The strength of the seagoing fleet shall not exceed:—

6 battleships of the "Deutschland" or "Lothringen" type;
6 light-cruisers;
12 destroyers } for coastwatching and fishery
12 torpedo boats } duties;

or an equivalent number of vessels built in accordance with Clause 8.

Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by Clause 13, Germany will keep in commission the number of minesweeping vessels fixed by the Allies and the United States.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 2. Disposal of Surplus.

(*a*) Personnel.

Officers and men belonging to the German Navy in excess of the numbers authorised by Clause 1 shall be demobilised within a period of two months from the signature of the present Convention.

(*b*) Vessels-of-war.

Vessels-of-war over and above the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1 shall be disposed of as required by Clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12, or, if not specially provided for in these clauses, shall be placed in reserve or utilised for commercial purposes.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 3. Submarines.

(*a*) All German submarines, without exception, submarine salvage vessels, and docks for submarines (including the tubular dock), are to be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can proceed under their own power, or which can be towed, shall be taken by the Germans into Allied ports, to be there destroyed* or broken up.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she authorises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of all German submarines in neutral ports.

(*b*) The German submarines which cannot be delivered in Allied ports, as well as those which are in course of construction, shall be completely broken up by the Germans, under the supervision of Allied and United States Commissioners.

The breaking-up of these submarines shall be completed within a maximum period of three months after the signature of the present Convention.

(*c*) The Naval Commission appointed by the Allies and the United States of America to supervise the execution of the terms of the Armistice has decided as to which submarines are to proceed or are to be towed to Allied ports and which are to be broken up by the Germans. The decisions of this Commission shall be strictly carried out.

Clause 4. Surface Vessels-of-War Now Interned.

All German surface vessels-of-war now interned in Allied ports, in conformity with the terms of the Armistice, or interned in neutral ports, cease to belong to Germany; they are definitely surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America for the purpose of being broken up or destroyed* in the shortest possible time.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she authorises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of the German surface vessels-of-war in neutral ports.

Clause 5. Further Reduction of Surface Vessels of War.

The German vessels-of-war named below shall be sunk* under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America within two months after the signature of the present convention.

Commissions of the Allies and the United States shall fix the localities where these vessels shall be sunk.

The vessels are to have their guns on board. In other respects they are to remain disarmed as ordered by Article XXIII. of the Armistice Convention dated 11 November, 1918.

With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value.

The vessels are:—

Battleships

Oldenburg
Thüringen
Ostfriesland
Helgoland
Posen
Westfalen
Rheinland
Nassau

Light-Cruisers

Stettin
Danzig
München
Lübeck
Strassburg
Augsburg
Kolberg
Stuttgart

Forty-two modern destroyers.

Fifty modern torpedo boats.

Clause 6. Vessels-of-War Under Construction.

All German surface vessels-of-war now under construction shall be broken up under the supervision of Allied and United States Commissioners.

Clause 7. Materials Arising From Vessels Broken Up.

The materials arising from the breaking-up of German vessels-of-war, whether surface vessels or submarines, may be used, but solely for industrial or commercial purposes, and on no account for warlike purposes.

Germany shall not sell or dispose of these materials to other Countries.

Clause 8. Construction of Vessels-of-War.

No vessels-of-war shall be constructed in Germany nor acquired by Germany except as follows:

(*a*) New vessels shall only be built to replace units of the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1.

(*b*) They shall be designed purely for coast defence and coast watching purposes.

(*c*)

(*c*) New vessels shall not exceed the following displacement:—

Armoured ships	10,000 tons
Light-cruisers	6,000 ”
Destroyers	800 ”
Torpedo boats	200 ”

(*d*) Except in the case of the loss of a ship, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of—

20 years in the case of battleships and cruisers:
15 years in the case of destroyers and torpedo boats.

This number of years expresses the duration of the life of the ship and shall count from the first year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship which is to be replaced to the year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the new ship.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 9. Prohibition of Construction of Submarines.

No submarines for any purpose whatever, commercial or otherwise, shall be built in Germany or acquired by Germany, until such time as the League of Nations may order otherwise.

Clause 10. Naval War Materiel.

The allowance of arms, ammunition, and all important items of naval war materiel for the German Navy will be fixed by a Commission of the Allies and the United States of America on the basis of the seagoing fleet and personnel authorised by Clause 1. The reserve of naval ordnance, arms, ammunition, and war materiel shall be in proportion to the number and types of the units of the seagoing fleet.

All arms, ammunition, and naval war materiel, including mines and torpedoes, belonging to Germany and now in possession of the German authorities, in excess of the above establishment, shall be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America, at places to be determined, to be destroyed or made useless. The surrender of material under this clause shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of signature of the present Convention.

The manufacture in Germany for foreign countries of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines and torpedoes, or their parts, or naval war materiel of any description, is prohibited.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to the final paragraph of this clause.

Clause 11. German Naval Laws.

(1) The personnel for the German Navy shall be recruited on a long-service system.

The authorised complement shall be obtained by classes of recruits, but the service of the men of the contingent called-up each year shall be continuous, and these men shall after their service, be definitely freed from all military obligation.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for, and men not called-up shall not be subject to any obligation for service in the Navy.

(2) The above regulations and Clauses 1, 8, 9 and 10 of Part I. of the present Convention shall form an integral part of the German Naval Laws.

(3) The German Naval Laws shall not include any provision in contradiction of any clauses of this Convention. On the contrary, they shall abrogate all previous legislative, financial or administrative measures which may be in contradiction of the Convention.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and shall be promulgated within three months from the date of this Convention.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 12. Merchant Cruisers and Fleet Auxiliaries.

Armed German merchant cruisers, whether in ports of the Central Powers or interned in neutral ports, and Fleet auxiliaries which can be readily adapted for commercial purposes or which have been

converted from merchant ships, shall be disarmed and treated as other merchant ships.

The vessels affected by this clause are given in Appendix.

Clause 13. Minesweeping.

Germany shall sweep up all mines in the areas which have been assigned to her in the agreement already entered into between the Allies and the United States of America.

In accordance with this agreement, Germany shall be responsible for sweeping in the following areas:—

(1) That portion of the North Sea which lies to the eastward of longitude 4°00′ E. from Greenwich—
(*a*) between the parallels of latitude 53°00′ N. and 59°00′ N.
(*b*) to the northward of latitude 60°30’ N.
(2) The Baltic Sea, excluding Russian waters. In regard to these waters further details will be given as soon as the Russian question is determined.

APPENDIX TO PART I.—ARMED GERMAN MERCHANT CRUISERS AND FLEET AUXILIARIES

(List referred to in Clause 12 (Part I) of Naval Terms.)

Interned in neutral countries (*3*).

Berlin
Santa Fe
Yorck.

In Germany (*28*).

Ammon
Answald
Bosnia
Cordoba
Cassel
Dania

Rio Negro
Rio Pardo
Santa Cruz
Schwaben
Solingen
Steigerwald
Franken
Cundomar
Fuerst Buelow
Gertrud
Kigoma
Rugia
Santa Elena
Schleswig
Moewe
Sierra Ventana
Chemnitz
Emil Georg von Strauss
Habsburg
Meteor
Waltraute
Scharnhorst

Part II

Clause 1. Heligoland.

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners, by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners, which shall not exceed one year from the date of this Convention.

The term “harbours” shall include the north-east mole; the west wall; the outer and inner breakwaters and reclamation works within them; and all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings, constructed and under construction, between lines connecting the following positions taken from British Admiralty Chart No. 126 of 19 April, 1918:—

(*a*) Lat. 54°10′49″N., long. 7°53′39″E.
(*b*) 54°10′35″N., 7°54′18″E.
(*c*) 54°10′14″N., 7°54′00″E.
(*d*) 54°10′17″N., 7°53′37″E.
(*e*) 54°10′44″N., 7°53′26″E.

The disposal of the Islands will be decided by the final Treaty of Peace.

NOTE. Admiral Benson makes a reservation regarding the destruction of the harbours.

Clause 2. Routes Into the Baltic.

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55°27′ N. and 54°00′ N. and longitudes 9°00′ E. and 16°00′ E. of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners.

The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Allies and the United States of America complete copies of all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Clause 3. Coast Fortifications.

All fortified works and fortifications within 50 kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be disarmed and dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications within the same limits is forbidden.

NOTE. Admirals Benson and Takeshita make reservations on this clause.

Clause 4. Kiel Canal.

The Kiel Canal shall be open at all times to all war or commercial vessels of every nation. No nation shall benefit by especially favourable treatment, and no class of vessels shall be excluded from the Canal.

NOTE. Admiral Benson does not agree to this Clause and believes that it cannot be justified except as a punitive measure.

Clause 5. Wireless Telegraphy.

(1) The German high-power W/T stations at
Nauen,
Hanover, and
Berlin
shall not be used for the naval, military or political purposes of Germany, or of any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Allied Powers and the United States of America, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

(2) Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace.

(3) In the event of Germany violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, the Allies and the United States of America shall be at liberty to withhold the services of their W/T stations from German stations.

(4) Germany shall have only one vote at the next International Radio-Telegraph Conference, irrespective of the number of independent or semi-independent states into which Germany may be divided.

Clause 6. Submarine Cables.

The German cables enumerated below shall not be returned to Germany:—

Emden-Vigo
Emden-Brest
Emden-Teneriffe

Emden-Azores (two cables)
Azores-New York (two cables)
Teneriffe-Monrovia
Monrovia-Pernambuco
Monrovia-Lome
Lome-Duala
Constantinople-Constanza
Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai
Yap-Shanghai
Yap-Guam
Yap-Menado (Celebes)

NOTE.—Admiral Benson disagrees.

APPENDIX TO PART II.—REPARATION FOR ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES

Reparation for Allied shipping losses shall be made by Germany to the extent and in the method to be laid down in the permanent Treaty of Peace. Part of such reparation shall consist in the handing-over by Germany to the Allies and the United States of America of all merchant ships (with such exceptions as may be laid down in the Treaty of Peace), completed, launched, or under construction, which were on 11 November, 1918, the property of the German Government or German owners or entitled to fly the German merchant flag.

For the removal of doubt as to the interpretation which shall be placed upon certain points which might be deemed open to question, and without prejudice to the further elucidations which may be inserted in the Treaty of Peace, it is hereby declared that:—

(*a*) Reparation for Shipping Losses.

The reparation required from Germany for shipping losses shall be based upon the total number of ships destroyed or lost, constructively or actually, through the hostile action of Germany, irrespective of the means employed for their destruction.

For the purpose of this paragraph the terms “ships” and “shipping” shall be deemed to include fishing vessels.

(*b*) Merchant Vessels captured by Germany.

All allied or neutral merchant vessels which have been condemned by the German Prize Court and which were German property at the date of the Armistice shall be regarded as being German vessels for the purpose of being included in the number of German merchant vessels which may be required to be surrendered under the heading of Reparation.

(*c*) Salvage of Allied Ships and Cargoes.

Notwithstanding that reparation may have been paid for sunken Allied ships and cargoes, the property in such ships and cargoes, if salved outside German territorial waters, shall remain at the disposal of the Allies.

PART III

Clause 1. Commissions for the Execution of Naval Terms.

All the measures prescribed by the Naval Clauses of this Convention shall be carried out under the control of a special Naval Commission appointed for the purpose by the Allies and the United States of America.

This Commission will act under the supreme direction of the Admiralties of the Allies and the United States. It will be established at the seat of the Central German Government and may appoint Sub-Commissions or Delegates as may be found necessary to visit any part of German territory.

The German Government shall facilitate, by all possible means, the exercise of this control, and shall furnish the fullest information demanded of it on all questions in connection with the same, including designs of warships, details and samples of naval war material, guns, ammunition, torpedoes, mines and other explosives, and W/T apparatus.

NOTE. Admiral Benson disagrees as to requiring Germany to furnish designs, samples, &c, of war materiel, and makes reservations

regarding the participation by Naval representatives of the United States of America in any Commissions appointed to deal with the execution of Clauses 1, 2, 8, 10 and 11 of Part I and Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Part II.

Clause 2. Conventions.

Nothing in the present Convention shall invalidate anything done or required to be done under the Armistice Convention of 11 November, 1918, or subsequent Conventions for its renewal.

Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who sign this Convention with her.

[1] The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC–45a, SWC–12a) gives a copy of the telegraphic report on this subject received by the British delegation from the British representatives at Spa, the text of which also appears as Annexure "A" to BC–46 (SWC–13), p. 266 [*Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 14*].

[*] Admiral de Bon, by direction of the Minister of Marine of France, makes reservations on this point. [Footnote in the original.]

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March 7, 3 p.m. (BC–46)

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[14] Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 7th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 7, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/53

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/53

BC–46 SWC–13

[Document 14]

Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 7th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 7, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT	ALSO PRESENT
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing	Admiral W. S. Benson
Hon. E. M. House	General Tasker H. Bliss
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick
Mr. A. H. Frazier	* Mr. Hoover
Mr. L. Harrison	* Mr. Davis
Mr. G. Auchincloss	* Capt. F. H. Schofield
BRITISH EMPIRE	BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	* The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K. C, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Secretaries	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	* Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
FRANCE	Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.
M. Clemenceau	Brig. Gen. P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.

M. Pichon	* Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Secretaries	* Paymr. Capt. C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.
M. Dutasta	* Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
M. Berthelot	FRANCE
M. Arnavon	M. Leygues
M. de Bearn	* M. Clementel
ITALY	* M. Tardieu
H. E. Baron Sonnino	Marshal Foch
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi	* General Belin
Secretaries	General Degoutte
Count Aldrovandi	* General Weygand
M. Bertele	General Duval
JAPAN	* Comdt. Lacombe
H. E. Baron Makino	* Comdt. de V. Levavasseur
H. E. M. Matsui	* Lieut, de V. Odend'hal
	ITALY
	* H. E. M. Crespi
	Admiral Grassi
	* General Cavallero
JAPAN	
	Admiral Takeshita
	General Nara
	* Captain Nomura
	* Captain Fujioka
	* Captain Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.

British Empire	Captain E. Abraham
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau said that the Report of the Belgian Commission had been received. Report of Belgian Commission on the Treaties of 1839

(It was decided that it should be circulated).

2. The Council had before them copies of a telegram, for the text of which see Annexure "A".

Interruption of the Negotiations at Spa Lord Robert Cecil said that Admiral Hope had returned from Spa and reported that the negotiations with the Germans concerning the surrender of their mercantile fleet had failed altogether. There had been in the morning a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council at which it had been decided that Germany was clearly bound by the Armistice to yield the ships, that it was of the greatest importance for the Allies to obtain possession of them, and also, in the general interest, that Germany should be supplied with food. Proposals had been made by the American Delegates and by himself and tentative conclusions reached. The French and Italian Delegates, however, had wished to see the conclusions in writing and to have some time for reflection before accepting them. He therefore suggested that a day's delay be granted for the Supreme Economic Council to consider its resolutions which could be furnished on the following day.

M. Clemenceau asked Lord Robert Cecil if he could give an outline of the resolutions proposed.

Lord Robert Cecil said that two clauses had been agreed to by all the Delegates. The meeting had only broken up at 2.15 p.m. that day and final texts could not be given. The first clause adopted was to the

effect that in accordance with the Armistice Germany must deliver the ships. The second clause provided that 270,000 tons of food should be supplied to Germany as soon as the German Government had given evidence of an intention of complying with the Armistice. The third clause concerning which there was not yet full agreement dealt with the future revictualling of Germany. Detailed proposals had been put forward by the American Delegates and agreed to by himself on behalf of the British Government. For reasons previously given he proposed that the final draft should be produced on the following day.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that this clause involved principles concerning which the French and Italian Delegates felt they must consult their Governments.

(It was decided to postpone the discussion to the following day.)

3. MR. LANSING put forward the following draft:—

It was agreed that,

> Mr. Lansing's Proposal for a Commission to Consider the Question of Enemy owned Submarine Cables In consideration of clause 6 of Part II of the Naval conditions for peace with Germany, the following questions should be submitted to a Committee composed of five Members, one to be named by each of the five Powers:
>
> Is it (legally) right under the rules or principles of international law to treat as capture or prize submarine telegraph cables of an enemy cut or taken possession of by naval operations?
>
> Is it (legally) right under the rules or principles of international law for a Government whose naval forces have cut or taken possession of a submarine telegraph cable of an enemy, to retain such cable by way of reparation?
>
> In the event that the cut or captured cable of an enemy is landed on the territory of another nation, what right and

authority does such nation possess under contracts or permits granted to the enemy to cancel the same or to control the use of the cable?

MR. BALFOUR said that he would only question, in this draft, the use of the word "legally"; as no international law existed concerning the point in question he asked whether it would not be better to suppress this word.

MR. LANSING agreed to the suppression of the word "legally" at the beginning of the second and 3rd paragraphs of the draft.

BARON MAKINO said he wished to ask a question. Should the Commission decide that it was not legitimate to take possession of the cables, would the consequence be their return to Germany?

M. CLEMENCEAU said the power of deciding on this remained with the Council.

BARON SONNINO said that the text proposed specifically related only to cables cut during the war or taken possession of by naval operations. He understood that there were enemy owned cables which did not come under either' of these categories.

MR. LANSING said that the question did not arise, as unless they had been taken from the enemy they could not be returned.

BARON SONNINO said that from the previous day's discussion he understood that there were some enemy-owned cables neither cut nor seized during the war. If so, should they not be taken into account?

M. LEYGUES said that there were some such in the East.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in the naval report a full list of cables had been given and this list should be submitted to the Commission.

MR. LANSING said he objected to any change in the draft because a legal opinion was required on the captured cables and not on any

other. The question was an abstract one and he thought it undesirable to mention any cables by name.

(Mr. Lansing's resolution was therefore accepted with the omission of the word "legally" in the second and third paragraph).

The following nominees were then appointed to the Committee:—

For the United States of America	Mr. James Brown Scott.
" Great Britain	Dr. Pearce Higgins.
" France	M. Fromageot.
" Italy	M. Tosti.
" Japan	M. Yanaka.

4. MR. LANSING suggested that Mr. Hoover should make a statement about the actual situation.

M. CRESPI said he had a similar statement to make, but had no objection if Mr. Hoover preceded him.

Supply of Food to Austria, and the Italian Blockade at Lubiana MR. HOOVER said that on the previous Wednesday he had brought forward certain proposals. He would remind the Council that the difficulties encountered did not entirely arise from the situation about Trieste, but were the result of enmity and differences among the various divisions of what was once an economic unit. He had therefore proposed that a certain amount of rolling stock be turned over exclusively for use in shipping food, and Lord Robert Cecil had suggested an amendment which he had been very glad to accept. Because of an unfortunate incident at Lubiana, the Yugo-Slav area was entirely closed, and consequently Bohemia and German Austria were rendered partly inaccessible. The Italian Government had made the greatest efforts to make shipments by other routes, but 1100 tons was the greatest amount that had yet been shipped in one day, while 3,000 tons were needed. It was manifestly impossible to ship food to the North through Yugo-Slavia without at the same time feeding the Yugo-Slavs, and while they were still starving. The efforts of the Italian Government had succeeded in getting 20,000 tons into Czecho-Slovakia in five weeks, whereas at least 45,000 tons per

month were needed. He believed that the peoples concerned would welcome the intervention of a fourth party, as they could not agree amongst themselves for obvious reasons. There was no possibility of dealing with the food situation in Austria Hungary without unimpeded control of the rolling stock, and the removal of the blockade.

M. Crespi said that at the last meeting when Mr. Hoover's proposal had been brought forward there were two questions before the Council. One was a general question of re-victualling the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian territory. There were difficulties of various kinds to be overcome. The Italian Government was in complete agreement with its Allies that it was desirable to overcome these difficulties and to feed these populations. It was ready to co-operate with the other Governments to this end.

The second question raised by Mr. Hoover, put so clearly by Mr. Balfour in a previous meeting, concerned the difficulty between the Italian Government and the Local Authority at Lubiana. He wished to give an account of the events that had led to this crisis. In accordance with clauses 7 and 10 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti of November 3rd, 1918,[1] each Allied Government had a right to establish Commissions of Control in Austria Hungary. The Italian Government accordingly placed a Commission in Vienna under General Segre. General Segre during the month of January had found it necessary to establish a sub-commission at Lubiana. This sub-commission took up its work on the 27th January in full agreement with the Local Authorities. On the 12th February a train carrying Italian refugees passing through the station of Saloch was fired on by men attired in Serbian uniform. Several of the passengers were wounded, and Italian flags were torn down and burnt. Major di Giorgi, head of the Sub-Commission demanded satisfaction from the Local Authorities. He was told on the 14th, that an enquiry was being made. On the 17th, he called on the Local Authorities again, and was given no reply. On the 18th, he was asked to show his passports. On the 20th, he was ordered to quit Lubiana as his passports were not in order, and as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was not subject to the Armistice. Major di Giorgi was compelled to leave Lubiana at once.

Another incident occurred on the 20th. A Commission composed of French and American Officers was working on the Frontier of Yugo-Slavia at Marburg. General Segre sent certain Italian Officers to join this Commission. On their arrival these Officers were ordered by the Yugo-Slav Authorities to withdraw. They refused to do so. After the dismissal of the Commission from Lubiana the Italian Government had made a protest at Belgrade. No answer had been returned. The Italian Government then considered means of closing this incident. The first means suggested was the military occupation of Lubiana. The second was the closing of the Armistice Frontier. The less severe of these alternatives had been chosen. The Frontier was closed. Mr. Butler of the Trieste Relief Commission had gone to Lubiana and it was thought that he had arranged for the Italian Commission to return there and to be received with due honour. It now appeared that he had not obtained this result. It was just at this moment that Mr. Hoover's proposal was brought forward, and that clearly put the Italian Government in a very embarrassing position. Meanwhile the Italian Government was sending trains to Bohemia by three other routes. Two routes led through Tarvis and one through Innsbruck. The whole question of re-victualling Austria depended on the supply of rolling stock. Any number of trains could be sent up the lines still open provided rolling stock was forthcoming. The Italian Government, to come to the assistance of Bohemia, had diverted its own trucks and succeeded in sending 1100 tons on the 3rd. March. Since then, the amount had been increased and he was informed that now nine trains were despatched per day carrying in all 2700 tons. If to this he added what would come via Fiume and the Adriatic Ports, he thought that Mr. Hoover's figure of 3,000 tons would be more than reached. The incident of Lubiana remained, and the Italian Government had not received satisfaction. It was bound to remember what had taken place at Spalato where Italian subjects had been molested in the presence of four Allied Admirals. The Admirals had demanded and obtained satisfaction. The Italian Government therefore proposed that a Commission of four Allied Generals should be appointed to proceed to Lubiana and make an investigation. He then submitted the following formula:—

THE MEANS FOR ITALY TO HAVE THE NECESSARY REPARATION

First—a commission consisting of four Generals (one American, one English, one French, one Italian) will go at once to Laibach to enquire into the incidents of 12th and 20th February, at Saloch and Laibach; after ascertaining the facts in the case they will require of the Local Government the punishment of the guilty persons and all those reparations and satisfactions for the Italian Government which shall be deemed due. (a) Commission of Enquiry at Lubiana

Second—The commission of four Generals, after ascertaining the facts in the case, will notify in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments that the repetition of similar incidents will have as its immediate consequence the inter-allied military occupation of the localities in which such incidents may occur in accordance with the terms of Art. 4 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918, besides any more severe measures which the Commission may deem requisite.

When the commission has been appointed and has begun its labours on the spot, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Laibach of those trains which the Commission shall deem necessary for re-victualling purposes.

As to the proposal made by Mr. Hoover, he reserved his right to make further comments when this part of the question had been settled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the incident described by M. Crespi was a very serious one. The Powers could not permit the flag of a great Allied country to be subjected to indignity. They were bound to do all they could do to uphold one another's national honour. He thought the sending of the Commission suggested by M. Crespi would have a good effect. A telegram informing the Yugo-Slavs that a Commission was to be sent would make it clear to them what the attitude of the Powers was. Nevertheless he did not think that in the meantime populations in no way concerned in the incident should be starved, and he did not understand that it was so proposed. He thought therefore, that Mr. Hoover's proposal could be accepted and executed *pari passu* with the appointment of the Commission. He proposed that a telegram appointing a Commission of enquiry be

sent at once; that the blockade be removed and that Mr. Hoover's plans be put in operation as soon as the telegram had been sent.

M. CRESPI said that he had agreed to discuss Mr. Hoover's proposal. He would have to propose a few modifications suggested by the Italian Railway Experts. One of these modifications was contained in his proposal regarding the Commission to investigate the incident at Lubiana. It suggested that the Commission should have discretion to pass such trains as it thought necessary. As he had already explained, there was no imminent risk to Bohemia or to Austria, seeing that 9 trains a day were being sent, carrying as much as 2,700 tons. Italy could not consent to raise the Blockade before the institution of the Commission, which would be a beginning of some satisfaction to the Italian Government. It was probable that it could be instituted within twenty four hours.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the only objection he had to raise was that the resumption of traffic was made to depend on the assembling of the Commission. He appealed to the generosity of the Italian Government to allow traffic to proceed as soon as a telegram had been sent to the Yugo-Slavs, concerning the appointment of a Commission of enquiry. This would remove any appearance of the Italian Government having been over-ruled by the Supreme War Council. The telegram would show clearly that the Powers intended that Italy should have satisfaction.

BARON SONNINO suggested, in deference to what Mr. Lloyd George had said, a slight alteration in M. Crespi's formula. He suggested that the last paragraph should run "As soon as the Commission has been appointed and is on the spot the Italian Government will allow ... etc." The presence of the Commission on the spot would be a guarantee that no repetition of the incident would occur. The Commission could be gathered in Lubiana in 24 hours, as each Power could select one of its officers at Trieste or Fiume. If no food were going to Bohemia and Austria a few hours might make a difference but as 2,700 tons were going daily since the previous day, a delay of 24 hours would not matter. It might be difficult to continue the transport of 2,700 tons a day by the other lines, but it

could certainly be continued for a few days. This alteration he thought would give satisfaction both to Italy and to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how the decisions of the Commission would be carried out. He had the worst recollection of a Commission of four Admirals sent to Fiume some three months ago. The Italian Admiral on this Commission had refused to submit to the views of the majority: in consequence nothing had been achieved. He had just heard that after three months' delay the Commission were beginning to do something. He did not wish to repeat this proceeding with four Generals. The matter in hand in that case also was a question of revictualling. The Allies desired to find means of sending food to General Franchet d'Esperey's Army.

BARON SONNINO said that in the present instance the Commission was to examine facts. As the appointment of the Commission itself would open the frontier, no such evil consequences as M. Clemenceau had described could result, even were the Members of the Commission to disagree in their judgment. It was only proposed that the facts should be examined by an Allied Commission. Meanwhile traffic would be resumed. Unless this proposal were accepted by the Council, Italy would be driven to the only possible alternative which was a Military occupation. This might be done at any time.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was not sure whether he could find a French officer in proximity to Lubiana.

BARON SONNINO said that there was a French Base at Fiume.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not sure that an English General could be readily found. It might take some days to discover one. Were people to starve because some mis-guided people at Lubiana had been guilty of insulting an Allied flag? Their guilt even should not be presumed. All we could say was that we would investigate and punish anyone found guilty. This, as well as the assembling of a Commission would take time. Seeing the appeals that came from all countries for food, he felt that we should be more indulgent in the

matter of offenses against ourselves and run no risk of starving the population of Europe.

BARON SONNINO said he would understand this objection if nothing were being done, but 9 trains were being sent per diem.

MR. HOOVER begged to differ about the 9 trains. He got a daily report and on no day had 9 trains been reported as having gone; but there had been 9 trains in the last 2 days. On the 24th February he and his colleagues informed the Supreme Economic Council that they declined to take further responsibility for order in Austria Hungary. They had done this after reflection and struggle with a similar situation for some weeks. It was not only a question of this blockade, but of getting some unity again among a lot of disintegrated and antagonistic countries. There had been an Inter-Allied Commission in Trieste for one month and nothing had been accomplished. 80,000 tons of food was ready for distribution.

M. CRESPI said that he had received a telegram that very morning stating that nine trains had been running since the previous day, including two via Innsbruck. The Italian Delegation had supposed that the Lubiana incident had been solved. Mr. Hoover, in his Note read on Wednesday,[2] had said that the blockade had been reported as raised on the previous day. It was now found that this was not so and there was no solution. If Mr. Lloyd George wished the blockade to be raised, the Council could order the Italian officers to be sent back at once to Lubiana and a Commission of Investigation to be appointed. This would be a solution. Without this, Italy would be in a disastrous position. She would appear to have been forced to abandon a line of conduct at the dictation of the Supreme War Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the sending of a telegram would prevent this consequence. He would propose an amendment to M. Crespi's draft. He suggested that the last paragraph should read: "When the Commission has been appointed and the local authority of Lubiana has been so informed, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Lubiana of such trains as may be necessary for re-victualling purposes".

MR. LANSING suggested that the appointment of the Commission should not be awaited, but that action should follow on the announcement that it would be appointed.

BARON SONNINO said that he could make no further concession. He would accept Mr. Lloyd George's amendment but could go no further.

MR. LANSING proposed that the Members of the Commission should be nominated that very day. He would further ask who was to determine the quantity of food that was necessary.

BARON SONNINO said the Trieste Belief Commission.

MR. LANSING thought it would have to be the Director-General of Relief.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the proposal before the Council merely provided for the raising of the blockade and the resumption of traffic on the same lines as before. If the controlling authority were subsequently changed, authority would pass from the old to the new.

MR. LANSING said that his acceptance of the formula was dependent on the adoption of Mr. Hoover's proposals.

Certain other amendments were made in the original formula proposed by M. Crespi and, subject to the reservation made by Mr. Lansing on behalf of the United States of America, the following resolution was adopted:

> "First—A Commission consisting of four Generals (one American, one Englishman, one Frenchman, one Italian) will go at once to Lubiana to enquire into the incidents of 12th and 20th February, at Saloch and Lubiana; after ascertaining the facts of the case they will give such directions as may be required including the punishment of the guilty persons, and all reparations and satisfactions which may be deemed due to the Italian Government.

> Second—The Commission of four Generals, after ascertaining the facts of the case, will notify in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments that a repetition of similar incidents will have as its immediate consequence the inter-Allied military occupation of the localities in which such incidents may occur, in accordance with the terms of Article 4 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918, besides any more severe measures which the Commission may deem requisite.
>
> When the Commission had been appointed and the local authority of Lubiana has been so informed, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Lubiana of such trains as may be necessary for re-victualling purposes."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the discussion on Mr. Hoover's text would now take place.

(b) Disposal of Rolling Stock in Austria-Hungary by Director-General of Relief M. CRESPI said that he had certain comments to make on the draft. For instance as there was already a relief committee at Trieste he would suggest that the Director-General of Relief should work through this Commission rather than through the communication section of the Supreme Economic Council. He had another remark of a general nature to make which was that a discussion with the Austrians must take place before the plan could be put into operation. The Armistice did not confer on the Allied Powers any authority to proceed without Austrian consent.

MR. HOOVER said that he would undertake to obtain the separate acquiescence of each of the local governments concerned. It would be made clear to them severally that they could not obtain food by any other means. No concerted Allied action would be required.

M. CRESPI said that what he wished to indicate was that some negotiation would be necessary.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he must point out that the state of war was not over. Consequently, all the railways in Austria-Hungary must remain under military control. It appeared to him extremely

dangerous to allot a section of the railways to a Relief Department, independent of the military administration. The state of war, moreover, had another consequence: all conversations with the enemy were forbidden while it lasted.

MR. HOOVER pointed out that all the states interested were not enemy states, but that food had to pass through enemy states to reach some friendly states. The military authorities had not taken over all the rail-roads in Austria-Hungary. They had only taken over a few of the railways for a definite object. The relief authorities dealing with the problem of revictualling the country would have to deal with 40 or 50 separate lines. The Military Authorities had made no attempt to solve the problem. As to conversations, all the Allies had delegations in every important town carrying on constant conversation with the local authorities. As to setting up a new agency, they already had representatives in four capitals, and an Over-Ruling Committee in Trieste. Less than 20% of the rolling stock would be required, and if hostilities were renewed, the Relief Department would give way to the Military Authorities. Unless this revictualling proceeded immediately, the Allies would have to resume military action at perhaps 5,000 times the cost in money and in lives.

M. CLEMENTEL said that the suggestion he had made on Wednesday tending to the execution by four Allied Generals of the Director-General's instructions should give satisfaction to Marshal Foch.

MARSHAL FOCH quoted, with disapproval, paragraphs (*f*), (*g*) and (*h*) of the proposals. They meant that the Military Authorities could get no rolling stock until the Relief Department was satisfied.

M. CLEMENTEL said that this applied except in case of war.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that this case existed.

M. CRESPI said that all agreed in principle, but there were technical objections which might be referred to a small Committee, and a final draft could be produced on the following day.

MR. HOUSE suggested that a Committee be appointed to report immediately while the Council proceeded with the other questions.

(It was then decided that Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Clementel, M. Crespi, and General Weygand, should withdraw to another room and return later with a draft proposal.

After an interval the following draft, unanimously agreed to by the above Committee, was produced and accepted:—

(*a*) All the states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling-stock;
(*b*) This rolling-stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and will be given priority for its purposes;
(*c*) The Director-General of Relief working through the communications section of the Supreme Economic Council should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this rolling-stock;
(*d*) A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the necessary programmes of food to the different localities;
(*e*) This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services except military; and within the Italian frontier this will be carried out in co-operation with the Italian authorities;
(*f*) The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory within the old Austrian Empire regardless of nationality or political boundaries;
(*g*) The Italian authorities will assign definite portions of port facilities to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consummation of these ends;
(*h*) In general the rolling-stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped, without prejudice to the ultimate ownership thereof;
(*i*) The railway officials of each state and port officials in each port will co-operate in maintenance of this service.

At this stage all the technical advisers save Marshal Foch, one General, one Admiral and one Air Officer of each nation, withdrew.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had the following draft resolution to propose:—

> Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace "The Military, Naval and Aerial terms of peace with Germany shall be based on the following principles:—
>
> 1. The German naval, military and air forces shall be raised entirely by voluntary service.
> 2. The minimum period of service for all ranks shall be 12 years with the colours.
> 3. The strength of the German army and air force shall not exceed 200,000 men of all ranks, organised in not more than 15 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions.
> 4. The strength of the German Navy shall not exceed 15,000 men of all ranks and ratings."

The object of this proposal was that Germany should not have an annual contingent of recruits, and should not be able to play the same trick on Europe as she had after Iéna. It might be objected that Germany would not have guns and cadres. This assumed that she would not be in collusion with any other power, for instance—Russia. It was absolutely necessary to make this impossible, and the method he proposed was, he believed, the only way to do so. A voluntary army was more expensive than a conscript army. If Germany had to maintain a voluntary army in addition to paying compensation to the Allies, there would be no money left for military adventures. The permanent limitation of armaments was an illusion. He had been told that very morning that the jigs and gauges necessary to permit the manufacture of armaments and munitions for a very large army could be concealed in one small room. Such concealment could not be prevented, and a nation endowed with these standards could gain three months in the race for the production of armaments.

(There being no dissentient, the resolution was adopted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as there was no objection, the draft read by Mr. Lloyd George would be sent to the military, naval and air committees for adaptation to the body of their recommendations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Delegation had a complete set of proposals.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that in the Commission there were no advocates of Mr. Lloyd George's principles. He would therefore ask that the British Delegation should be instructed to report on the matter. He had received the British project just referred to by Mr. Lloyd George at mid-day and at first sight he noticed that it dealt with other than military questions. Was the Commission to enter into these matters or would the Governments give them instructions for their guidance? There were, for instance, chapters relating to prisoners of war and to Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that these matters did not concern the military experts. The Commission would be able to judge what part of the proposals concerned them and what part did not.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE said that he personally would never agree with the views expressed by the British Delegation in favour of a voluntary long term army in Germany. He thought this would make Germany far stronger than a short term conscript service.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Governments could not force the Military Authorities to change their opinions. He suggested that a report should be made on Monday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of principle must be decided in the Council itself. He, on behalf of Great Britain, would never sign any peace giving Germany an army of more than 200,000 men. He would never agree to an army raised in Germany by short conscript service. No General's opinion would shake his decision. This was a matter for Governments to decide. He did not wish to say that he rejected the advice of the Generals. It was to avoid this that he had put forward his resolution. He declared for a long service army as the only guarantee of a small army. He proposed this principle be accepted by the Council and that directions be given to the Military advisers to prepare regulations in accordance with this principle.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the case had been clearly put by Mr. Lloyd George. He himself was also bound by his acceptance of these principles. The resolution would now be reported on by the Military Committee, who would, of course, remain free to express their own views. The decision would remain with the Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE understood that the Military Advisers would draft a scheme on the basis of the resolution.

(This was agreed to.

It was also agreed that the Naval and Aerial Committees should be guided by the same principles.)

(a) Suppression of German Air Force GENERAL DUVAL remarked that the Aerial Committee had proposed to suppress the whole of the German air force. Was he to understand that a different report was now required?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had no objection to the entire suppression of the German air force.

Revision of Naval Conduitions ADMIRAL WEMYSS said that the Admirals had reconsidered certain points referred back to them by the Supreme War Council on the previous day. He made no mention of the clauses which had been reserved.

(Admiral Wemyss then read the proposed re-draft, and, after a short discussion, the following revised clauses were accepted:—

"PART I

Clause 8. Construction of Vessels-of-War.

No vessels-of-war shall be constructed in Germany nor acquired by Germany, except as follows:—

(a) New vessels shall only be built to replace units of the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1.

(b) New vessels shall not exceed the following displacement:—

Armoured ships	10,000 tons
Light-Cruisers	6,000 "
Destroyers	800 "
Torpedo-Boats	200 "

(c) Except in the case of the loss of a ship, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of

20 years in the case of armoured ships and light cruisers,
15 years in the case of destroyers and torpedo-boats.

This number of years expresses the duration of the life of a ship and shall count from the date of launching of the ship which is to be replaced to the year in which the new ship is launched.

Clause 9. Prohibition of Construction of Submarines.

No submarines for any purpose whatever, commercial or otherwise, shall be built in Germany or acquired by Germany.

Part II

Clause 3. Coast Fortifications.

All fortified works and fortifications now established within 50 kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast, other than those mentioned in Clauses 1 and 3 of Part II., shall be considered as of a defensive nature and may be retained as at present. No new fortifications shall be constructed within the same limits.

The armament of these defences shall not exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those in position at the date of the signature of the present Convention. Their numbers and calibres shall be at once communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall not exceed the following rates:—

Calibre	*Rounds apiece*
3-inch and under	3,000
Over 3-inch	1,000”

It was agreed that Admiral Benson’s reservations should be examined in connection with the general question of future control.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 8th March, 1919.

Annexure “A”

(Despatched 4.25 a.m. Received 10 a.m. March 6th, 1919.)
No. C. 3. March 6th.

INTERRUPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SPA

Copy of Telegram

From:—Spa.

To:—Astoria.[3]

Following for Lord Robert Cecil for the Economic Council and Hankey for the Supreme War Council, Hotel Majestic, Paris. Also for Marshal Foch, No. 4 Bis, Boulevard des Invalides, Paris, and for His Excellency Signor Crespi, Hotel Edouard VII, Paris.:—

After communicating with Weimar, the German delegates refused to deliver their mercantile marine in its entirety until a definite programme of food supplies has been arranged up to next harvest. They indicate their willingness to compromise on the basis of delivering a portion of the ships in return for a limited supply of (? group omitted) stuffs and further ships proportionately with further supplies. We have pointed out to them that this is not consistent with

the agreement for the immediate delivery of all the ships to which they have already bound themselves, and we have reassured them of the intention of the Associated Governments to accord further food supplies to the fullest extent that our instructions permit. The German delegates after further communication with Weimar having announced their inability to modify their attitude we are informing them that in view of our instructions no useful purpose can be served by further discussions, and that we are returning to Paris immediately.

The situation is evidently most serious one and I trust the (? Supreme War Council) will be in a position to consider it on Friday.

(Repeated Ministry of Shipping, London.)

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[1] Vol. II, p. 175.
[2] See BC–44, p. 199 [*Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 12*].
[3] Hotel Astoria, headquarters of the British delegation.

March 8, 3 p.m. (BC–47)

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[15] Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 8th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 8, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/54

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/54

BC–47 SWC–14

[Document 15]

Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 8th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 8, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing.	General Tasker H. Bliss.
Hon. E. M. House.	Mr. Hoover.
Secretaries	Mr. Baruch.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	Mr. Davis.
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. Strauss.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.	Mr. Lamont.
British Empire	Mr. Haskins.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Mr. McCormick.
Secretaries	Mr. Robinson.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	British Empire
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K. C., M. P.
France	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
M. Clemenceau.	Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
M. Pichon.	Sir W. Beveridge.
Secretaries	Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
M. Dutasta.	France

M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
M. Salvatore Barzilai.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Marshal Foch.
General Alby.
General Weygand.
Admiral de Bon.
M. Klotz.
M. Clementel.
M. Leygues.
M. Loucheur.
M. J. Cambon.
M. Tardieu.
M. de Lasteyrie.
Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.
ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.
Admiral Grassi.
Col. Laghezza.
JAPAN
Admiral Takeshita.
Captain Nomura.
Captain Yamamoto.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENTEL said that on the 24th February, 1919, the Inter-Allied Blockade Council had passed a resolution to the following

effect:—

> Raisin of the Blockade in the Adriatic "The Blockade of the Adriatic shall forthwith be raised and the trade of all countries shall be allowed free access to all ports."

He wished to ask the Conference to approve this Resolution.

M. SONNINO enquired whether the Resolution referred only to the commercial blockade of the Adriatic.

MR. LANSING replied in the affirmative.

(It was agreed that the commercial blockade of the Adriatic should forthwith be raised.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the representatives of the Great Powers were prepared to hand in the names of the Generals, who were to proceed to Laibach. Nomination of the Generals to Proceed to Laibach

(The following names were handed in:—

United States of America	General Treat.
Great Britain	General Gordon.
France	General Savy.
Italy	General Segre.)

Mr. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that subject to the approval of the Conference he, as President of the Peace Conference, would forward the following telegram to the President of the Inter-Allied Relief Commission in Trieste:—

> "The Supreme War Council at meeting held on 8th March, 1919, approved the following Resolution:—Firstly, a Commission composed of four Generals (1 American, 1 British, 1 French, 1 Italian) shall forthwith proceed to Laibach to enquire into the incidents which took place at Saloch and at Laibach on the 12th and 20th February. After ascertaining the facts of the case, they will issue all necessary instructions,

which will include the punishment of the guilty, and such amends and indemnification as may be considered to be due to the Italian Government. Secondly, the Commission of four Generals, after having ascertained the facts, will issue a notification in the names of the Allied and Associated Governments, to the effect that a recurrence of similar incidents would immediately be followed by an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the localities where such incidents might occur, in accordance with the terms of Article 4 of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, combined with such other more stringent measures as the Commission may consider proper.

As soon as the Commission will have been appointed, and as soon as the local authorities of Laibach have been informed thereof, the Italian Government will authorise the passage of the necessary supply trains via Laibach."

(It was agreed that the above telegram should be forwarded in the name of the Great Powers to the President of the Inter-Allied Belief Commission in Trieste by M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference.)

3. M. TARDIEU said that the Commission on Belgian Affairs entrusted by the Supreme Council at its meeting on 26th February, 1919,[1] with the study of the question of the Revision of the Treaty of 1839, had arrived at the following conclusions:— The Report of the Belgian Commission on the Treaty of 1839

(1) In law, the three treaties and all their clauses together constitute a single entity.

The treaty between Belgium and Holland is not separable from the other two.

Without examining the argument that the three agreements may be said to have been terminated by the fact of their violation, the Commission holds that since three of the Signatories consider revision necessary, such revision is called for.

(2) In fact, the three treaties which were directed against Belgium and imposed upon her and upon Holland by the Great Powers have not afforded Belgium any of the guarantees which these treaties promised to her, and by their clauses relative to her territory and her rivers have seriously impaired her capacity for defence, and are thus in great measure responsible for the injuries she has sustained. As far as concerns Germany, Austria and Russia, it is now in fact impossible to give to Belgium the guarantee of the five Great Powers to which she is entitled by the treaties. On this ground also, the revision of the treaties in their entirety is called for.

(3) In principle, the basis accepted for the Peace Conference contemplates the abandonment of the neutralisation of Belgium which constitutes a limitation upon her full sovereignty. Revision of the treaties is thus a matter of general interest. This neutralisation is at present guaranteed to Holland by Great Britain and by France under the treaty between the five Powers and Holland. The participation of Holland in the revision of the Treaties is thus called for.

The conclusion suggested accordingly is as follows:—

(*a*) The treaties of 1839 should be revised in the entirety of their clauses at the joint request of the Powers which deem their revision necessary.
(*b*) Holland should take part in this revision.
(*c*) Those of the Guarantor Great Powers which have fulfilled their obligations should also take part therein.
(*d*) Similarly the Great Powers at the Peace Conference whose interests are general should take part therein.
(*e*) The general object of this revision is, in accordance with the aim of the League of Nations, to free Belgium from that limitation upon her sovereignty which was imposed on her by the treaties of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium and of general peace, to remove the dangers and disadvantages arising from the said treaties.

With respect to the procedure to be followed the Commission submits to the Supreme Council that:—

The Supreme Council entrusts the Guarantor Powers which have been faithful to their obligations with the duty of informing Holland that the Council deems the revision of the treaties of 1839 to be necessary, and of inviting her to send her representatives to set forth before the Supreme Council the views of the Dutch Government in regard to such revision.

The whole question of the revision of the treaties would then be before the Supreme Council. This revision could be examined with regard to the interests of Belgium and of Holland by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, as well as by the Commission of ports, waterways and international communications, on the basis of investigations carried on by each of these two Commissions.

The provisions of the final treaty would come under the guarantees contemplated by the League of Nations.

(The report of the Commission on Belgian Affairs on the Treaty of 1839 was duly accepted.)

4. M. JULES CAMBON said that he had presided at a Meeting of the Small Powers, which had met together yesterday to elect their representatives on the Economic and Financial Commissions. It had been agreed that the Small Powers should elect five regular delegates in addition to four supplementary members to act as a panel. Unfortunately, an understanding had previously been reached by the South American States to form a combination, with the result that out of the five delegates elected to sit on the Financial Commission, four belonged to South American States, namely, Brazil, Panama, Bolivia and Peru, and the fifth representation was given to Portugal. The small European Powers, thus finding themselves out-voted, had refused to take any further part in the proceedings, and had refused to vote for the remaining four supplementary Delegates. Representation of the Smaller Powers on the Financial and Economic Commissions: (a) Reports by M. Jules Cambon

The same manoeuvre had been followed in the case of the election of representatives for the Economic Committee with the result that the five seats fell to Brazil, Chili, [*China?*], Cuba, Siam and Equador.

The Smaller European Powers having refrained to vote for the Supplementary members, the representatives of the following states were elected by the votes of the other Small Powers, namely:—

For the Finance Committee—Roumania, Belgium, Chili [*China?*], Greece.
For the Economic Committee—Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece.

The Small European States since then had continued to protest and Mr. Politis, the Greek Foreign Minister, had declared that it was "shocking" that the Small Powers who had fought in the war should remain unrepresented on the Economic and Financial Commissions, whilst States that had merely broken off relations with Germany had obtained full representation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was obviously very unjust that the South American States, who had made no sacrifice during the war, should obtain all the representation, whereas Belgium, Serbia and Roumania were excluded after the great sacrifices they had made during the war. He wished to enquire whether the Conference would accept this decision, or whether it would decide to upset the result of the election.

(b) Mr. House's Proposal for Fractional Representation MR. HOUSE suggested that each of the European Small Powers should have a representative on the Financial or Economic Commission, but without full voting powers. In his opinion the Small Powers did not care very much about voting, but each one was anxious to be represented. In his opinion, the difficulty would be solved if arrangements were made to include all the Small Powers mentioned by M. Pichon, giving them say half a vote apiece.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that fractional voting was quite a new idea to him.

(c) M. Pichon's Proposal—Conference to Select Representatives of Small Powers M. PICHON thought that the States that had merely broken off relations with the enemy Powers could not be allowed to have representation to the exclusion of those States that had taken a

lively part in the war. He thought the latter States had a right to be represented. Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and perhaps even Portugal had an undoubted right to be represented on a Committee dealing with reparation and finance, whereas the other States had no excuse for having an effective representation on these Commissions at the expense of the States he had mentioned. As a solution, he wished to propose that the Conference should select the States to be represented on these Commissions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE understood that the incident was holding up the work of an important Commission, whose report was required before the Peace Treaty could be drawn up. Consequently, in his opinion, the first thing for the Conference to decide was that the Committee should proceed with its work. In regard to the second question, namely, the representation of the Small Powers, he found himself in complete agreement with M. Pichon. The non-belligerent Small Powers, other than those mentioned by M. Pichon, could be heard by the Commission, whenever any question concerning them came up for discussion.

MR. HOUSE expressed his concurrence with M. Pichon's proposal.

MR. LANSING said that a few days ago he himself had drawn attention to the names of the Small Powers who had been elected to sit on various Commissions and Committees. He had then pointed out that many of these names belonged to Countries that had merely broken off relations with the Central Powers, but had not declared war. For instance, on the previous occasion he had pointed out that Panama and Cuba had not been elected to sit on any Commission. Now, both Panama and Cuba had received representation, but the same objectional features still continued of putting on nations that had merely broken off relations without going to war. He, therefore, entirely agreed with M. Pichon's views on this question, and suggested that Brazil, Cuba and Peru should be added to this list of interested Countries given by M. Pichon.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether a distinction could not be made between countries entitled to vote and those entitled to attend

meetings. If such a distinction could be made, five countries could be admitted to vote, the remaining five or six countries being admitted merely for consultation.

M. PICHON remarked that in accordance with the decrees of the Conference every State forming part of the Peace Conference had a right to be heard when questions concerning its interests were discussed. The important question, however, was that Countries with special interests should have a seat on the Economic and Financial Commissions; otherwise it would be impossible for them to have a voice in deciding the amount to be paid by Germany. How could the Financial Commission decide the amount to be paid by Germany without Belgium and Poland, for instance, having a voice in the matter?

M. JULES CAMBON remarked that M. Pichon had suggested that six Delegates should be appointed to represent the Small European States. He thought the Small States would be quite satisfied if three out of the six representatives were appointed to the Economic Commission, and three to the Financial Commission.

M. PICHON insisted that certain of the small Powers such as Belgium, had a right to sit on both the Financial and Economic Commissions.

BARON SONNINO asked permission to explain his previous statement which was not in contradiction with M. Pichon's views. He thought the Conference should select the five representatives of the Smaller Powers from among the belligerent States; the remaining small Powers having a right to sit on the Conference with a consultative vote, that is to say, without having the full rights of Delegates.

M. PICHON drew attention to two important points. In the first place it was essential that there should not be too many Delegates on any Commission, since that interfered with the expeditious despatch of work. In the second place, the representatives of the Great Powers should not be swamped by an excessively large number of representatives of the Smaller States.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that when the Financial Commission had been set up, amongst other objects allotted to it, had been the division of the Ottoman debt. How could such a question, for instance, interest Ecuador or Panama? Again, there was the question of the Austrian debt, a most important matter. If Austria vanished, Czecho-Slovakia was very nearly concerned. But what had the other South American countries to do with it, whether belligerent nor [*or*] not? He wished to suggest, therefore, that the representatives of the Great Powers on the Commission should forthwith get to work, and at the end of a week the question could be considered as to whether the Small Powers should be admitted or not.

M. CRESPI pointed out that unless the representatives of the small Powers were appointed, the Commission would not be legally constituted, and unless properly constituted, work could not be commenced.

M. CLEMENCEAU, summing up, proposed that on Monday next M. Pichon should submit a draft resolution, giving effect to his proposal, which had apparently met with general approval.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should, at the meeting to be held on Monday next, March 10th., submit a draft resolution giving effect to his proposals that the Conference should select the small Powers to be represented on the Financial and Economic Councils.)

5. LORD ROBERT CECIL said that the Supreme Economic Council had that day been considering the situation created by the breakdown of the negotiations at Spa, and certain definite conclusions had been reached. The Food of Germany: The Breakdown of the Negotiations at Spa. (a) Reports of Supreme Economic Council

In the first place he wished to bring to the notice of the Conference that the question of the surrender of the merchant ships by Germany was one thing, and the understanding that the Allies should supply food to Germany was quite another thing. Article 26 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, read as follows: “The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice, as shall be found necessary”. Again, in the agreement for

the prolongation of the Armistice, dated the 16th January, 1919, it had been said: “In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German Merchant Fleet for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and power of the Allied flags and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German Delegate. This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels”. That was the position so far as the Armistice was concerned. There was, however, another aspect of the case to which he need not refer at any great length, he meant the obligations of humanity and the grave danger of Germany drifting into Bolshevism unless food were sent into Germany.

When the negotiations at Spa had been broken off, the Supreme Economic Council had met together to consider the situation, and had arrived at certain decisions, which had been embodied in the report which he would proceed to read to the Conference. Unanimous decision had been reached on all but two points, regarding which very strong differences of opinion appeared to exist.

Lord Robert Cecil then read the following draft report of the Supreme Economic Council:—

> “The Supreme Economic Council report that, in their opinion a communication on the lines hereinafter stated, should be made to Germany.
>
> The Supreme Economic Council should be authorised and directed to appoint a Committee with full powers to prepare the actual terms of the proposed communication including the financial and other arrangements necessary to carry it out.
>
> Germany should be informed that—
>
> (1) She is bound by the terms of the Armistice to hand over her mercantile fleet forthwith, under the terms settled at Tréves on [*in*] January last.
> (2) On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now

available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations referred to in the first paragraph, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighbouring neutrals for the balance of the month's supply, that is, of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as at least ... ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

(3) She may import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1st.

(4) She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:—

(*a*) By the hire of the ships.

(*b*) By the export of commodities and the sale of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(*c*) By credits in neutral countries.

(*d*) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.

(*e*) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities of properties as collateral.

(*f*) Further, gold also may be used as collateral for loans to be released as other means of payment to provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above named means of payment are inadequate.

(5) She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must be converted into payment for foodstuffs.

(6) A definite amount of the Shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.

(7) She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities.

(8) It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void should a state of hostilities be renewed.

Clauses 1 and 2 Clause 3 Lord Robert Cecil, continuing, said that in regard to Clause 1 and 2 above, complete agreement had been reached. But two objections had been raised in regard to Clause 3, namely, in connection with the relaxation of the blockade, and in connection with the engagement to feed the Germans until September 1st.

In regard to the first objection, it was obvious that if any food at all were to be imported into Germany, that would necessarily imply a certain relaxation of the blockade. But, in his opinion, the importation of food, far from weakening the power of the blockade, would strengthen it. The only way in which the blockade could be weakened would be by sending into the country so much surplus food as to allow large stocks to be constituted. On the other hand, if only just as much food as was required for immediate consumption were allowed to be sent in, the power of the blockade would thereby be strengthened. Once the Allies started feeding the German people, it would be easy for the latter to realise the full force of a threat to cut off further supplies.

In regard to the second objection, the French representatives held that the clause, as worded, implied an absolute engagement to feed the Germans until September 1st. He did not think that was the correct English interpretation of the text. Obviously, as soon as the Armistice came to an end, further supplies of food could also cease. Moreover, Clause 8 made the supply of food dependent on a non-renewal of a state of hostilities.

Clause 4 In regard to Paragraph 4, the Council agreed that Germany must pay for the food supplied to her, but the gravest differences of opinion had been expressed in regard to the manner of payment, particularly in connection with Clauses (*d*) (*e*) and (*f*). As a matter of fact, he did not think his French colleagues had yet had an opportunity of considering Clause (*f*), which had been re-drafted in order to meet, if possible, some of the objections raised by them.

Clauses 5, 6 and 7 Finally he would add that Clauses 5, 6 and 7 had been unanimously accepted.

(b) Views of French Representatives on Supreme Economic Council M. CLEMENTEL thought it would be necessary, in the first place, to bring to the recollection of the Conference the exact terms of the decisions taken by the Supreme War Council, with particular reference to any promises said to have been made to Germany. In Clause 2 (*b*) of the first armistice, dated November 11th, the Allies had merely contemplated the provisioning of Germany during the armistice: But at the time of the second armistice, in accordance with a decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council, it had been agreed to supply to Germany from time to time such quantities of food as might be considered sufficient to meet her immediate requirements. Accordingly, on the advice of Mr. Hoover, 270,000 tons had been fixed as the amount of the first instalment of food-stuffs: But difficulties had arisen as regards the payment, so that nothing had as yet been sent. That, however, was all that had ever been promised by the Allies to Germany. During the last negotiations, the Germans had asked for a guarantee that food would be supplied up to the next harvest. That request had been discussed by the Supreme Economic Council and the French Delegates had maintained that no undertaking could be entered into for so long a period: No agreement should be entered into for more than one month at a time, and the agreement should only apply to the duration of the armistice. That is to say, the Germans would continue to obtain, their food requirements during the period of the armistice, but should the armistice be broken for any reason, the supply of food would *ipso facto* cease. The British and American delegates had agreed to add Clause 8, which laid down that in the event of a renewal of hostilities, the engagements entered into by the Associated Governments would become null and void. The French Representatives had accepted this Clause only on the understanding that the Military experts were satisfied that it did not contravene any of the terms of the armistice.

Clause 3 had been accepted by the French delegates in principle on the understanding that the figures given merely represented maxima and that the final quantities to be entered should be referred to the

Economic experts. The Experts had not yet been consulted, but no delay need thereby be incurred, as the four competent Ministers could settle that question within a few hours.

Clause 4 In regard to Clause 4, the French Representatives held the view that people who wanted to eat should work. It was a well-known fact that in Berlin, for instance, the unemployed received an unemployment indemnity of 8 marks per day and as a result, at the present moment, there were no less than 300,000 unemployed in receipt of gratuities. Furthermore, peasants were pouring into the town to have a rest and to draw their gratuities. This fact had had an enormous influence on the output of coal, potash, and other raw materials. In his opinion, therefore, the Germans should be given an ultimatum; they should be told that they would only receive food in return for raw materials. The Supreme Economic Council had thought this to be too harsh a condition to introduce into an agreement, but it had been decided to communicate it verbally to the Germans during the course of the recent negotiations at Spa. Unfortunately these negotiations had been broken off before that stage had been reached.

In regard to the method of payment for the food to be supplied to Germany the French representatives held that methods (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) would be sufficient to meet all payments likely to fall due within the next few months. They had further suggested that the following Clause should be substituted for Clauses (*d*), (*e*) and (*f*), namely: "Should the above 3 ways be found insufficient to yield the sums required, it would be the duty of the Finance Committee to find supplementary ways".

Clause 7 Clause 7 laid down that Germany could purchase and import food stuffs from neutrals, who would, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities. This meant that unlimited quantities of food could be purchased by neutral countries to replace equivalent quantities sold to Germany, thus practically abolishing the system of rationing which was still enforced in the case of neutral countries.

LORD ROBERT CECIL pointed out that in the British text the Clause in question read: “She may purchase and import food stuffs within the limits above stated from neutrals, who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities”.

M. CLEMENTEL said that the word[s] “Within the limits above stated,” gave complete satisfaction.

He wished finally to lay stress on the fact that in renewing the negotiations with the Germans the conclusion reached by the Conference should be communicated to the Germans by the President of the Armistice Commission at Spa, so as to avoid discussions being carried on by a large body of representatives.

M. KLOTZ suggested that Marshal Foch’s views should be heard.

MARSHAL FOCH held that Clause 3 created a somewhat dangerous situation, since the Allies thereby bound themselves to supply food to the Germans until September 1st, unless, as stated in Clause 8, hostilities were renewed. Consequently, that Clause had the effect of disarming the Allies, who would be obliged to start hostilities should any difference arise with Germany, since, as long as the Clause remained, pressure could not be exerted by the fear of withholding food.

MR. LANSING enquired what was the connection between the subject under consideration and the military situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that at the present moment the Allies possessed a method of applying pressure to Germany, without appeal to arms, but if the Clause suggested were accepted, the only method of exerting pressure would be the renewal of hostilities.

MR. HOOVER held that a very important difficulty had apparently been overlooked. It was essential that the Allies should obtain the German merchant ships in order to deliver the food supplies required by all countries of Europe, both friendly and enemy. It was evident, in his opinion, that Germany would refuse to give up her ships unless she were assured a supply of food until next harvest. If a

monthly agreement alone were desired, Germany did not consider that a sufficient guarantee to justify the surrender of her ships. It may become desirable to shut off the supply of food in order to exert pressure on Germany. But, the delegates who went to Spa were positive that the German ships would never be surrendered unless the guarantee asked for were given. It would be possible for the Allies to go into German harbours and take the ships by force, but a great many of the ships were in neutral ports, and could not, therefore, be taken by force. Consequently, the Allies were faced by a dilemma: either to abandon the point raised by Marshal Foch and so obtain the ships required, or deliberately to refuse to supply food to Germany and break the promises made. He must, however, insist on the situation in Germany to-day. During the last four years Germany had divided its own food supplies into eleven packets, and a twelfth packet had been made up of the food stolen from the occupied territories. Since the armistice the twelfth packet had been lost to Germany and the remaining eleven packets had, through unemployment and disintegration, been greatly reduced in size. Consequently, Germany now only possessed food sufficient to feed the country for eight months, and some time about the 1st May next, food would become so scarce in all the towns of 50,000 inhabitants and more, that starvation would stare the people in the face, and that would constitute a very grave danger for the whole Government of the country. That was the substance of the report received from the most trustworthy sources in Germany. Therefore, unless the Allies were willing to run the risk of supplying certain quantities of food to Germany, in return for the possible surrender of her merchant ships, thus enabling her to maintain a stable Government, the efforts of the representatives now sitting in the Council Chamber would be washed out to nothing within the next sixty days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had been rather staggered by Marshal Foch's proposition that we were parting with a very great effective power of exerting pressure on Germany. The difficulty was, however, more apparent than real, for the Allies were not in reality parting with the considerable power which food gave them. As a matter of fact, there were only two contingencies which might call for the exercise of that power. The Germans might refuse to carry out the terms of the armistice, but in that case the armistice would at

once come to an end, and therefore the provisions of Clause 8 would apply. Again, the Preliminary Terms of Peace would shortly be presented to Germany, and if Germany refused to accept those terms, that would put an end to the armistice. But, when that happened, the Allies would be quite entitled to decide not to advance into Germany and to exert the necessary pressure by the stoppage of food supplies. Consequently, the only two contingencies when food pressure might be required, had been duly provided for. The Conference was therefore not parting with any potent weapon. On the other hand, he wished to urge with all his might that steps should at once be taken to revictual Germany. The honour of the Allies was involved. Under the terms of the armistice the Allies did imply that they meant to let food into Germany. The Germans had accepted our armistice conditions, which were sufficiently severe, and they had complied with the majority of those conditions. But so far, not a single ton of food had been sent into Germany. The fishing fleet had even been prevented from going out to catch a few herrings. The Allies were now on top, but the memories of starvation might one day turn against them. The Germans were being allowed to starve whilst at the same time hundreds of thousands of tons of food were lying at Rotterdam, waiting to be taken up the Waterways into Germany: These incidents constituted far more formidable weapons for use against the Allies than any of the armaments it was sought to limit. The Allies were sowing hatred for the future: they were piling up agony, not for the Germans, but for themselves. The British troops were indignant about our refusal to revictual Germany. General Plumer[2] had said that he could not be responsible for his troops if children were allowed to wander about the streets, half starving. The British soldiers would not stand that, they were beginning to make complaints, and the most urgent demands were being received from them. Furthermore, British Officers who had been in Germany said that Bolshevism was being created, and the determining factor was going to be food. As long as the people were starving they would listen to the argument of the Spartacists, and the Allies by their action were simply encouraging elements of disruption and anarchism. It was like stirring up an influenza puddle, just next door to one's self. The condition of Russia was well-known, and it might be possible to look on at a muddle which had there been created. But, now, if Germany went, and Spain: who would feel safe?

As long as order was maintained in Germany, a breakwater would exist between the countries of the Allies and the waters of Revolution beyond. But once the breakwater was swept away, he could not speak for France, but trembled for his own country. The situation was particularly serious in Munich. Bavaria, which once had been thought to represent the most solid and conservative part of Germany, had already gone. He was there that afternoon to reinforce the appeal which had come to him from the men who had helped the Allies to conquer the Germans, the soldiers, who said that they refused to continue to occupy a territory in order to maintain the population in a state of starvation. Meanwhile the Conference continued to haggle. Six weeks ago the same arguments about gold and foreign securities had been raised, and it had then been decided that Germany should be given food. He begged the Conference to re-affirm that decision in the most unequivocal terms, unless this people were fed, if as a result of a process of starvation enforced by the Allies, the people of Germany were allowed to run riot, a state of revolution among the working classes of all countries would ensue with which it would be impossible to cope.

(c) M. Clemenceau's Criticisms of Mr. Lloyd George's Proposals M. CLEMENCEAU expressed his desire to make a few observations in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's statement; and he would preface his remarks with the affirmation that his conclusions agreed with that of Mr. Lloyd George, namely, that Germany must be fed as soon as possible. That however, was not the question now under discussion. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the honour of the Allies was involved, since they had given the Germans to understand that food would be sent into Germany. That was not altogether a correct statement of facts. In the Armistice no promise had ever been made to feed Germany.

Mr. BALFOUR, intervening, remarked that almost a promise had been made.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said he would not argue the point, because, as he had already said, he was ready to give the food, whether promised or not. On the other hand, his information tended to show that the Germans were using Bolshevism as a bogey with

which to frighten the Allies. If the Germans were starving, as General Plumer and others said they were, why did they continue to refuse to surrender their fleet? The Germans certainly did not act as if they were in a hurry, and it was curious that a people who was said to be so hard up for food should appear to be in no hurry to assist in obtaining it by giving up their ships. No doubt very pitiable reports were being received from certain parts of Germany in regard to food conditions; but those reports did not apparently apply to all parts of Germany. For instance, General Mangin had told him that there was more food in Mayence than in Paris. In his opinion, the food hardship was probably due to bad distribution. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the Germans must be made to observe the conditions of the Armistice. But the Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and so far they had not done so. In his opinion, the Germans were simply trying to see how far they could go; they were simply attempting to blackmail the Allies. To yield to-day would simply mean constant yielding in the future. He had that day received the following telegram dated the 7th. March, 1919, from the French Naval Attaché, in London:—

> "Having been informed of the refusal of the German Merchant Shipping Commission to surrender the German mercantile fleet to the Allies, a refusal which had led to negotiations being broken off and to the return of the Allied Mercantile Marine Commission to Paris, the Armistice Commission has forwarded the following telegram to the Allied Admiralties:—
>
> > Begins. Urgent:—
> >
> > With reference to your 394 ANAC,[3] it is proposed that the following action be taken, a limit of 3 days being imposed:—The Allied and Associated Powers shall insist that the Germans shall on or before the. ... March next execute without further discussion or reservations the conditions set forth in Article 8 of the agreement for the prolongation of Armistice, dated 16th January, 1919, in regard to the surrender of the German merchant ships in Allied ports. The draft agreement dated . . . . . shall be accepted in its entirety. Should

> these conditions not be executed in their entirety within the prescribed period, the authorisation accorded to German merchant ships, including fishing boats and mine-sweepers, to proceed to sea, shall forthwith be cancelled. Further, no neutral ship shall be authorised to proceed to German ports and the blockade shall be completely re-established. Message ends.
>
> ANAC requests that the above message be submitted to the Supreme War Council."

He himself did not wish to champion that text, but he accepted the spirit which it breathed. In his opinion Marshal Foch should be instructed to meet the German Peace Delegates at Spa, and to tell them that the Allied and Associated Powers refused to argue or to discuss matters concerning the accepted clauses of the armistice. The Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and immediate compliance must be demanded. The Germans could at the same time be told that food would be sent, but the conditions of Article 8 of the Armistice of 16th January, 1919, must in the first place be fulfilled. It was essential that no signs of weakness should be displayed on the eve of the settlement of other large territorial, military and economic questions. The Germans must not be given any advantage to-day that might give them the impression that the Allied Powers could be intimidated and made to yield. Therefore, in his opinion Germany should be asked point blank: "Are you or are you not going to execute the conditions set forth in Clause 8 of the [agreement for the prolongation of the] Armistice?" If his proposal were accepted, the position of the Great Powers would be extremely strong and promises to supply food could then safely be made.

Marshal Foch had made an objection which he (M. Clemenceau) considered to be very strong, but a slight amendment of the text would easily put that matter right. In regard to the manner of payment, he would be prepared to waive his objection to the earmarking of gold for the purpose, provided he knew that the Germans would work for their food. This was not an unreasonable request, and it would be found to be in agreement with the teachings

of Christianity. In conclusion, he could not too strongly urge his view that the Germans should be made thoroughly to understand that the Allies would allow no nonsense in regard to the minute observance of the terms of the clauses of the Armistice. As soon as the Germans recognised this fact, he felt sure his colleagues, M. Loucheur, M. Klotz and M. Clementel, who were ever ready to be guided by feelings of humanity, would easily arrive at an agreement in regard to the supply of food to Germany, and the payment therefor.

(d) Baron Sonnino's Amendment to Clause 8 M. SONNINO said that by way of conciliation, he desired to suggest a slight amendment to Clause 8 which, he thought, would give satisfaction to all parties. Mr. Hoover had argued that the Germans refused to surrender their ships to the Allies because such a surrender would merely act as an incentive to the Allies to ask for new conditions. He (Mr. Hoover) therefore maintained that a complete agreement in regard to the two questions, (the surrender of the ships, and the supply of food), must be reached simultaneously. On the other side, Marshal Foch had said that the acceptance of Clause 8 as at present drafted, would imply the renunciation by the Allies of all means of exercising pressure on the Germans, short of the renewal of hostilities. The Germans would thereby be given an incentive to break all the minor conditions of the Armistice, because they would know that the Allies would never go to war for small things, especially after demobilisation had proceeded further. In order to meet these divergent views, he proposed that the words "should Germany break the terms of the armistice", should be inserted at the end of Clause 8 instead of "should a state of hostilities be renewed."

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that M. Clemenceau's point was that the Germans had already broken the terms of the Armistice by their refusal to surrender the ships. On the other hand M. Sonnino's amendment meant that no food would be supplied until the ships had actually been delivered. Mr. Hoover had, however, laid the greatest stress on the importance for the immediate supply of food. Consequently he did not think Sonnino's amendment really met the difficulties of the case.

(e) Mr. Lloyd George's Amendment to Clause 1 MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was most anxious to get on with the supply of food to Germany. No conditions requiring the surrender of the German mercantile fleet had been included in the original Armistice, but in the agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, it had been stated that: "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet for the duration of the Armistice under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States." That agreement had been entered into on the 16th. January last, and for two months nothing had been done.

Personally, he accepted M. Sonnino's amendment, and if it should meet with the approval of the Conference, he would propose to add to Clause 1 of the proposed communication to be made to Germany, the following sentence: "On condition that Germany formally acknowledges her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th."

(f) M. Clemenceau's proposal in Regard to Procedure in Presenting Resolutions to Germans M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal in regard to Clause 1. Furthermore he would suggest that Clause 1 be communicated forthwith to the Germans by Marshal Foch. In addition the Conference should that day also come to an agreement in regard to the remaining clauses of the draft under consideration, on the clear understanding, however, that those clauses would not be communicated to the Germans until Clause 1 had been accepted by them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired how long it would take for a telegram embodying Clause 1 to reach the German Delegates and for a reply to be received thereto.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that a telegram would have to be sent to Spa and then repeated either to Berlin or Weimar. He thought a reply might be received, at the earliest, on Monday evening, always supposing that the Germans were prepared to send an immediate affirmative or negative reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had overheard a remark to the effect that an ultimatum of this nature would inevitably lead to war. In his opinion if the Germans were prepared to go to war over a question of food supplies, they would not hesitate to do so when the military economic and financial peace conditions came to be presented to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on second thought, it would probably be better to summon the German Delegates to a meeting rather than to send a telegram. He was afraid the latter procedure might result in the despatch of a long argumentative reply by the Germans. In his opinion, the Allied Delegates sent to Spa should receive definite instructions to tell the Germans that a formal acknowledgement to undertake their obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th. 1919, was required as a preliminary to any discussions whatsoever in regard to the conditions for the supply of food.

MR. LANSING remarked that Admiral Hope had already put forward that very same proposition twice during the recent negotiations.

M. CLEMENCEAU in reply pointed out that Admiral Hope had merely spoken as a great Admiral: he had [not?] delivered a message to the Germans in the name of the Great Powers.

In regard to the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George, he wished to urge very strongly that the case of the Allies would be lost irretrievably should any discussions take place prior to the acceptance of the conditions contained in Clause 1. But as soon as the Germans had accepted their obligations under that clause, the remaining clauses could then be discussed. In conclusion, he wished to propose that Clause 1 should be presented to the German Peace Delegates by Marshal Foch himself since the terms of the Armistice were in question. Marshal Foch would naturally be accompanied by the Economic experts, and he would retire as soon as the revictualling clauses came under discussion. He would merely present Clause 1, dealing with the German Mercantile Fleet.

M. CLEMENTEL said he agreed with the proposal contained in the document, but he wished to raise a very strong protest against the

suggestion that an Allied Commission consisting of a large body of men should proceed for the third time to Spa, there to enter into lengthy disputations with a corresponding number of German experts. He would like to remind the Conference that the question of the surrender of the German Mercantile Fleet had been settled by Marshal Foch alone at an interview with Mr. Erzberger within the space of 20 minutes. Marshal Foch had given Mr. Erzberger a time limit which left the German Delegate no option but to accept the conditions imposed. On the other hand, at the last meeting, the Germans had been represented by three separate sections within their Delegation, namely, representatives of the Treasury, Food Department, and the Shipping Department. Each section had held different opinions and had expressed antagonistic views. He did not think it was at all dignified that twenty representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments should enter into violent disputations with the Germans. He felt very strongly on that subject. In his opinion, only one delegate should be appointed to represent the Allies in any further negotiations, and that single delegate so selected, should be a Military representative. In addition, technical advisers could accompany the official delegate merely as his advisers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the two questions, namely, the drafting of the text of the communication to be presented to the Germans and the procedure to be followed in communicating the same, should not be mixed up. Before proceeding further, however, he asked permission to read the following telegram which he had just received from General Plumer at Cologne dated 8th March, 1919, 2.45 p.m.:— (g) Mr. Lloyd George's Proposed Final Draft of Clause 1

> "Please inform the Prime Minister that in my opinion food must be sent into this area by the Allies without delay. Even now the present rations are insufficient to maintain life and owing to the failure of supplies from Germany they must very soon be still further reduced. The mortality amongst women, children and sick is most grave and sickness due to hunger is spreading. The attitude of the population is becoming one of despair and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation. All this naturally results in great activity by subversive and disorderly elements. Apart from the

> imminence of danger from the situation the continuance of these conditions is unjustifiable. I request therefore that a definite date be fixed for the arrival of the first supplies. This date should not be later than March 16th even if from that date regular supplies cannot be maintained."

He thought General Plumer's telegram disclosed a very serious state of affairs and he felt certain that the Conference did not wish to create sympathy with Germany by a continuance of a system of starvation. To bring the discussion to a head he desired to make the following definite suggestion, namely, that the terms of the ultimatum to be presented to the Germans prior to the discussion of the conditions for the supply of food should be made to read as follows:—

> "On condition that Germany formally acknowledges her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th, that is to say, (Here enter Article 8 of the agreement for prolongation of the Armistice dated 16th January, 1919), the delegates of the Associated Governments are authorised and directed to proceed upon their instructions as to revictualling."

MARSHAL FOCH thought that the mere recognition of Germany's obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice would hardly be sufficient, as the Germans had already recognised their obligations by accepting the clause. He suggested that the clause should be made to read:—

> "On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted this amendment.

(h) Proposal Regarding Delivery of Resolutions to Germans M. CLEMENCEAU said that the next thing to settle was how the message should be delivered. He suggested that Marshal Foch should be authorised to meet the German delegates and communicate the message to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was the last man to have any distrust of Marshal Foch, whom he admired for his great qualities. On the other hand, the surrender of the ships really constituted a naval question and up to the present the shipping part of the Armistice had always been left to Great Britain. Thus, Admiral Wemyss had been sent to negotiate all matters relating to ships. And although he realised that Marshal Foch was a master on land, he thought Admiral Wemyss should be allowed to retain his mastership of the ocean: otherwise he feared the British Admiralty might think they had been deposed. He wished to propose, therefore, that the procedure followed hitherto should be adhered to and that a British Admiral should be sent to deliver to the Germans the message relating to the surrender of ships.

M. CLEMENTEL said that the French delegates were firmly agreed that only one representative of the Allies should be appointed to meet a representative of the Germans. Should that principle be accepted, the one delegate could be accompanied by experts, if so desired, for consultation outside the Council Chamber. The French representatives quite agreed that the one Allied delegate should be a British Admiral. He would arrange to meet the German delegate and say to him:—"I come from the Supreme War Council to demand that you accept these conditions without further discussion".

(i) Conditions for Supply of Food M. CLEMENCEAU said that that proposal having been agreed, the conditions to govern the supply of food should next be settled. Clause I of the original draft now disappeared and would constitute a separate document to be presented to the German Peace delegate by a British Admiral, as a preliminary to the discussion of the remaining clauses of the original draft.

Clauses 2 and 3 of ·the original draft had been unanimously accepted. In regard to Clause 4, sub-heads (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) had been accepted, but he would call on M. Klotz to make a statement in regard to sub-heads (*d*), (*e*) and (*f*).

M. Klotz expressed the view that sub-heads (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) by themselves would be sufficient to meet all requirements, and M.

Clemenceau's statement that the Germans should be made to work in order to earn their food had merely confirmed that view. If the Allies put on the table all the German gold and foreign securities which the Allies held in trust, there would be no incentive for the Germans to work. In order to reach an agreement he would, however, suggest the addition of the following paragraph at the end of Clause 3, namely:—"The methods of payment provided in (*d*), (*e*) and (*f*) shall not be resorted to until, in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council, the possibility of payment under (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*), shall have proved inadequate."

M. LOUCHEUR thought that some misunderstanding existed in regard to the text. The American delegates had stated to him that two or three months would have to elapse before it could be known whether methods (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) would provide sufficient funds. That was not the intention of the Committee. The wherewithal for the necessary payments would at once be made available by releasing the necessary quantities of gold and other securities. On the other hand, the Germans should be required to work in order to produce the raw material which would pay for the food supplies. Consequently, if at the end of a month or two it were found that the Germans were not producing any greater quantities of coal and other raw materials, the question as to whether the Allies should continue to feed people who refused to work would have to be reconsidered. It was essential that the Germans should not live at ease on the gold which was required for the payment of reparation for the damages deliberately committed by them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on January 13th exactly the same speeches had been made by M. Klotz and he had then been overruled by the Supreme War Council. M. Klotz should, therefore, submit to the decisions then given by the Supreme War Council. In support of his statement, he would read to the Conference excerpts from the procès-verbal of the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on Monday, January 13th, 1919:—(I. C. 104) [*IC–105*][4]

> "PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that any further delay in this matter might be fatal, as it meant the dissolution of order and government. They were discussing an absolute and

immediate necessity. So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble. Therefore, food should be supplied immediately, not only to our friends but also to those parts of the world where it was to our interest to maintain a stable government. He thought they were bound to accept the concerted counsel of a number of men who had been devoting the whole of their time and thought to this question. He trusted the French Finance Department would withdraw their objection as they were faced with the great problems of Bolshevism and the forces of dissolution which now threatened society.

M. KLOTZ said he would gladly meet President Wilson's wishes. But it was not altogether a question of food supplies. They were all fully agreed as to the necessity of feeding the Germans but he would appeal to President Wilson to consider also the question of justice. He was quite willing to admit that German foreign securities should be earmarked for this purpose. But they were creating a new German debt. There were other German debts which were just as honourable and noble. Therefore, he would ask, as a matter of justice, why Germany should pay for food in preference to paying off debts incurred for the restoration and for the reparation of damage committed elsewhere. Why should exclusive priority be given to such a debt? As a solution of the difficulty he would agree that payment for this food should be made in foreign securities and values. But he would add that 'these assets shall be pooled and distribution shall be made by the Allies, taking into account such privileged claims as the Peace Conference would admit.'

He would merely point out that it was not a question of food supply, it was purely a financial question and no delay need therefore occur in the supply of food.

PRESIDENT WILSON urged that, unless a solution for the immediate situation could be found, none of these debts would be paid. The want of food would lead to a crash in Germany. The great point, however, was this, that the

Associated Governments have no money to pay for these supplies. Therefore Germany must pay for them, but if they were not paid for and supplied immediately there would be no Germany to pay anything.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that, in calculating the sums, they had been going on the assumption that the supply of food would last for one year. He did not think that it would need to last more than a few months, or, say, up to the harvesting of the next crop. The suggestion had also been made that the German merchant ships to be requisitioned would yield funds for the payment of a portion of the sum in question.

M. KLOTZ proposed that they should accept, for a period of two months, the text as it stood. At the end of that period the Peace Conference would be able to come to a decision on the whole question of policy.

MR. BONAR LAW considered that if sanction for two months' payment only were obtained, the food supplies could only last for two months.

M. KLOTZ thought that this showed some confusion of ideas. It was not a question of supplying food for two months. Food supplies could continue. The question to be settled during the course of the two months was merely as to the priority to be given to the payments to be made by Germany. It would be Admitted that foreign securities must be considered as gilt-edged securities.

MR. BONAR LAW thought they were arguing in a circle. The first question to be settled was whether a new debt which they had no necessity to incur should be added to previous debts.

M. KLOTZ agreed, but suggested that at the end of the two months a priority list could be prepared.

M. PICHON said he thought that an agreement had now been reached. Everyone was agreed that payment had to be made.

> The proposal could therefore be accepted. But the Conference could reconsider the question later on, should they wish to do so.
>
> (This was agreed to.)"

It was true that M. Klotz had then suggested that the question should be reconsidered at the end of two months, but in the interval nothing had been done and as long as people were starving they could not be expected to work, as M. Klotz proposed.

M. KLOTZ asked permission to point out that his contention in reality was in complete agreement with what had originally been settled on January 13th. It had then been agreed that two months later the whole clause would be reconsidered. In other words, he had then agreed to the sum of 450 million francs being expended during a period of two months, an expenditure which could, in his opinion, be incurred without endangering the finances of his country. Now, however, the proposal involved an expenditure of 2 milliards of francs up to the 1st September next, and for that purpose it was proposed to use up all the funds which might eventually become available for the payment of reparations. That was what he objected to. He had been willing and he was still willing to agree to an expenditure of 450 million francs; but he hesitated to go beyond that sum without a full and careful reconsideration of the whole question. Consequently, he had already shown a very conciliatory spirit and had made great sacrifices in agreeing to accept clauses (*d*), (*e*) and (*f*), with certain reservations; but it would be impossible for him to go further without compromising his country's interests, which had been placed in his charge.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE appealed to M. Clemenceau to intervene in the matter. It was true that on January 13th it had been suggested that the question might be reconsidered at the end of two months. Nothing had however, been done during those two months and now the question had been brought up for discussion with all the old arguments. He would not have raised the matter, but for the fact that during the past two months, in spite of the decision reached by the Supreme War Council in January last, obstacles had continually been

put in the way, with the result that nothing had been done. He appealed to M. Clemenceau to put a stop to these obstructive tactics, otherwise M. Klotz would rank with Lenin and Trotsky among those who had spread Bolshevism in Europe.

MR. HOUSE said that it always made him unhappy to take sides against France. But the American delegates had told him that they had gone to the utmost limits to meet the wishes of the French, and unless Clause 4 were accepted practically as it stood, it would have no value.

M. CLEMENCEAU exclaimed that his country had been ruined and ravaged; towns had been destroyed; over two million men had lost their lives; mines had been rendered unworkable; and yet what guarantees had France that anything would be received in payment for all this destruction? She merely possessed a few pieces of gold, a few securities, which it was now proposed to take away in order to pay those who would supply food to Germany; and that food would certainly not come from France. In a word he was being asked to betray his country and that he refused to do.

LORD ROBERT CECIL thought that there had been some misapprehension as to Clauses (*d*) and (*e*) which in his opinion, could easily be accepted by all the delegates. The strong opposition of the French representatives concerned Clause (*f*) which dealt with the question of gold. He would point out to M. Klotz that the Clause as redrafted now read as follows: “gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be realised as other means of payment, provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the other means of payment are inadequate”. M. Klotz himself had admitted that something of the kind would have to be done, that is to say, that some liquid assets would be required in order to get over the period until money could come in from other sources, such as mines. Consequently, he had confidently hoped that an agreement could have been reached as the British, American and Italian Delegates had gone a long way to meet the views of the French Delegates.

M. CRESPI said that the draft of Clause (*f*) which had been presented at that morning's meeting, had been different. He himself had suggested a new form as a compromise to reconcile the views of the French, American and British. In his opinion, he thought, the clause as now amended, should satisfy all parties. Italy, who was sadly in need of coal, was prepared to accept it. He hoped, therefore, that M. Klotz would do the same.

(f) Mr. Loucheur's Proposal to Open a Credit for 1 Milliard Francs M. LOUCHEUR thought that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding. He himself quite agreed that the Germans could not be expected to work until they had been fed. Two months ago a credit of 450 million francs had been voted; but so far that sum had been utilised. He fully agreed that Mr. Hoover should at once take all the necessary measures for the immediate supply of the necessary food stuffs to Germany. Obviously, the credit of 450 million francs would not suffice. It had been thought that this sum could be supplemented by money to be obtained by the exportation of raw material from Germany: but there did not appear to be much likelihood of any great sums becoming available in that way in the near future. Consequently, as the matter was urgent, it would be necessary forthwith to open a credit for a much larger sum than 450 million. On that day, the Allies were, in fact, taking engagements to supply food up to a value which might amount to two milliards. He proposed, therefore, that the Conference should forthwith agree to open a credit for one milliard, to be made available immediately, and later on, if necessary, further credits could be opened.

(M. Loucheur's proposal, having been accepted, the Conference adjourned for a short time for the re-drafting of the text of the communications to be made to Germany in such a manner as to embody the various amendments accepted that afternoon.)

After the adjournment the following draft was approved:—

1. As a preliminary to any discussion whatsoever with the German representatives, the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is to make the following statement:—

On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations under Clause VIII of the Armistice of January 16th, that is to say—

> *VIII*. "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the whole of the German merchant fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.
>
> This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.
>
> Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the Allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.
>
> All questions of detail, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessel, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately."

The Delegates of the Associated Governments are authorised and directed to proceed upon these instructions as to revictualling.

2. Subject to the above undertaking by Germany the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is authorised to make a communication to the German representatives. (On the basis set forth in Annexure I.)

3. An Admiral, to be nominated by the British Government, will be the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers in these negotiations.

4. In order to avoid delay, the negotiations shall take place at Brussels.

The French Government undertake to make the necessary arrangements with the Belgian Government.

Marshal Foch undertakes to make the necessary communication to the German Delegates.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 10th March, 1919.

Annexure I

Supreme Economic Council

1. On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighbouring neutrals for the balance of the month's supply, that is, of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as at least—ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.
2. She may import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1st.
3. She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:—
   (*a*) By the hire of ships.
   (*b*) By the export of commodities and the same of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.
   (*c*) By credits in neutral countries.
   (*d*) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.
   (*e*) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities or properties as collateral.
   (*f*) Further, gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be released as other means of payment provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated

Powers that the above named means of payment are inadequate.[*]

4. She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must, however, be converted into payments for foodstuffs.
5. A definite amount of the shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.
6. She may purchase and import food stuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities.
7. It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void should Germany break the terms of the armistice.

[1] See BC–40, p. 141 [*Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 8*].

[2] Gen. H. C. O. Plumer, Commander of the British Army of the Rhine.

[3] Abbreviation for Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

[4] See BC–1 (SWC–2), vol. III, p. 516.

[*] The methods of payment provided in (*d*), (*e*), (*f*), shall not be resorted to beyond the sum of $200,000,000 (in addition to the financial arrangements already agreed upon in payment of the first 270,000 tons of food), until in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council the possibilities of payment under (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) have proved inadequate). [Footnote in the original.]

March 10, 3 p.m. (BC–48)

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[16] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 10th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 10, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/55

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/55

BC–48 SWC–15

[Document 16]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 10th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 10, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing.	General Tasker H. Bliss.
Hon. E. M. House.	Admiral W. S. Benson.
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick.
Mr. A. H. Frazier.	British Empire
Mr. L. Harrison.	Rear-Admiral G. P. Hope, C. B.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
British Empire	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.	Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Secretaries	Paymaster Captain C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.	France
Mr. H. Norman.	M. Leygues.
France	M. J. Cambon.
M. Clemenceau.	Marshal Foch.
M. Pichon.	General Belin.

Secretaries	General Degoutte.
M. Dutasta.	General Weygand.
M. Berthelot.	General Duval.
M. Arnavon.	Admiral de Bon.
M. de Bearn.	Comdt. de V. Levavasseur.
ITALY	Comdt. Lacombe.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.	Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Rnggi.	ITALY
Secretaries	General Cavallero.
Count Aldrovandi.	JAPAN
M. Bertele.	Admiral Takeshita.
JAPAN	General Nara.
H. E. Baron Makino.	Colonel Nagai.
H. E. M. Matsui.	Captain Fujioka.
	Captain Yamamoto.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(1) M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Pichon had a text of a resolution on this subject propose. The following text was then read accepted:—
Representation of Power With Social Interests on the Economic and Financial Commissions

> The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considering that the Powers which have actually taken part in the war and in consequence thereof suffered damage calling for reparation should not be excluded from the financial and

economic committees, hereby declare that they cannot accept the list of delegates as put forward by the meeting of the Powers with particular interests, and with regard thereto move the following resolutions:

1) Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, Czechoslovack Republic and Serbia shall be represented by one delegate each in the financial commission.
2) Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Portugal, Roumania and Serbia shall be represented by one delegate each in the economic commission.

The other Powers with particular interests shall have a hearing at these Committees whenever questions bearing on their interests are being dealt with.

M. J. CAMBON was charged with the mission of communicating this decision to the Powers concerned.

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU said that before proceeding with this subject he would read a Declaration made by Marshal Foch. He then read the following Declaration:— Military Terms of Peace

On February 12th, the Governments entrusted a Military Committee with the task of laying down, in all liberty, the conditions of Germany's disarmament. After a particularly thorough study of the question, the Military Representatives established the draft of March 5th, which was based upon the short term of service and excluded the long term service.

On March 7th, the Governments, upon the demand of the British Government, entrusted the same representatives with the laying down of a draft based upon the long term service. The draft of March 10th is submitted as a consequence of these directions.

From the military point of view, I hold that the draft of March 5th is preferable for the considerations already explained and owing to the thorough study to which it was submitted.

> If, in spite of all, the Governments were to adopt the principle of the long term service and rally to the draft of March 10th. it is indispensable, in order to diminish the danger, which, in my opinion, exists with an army based upon a long term of service, to reduce the strength from 140,000 men provided for in the draft, to 100,000 men, this for various reasons will be explained.

The draft regulations were then read article by article. (For text see Annexure A.)

Chapter 1. Article 1 Chapter 1, Article 1 was passed.

Article 2 Article 1 was read.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that there was a discrepancy between the figure 140,000 men given in this article, and the figure recommended by Marshal Foch in his Declaration, namely 100,000.

MR. BALFOUR enquired how the original number 200,000 had been reduced to 140,000 which it now appeared Marshal Foch wished further to reduce to 100,000?

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that in the case of a short term service half of the contingents were undergoing training and were therefore regarded as ineffective, whereas, in a long term service, all the men serving were effective. Hence to obtain an equivalent of 200,000 short term men, 140,000 long service men were considered sufficient.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to raise to this.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the American Delegates agreed to the reduction.

GENERAL BLISS said that the American view was that a 25% reduction should be made on a short term Army of 200,000 to give an equivalent in long service men. The figure of 140,000 had therefore been chosen. The American Representatives were of opinion that this number should not be further diminished. It was a matter of guess work to judge what number of troops would be necessary to maintain

order in Germany, but he felt that safety could not be ensured with less than 140,000.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if the force left to Germany was to be a police force, 140,000 men represented far more than was required. In support of this, he instanced the United States of America with a population of 100,000,000 and a standing army, before the war, of 100,000 men and no constabulary. Proportionately 100,000 men were therefore more than enough to police Germany. If Germany were given a permanent army of 140,000 men, together with 15,000 sailors, a constabulary the number of which was unknown and not limited, but which probably exceeded that of the French constabulary which was 22,000 men, plus 6,300 Forest Guards, plus 23,000 *douaniers*, Germany would have a trained force of not less than 206,000. This would not constitute an aggressive force able to mobilise at once. If all Germany required was a police force, this was far too much, and 100,000 men would be ample. If the recommendations before the Council were adopted, the Allies would have to maintain 206,000 trained men against Germany. Even if this burden were distributed amongst four Powers, each would have to keep in readiness over 50,000 fully trained men.

MR. LANSING said that in reference to Marshal Foch's figures of forces in the United States before the war, he wished to make a few remarks. Before this war, the United States of America were perhaps the least military nation on earth. They had a population of about 100,000,000, that is to say some 20,000,000 more than Germany. The regular army had numbered 100,000 men, the National Guards contained 125,000 more or less trained men who had shown their value on the Mexican frontier. In addition to this there were thousands of men in the State Constabulary and tens of thousands in the police, all trained in the use of firearms, and suitable for incorporation. There were therefore available in times of Peace, 300,000 to 350,000 trained men. With this term of comparison, he did not think the allotment made to Germany over, great, especially if the very difficult task of the German Government be taken into account. The various States composing the German Federation had not the same spirit of cohesion as existed amongst the States of America.

MARSHAL FOCH said that according to Mr. Lansing's figures there were in the United States some 225,000 trained men before the war. He had added to this, however, the police in the various states. These had not been taken into account in considering the force of Germany. If Town and Municipal police were added to his estimate of Germany's armed forces, the proportion would be about the same.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the figure of 140,000 were maintained for the regular army, in effect Germany would have 200,000 trained men. If the army were reduced to 100,000 she would still have 160,000 trained men, and this figure exceeded that considered by General Bliss as necessary to maintain order in Germany. Marshal Foch had suggested that there [were?] four Powers ready to share the burden of opposing an equivalent force to this German army. He was not sure that he could prejudge the future so confidently. The British and American troops were reasonably anxious to go home. Should they do so the whole burden would be on France. He felt it was therefore his duty to say with the greatest emphasis that to lighten France's burden Marshal Foch's figure ought to be adopted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had been much impressed by the last argument. He was bound to admit that in all probability the occupation of any points it might be decided was necessary for the safety of France would ultimately be a burden on France alone. France was therefore entitled to a decisive voice in the matter. It was inevitable that this interest should affect France more closely than Great Britain, and Great Britain more closely than America. Twice in living memory invasion of French soil had come from the same quarter. France was therefore entitled to consider her fears. Germany would have no good cause for complaint. Twice she had misused her military machine, and on this occasion its misuse had led to the death of 20,000,000 young men. Consequent famine and disorder would doubtless do to death as many more. The Associated Powers were therefore entitled to say that they would not allow Germany the use of a machine that could again be the cause of similar disaster. As between the figures of 100,000 and 140,000 he had no very clear predilection, but he did not feel that he could resist the Military Advisers of France, unprotected by the sea as England and America were, and with only the Rhine as a defence. He agreed there was force in what Mr. Lansing and General Bliss had said. Great Britain had a

very small army, although it exceeded 100,000; but it had to ensure the security of a large and scattered Empire including India and Africa. There was also Ireland. Germany had no Empire, and as far as he knew, no Ireland. Should Bavaria represent the Irish problem of Germany it was not the business of the Allied Powers to arm Germany against her.

In conclusion, if France felt strongly about this question, he did not think that the British or American Delegates had a right to withstand her views.

MR. LANSING said that he was very much impressed by the words of M. Clemenceau and also by those of Mr. Lloyd George, with whom he was glad to agree.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had nothing to add to the arguments used, but the conclusion to which they led was one which the Conference must take into account. The army of Germany was to be reduced to a police force, and that a small one. In that case Germany must be secured against invasion. There was no plan at present before the Conference for general disarmament. If the Germans were told that they were to have only 100,000 armed men, while France, Poland or Bohemia could have as many as they wished, they would say that the Allied Powers were leaving them at the mercy even of their small neighbours. What form the guarantee of non-invasion should take he was not prepared to suggest, but some such guarantee would have to be found if the Conference made Germany powerless for attack and weak for defence.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question raised by Mr. Balfour was a very important one, but its solution lay with the League of Nations, one of whose functions was to prevent sudden aggression by any of its members.

MR. BALFOUR said that if this was the solution, it should be communicated to Germany.

MR. HOUSE said that General Bliss suggested that the powers should guarantee the neutrality of Germany as she had guaranteed that of Belgium.

(Article 2 was accepted with the reduction, of the figure 140,000 to 100,000).

Article 3 Article 3 was carried with the proviso that a proportional reduction of numbers be made.

Article 4 Article 4 was carried with the same proviso.

Article 5 The same proviso was made.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that with reference to this article, he wished to enquire why an Army Staff was maintained at all. A police force would not require one. France had not had one before the war. The only purpose of an Army Staff could be the study and preparation of war. He, therefore proposed that Army Corps Staffs should be maintained, and that the Army Staff should be suppressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Great Britain had had a small Army but nevertheless it had a general staff.

BARON SONNINO said that the Army Staff in Germany in the future might be engaged on the study of the defence of Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had to prepare her defence and yet had none.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the Army Staff should be suppressed, but also pointed out that Article 7 endowed Germany with a War Office staff of 300 officers which was amply sufficient for the organization of their army.

(It was agreed that the words “and one army staff” be suppressed.)

Article 6 Article 6 was accepted with the excision of the words “Army or . .”

Article 7 MARSHAL FOCH suggested an addition forbidding manoeuvres carried out by Staffs or by troops representing larger formations than regiments.

(It was decided, after some discussion, that the difficulty of ensuring the execution of such a prohibition, and the undesirability of continual interference in the internal affairs of Germany on matters of detail, were considerations outweighing the advantages of the amendment.)

Article 7 was then accepted.

Article 8 Article 8 was accepted.

Article 9 Article 9 was accepted, with the addition of the words: “of the signing of this Convention”.

Chapter II The first seven Articles of Chapter II were accepted without amendment.

Article 8 MR. BALFOUR said he wished to ask two questions in relation to this Article. He was not aware that it had been explained why a different policy was advocated in relation to fortifications on the Southern and Eastern as opposed to the Western frontiers of Germany. Further, he was informed by Admiral Hope that the number of rounds allotted to each gun had in the naval proposals been reduced to half the figures proposed in this Article. Was it not desirable to obtain uniformity?

GENERAL DEGOUTTE, regarding the fortification of frontiers, said that the Germans had two fortresses on their Southern frontier at Ulm and Ingolstadt. Both of these were more than 50 kilometres from the frontier. There was therefore no case for disarming them. It had been thought undesirable to mention the dismantling of any fortresses on the Eastern frontier, as it was possible that they might be in Polish hands. There were also two small fortresses in the Mazurian region. It was thought undesirable to demand their destruction, though they would doubtless remain German, because they might serve as a protection against Bolshevism.

MARSHAL FOCH, in relation to the ammunition allotted to the guns, agreed to the halving of the allotment proposed.

With this amendment, Article 8 was accepted.

Article 9 M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask for the suppression of this Article, as the Governments had not yet decided on the fate of the area in question. He thought it would be of no use to ask the Germans to agree to any terms regarding it before its final allotment. They would have to sign another document concerning territorial adjustments. After this, the provisions contained in this Article might, if necessary, be revised.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the question might be reserved.

MR. LANSING proposed that the Article be struck out, and put in later if necessary.

(Article 9 was accordingly struck out, subject to reconsideration at a later date, if necessary.)

Article 10 Article 10 was accepted.

Article 11 Article 11 was accepted.

Article 12 Article 12, with the addition at the end of each clause of the words: “of the signing of the present convention”, was accepted.

Chapter III. Article 1 After some discussion, it was agreed to substitute the formula “all compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany”.

Article 2 Article 2 was accepted, with the addition at the end of the last clause of the words “of the signing of this Convention”.

Article 3 MR. BALFOUR pointed out that though the first two Articles of this chapter fitted the heading of the Chapter itself, this and the subsequent Articles bore hardly any relation to it. He himself would have thought it unnecessary to put this kind of regulation into the Treaty at all. If, in military opinion, it were necessary to do so, it would be better to put them under another heading. This led him to think that the whole document should be referred to the Drafting Committee of the Conference for re-adjustment and reduction to reasonable proportions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that provided the substance were not altered, he agreed to the re-casting of the document by the Drafting Committee.

M. SONNINO drew attention to the last words of the Article: “or in any other form”. Earlier in the Meeting, Marshal Foch had said that constabulary was a military force. Was it or was it not included in the scope of this Article?

MARSHAL FOCH admitted that it was not, and again expressed his willingness to refer the document to a Drafting Committee, provided soldiers were attached to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to Article 8 of this chapter, which apparently differentiated gendarmes, customs house officials, forest and coast guards from troops. It was therefore undesirable in Article 3 to mention them as an exception, as this would assimilate them to military forces.

MR. LANSING said that in view of the strong claim made by Marshal Foch on the basis that these people were soldiers, and should be counted as trained men, Article 8 should be entirely omitted, and that their instruction should be permitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether gendarmes were soldiers.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative, adding that they were soldiers subjected to a special régime. They could not be governed by the same rules as were laid down for the standing army. The Conference was concerned with the latter only. Germany must be left freedom to enlist the number of constabulary she required.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the addition at the end of this Article of the clause: “This does not affect the police forces mentioned in Article 8”.

(With this addition, the Article was accepted.)

Article 4 Article 4 was accepted.

Article 5 MARSHAL FOCH proposed the addition that there should be no military census or classification of horses for army purposes. Such a census was a necessary preliminary of mobilisation.

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether it was wise to enter into details of this kind. If the Germans wished to know their resources, they could call their horse census agricultural and not military. They would obtain the same results. It would be quite sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers could compel Germany to keep an army of no more than 100,000 men. If this result could be achieved, it would be amply sufficient, and it was a pity to cumber a treaty with details, many of which might be obsolete in ten years.

MR. HOUSE added that aggravating minutiae of this kind would be a temptation to the Germans to evade them, and this would ultimately bring the treaty as a whole into contempt.

Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 M. CLEMENCEAU said that as both Great Britain and America were opposed to any alteration, the Article would be accepted as it stood. Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 were accepted without amendment.

Chapter IV. Article 1 MR. BALFOUR said that according to a telegram just shown to him by Admiral Hope, the British Admiralty thought it necessary to qualify the establishment of the Commission at the seat of the Central German Government by the proviso "if found convenient". He himself thought that perhaps the whole paragraph might with advantage be omitted.

GENERAL BLISS said that the reasons which had led to the insertion of this paragraph were that the German Government, unless this was stated, might put obstacles in the way of the establishment of the Commission in Berlin, and thereby make it very difficult for the Commission to gain access to the records of the personnel of the administration.

M. SONNINO proposed that the paragraph should read: "This Commission shall be entitled to establish itself in, and to send sub-Commissions or delegates to, any part of German territory".

(This was agreed to, and Article 1, with this amendment, was accepted.)

Article 2 MR. BALFOUR pointed out that it was undesirable to introduce the clause, "especially from the point of view of military and financial measures". This suggested to the Germans that they need not concern themselves with other considerations.

(These words were struck out, and, with this amendment, Article 2 was accepted.)

Article 3 Article 3 was accepted.

Chapter 5. Article 1(a) M. CLEMENCEAU suggested the substitution of the words "this Convention" for the words "the Treaty of Peace."

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING observed that the last words of paragraph (*a*) raised the question of the possible subdivision of Germany into several States. Should this take place, what part of the present German territory would be, for the purposes of the Treaty, Germany?

(It was decided, after some discussion, to omit the words "or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.")

With the amendments mentioned, paragraph (*a*) was accepted.

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether there was any advantage in retaining this paragraph.

(b) (It was agreed to suppress paragraph (*b*).)

(c) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that though a partisan of the League of Nations, he was not sure that it would be in a position to do what was required of it in this paragraph. The Commission established under Chapter 4 would fulfill its duties in a relatively short time. The League of Nations might not agree to execute the Articles of the Convention. We, therefore, had provision for the supervision of Germany during a few months and no certain means of continuing it for 10, 20 or 30 years. The League of Nations was not a body of police to enforce the

execution of a treaty. He thought the supervision should be organised and maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It was decided that Clause (*c*) should read as follows:

> "The execution of these clauses shall be supervised by such means and by such organs as the Associated Powers may decide to employ or to create.")

MR. LANSING said that, on behalf of the United States, he wished to reserve his assent to Chapter 5 until the final draft came before the meeting.

(a) Reference of Whole Convention to Drafting Committee (It was agreed that the whole Convention, as amended, should be referred to the Drafting Committee of the Conference, assisted by General Weygand, General Sir Henry Wilson, General Bliss and General Cavallero.)

MARSHAL FOCH suggested that the Aviation clauses should be combined with the Military clauses in the same document, and, if possible, the Naval clauses also. If this were to be done, the Committee could not furnish its final draft in one day. He also pointed out that the Air clauses had not been examined, though they contained important questions of principle.

GENERAL DUVAL remarked that all the experts had agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, for his part, he would assent to them.

MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether the Naval terms were ready.

M. LEYGUES said that they were ready, excepting those relating to the Kiel Canal and submarine cables. Both these questions had been referred to Commissions.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Leygues to prevail on these Commissions to hasten their reports.

(It was decided that the Drafting Committee of the Conference should furnish the Council on Wednesday with a complete re-draft of the

Convention, containing all the Military, Aerial and Naval Terms of a Preliminary Peace with Germany.)

MARSHAL FOCH said that General Degoutte and General Cavallero wished to be heard.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE said that he was not in favour of a long term army for Germany. He thought that dangers of this army system had not been considered.

(b) Dissent of French and Italian Military Experts M. CLEMENCEAU observed that General Degoutte should have expressed his opinion while the Council was discussing Article 1 of the first chapter of the Convention. The matter was then decided and the discussion could not be re-opened.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had understood that the Council was examining a plan made by the military experts by order on certain assumptions which had been furnished to them. They had not, therefore, thought it right to make any comment on the principles the Council had chosen to impose.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that he wished to express the same view as General Degoutte and Weygand. He had thought the Council meant to choose between two systems. His instructions were, as Italian military adviser, to state that the system of long term voluntary service was inacceptable.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as Chairman of the Council, he could not take cognisance of the views of the military advisers of the Italian Government, but only of the vote of the Italian Delegation. The only satisfaction he could give to the Generals was that their protest would be recorded in the Minutes.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 11th March, 1919.

(When the Military and Naval Advisers had withdrawn, a Conversation was held in M. Pichon's Room.)

Agenda for Future Conversations M. PICHON said that he had received a very important document from M. Benes, relating to a German conspiracy against Czecho-Slovakia. He suggested that the Council should consider this on the following day.

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided that the Military and Naval Convention should be discussed on Wednesday, and that the eastern and northern frontiers of Germany should be discussed on Thursday. At Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion, it was decided that the discussion of Germany's eastern and northern frontiers should be begun on Tuesday, after disposing of M. Benes' note. It was further decided that Germany's western frontier should be discussed on Friday.

Appendix "A"

Draft Regulations Concerning a Definite Military Status of Germany

CHAPTER 1.—LIMITATION OF EFFECTIVES

Article 1.

The German Military Forces will be demobilised within the period mentioned in Article 9, and to the extent required in Articles 2 and 3.

Article 2.

The total effectives of the Land Army of all the States both present and future, constituting Germany, fixed so that Germany can ensure order and police control within her territory, shall not exceed 140,000 men, including officers.

Article 3.

The total effectives of Officers shall not exceed 6,000 including all staffs however constituted.

Article 4.

Germany is permitted to commence forthwith, recruiting on a voluntary basis of 12 years colour service for Non-Commissioned Officers and men, of an army which shall not exceed the establishment of

11 Infantry Divisions
3 Cavalry Divisions.

Article 5.

These divisions may be formed with not more than 4 Army Corps Staffs and 1 Army Staff.

The formation of forces differently grouped and of other organisations of command is forbidden.

Article 6.

The composition of the divisions and that of Army or Army Corps Staffs is given in Table No. 1.

The number of small units of infantry, artillery and engineers, and of technical services and troops, provided for the divisions, as well as the effectives allowed for these small units, technical services of troops, must not be exceeded:

Article 7.

As the German Army can have no other duty than the maintenance of internal order, and, in case of necessity, the police control of the frontiers, the High Command of the Army is confined to functions of an administrative character. The Staff of Officers of the Ministries of War of all the German States and of the Administrations directly attached to them, shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2, and shall not exceed 300 officers.

No organisation shall exist intended to prepare troops for employment in any warlike operations, and in particular, the German Great General Staff or similar formation shall be dissolved and cannot be reconstituted in any other form.

Article 8.

Only the number of military schools strictly indispensable to the recruitment of the officers of the units to be maintained shall continue to exist.

In consequence, the War academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, officer-students, cadets, non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officer students, shall be suppressed; the only schools authorised shall be those intended for the recruitment of the officers of each arm in the proportion of one school for each arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the lectures in these schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled up in the cadres of officers, students and cadres being included in the effectives mentioned in Article 1.

Article 9.

All the measures prescribed in the present chapter must be carried out within two months at the most.

Chapter 2.—Limitation of Armaments

Article 1.

The units forming the German Army shall have an armament the total amount of which shall not exceed that stated in Table No. 2.

Article 2.

The German Army may have besides, at its disposal, to provide for eventual replacements, an amount of material equal to l/25th part for small arms and to l/50th part for guns of the quantity provided for in the preceding Article.

Article 3.

The German Army may have at its disposal stocks of munitions the amount of which shall not exceed that fixed by Table No. 3.

Article 4.

These stocks of munitions shall be stored at points fixed by the German Government of which it shall inform the Allied and Associated Powers.

Apart from these depots it shall be forbidden to form stocks, depots or reserves of munitions.

Article 5.

Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.

Article 6.

The manufacture of armoured cars, tanks, or of any similar machines which can be used for military objects is forbidden.

Article 7.

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall be permitted only in a very limited number of factories, the exact names of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers with a statement of the amount of material ordered.

No other establishment having for its object the design, preparation, manufacture or storage of munitions or any war material whatever shall exist.

In particular, the arsenals shall be suppressed, unless they are used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions. The personnel of the suppressed arsenals shall be dismissed.

Article 8.

(*a*) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts, which are situated in German territory West of a line traced 50 kilometres East of the Rhine, shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

(*b*) The *status quo* is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

(*c*) The armament of the fortified works, fortresses and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain shall never exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those existing at the date of the signature of the present convention, which number and calibres shall at once be communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be maintained at the following uniform rates: 3,000 rounds apiece) for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm. and under: 1,000 rounds apiece for those of higher calibre.

Article 9.

All territory on the left bank of the Rhine which may remain as part of Germany after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace will be "demilitarized". That is to say, the inhabitants of this territory will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organization either on a voluntary or compulsory basis, and no fortifications, depots, establishments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within the area. Nor will this territory be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in money or in material of any description towards the armies of Germany.

Article 10.

All German arms, munitions and war material, including all antiaircraft guns, ammunition and projectors, etc., existing in Germany, including those mentioned in Articles 5, 6 and 7, in excess of the quantities allowed by the present regulations shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers at points to be fixed in German territory, with a view to their being destroyed or rendered useless.

The same shall be done in the case of special machinery intended for the manufacture of war material in excess of that recognised as necessary for the manufacture authorised.

War material of all sorts, even if not in working order, of origin other than German, shall be sequestrated; the Allied and Associated Powers shall decide as to its disposal.

Article 11.

Germany is forbidden to manufacture war material, including aircraft and engines, equipment and armament for aircraft for other countries.

The German State or States or German private individuals shall not receive by purchase, exchange or cession of any sort war material coming from abroad.

Article 12.

The measures prescribed by Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 of the present chapter shall be carried out within one month.

The measures prescribed by Articles 7 and 8 of the present chapter shall be carried out within 3 months.

CHAPTER 3.—LIMITING CLAUSES CONCERNING GERMAN MILITARY LAWS

Article 1.

The Universal Service Law shall be removed from the Statute Book of the German Constitution.

Article 2.

Clauses of the following Articles shall form an integral part of the German Military Laws.

These laws moreover shall not include any provision in contradiction of the clauses contained in the different chapters of the regulations. They shall on the contrary prescribe the abrogation of all previous

legislative, financial or administrative measures which may be in contradiction with these clauses.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and promulgated within three months.

Article 3.

All non-commissioned officers and privates shall be voluntarily enlisted for 12 years continuous service only. Within this time they may not leave the Army except under the conditions laid down for officers in Article 4.

Beyond this number of voluntarily enlisted men, no military force shall be raised in Germany either in the form of a militia or in any other form.

Article 4.

Officers who have previously belonged to any military formations and who are not included in the units, the maintenance of which is authorised, shall not participate in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and shall not be liable to any military obligation.

Officers kept in the Army shall serve at least till the age of 45 years.

Officers newly commissioned shall sign an engagement to serve on the active list for at least 25 years.

No officer shall leave the army without being pronounced unfit on grounds of health. If by an exception, he is authorised to do so, his place shall not be filled before he has reached the age of 45 years or the period of service of 25 years provided for is ended.

The proportion of officers thus pronounced unfit on grounds of health shall not exceed in any one year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in Article 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 5.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for.

In no case shall troops, services, or staffs include supplementary cadres.

Article 6.

The following units may have a depot of their own:

A regiment of Infantry,
A regiment of Cavalry,
A regiment of Field Artillery,
A brigade of Horse Artillery,
A battalion of Pioneers.

The effectives of the depots of the German Army are included in the total figure given in Article 1 of Chapter 1.

Article 7.

The administrative services the staff of which are neither officers, non-commissioned officers or men, shall have their effectives reduced for each category, to the fifth part of those provided for in the Budget of 1913. They are not included in the effectives indicated in Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 8

Public servants such as Gendarmes, Customs House Officials, Forest and Coast Guards, and local and Municipal Police Officials, shall never be assembled to take part in any military training.

Article 9

Societies of retired soldiers, rifle, sporting or touring clubs and, in general, associations whether incorporated or not, whatever may be the age of their members, shall not concern themselves in any military question. They shall, in particular, be forbidden to instruct or exercise, or to allow to be instructed or exercised, their members in the vocation of war or use of weapons of war. The same rule applies to Schools or Universities not provided for in Article 7 of Chapter 1.

These Societies, Associations or Schools shall have no connection with the Minister of War or any other Military Authority. They shall have no military instructors.

Chapter 4.—Supervision

Article 1.

The provisions of all Articles of Chapter 1 and of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 of Chapter 2, will be carried out under the supervision of a special Commission, delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers. That Commission will work until the provisions of the Articles mentioned above are carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if, for any reason, anyone of these provisions be not carried out within the allotted period, the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring those facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments, who will give them new instructions.

This Commission shall be established at the seat of the Central German Government, but will be able to send Sub-Commissions or delegates to any other parts of German territory.

Article 2.

The German Government undertakes to facilitate so far as possible the exercise of this supervision, especially from the point of view of military and financial measures, and to communicate to the Commission in its entirety the War Budget.

It undertakes also to communicate to the said Commission all orders given by it for the carrying out of the provisions of the present regulations and to furnish, moreover on questions which may be put to it, all information which may be asked.

Article 3.

The destruction and putting out of action provided for in Chapter 2 will be carried out by orders of the German authorities under the supervision of the delegates of the said Commission.

Chapter 5

Article 1.

(*a*) All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.
(*b*) Germany undertakes to respect all the Clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed this Convention with her.
(*c*) The execution of these Clauses may continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as a League of Nations may see fit to employ or to create.

Table No. 1

State and Establishment of the Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

1. ARMY CORPS STAFFS

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Men
Army Headquarters	1	85	400
Army Corps Headquarters	4	60	500
Total for Staffs		325	2,400

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Constituent Unit	Max. No. of such units in a single division	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Men
H. Q. of an Infantry Div	1	25	70
H. Q. of Divisional Infantry	1	4	30
H. Q. of Divisional Artillery	1	4	30
Regiment of Infantry	3	70	2,300
Each Regiment comprises:—			
3 battalions of Infantry.			
Each battalion comprises:—			
3 companies of infantry and 1 machine gun company.			
Trench Mortar Company	3	6	156
Divisional Squadron	1	6	150
Field Artillery Regiment	1	85	1,300
Each regiment comprises:—			
3 groups of artillery.			
Each Group comprises:—			
3 Batteries.			
Pioneer Battalion	1	12	400
This Battn. comprises:—			
2 companies of pioneers.			
1 Pontoon detachment.			
1 searchlight section.			
Signal Detachment	1	12	300
This detach. comprises:—			
1 telephone detachment.			
1 listening section.			
1 carrier pigeon section.			
Divisional Medical Service	1	20	400
Parks and Convoys		14	800

Total for Infantry Division		410	10,830

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAVALRY DIVISION

Headquarters of a Cavalry Division	1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment	6	40	800
Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.			
Horse Artillery Group (3 Batteries)	1	20	400
Total for Cavalry Division		275	5,250

Table No. 2

Tabular Statement of Armament Establishment for a Maximum of 11 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions and 4 Army Corps Staffs

	Infantry Division	For 11 Infantry Divisions	Cavalry Division	For 3 Cavalry Divisions	4 Army Corps Staffs	Total of columns 2, 4 and 5
Material	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rifles	12,000	132,000			This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.	132,000
Carbines			6,000	18,000		18,000
Heavy machine guns.	108	1,188	12	36		1,224
Light machine guns.	162	1,782				1, 782
Medium trench mortars.	9	99				99
Light trench mortars.	27	297				297
77 mm. guns	24	264	12	36		300

105 mm. Howitzers.	12	132				132

Table No. 3

Maximum Stocks Authorised

Maximum number of arms authorised			Establishment per unit		Maximum totals
Rifles		132,000	400 rounds		52,800,000
Carbines		18,000			
Heavy Machine-guns		1,224	8,000 rounds		24,048,000
Light	”	” 1,782			
Medium Trench Mortars		99		400 rounds	39,600
Light Trench Mortars		297		8,000 rounds	237,600
Field Artillery		77 mm. Guns 300		1,000 rounds	300,000
		105 mm. Howitzers 132		800 rounds	105,600

March 11, 3 p.m. (BC–49)

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[17] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 11th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/56

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/56

BC–49

[Document 17]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 11th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 11, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
General Tasker H. Bliss.
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY

ALSO PRESENT

FRANCE
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

ITALY
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.

H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof P. J. Mantoux.

(1) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a telegram, dated the 10th March, 1919, from General Nudant, the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, transmitting two verbal communications, which he had received from the German Minister Von Haniel. The first message read as follows:— Preliminary Peace Terms

> "If, as stated by the press, the approaching discussions are intended to take the character of preliminaries of Peace and to prescribe, for instance, the Military and Naval terms of Peace, Wako[1] will not be qualified to deal with them. That would have to be done by a Commission presided by Brockdorff-Rantzau. You are requested, therefore, to give sufficient notice in order that the competent Commission may arrange to come to the meeting place."

MR. BALFOUR said that apparently all Minister Von Haniel asked for was that due notice should be given in order that the German Government might be able to send a duly accredited Commission. He thought that was a reasonable request.

(It was agreed that when the time came for presenting the preliminaries of Peace to Germany, due notice thereof would be given, as requested.)

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that the second part of the message received from General Nudant read as follows:—

> Poland (a) Proposed Transport of Troops via Danzig "General Hammerstein[2] has handed in a written statement giving reasons in support of Germany's demand that no troops should be landed at Dantzig. The statement may be summed up as follows: The passage by rail of Polish troops across a region thickly populated by Poles in order to reach Warsaw would positively lead to risings and troubles in Eastern Prussia, at the rear of the German troops, who are now facing the Bolsheviks between the Sea and the Polish front."

MARSHAL FOCH explained that a resolution had been passed by the Conference on the 25th February last,[3] calling on M. Noulens as President of the Allied Commission in Poland to enquire whether the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig, and their transport by rail to Poland, would be guaranteed by the German Government, without the necessity of securing this guarantee by a previous occupation by Allied Contingents of Dantzig and of the railways.

General Barthelemy and General Carton de Wiart, the French and British representatives on the Allied Polish Commission had arrived in Paris yesterday. General Wiart had informed him that he had assisted at a meeting held at Kreutz on the 6th March last, when Mr. Noulens had handed to the Germans the resolution of the Conference above quoted. The German representatives had said that they would refer the matter to their Government; but so far no formal reply had been received. Meanwhile, General Hammerstein at

Spa had been putting every possible obstacle in the way to prevent the Allies' request being granted.

(b) Appointment of General Henrys as Chief of Staff to the President of the Polish Republic MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had spoken to General Wiart the previous evening, and the account he had given of Poland made him believe that the Allies ought to attend to the affairs of poland as soon as possible. The Poles had no idea of organisation; they had no capacity to direct on govern. The Premier was a pianist; the President, an idealist without any practical ideas. The generals of the army were all acting independently; they had no notion of training the 500,000 troops they were raising or of co-ordinating the various units constituting the army. Taking these facts into consideration, General Wiart held the view that a French General of position should immediately be sent to take command of the whole of the Polish forces. He felt confident the Polish Government would willingly accept some such arrangement, on the understanding that the President of the Republic would continue to be the nominal head of the army with the French General as his Chief of Staff: the latter, however, being granted full powers of action. General Wiart was very insistent that someone should be sent at once, but he thought that the officer selected should be a general, whose name was widely known and respected. He suggested, for instance, someone like General Gouraud.

MARSHAL FOCH said that in his opinion all that General Wiart had said was very exact. He quite agreed with him that the Poles really had no army organisation of any kind, except perhaps at Posen, where German methods were still being followed.

In Galicia the Austrians were in command of the Polish forces, but (and that was typical of the Austrians) they were on bad terms with the civilian population and had only introduced disorder into the army. At Warsaw, there was no organisation of any kind. Consequently, he thoroughly agreed that a French General should forthwith be sent to Poland to put into execution without further delay the scheme for the reorganisation of the Army, which had already been accepted in principle by the Polish Government.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Polish Government should forthwith be asked to accept General Henrys, as Military Adviser and Chief of the Staff to the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Republic, to organise the Polish forces in Poland.)

(3) Reported German Intrigues in Czecho-Slovakia M. CLEMENCEAU next called attention to a letter sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovakian Republic, dated Paris, 8th March, 1919, addressed to himself, which had been circulated.

(For full text of letter, see Annexure "A".)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the letter in question contained various references to intercepted documents. In his opinion, everything seemed to depend on those documents, and it would be impossible for the Conference to arrive at any decision without seeing those papers.

M. PICHON explained that his reason for bringing the matter at once to the notice of the Conference had been that Dr. Benes' letter contained the following sentence, namely: "The Prague Government begs me to lay these facts before the Inter-Allied War Council, with the request that the situation may receive consideration and the necessary measures be taken immediately." Furthermore, Dr. Benes also wrote: "The Czecho-Slovakian Government accordingly begs the Allied and Associated Governments to address an energetic protest to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest requiring them at once to cease all hostile action towards the Czecho-Slovak Republic either of a military nature or from the point of view of propaganda." He (M. Pichon) had therefore thought that the Conference would desire to address some communication to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest pending the receipt of the relevant documents.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that no decision would be reached on that date: that would look like pre-judging the case. In his opinion, there was another side of the question. The situation was not the same as that which existed in Germany. In Austria-Hungary there were various nationalities; all had fought against us, and some had

suddenly become our Allies. These various nationalities were all now scrambling for territory. He had heard, for instance, that both the Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovaks were claiming territories which contained 40 per cent of Magyars. In his opinion, the Allies were here to do justice to all those peoples. He would circulate a letter which the Archduke Joseph had addressed from Budapest to H. M. the King of Great Britain, in which he exposed the tactics of the Czecho-Slovaks, and pleaded for justice. He thought great care should be taken to show complete fairness to all parties. The new map of Europe must not be so drawn as to leave cause for disputations which would eventually drag Europe into a new war.

M. PICHON said that if Mr. Lloyd George thought that no action should be taken on that day, he would not insist. He would, however, have been more ready to accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, had the complaint made by the Czecho-Slovaks related merely to the action of the Austrians or Hungarians. But the plots mentioned by Dr. Benes had actually been started by Germans, whose names were given, including the well-known Baron Lancken, the notorious German Consul, Baron Gobsattel, as well as Dr. Schwarz, an agent of the Berlin Foreign Office. Dr. Benes affirmed that papers had been seized proving that an agreement had been entered into between the authorities of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, to cause risings and strikes and civil war in Bohemia. Mr. Lloyd George had proposed that no action should be taken until the promised documents had been received, and he (M. Pichon) agreed. Obviously, it would be necessary to await the receipt of those documents before any decision could be reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the claims put forward by Dr. Benes in his document, where he stated: "That the Hungarian Republic be ordered to give every satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the nature and method of such satisfaction being determined by the latter."

MR. LANSING agreed that Dr. Benes made exactly the same request that Austria had made to Serbia in 1914.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that he thought that the demand made by the Czecho-Slovaks was monstrous; the Italians had not dreamt of putting forward such a request when the Laibach incident had recently been considered.

M. PICHON thought that a reply should immediately be sent to Dr. Benes, informing him that the Conference had taken his letter into consideration, and had decided to take no action pending the receipt of the promised documents.

MR. LANSING agreed to the general plan of postponing the further consideration of the question. He thought, however, that in addition the Allied Commission in Teschen should be called upon to investigate the matter *in situ* in order that an independent view might be obtained, which would be of the greatest value.

He also wished to draw attention to the fact that though apparently the Berlin Government was wholly to blame for the intrigues in question, the Czecho-Slovaks merely asked for action to be taken against the Vienna and Budapest Governments. Furthermore, he thought the Czecho-Slovak Government had displayed considerable laxity; firstly, in permitting a courier to pass between Berlin and Prague and, secondly, in allowing a German official to reside at Prague.

M. PICHON pointed out that the official in Prague was there in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Czecho-Slovaks to supply German-Austria and the Magyars of Hungary with coal and other raw materials.

M. SONNINO enquired whether the intercepted documents referred to in Dr. Benes' letter had already been posted to M. Clemenceau.

M. PICHON, in reply, read the last paragraph of Dr. Benes' letter, namely:

> "I am at present preparing a detailed report on these events, which will be addressed to all the Allied and Associated Governments. This report will contain all the documents to

> which I have alluded in the present memorandum. I shall also venture to submit a copy of the said report with the documents in question, to the Supreme War Council, but before this can be done, I am taking immediate steps to inform the Council of the matter, in order that it may be aware of the facts, in the event of the Czecho-Slovak Government being obliged to take energetic measures in consequence of the Austro-Hungarian conspiracy."

MR. BALFOUR said that before leaving this subject, he would like to ask Marshal Foch a question. The documents under consideration dealt with two kinds of attack on the Czecho-Slovaks: attack through propaganda and strikes, and a military attack by German-Austrian and Hungarian troops. The Czecho-Slovaks appeared to be exceedingly apprehensive in regard to the threatened military attack. He, himself, would be surprised to learn that either the German-Austrians or the Hungarians were in a condition to make a military attack on the Czecho-Slovaks, and he would be glad to have some explanation on that point from Marshal Foch, either immediately or later on, when the whole question would again come up for discussion.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that as far as his information went, he had been led to believe that the means of attack of Hungary and German-Austria were not very great, as against the Czecho-Slovaks. He would, however, look into the matter further before giving a final verdict, as he knew an attempt was being made to reconstitute two or three Hungarian divisions on the Bohemian front.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that the continuance of the bureaucracy in Berlin was at the bottom of all the trouble; he referred to the continued employment of the same people and the same personnel that had been made use of by the old régime, together with the same methods of intrigue and espionage. He thought that the Allied and Associated Governments should suggest in some way or another to the German Government that their house must be cleaned, and that the men who had hitherto been responsible for all the trouble must be got rid of.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and suggested that a hint to that effect might be dropped by one of the members of the Food Supply Commission, for instance, by Mr. Hoover.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that Germany only possessed one type of personnel—Scheidemann, Rantzau, and the rest, all belonged to the old gang, and it would be impossible to get rid of them.

(It was agreed that:—

(1) The Governments of the United States of American, Great Britain, France and Italy, shall instruct the Commission at Teschen to proceed forthwith to Prague, in order to investigate the facts of the conspiracy of enemy States reported to the Allied and Associated Powers by the Czecho-Slovak Government, to furnish a report, and to make arrangements [*recommendations?*] as to the action to be taken.

(2) The communication addressed to [*by*] the Minister of Foreign Affairs to [*of*] the Czecho-Slovak Republic to the Prime Minister and Minister of War, Paris, on 8th March,[4] shall be communicated by M. Pichon on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Commission at Teschen.

(3) M. Pichon shall inform M. Benes that further consideration of the question is postponed, pending the receipt of the documents referred to in his report of March 8th.)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU asked permission to read the following letter, dated the 6th March, 1919, which he had received from M. Pachitch: —

> Request of Serb-Coast-Slovene Delegation to be Present When Boundaries Between Italy and the S. C. S. Kingdom Discussed
> "Mr. President,
>
> At the meeting of the Supreme Allied Council held on February 18th,[5] we had the honour to state that in our opinion

we ought to be placed in the same situation and have the same opportunities as the Royal Italian Government for examining and discussing the problem of our frontiers. This statement was inspired by the desire to fix our future common frontiers on a basis of equilibrium and in such manner as to ensure neighbourly relations between the two countries of a loyal and friendly character. There was a further and more general reason for making that statement, namely, that our Government could only assume responsibility for solutions to which it had given its consent after an exchange of suitable explanations.

The degree to which we have been animated by a desire to reach an amicable settlement, such as will leave in the future no trace of misunderstanding between the two Governments, has we think been proved by our offer to submit the settlement of this problem to an arbitration by President Wilson which would be sanctioned by the Peace Conference itself.

In view of the assertion coming from different quarters and diffused by authorised organs of the Press, to the effect that the Council of Ten has accepted the point of view of the Italian Delegation, namely, that the delimitation of these frontiers should be examined and determined simultaneously with that of the frontiers between France and Germany and in accordance with the same procedure, that is to say in the Supreme Allied Council,—we consider it to be our duty to bring to the notice of that exalted Council the essential difference between those two problems, a difference which is derived from the fact that the Rhine frontier is to be fixed as between enemy States, whereas that on the Adriatic must be fixed between two Governments whose peoples have been friends in the past, who desire to remain friends in the future and, what is even more important, between two countries which have fought for the selfsame cause of right and justice and have substantially contributed, in proportion to their strength and their resources, to the common victory.

We are indeed unable to imagine how a problem which touches so nearly the most vital interests of our country could be examined in a practical manner and settled equitably unless we have an opportunity of discussing it with our partners before the Council, nor how the Conference itself can sanction an arrangement which would be lacking in an essential element of validity, namely the participation of one of the interested parties.

For the foregoing reasons we take the liberty of writing to you, Mr. President, and of requesting your Excellency to be so good as to communicate this request to the Supreme Allied Council with a view to our admission to its deliberations whenever the discussion of frontier delimitation between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croates and Slovenes shall be placed on its Agenda.

I beg, etc.

(Sgd) P. Pachitch"

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, asked the Conference to say what reply should be sent to M. Pachitch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it had been agreed that the Small Powers would be entitled to be present whenever any question affecting their rights came under discussion; and, in his opinion, it made no difference whether the question to be discussed was one between two Small Powers or between a Great Power and a Small Power. He felt sure that the Italian representative would accept that view of the matter.

M. SONNINO said that at the Meeting of the Conference held on 18th February, 1919, after the Serbian Delegation had put forward their territorial claims, he himself had proposed, and the Conference had agreed to accept the following resolution:—

"That the question raised in the statement of MM. Vesnitch, Zolger and Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbian Delegation on

> the Serbian territorial interests in the Peace settlement, (excepting only the question in which Italy was directly concerned) shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee, and that it shall be the duty of that Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limit, and to make recommendations for a just settlement."

That is to say, it had been decided that all frontier questions in which Italy was directly concerned should be considered by the Conference itself. That did not, however, mean that the representatives of the Serbians should not be present when frontier questions affecting them were discussed by the Conference. The Serbs obviously had the same right to appear before the conference that other interested States had to appear before Commissions. He agreed, therefore, that the interested parties would have the right to appear before the Conference to express their views, and to take part in the discussions; but the Small Powers could obviously have no voice in drawing up the final decisions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hesitated to accept Baron Sonnino's interpretation of the question. He would draw the attention of the Conference to the decision taken at the meeting held on March 5th last, in regard to the admission of Belgians to the deliberations concerning the preliminaries of peace. It was then agreed:—

> "That the right of the Belgian Government to be represented on the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers during the discussion of the preliminary Peace Terms should be limited to the occasions coming within the regulations for the Peace Conference when terms for which Belgium was specially interested were under discussion."

In his opinion that decision could not be interpreted to mean that the Small Powers should retire when a decision had to be taken.

M. SONNINO held that in the case of a Commission on Frontiers the Small Powers were heard, but they took no part in the final decision. In his opinion, the Conference when dealing with territorial

questions, should adopt the procedure followed by territorial Commissions.

MR. LANSING thought that in justice when the decision came to be taken, either both parties should be present, or both parties should retire.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the final decision would rest with the Conference itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but enquired whether both parties should be present during the discussion which led up to the final decision. That was the question under consideration. In other words, should one of the two interested parties be turned out, whilst the other party remained to take part in the final discussion.

M. ORLANDO said that according to his understanding the question should be regarded in the following light. In the first place, he could not agree that the Resolution quoted by Mr. Lloyd George was applicable except on the assumption that the question under consideration referred to a single State, called Serbia, and to a problem affecting that State. Had that really been the case, he would not have ventured to dispute the fact that questions concerning Italy and Serbia should be discussed as between equals and strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down for all other States with particular interests, taking part in the Conference.

But the question now under discussion did not concern the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbia proper. The Conference was asked to consider a question relating to the frontiers which separated Italy from an enemy State, formerly known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If, in consequence of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, new States had been formed, some of which desired to join Serbia, that meant that the Conference had no longer to deal with the Kingdom of Serbia, but with a new State consisting partly of the old Kingdom of Serbia and partly of other territories which belonged to an enemy State. The correctness of this point of view was evidence[d] by the fact that the Delegation had sent the communication under consideration not in the name of the Kingdom of Serbia but in the

name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and one of those members of that Delegation had actually been a Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The whole question, therefore, turned on whether this new State should or should not be recognised. Obviously, he (M. Orlando) could not prevent the friendly and allied Powers from recognising it, even though agreements to the contrary had been entered into. Certainly, the recognition of the new State would not constitute an amiable act towards Italy. But, however that might be, his Allied and Associated colleagues would not hesitate to admit that Italy was entitled to a free choice in the matter; and so far Italy had not recognised the new State. He, personally, did not recognise the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Furthermore, he regarded the Croats and the Slovenes, that is to say the people whose frontiers were in question, as his enemies. As far as Italy was concerned, these people had merely taken the place of the Austrians; and he would ask his colleagues to consider whether the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could have done anything worse to Italy, had they been present instead of the Croats and the Slovenes. Consequently, as far as he was concerned, the question presented itself as follows. No appeal could be made to a resolution which did not apply to the case under consideration. The question for the Conference to decide was whether matters relating to frontiers between Enemy and Allied countries should be discussed in the presence of the Enemy. He (M. Orlando) could never accept such a proposition. Italy's allies and associates could naturally do as they pleased, but in regard to matters in which he was concerned, he would never agree to discuss them under those conditions, any more than France would ever agree to admit Germany to take part in a discussion on the settlement of her frontiers.

M. Sonnino, with whom he found himself in complete agreement, had stated that instead of imposing our conditions on the Croats and on the Slovenes, as would be done in regard to other enemy countries, he would agree to their being given a hearing. In agreeing to that, he had made a great concession and it showed how great was their desire to be conciliatory. But beyond that point he could never

agree to go and he must absolutely refuse to discuss and to dispute with his enemies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could well understand M. Orlando taking the line he had in regard to the Croats and Slovenes, as obviously they were not in the same position as the Belgians and the Serbs. But he could hardly take that line in regard to Mr. Pachitch. It would hardly be consistent for M. Orlando to say that he did not object to Mr. Pachitch or to the other Serbian delegates, but that he declined to discuss any territorial question if representatives of the Croats or of the Slovenes were admitted on equal terms. Therefore he would make the following suggestion. He thought it would be a very strong order for the Conference to rule the Serbs out when questions relating to their frontiers came under discussion, especially when it was remembered that the King of Serbia was now the King of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Serbs by the great gallantry displayed by their Armies had helped to conquer the countries in question. In his opinion, the Serbs should be granted exactly the same rights as had been accorded to the Belgians to attend when questions affecting their territorial interests were being discussed by the Conference. The Croat and Slovene countries did not constitute separate and independent bodies: They were going to be attached to and to form a part of Serbia. He begged M. Orlando, therefore, to consider whether the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia proper, whose armies had fought on the side of the Allies, should not be present when questions concerning them came under discussion. He thought the Conference could hardly refuse the request of a country who had done its duty to the Allies and manfully supported the common cause during the whole period of the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that M. Orlando's proposal, together with Mr. Lloyd George's amendment, would meet with general approval; that is to say, the representatives of Serbia, an Allied country, should be admitted to the Conference to take part in the discussions whenever questions affecting their frontiers came under considerations.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that M. Pachitch would come to the Conference, not as a representative of Serbia, but as a representative

of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; and he would presumably be assisted by M. Trumbitch and by Dr. Zolger, the latter a former Austro-Hungarian Minister.

M. PICHON agreed that M. Pachitch had written his letter on behalf of the Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, as the representative of a State which had not yet been recognised by all the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, however, was that the representatives of Serbia alone should be invited to attend in connection with all questions relating to their own frontiers. Consequently, he thought a reply should be sent to M. Pachitch, informing him that the Conference would be willing to admit the representatives of Serbia, but it could not receive the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes whose constitution had not yet been recognised by all the Allies.

M. ORLANDO said that the question under consideration might lead to very grave results for Italy. On the other hand, the question was not a very urgent one, since M. Pachitch's letter had only been written on the 6th March last. He begged the Conference, therefore, with the greatest insistence to adjourn the further consideration of the question for a few days, in order to allow him to consult all his colleagues. He was particularly anxious that nothing should be done to prejudge the final solution of the question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the Conference would be bound to meet a request of that kind.

MR. LANSING said that before the discussion was closed he wished to state the views of his Government, whose views coincided with those expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. The question under consideration concerned Serbia, the same country which the Allies had always known: and the mere fact that the old Serbia had acquired or annexed other territories did not affect the case.

BARON SONNINO, interposing, said that the case under consideration did not merely refer to the acquisition or annexation of territories by Serbia.

MR. LANSING thought that it did, just in the same way as England had acquired or annexed Scotland and called herself Great Britain. It was all a mere technicality, and in his opinion, it was important to uphold the decisions already reached. Serbian interests were at stake. When questions affecting Roumania and Serbia had been considered by the Conference, both parties affected had been heard. Consequently, he favoured the conclusion that either both parties should be included or both parties should be excluded. In any case one of the contending parties should not be allowed to sit as a judge of its own case.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to a later meeting).

(5) M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Territorial Co-ordination Committee had enquired whether the question relating to the constitution of a Turkish State fell within its jurisdiction, since no Commission had yet been appointed to deal with that question. Boundaries of Turkey

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this enquiry raised very important questions of principle, for the solution of which instructions would have to be given by the Conference. So far, not even the crudest indications had been given. Furthermore, the mandatory question was involved and would have to be discussed by the Conference. He proposed, therefore, that further discussion should be adjourned until President Wilson's return.

(It was agreed that the question of the constitution of a Turkish State should be adjourned to a later date.)

(6) M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Greece had enquired whether the delimitation of Albania and Jugo-Slavia, with the exclusion of the Adriatic frontiers, fell within its competence. Albania

MR. BALFOUR remarked that this raised a difficult question, since it had been agreed to exclude all frontier questions in which Italian interests were concerned. Furthermore, in view of the situation in

Albania, he thought that the frontier between Albania and Jugo-Slavia would vitally concern Italy, and on that account should be excluded.

(It was agreed that the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Greece should not deal with the frontiers of Albania and Jugo-Slavia.)

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU reported that a group of ladies, representing the Suffrage Association of the Allied countries, who had previously been received by President Wilson, had called on him with a request to take part in the work of the Conference. He had suggested, in reply, that a chosen number of their representatives should ask to be heard by the various Commissions of the Conference dealing with questions in which they were interested, such as, the International Labour Legislation Commission, and the League of Nations Commission. Women Representation at the Conference

M. PICHON pointed out that these ladies did not only ask to be heard, but they also wished to form part of the Commissions in question.

M. SONNINO said that he had also seen some of the women representatives, who had submitted the same proposals to him. They were anxious to be represented on the League of Nations, as it was possible that questions concerning white slave traffic might be considered.

(It was agreed that the Women's Suffrage Association of the Allied Countries should be invited to send a deputation to state their case to the Commission on Labour Legislation and to the League of Nations Commission.)

(The meeting then adjourned until Wednesday, March 12th, 1919.)

PARIS, March 12th, 1919.

Annexure "A"

PARIS, 8th March, 1919.

From:—The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

To:— The Prime Minister and Minister for War, Paris.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: Certain events which have taken place during the last few days at Prague and regarding which I have to-day received official information, compel me to address this memorandum to you with the request that you will kindly communicate the contents either to Marshal Foch or to the Supreme War Council. Our position is serious. The decision of the Conference with regard to Teschen has been a severe blow to us. The Germans are taking advantage of it, believing that they can treat us just as they like and that we are no longer protected. I therefore address myself to you and respectfully request your swift and energetic intervention.

On the 1st March, 1919, the Czecho-Slovak Authorities discovered a conspiracy of espionage and revolutionary propaganda at Prague against the Czecho-Slovak Republic organized by agents from Berlin and Vienna with the connivance of the authorities at Budapest. This plot, as may be seen from the intercepted documents, was prepared with the object of keeping the Governments of Berlin and Vienna informed as to the military situation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and of fomenting disturbances either in the German regions, or in the mixed Czech and German districts, or in the purely Czech territory where they hoped to stir up a Bolshevist movement. The plot was organised by agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, by Baron Gobsattel (late Consul of the German Empire) and Dr. Schwartz. The Czech Authorities had allowed them to remain in Prague at their own request because they were occupied in charitable work for German nationals. Under cloak of this pretext they carried on their hateful campaign, and, as proved by documents seized by the Czecho-Slovak Government, they were sent from Berlin by the present Ministry of Foreign Affairs and worked under the directions of the notorious Baron Lancken, who even paid a clandestine visit to Prague on one occasion in this connection.

The plot was discovered by the Czecho-Slovak authorities, who arrested a courier sent by the Berlin Government on Messrs.

Gobsattel and Schwartz's premises with revolutionary propaganda, leaflets, ethnographical maps, and other documents addressed either to the two gentlemen in question, to the authorities in Vienna, or to the authorities in Budapest.

In agreement with the authorities in Vienna these gentlemen organised a press campaign, especially in the German papers, describing the situation of the Czecho-Slovaks as disastrous; they exploited the decision of the Peace Conference on the Teschen question against the Prague Government, and tried to stir up either Nationalist or Bolshevist disturbances. At the same time, the Czecho-Slovak authorities were able to seize a certain number of documents emanating from the War Ministry in Vienna.

From these documents they were able to ascertain that, in connection with this campaign of espionage and propaganda, the Vienna Government was preparing military measures against the Czecho-Slovak Republic. It was organising certain regiments and issuing written orders, announcing that these regiments were intended to undertake operations in certain districts of Bohemia and Moravia, especially those of Znaim in Moravia and Trautenau and Leitmeritz in Bohemia.

It tried simultaneously to bring about a general strike in the Czecho-Slovak Republic (to begin on 4th. March), hoping to stir up serious Bolshevist disturbances. The regiments referred to above even received maps and detailed plans of operations, mentioning the names of villages and localities on which they were to march. At the same time arms, ammunition and, above all, machine guns were issued to them. The Czecho-Slovak authorities ascertained with absolute certainty that all these orders and operations were prepared by agents of the War Ministry in Vienna and that the exceedingly widespread system of espionage was organised on behalf of the Vienna authorities and with this special object, on the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic; the whole scheme was prepared in concert with similar attempts made by Magyars in Slovakia.

The Prague Government begs me to lay these facts before the Interallied War Council, with the request that the situation may

receive consideration and the necessary measures be taken immediately.

As a matter of fact, the Czecho-Slovak Republic—as one of the Allied countries which, notwithstanding the danger that menaced it, always worked loyally with the Allies—cannot be left defenceless in the difficult situation in which it is placed. It is organising itself, but it has a considerable army in Russia which it requires for its own defence, but which cannot return. The whole world knows that this army defended the interests of the Allies with the greatest devotion; it is now far from its own country and cannot defend it directly.

Furthermore, we are threatened by another great difficulty; notwithstanding the efforts of the Allies, the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot obtain sufficient food supplies. From this point of view, it is placed in a much more difficult position than that of our enemies to-day; German-Austria and the Magyars exploit this situation and make use of it in their subversive dealings and for their pan-German ends.

We believe, therefore, that the Allied and Associated Governments cannot allow this action on the part of the Governments of Vienna, Budapest and Berlin to pass without rejoinder, since it is not only dangerous for us, but also directed against the Allies.

The Czecho-Slovak Government accordingly begs the Allied and Associated Governments immediately to address an energetic protest to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest, requiring them at once to cease all hostile action towards the Czecho-Slovak Republic either of a military nature or from the point of view of propaganda.

This is the first measure of imperative necessity which should be taken with the least possible delay. In addition to this, the Czecho-Slovak Government requests the Allied and Associated Governments to impose the following measures upon the Vienna and Budapest Governments viz:—

1. That the Austro-German Republic be compelled to give entire satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Government.

2. That, after most careful enquiry, exemplary punishment be meted out to all the guilty parties, the nature and extent of such punishment being communicated to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
3. That the Government of the Austro-German Republic be ordered to repay to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the total amount of all extraordinary expenditure, whether of a military nature or undertaken in the interests of public safety incurred to prevent the threatened invasion and revolution.
4. That all military detachments intended to invade the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic be immediately disarmed and disbanded under Inter-allied control.
5. Whereas no reliance can be placed in any contingent declaration by the Government of the Austro-German Republic that it will attempt no further plots against the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and whereas this would in no wise secure the Czecho-Slovak Republic against any other hostile action, the permanent armed forces of the Austro-German Republic must be so diminished as to be merely sufficient to assure the service of public safety.
6. That all weapons rendered superfluous by the reduction of armed Austro-German forces be restored to the Interallied Commission (including Czecho-Slovak delegates) which shall be entrusted with the control of all munition factories and arsenals on Austro-German territory.
7. That all Austro-German railways be placed under the control of the Interallied Commission, including Czecho-Slovak delegates.
8. In view of the imminent danger that the Government of the Austro-German Republic will continue to plot against Czecho-Slovak independence, the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic reserves the right to take provisionally all measures necessary to prevent any Austro-German action hostile to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
9. That the Government of the Hungarian Republic be ordered to open a most strict enquiry, under Interallied control, as to the share taken by the Magyar Army in the projected invasion and as to the delivery of arms and ammunition for this purpose.
10. That, after careful enquiry, exemplary punishment be meted out to the guilty parties within the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and that the result of this enquiry, together with the nature and

extent of such punishment, be communicated to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

11. That the Hungarian Republic be ordered to give every satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the nature and method of such satisfaction being determined by the latter.

The Governments of Vienna and Budapest could easily be compelled to acquiesce in the measures required, because the question of food places them entirely at the mercy of the Allies. In any case, I venture to repeat my request and to beg the Allies to deal with this question and to protect us from our common enemies.

In closing I would just venture to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the conclusions which may be drawn from all these events.

1. The so-called Socialist Government at Berlin is pursuing the same policy towards us as the old Imperial Government, making use of the same agents and the same methods as the former militarist Government of William II.
2. The Republic Governments at Vienna and Budapest are employing the same methods against us as the old Austro-Hungarian Government and whilst ostensibly desiring to submit themselves to the decision of the Peace Conference, are attempting to stab us in the back.
3. Up to the present we have refrained from taking any military action or reprisals against our Austrian and Magyar enemies.

I must add that the Allied and Associated Governments have requested us to supply German Austria and the Magyars of Hungary with coal and other raw materials, which we have loyally done, and in the meantime our enemies were planning a treacherous attack on us. Conditions with us are such that the population is losing all patience, and if measures of some kind are not taken to give us at any rate moral support, we shall not be able to guarantee order in our country.

Monsieur le Président, I am at present preparing a detailed report on these events, which will be addressed to all the Allied and Associated

Governments. This report will contain all the documents to which I have alluded in the present Memorandum. I shall also venture to submit a copy of the said report, with the documents in question, to the Supreme War Council, but before this can be done I am taking immediate steps to inform the Council of the matter, in order that it may be aware of the facts, in the event of the Czecho-Slovak Government being obliged to take energetic measures in consequence of the Austro-Hungarian conspiracy.

I have [etc.]

EDWARD BENES

[1] Abbreviation for *Waffenstillstandskommission* (German Armistice Commission).
[2] Military representative on the German Armistice Commission.
[3] See BC–39, p. 120 [*Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 7*].
[4] Annexure A, p. 327 [*Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 17*].
[5] BC–35, p. 44 [*Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 3*].

March 12, 3 p.m. (BC–50)

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[18] Minutes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, March 12th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 12, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/57

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/57

BC–50 SWC–16

[Document 18]

Minutes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, March 12th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 12, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	General Tasker H. Bliss
* Hon. E. M. House	Admiral W. S. Benson
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Colonel Garrett
Mr. L. Harrison	British Empire
Mr. G. Auchincloss	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
British Empire	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville West, C. M. G.
* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	France
Secretaries	M. Leygues
Lt. Col. Sir M. P, A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Marshal Foch
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	Admiral de Bon.
France	General Belin
M. Clemenceau	General Weygand
M. Pichon	General Duval

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn
ITALY
* H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Comdt. Lacombe
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur
Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.
ITALY
General Cavallero
JAPAN
Captain Nomura
Captain Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a telegram had been received from the British Military Representative at Vienna to the effect that a bill would be introduced by the Austrian Government, probably during the course of the present week, providing for the abdication and banishment of the Emperor Charles. The Austrian Government, wishing to prevent any personal annoyance or danger to the Imperial Family, had apparently requested the British Mission in Vienna to grant facilities for the Emperor's journey out of Austria. The Swiss Government had expressed its readiness to allow without condition

the passage of the Austrian Imperial Family through Switzerland: but it refused to grant permission to the Emperor to reside in Switzerland, unless a guarantee were given by the Allied Governments that no difficulties would hereafter be raised in regard to his extradition. Abdication and Banishment of the Empire Charles from Austria

He did not know what views the Conference held on the question: but he, (Mr. Lloyd George) was inclined to think that the Swiss Government might be given a guarantee that the Allies would not desire to ask for the Emperor's extradition. In his opinion, the Emperor was not [to] be held responsible for the war. The whole responsibility rested with his uncle, Francis Joseph. Furthermore, when the Emperor Charles had ascended the throne, he had done his best, though rather clumsily, to bring about peace. In view of the present situation in Austria, he would suggest that the Swiss Government be given the desired guarantee so as to avoid the occurrence of an awful tragedy.

M. SONNINO said that he saw no objection to the thing itself. But, in his opinion, somewhat complicated issues might be raised if an attempt were made at this stage to make a distinction between this particular Monarch and the other Sovereigns who might, or might not, eventually be held responsible for the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the question might be referred to the existing Committee dealing with the responsibilities for the war.

MR. LANSING explained that the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War, of which he was President, had not attempted to draw up a list of criminals, because the Sub-Committee, dealing with the responsibility for the war, had decided that no one could be tried under that particular head. That is to say, the Sub-Committee had come to the conclusion that the accused could not be brought before any legal tribunal, since they were only guilty of a moral responsibility.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War could be asked to report whether the Emperor Charles

could, in any way, be held responsible for the war. His information went to show that the Emperor was now being treated very badly in Austria, where the situation was daily more nearly approaching that of Russia. The Empress also had been treated somewhat brutally; and since the Emperor could in no way be held responsible for the war, it would be a pity if he were murdered. For that same reason, the Austrian Government was rather anxious to get him away.

MR. BALFOUR suggested, as carrying out Mr. Lloyd George's idea, that a telegram should at once be despatched to Vienna, in the name of the Conference, stating that, as far as the Allied and Associated Governments were concerned, the Emperor should forthwith be permitted to go to Switzerland. At the same time, the Great Powers would ask the Swiss Government to receive the Emperor pending a final decision being reached on the question to be referred to the Committee on Responsibility. In that way, the Emperor would be permitted to remain in Switzerland for a few days, pending the final decision. He did not know whether the Swiss Government would accept a provisional guarantee of that nature, but he thought the proposal would meet M. Sonnino's views.

To sum up: a telegram would at once be sent to the British Military Representative at Vienna, in the name of the Great Powers, asking him to facilitate the Emperor's journey to Switzerland. At the same time, the Swiss Government would be asked to give the Emperor a temporary hospitality in Switzerland.

MR. HOUSE questioned whether that proposal would reassure the Swiss Government. He thought that the Swiss Government would require a definite guarantee that no difficulty would be raised about extradition.

MR. LANSING thought that the great difficulty lay in the fact that the Committee on Responsibilities had reached the conclusion that the late rulers of the various enemy States could not be held responsible for making the war; but they could be held liable for the violations of the customs and laws of war, which had taken place through their failure to prevent or to put a stop to such occurrences. The

Committee held that the Emperor of Austria could also be made responsible for the latter acts.

M. SONNINO agreed that, owing to the danger of the situation in Austria, the Emperor should, provisionally, be put in a place of safety.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the British Government really had any positive evidence that the Swiss Government would refuse to receive the Emperor Charles without a guarantee that no difficulties of any kind would be raised about extradition. He, himself, had been informed by M. Dutasta, who had only recently visited Berne, that the Swiss Government would be ready to receive the Emperor without any guarantee.

MR. HOUSE enquired whether the Conference could not there and then frankly state that the Emperor's extradition would not be demanded.

M. SONNINO agreed. He thought that perhaps a guarantee could be given that for two or three months the Great Powers would not ask for anything in regard to the extradition of the Emperor Charles.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Conference could well take that on itself.

Mr. BALFOUR agreed and said he felt quite confident that the Great Powers were not going to prosecute the Emperor Charles. He certainly could not be tried before a legal tribunal under any existing code: though an attempt might be made to set up some international court for the purpose.

(It was agreed to authorise Mr. Balfour on behalf of the five Great Powers:—

(1) To telegraph to the British Mission in Vienna to grant facilities for the Austrian Imperial Family's journey out of Austria into Switzerland, and
(2) To ask the Swiss Government to give hospitality to the Imperial Family; a guarantee being given, if so required by the Swiss

Government, that no difficulties would be raised.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU called on General Duval to read the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics. He understood that reservations had been made by some of the Allied Officer Air Delegates in regard to certain of the conditions of the draft Convention, and he asked General Duval to call the attention of the Conference to the controversial clauses in question, when read. Air Terms of Peace

GENERAL DUVAL replied that the document had been unanimously accepted without reservations by any of the members of the Commission.

(General Duval then read the aerial peace terms, Article by Article, for text of which, see Annexure "A".)

Article I. (1) (a) MR. BALFOUR pointed out that apparently at the present time the most effective method of maintaining order was by Aeroplanes. He had read in the newspapers that the Spartacists' nests in Berlin had been attacked and put out of action by Aeroplanes.

GENERAL DUVAL agreed that order could obviously be maintained by using Aeroplanes; but he had no information in regard to their use in Berlin.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not wish to press the matter further.

(1) (d) MR. LANSING expressed the view that the entire suppression of dirigible balloons was, in his opinion, a little too stringent. Were not certain classes of dirigibles used for commercial purposes?

GENERAL DUVAL replied that the clause applied only to military material, and he drew attention both to Article 9 and to the title of the Convention wherein it was clearly laid down that the conditions to be imposed on Germany related to Military and Maritime Aeronautics only.

MR. LANSING said he was prepared to accept the clause.

(2) (c) M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the words:—"from date of signature of present Convention" should be added. The clause would therefore read:—"The whole personnel ... within one month from date of signature of the present Convention (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Aerial statute must not be exceeded)".

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 1 was approved, Clause (2) (*c*) being amended, as above stated, by the addition of the words: "from date of signature of present Convention.")

Article II MR. LANSING enquired whether this Article related only to Military Aviation Grounds, and if so how could a distinction be made between Military Aviation grounds and commercial Aviation grounds?

GENERAL DUVAL replied that the whole question of the organisation of a commercial Air Service had been reserved for future study, and he invited attention to Article IX, which read as follows:—

> "The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial Air Service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace".

MR. LANSING enquired why the Article in question had been inserted before a decision had been reached on the question of the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial aeronautics.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Lansing's point was well worth considering, namely, the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial Aeronautics. Reference had been made to Article IX which merely deferred a decision on the really difficult question connected with flying, that is, the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial machines, until after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace. In his opinion, it would be most difficult to draw a distinction between Military and Commercial Aeroplanes.

Article I forbade all Military aviation, though provisions were made in the Convention for the organisation of a future Commercial Air Service. Under those conditions, the Revolutionists of the future might have commercial Aeroplanes which they could convert into fighting machines, whilst the police would, by the terms of the Convention, find themselves without Aeroplanes of any kind with which to face the danger. Article IX merely evaded the question by referring the decision to a body not yet appointed.

MR. HOUSE explained that it was not the fault of the Official Air Delegates that the question had been so dealt with, because in accordance with the terms of reference, the delegates had merely been asked to suggest the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics. The commercial question really did not form part of their terms of reference.

MR. BALFOUR agreed and suggested, as a practical way out of the difficulty, that an Inter-Allied Aerial Commission should at once be appointed to consider and to submit recommendations in regard to the distinction to be drawn between Commercial and Military Aeronautics: all conditions contained in the draft Aerial Convention, which required a distinction to be drawn up between Military and Commercial Aeronautics, being thus reserved for further consideration. He would therefore ask the Conference to accept the following Resolution:—

> "It is agreed:—
>
> That a Commission consisting of two representatives each (with technical delegates as required) of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, with five representatives elected by the other States at the Conference be appointed to consider:—
>
> (*a*) Aerial matters arising out of the work of the Preliminary Peace Conference or referred by the Commissions set up by the Conference.

(*b*) A Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace."

MR. HOUSE pointed out that a Commission had already been appointed to consider Commercial Aerial Questions.

MARSHAL FOCH said the Allies were now engaged in carrying out the complete disarmament of Germany and the armaments with which she had fought the Allies, both in the Air and on the Earth, were being taken away from her. Why should any exception be made in the case of the aerial armaments of Germany? Why should the Allies not proceed forthwith to take away all the military aircraft? He thought the Allies were fully entitled to do that. On the other hand, he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that a special Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to study the question of Commercial Aeronautics; but that should be kept as a separate problem. He was firmly of the opinion that, in the interests of the Allies, it was urgent forthwith to commence the disarmament of the German Military Air Service. Eventually it would be possible to decide where the line could be drawn between Military and Commercial Aeronautics; but no delay should occur in depriving the Germans of their military aircraft which had wrought such evil work throughout the war in connection with the unjustifiable bombing of open towns. The Conference should, therefore, adopt the principle of the Aerial disarmament of Germany.

MR. LANSING expressed his complete agreement with Marshal Foch's point of view. But, as long as aeroplanes existed which could be used for commercial purposes, they could always be converted into military machines. The problem presented the same difficulties as that connected with horses, which could be used to draw guns or to draw ploughs. Everything depended on the use made of the article in question. Consequently, he, personally, was far more impressed with the necessity for the removal of the guns and armaments in the aeroplanes, in preference to depriving the Germans of the use of flying machines which would be of value to them for purely commercial purposes.

GENERAL GROVES held that it was impossible to get away from the point of view that all aircraft was inherently an implement of war. Leaving that question out of consideration, however, the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission had been obliged to decide on the purely military aspect of the case. In regard to the future, however, it was evident that all machines, commercial or otherwise, would be capable of being converted very quickly into machines suitable for military purposes. It would, therefore, be very difficult to prevent Germany setting up a large potential military air service under the guise of commercial enterprise. He thought that question, which was one of great difficulty and complexity, should, as proposed, be referred to a special Inter-Allied Commission.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that, as suggested by Mr. Lansing, the armament of aeroplanes could be removed; but the Convention drawn up the Officer Air Delegates aimed at the complete disarmament of Germany. Consequently it forbade the organisation of a military Flying Corps, maintained as a military body, capable of acting militarily in the manner which had during the war rendered possible the perpetration of those ghastly bombing raids, so universally condemned.

GENERAL DUVAL asked permission to explain the circumstances which had guided the Officer Air Delegates in drawing up the Convention under consideration. The terms of reference included the complete disarmament of the German Military Air Service; and commercial aviation had in no way been referred to. As a matter of fact at the present moment no commercial air service existed in Germany, and it could only be created by the conversion of military machines. Consequently, by imposing the surrender of all military machines and by prescribing the prohibition of the construction of new machines, the draft Convention solved for the present and until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, the question of the maintenance both of a commercial and of a military air service in Germany.

Should the Conference now wish to reach a decision on the question of commercial aeronautics, that could still be done; but he felt compelled to point out that the question was a very big one, and

could not be settled within a reasonable time. Mr. Balfour's resolution proposed that a convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace should be drawn up. That raised a very complex question, so great that no one country had ever yet been able to draw up even its own national convention. Should the Conference, therefore, decide to draw up a convention in connection with International Aerial Navigation, he despaired of ever reaching a conclusion before the signing of the Peace. For that very reason Articles IV and IX had been introduced in the convention as the only practical means of arriving at an immediate settlement.

M. PICHON said in support of General Duval's statement that in the past many attempts had been made to draw up a Convention in regard to international Aerial Navigation, but without result. He thought eventually a decision might be reached, but it would be a very lengthy work requiring careful consideration and if it were to form part of the Air Terms of Peace, it would indefinitely postpone the signing of the necessary Convention.

MR. BALFOUR thought that some misunderstanding appeared to exist. The previous speakers appeared to labour under the impression that nothing was to be done in regard to the German Military Air Service until the question of commercial Aerial navigation had been settled. In his opinion, the Allied Aerial Commission had been quite right in framing the conditions of the Convention under discussion. But in raising this question, Mr. Lansing and he had meant to point out that the disarmament of Germany would not be permanently effected as long as the question of Commercial Aeronautics was left unsettled.

MR. LANSING suggested that as a Commission to study Aerial navigation already existed, this question should be referred to it for consideration, with special reference to the difficulty of distinguishing between Military and Commercial Aviation; the Commission being required to submit their report with as little delay as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to set forth the situation as it existed at the present moment. As Marshal Foch and General Duval had

correctly explained, the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission had been instructed to study the disarmament of Germany and the Convention under consideration gave the formal means of accomplishing that desideratum. The discussion of the Articles from that point of view should therefore be proceeded with.

On the other hand, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing had stated that it would be very difficult to carry out a proper disarmament of Germany unless a definite agreement were reached in regard to the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial aviation. In his opinion, that question could most satisfactorily be referred to the existing Commissions. No doubt, it would be impossible to attain perfection since the Germans could obviously always be able to evade whatever conditions might be laid down. Consequently it would be sufficient for the present to consider only the military aspect of the case and to demand the immediate surrender of all military machines.

Finally, in his opinion, Article 9 could be amended so as to discriminate between Commercial and Military machines, the question being referred to a Commission whose function would be to suggest what amendments were necessary in order to give effect to the views expressed.

(It was agreed that the question of making a distinction between Commercial and Military Aviation would be considered in connection with Clause IX.

Article II was approved, subject to the last sentence of the Article being amended to read:—"this is to be carried out within one month after the signature of the present convention.")

Article III GENERAL DUVAL explained that Article III had been included at the request of the British representatives in order to allow for the establishment of an aerial line of postal communication with Bohemia, and also to maintain communications with Poland by the air route across Germany.

MR. BALFOUR said that the only comment he had to make in regard to Article III was that nothing had yet been settled as to how long the Allied and Associated troops would occupy German territory. He thought that the Article might provisionally be accepted, pending the drafting of the terms of peace, when the question of the period of time applicable to the conditions imposed in Article III might be reconsidered.

(It was agreed, until the final terms of peace had been settled, to reserve the decision of the period of time during which Germany should allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory.)

Article IV MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that in accordance with the conditions of Article IV, the German motor industry would be absolutely stopped until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace. The Germans would not be able to build even the most innocent motors for lorries.

GENERAL DUVAL suggested that the words "aeroplane motors" could be inserted instead of the word "motors".

MR. BALFOUR continuing, enquired whether experts could be sure of distinguishing between a combustion motor engine suitable for an aeroplane or a dirigible, and one suitable for a motor lorry.

GENERAL DUVAL explained that aeroplane motors were made of very great power, 120 to 180 H. P. No lorries would use motors of so great a power.

(Mr. Balfour withdrew his objection.)

MR. LANSING asked permission to raise a question in connection with the statement that the Article would be made operative "until the signature of the definite treaty of peace". He assumed that the Article in question would be inserted in the definite treaty of peace. Consequently, he failed to see what was the use of the Article.

GENERAL DUVAL explained that, in drafting this Article the Officer Air Delegates had in mind that the Convention would be presented to the

Germans for acceptance without delay. Subsequently, there would be a final act embodying all the terms of peace. He thought that the Article could, if necessary, be re-drafted to make this clear.

M. SONNINO understood that the Article was intended to mean that as long as it was impossible to define a military as distinguished from a commercial flying machine, the manufacture of all parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors should be forbidden. In the Peace Treaty all those questions would be settled, and accordingly the conditions contained in the Convention would cease to operate. But, as a safeguard, until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, all manufacture should be suspended.

MR. LANSING quite agreed with M. Sonnino that the Article in question should be included in the Treaty of Peace. That being the case, he could not understand why provision should be made for a duration of time which did not exist. The whole of the Aerial Convention would in fact be included in a Treaty, which would go to the Senate of the United States of America for approval. That Preliminary treaty would, however, cover questions of boundaries, indemnity, and practically everything that would go into the definite Treaty of Peace, though not necessarily in such minute detail.

MARSHAL FOCH thought that Mr. Lansing's objection might be met by substituting for the words "until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace", the words "until the signature of the Convention which will fix the statutes of commercial and aerial navigation in Germany".

MR. LANSING agreed that that would be a rational way of settling the affair. Personally, he could not see what constituted the difference between a Preliminary and a Final Peace in regard to aviation. Consequently, he failed to understand why commercial aviation should not be re-established in Germany as soon as the Preliminary Terms of Peace were signed.

MR. BALFOUR thought there would be some danger in first signing a Preliminary Peace, then a final definite Treaty of Peace, and lastly, in addition, to have subsequently a Convention about aerial matters. Germany might disapprove the Convention [or] refuse to sign it: it

would then be very difficult to go to war about a Convention after the Preliminary Peace and the Final definite Treaty of Peace had been signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Article might be accepted as it stood.

(Article IV was approved without modification.)

Article V MR. LANSING pointed out that Article V contemplated the handing over of all photographic and cinematographic apparatus. In his opinion, their cession was not a necessity, but they might be described as spoils of war, and he wished to enquire whether in the opinion of the experts such apparatus constituted a real danger.

GENERAL DUVAL explained that since it had been agreed to demand the surrender of all war material, it was only logical that photographic and cinematographic apparatus should also be included. He also wished to point out that the apparatus in question could only be used on board air-ships.

(Article V was accepted without amendment.)

Article VI (Article VI was accepted without amendment.)

Article VII GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that paragraph 2 of Article VII, which laid down that the special Control Commission should work at the seat of the Central German Government, might require to be slightly modified, in order to agree with the similar condition laid down in the Military Convention. In this connection, he wished to draw attention to the note inserted at the end of the Convention, which read as follows:—"The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits."

MR. LANSING enquired why a provision had been entered requiring the German Government to give to all Delegates of the Special

Control Commission every facility “to take any photographs and sketches”.

GENERAL DUVAL said that this condition had been inserted at the request of the American Air Delegate, and he personally would be glad to see it struck out.

GENERAL PATRICK agreed to the omission of this condition.

(It was agreed to accept Article VII, the words: “to take any photographs and sketches” being deleted.)

Article VIII GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that just as in the case of the Military Convention it was proposed that the whole Convention should be referred to the Drafting Commission for such minor additions and alterations as might be found necessary.

(Article VIII was accepted without amendment.)

Article IX GENERAL DUVAL expressed the view that Article IX should be retained in the Convention. In drawing up this Article, the Officer Air Delegates had not thought it right to prevent Germany from constituting a commercial air service; but the conditions which should govern such an aerial service could not be settled within the time available. Consequently, it had been agreed to forbid to Germany all forms of aviation, not particularly with the intention of forbidding commercial aviation, but to prevent any developments from taking place until the rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service could be laid down in the Peace Treaty.

MR. LANSING said he agreed with the general purpose of the Article; but, in his opinion, it should not properly be included in the Convention which dealt with Military Aviation. He thought the whole question of commercial aeronautics might perhaps be dealt with in a second document, which need not even necessarily form part of the Peace Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Balfour had handed in the following text of a resolution, the second paragraph of which he thought would probably give satisfaction to Mr. Lansing.

Mr. Balfour's resolution read as follows:—

"It is agreed—

1. That the existing aviation Commission, consisting of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, with five representatives of other States at the Conference shall be recognised and invited to consider:—
   (*a*) Aerial matters arising out of the work of the Preliminary Peace Conference or referred by the Commissions set up by the Conference.
   (*b*) A Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace.
2. That the question of the commercial aviation to be allowed to Germany be referred to this Commission."

(This Resolution was adopted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that Article IX of the Convention should be referred to the existing Aviation Commission for report as to whether it should be included in the Convention, either in its present form or with amendments.

MARSHAL FOCH suggested that a date should be fixed for a reply to be received from the Aviation Commission in regard to Article IX.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that two questions had been referred to the Aviation Commission: a practical question relating to Article IX, a reply to which should be given within the next two days; and a more ideal part relating to the preparation of a Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace, which would require time for careful study.

GENERAL DUVAL remarked that the terms of reference to the Aviation Commission were exceedingly large.

MR. BALFOUR said he could not quite understand what objection there could be to the proposals contained in his resolution. Article IX merely contained a statement of good intention, but supplied no

machinery for the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany, whereas his resolution would, he hoped, lead to the creation of the required machinery.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and proposed that Article IX be referred to the existing Aviation Commission with a request that a report be submitted within 48 hours.

(It was agreed that Article IX be referred to the existing Aviation Commission for report within 48 hours as to whether it should be included in the Aerial Convention, and, if so, to make such amendments thereto as might be considered necessary.)

Articles I to IX of the Air Terms of Peace (It was decided that the Drafting Committee of the Conference should furnish the Council with a complete draft of the Convention dealing with the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics (see Annexure "A") taking into account the following reservations and amendments:—

(i) —*Article I*) (*2*) (*c*). After the words "within one month", add "from date of signing of present Convention."
(ii) —*Article II*. After the words "This is to be carried out within one month", add the words "from date of signing of present Convention."
(iii) —*Article III*, is reserved for further consideration.
(iv) —*Article VII*. Delete the words "to take any photographs and sketches."
(v) —*Article IX*. See resolution above.

In addition, the Drafting Committee should reconcile the conditions and statements made in the Aerial Convention with those contained in the Military Contention, especially in regard to the control to be exercised by the Special Commission to be sent to Germany (Article VII), and in regard to the time limits prescribed for the execution of the terms of the Convention.)

3. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to raise a further question. By the Convention, Germany would quite properly be deprived of

aircraft and material, which would have to be disposed of somehow. That material possessed great military and commercial value, and he wished to know how it was proposed to distribute it. Naturally, he quite understood that no reference to this question would be made in the Convention which had just been approved. Disposal of Aircraft to be Surrendered by Germany

MR. LANSING thought that the taking over of all the property referred to in the Convention looked to him far more like the taking over of spoils of war rather than disarmament. In his opinion, if the whole of this material could not be used for commercial purposes, it should be destroyed: but, if it could be used for commercial purposes, it should be left to Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his reply to that would be that the question could not be settled at once, and, in any case, it should not be dealt with in the Convention. He thought the question should be adjourned for consideration at a later date.

M. SONNINO remarked that the matter could be discussed when the disposal of the ships and submarines came under discussion.

(It was agreed to adjourn further discussion regarding the disposal of the aircraft to be surrendered by Germany.)

4. M. SONNINO asked permission to draw attention to a question of urgency. A declaration had been received from the Czecho-Slovak Govt. to the effect that it declined to accept responsibility for any share of the Austro-Hungarian debt, whether incurred before the war or during the war. The Conference would recollect that the question had been discussed at their meeting held on 25th February last,[1] when a decision had been reached to address a telegram to the Financial Conferences of the former Austrian Empire, then sitting at the Ballplatz in Vienna. The Austrian Debts Payment of Coupons Due 1st March, 1919

In his opinion, the Czecho-Slovak communication called for immediate action; otherwise the Austro-Hungarian Governments

would refuse payment, and serious consequences might therefore ensue.

M. PICHON said the communication referred to by Baron Sonnino had been circulated to all the Delegations.

(For full text of communication, see Annexure "B".)

The Czecho-Slovak Government whilst refusing to pay any part of the interest on the debt, held by enemy countries, were apparently willing to contribute towards the payment of the interest due to bond-holders in Allied and Associated countries. On the 25th February last the Conference had passed the following resolution:—

> (It was agreed that a copy of the following telegram should be addressed by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers to the Gesamter Konferenz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ballplatz, Vienna:—
>
> > "The Allied and Associated Governments are informed there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments.
> >
> > The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt.["]
>
> The British Delegation would also send a copy of the same telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.)

He agreed with Baron Sonnino as to the gravity of the situation, and he would suggest that the question be referred for consideration and report to the Allied Financial Commission.

(It was agreed to refer the question of the payment of the coupons of the Austrian debt due on 1st March, 1919, to the Allied Financial Committee for consideration and report.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Territorial Coordination Committee would not be prepared to submit their report on the Western frontiers of Poland for a day or two. He suggested, therefore, that the consideration of the question should be postponed until Saturday, and suggested that the Conference should adjourn until that date, when President Wilson would also be present. The Agenda for Saturday might therefore contain:— Agenda for Next Meeting

1. —The final revised draft of Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace.
2. —The Western frontiers of Poland.

MR. LANSING asked that a Meeting should, if possible, be held on Friday afternoon to discuss the eastern boundaries of Germany.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Saturday afternoon, March 15, the President being empowered to call a Meeting for Friday afternoon in the event of the report on the Western frontiers of Poland being available.)

PARIS, 13th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Air Terms of Peace.—Conditions To Be Imposed on the German Government in Regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics

Article I.

The effectives of the German Air Service in material and personnel shall be reduced to the following figures:—

(1) Material.
(*a*) Aeroplanes.

The military forces of Germany having to be limited to the necessary minimum to allow her to maintain order in the interior, must not comprise any military aviation.

(*b*) Hydroplanes.

Germany can for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919, maintain a total of 100 hydroplanes or water gliders for the purpose of seeking out submarine mines, with the necessary equipment, but without armaments, munitions or bombs.

(*c*) Motors.

In addition to the motors mounted on hydroplanes, and water gliders mentioned above, one motor may be allowed for each hydroplane or water glider.

(*d*) Dirigibles.

No dirigibles shall be kept.

(2) Personnel.

(*a*) Land Aviation.

Land aviation being suppressed, no personnel is allowed under this heading.

(*b*) Naval aviation.

Until the 1st October, Germany may maintain a total number of 1000 all ranks which will comprise all the personnel flying and non-flying of all formations and establishments.

(*c*) The whole personnel, excepting a total of 1,000 men mentioned in Paragraph I (2) (*b*) figuring at present on the control lists of the German land and sea forces will be demobilised or sent to other arms or services within one month (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Naval Statute must not be exceeded).

Article II.

No aviation ground and no shed for dirigibles must be maintained or established:—

(1) to the East of the Rhine, at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that river.

(2) to the West of the Eastern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that frontier.

(3) to the North of the Southern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from the frontier of Italy or of Czecho-Slovakia.

All grounds now existing which do not satisfy these conditions are to be immediately placed out of use. The sheds are to be dismantled and the earth is to be ploughed up. This is to be carried out within one month.

Article III.

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article IV.

The manufacture of parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors shall be forbidden in the whole of German territory until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace.

Article V.

The material now existing in the German land and sea forces or in process of manufacture, in excess of the figures given under Article I shall be handed over to the Allies. In that material must be comprised in particular:—

complete aeroplanes and hydroplanes, as well as those in process of manufacture, repair, or of being put together;
dirigible balloons able to take the air in process of manufacture, repair or being put together;
machinery for the manufacture of hydrogen;
dirigible sheds and every kind of shelter for balloons or dirigibles.

Pending their delivery dirigible balloons are to be maintained blown out with hydrogen at Germany's expense and the apparatus for the manufacture of the hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigibles may,

at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the moment when the dirigibles are handed over.

Motors.
Cells.
Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb throwers, torpedo throwers, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).
Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded and unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).
Instruments for use on aeroplanes.
Wireless apparatus; photographic or cinematograph apparatus.
Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

Article VI.

Any movement of material mentioned in Article V shall be forbidden without special authorisation by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article VII.

The terms of the various Articles of the present Convention shall be carried out under the control of a Special Commission delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This Commission shall work at the seat of the Central German Government, but shall be able to send a sub-Commission or delegates to any other part of German territory.

This Commission will have every power to settle directly and without appeal any disputes which may arise in regard to the execution of the present Convention.

The German Government will immediately hand over to it:—

(1) A numerical list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services and of the existing material as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order.
(2) A complete list, with their position, of all establishments working for aviation, and of all landing grounds and sheds.

The German Government will immediately place at the disposal of this Commission all documents relating to the German Air Service.

The German Government will give to all the delegates of this Commission every facility to carry out their mission, and in particular:—

to effect over the whole extent of German territory a census of the material mentioned under Article V;
to inspect, whenever called upon, aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and arms, munitions and explosive factories, aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots.
to take any photographs and sketches.

The German Government will immediately hand over to this Commission all the information and documents set forth in Articles V and VII, and all the material mentioned in these Articles shall be handed over as rapidly as possible, and within a time limit of three months.

Article VIII.

The Commission instituted under Article VII will work until the conditions of this convention have been carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if for any reason anyone of these provisions be not carried out within the allotted period the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring these facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments who will give them new instructions.

Article IX.

The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace.

NOTE:—The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards Aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military

Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.

Annexure "B"[1]

PARIS, March 6, 1919.

M. Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to M. S. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs [*of France*]

I have the honor to submit to you herewith a communication sent to me from Prague by the Minister of Finances following a decision of the Council of Ministers.

It is a decision of the Czecho-Slovak Government on the subject of the payment of the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian National loan at the time of their maturity on 1 March 1919. This decision was reached as the result of a telegram from the French representative at Berne, sent to the representatives of the nations of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire at Vienna. This despatch was as follows:

> "The governments of the Allied and Associated States have learned that there is danger that the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian National Debt, at the time of their maturity on 1 March 1919, shall not be paid, for the reason that the Austrian and Hungarian governments, as well as the other interested governments, are not in a position to agree on the share incumbent on each.
>
> "The Allied Governments state that no arrangement which may be made to insure the payment of the coupons in the month of March from the common funds can influence in any way the decision of the Peace Conference concerning the reapportionment of the Austro-Hungarian debt.
>
> "Signed: Pichon, Balfour, Lansing, Sonnino, Martino."

I take the liberty of sending you herewith the decision of the Czecho-Slovak government bearing on this despatch, and of adding that this

question obviously is intimately connected with the problem which is now being discussed in certain commissions of the Peace Conference, and that it particularly affects the question of the economic and financial liquidation of Austria-Hungary.

The Czecho-Slovak Government is obviously particularly interested in this problem; it is a question of its fundamental existence.

I have had the honor personally to state on several occasions that the Czecho-Slovak State will do all that it can to insure that the Allied and Associated States will not lose a single sou in the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

This principle, which we have always recognized and which also will guide us, when we submit before the Peace Conference our plan concerning the financial liquidation of Austria-Hungary, is in no way influenced by this decision. We wish, simply, to negotiate directly with the Allied and Associated States in dealing with questions which affect us so directly, and we do not wish to dispute these troublesome and difficult questions again with our enemies, the Austrians and the Magyars.

Moreover, the attached document itself indicates sufficiently what our point of view is.

Requesting you, Sir, to be so good as to let me know whether the French Government accepts this point of view, or otherwise what are its objections to this procedure, I beg you to accept the assurances of my highest esteem.

Enclosure to Annexure "B"

The Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot enter into negotiations, which are to assure the payment of the March coupons and cannot contribute any amount, even in case where by this act, no prejudice would be brought into the decision of the Peace Conference, relative to the reparation of the guarantee, for the debts of Austria-Hungary. The situation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic differs essentially from that of the other Governments as well in that

which concerns the Austrian war debt as the pre-war debt. The Czecho-Slovak Government can neither pay the Austrian and Hungarian war debts nor even the interest that would result therefrom, because in this way it would render itself liable towards the Allies and the engagements it made with them. The Austrian and Hungarian war loans were issued with the object in view of conducting the war against the Allies and against the Czecho-Slovak people which has been recognized by the Allies as a friendly nation, of which the Paris Government and the armies in the Entente countries were recognized as being an Allied government and army. According to principles in the Allied countries, all the transactions of the war loans and the payment of interest on such loans as were directed against the Allies have been cancelled and the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic would act disloyally against the Allies if it contributed in part to the payment of the coupons of the war loans.

This disloyalty would be so much the more serious because these war loans are found in the hands of the subjects of the states who up to the present are still considered by the Allies as enemies; it would thus be to enemy countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic would pay them.

Outside of this the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic remarks, that, on the contrary, it has the right and the duty to claim for its citizens reparation for the damages that were caused them by the anti-constitutional and illegal war loans. The subscription to these was imposed by the infraction of all laws of liberty: the citizens were menaced by the threat of having all their goods confiscated, by threat of imprisonment, and of being sent to the first line of the front, by condemnation to death even of those who faithful to the Czecho-Slovak government of Paris refused to give money for the carrying on of the war against the Allies. Should the government of the Czecho-Slovak republic contribute to the payment of the coupons of the war loans, it would approve of the terrible injustices which were permitted against the Czecho-Slovak people on the part of those the incontestable inheritors of whom are the Austro-German and Magyar republics and which still today are in most intimate relations with the enemies of the Allies.

In that which relates to pre-war debts, the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot participate either, in the slightest measure to the payment of the March coupons, because these pre-war debts are placed for the most part in countries hostile to the Entente. The government of the Czecho-Slovak republic will charge itself to pay for its subjects in seasonable time, the coupons of the pre-war debt and will come to an understanding directly with the Allied governments as to the method of paying loan coupons, found in the Allied countries where it is diplomatically represented, and can independently and indirectly settle the questions of interest on these pre-war debts.

For these reasons, the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic does not think it necessary to have any discussions relative to this matter brought up at the meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the states created from the territory of old Austria-Hungary.

[*] Present for cells 1 and 2 only.

[*] Present for cells 1 and 2 only.

[*] Present for cells 1 and 2 only.

[1] See BC–39, p. 118 [*Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 7*].
[1] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

March 15, 3 p.m. (BC–51)

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[19] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday, March 15th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/58

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/58

BC–51 SWC–17

[Document 19]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday, March 15th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	General Tasker H. Bliss
Hon. E. M. House	Major General M. N. Patrick
Secretaries	Dr. S. E. Mezes
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Mr. I. Bowman
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. J. B. Scott
Mr. G. Auchincloss	Colonel W. S. Browning
British Empire	Colonel E. G. Gorrell
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Captain S. Montgomery
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	British Empire
Secretaries	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
Mr. E. Phipps	Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
France	Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.
M. Clemenceau	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
M. Pichon	Brigadier General P, R. C. Groves, D. S. O.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
Capt. Fracchia
M. Brambilla
JAPAN
H. E. Marquis Saionji
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, C. B., K. C.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Paymaster-Captain C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.
FRANCE
M. Leygues
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Belin
General Degoutte
General Duval
Admiral de Bon
General Le Rond
M. Tardieu
M. Cambon
M. Fromageot
M. Degrand
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur
Comdt. Lacombe
Lieut. de V. Odend'hal
ITALY
Admiral Grassi
General Cavallero
M. Tosti
Marquis della Torretta
JAPAN
Admiral Takeshita
General Nara
Colonel Nagai
Captain Fujioka
Captain Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Captain E. Abraham
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.

M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Lansing had a resolution to propose.

Power for Representatives on the Inter-Allied Polish Commission to Visit German Parts of Poland Mr. Lansing then read the following resolution:—

> It is agreed that:—
>
> Marshal Foch is hereby requested to seek an early opportunity to arrange with the Germans that any member or delegate of the Inter-allied Mission to Poland shall be enabled at any time to visit any portion of the territories east of the Vistula still under German civil or military command.

Mr. Lansing explained that the purpose of the proposal was to obtain means of checking the alleged sale of arms to the Bolsheviks by the Germans whenever they evacuated territory. He presumed that similar information had reached all Governments on this score.

(No comment being made, the above resolution was adopted.)

2. M. Clemenceau said that to complete the nominations to the Aviation Commission, representatives of the smaller Powers were required.

Appointment of Representatives of Powers With Special Interests en the Aviation Commission M. Pichon proposed that the following Powers be invited to nominate members on this Commission:—

Belgium
Brazil
Greece
Roumania
Serbia

He thought that it was necessary to designate the Powers that should be represented lest the incident relating to election of delegates for the Financial and Economic Commissions be repeated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood that each of the Powers mentioned would have the right to select their own delegate.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Portugal should be added to the list as the Azores were important as an air station.

M. PICHON said he had no objection to the addition of Portugal.

MR. LANSING pointed out that Cuba had equally strong claims. Without Cuba the Allies would have had no sugar.

(It was therefore agreed that the following Powers with special interests should appoint members to the Aviation Commission:

Belgium
Brazil
Cuba
Greece
Portugal
Roumania
Serbia

3. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he had received a message from President Wilson asking for the postponement of the discussion on the Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace. In view of this request the discussion would be postponed until Monday, 17th March.
Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the remaining item on the Agenda was the report of the Polish Commission. As some of the Powers present

were not ready to discuss this subject, it would be necessary to adjourn its discussion. Report of Polish Commission

(The meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, March 15th, 1919.

March 17, 3 p.m. (BC–52)

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[20] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, March 17, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/59

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/59

BC–52 SWC–18

[Document 20]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, March 17, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
President Wilson	Admiral W. S. Benson
Hon. R. Lansing	General Tasker H. Bliss
Secretaries	Major General M. N. Patrick
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Dr. Bowman
Mr. L. Harrison	Prof. Lord
British Empire	Colonel W. S. Browning
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.	Colonel E. G. Gorrell
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Captain Schofield
Secretaries	Commander Carter
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	British Empire
Mr. E. Phipps	General Sir H. H, Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
France	Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.
M. Clemenceau	Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
M. Pichon	Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Secretaries	Brigadier General H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. Arnavon

M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando

H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi

M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Marquis Saionji

H. E. Baron Makino

H. E. M. Matsui

Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.

Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.

Paymaster Captain Pollard, C. B., R. N.

Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, C. B., K. C.

Lieut. Col. F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Leygues

M. J. Cambon

Marshal Foch

General Weygand

General Degoutte

General Belin

General Le Rond

General Duval

Admiral de Bon

M. Degrand

M. Fromageot

Comdt. de V. Levavasseur

Comdt. Lacombe

Lieut. de V. Odend'hal

ITALY

General Cavallero

Admiral Thaon di Revel

Admiral Grassi

Capt. di Corvetta

Capt. F. Ruspoli

Capt. Fracchia

M. Tosti

M. Brambilla

JAPAN

Admiral Takeshita

General Nara

Colonel Nagai
Captain Fujioka
Captain Yamamoto
BELGIUM
General Gillain
Colonel Menschaert
Lt-Col. Gaillot

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Professor Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question on the Agenda related to the Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, and he would call upon M. Mantoux to read the document which had been circulated, Article by Article. He understood there were certain parts which had been reserved; and he enquired whether the Commission had prepared any special reports in regard to those paragraphs, or whether Marshal Foch or General Weygand would be in a position to give the necessary explanations. Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the sub-Committees which had dealt with subjects such as the Kiel Canal, and Cables, had submitted special reports, which had been duly considered by the Allied Military, Naval and Aerial Commission. When the time came, he would if so desired, give the summary of those reports.

(M. Mantoux then read the draft Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, Article by Article. For full text, see Annexure “A”.)

(a) Section I. Military Clauses. Chapter I. Article 1 (Read and approved.)

Article 2 PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be assured that the exterior dangers from the Bolsheviks and so forth, which the Germans might have to meet on their eastern frontiers had been considered by the military experts in fixing the total number of effectives to be allowed to Germany.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Commission considered that the 100,000 men allowed, in addition to the *gendarmerie*, would be quite sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory of Germany and for the defence of her frontiers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired, following up President Wilson's point, how many German troops had been engaged in suppressing the various Spartacist insurrections through Germany, including Bavaria.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he had no exact idea; only vague estimates were available.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the number of German troops so engaged had exceeded 100,000.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in putting his question he had in mind such isolated places as East Prussia, which adjoined Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the province of East Prussia would have no direct contact with Russia, as Lithuania intervened.

MARSHAL FOCH said that in the whole of Eastern Germany, the number of German troops did not exceed 28,000 to 30,000 men.

(Article 2 was approved.)

Article 3 PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the use of the word "never" in the second paragraph of Article 3. In his opinion, that word would cover all future time, and if that were intended, some

permanent machinery would have to be set up to ensure the execution of the conditions therein set forth.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that President Wilson's point would be met by substituting the word "not" for "never".

Article 4 & 5 (It was agreed that paragraph 2 of Article 3 should read:—"The number and strengths of the units of infantry ... constitute maxima which must not be exceeded".)

(Were read and accepted.)

Article 6 M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had proposed the following text in substitution of the one which had been previously reserved by the Supreme War Council:—"The number of Employés or Officials of the German States, such as Customs House Officers, Forest Guards, Coastguards, must not exceed that of the employés or officials functioning in 1913. The number of gendarmes and employés or officials of the local or municipal police, may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employés and officials shall never be assembled for military training".

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the word "not" should, as in the previous Article, be substituted for "never" in the last paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that if the Peace Conference were to decide that the territory on the Western bank of the Rhine should be administratively severed from the rest of Germany, the eastern section would, under this article, still be authorised to have the number of employés formerly needed by the entire German Empire.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question had better be postponed for the present, as it could not be settled until a decision had been reached on the territorial question itself.

(Clause 6 was accepted, subject to such modifications as might be required when the territorial question relating to the future

constitution of German territories on the Western bank of the Rhine came to be settled).

Articles 7 & 8 (Were read and accepted.)

Article 9 PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the word "not" should be substituted for the word "never" in the last line of the first paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 9 was accepted, as amended.)

PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the very great scope and difficulty of the second sentence of this Article, namely:—

> Article 10 "All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments, and may not be carried out until after such notification".

No limiting time was given, and no provisions were made to set up a permanent machinery for receiving the notification therein referred to, and for granting permits. In his opinion, the execution of that sentence was not feasible, and he proposed that it should be deleted from the text. It would be impossible to introduce a guarantee of that nature without setting up an instrumentality permanently limiting the sovereignty of Germany. The only other alternative would be to reserve the right of going to war with Germany in the event of her failing to make the notification therein referred to.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the same difficulty would arise if Germany were to set up an army of 200,000 men in place of the 100,000 allowed her.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. He pointed out that in the Convention provisions had been made for the setting up of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, but no time limit of any kind had been given. He quite agreed to the setting up of these Commissions during the definite time required for carrying out the necessary disarmament. But all these Commissions of Control had been made instrumentalities of the Inter-Allied High Command, which, in his opinion, meant an indefinite continuation of that Command, and of the Allied and

Associated armies. In his opinion, if the Allied armies were to be maintained for ever in order to control the carrying out of the Peace Terms; not peace, but Allied armed domination would have been established. His Government would never agree to enter into such an arrangement and, were he to enter into such an agreement, he would be far exceeding his authority under the United States Constitution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that there was very great force in what President Wilson had said. In his opinion, Article 10 was the sort of clause which would be a perpetual source of irritation and humiliation to any country; whilst, on the other hand, it would not ensure the purpose intended. For instance, if in 1870 the Germans had imposed on France a condition to limit her army, that would have been a reasonable proposition. But if Germany had, in addition, imposed a condition that France was not to order a single rifle without asking her permission, that would have been intolerable. In 40 years' time, when Germany might have recovered her self-respect, should she require to order anything to replace the armaments permitted to her, she would have to give notice separately to France, Great Britain, America, Italy and Japan. He did not know what the Germans were made of, but he certainly knew what France and Great Britain would have felt about it. In his opinion, such a condition would constitute a constant source of insult, whilst, on the other hand, it did not really serve any useful purpose. Should the Germans mean to evade it, they would merely refrain from making the required notification. The first part of Article 10, which President Wilson was ready to accept, was merely a treaty obligation, whereas the second part of the first paragraph was merely intended to check that obligation. In his opinion, however, it did not succeed in doing that, and the Allied and Associated Governments would obviously be thrown back on the ordinary means which Governments possess of checking the doings of other countries. Although diplomatically the Allies had been taken by surprise when Germany declared war, and especially in regard to the use that might be made of the guns, the number of men and the number of guns possessed by Germany had been fully and accurately known. The construction of guns and the training of men could not be carried out clandestinely. Should there be a clause in the League of Nations requiring each member to notify to the others its programme of armaments and stocks of war material, that would be in no way humiliating, as every country would be bound to do the same thing.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that a condition to that effect already practically existed in the League of Nations Covenant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the clause as it now stood would merely be making for trouble. Should some German Minister say that he would defy the Allies and refuse to give the information required: would the Allies be prepared to go to war? That might be done should Germany proceed to order rifles or war material greatly in excess of the quantities prescribed; but not otherwise. His military advisers took substantially the same view as President Wilson, namely, that the conditions objected to could never in reality be enforced, and, in his opinion, it was inexpedient to put into a treaty a number of conditions that the enemy would be bound to evade. In his opinion, that was not a good plan, as the continual evasion of a multitude of small points would eventually lead to the document itself becoming a mere scrap of paper. He wished, therefore, strongly to support President Wilson's objection.

MARSHAL FOCH held that there were two objects to be attained in regard to the control to be exercised over the execution of the clause. One control would have to be set up in order to follow the immediate application of the conditions dealing with the surrender and destruction of armaments and other war materials in excess of the quantity prescribed. The work of that control would naturally come to an end as soon as the material in question had been surrendered. But, in regard to the application of the other conditions, no provisions had been made for setting up a special control and the only control possible would be that which would, under ordinary circumstances, be exercised by Military Attachés and other similar agencies. Should the Supreme War Council, however, hold the opinion that the condition in question would cause unnecessary humiliation to the enemy, he agreed to its suppression.

(It was agreed to accept Article 10, with the omission of the following sentence:—

> "All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments and may not be carried out until after such notification.")

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the last sentence of the first paragraph of Article 11 should read as follows:—

> Article 11 "This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for the manufacture which is authorised."

(This was agreed to.)

Article 12 PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Article 12, in effect, established a limitation on the activities of other countries than Germany. One of the outstanding difficulties of the present war had been the question of ensuring that goods shipped to neutral countries did not find their way to Germany. This clause would have the effect of limiting sales by other countries to Germany. As far as he was concerned, he would be content to oblige Germany to manufacture her own armaments, if possible. But that involved a supervision of exports and imports from and into Germany, and he did not see how that could be done without setting up very complicated machinery. The United States of America had tried to do that on the Mexican frontier but with little success, because the power of smuggling was very great and required a minuteness of supervision which was not practicable. It had been agreed to set up a League of Nations which made it obligatory for each member to notify its stock of war material.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether that would not be the answer to President Wilson's criticisms.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that the League of Nations by itself would not be sufficient, because the application of Article 12 involved a perpetual and permanent supervision. In accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the members would only be required to disclose the war material possessed by them and not whence it came, whereas the Article under consideration required an investigation into the origin of supplies, not only in Germany, but in other countries also. If suitable inoffensive machinery could be set up, he would be prepared to accept the Article in question, but in the place of an illusive process of that nature he would prefer merely to judge by

results. In order to give effect to his proposal, he would suggest that Article 12 should be made to read:—

> "Germany shall strictly prohibit the import of arms, munitions and war materials of every kind, and shall also prohibit the export of the same to foreign countries."

The treaty obligation to enforce the provisions of the Article would thus be placed upon Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in his opinion, Article 12 should be accepted as it stood, as, under the Covenant of the League of Nations, it had been laid down that the manufacture of arms, munitions and war material should become a State undertaking.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the procedure mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George had only been accepted in principle.

MR. LLOYD GRORGE, continuing, said that his argument was thereby somewhat weakened. Nevertheless, if the Article as originally drafted were included as a part of the Treaty, any member of the League of Nations selling arms to Germany would be guilty of a breach of the League's Covenant.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, under the circumstances, he was prepared to withdraw his objection.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the French and English drafts did not correspond, in that the English version read:—

> "Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind *is* strictly prohibited,"

whereas the French text read:—

> "Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war materials of every kind *shall be* strictly prohibited."

(Article 12, with the following amendment, was accepted:—

> "Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited. The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.")

Article 13 MR. BALFOUR enquired how it would be possible to forbid the importation of materials required for the manufacture of asphyxiating gases, as many of these were innocent chemicals which were eventually perverted to these nefarious uses.

MARSHAL FOCH suggested, in order to meet Mr. Balfour's criticism, that the second paragraph of Article 13 might be altered to read:—

> "The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices."

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 13, as amended, was accepted.)

Article 14 Article 14 was read and accepted.

Article 15 MR. BALFOUR called attention to the second paragraph which laid down that "Until the expiration of his period of enlistment, no non-commissioned officer or private may leave the army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service." That condition would require the retention in the Army of men, for instance, who had committed every crime in the calendar. In his opinion, the imposition of such a condition would be inherently impossible.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. He thought that for pure reasons of humanity, it might be desirable to omit such a condition.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the second paragraph in question should be omitted, and that the third paragraph should be made to read:—

> "The proportion of men discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent, etc."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the words “before expiration of period of their enlistment” should be added after the words “for any reason”.

(Article 15, as amended, was approved, namely:—

> “The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be 12 consecutive years.
>
> The proportion of men discharged for any reason before expiration of the period of their enlistment must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives fixed by the second paragraph of Article 2 of the present stipulations.”)

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that a corresponding correction to that made in Article 15 would also have to be made in Article 16, by the omission of paragraph 4 and by making paragraph 5 read:— Article 16

> “The proportion of officers discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent, etc.”

(This was agreed to.)

Article 17 (Article 17 was read and approved.)

Article 18 (Article 18 was read and approved.)

Article 19 PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be told for his own information what was technically included under “Mobilisation”. Would it, for instance, prevent the whole of the 100,000 men being assembled in one place?

MARSHAL FOCH explained that by “Measures of Mobilisation” was understood any steps taken to increase the number of men, or the number of animals, forming part of an army, by the calling up of reserves.

(Article 19 was accepted.)

Article 20 PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he quite agreed with the provisions contained in Article 20 in regard to the Western frontiers of Germany. In regard to the Eastern frontiers, however, Germany, would

now be faced with much weaker Powers, owing to the creation of a number of new States, such as, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, a new Roumania, a modified Serbia, and a Turkey broken up into a score of parts, from which the stronger units would have disappeared. It must not be forgotten that Germany's ambitions had always leant towards the South and the East, and he would like to enquire whether sufficient thought had been given towards ensuring the safety of those regions against future German aggression. He was particularly concerned that nothing should be done to revive those ambitions, either by permitting Germany to attach to herself the newly created States, or by permitting her to retain as formidable a front on that side as heretofore.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the answer given by General Degoutte at a previous meeting, which would appear to cover President Wilson's objections. General Degoutte had then stated that Germany only had two fortresses which were situated less than 50 miles from the Eastern and Southern frontiers.

PRESIDENT WILSON accepted this explanation and withdrew his objections as being more theoretical than practical.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood a large number of railway sidings existed along the Franco-German frontier. He enquired from Marshal Foch whether he placed any importance on their existence.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative.

(Article 20 was accepted without amendment.)

(b) Section II. Naval Clauses. Article 21 (Article 21 was read and accepted.)

Article 22 (Article 22 was read and accepted.)

Article 23 (Article 23 was read and accepted.)

Article 24 M. LEYGUES suggested that the last sentence of Article 24, which stated that "all these vessels will be destroyed or broken up" should be omitted, as the question was purely one which affected the

Allied and Associated Governments, and a decision would be reached among themselves.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING pointed out that in the Military Clauses the expression "Allied and Associated Governments" had been employed, whereas in the Naval Clauses the expression "Governments of the Allies and the United States of America" had been used. He assumed that would be put right when the text came to be edited.

MR. BALFOUR thought it was important to decide which of these expressions should be employed. The expression "Governments of the Allies and the United States of America" had been deliberately used in the Article in question in order that no other Associated Government should participate in the possible distribution of the ships to be surrendered.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the word "Government" appeared in the singular in connection with the word "Associated" in the French text.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he preferred that the present text be retained.

(Article 24 was approved, the last sentence being deleted, namely: "All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up.")

Article 25 (Article 25 was reserved for further consideration.)

Article 26 (Article 26 was read and accepted.)

Article 27 (Article 27 was read and accepted.)

Article 28 (Article 28 was read and accepted.)

Article 29 (Article 29 was read and accepted.)

Article 30 (Article 30 was read and accepted.)

Article 31 PRESIDENT WILSON enquired what the term "in Germany" was intended to mean. Did it mean that the construction and acquisition of any submarines would be forbidden both to the German Government and to private individuals?

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative.

(Article 31 was accepted.)

Article 32 PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the last words of the last paragraph, namely: "in German territory" should be omitted.

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 32 was accepted, with the omission of the last three words: "in German territory.")

Article 33 BARON SONNINO pointed out that in the last paragraph of Article 33 the French word "Ultérieurement" had been translated as "ultimately". He suggested that a better translation would be "subsequently."

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 33 was accepted, the word "ultimately" in the last paragraph being altered to "subsequently".)

Article 34 PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the words "on account of ill-health" should be omitted in paras. (1) and para. (3) of Article 34. The concluding sentence of para. (3) being made to read:—" ... must engage to serve to the age of 45, unless discharged for sufficient reasons."

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 34 as amended was accepted.)

Article 35 PRESIDENT WILSON said he was entirely in sympathy with the destruction of the fortifications on the Islands of Heligoland and Dune, but he thought the destruction of breakwaters was rather a serious matter from a humane point of view, as those formed havens for

fishermen in case of storms in the North Sea. If the destruction of the fortifications could be assured, he could see no real justification for destroying harbours. No doubt the works had been undertaken for military reasons, but they were there now, and were extremely useful as fishing harbours.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the fishing harbours were quite different and separate from the Naval harbours. No fishing boats had ever been allowed into the Naval harbours.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the Clause was not well expressed. What was meant was that only certain harbours, that is to say, that only purely Naval harbours, should be destroyed. But that was not clearly stated in the Article in question, as the use of the word "included" gave the sentence too wide an interpretation.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in Heligoland two kinds of harbours existed, harbours for fishermen and harbours constructed as Naval Bases. After Germany had obtained possession of these islands she had built ports purely as Naval bases, and the latter were alone intended for destruction in the Article in question. That destruction was absolutely necessary in order to prevent Heligoland again becoming useful as a base for military operations.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Germany's Naval Establishment had under the Naval Convention been reduced to a minimum. The Naval Service had also been reduced to a minimum; and in addition the fortifications were all to be destroyed. Consequently, his contention was that the artificial harbours were useful places of refuge. It would be noticed that the destruction of these harbours was to be carried out "under the supervision of the Allied Governments," since the United States of America did not wish to take part in a destruction which was not considered to be necessary from a purely military point of view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that after President Wilson's statement he would rather like to look further into the question, and he suggested that this Article be reserved for future consideration.

(It was agreed that Article 35 should be reserved for future consideration.)

Article 36 (Article 36 was read and accepted.)

Article 37 PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 37 made it incumbent on Germany to notify to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America the strength of the armaments of the coast defenses. In his opinion, that was a question in which all European countries were particularly interested. He proposed, therefore, that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 should read:—"The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all European Governments."

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it would not be preferable to say straight away that the League of Nations should be informed.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that the League of Nations should be regarded as something more than an alliance to enforce this Peace Treaty. In his opinion the United States of America could be omitted from this clause, since it was not more entitled to have the information therein set forth than Japan or any other Asiatic Government.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Article 37 should be compared with Article 9 in which it was clearly stated that the number and calibre of the guns constituting the armament of fortified works, etc., would have to be notified by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thought the two articles should be placed in the same framework and, consequently, America should not be left out of Article 37.

PRESIDENT WILSON admitted the force of Mr. Balfour's contention. On the other hand, Article 37 dealt with local fortifications which could not be transported to the United States of America or elsewhere.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether the Allied and Associated Governments could not be made responsible for giving the necessary information to other Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that that would place Germany under the perpetual obligation of notifying a particular group of States as to her doings; a condition, which he considered exceedingly humiliating to her.

(Article 37 was approved; the last sentence of Paragraph 2 being made to read:—"The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all the European Governments.")

M. LEYGUES said that the Sub-Commission appointed by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held on March 6th, 1919, to report on the future regime of the Kiel Canal[1] had unanimously agreed that the following clause should be inserted in the preliminary Treaty of Peace, on the assumption that the canal should remain entirely within German territory and without prejudice to any guarantees of a military nature which might be stipulated:—

> "The Kiel Canal shall remain under the sovereignty of Germany with the reservation that the rules, which shall ultimately be formulated in regard to the international regime of navigable waterways shall be applied to this Canal and its approaches, in particular those rules which concern freedom of navigation for the subjects, goods, and flags of all nations at peace with Germany in such manner that no distinction shall be made between the subjects, goods, and flags of Germany, and of all other States at peace with her. This provision shall apply not only to merchant ships, but also to ships of war."

M. LEYGUES continuing, said that two questions arose in connection with the text submitted by the Sub-Commission. In the first place, the proposal had been made that the Canal should be placed under the sovereignty of Germany. In the past that arrangement had permitted the hegemony of Germany, and enabled it to make the Baltic a German lake, both economically and militarily. He did not think the Allies were going to allow Germany to reconstitute that power; but the use of the word "sovereignty" meant the grant of full power to Germany to do what she liked. Should the Allied and Associated Governments wish to assure a normal existence to the new Baltic nationalities, such as Finland, Poland, Esthonia, Lithuania, free access to the sea must be assured. Now, the Baltic was not a free sea since all channels had been

mined by Germany with the exception of the Kiel Canal, which was reserved for her own use. The Belt was not practicable, on account of the dangers to navigation, and there remained only the Sound which was too shallow, being less than 7 metres deep, for the passage of large ships. Therefore, the Kiel Canal could not in justice be placed under the sovereignty of Germany; it must be subjected to a regime, which would allow its free use to all countries for the passage both of commercial and military ships. The Canal was accessible to the larger ships: it had a surface width of 100 metres, a bottom width of 31 metres, and a depth of 11 metres. Therefore, unless the Kiel Canal were opened, the Baltic countries would only be able to keep ships below a certain size owing to the shallowness of the only other available channel, the sound. In his opinion, therefore, two things were necessary, namely: firstly, German sovereignty over the Kiel Canal must not be proclaimed and, secondly, the regime to be enforced should allow free access to the Baltic through the Kiel Canal to the ships of all countries, and especially to the ships of those Baltic countries whose independence and autonomy it has been decided to recognise so that their means of existence might be ensured to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was quite prepared to discuss any proposal that would make the Kiel Canal a free International waterway. But the draft text under consideration merely stated that the rules, which might ultimately be formulated in regard to the International régime of waterways should be applied to this Canal. In his opinion, that statement was extremely vague as the unknown rules formed the essence of the system to be applied. Had it been proposed to give to the Kiel Canal the same status as the Suez or Panama Canal, that would constitute a definite proposal. But the clause as now drafted merely prescribed the application of an unnamed and undefined system. He inquired, therefore, whether it would not be sufficient to say that the régime to be applied to the Kiel Canal should be the same as that applied to the Suez Canal.

M. LEYGUES said that the Admirals who had first considered the question, had proposed the following text:—"The Kiel Canal shall be opened at all times to all commercial and war ships of all nations. No nation will be given favoured treatment and no class ships shall be excluded." He suggested that the Conference should accept that text.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired when the Report of the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways could be expected. He did not think that Germany should be treated in any different way to other countries in connection with the public waterways passing through her territory. He invited attention to the International régime applied, for instance, to the Danube.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that a distinction should be drawn between the Kiel Canal and other International waterways, in that the Kiel Canal was an artificial waterway running altogether through Germany, and created by her; whereas great rivers, like the Danube, constituted the boundaries of nations, or passed through one national territory and continued in another.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Conference was now discussing how to limit Germany's military and naval power. The use of the Kiel Canal in time of war gave Germany an enormous advantage, and it was in the public interest that the Kiel Canal should not be used for purely military purposes. From a commercial point of view, he was told, the Kiel Canal was not of much importance; consequently, unless the fortifications in connection with the Canal could be destroyed, it was of little use to take any other action. He proposed that the whole question should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the question should be left to the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways because it constituted, in reality, a purely commercial question and, he thought, the same general policy ought to apply to the Kiel Canal as to other International waterways.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the Sub-Commission which had considered the question of the Kiel Canal had accepted that principle. On the other hand, it would be difficult to avoid the Kiel Canal remaining under the sovereignty of Germany.

MR. BALFOUR thought that measures should nevertheless be taken to prevent its being fortified.

ADMIRAL DE BON said, in reference to Mr. Balfour's statement in regard to the employment of the Kiel Canal for military purposes, that the destruction of all fortifications had been prescribed. The French representatives had, in fact, drawn up the following text for inclusion in Article 38:—

> "In view of ensuring free passage through the Kiel Canal, from the North Sea into the Baltic, Germany will neither erect any fortification nor instal any gun, in the islands or on its territory, within 30 miles from the Elbe Mouth and the Kiel Canal.
>
> The fortifications now in existence will be demolished and the guns removed, within three months.
>
> The same will apply to the torpedo-tube batteries, the mine-stores, and obstruction material sheds."

This text had, however, not yet been accepted by the Allied Naval experts.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the further consideration of Article 38 should be postponed until the Report of the Inter-Allied Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways had been received. He understood their Report might shortly be expected.

BARON SONNINO said that if he were correctly informed, the work of the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways was being held up pending a decision being reached on certain territorial questions. Consequently, this particular question should be referred to that Commission as a special thing, requiring immediate decision. Otherwise the Conference by referring questions from one Commission to another would be entering into a vicious circle.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the fact that in a previous Article provisions had been made for the disarmament of the coasts of Germany, which would obviously include the armaments in the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal. Therefore, there would be no great objection in omitting Article 38 altogether. The Convention was, in his opinion, quite complete without that Article, which could, eventually, find a place in some other document.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed on the clear understanding that the Article should form part of the Preliminaries of Peace.

(It was agreed to reserve Article 38 for further consideration.)

Article 39 (Article 39 was read and agreed.)

Article 40 M. CLEMENCEAU said that a Report relating to submarine cables had been submitted by the Judicial Commission to which the question had been referred, but it had not yet been circulated.

PRESIDENT WILSON submitted that the question was not a military or a naval one at all, except in a very restricted measure.

M. LEYGUES suggested that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to a later date as the Report of the Commission relating thereto had not yet been distributed.

(Article 40 was reserved for further consideration.)

Section 3. Air Clauses. Article 41 (Article 41 was read and approved.)

Article 42 (Article 42 was approved. The English text being altered to read:—"within two months from the signature of the present stipulation ...")

Article 43 (Article 43 was read and approved.)

(The following text of Article 44 was approved:—

> Article 44 "Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing".)

Article 45 GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that in drafting Article 45 the British, Italian, Japanese, and French Representatives had asked for the addition of the following words at the end of Article 45, viz:—

> "And after the signature of the Treaty of Peace during a period to be fixed by the Treaty of Peace"

This proposal had been opposed by the American representative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he could not accept any such additional condition. He thought the Article should stand as at present drafted.

GENERAL DUVAL explained that the Commission had asked for the addition of the words in question for the reason fully set forth in the following report of the Aeronautical Commission on the questions referred by the Supreme War Council of the Peace Conference:—

> "It was thereupon ruled that the questions to be answered were four in number, viz:—
>
> 1st Question. Can civil aeroplanes and airships be easily transformed into weapons of war?
> 2nd Question. Should all aviation and all aeronautical fabrication continue to be forbidden, in Germany and all other enemy States, until the signature of the Treaty of Peace?
> 3rd Question. After the Treaty of Peace and in view of the easy transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of war, will it be necessary to prohibit civilian aviation in Germany and all other enemy States?
> 4th Question. Arising out of the preceding questions is it necessary to suggest alterations in the Regulations concerning the Air Terms imposed on Germany until signature of the Treaty of Peace?

I. In answer to Question 1 the Commission unanimously replied:—

Yes Commercial aeroplanes and airships can be very easily and quickly transformed into weapons of war.

II. In answer to Question 2, the Commission unanimously replied:—

Yes (question quoted).

III. In reply to Question 3 (quoted), Great Britain replied as follows:

> *Yes*, for a period long enough to dissipate the very extensive air industry now existing in Germany and all States which became

> our enemies by reason of the war. This period should not, in its opinion, be less than from two to five years.

France replied as follows:—

> *Yes*, for 20 or 30 years, a period required for the destruction of all existing flying material and dispersion of personnel, for it is impossible to foresee the progress of flying in the immediate future. Even now:—
>
> 1 aeroplane can carry 1 ton of explosives a distance of 300 kilometres.
>
> 1000 aeroplanes can carry 1000 tons of explosives a distance of 300 kilometres (or more than has been dropped during a whole year of war). In order to have 1000 aeroplanes ready for use at any time, it is sufficient for the factories to turn them out at the rate of 100 a month.

Italy replied as follows:—

> *Yes*, for a long period, since Germany and all enemy States deserve to be penalised and the Allies are entitled to take precautions.

Japan replied:—

Yes, (agreeing with the majority).

The United States replied:—

> *No*, considering all such restrictions of the entire flying activity of Germany and her Allies after the signature of the Treaty of Peace to be neither wise nor practicable.

IV. In accordance with the answers given to the above questions, and after extensive study of the Regulations relating to the Air Terms imposed on Germany until the signature of the Treaty of Peace, the Commission recommended that the following amendments be made to such Regulations, viz:—

1. That Article 45 be completed as follows:— “And after signature of the Treaty of Peace during a period to be fixed by the Treaty of Peace.”

This was carried by a majority of votes.

The United States reserve their opinion as regards this addition.

2. That the whole of Article 50 be omitted.

This was carried unanimously.”

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Military Units of aircraft had already been regulated by other Articles. The addition proposed was an excursion into other realms. Railroad trains could be used to carry guns, should the manufacture of trains therefore be limited? Some types of ships could be readily converted for military use, should the construction of ships be limited on this account? The amount of military equipment authorized has already been limited, and personally he was not willing to go any further in that direction.

(Article 45 was accepted without amendment).

Article 46 PRESIDENT WILSON asked the Commission that formulated Article 46 to say whether all the materials specified constituted military material or not.

GENERAL DUVAL replied in the affirmative.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether plant[s] for the manufacture of hydrogen necessarily constituted military material?

GENERAL DUVAL replied that the proviso in question related only to hydrogen plant[s] in military Aviation Parks.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that had not been specifically stated.

GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that the commencement of Article 46 clearly stated that “on the signature of the present stipulations, all military and naval aeronautical material, … must be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments”.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the first paragraph were strictly interpreted and applied it would be sufficient. He was perfectly satisfied with all military material, but he did not think that it was clear that only this was intended. He had another observation to make, namely, that it was not definitely stated whether this material should be destroyed or turned over. If turned over, it must either be stored or divided. In case the latter method were adopted, would it be put to the credit of Germany on the balance sheet or not? He thought many complicated questions might arise from this paragraph.

GENERAL DUVAL stated that there had not been full unanimity as to what disposition should be made of the materials surrendered; but in any case it was not considered that this disposition should be specified in the terms agreed to with the Germans. There was entire unanimity about this, and about the fact that the material should be surrendered.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question under consideration formed a parallel case with that relating to the surrender of ships, and the disposition of the aircraft should be decided on the same principles. He was informed by his experts that all aircraft and aircraft appliances and sheds, now in Germany, were military, as Germany had no commercial aircraft as yet.

M. SONNINO proposed that the third paragraph should be made to read as follows:—

> "In particular, there will be included the following military and naval material".

PRESIDENT WILSON, subsequently, proposed that the following phraseology should be accepted for the third paragraph of Article 46:—

> "In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes".

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 46 was adopted, paragraph 3 being altered to read:—

> "In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes".)

(d) Section IV. General Articles. Article 47 PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his willingness to accept Article 47, but the German Government was in an unstable equilibrium, and supposing it were upset within three months, then the Allied and Associated Governments would presumably have to set up a new Government in Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the same remark would apply to all the Articles of the Convention.

M. FROMAGEOT asked for a ruling as to the character of the document that the Conference wished to present to the Germans. If the Convention under discussion were to be considered merely as a set of military clauses for immediate execution by the Germans, and not as a Treaty of Peace, it was to be feared that when the Treaty of Peace was presented to Germany, she would argue that the clauses previously accepted had not been Peace conditions, and consequently were open to fresh discussions. On the other hand, if the Articles under consideration were to be considered as final Peace conditions, then it would be necessary for them to be ratified by the legislators of the various countries, parties to the agreement, and in that case he would suggest that Article 47 be made to read:—

> "After the expiration of a period of three months from the date of exchange of ratifications of present stipulations for German laws, etc."

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the same question arose in regard to Article 48, and asked that that Article be read before the whole question came under discussion.

Article 48 (Article 48 was then read.)

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that the paragraph as it now read indicated that these terms would be part of the Armistice. But if they were to constitute the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, the wording was

not correct. In this matter he found himself in considerable difficulty, and he would be compelled to seek legal advice. He had assumed that this preliminary Convention would only be temporary until the complete Treaty was prepared, and that it would have the character of a sort of exalted armistice, the terms being re-included in the formal Treaty. If this Preliminary Convention should have to be submitted to the Senate for a general discussion there, he knew from the usual slow processes of legislatures that it would be several months before it could be ratified.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that the statements made by President Wilson were most important and serious. As he understood the situation, the policy accepted was that a Preliminary Peace should be made, each clause of which should be a part of the final Act, so that by the settlement of the Preliminary Peace a great part of the final permanent Peace would actually have been conquered. It now appeared, however, that the American Constitution made that full programme impracticable.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not feel quite sure of his ground, and he proposed that the question be postponed until he could consult with the Constitutional lawyers, in whose opinion he had more confidence than in his own. For the present, it appeared to him that they would have to use the alternative phraseology proposed by M. Fromageot, namely:—"After the expiration of a period of three months from the date of exchange of ratifications of present stipulations for German laws, etc."

(Articles 47 and 48 were reserved for further consideration.)

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the footnote of Article 49, and expressed the view that the note was not really relevant, as no express time limit had been fixed.

(e) Section V. Inter-Allied Commissions of Control. Article 49
PRESIDENT WILSON said that while it was not specifically stated that any of the Commissions provided should have an indefinite duration, he thought it would be advisable to add a statement including the explanation made by Marshal Foch that these Commissions would not continue more than three months.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that it appeared to him unnecessary to undertake such a contract with the Germans. They could agree to this among themselves.

MR. BALFOUR called attention to the fact that some of the operations might take more than three months, such as the destruction of the naval works at Heligoland harbour. It appeared to him that provision would have to be made for supervision during an indefinite, not an eternal, period.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that some definite conclusion should be reached.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it would not be necessary to continue to exercise supervision over the German Army and its armaments in order to ensure their maintenance in the status stipulated.

PRESIDENT WILSON held that supervision of that nature would become endless. He thought that the Allies should agree among themselves that these Commissions would cease to function when the terms had once been carried out; for example, as soon as the army had been actually reduced to 100,000 men.

MARSHAL FOCH maintained that Articles 49 and 50 mutually explained one another.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Article 49 included in general all the terms, and was not specifically limited by Article 50.

M. ORLANDO thought that a very important point had been raised and it was necessary that a distinction should be made. First of all, there were clauses the execution of which could be completed within a definite period, and it had been unanimously agreed that the Commissions of Control over the execution of these clauses would last during the time necessary for their execution. But there were also clauses the execution of which would extend over an indefinite period, and the most important of these seemed to be that Germany should not have an army exceeding 100,000 men. It was necessary, then, to know what control the Allies would establish to supervise the carrying out of these clauses operating during an indefinite period. Marshal

Foch had said that the control of the Commissions would not be applied to the clauses having an indefinite period of execution. Article 49 should, therefore, be modified to conform with this interpretation and to make the distinction between the two kinds of stipulations clear. It remained, then, to determine what guarantee the Allies would have for the execution of the other stipulations. Commissions could not be charged with this duty, as Germany would, as a result, always remain under the control of such Commissions. He personally would not object to such a proposal, but he did not think it would be accepted. What guarantee would there then be? The League of Nations might be considered. One of the Allied Powers alone could not be charged with this duty since Germany had taken engagements towards all the Allies conjointly. Some Inter-Allied agency would, therefore, have to be constituted. He feared he might be accused of raising difficulties, but it seemed to him that these were questions which must be considered.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that the question raised by M. Orlando was a very important one, but he thought that they were digressing from the question under consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that "All Military, Naval and Air Clauses" should be substituted for "The Military, Naval and Air Clauses".

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 49 as amended was approved, to read as follows:—

> "All Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present stipulations for which a time limit is fixed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments.")

Article 50 (Article 50 was read and approved.)

Article 51 (Article 51 was read and approved.)

Article 52 (Article 52 was read and approved.)

Article 53 (Article 53 was read and approved.)

Articles 54, 55 and 56 PRESIDENT WILSON said that these Articles, as at present drafted, contemplated the continuation of the Inter-Allied High Command during a period of three or four months after the signing of the Peace Preliminaries. He wished to enquire why the High Command should be continued when Commissions had been created whose function it would be to supervise the complete execution of the stipulations of the Treaty. He proposed, therefore, that the Military Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should represent the Allied and Associated Governments. The same remark applied to Article 55, where the words: "Allied and Associated Governments", should be substituted for "Admiralties of the Allied Governments and the United States".

(It was agreed:—

(1) That Article 54 should read: "The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with …"
(2) That Article 55 should read: "The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied Governments and the United States in dealing with …"
(3) That Article 56 should read: "The Aerial Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with …")

(The Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace were accepted, subject to the following amendments and reservations:—

Section I.

Article 3. Paragraph 2 to read:—"The number and strengths of the units of infantry … constitute maxima which must not be exceeded".

Article 6. The following amended text was accepted, subject to such modifications as might be required when the territorial question relating to the future constitution of German territories on the Western bank of the Rhine came to be settled:—"The number of employés or officials of the German States, such as Customs House Officers, Forest Guards, Coastguards, must not exceed that of the employés or officials functioning in 1913.

The number of gendarmes and employés or officials of the local or municipal police, may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employés and officials shall not be assembled for military training."

Article 9. The word "not" to be substituted for "never" in the last line of the first paragraph.

Article 10. The second sentence to be omitted:—"All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments and may not be carried out until after such notification".

Article 11. The last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows: —"This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for the manufacture which is authorised".

Article 12. The words "shall be" to be substituted for "is" in the first paragraph.

Article 13. Paragraph 2 to read:—"The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices".

Article 15. The following amended text was accepted:—"The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be 12 consecutive years. The proportion of men discharged for any reason before expiration of the period of their enlistment must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives fixed by the second paragraph of Article 2 of the present stipulations".

Article 16. The fourth paragraph to be omitted. The fifth paragraph to be amended to read:—"The proportion of officers discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives of officers provided by Article 2, third paragraph, of the present stipulations".

Section II.

Article 24. The last sentence of Article, viz: “All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up” to be deleted.

Article 25. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 32. The last three words, viz: “in German territory” to be deleted.

Article 33. The word “subsequently” to be substituted for “ultimately” in the last paragraph.

Article 34. The words “on account of ill-health” in paragraphs 1 and 3 to be deleted, paragraph 3 being amended to read:—“Officers belonging at the date of the signature of the present stipulations to the German Navy and not demobilised must engage to serve to the age of 45, unless discharged for sufficient reasons”.

Article 35. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 37. The last sentence of paragraph 2 to read:—“The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all the European Governments”.

Article 38. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 40. Reserved for further consideration.

Section III.

Article 42. This Article to commence:—“Within two months …”

Article 44. The following text was accepted:—“Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany the freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing”.

Article 46. The third paragraph was amended to read as follows:—“In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes”.

Section IV.

Article 47. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 48. Reserved for further consideration.

Section V.

Article 49. Article 49 to be amended to read as follows:—"All Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present stipulations for which a time limit is fixed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments".

Article 54. This article to read:—"The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with ..."

Article 55. This Article to read:—"The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied Governments and the United States in dealing with ..."

Article 56. This Article to read:—"The Aerial Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with ..."

2. MARSHAL FOCH asked permission to draw the attention of the Conference to the situation in Poland. On the 2nd of January last the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send to Poland a Mission to report on the situation and on the needs of that country. Mr. Noulens, in despatches dated the 5th, 8th, 11th and 12th March had, in the name of the Mission, drawn attention to the actual situation existing in Poland. The gravity of the situation was such that the very existence of this nation, which the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to recognise, to reconstitute and to assist, was in question. The most imminent danger related to the town of Lemberg which was infested by the Ukrainians, and whose fall would entail that of the Polish Government. Such an eventuality threatened to draw into anarchy a country menaced on three sides by the Germans, Bolsheviks and by the Ukrainians. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to take immediate action, and the Allied and

Associated Governments could no longer delay in arriving at a decision in order to ward off the grave peril which threatened Poland. Assistance must at once be sent to Lemberg. The possible measures included the transport to Lemberg of a part of the Polish troops at Odessa if the situation in that region made this possible; and the transport to Lemberg of one Polish regiment from France. The transport of these troops would be carried out over the Roumanian, Italian and Austrian railways and for this purpose an understanding would have to be reached by the Allied General Staffs. The force thus made available would, however, [be] largely strengthened by the support of the Roumanian Army, for which purpose a force of ten to twelve divisions at least could be obtained of good physique and good moral[e]. The Roumanian Government had, in principle, agreed to participate in the prepared operations on the condition that the Allied and Associated Governments would furnish the material which was lacking, namely: clothing, equipment and food. The assistance of the Roumanian Army should be accepted without delay and without hesitation on account of its great value and on account of the proximity of Roumania to the theatre of operations. It was of the utmost importance that Roumania should be given, without delay, the assistance, required, but in order to bring together the necessary resources concerted action between the Allied General Staffs was again necessary. Inter-Allied Intervention in Poland: (a) Marshal Foch's Scheme for Allied Intervention in Poland

To sum up, the two countries, Poland and Roumania, with whom the Allies were tied, offered sufficient forces for the purpose required, provided that these troops received guidance and material assistance. Their combined action would constitute a most solid barrier against Bolshevism, which would otherwise triumph. The object in view would be realised as soon as the Allied Governments decided on a resolute policy, affirming their resolve to stop the progress of Bolshevism, and constituting for the purpose an Allied High Command, charged with the duty of supplying to Poland and to Roumania (and eventually to the other Governments in a position to act, such as Finland etc.,) the necessary material aid, and with the duty of co-ordinating the action of these various Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hoped the Conference would not accede to the proposals contained in the statement read by Marshal Foch as, he

thought, it would merely mean giving support to the perpetration of a great mischief. The proposal at bottom merely meant the setting up of a great army for the eventual invasion of Russia. It would be agreed that Roumania had nothing whatever to do with Lemberg, but it was hoped that, once the Roumanian troops had been brought to that place, they would be available for operations against Russia. He was entirely opposed to any such operations which could only be carried out at the expense of the Allies. Even supposing the policy was correct, who was going to pay? Roumania could not finance their own justifiable military operations. The Poles were starving and unable to defend Lemberg against an untrained mob of Ukrainian rebels, unless they were organised, furnished with supplies, and paid by the Allies. He, therefore, personally would have nothing to do with the proposal which merely, being interpreted, meant that in the first place the Roumanians and the Poles would be assembled in Galicia and under the guise of relieving Lemberg, Russia would be invaded. Furthermore, the proposal suggested the transfer of troops from Odessa. Did the Conference fully realise what was happening in that region? It had been said that the Ukrainians possessed a powerful army, that they did not want the Bolsheviks, that they would be able in effect to roll the Bolsheviks back to Moscow. As a matter of fact, it appeared that the Allied troops, as well as the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian troops, had actually been driven back to a narrow fringe in the south of the country. Kerson had been lost and the Bolsheviks were pressing on towards Odessa; the whole of that grain district had, in fact, fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks. In the face of that situation, it was now proposed to take all the forces from Odessa in order to take part in some quarrel at Lemberg. In his opinion, these proposals merely meant giving help to the Bolsheviks, since Petlura was fighting against the Bolsheviks and now it was proposed to destroy him.

In regard to the question of Lemberg, he would enquire whether any decision had been reached that the town should belong to Poland. In his opinion no decision had been reached by the Committee appointed to enquire into the frontiers of Poland. Why, therefore, should the Conference decide the question in favour of the Poles and against the Ukrainians before the question had been properly examined? Had the Poles felt very strongly on this question he thought they would have been able to defend themselves.

To sum up, he was entirely in favour of using all sources of persuasion in order to bring about the temporary settlement of the dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the same way as had been done in the case of Teschen. But he was absolutely opposed to the idea of organizing armies, to the idea of sending Roumanians at the Allies' expense to Lemberg, and to the idea of sending Haller's Army, which was required to defend Poland, to Lemberg to fight questions of this kind. Consequently, he suggested that the proposal made by Marshal Foch should be negatived in so far as it related to military operations, and that persuasion should, in the meantime, be used pending a decision on the question of the frontiers of Poland. Apparently the Poles had a quarrel with the Ukrainians and an attempt was being made by them to grasp territory from the Ruthenians. No doubt the Polish troops would march against Lemberg, provided they were fed and paid by the Allies, but he personally would never agree to such a proposal.

MARSHAL FOCH asked that the discussion should be brought back to the particular question under consideration. Today was the 17th March, a month in which the enemy generally prepared his offensive, a fact which was evidenced by the experience of previous years. Therefore, if the Conference would that day merely consider the Allied situation, and not that of the enemy which was unknown, the following conclusions would be reached.

In accordance with M. Noulens' report, it would be admitted that the situation in Poland was very grave. Lemberg was about to fall, and if Lemberg fell the Polish Government would fall with it. That is to say, the Government would be wrecked at its birth, and the country, which it had been intended to re-constitute, would be threatened, by Germans, Bolsheviks and Ukrainians with the result that the creation of the Allies might only live a few days. To prevent the occurrence of this catastrophe, the Commission sent to Poland by the Allied and Associated Governments had proposed that the Polish troops at Odessa and in France should be sent to Lemberg without delay. And, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, he had put forward proposals to give effect to the demands made by the Commission. He had accordingly proposed that arrangements should forthwith be made by the Allied General Staffs for the transportation of the above Polish troops across various territories, in order to assist in the defence of Lemberg, which

would otherwise fall. The Commission had also reported that assistance could be given by Roumanian troops, who were only too anxious to give the help required, provided an understanding were reached between the Roumanian and Polish Governments. He (Marshal Foch) still took, as the basis of his proposals, the suggestions made by the Inter-Allied Commission which had been sent to Poland; and, in order to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission, he had merely formulated a scheme having as its object the continuation of the policy hitherto followed, namely: the creation of an independent Poland, and its support when threatened. The Roumanian Government, which was fighting on the Allied side, had agreed to send troops to Lemberg on condition of its receiving some assistance. The scheme he had proposed was a very moderate and restricted one; it was based on the recommendations made by the Polish Commission and it would work out successfully with the employment of only small military means, without great expense, and without undertaking any imprudent engagements. By the application of his scheme, a nucleus of resistance against the Bolsheviks would be created, and time would be gained for a further study of the situation. At the present moment, it was undeniable that the Bolsheviks were gaining ground everywhere in South Russia, and they were preparing a big attack on the Lower Dniester. Consequently, measures should forthwith be taken to put up a resistance to prevent the wings of the anti-Bolshevik armies being rolled up and the centre being pierced. It was with that object in view that he had proposed to constitute here an Inter-Allied staff to deal with this question with a view to the utilisation of all available means.

M. PICHON drew attention to the fact that the Polish Commission, which had dealt with this particular question, had put forward certain definite proposals, which would appear to agree with what Mr. Lloyd George had said, Paragraph 3 of the Commission's proposal, dated 14th March, 1919, read as follows:—

> "3. Lastly, with the object of making a simultaneous diplomatic attempt to save Lemberg, it submits to the Supreme Council the proposal to enjoin the Ukrainian Government, through the intermediary of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice.

> If this attempt is to have any chance of success, the armistice conditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account, and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields."

In his opinion, in the manner above suggested, a solution might best be obtained. He thought if the Ukrainians were given the oilfields, they would be likely to accept an armistice. That was the proposal which had been put forward by General Barthélémy, and General Carton de Wiart, and had been accepted by all the experts, except Marshal Foch.

M. CAMBON said that he was President of the Committee for Polish Affairs. Having heard General Barthélémy and General Carton de Wiart and Lieutenant Foster, his Committee had decided to adopt the recommendation just read by M. Pichon, which included the idea of an armistice. The Commission in Poland had recently visited General Petlura and had been somewhat badly received. In consequence the conclusion had been reached that the proposal for an armistice by itself would not in all probability satisfy the Ukrainians, unless some advantages were at the same time granted to them, such as the temporary cession of the oilfields. In addition, in order to make the acceptance of an armistice more certain, it would be necessary for Poland to be able to put forward some show of force. For that reason, in his opinion, the necessary help should be given to Poland by the immediate return of the Polish troops now in France.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired by what route the troops would be sent from France to Poland. He thought there would be some difficulty in sending them via Dantzig.

(c) [*sic*] Supply of Ships for Transport of Gen. Haller's Troops to Poland MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the difficulty was one of shipping. No ships were available unless each of the Allies agreed to make a contribution, as it was a question of withdrawing ships which would otherwise be employed for the transportation of Australian or American troops from France.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired as to the advisability of communicating with the Allied Maritime Transport Council with a view to hastening the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the shipping question was one which would have to be settled by the Governments concerned as matters of policy were involved, which the Allied Maritime Council could not settle. There was no spare shipping and consequently the ships required for Polish troops could only be obtained by the temporary withdrawal of ships at present employed for the transport of Allied and American homeward bound troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the Allied Maritime Council could not be asked to submit a memorandum showing what each country was required to do, that is to say, to submit a scheme giving a definite quota of contribution.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU summing up, said that the proposal made by the Committee for Polish Affairs which read as follows should at present be accepted:—

> "With the object of making a simultaneous diplomatic attempt to save Lemberg, it submits to the Supreme Council the proposal to enjoin the Ukrainian Government, through the intermediary of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice. If this attempt is to have any chance of success, the armistice conditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account, and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields".

(This was agreed to.)

(d) Appointment of an Allied General Staff to Study Question of Transport of Polish Troops to Poland and Possible Utilisation of Roumanian Troops in Poland MARSHAL FOCH proposed that the question of the transport of Polish troops from France and Odessa to Poland should be studied by an Allied General Staff. He also proposed, with the consent of the Conference, to study the possible utilisation of the Roumanian troops in Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the question to be settled was chiefly a financial one, as the employment of the Roumanian army would entail

considerable expense.

MARSHAL FOCH pressed for a definite answer to his proposal. He asked, in the event of its acceptance, that a representative of each Government should be appointed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed to accept the first part of Marshal Foch's proposal, relating to the study of the question of the transport of Polish troops from France and Odessa to Poland; but he declined to agree to the study of the second proposition to which he was entirely opposed in principle. He could not agree to instruct the Allied Commander-in-Chief to study the question of attacking the Ukrainians at Lemberg, whilst at the same time, General Franchet d'Esperey was being instructed to do all he could to help the Ukrainians to fight against the Bolsheviks at Odessa.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his agreement with Mr. Lloyd George's views.

M. ORLANDO said that he would also accept Marshal Foch's first proposal.

(It was agreed:—

(1) To call upon the Allied Maritime Transport Council to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller's troops from France to Dantzig.
(2) To enjoin the Ukrainian Government through the intermediary of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice. The armistice conditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields.
(3) To authorise Marshal Foch to study the possibility of the transport of Polish troops to Poland from France and Odessa.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 18th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace

SECTION I.—*Military Clauses*

CHAPTER I.—EFFECTIVES AND CADRES OF THE GERMAN ARMY

ARTICLE 1

Within two months of the signature of the present stipulations the German military forces shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

ARTICLE 2

The German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

In no case must the total number of effectives in the army of the States constituting Germany ever exceed 100,000 men, including officers and establishment of depots. The arm shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.

The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed 4,000.

ARTICLE 3

Divisions and Army Corp Headquarters staffs shall be organised in accordance with Table No. I. annexed hereto.

The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in the Table constitute maxima which must never be exceeded.

The following units may each have their own depot:—

An infantry regiment;
A cavalry regiment;
A regiment of Field Artillery;
A battalion of Pioneers.

Article 4

The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarter staffs.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.

The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the Administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength laid down in Article 2, 2nd paragraph, of the present stipulations.

Article 5

Army administrative services consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives prescribed by the present stipulations will have such personnel reduced in each class to one-tenth of that laid down in the Budget of 1913.

Article 6

(Reserved by the Supreme War Council.)

chapter ii.—armament, munitions and material

Article 7

At the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the German army must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table No. 2, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding one-twentyfifth part for small arms and one-fiftieth part for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary.

Article 8

At the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations, the stock of munitions which the German army may have at its disposal shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table No. 3.

Within the same period the German Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments. The German Government is forbidden to establish any other stocks, depots or reserves of munitions.

Article 9

The number and calibre of the guns constituting, at the date of the signature of the present stipulations, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses, and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain, will be immediately notified by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Governments, and will constitute maximum amounts which may never be exceeded.

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations, the maximum stock of ammunition for these guns will be reduced to, and maintained at, the following uniform rates:—1,500 rounds per piece for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm. and under: 500 rounds per piece for those of higher calibre.

Article 10

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material, shall only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Governments, and the number of which they retain the right to restrict. All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments, and may not be carried out until after such notification.

Within three months from the signature of the present stipulations, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatever shall be closed. The same applies to all arsenals except those used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions. Within the same period the personnel of these arsenals will be dismissed.

Article 11

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations, German arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material, existing in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed, will be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Governments to be destroyed or rendered useless. This will also apply to special plant-intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for manufacture which is authorised.

The surrender in question will be effected at such points in German territory as may be selected by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Within the same period arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material, of origin other than German in whatever state they may be, will be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments, who will decide as to their disposal.

Article 12

Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited.

The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.

Article 13

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.

The same applies to materials for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

chapter iii.—recruiting and military training

Article 14

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany.

The German Army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

Article 15

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be twelve consecutive years.

Until the expiration of his period of enlistment no non-commissioned officer or private may leave the Army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service.

The proportion of men so discharged must not exceed in any year five per cent of the total effectives fixed by Article 2, second paragraph, of the present stipulations.

Article 16

The officers who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of forty-five years at least.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for twenty-five consecutive years at least.

Officers who have previously belonged to any formations whatever of the Army, and who are not retained in the units allowed to be maintained, must not take part in any military exercise whether theoretical or practical, and will not be under any military obligations whatever.

No officer may leave the Army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service.

The proportion of officers so discharged must not exceed in any year five percent of the total effectives of officers provided by Article 2, third paragraph, of the present stipulations.

Article 17

On the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations there must only exist in Germany the number of military schools which is absolutely indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed. These schools will be exclusively intended for the recruitment of officers of each arm, in the proportion of one school per arm.

The number of pupils admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The pupils and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by Article 2, second and third paragraphs, of the present stipulations.

Consequently, and during the period fixed above, all military academies or similar institutions of the German States as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers ("Aspiranten"), cadets, non-commissioned officers or student non-commissioned officers ("Aspiranten"), other than the schools above provided for, will be abolished.

Article 18

Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and generally speaking associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters. In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms.

These societies, associations, educational establishments and universities must have no connection with the Ministries of War or any other military authority.

Article 19

All measures of mobilisation or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden.

In no case must, formations, administrative services or General Staffs include supplementary cadres.

CHAPTER IV.—FORTIFICATIONS

ARTICLE 20

Within three months of the date of the signature of the present stipulations all fortified works, fortresses and field works situated on Germany's territory to the west of a line drawn fifty miles to the east of the Rhine will be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance, is forbidden in this zone. The fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany will be maintained in their existing state.

TABLE NO. 1

STATE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTER STAFFS AND OF INFANTRY AND CAVALRY DIVISIONS

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

I. ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Units	Maximum No. Authorised	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	N. C. O.'s & Men
Army Corps Headquarter Staffs	2	30	150
Total of Headquarter Staffs		60	300

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Unit	Max. No. of such units in	Maximum Strengths of each unit

	a single division	Officers	N. C. O.'s & Men
H. Q. of an Infantry Div	1	25	70
H. Q. of Divisional Infantry	1	4	30
H. Q. of Divisional Artillery	1	4	30
Regiment of Infantry. Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry. Each Battalion comprises 3 companies of Infantry & 1 machine gun Companly.	3	70	2,300
Trench Mortar Company	3	6	150
Divisional Squadron	1	6	150
Field Artillery Regiment. Each Regiment comprises 3 groups of artillery. Each group comprises:—3 batteries.	1	85	1,300
Pioneer Battalion. This Battn. comprises:—2 companies of pioneers, 1 Pontoon detachment, 1 searchlight section.	1	12	400
Signal Detachment: This detachment comprises:—1 telephone detachment, 1 listening section, 1 carrier pigeon section.	1	12	300
Divisional Medical Service	1	20	400
Parks and Convoys		14	800
Total for Infantry Division		410	10,830

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAVALRY DIVISION

Unit	Max. No. of such units in a single division	Maximum Strengths of each unit	
		Officers	N.C.O.'s & Men
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division	1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment	6	40	800

Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons			
Horse Artillery Group (3 Batteries)	1	20	400
Total for Cavalry Division		275	5,250

TABLE NO. 2

TABULAR STATEMENT OF ARMAMENT ESTABLISHMENT FOR A MAXIMUM OF 7 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 CAVALRY DIVISIONS AND 2 ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTER STAFFS

	Infantry Division	For 7 Infantry Divisions	Cavalry Division	For 3 Cavalry Divisions	2 Army Corps Headquarters	Total of Columns 2, 4, and 5
Material:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rifles	12,000	84,000				84,000
Carbines			5,000	18,000	This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.	18,000
Heavy machine guns.	108	756	12	36		792
Light machine guns.	162	1,134				1,134
Medium Trench Mortars.	9	63				63
Light trench Mortars.	27	189				189
7.7 cm. guns	24	168	12	36		204
10.5 cm. Howitzers.	12	84				84

TABLE NO. 3

Maximum Stocks Authorised

Maximum number of arms authorised				Establishment per unit	Maximum Totals
Rifles			84,000	400 rounds	40,800,000
Carbines			18,000		
Heavy Machine guns			792	8,000 rounds	15,408,000
Light	”	”	1,134		
Medium Trench Mortars			63	600 rounds	25,200
Light Trench Mortars			189	800 rounds	151,200
Field Artillery		7.7 cm. guns	204	1,000 rounds	204,000
		10.5 cm. Howitzers	84	800 rounds	67,000

Section II.—*Naval Clauses*

Article 21

After the expiration of a period of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the German naval forces in commission must not exceed

6 battleships of the “Deutschland” or “Lothringen” type,
6 light-cruisers,
12 destroyers,
12 torpedo boats,

or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 30.

No submarines are to be included.

All other warships, except where there is provision to the contrary in the present stipulations, must be placed in reserve or devoted to commercial purposes.

Article 22

Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by the present stipulations (Article 33) Germany will keep in commission such number of minesweeping vessels as may be fixed by the Allies and the United States of America.

Article 23

After the expiration of a period of two months the total personnel of the German navy, including the manning of the fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, must not exceed 15,000, including officers and men of all grades and corps.

The total strength of officers and warrant officers must not exceed 1,500.

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations, the personnel in excess of the above strength shall be demobilised.

No naval or military corps or reserve force in connection with the navy may be organised without being included in the above strength.

Article 24

From the date of the present stipulations all the German surface warships which are not in German ports cease to belong to Germany, who renounces all rights over them.

Vessels which, in compliance with the armistice, are now interned in the ports of the Allies, are declared to be finally surrendered.

(Reserved) Vessels which are now interned in neutral ports will be there surrendered to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America. The German Government must address a notification to that effect to the neutral Powers on the signature of the present stipulations. (All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up.)

Article 25 (reserved)

Within a period of two months from the date of the present stipulations, the German surface warships enumerated below will be sunk.

These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the Armistice dated 11 November, 1918. Nevertheless they must have all their guns on board.

These vessels will be sunk in the presence and under the control of representatives of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America and in such place as shall be fixed by the said Governments.

Battleships

Oldenburg
Thüringen
Ostfriesland
Helgoland
Posen
Westfalen
Rheinland
Nassau

Light-Cruisers

Stettin
Danzig
München
Lübeck
Strassburg
Augsburg
Kolberg
Stuttgart

and in addition forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 26

On the signature of the present stipulations the German Government must undertake, under the supervision of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America, the breaking-up of all the German surface warships now under construction.

Article 27

The German auxiliary cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries, of which the list is annexed to the present section, will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships.

Article 28

On the expiration of one month from the date of the present stipulations all German submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines, including the tubular dock, must have been handed over to the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

(Reserved) Such of these submarines, vessels and docks as are considered by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America to be fit to proceed under their own power or to be towed shall be taken by the German Government into such Allied ports as have been indicated (there to be destroyed or broken up).

The remainder, and also those in course of construction, shall be broken up entirely by the German Government under the supervision of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America. The breaking-up must be completed within three months at the most after the signature of the present stipulations.

Article 29

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of German warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial and commercial purposes. They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

Article 30

Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the units in commission provided for in Article 21 of the present stipulations.

The vessels-of-war intended for replacement purposes as above shall not exceed the following displacement:—

Armoured ships	10,000 tons,
Light-cruisers	6,000 “
Destroyers	800 “
Torpedo boats	200 “

Except where a ship has been lost, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of a period of 20 years in the case of battleships and cruisers, 15 years for destroyers and torpedo boats, counting from the launching of the ship.

Article 31

The construction and acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.

Article 32

The vessels-of-war in commission of the German fleet must only have on board or in reserve the allowance of arms, munitions and war materials fixed by the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America.

(Reserved) Within a month from the fixing of the quantities as above, arms, munitions and war material of all kinds, including mines and torpedoes, now in the hands of the German Government and in excess of the said quantities, shall be surrendered to the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America at places to be indicated by them. (Such arms, munitions and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless.)

All other stocks, depots or reserves of arms, munitions or naval war material of all kinds are forbidden.

The manufacture and the export of these articles to foreign countries shall be forbidden in German territory.

Article 33

On the signature of the present stipulations, Germany will forthwith sweep up the mines in the following areas in the North Sea to the

eastward of longitude 4°00′E. of Greenwich:

(*a*) between parallels of latitude 53°00′N. and 59°00′N.
(*b*) to the northward of latitude 60°30′N.

Germany must keep these areas free from mines.

Germany must also sweep and keep free from mines such areas in the Baltic as may ultimately be notified by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

Article 34

(1) The personnel of the German navy shall be recruited entirely by voluntary engagement entered into for a minimum period of
25 consecutive years for officers and warrant officers,
12 consecutive years for petty officers and men.
The number engaged to replace those discharged on account of ill-health must not exceed five per cent, per annum of the totals laid down in this section (Article 23).
(2) The personnel discharged from the Navy must not receive any kind of naval or military training or undertake any further service in the Navy or Army.
(3) Officers belonging at the date of the signature of the present stipulations to the German Navy and not demobilised must engage to serve till the age of 45, unless discharged on account of ill-health.
(4) No officer or man of the German Mercantile Marine shall receive any training in the Navy.

Additional Articles

Article 35

Heligoland

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Allied Governments, by German labor and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Allied Governments.

The term “harbours” shall include the north-east mole; the west wall; the outer and inner breakwaters and reclamation works within them; and all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings, constructed or under construction, between lines connecting the following positions taken from British Admiralty chart No. 120 of 19 April, 1918:—

(*a*) lat. 54°10′49″ N., long. 7°53′39″ E.
(*b*) 54°10′35″ N., 7°54′18″ E.
(*c*) 54°10′14″ N., 7°54′00″ E.
(*d*) 54°10′17″ N., 7°53′37″ E.
(*e*) 54°10′44″ N., 7°53′26″ E.

Article 36

Routes Into the Baltic

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55°27′N. and 54°00′N. and longitudes 9°99′E. and 16°00′E. of the meridian of Greenwich, not instal any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic. The fortifications now existing in this area shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the Allied Governments and in periods to be fixed by them.

The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States of America all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Article 37

Coast Defences

All fortified works and fortifications, other than those mentioned in Articles 35 and 36, now established within fifty kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be considered as of a defensive nature and may remain in their existing condition. No new fortifications shall be constructed within these limits.

The armament of these defences shall not exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those in position at the date of the signature of the present stipulations. The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America.

On the expiration of a period of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be reduced to and maintained at a maximum figure of:—

Rounds per piece Calibre

1,500 for 3-inch and under

500 for over 3-inch

ARTICLE 38

Kiel Canal

(Reserved.)

ARTICLE 39

Wireless Telegraphy

Until the Treaty of Peace the German high-power W/T stations at Nauen, Hanover and Berlin shall not be used for the transmission of messages relative to naval, military or political affairs in Germany, or any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

Until the Treaty of Peace Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey.

ARTICLE 40

Submarine Cables

(Reserved.)

ANNEX

(See Article 27.)

GERMAN AUXILIARY CRUISERS AND FLEET AUXILIARIES

Interned in neutral countries.

Berlin
Santa Fe
Seydlitz
Yorck

In Germany.

Ammon
Answald
Bosnia
Cordoba
Cassel
Dania
Rio Negro
Rio Pardo
Santa Cruz
Schwaben
Solingen
Steigerwald
Franken
Gundomar
Fuerst Buelow
Gertrud
Kogoma
Rugia
Santa Elena
Schleswig
Moewe
Sierra Ventana
Chemnitz

Emil Georg von Strauss
Habsburg
Meteor
Waltraute
Scharnhorst

Section III.—*Air Clauses*

Article 41

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.

Germany may, during a period not extending beyond October 1st, 1919, maintain a maximum number of one hundred seaplanes or flying boats, which shall be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions or bombs of any nature whatever. In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flying boats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each engine of each of these craft.

No dirigible shall be kept.

Article 42

Within one month from the signature of the present stipulations the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilised. Up to the 1st October, 1919, however, Germany may keep and maintain a total number of one thousand men including officers, for the whole of the cadres and personnel, flying and non-flying, of all formations and establishments.

Article 43

No aviation ground or shed for dirigibles will be maintained or established:—

(1) to the east of the Rhine, within a distance of 150 kilometres from that river;

(2) to the west of the eastern frontier of Germany, within a distance of 150 kilometres from that frontier;
(3) to the north of the southern frontier of Germany within a distance of 150 kilometres from the frontiers of Italy and Czecho-Slovakia.

All aviation grounds now existing in the zones defined above will be immediately put out of use. The sheds will be dismantled and the earth ploughed up. The work of putting these out of use must be completed within one month from the signature of the present stipulations.

Article 44 (Reserved)

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit, and the right to land on her territory, until the complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 45

The manufacture and importation of aeroplanes, parts of aircraft, seaplanes, flying boats or dirigibles, and of engines for aeroplanes, shall be forbidden in all German territory until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace.

Article 46

On the signature of the present stipulations, all military and naval aeronautical material, except the machines mentioned in Article 1, second and third paragraphs, must be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments. Delivery must be effected at such places as the Allied and Associated Governments may select and must be completed within three months.

In particular there will be included in this material:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.
Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled. Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen. Dirigible sheds and shelters of every sort for aeroplanes.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Germany, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aeroplanes.
Nacelles and fuselages.
Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb dropping apparatus, torpedo dropping apparatus, synchronization apparatus, aiming apparatus).
Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks or explosives or material for their manufacture).
Instruments for use on aircraft.
Wireless apparatus, and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.
Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the Allied and Associated Governments.

SECTION IV.—*General Articles*

ARTICLE 47

After the expiration of a period of three months from the signature of the present stipulations the German laws must have been modified and shall be maintained in conformity with the preceding articles. Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of the present stipulations must have been taken.

ARTICLE 48

The Armistice of November 11, 1918, and the Conventions subsequent thereto remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the present stipulations.

SECTION V.—*Inter-Allied Commissions of Control*

ARTICLE 49

The military, naval, and air clauses contained in the present stipulations shall be executed by Germany under the Control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Article 50

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control will be specially charged with the duty of seeing to the complete execution of the works of destruction demolition and rendering things useless to be carried out at the expense of the German Government in accordance with the present stipulation.

They will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the allied and Associated Governments have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the military, naval and air clauses may necessitate.

Article 51

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at the seat of the central German Government.

They shall be entitled as often as they think desirable to proceed to any point whatever in German territory, or to send Sub-Commissions, or to authorise one or more of their members to go to any such point.

Article 52

The German Government must give all necessary facilities for the accomplishment of their missions to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and to their members.

It shall attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control, for the purpose of receiving the communications which the Commission may have to address to the German Government and to supply or procure for the Commission all information or documents which may be required.

The German Government must in all cases furnish at its own cost all labour and material required to effect the deliveries and the works of

destruction, demolition, dismantling and of rendering things useless provided for in the present stipulations.

Article 53

The cost of maintenance of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, and the expenditure incurred by them in the execution of their duties, shall be borne by Germany.

MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 54

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Inter-Allied High Command in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the military clauses. In particular it will be charged with the duty of receiving from the German Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses, and forts which Germany is allowed to retain, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, and war material, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, demolition and rendering things useless to be carried out in accordance with the present stipulations.

The German Government must furnish to the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the military clauses, and in particular all legislative and administrative documents and regulations.

NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 55

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Admiralties of the Allied Governments and the United States in

dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Naval Clauses.

In particular it will be its special duty to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of all surface ships or submarines, salvage ships, docks and the tubular dock, and to supervise the destruction and breaking up provided for.

The German Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Articles, in particular the designs of the war ships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus and in general, everything relating to Naval War Material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 56

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Inter-Allied High Command in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Air Clauses.

In particular it will be charged with making an inventory of the aeronautical material existing in German territory, of inspecting aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft and visiting all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depôts, of authorising, where necessary, a removal of material and of taking delivery of such materials.

The German Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control, all such information and legislative administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Air Clauses, and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services, and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of

manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

[1] See BC–45 (SWC–12), p. 225 [*Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 13*].

March 19, 3 p.m. (BC–53)

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[21] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 19th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/60

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/60

BC–53

[Document 21]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 19th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
President Wilson	General Tasker H. Bliss
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. I. Bowman
Secretary	Professor Lord
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Captain W. C. Farabee
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.	Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.	Mr. H. W. Malkin
Secretaries	Mr. H. J. Paton
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.	Lieut. Col. F. H. Kisch, D.S.O.
Sir P. Loraine	France
France	Marshal Foch General Weygand } For question 2 only
M. Clemenceau	General Le Rond
M. Pichon	M. Jules Cambon
Secretaries	M. Tardieu
M. Dutasta	M. Hermitte

M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn
Lieut. de Percin
ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
M. Brambilla
JAPAN
H. E. Marquis Saionji
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

M. Degrand
ITALY
Marquis della Torretta
JAPAN
M. Nagaoka
M. Ashida

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

1. After some discussion it was agreed that this question could not be dealt with at once, but should be discussed on Friday. Question of Maritime Transport for Polish Troops

2. M. CAMBON said that the Committee over which he presided had prepared two documents. One was a telegram to be sent by the Supreme Council to the President of the Allied Commission at Warsaw, and the second a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian

troops in Eastern Galicia (for text see Annexure “A”). The Committee, however, had on the 18th March heard Dr. Lord, the American delegate on the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw. He was of opinion that the Warsaw Commission would not be able to bring about an armistice between the Poles and Ukrainians. He suggested that the Warsaw Commission should be asked merely to bring about a cessation of hostilities and that the conclusion of an armistice should be undertaken at Paris under the direct authority of the Supreme Council of the Conference, acting through the Polish and Ukrainian representatives at present there. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should hear the views of Dr. Lord. If these views were adopted the two documents above mentioned would have to be modified. Question of an Armistice Between Ukrainians and Poles in the Region of Lemberg

(After a short discussion it was agreed that Dr. Lord should be heard and that Marshal Foch should be summoned to attend the discussion.)

Dr. Lord said that, before explaining the proposals he had to make, he thought it was his duty to state that the views he was about to express were personal to himself. As a Member of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw he was aware of the views held by his colleagues. Since his return to Paris, however, he had come to the conclusion that vigorous action, in other words military action, as recommended by the Commission, could not be undertaken. He had therefore come to think that diplomatic means of putting an end to the conflict must be sought. Dr. Lord then set forth the following proposals:—

1. That the Conference send an urgent invitation to the Poles and Ukrainians to agree to an immediate suspension of hostilities.
2. That this suspension of hostilities be effected through a truce based substantially on the existing military *status quo*, but under conditions which would insure the security in Polish hands of the city of Lemberg and of the railway connecting Lemberg with Przemysl.
3. That in case both belligerent parties agree to an immediate truce, they should be invited to send representatives to Paris to discuss

with an interallied commission appointed for this purpose the terms of an armistice which should last until the final settlement of the Conference of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia.

4. That the armistice as finally fixed by the interallied commission after due consultation with Polish and Ukrainian representatives should be submitted to the Conference, and, if approved by it, should then be communicated to the belligerent parties as a mediatory arrangement proposed by the Conference.

The foregoing recommendations were based principally on the following:—

(*a*) That it is indispensable to secure an immediate cessation of hostilities, especially in view of the grave situation at Lemberg, the imminent fall of which may involve the most disastrous consequences upon the whole political situation in Poland.
(*b*) That this termination of hostilities ought if possible to be obtained without the need of resorting to force.
(*c*) That such a peaceful solution of the question can probably be attained only by the direct intervention and by the moral authority of the Conference.

Recommendation 1.

> It is recommended that the Conference send an urgent invitation to the Poles and Ukrainians to agree to an immediate suspension of hostilities.

The interallied Commission at Warsaw has already attempted to establish such a truce, and has met with a severe check. It would seem useless to direct this Commission to make a second attempt of the same kind. After all that has happened, it would probably be unable to obtain the agreement of the Ukrainians. Moreover, the delay incidental to the trip from Warsaw to Lemberg and the necessary discussions with the Ukrainians would probably consume so much time that Lemberg would have fallen before anything was arranged. The only way to secure an immediate result, and one which may perhaps avert the fall of Lemberg, is for the Conference to

intervene with all the moral authority it possesses, by means of telegrams to be dispatched immediately and simultaneously to the two belligerents.

Recommendation 2.

> It is recommended that this suspension of hostilities be effected through a truce based substantially on the existing military *status quo* but under conditions which would insure the security in Polish hands of the city of Lemberg and of the railway connecting Lemberg with Przemysl.

It is suggested that the truce signed between the Poles and the Ukrainians on the 24th February under the mediation of the Interallied Commission of Warsaw (a copy of which is here appended (Annexure B)), might serve substantially as the basis for a new truce. It is necessary, however, to stipulate expressly that the city of Lemberg and the railway which feeds it should be left in Polish possession. After the citizens of Lemberg have defended themselves with such determination for four months against the Ukrainians, it seems impossible to hand over the city to its besiegers, or to deprive it of its food supply, during the period of the armistice.

If both belligerents expressed their agreement to an immediate suspension of hostilities, representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments could promptly be sent to Lemberg to conclude the truce, but the Conference ought first to obtain the agreement to an immediate truce before any Interallied Commission on the spot were called into action.

Recommendation 3.

> It is recommended that in case both belligerent parties agree to an immediate truce, they should be invited to send representatives to Paris to discuss with an interallied commission appointed for this purpose the terms of an armistice which should last until the final settlement by the Conference of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia.

It appears indispensable that the negotiations for an armistice should be carried on in Paris under the supervision and with the direct authority of the Conference, rather than by an interallied commission on the spot. For the Ukrainians, who have hitherto been the refractory party in this dispute, have already dealt with a number of interallied commissions, have refused to accept their proposals, and in all probability will continue to refuse so long as they dare to do so, a commission which has no means at its disposal except persuasion will almost certainly be unable to effect anything.

There would seem to be only two means of escaping from this dilemma; either the mediating powers must use force to impose their terms, and this everyone is anxious to avoid; or else the powers must call into play all the moral authority they possess, and this can be attained only by placing the mediatory action under the most direct supervision and sanction of the Conference.

The transfer of the proceedings to Paris would also have this great advantage, that the Ukrainians are especially anxious to have a representation here, a representation which, once the armistice was disposed of, might then have the opportunity to lay before the Powers the desires of the Ukrainian people with regard to the definite solution of the territorial questions affecting them. Perhaps the surest means of securing their acceptance of a truce and later of an armistice is to be found precisely in the opportunity here offered them to secure a hearing before the Conference.

At the same time knowledge could be conveyed to them that if they refused to defer to the wishes of the Powers with regard to an armistice, they would then be excluded from a hearing on the far more fundamental questions so long as they remained obdurate.

Moreover the variety and difficulty of the problems connected with this negotiation, involving as it does, questions of high policy on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments, render it particularly desirable that the negotiations should be conducted here rather than by a commission remote from Paris and imperfectly informed as to the desires and intentions of the Powers.

It is suggested that the negotiation of an armistice at Paris might be entrusted to the Commission on Polish Affairs, who are in possession of sufficient data to enable them, in consultation with Polish and Ukrainian representatives, to arrange an armistice here as easily as it could be done at Lemberg.

Recommendation 4.

> It is recommended that the armistice as finally fixed by the interallied commission after due consultation with the Polish and Ukrainian Representatives should be submitted to the Conference, and, if approved by it, should then be communicated to the belligerent parties as a mediatory arrangement proposed by the Conference.

A difficulty which has lamed every previous effort at mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict has been the uncertainty whether the terms proposed by the mediators had the sanction of the Great Powers. It is indispensable that the armistice conditions to be arranged in the new negotiations should be issued only after receiving the most careful attention and approval of the Conference. Nothing but the expressed sanction of the Conference itself could have weight enough to extort the necessary sacrifices from both the belligerents.

It would seem that the Conference could put forth these armistice conditions by way of friendly mediation without committing itself to imposing them by force in case of refusal. The conditions should be supported by the assurance that a belligerent who refused to accept them need expect no recognition and no hearing from the Conference.

Dr. Lord added that it was perhaps hardly necessary to emphasise the importance to the present Polish Government of holding Lemberg. The situation was so critical that some immediate action must be taken. Heretofore Lemberg had held out because the Poles had been able to operate the railroad from Przemysl; but this had been cut, and he had been told when there that Lemberg had provisions enough for only 8 days after suspension of the railroad traffic. These 8 days were now nearly passed. It was universally

acknowledged that M. Paderewski's Government could not survive the loss of Lemberg. On the other hand, if it were made possible for them to hold on to the city for a short time longer, the advent of General Haller's army or other factors might change the situation in favour of the Poles.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what means existed of communicating with the Commanders-in-Chief of the opposing forces.

DR. LORD said that communication with the Ukrainians might be had through Vienna and with the Poles through Warsaw. He suggested that several alternative routes should be used.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked by whom Dr. Lord suggested the communications should be signed.

Dr. LORD replied that they should be sent by order of the Council through a military channel. He believed that there was in Lemberg itself a British Colonel who might be able to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian troops by wireless.

BARON SONNINO asked whether there was direct communication with Lemberg.

DR. LORD said he thought communication by wireless via Warsaw could be obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Colonel Kisch informed him that this was doubtful.

COLONEL KISCH explained that since the Railway to Lemberg had been cut, it was probable telegraphic communication was also interrupted and very doubtful whether the Ukrainians would take wireless messages from Lemberg.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what was the national character of the population in and around Lemberg.

DR. LORD replied that in the city itself, 10 to 12% were Ruthenians, 50% Poles and the remainder, Jews. The Polish character of the city

population had been strikingly demonstrated by the events of the last four months. The town has been defended against the Ukrainians street by street and house by house.

MR. LANSING observed that the city of Lemberg was a Polish island surrounded by a Ruthenian district.

DR. LORD agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that there were in Paris both Polish and Ukrainian representatives. It might perhaps be the most expeditious method if they were severally asked to inform their Governments that it was the desire of the Council that hostilities should cease and that if either party refused the truce its claims would not be heard by the Conference.

DR. LORD said that this method might be employed but should be supplemented by the sending of telegrams direct as the Ukrainians had the greatest interest in not receiving the message.

MR. BALFOUR asked Dr. Lord whether it was not desirable that the terms of the truce should approximate as closely as possible to the final delimitation between Poland and the Ukraine. Would there not be a great disadvantage in delivering to either a region which might subsequently be taken from them?

DR. LORD replied that without pre-judging any ultimate decision, he thought it was of urgent importance to cause fighting to cease.

MR. LANSING asked whether Dr. Lord would favour a truce on the present line held by either side.

DR. LORD replied that this was not quite his view. He was prepared to remove the Ukrainian troops from the immediate vicinity of Lemberg. These troops could not be trusted to refrain from looting the city at any moment. It was also important to re-establish traffic on the Railway line which the Ukrainian troops had cut.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether he had any comments to make on Dr. Lord's proposals.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had little criticism to make except to say that if the Ukrainians neglected the decisions of the Conference as they had those of the Inter-Allied Commission, the Conference might be discredited. He was not sure on what terms the Allies were with the Ukrainians. Were the latter friends or enemies?

MR. BALFOUR said that he shared Marshal Foch's doubts but he would like to ask Marshal Foch to explain how the Ukrainians, whose country was represented as over-run by Bolsheviks, could find troops to invade Poland which was being over-run by no-one.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had no explanation to offer of this phenomenon unless it be assumed that the Ukrainians were in agreement with the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Conference hitherto had only heard the Poles. According to the maps he had the majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian. According to the principle of the Allied and Associated Powers the country should, therefore, be attributed to them, unless very cogent reasons to the contrary existed. It might be that the Ukrainian troops attacking Lemberg were troops raised among the local population to establish their independence. If we supported the Ukrainians in the South, as we had done, why should we fight them in the North? The Report of the Polish Committee showed that the Poles were not incapable of claiming more for themselves than was theirs by right. They had done so in respect to their frontiers with Germany and Russia. They might be doing so in this region too. It was desirable that the Conference should he strictly impartial. It was not improbable that what the Poles chiefly wanted in Eastern Galicia was the oilfields.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that there was a decision which the Council should take before leaving this subject. The Polish Committee had asked whether they were to proceed to draw the boundaries of Poland in other regions than those bordering on Germany, The Committee had not proceeded with any investigation concerning the Eastern and Southern frontiers of Poland, pending a decision by the Council regarding the status of Lithuania, Ukraine etc. He was of opinion that the Committee should proceed without delay to fit the

proper ethnographical limits of Poland in order that when the Conference came to deal with the question of Lemberg, and of the oil wells of Eastern Galicia, it should have before it an impartial judgment. If the Ukrainian Delegation were to come before the Council, the Council should be prepared with the advice of an impartial body before attempting to adjudicate. The Committee in his opinion therefore, should be told to proceed with their labours.

MR. LANSING remarked that the same procedure should apply to Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. CAMBON said that some time ago he had asked if the Committee was authorised to hear the Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The Committee had felt that before hearing Delegates of these nationalities, permission should be obtained from the Council, as the Committee did not know with whom they were dealing. If the Council now decided that they should be heard, the Committee would proceed at once to hear them.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, if in accordance with Dr. Lord's proposals, the Council was to make the acceptance of a truce a condition of being heard with the Ukrainians, this proposal would not offer them any special inducement if they had already been heard by M. Cambon's Committee. He proposed that M. Cambon should be asked to draw up a message to both Commanders embodying the suggestions of Dr. Lord. The message should then be signed by the Chairman of the Conference and despatched by the best method available. It should also be communicated to the Polish and Ukrainian groups at present in Paris with a warning that the hearing of their respective claims depended on their accepting the truce.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supported this proposal.

BARON SONNINO said that the only reason that might induce the Ukrainians to accept the truce would be the hope of some kind of recognition by the Peace Conference. If the Committee set about defining the frontier in Galicia, and its decision were adverse to the Ukrainians, they would get to know it and would feel they had nothing to gain from obeying any behest sent to them by the Council.

They would feel that it was to their interests to effect the capture of Lemberg as speedily as possible. He therefore, supported President Wilson's proposal but thought that no definition of the Polish Frontier in this region should be made for the present. The Council might promise to hear the Ukrainians if they stopped fighting. This was probably the only means of saving Lemberg.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he also accepted President Wilson's proposal, but he would ask that the message be submitted to all the Heads of Governments and signed by each.

This was agreed to.

The following resolution was then adopted:—

(1) That the attached telegram, signed by the heads of the delegations of the United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, shall be transmitted in the name of the Conference by the French Government to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Polish and Ukrainian forces by the best available routes.

(It was arranged to send the message direct by radio. In addition that General Bliss should instruct the American General Kernan at Warsaw to proceed to the front to deliver the message to both Generals.)

(2) That the telegram shall also be communicated by the French Government in the name of the Conference to the heads of the Polish and Ukrainian groups in Paris.
(3) That the Paris Commission for Polish affairs shall resume its study of the remaining Polish frontiers.

TELEGRAM

A. General Pawlenko Commanding the Ukrainian forces before Lemberg.

In the course of its sitting of March 19th, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference has decided to request both parties now opposing

each other at Lemberg to conclude a truce immediately on receipt of the present telegram.

In consequence, the Chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments apply to General Pawlenko to acquaint him with the request from the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference immediately to stop hostilities as far as he is concerned, in front of and in the region of Lemberg; this request is simultaneously being sent to the Polish General Rozwadowski, Commanding the Garrison of Lemberg.

Throughout the duration of the truce, the troops of both parties shall remain on their positions the communications by rail between Lemberg and Przemysl must however remain open strictly in so far as necessary for the daily revictualling of the town.

The Supreme Council add that they are ready to hear the territorial claims of both parties concerned and to approach the Ukrainian and Polish delegations in Paris or whatever authorised representation the parties may select, with a view to changing the suspension of arms into an armistice.

The hearing of the Ukrainian and Polish representatives with regard to their competitive claims is moreover made subject to the formal condition of an immediate suspension of hostilities.

B. An identic telegram *mutatis mutandis* to General Rozwadowski commanding at Lemberg.

3. M. CAMBON said that he had received a telegram from M. Noulens to the effect that the Germans wished to discuss the question of the landing, of Polish troops at Dantzig at Spa, instead of with the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A draft telegram had been prepared for the approval of the Council in answer to this message. Question of Landing Troops at Dantzig

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that Marshal Foch had given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the

Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this order had been sent to M. Noulens for his information.

(There was a short adjournment.)

4. M. CAMBON referring to the map accompanying the report explained that the red line represented the claims of the Poles, and the blue line the frontier proposed by the Committee. There were in these regions no natural frontiers. The population was very mixed as was usual in central and eastern Europe. The Committee had followed as far as possible the ethnological principle, but it had been impossible to draw any lines that did not include alien populations. Economic and strategic requirements had also been taken into account, in order that the new State should be so delimited as to be capable of life. At all points save one, the frontier adopted by the Committee gave the Poles less than they asked for. The exception was in the region of the river Bartsch. The reason in this case was of a military nature. Without this line of frontier Posen would be exposed, at the very outbreak of war with Germany, to be surrounded and captured at once. It was to render its defence possible that the Committee had placed the frontier further west than the Poles themselves had suggested. Further north the Committee had adopted a line considerably more to the east than the Poles. This region was sparsely populated and was the scene of the intense German colonization that had been pursued of late years. In 1908, Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor, had obtained legislation for the forcible expropriation of the Poles in this region. Not only could no land or houses be sold to Poles but they were prevented from building or even repairing their houses. He had himself seen Poles living in abandoned trucks and omnibuses and then evicted from them because they had placed stoves inside them which the Germans represented as repairs. It was commonly supposed that the Russians had persecuted the Poles more than the Germans. This was not the case. German persecution penetrated into private life in a manner unknown to the Russians. This had led to the emigration of Poles on a large scale. Still further north the Committee had adopted a line following the takes up to the sea. This line had been drawn in accordance with statistics of school attendance. Eastern Frontier of

Germany: First Report of the Polish Commission (a) Frontier Near Posen (b) Region W. of Dantzig

(c) Dantzig In order to give Poland access to the sea, the Committee had attributed to Poland a strip of territory enclosing Dantzig. There was another Port east of this, namely, Elbing, which had once been Polish, but which the Committee had decided to leave in Eastern Prussia. Dantzig had been Polish until the first partition, and its possession was a matter of life and death to Poland. The discussions at present proceeding regarding the transport of Polish troops to Poland through Dantzig indicated the importance of that Port. Without access to the sea, Poland would be stifled. There were commercial and economic reasons as well as military reasons to justify the attribute of Dantzig to the Poles. Since its annexation by Germany, Dantzig had diminished in importance. It was true that the townspeople themselves were mostly of German race, but the surrounding population was Polish. Dantzig had communication with the interior by two railways, one leading to Thorn and the other to Mlawa. The Committee proposed to give both these lines to Poland.

(d) East Prussia East Prussia was doubtless the most Prussian part of Germany, and its capital, Königsberg, was a holy place of Prussianism. The southern part of the Province, notably in the district of Allenstein, the people were Polish, but the Poles here, unlike the majority of their countrymen, were Protestants, and had been very largely Germanized. They spoke German as much as Polish. The Committee therefore, proposed that these people be consulted concerning their future allegiance, and that a plebiscite be held there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the bulk of the recommendations of the Committee represented views that had secured general agreement. He would suggest that only controversial questions should be discussed, and that M. Cambon be asked to give replies to any points that might be raised on questions that might appear still open to discussion. He himself, had one general question to put. He noted that the number of Germans to be included in the future Polish State as drawn up by the Committee was not less than 2,132,000. This was

a considerable figure, and might spell serious trouble for Poland in the future. The Germans moreover might hesitate to sign any Treaty containing such a provision. Any terms that no delegate and no Government were likely to sign should make the Council hesitate. The present German Government had gained a temporary victory, but was not very strong. It was said that another rising was likely to take place in 6 weeks. The Government might not be able to withstand it. If the Allies should present a document requiring from Germany huge indemnities and the cession of a large German population to Poland, the German Government might collapse. The Poles, as it was, had not a high reputation as administrators. He wished to ask if the Committee could not restrict the Polish claims in such a way as to diminish the German population assigned to Poland. In the Dantzig district alone 412,000 Germans were assigned to Poland. Was it necessary to assign so much German territory, together with the port of Dantzig? There was another district in which a German majority was being attributed to Poland, namely that of Marienwerder. He would ask whether this could not be avoided.

(e) Marienwerder M. CAMBON said that in his general explanation he had pointed out that it was very difficult to make a frontier on purely ethnological lines. The same difficulty would be encountered in dealing with the frontiers of Greece and other countries in the east of Europe, where the population was very mixed. Economic and strategic reasons therefore must be given weight. In the case of Marienwerder, for instance, if this place were left to Prussia, all the lines from Warsaw to the sea would pass through Prussian territory, and Poland would practically be cut off from the sea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was hardly possible to draw any line that would not have Germans on both sides of it, but he thought it was very dangerous to assign two million Germans to Poland. This was a considerable population, not less than that of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870. He would point out that the Germans had been accorded communication between East and West Prussia across Polish territory. Why was a similar arrangement not possible in favour of the Poles? To hand over millions of people to a distasteful allegiance merely because of a railway was, he thought, a mistake.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the very special effort made in late years by the German Government to colonise the very region to which Mr. Lloyd George had drawn attention. The Germans had sought to make a German cordon from Schneidemühl to Marienwerder in order to isolate Dantzig from Poland. Hence, this was actually a region of political colonization.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he referred less to Marienwerder itself than to the country East of it, which was historically German.

M. CAMBON said that he regarded it as essential for Poland to have free access to the sea. This region afforded the best corridor from the mainland to Dantzig. He thought that a large number of the German population which was of recent importation would emigrate to other parts of Germany when the Polish State was constituted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he raised no objection in respect to the regions lately colonized by Germany, but he did not feel that he could assent to the delivery of areas whose whole history was German.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this would only be justified by reciprocity. Many Poles in areas historically Polish were to be left within Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Council proposed to define the frontiers of Germany finally on *ex parte* evidence alone. The other side had not been heard. It was not only a question of fairness to Germany of establishment of a lasting peace in Europe. It was neither fair nor prudent, because of a railway, to hand over large populations to a Government they disliked.

M. CAMBON said that it was quite true the Committee had only heard the Poles. It had not been commissioned to listen to the Germans. It had been asked to examine the means of setting up a Polish State with some prospect of continued life. The Committee had tried to approximate to the Polish State as it existed before the first partition. After examination they had made recommendations of a far more modest character. What had caused the death of Poland was not merely its faulty political system, but principally its lack of

communication with the sea. The end of Poland might be considered to have occurred in the year 1743, when Dantzig fell. Without it, Poland could not live. By it alone could Poland have contact with the liberal Powers in the West. It was no use to set up a Poland deprived of access to the sea as it would inevitably be the prey of Germany or Russia. Not only must Poland have a sea-board, but full and free communication with Dantzig. If he had to choose between protecting German populations largely imported since the 18th Century, and protecting the Poles, he preferred the latter alternative. There was no comparison between the need of the Germans for communication between East and West Prussia and that of the Poles for communication between Warsaw and Dantzig. East Prussia had very little railway traffic with Western Prussia. Nine tenths of its exports—chiefly wood—went by sea. The products of East Prussia, by reason of the cost of land transport, at the present time went by sea. The council need therefore feel no anxiety about the land communication between East and West Prussia. On the other hand, the two railways linking Warsaw to Dantzig were absolutely essential to Poland.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to draw attention to two points. One was that the Committee set up to co-ordinate recommendations as to boundaries had unanimously approved the report of the Polish Committee. Secondly, the situation which Mr. Lloyd George wished to avoid was bound to recur everywhere. The Conference had set out to revive ancient States subjected for a number of years or centuries to alien domination. In every instance inevitably some of the dominating race would be found settled in these areas. With the best will in the world it would not be possible to settle frontiers on ethnological grounds alone. If the submerged nations were to be revived a mixed population must be included in them.

M. CAMBON added that the Polish Committee had also reached unanimous conclusions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that though the British delegates had adopted the conclusions, they had done so reluctantly. They regarded them as a departure from the principles of the Fourteen Points which had been adopted by the Allies. In some parts of the territory assigned to Poland the argument of political colonisation did not

apply. We were told, moreover, that a region colonised with Germans as far back as the 18th Century should be restored to Poland. But because fifty years ago some capitalists had built a railway that was convenient to the Poles, the area surrounding it must be ascribed to Poland, in spite of the undoubted German nationality of the population. M. Cambon had said that a corridor to the sea was necessary to Poland. He had nothing to say against this. The Vistula was a navigable river, and must remain the principal artery for commerce. There were, moreover, other railways. A railway could be removed, but a long-settled population was not removed with the same ease. He thought that in accepting these proposals the Council would be abandoning its principles and making trouble, not only for Poland, but for the world. Wherever it could be shown that the policy aimed at reversing the German policy of Polish expropriation the decision might be accepted by the Germans, but the areas he had in mind would be represented as "Germania Irredenta" and would be the seed of future war. Should the populations of these areas rise against the Poles, and should their fellow-countrymen wish to go to their assistance, would France, Great Britain and the United States go to war to maintain Polish rule over them? He felt bound to make this protest against what he considered to be a most dangerous proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the discussion had brought out a difficulty which, it had been said, would be met in many cases, and he had not reached a definite conclusion in his own mind on the particular point under discussion. He hoped that the discussion would be carried far enough to bring out all its elements. Everywhere in Europe blocks of foreign people would be found whose possession of the country could be justified by historic, commercial and similar arguments. He acknowledged that the inclusion of two million Germans in Poland was a violation of one principle; but Germany had been notified that free and safe access to the sea for Poland would be insisted upon. The Allied and Associated Powers were therefore not open to the reproach that they were doing this merely because they had the power to do it. This was one of the things they had fought for. The difficulty was to arrive at a balance between conflicting considerations. He thought Mr. Lloyd George was misinformed in saying that the river carried the largest proportion of

the commerce. He would find that the railroad along the river carried the greater, or at least an equal amount, of the traffic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that he was referring not to the railroad along the river, but to the one further to the East.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the proposal would, however, leave in German hands territories abutting on the westerly railroad at several points.

M. CAMBON said that the direct line to Warsaw through Mlawa was quite near the frontier proposed by the Committee. Mr. Lloyd George had mentioned the Vistula as the main artery of traffic. Marienwerder dominated the Vistula as well as the railway lines, and anyone holding that place commanded the valley.

M. PICHON pointed out that there were only two lines of railroads from Dantzig to supply twenty millions of people. One of these was through Thorn and the other through Mlawa. The latter passed East of Marienwerder, this was the one referred to by Mr. Lloyd George. Both were indispensable to the economic life of Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted that the line from Mlawa was important, but did not regard it as essential for access of Poland to the sea.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it must be realised the Allies were creating a new and weak state, weak not only because historically it had failed to govern itself, but because it was sure in future to be divided into factions, more especially as religious differences were an element in the situation. It was therefore necessary to consider not only the economic but the strategic needs of this state, which would have to cope with Germany on both sides of it, the Eastern fragment of Germany being one of a most aggressive character. There was bound to be a mixture of hostile populations included in either state. The Council would have to decide which mixture promised the best prospect of security. He was afraid himself of drawing the line as near the Dantzig-Thorn railway line as Mr. Lloyd George suggested. He, however, felt the same anxieties as Mr. Lloyd George. The desire

might arise among the Germans to rescue German populations from Polish rule, and this desire would be hard to resist. It was a question of balancing antagonistic considerations. He had wished to bring out the other elements in the problem.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with President Wilson that a balance must be attained, and that it is necessary to admit that ethnological considerations must in many cases be qualified. The line under discussion was that joining the port and the capital of Poland. It might be presumed that no circuitous line was likely to be built which could compete with the direct line. If the ethnological frontier were adhered to this line would cut German territory twice—at Soldau and Rieseriburg. This was doubtless inconvenient; but he would like to ask the experts if Poland could be given such rights over this line as would preserve its character as a Polish line, in spite of crossing German territory at these two points.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Committee should consider the ancient boundary of the province of East Prussia as it existed in 1772. This line was in some cases intermediate between the line recommended by the Committee and the ethnological line advocated by Mr. Lloyd George. It would not cut the railway between Dantzig and Mlawa and its adoption might offer a sentimental justification to Germany for the loss of some German population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this might be considered with advantage. He proposed that the report on the boundaries of Poland should be referred back to the Committee for reconsideration with a view to readjustment of the boundaries of East Prussia in such a manner as to exclude from the new Polish State territory historically as well as ethnologically Prussian, while ensuring to Poland secure access to the sea.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Committee be merely asked to reconsider its recommendations in the light of the discussion.

(It was agreed to refer to the report on the boundaries of Poland back to the Committee for reconsideration in the light of the foregoing discussion.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 20th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Draft Telegram to the President of the Allied Commission at Warsaw

The Supreme Council have decided that in view of the extreme importance of avoiding the fall of Lemberg a fresh effort to effect a cessation of hostilities between the Poles and Ukrainians should be made forthwith. For this purpose you will at once despatch to the front an Armistice Commission, with full powers to negotiate in the first instance a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the present positions of the opposing forces, and subsequently an Armistice. In order that these negotiations may have the most favourable chances of success, the Armistice Commission is to be instructed to negotiate in accordance with the present military situation, which is undoubtedly favourable to the Ukrainians. The Poles must be made to understand that they must for the present purpose at any rate give up their claims to such portion of the oilfields as are in Ukrainian hands, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of the question. The Ukrainians on the other hand must agree to the free use of the Przemysl-Lemberg railway by the Poles for the revictualling of Lemberg from the moment of the cessation of the hostilities.

In order that the efforts of this Armistice-Commission may be disassociated, in the eyes of the interested parties, from the previous unsuccessful negotiations, it is suggested that the Commission should be under American presidency.

Both Poles and Ukrainians should be made to understand that these fresh negotiations are undertaken with the direct authority and on the lines laid down by the Peace Conference.

Proposal for a Declaration by the Allied and Associated Governments to General Pawlenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia

The Allied and Associated Governments, having received the report of the Inter-Allied Mission to Lemberg, and the telegram addressed to the President of the United States by Dr. Faneyko, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Western Ukrainia, desires to call the most earnest attention of the Ukrainian authorities to the declaration issued by the Allied and Associated Governments on January 23rd [*24th*], summoning all the people of Eastern Europe to cease hostilities and to refrain from any attempt to use force in order to assert their territorial claims.[1]

The Allied and Associated Governments reserve to the future the definitive settlement of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia, as elsewhere, and must demand that the peoples who desire to press their claims before the Peace Conference should place their faith in the validity of their claims and in the spirit of justice animating the Great Powers, rather than in armed force.

Therefore the Allied and Associated Governments demand of the Ukrainian military authorities that they consent to an immediate cessation of hostilities on the basis of the truce signed between the Poles and the Ukrainians under the mediation of the Inter-Allied Mission on February 24th.[2]

If the Ukrainian military authorities give proof of their good faith by assenting to this demand, the Allied and Associated Governments will then take immediate measures to effect an armistice, to last until the definitive settlement of the territorial question. If the Ukrainian authorities do not immediately accept the suspension of hostilities, they have only to expect that the Allied and Associated Governments will regard them as disturbers of the peace of Europe.

Annexure "B"

Convention[3]

Concluded between the delegates of the Supreme Command and the Government of Western Ukraine:—Colonel Miron Tarnawski, the former deputy Lew Baczynski, and Father François Xavier Bonne, on the one part;

And the delegates of the Command of the Polish army in Eastern Galicia:—Senior Colonel of Brigade Mieczeyslaw Kulinski, Staff Major Jean Hempel Quartermaster General, and Major Valerien Marienski Assistant Chief of Staff, on the other part;

Relating to the suspension of hostilities on the Polish-Ukrainian front in Eastern Galicia.

Full powers have been conferred on the delegates of both sides by the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Army and by the Command of the Polish Army in Eastern Galicia respectively.

Article I.

All military action shall cease on the 25th February, new style, at six o'clock in the morning.

Article II.

The two armies shall remain in their positions. Reconnoitering as well as patrols by aeroplane shall cease.

Article III.

All movement of troops and transport of munitions is forbidden in the regions comprised between: Sambor, Mikolajow, Bobrka, Kurowice, Krasne, Kamionka Strumilowa, Krystynopol, Sokal, Grubieszow, Belzec, Narol, Rozaniec, Czerwona, Wola, the line through San, Przemysl, Ustryzyki, Dolne, and Sambor.

Article IV.

Communications between the two lines are forbidden along the whole extent of the front. Bearers of flags of truce may pass only by the way Lwow-Sichow.

Article V.

The suspension of hostilities shall last until the 26th of February at six o'clock in the morning. On the following days, if it has not been

denounced before that hour, it shall be automatically extended for 24 hours.

Hostilities may be resumed twelve hours after delivery of the denunciation to the Interallied Commission at Leopol, which shall acknowledge receipt and note the hour.

Article VI.

Officers of the Allied and Associated armies shall be in control on both sides and shall settle all disputes.

Article VII.

Commissions from both sides shall remain in the following places: Sambor, Mikolajow, Bobrka, Krasne, Kamionka Strumilowa, Krystynopol, Belzec, Przemysl, Chyrow.

Officers of the Allied and Associated armies shall remain at Mikolajow, Bobrka, Krasne, and Przemysl.

The commissions shall proceed to their posts on the 25th day of February, armed with passes which shall be furnished to them by officers of a rank not lower than Major. The members of these Commissions shall enjoy the absolute right to return to their point of departure after the denunciation of the suspension of arms.

Lwow, February 24.—midnight 25.

Miron Tarnawski
D. L. Batschynsky
Fr. Xav. Bonne
Mieczeyslaw Kulinski
Jean Hempel
Valery Marienski

[1] See BC–9, vol. III, p. 715.
[2] See Annexure "B," *infra*.
[3] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

March 21, 3 p.m. (BC–54)

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[22] Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/61

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/61

BC–54

SWC–19

[Document 22]

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, March 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
President Wilson	General Tasker H. Bliss
Hon. R. Lansing	Admiral Benson
Secretaries	Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Dr. Lord
Mr. Dolbeare	Mr. Scott
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.	General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
Secretaries	Maj. General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	Mr. H. J. Paton
France	Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
M. Clemenceau	Mr. J. A. Salter
M. Pichon	France
Secretaries	M. Cambon

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
M. Arnavon
ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
M. Brambilla
JAPAN
Marquis Saionji
M. Matsui
Secretaries
M. Kawai
M. Ashida

M. Tardieu
M. Leygues
Marshal Foch
Admiral de Bon
General Weygand
General Belin
General Le Rond
M. Degrand
M. Hermitte
Lt. de Percin
ITALY
Marquis della Torretta
JAPAN
M. Kuriyama

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—Professor Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU having declared the meeting open, called on Marshal Foch to make a statement in connection with the transport of General Haller's army to Poland.

Transport of General Haller's Troops to Poland: (a) Report by Marshal Foch MARSHAL FOCH said that the question of the transportation of General Haller's army to Poland by rail had been

studied, and the conclusion had been reached that it could be carried out as soon as the Conference gave the necessary authority, five or six days only being required in order to get the rolling stock together. By the land route one or two trains could be despatched daily; but conversations in regard to details were still taking place between the general staffs of the Allied Powers concerned.

The transport of the troops by sea, via Dantzig, had also received consideration, and a conclusion had been reached in regard to the tonnage which would be required.

The carriage by rail would only give very feeble results; consequently, it should be supplemented by the sea route, provided an agreement could be reached in regard to the disembarkation of the troops at the Port of Dantzig, and their transportation thence over the railway lines, under proper guarantees.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to make some statement about the views taken by the Germans in regard to the passage of the Polish troops through Dantzig.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that all he knew on this subject was contained in the telegrams received from M. Noulens and General Dupont, copies of which had been circulated.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew Marshal Foch's attention to the recommendation contained in M. Noulens' telegram of the 18th March, 1919, to the effect that the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw considered it necessary that the Naval forces of the Entente should immediately make a considerable demonstration opposite Dantzig, and enquired whether that proposal had Marshal Foch's approval.

MARSHAL FOCH said that with the information at his disposal, he could express no opinion. The Supreme War Council alone could determine the object to be attained; it would then be possible to determine the means of securing the end desired.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired from Marshal Foch what it was that he wished the Conference to decide. It had been definitely settled that General Haller's army should be sent to Poland, provided the necessary tonnage could be made available. He failed therefore to understand what else was in Marshal Foch's mind.

(b) Marshal Foch's Proposal to Transport Haller's Army by Rail to Poland MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that in accordance with the decision taken by the Supreme War Council on 17th March, 1919,[1] he had been merely authorised "to study the possibility of the transport of Polish troops to Poland from France". He wished to know, therefore, whether the Conference agreed to the transport of the troops by rail to Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as far as the Conference was concerned, the decision had been reached that General Haller's army should be sent to Poland; and the only question left to be considered was the means of transport. In other words, the principle of the transport of the Polish troops was decided, the only question in doubt was the method of transportation. The latter obviously was a question which should be decided by the specialists; it could not be decided by the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the transport of the Polish troops by rail could be started at once, but as this method would be very slow, he proposed that transport by sea should continue to be studied by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, to whom the question had been referred by the Supreme War Council on the 17th March last.

In connection with the sea route, another question however, required to be settled, namely, whether the troops could be landed at Dantzig. This operation at the moment, seemed somewhat doubtful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired to what place the troops sent by rail were to be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the troops could be railed either to Lemberg, or to Cracow, or to any other part of Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again asserted that the question was not one which the Conference could be called upon to decide; the Allied Maritime Transport Council alone was competent to furnish the necessary information. A decision had already been reached by the Conference that the troops should be sent provided tonnage could be made available, as would appear from the Resolution taken at the meeting held on 17th March last, namely:—

> "To call upon the Allied Maritime Transport Council to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller's troops from France to Dantzig."

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that he sought the sanction of the Conference to both routes being used, namely, the rail route and the sea route; and enquired whether that proposal was approved by the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the reply should be in the negative. The land route was extremely long, and complicated by the situation at Lemberg. The Conference had merely agreed to the transport by sea, because it was anxious not to appear to take sides in the quarrel which was taking place at Lemberg.

MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether under those conditions the land route was ruled out.

President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau replied in the affirmative.

MARSHAL FOCH continuing, said that the sea route then alone remained. A transport scheme had been worked out and could forthwith be brought into operation. Only two questions remained to be considered, namely, the possibility of landing at Dantzig, and the transportation by rail from Dantzig to Thorn.

(c) Mr. Lloyd George's Remarks on Conduct of Negotiation at Spa

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not altogether satisfied with the

manner in which the negotiations had been conducted in Poland. He could not bring himself to believe that the Germans would in reality point blank refuse to carry out one of the conditions of the armistice, and, as a matter of fact, it was not clear from the information available that the Germans had actually done so. It was not quite clear what had occurred at Posen and whether the Germans had really refused to carry out the accepted conditions of the armistice. Under those circumstances, he thought the best solution of the difficulty would be for Marshal Foch to put the question to the German representatives at Spa, particularly as a military operation was involved. Marshal Foch should, in his opinion, be authorised to tell the German delegates that the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send troops to Poland through Dantzig in accordance with the provisions of Clause XVI of the armistice. He did not think the Germans would ever refuse compliance.

(d) Interpretation of Clause XVI of Armistice of November 1918

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the fact that Clause XVI of the armistice stated that the troops of the Allies should have free access to Poland through Dantzig. A technical question might be raised as to whether the Polish troops could be defined as "troops of the Allies". In his opinion, the answer would be in the affirmative since those troops had been raised in France and America to fight on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless that was a matter which would have to be explained to the Germans.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Clause XVI of the armistice of 11th November 1918, read as follows:—

> "The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Dantzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for the purpose of maintaining order."

That was all it contained. Had troops been dispatched shortly after the signature of the armistice, the Germans would undoubtedly have allowed them free passage; but today the Germans would undoubtedly maintain that, since perfect order prevailed in Poland,

it was unnecessary to send troops for the purpose of maintaining order and that the line could only be employed to convey supplies to the population. Furthermore, he would invite attention to the instructions sent to M. Noulens on the 25th February 1919, that the Germans should guarantee the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig, and their transit thence by rail to Poland. It was necessary that the guarantee in question should be obtained, otherwise great risks would be run. In his opinion, that constituted a new condition, which could not be considered to form part of Clause XVI of the armistice of November 1918.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not agree with the view taken by Marshal Foch. His information went to show that Haller's army was essential for the maintenance of order in Poland, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism. If those troops were not required to maintain order, he did not understand why they should be sent at all. They certainly were not required to fight against the Germans or anyone else: a definite ruling on that point had been given by the Conference at a previous meeting.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Clause XVI stated that: "The Allies shall have free access, etc." He did not know whether the Poles were "Allies": but, even so, it was certain that without proper guarantees, it would not be safe to convey troops over a railway line whose two extremities (Thorn–Dantzig) were fortified and held by the enemy, without taking other measures to secure the safety of the line.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to put forward his own proposals.

(e) Marshal Foch's Views re Transport of Troops to Poland MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 11th January 1919, the Military High Command had suggested to the Supreme War Council the occupation by Allied contingents of the railway line in question, but the proposal had been rejected. Again, on the 24th February 1919, he had suggested that the only possible solution of the question appeared to be that the Eastern boundaries of Germany should forthwith be determined, and that the Germans should be required to accept that frontier line, and to withdraw their troops behind it. In

that way, free transit over the Dantzig line would be obtained. In his opinion, as long as the railway line remained in the hands of the Germans, there could be no guarantee even if a verbal promise were given by them—a thing which, as a matter of fact, they had so far refused to do. He would again ask the Conference to consider the railway route to Poland, as by that route troops could be taken to any place desired. The traffic capacity of the line, as he had already stated, was very poor, but the troops would reach Poland eventually, whereas by the northern sea route, in his opinion, they would never get there. It would not be necessary for the troops to go to Lemberg, if taken by the land route. They could be sent wherever required, either to Cracow or to Warsaw.

(f) President Wilson's Views in Regard to Posen Negotiations

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not clear to him from the telegrams, which had been circulated, that the Germans had denied their obligations under Article XVI of the Armistice of November 1918. It appeared to him that they merely wanted to discuss the question at Spa at a meeting with the military authorities, just as had been done in the case of other similar matters. In his opinion, the Conference was taking a great deal for granted when it assumed that the Germans would attack the troops when passing over the Dantzig Thorn railway line, since that would mean a renewal of the war. He had been told that General Haller considered that an escort of Allied troops would not be necessary; merely a few officers were required to superintend the process of transportation. Consequently, if his information were correct, the Germans had not denied their obligations under the Armistice. On the contrary, it would appear from messages received from Poland that they actually admitted their obligations. In this connection he would point out that Marshal Foch had stated that all his information in regard to the unwillingness of the Germans to comply with the demands of the Allies had been obtained from M. Noulens' messages. Now, M. Noulens was the head of a Commission that had been sent by the Allied and Associated Governments to Poland, and it was highly probable that the Germans might imagine that the Commission would naturally act in the interests of the Poles. Therefore, he could not help thinking that when the matter came to be dealt with by the

Allied High Command at Spa, as suggested, the question would assume a different aspect in the minds of the Germans.

MARSHAL FOCH drew attention to a very precise message dated Spa, 20th. March, 1919, in which the following statement occurred, namely:—

> "In confirmation of these incidents, the German Commission communicated to me this morning a note which amounts to a clear and categorical refusal (1) to let Poles land at Dantzig, (2) to authorise Officers of Warsaw Mission to proceed to territory occupied by the Germans to the east of the Vistula".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he entirely shared President Wilson's views. He did not know what had really occurred at Posen, but if Marshal Foch was satisfied that General Haller's troops should be sent to Poland, provided tonnage could be set free for the purpose, then he would suggest that the Marshal should himself without delay interview the German representatives at Spa so that all necessary arrangements might be made. He could not believe that the Germans would refuse to allow the troops free passage along the Dantzig Thorn railway line; and the idea that the Germans would cut them off was most unlikely. What object would the Germans have in doing so? Even if a whole brigade were cut up, it would not reduce the strength of the Allied Forces in any way, whereas such an outrage would lead at once to the Allied troops marching into Germany, or to the renewal of a strict blockade. He was not surprised to hear that General Haller himself had no apprehensions from that side.

(g) Mr. Lloyd George's Proposal for Marshal Foch To Proceed to Spa To Make a Formal Demand to German Delegates for Transport of Troops Through Dantzig In conclusion, he proposed definitely that Marshal Foch should be authorised to proceed to Spa to take the matter up with the German representatives there with a view to making a formal demand and the necessary arrangements.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Germany had already given, according to General Dupont, a point blank refusal. Under those conditions, it was a question whether negotiations should now be

reopened. Certainly he could go to Spa and say to the Germans that they must either allow the passage of the troops or he would wring their necks. It might be a moot point whether the question to be put to the Germans did or did not constitute a new demand; but if he went to Spa, he must go there fully authorised to tell the Germans that they must comply with the demands of the Allies, failing which hostilities would be renewed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should first put forward his demand in exactly the same way as other similar conditions had previously been put forward, that is to say, tactfully but firmly. He could see no difference between the demand, now to be delivered, and those previously made.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the chief advantage of discussing the matter at Spa was that Marshal Foch would be able to explain, firstly, that the demand was made in execution of Clause XVI of the Armistice; secondly, that the troops to be transported were actually Allied troops; thirdly, that they were required for the maintenance of order in Poland; and fourthly, that there was no idea of using them against Germany. This explanation would relieve the Germans of any suspicions that might exist in their minds. He hoped Marshal Foch would give a frank and open explanation to the Germans and tell them that they were expected to yield in good faith to the conditions of the Armistice; there was no necessity to say what the consequences of a refusal would be.

MARSHAL FOCH called attention to the character of the conversation which [he] had previously held with the Germans. In each case, he had had to deal with the renewal of an Armistice, which expired on a fixed date. That is to say, a refusal by the Germans to accept the terms to be imposed as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice by the date given naturally entailed the breaking of the Armistice, and the renewal of hostilities. Consequently, the Germans had no choice in the matter. Similarly, if on this occasion he did proceed to Spa to communicate the decision of the Supreme War Council to the Germans, he could not be expected to remain there indefinitely to await an answer.

(h) M. Pichon's View in Regard to Procedure To Be Followed To Enforce Article XVI of the Armistice M. PICHON expressed the view that Marshal Foch's proposals should be accepted, otherwise the Allied and Associated Governments would find themselves in a difficult and delicate position in view of the fact that the Germans had already given a categorical refusal to allow the Poles to land at Dantzig. Should Marshal Foch, therefore, simply ask for the enforcement of Clause XVI of the Armistice without being empowered to give an ultimatum, the effect would be merely to encourage the growing tendency of the Germans to resist the demands of the Allies. Therefore, he asked the Conference to authorise Marshal Foch to insist on an immediate compliance with the conditions of the Armistice. Public opinion was already much exercised by the fact that the Germans had apparently been able with impunity to confront the Allies with a refusal. He, therefore, very strongly seconded Marshal Foch's proposal. If he correctly understood the telegram received from General Nudant at Spa, it was the German Peace Commission that had notified to the representative of the Allied and Associated Governments at Spa, the clear and categorical refusal of the German Government to allow the Poles to land at Dantzig, since the message in question had been given officially to General Nudant, Marshal Foch's representative at Spa. Under those conditions he did not think Marshal Foch could be asked to proceed to Spa without giving him at the same time full authority to compel the Germans to submit.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that if it were considered that a question of dignity was involved, he would like to ask whether it was more undignified to make sure that the Germans understood what was wanted, than it would be to send troops by another route, as proposed by Marshal Foch. In his opinion, to send troops by another route than Dantzig would constitute an entire yielding to German demands. He thought, therefore, it would be far more dignified to renew conversations with the Germans.

(i) Mr. Lloyd George's Proposal re Action To Be Taken for Enforcement of Clause XVI of Armistice MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that to bring the discussion to a point he proposed, definitely, that Marshal Foch should be authorised to place the demands of the

Allied and Associated Governments before the German Delegates, calling upon them to comply with the conditions of Clause XVI of the Armistice, the correct interpretation of which would be set forth. He quite agreed that Marshal Foch should not be asked to make a demand, which the Allied and Associated Governments were not prepared to impose; but if the Germans refused to comply with the just interpretation of the terms of the Armistice, that would naturally constitute a serious matter. He thought most of the difficulties which had been raised by the Germans had reference to the occupation of the port of Dantzig. Marshal Foch treated the question of the passage of the troops between Dantzig and Thorn as a march through an enemy country, where bases and lines of communication would have to be held. Clause XVI of the Armistice, however, merely stipulated "free passage" and, therefore, Marshal Foch's demands should be restricted to the free passage of troops from Dantzig to Poland, and the port of Dantzig should not be held any longer than was required for the troops to pass through. In his opinion it was possible that the Germans thought that the demands of the Allied and the Associated Governments merely constituted a method of prejudging the question of the ownership of Dantzig in favour of Poland. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, were entitled to the use of this route, and Marshal Foch should make it quite clear to the Germans that if free passage were not allowed, that would constitute a breach of the armistice, and he would return to Paris to consult with the Supreme War Council in regard to the further measures to be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH argued that a clear and categorical refusal had already been given to the question he had been asked to put to the Germans. Suppose he agreed to repeat the question and met with the same reply, he could then hardly tell the Germans that he would proceed to Paris to consider what should be done. He felt that if he agreed to go to Spa he should have full discretion to take the necessary measures, should he meet with a refusal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought his proposal had not been fully understood by Marshal Foch. In his opinion, in the event of the Germans declining to accede to his demands, Marshal Foch should be authorised forthwith to tell the Germans that their refusal

constituted a breach of the Armistice, and that he would proceed to Paris merely to decide what means should be taken to enforce his demands, namely, whether troops would be marched into Germany, or whether economic restrictions would be imposed.

He drew attention, however, to the fact that he did not know exactly what demands had been put forward by the Polish Commission to the Germans. The Conference had seen General Nudant's telegram giving the reply of the German Commission,[2] but no information was given in regard to the question put to the Germans.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that General Nudant's telegram gave the reply to demands which had been made by the Allies, but it was not known what those demands were.

MARSHAL FOCH expressed the view that if the Conference considered that the terms of the armistice established the right of free passage through Dantzig, it would be sufficient for the Supreme War Council to inform the German Government of its intention to apply Article XVI of the Armistice and the necessary steps could then be taken to enforce compliance. It would not be necessary, therefore, for him to proceed to Spa.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that someone would have to present the demand to the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested a written document could be delivered by Marshal Foch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed to M. Clemenceau's proposal, provided it were made perfectly clear in the document that an occupation of Dantzig was not intended, but merely a free passage through Dantzig.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood that Marshal Foch's proposal was accepted, namely, that the Supreme War Council would draft its demands and Marshal Foch would proceed to Spa to present the document to the German Delegates.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that he would transmit the document to Spa, stating that the Supreme War Council demanded the execution of Clause XVI of the Armistice. At the same time, in reference to Mr. Lloyd George's argument, it would be necessary to establish a base at Dantzig in order to supervise the embarkation and entrainment of the Polish troops. He thought, therefore, that the document should contain a statement to the effect that provisions should be made by the Germans for the landing of the troops, housing and transport.

M. CLEMENCEAU understood that Marshal Foch would himself take the document to Spa.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he would telegraph the document to his representative, General Nudant, at Spa, since it was not intended that he should discuss the question with the German Delegates, and General Nudant was there to see to the execution of the clauses of the armistice. He would, therefore, merely tell General Nudant to insist on the execution of the conditions contained in Clause XVI of the Armistice which conditions had been held in abeyance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would ask the Conference to accept the following resolution:—

> "It is agreed:
>
> (j) Mr. Lloyd George's First Resolution That Marshal Foch shall receive full authority to demand from the Germans that Clause XVI of the Armistice of November 11th shall be so interpreted as to permit the free passage of General Haller's army, as part of the Allied army, to Poland through Dantzig, to maintain order in Poland. That he will inform them that this passage does not involve a permanent occupation of the port of Dantzig and that a refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the armistice by Germany. In the event of a refusal on the part of the Germans to accede to this demand Marshal Foch will inform them that the armistice has been broken and that he is returning to Paris to take the instructions of the Allied and Associated Governments as to the action to be taken."

MARSHAL FOCH maintained that if the intention were merely to apply Clause XVI of the armistice, it would only be necessary to call on the Germans to execute its provisions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it would be necessary to insist on the Germans interpreting Clause XVI to mean that General Haller's Army must be given free passage through Dantzig in order to proceed to Poland for the purpose of maintaining order, and that the passage asked for did not mean the occupation of Dantzig.

MARSHAL FOCH called attention to the fact that Mr. Lloyd George's resolution contained a statement to the effect that the free passage of General Haller's Army to Poland did not involve the occupation of the port of Dantzig. In his opinion, no such undertaking could be given since it would be necessary to constitute a temporary base at Dantzig in order to supervise the disembarkation and entrainment of the troops, operations which might continue for two or three months, if five or six divisions were to be transferred.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that such temporary establishments could not be defined as an occupation. Nevertheless, if the Conference preferred he would suggest adding the words:
—"that every facility must be given for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port."

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not like to force on Marshal Foch an unacceptable mission. If Marshal Foch's judgment were against this, the Conference should not urge him to undertake it, and should he so desire, some other channel of communication should be sought. He could see that the mission was extremely distasteful to Marshal Foch, and he did not wish to insist on his carrying out a work against his wishes. As an alternative, he would therefore suggest that the Supreme War Council should draw up its demands in writing to be conveyed in a formal manner to the German Delegates through General Nudant at Spa. That would be a less impressive way than the delivery of the message by Marshal Foch in person; but this method might have to be taken if the Marshal did not like to undertake the duty himself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it might be necessary to find some other channel of communication; but he did not think the proposal to transmit the message through General Nudant was a good one.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would read, for the information of the Conference, a portion of M. Noulen's despatch dated Posen, 18th March, 1919:—

> "The following conclusions have been reported by the Commission which returned to Warsaw on March 15th, after having been instructed to go to Dantzig to examine the possibilities of disembarking Polish troops: this operation will be very easy, for the wharfs, in particular those of Kaiserhafen, are large and well-suited for unloading several large steamers. The apparatus for unloading is sufficient. There are also two large empty warehouses for the housing of troops, and accommodation and sheds for material and provisions. The railways connect the quays with the principal lines; in a word, all facilities exist for a fairly extensive disembarkation of troops. Colonel Marshal and Intendant Gruet started for Paris on Sunday, and will give all detailed information with a view to effecting as soon as possible the despatch of General Haller's troops, the urgency of which is felt more and more."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, putting aside altogether his own personal opinions, which by the way coincided with those of M. Pichon, he would allow himself to ask Marshal Foch whether he would not subordinate his own personal feelings and inclinations, in order to remain the mouthpiece of the Allies—and they were Allies. It was essential that no dissensions should appear among the Allies on the eve of taking a decision which might lead to very serious consequences, even to a renewal of hostilities. Marshal Foch had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies and had led them magnificently to victory. He had thus acquired great influence, and unless he were the Allied spokesman on this occasion, the Germans would be led to believe that serious differences existed among the Allies, and these imaginary differences would be taken to explain the delays which had occurred, even though he and his colleagues knew that a delay was unavoidable, owing to the inherent difficulties of the

questions to be settled. Nevertheless, the Germans would take this as further evidence that disagreements existed between the Allies and would draw therefrom additional encouragement. We trusted that such an unfortunate incident would be avoided and that a formula would be found, which would meet Marshal Foch's objections. With this object in view, Mr. Lloyd George had proposed the following amended resolution:—

> It is agreed:—
>
> (k) Mr. Lloyd George's Second Proposal That Marshal Foch shall receive full authority to demand from the Germans that under Clause 16 of the Armistice of November 11th, they shall permit the free passage of General Haller's army, as part of the Allied Army, to Poland through Dantzig to maintain order in Poland. That he shall inform them that this passage does not involve the occupation of the port of Dantzig, although every facility must be given for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port. That he shall notify the Germans that a refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the armistice by Germany. In the event of a refusal on the part of the Germans to accede to this demand, Marshal Foch is instructed to take counsel with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken."

MARSHAL FOCH thought there existed a contradiction in the resolution just read. On the one hand, he was given full authority to make demands, whilst on the other hand, he was told to come back for further instructions. In other words, he was authorised to speak, but not to act.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that it would only be necessary for Marshal Foch to consult with the Supreme War Council as to the particular action to be taken in the event of a refusal. In his opinion, Marshal Foch should merely deliver the message to the German delegates at Spa, and then return immediately to Paris. On receipt of the Germans' reply, the Marshal would then consult the Council as to the further measures to be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not think it necessary that he should go to Spa merely to deliver a letter.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that the Council placed considerable importance on the delivery of the message by Marshal Foch in person.

MARSHAL FOCH called attention to the fact that he would find no-one at Spa, except General Hammerstein, who would say he had no authority; he was merely a letter-box and he himself also had a letter-box a representative at Spa in the person of General Nudant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether no means existed for informing the Germans that Marshal Foch would come to Spa to lay an ultimatum before them on the subject of the transport of troops to Poland, and that a delegate should be sent to receive that message. In that case the question would not be left to General Hammerstein.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that if a German Plenipotentiary were sent to receive the message he would go; but otherwise he did not see what useful purpose would be gained by his proceeding to Spa.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Marshal Foch clearly regarded this Mission, for some reason which he could not understand, as humiliating to himself. He (President Wilson) was the last man to propose anything that was humiliating to a man he so much admired as Marshal Foch. Therefore, he would ask Marshal Foch to suggest a solution of the difficulty.

MARSHAL FOCH saw nothing humiliating to himself in the proposal under consideration. He only saw in the proposal a violation of the principle which had so far governed his relations with the Germans. In other words, he was now asked to talk and argue with the Germans, whereas his strength had so far lain in silence. In reply to President Wilson's question, he proposed that a telegram to the following effect should be sent:—

> "The Supreme War Council calls the attention of the German Government to Article XVI of the Armistice and demands its

> immediate execution in regard to the disembarkation and free passage of troops from Dantzig to Thorn, and the grant of all facilities for the transport of the Polish forces. Guarantees shall be given for the complete execution of the conditions contained in that clause. Refusal to comply with the demands herein contained shall constitute a breach of the Armistice, leading to immediate renewal of hostilities."

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether any means existed for communicating with the Authorities in Berlin, who might be informed that the Supreme War Council had received a message from General Nudant, which was not understood. The German Authorities would at the same time be informed that the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send the Polish troops through Dantzig to Poland, and they desired the Berlin Authorities to give the necessary instructions to their military authorities on this point. He should be glad to know whether there was any direct or indirect channel of communication with Berlin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that no other means of communication existed, except through Spa.

(l) President Wilson's Proposal to Adjourn Further Consideration of Question Pending Receipt of Further Documents From General Nudant PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that no decision should be taken until General Nudant's promised reports had been received, so that the Conference might know exactly what demands had been put forward by M. Noulens, and whether these demands were consistent with the terms of the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the proposals put forward by M. Noulens might have been inconsistent with the letter of Article XVI. In this connection he called attention to the following extract from the Minutes of the Conference held on the 19th March:—

> "M. CAMBON said that he had received a telegram from M. Noulens to the effect that the Germans wished to discuss the question of the landing of Polish troops at Dantzig at Spa instead of which [*with*] the Inter-Allied Commission in

> Poland. A draft telegram had been prepared for the approval of the Council in answer to this message.
>
> GENERAL WEYGAND explained that Marshal Foch had given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this information [*order*] had been sent to M. Noulens for his information."[3]

PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the fact that the Warsaw Commission had been instructed to arrange for the receipt and transportation of the Polish troops at Dantzig. The Germans, on the other hand, had asked to have the discussion transferred to Spa, and the Council had been told that this request had been refused. The Germans then refused to discuss the matter further. This might be a perfectly proper refusal, and he suggested that M. Cambon be called on to furnish all the correspondence on the subject, so that the Council should know exactly what M. Noulens' Commission had asked and what had been refused.

M. CAMBON explained that the Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference had from time to time forwarded to him as Chairman of the Committee on Polish Affairs, all the documents received from M. Noulens in order to keep him fully advised. The day before yesterday the following telegram, dated Posen March 18th, 1919, received from M. Noulens, had been communicated to him:—

> "The Inter-Allied Commission has taken note of the declaration according to which the Berlin Government guarantees the safety of transport to German territory, but the Commission protests against the inadequacy of the reply on the other points of detail set forth by the Commission at the Conference held at Kreutz on March 5th.
>
> As a matter of fact, the German Government is seeking all possible ways of escape in order to delay and avoid the landing of Polish troops at Dantzig.

> We have proof of this in intercepted telegrams. If the Allied Governments do not rush things through and demand the complete execution of Article XVI of the Armistice, the Germans will manoeuvre between the Commission of Spa and that of Warsaw in order to delay all decisions.
>
> As the Allied Governments have instructed the Warsaw Commission to find a solution to this question we demand that the Berlin Government should be once more informed of the matter officially, and that the Commission at Spa should force the Germans to address themselves to us and insist on their submitting, without delay, in all the measures of detail which the Inter-Allied Military Commission may have to require. Further, the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw holds it necessary that the Naval Forces of the Entente should immediately make a considerable demonstration opposite Dantzig. This will be the way to prevent the Germans stirring up troubles on the day before that when the port will be opened to the troops of General Haller, and assigned according to the wireless messages to Poland."

A draft telegram had been prepared by him for the approval of the Council in answer to this message; but General Weygand had explained to the Meeting that Marshal Foch had already, in reply to a similar telegram, received by him, given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this order had also been sent to M. Noulens for his information. Consequently, there was nothing more to be said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to a previous telegram of the same date, signed by M. Noulens, which read as follows:—

> "The *pourparlers* with the German Delegation are almost ended. As a result of our demand with regard to the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig, von Rechenberg has just written to say that the German Delegation had no authority to consider this point, and that his Government had

> the right, and also the duty, of approaching the Armistice Commission at Spa, as the exact interpretation of Article XVI was not fixed. He added, 'My Government authorises me to say that, in the event of an eventual disembarkation at Dantzig, it would doubtless reserve the right to discuss the application of the principle set up by the Agreement of the 11th November, but that it was able to guarantee the safety of transport on German territory'.
>
> "Finally, as the Commission complained some time ago that orders had not been given to the local authorities at Dantzig when our Mission arrived there, von Rechenberg says that it will be necessary to be informed in advance of the time fixed for disembarkation, the numbers and composition of the expeditionary corps, and the length of time it will stay in Dantzig."

In his opinion, the requests made by the German Delegation were very reasonable and there was nothing contained therein which would justify the renewal of hostilities.

In regard to the reply sent by General Weygand to the telegram read by M. Cambon, he regretted that the question had not first been referred to the Supreme War Council.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that he had sent the telegram on his own responsibility, because the Supreme War Council had authorised the Commission in Poland to take all necessary action.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Conference was still ignorant as to the demands made by M. Noulens to the German Government. That is to say, the Conference did not know what their Commission had demanded and what had been refused.

M. CAMBON said that the following telegram sent by M. Noulens on the 16th March, 1919, gave some indication as to the demands made by him to the German Government:—

> "On account of the frequent bombardment of the Polish front by the Germans, the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen has thought it necessary to impose on both the parties the obligation to withdraw their artillery to a distance of 20 kilometres on either side of the line of demarcation. This condition, which had at first been accepted by the Germans at Kreutz, has subsequently been put in question by them. They state to-day that the German High Command refuses to withdraw the artillery to a greater distance than 6 kilometres from the line.
>
> As regards Dantzig, after having declared that they awaited instructions, and thereby delayed a solution of the question, the German Delegates state to-day that their Government wished to discuss the question at Spa. This request is put forward in the hope that different views may be taken by the various Missions representing the Allied Governments. It is necessary that the German answer should be given to the Commission charged with the study of the question of the debarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig. The local authorities at Dantzig have given permission to the Mission of Lt.-Col. Marshall to study the available resources for this operation, but they have refrained from giving any assistance and from taking any engagements on the pretext that they had received no instructions from their Government. We have therefore actually no guarantees that the disembarkation can be carried out with safety. The Inter-Allied Commission considers it indispensable in order to put an end to the dilatory proceedings of the German Delegation that the wishes of the Allied Governments should be communicated to Berlin by the Allied High Command."

It was on the strength of that telegram that he had drafted a reply for the approval of the Supreme War Council, informing M. Noulens that negotiations would not be transferred to Spa and should be continued by him at Posen.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the telegrams which had been read showed that everything was approaching a satisfactory conclusion on

the 17th and 18th, while on the 20th everything was exploded. In that connection he would again invite attention to the fact that General Dupont had telegraphed to General Nudant from Berlin that negotiations at Posen had been broken off for reasons given by M. Noulens. General Nudant, in forwarding that message had said:—

> "In confirmation of these incidents, the German Commission after sending several vague notes has communicated to me this morning a note which amounts to a clear and categorical refusal (1) to let Poles land at Dantzig, (2) to authorise officers of Warsaw Mission to proceed to territory occupied by the Germans to the east of the Vistula".

He again wished to draw attention to the fact that the Conference did not know what the "vague notes" referred to by General Nudant were, nor what it was that had been categorically refused by the Germans.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the telegram from General Nudant, just read by President Wilson, had been despatched at 14 hours 15 the previous afternoon. At the same time, the papers relating thereto had been sent by special messenger, but they could not reach Paris before tomorrow, the 22nd March.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that what was interpreted as "a clear and categorical refusal" would probably be found to be due to the refusal given to the Germans to discuss the question at Spa. It was probable that the German delegates at Posen were not authorised by the German Government to carry out the necessary negotiations relating to Armistice Conditions, which had invariably been carried out at Spa. He sincerely regretted the fact that General Weygand had sent his reply without first consulting the Supreme War Council, especially as the telegram was one which might have led to very serious results, including the resumption of hostilities.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the telegram from M. Noulens to which he had replied was one dated the 12th March 1919, which read as follows:—

> "The Inter-Allied Commission of Warsaw learns from intercepted telegrams that the German Government were inclined to refuse to grant passes to Allied officers to study the preparatory measures to be taken in connection with the transport of troops through Dantzig, stating that a request had already been forwarded to Marshal Foch requesting that the troops should be disembarked at Konigsberg and at Libau. That proposal would put aside the decision taken by the Inter-Allied Commission to insist on the enforcement of Article XVI of the Armistice of November last. Should another port be approved by the Allied Governments, the Germans would take that condition to imply a disavowal of the Commission; inevitable complications would delay the transportation of the troops; and lastly, the fear of insurrections which the Germans invoked as a reason for keeping the troops away from Dantzig would certainly take place, whereas it was hoped that the early arrival of Haller's Division and the authority which that event would give us to reason with the Poles, were likely to prevent the occurrence of any disturbances."

General Weygand, continuing, said that he had forthwith replied to that telegram, because he knew that the Germans, if unable to get what they wanted in one way always tried to get it by other means. In this case again their intention had been to complicate the issue and to create dissensions. Had he given any other reply to the Germans, they would have taken it as a disavowal of the Commission, to whom the Council had given full powers to settle this question, Thus, M. Noulens having been given full authority, the Germans appealed to Spa, and Dantzig having been selected as the port of debarkation, the Germans offered Konigsberg or Libau. Consequently, he had felt justified in replying at once to M. Noulens to allow him to continue his negotiations.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that under the circumstances the meeting should be adjourned to await the receipt of General Nudant's reports from Spa. A telegram should also be despatched forthwith to M. Noulens asking him to report in clear and precise terms what demands had been made to the Germans. He regretted that an adjournment until Monday should be necessary; but that was

unavoidable even though the Germans might thereby gain confidence from a knowledge of the fact that no decision had been reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a copy of the exact answer given by the German Delegation should also be obtained.

M. PICHON proposed sending the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw:—

> (m) Draft of M. Pichon's Telegram To Be Sent to M. Noulens
> "You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark to Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn: also the precise replies made by the Germans."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE requested that the reports received from General Nudant should forthwith be circulated.

(n) Marshal Foch's Request for Transport of Polish Troops by Rail to Poland MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether, pending further decision the transportation of troops by rail to Poland was duly authorized. The transportation of troops by that route would be extremely slow, but still some results would be obtained.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that President Wilson's comment on that subject was irrefutable. Should the Allied and Associated Governments agree to send the Polish troops to Cracow by that route after the Germans had refused passage through Dantzig, it would mean yielding to the German pretentions.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in the interval preparations for the expedition of the troops to Dantzig should be completed.

(o) Communication to Press in Regard to Decisions Reached by Meeting M. PICHON enquired, in view of the fact that an adjournment had been agreed to, whether the fact should not be published that the Supreme War Council had decided upon the transportation of the Polish troops via Dantzig.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be advisable to wait before publishing anything on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that considerable difficulty existed in connection with the supply of the required tonnage for the transport of troops via Dantzig. He was informed by the experts that passenger ships would alone be suitable for this work, and that none were available, unless ships at present employed for the transport of British and American troops were temporarily withdrawn for the purpose.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had already been called upon, in accordance with a decision taken on the 17th March last,[4] to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller's troops from France to Dantzig.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be extremely unwise under these circumstances to publish the fact that the Supreme War Council had decided to send General Haller's Army to Poland by sea, because considerable difficulties existed in regard to tonnage, the withdrawal of which would seriously affect the shipping programme relating to Australian troops.

(It was agreed:—

(1) To send the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw:—

> "You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark at Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn also the precise replies made by the Germans."

(2) To adjourn further consideration of the question pending receipt and circulation of reports to be received from General Nudant for M. Noulens.

(3) To obtain report from the Allied Maritime Council, in accordance with the decision taken on 17th March, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourned).

PARIS, 20th March, 1919.

[1] See BC–52 (SWC–18), p. 384 [*Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 20*].
[2] *Ante*, p. 428 [*Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 22*].
[3] BC–53, p. 413 [*Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 21*].
[4] See BC–52 (SWC–18) p. 383 [*Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 20*].

March 21, 6 p.m. (BC–55)

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[23] Minutes of a Conversation Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 6 p.m.

Paris, March 22, 1919, 6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/62

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/62

BC–55

[Document 23]

Minutes of a Conversation Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 6 p.m.

Paris, March 22, 1919, 6 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson

Hon. R. Lansing

Secretary

Mr. A. H. Frazier

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

Secretaries

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. de Bearn

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Russell Dolbeare

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.

M. Arnavon
ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
JAPAN
Marquis Saionji
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN	M. Ashida

Interpreter:—Professor Mantoux.

Publication in Press of Matters Discussed at the Conference MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he raised the following question with considerable disinclination. It would be in the recollection of the Conference that on Tuesday last a discussion took place on the subject of Poland. It was necessary that at these meetings the members should express themselves quite freely and quite clearly. He was therefore surprised on the following morning to find in the French papers not only a full report of the Committee's finding illustrated by secret maps; but, in addition, a garbled account of what he himself had said in the Council. The account contained actual quotations of the words used by him between quotation marks. Had a verbatim report been given, he would not have objected so

strongly. But the report gave a very wrong impression of what he had said, and the distortion permitted an opportunity for violent attacks against him. He did not mind the personal attacks, except in so far as they did undoubtedly tend to create ill-feeling, more especially as England itself was abused for its action in Syria.

The Conference would recollect that President Wilson had on a previous occasion drawn the attention of the Council to a similar occurrence. The report then complained of had also been a very garbled version of what had actually taken place at the meeting. There had been sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the information must have come from British sources and had probably been supplied by someone who had been present at the meeting. Feeling that the honour of the British Delegation was thereby involved, he had directed that measures be taken in order to discover the offender. The case was tracked down, with the result that not only was the person concerned dealt with as far as possible, but also the newspaper correspondent responsible was sent away from Paris. He was afraid from internal evidence that the incident now complained of had come from French sources, for reasons which he could give. It was most unfortunate that such disclosures shoud be made, and he felt sure that the French delegates would not resent his taking notice of the matter. That very afternoon General Bliss had told him that an American gentleman just returned from Berlin stated that the disclosures which were daily appearing in the papers in connection with the peace negotiations were causing the greatest harm in Germany. From what this witness had seen and heard in Germany, he felt convinced that if the whole peace terms, however stiff, were at once presented, they would be accepted. But the disclosure of one condition at a time had the effect of driving the Germans to desperation, especially as each new thing was published to the world with the suggestion that the Allies were not agreed among themselves. He wished to speak quite plainly, and to say that if similar disclosures were to be repeated, he would much prefer not to take any further part in the discussions, and to put off expressing his views until the final Conference took place. A perusal of the articles complained of would make it clear that someone who had been present in the room was responsible for the disclosure, and his

colleagues would agree that it would be impossible to continue these discussions if such incidents were likely to recur.

It would be in the recollection of some of his colleagues that he had hesitated to agree to the Peace Conference meeting in a capital, because he was afraid that the local press would take an undue part in the proceedings, and attempt to influence decisions by an injudicious criticism of the delegates of other countries. The mere fact that the Peace Conference was meeting in Paris should transform the city for the moment from a French into an international capital.

It would be unnecessary for him to lay stress on the fact that the occurrence of such incidents only tended to encourage the Germans to give the public the wrong impression that the Allies were only fighting each other for individual advantages. Consequently, such incidents must be put a stop to; strong action must be taken to prevent the possibility of their recurrence; otherwise, that Conference would become absolutely futile.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could only thank Mr. Lloyd George for his statement, which he accepted in the spirit in which it was made. Mr. Lloyd George would recognise how difficult it was to supervise the press. The pressmen had entry into all Government offices, and it was impossible to prevent leakage occurring. He could only express his deep regret that the articles referred to had found their way in the press, and he promised to take every possible measure to prevent a recurrence of the incidents complained of. Here, in France, the press censorship still functioned; but the Government did not dare to enforce it too rigorously. Nevertheless, he would do his best to stop the publication of such harmful articles. He agreed word for word with everything that Mr. Lloyd George had said. Nothing had done more to put the Allies in the wrong light with the Germans than the indiscretions of the press. He promised to do his best to prevent a repetition of such indiscretions. But he could hardly guarantee that nothing of the kind would ever occur again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the fact that the articles complained of had been published in the “Temps”, the “Journal”,

and the “Echo de Paris”. As was well known, the “Temps”, was, at any rate, supposed to be in close touch with the Government, so that the article in question became doubly mischievous. His complaint, however, was not directed against the press. His chief point was that someone sitting in that room had deliberately given the information complained of to the press with a definite purpose. He fully agreed with M. Clemenceau that it was impossible to control the press, but it should be possible to prevent responsible officials from giving away such information, especially when the information so given was deliberately altered in order to make it the ground for a violent attack on one of the Allied countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would make very serious protests to the directors of the “Temps”. At the same time he would point out that in France a press censorship still existed which did not exist in Great Britain and America, consequently measures could be taken for its proper application.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether in M. Clemenceau’s opinion a severe enquiry could not be instituted to discover who had given out the information about Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the British authorities had in the previous case instituted a stern inquiry, with the result that the offender had been discovered. He thought that if the French Government were to make a stern and persistent enquiry, the culprit in this case would also be found. In his opinion, the culprit ought to be tracked down, otherwise discussion here would become impossible.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. BALFOUR invited attention to another aspect of the same case. The same leakage was taking place in regard to Commissions and Committees, with the result that the members who had expressed an opinion on any question were subsequently lectured by outside parties. For instance, he himself had mentioned at one of the meetings that the port of Dantzig constituted a difficult problem. In consequence, M. Dmowski had called on him and talked to him for a

considerable time on his supposed anti-Polish feelings; though, as a matter of fact, he was a great supporter of the Poles. The point, however, was this, namely, that as a result of his having made a remark at a secret meeting, an outside diplomat had forthwith been sent to him to discuss the whole question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could confirm Mr. Balfour's statement, because he himself had first learnt of the decisions about to be reached by Commissions from outside parties against whom the decision was going to be given. In his opinion, every member of the Delegation should take steps to ensure that no one connected with his Delegation was to blame.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether, to begin with a notice should not be circulated to all members of the Peace Conference, enjoining strict secrecy.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the whole of the military and naval terms had been published in the press.

M. SONNINO said that whilst all were agreed in regard to the question of the Press, the proceedings of Committees and Commissions presented a greater difficulty. In his opinion, a circular should be issued to all members of the Commissions impressing on them the necessity for reticence. He thought a great many people talked almost unconsciously; therefore, a circular might be useful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that whoever was responsible for giving the information should not be allowed in the Council Chamber. The incident to which he had called attention presented the same characteristics as the previous case, that is, it contained a communication in inverted commas, which could only have been given by someone who had been present in the room.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with all that had been said by M. Clemenceau. He merely wished to add that severe instructions had been given to the Press, and daily a great number of articles and paragraphs were suppressed by the press censor. An enquiry would, however, be carried out as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That a strict and severe enquiry should be instituted by the French Authorities in order to discover, if possible, the name of the person who had given information to the Press in regard to the Conversation held at the Quai d'Orsay about Poland.
(2) That a circular should be issued by the Secretariat General to members of the Peace Conference impressing on them the necessity for strict reticence in regard to the proceedings of the Conference.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 22nd March, 1919.

March 22, 11 a.m. (BC–56)

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[24] Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, March 22, 1919, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/63

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/63

BC–56

[Document 24]

Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, March 22, 1919, 11 a.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
President Wilson	Dr. I. Bowman
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. Lord
Secretary	British Empire
Mr. A. H. Frazier	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
British Empire	Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.	Mr. H. J. Paton
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	France
Secretaries	M. Cambon
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	M. Tardieu
Mr. Norman	General Le Rond
France	M. Hermitte
M. Clemenceau	Lt. de Percin
M. Pichon	M. Degrand
Secretaries	Italy
M. Dutasta	Marquis della Torretta
M. Berthelot	Japan
M. Arnavon	M. Kuriyama

M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E., M. Orlando
H. E., Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldroyandi
M. Bertele
JAPAN
Baron Makino
Marquis Saionji
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain B. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Porter.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU opened the Meeting by asking M. Jules Cambon to address the Council. Polish Frontiers: Western Frontier of East Prussia

M. CAMBON said that he proposed to read the note prepared for the Council by the Committee on Polish Affairs in accordance with the instruction received to re-examine the proposals concerning the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the exchange of views in the Council on the 19th March.[1]

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the opinion that as this note had been communicated to all the representatives, it would be unnecessary to read it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conclusion of the note was that the Committee on Polish Affairs, after reconsidering the problem, maintained its previous proposals.

(For text see Annexure "A".)

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that as he had taken an active part in the discussion of the first Report of the Polish Committee and as he had raised objections to the inclusion within Poland of two million Germans, he felt he must add a few comments on this second Report. He was still somewhat alarmed by the effect the Report would produce. He was not as convinced as at the previous meeting that this effect could be avoided. He did not wish to criticise the Polish Committee which had worked in a perfect spirit of impartiality and which had had to solve serious difficulties. Poland had to be given a corridor to the sea with every guarantee of security. The Committee had come to the conclusion that this could not be done without subjecting to Poland a large German population. He feared that this demand, added to many others which would have to be made from Germany, would produce deplorable results on German public opinion. The Allies should not run the risk of driving the country to such desperation that no Government would dare to sign the terms. At the present time the Government at Weimar was not very stable and all the currents of German life went on their way without taking much notice of its existence. It was tolerated, however, as there was nothing put in its place. The Conference must avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign it, or such as would cause the immediate collapse of any government that undertook the responsibility of accepting it. These observations were not levelled at the Committee on Polish Affairs, but the recommendations of that Committee were a considerable element in the difficulty just mentioned. He was inclined to accept, provisionally, the solution proposed by the Committee and to do likewise with all similar proposals by other Committees, with the clear understanding that

the Supreme Council reserved the right of revision when it came to consider the total effect of all these proposals.

M. CAMBON said that he had only a word to add. He agreed that the Germans in general and the Prussians in particular would be extremely sensitive in regard to the destruction of the cherished enterprise of Prussia pursued for so many years. They had hoped to link Eastern and Western Prussia along the coast of the Baltic. The Committee, however, had been charged with the constitution of a Polish State with some chance of survival. The Committee had considered that to do this, wide access to the sea was necessary.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George was wise, and he was prepared to accept it. He did not, however, quite see how the Public would be made to understand that the Council had provisionally accepted frontiers for Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that when the matter of communications to the Press had been discussed, it had been decided that no information should be given regarding territorial questions. It would, therefore, be enough to inform the Press that an agreement had been reached, without any details.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Public might be informed that the Committee's Report had been received and reserved for further examination together with the whole group of territorial questions. He would suggest the following formula:—

> "The new Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs was received and discussed and reserved for final examination in connection with subsequent boundary determinations affecting Germany."

(This text was adopted.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU caused to be read to the Council four telegrams lately received relating to the rupture of negotiations.

(See Annexure "B" (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*).)

Failure of Negotiations Between the Polish Commission and Germany Relating to Disembarkation at Dantzig MR. BALFOUR said that two questions arose. The first, which was the more important, was to determine whether the demands addressed by the Allies to the Germans were in conformity with the clauses of the Armistice. For his part he thought they were and that the Germans were attempting to evade their execution. If the Council shared his opinion he thought that the application of the terms of the Armistice should be vigorously pursued through the instrumentality of Marshal Foch at Spa. The second question raised by the Germans was whether it was more convenient to land troops at Königsberg or at Libau. This was a question of convenience which might be examined.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that disembarkation might be carried out at all three ports.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the whole correspondence relating to disembarkation was now available.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that M. Noulens' note to the Germans was not yet before the Council. According to the terms of General von Hammerstein's telegrams it would seem that M. Noulens had asked for free passage for Polish troops and not for Allied troops. If so, the request would not be in agreement with the terms of the Armistice. Polish soldiers could, if need be, be represented as Allied troops if they had been enlisted in the French or American armies, but, if the Germans were required to give passage to Polish troops as such, the Allies might be putting themselves ostensively in the wrong. This point, therefore, should be made clear, and once our rights had been established, the Council might enquire whether it was more expedient to disembark at Königsberg or at Libau than at Dantzig, in order to avoid crossing German territory.

BARON SONNINO observed that this would entail crossing Bolshevik territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the Polish troops were disembarked at Königsberg it was not quite clear how they would avoid crossing German territory. It must be remembered that this question was

closely related in the minds of the Germans to the ultimate fate of Dantzig. An impression would be produced on the population of Dantzig that the Poles had come to take possession of the town. This impression might perhaps only last for a few days during the passage of the troops, but it might be strong enough to provoke disorder. It had been declared that the decisions of the Conference must not be prejudged by military operations. A bad example should therefore not be set. It was therefore very desirable to know exactly in what terms M. Noulens had addressed the Germans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would be advantageous to use all three routes. This would doubtless hasten the realisation of our plans and facilitate the importation of food into the country. The idea of disembarking at Dantzig should, however, not be abandoned, as this would look like a surrender of our position.

He also wished to draw attention to the wording of Clause 34 of the Armistice:—

> "To secure the execution of the present Convention under the most favourable conditions the principle of a Permanent International Commission of Armistice is accepted. This Commission shall operate under the supreme authority of the Chief Command of the Naval and Military Forces of the Allies."

Consequently, it appeared to him that the Germans were within their rights in demanding that the negotiations should be conducted at Spa and not at Posen.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Germans suggested the disembarkation of Polish troops at Königsberg or Libau. As regards Konigsberg, Marshal Foch might be asked to furnish a report, but as to Libau, he wished to point out that this port was in Courland, in a zone claimed by the Lithuanians. Lithuanians and Poles were not on the best of terms.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the same difficulty arose in respect to Memel.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed as a result of the discussion that Marshal Foch be requested to furnish the Council with all documents not at present before it; to prepare a report on the subject of a possible disembarkation at Konigsberg, and to meet the heads of Governments at a private meeting, on Monday, 24th March, at 3 p.m.

(This proposal was accepted.)

3. Following on proposals by President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, it was decided that the Secretary General should draw up a list of all questions ready for immediate discussion, giving priority to such as concerned Preliminaries of Peace with Germany. Agenda for Next Meeting

It was further decided that the two following questions should be considered at the next Meeting of the Council on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.:—

(1) Submarine Cables.
(2) Teschen.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 22nd March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

To the Council of Ten

From the Commission on Polish Affairs.

The Polish Commission has been instructed to reconsider its recommendation in regard to the western frontier of East Prussia[2] in the light of the Conversation at the Council of Ten on March 19th.[3]

That conversation started primarily from the objection that the number of Germans whom it was proposed to include within the new Polish State was excessive, and it was suggested that this objection was particularly applicable to the region between the Vistula and the proposed western frontier of East Prussia.

The recommendations of the Polish Commission were based primarily on the ethnographical distribution of the two peoples concerned, but it was recognised that in any particular region other considerations might be so strong as to override purely ethnographic facts. This applied to the region to which attention was drawn at the Conversation of the 19th March, in as much as the Commission were of the opinion that it was their duty to assign to Poland, throughout its length, the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway:

(*a*) In order that Poland might have secure access to the sea.
(*b*) Since the economic value of the railway would lie only in the fact of its serving as a means of communication between different parts of Poland.
(*c*) Since this is by far the shortest line of rail between the port of Poland and the capital of Poland.

These considerations were held to outweigh the fact that this involved the annexation of two areas (Kreis Rosenberg and that part of Kreis Marienwerder which lies east of the Vistula) which were not only predominantly German, but had been part of Ducal or East Prussia for many centuries. The total population for these two areas according to the undoubtedly biased census figures of 1910 are 73,000 Germans and 7,000 Poles. It should be observed that all other areas assigned to Poland east of the Vistula are historically Polish territory, with the exception of a small district in the extreme south where there is a Polish Protestant population.

As regards the 73,000 Germans of Kreis Rosenberg and Marienwerder, it should be observed that although their claim for special consideration is undoubtedly strengthened by their historic connection with East Prussia, the intricate and abnormal character of the historic frontier of East Prussia makes it almost impossible to follow that frontier. The Prussian Government itself has recognised

this by excluding these districts from East Prussia, and incorporating them with West Prussia to which geographically they belong. Further, to assign the whole of this area to East Prussia is impossible, as it would give the Germans complete command of the Vistula, and the historical principle in this area must therefore in any case be overridden by considerations other than that of the Danzig-Mlawa railway.

Taking the above facts and arguments into consideration, the Commission remain of the opinion that the importance to Poland of retaining complete control over the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway overrides the historical and ethnographical arguments in favour of Germany in this area.

With regard to the general question of the number of Germans included in Poland, it should be noted that the statistics in the third and fourth columns of Appendix I (B) of the Report of the Commission have reference only to the strip of former German territory which it is proposed to include within the new Polish State.

Until the eastern frontier of Poland has been defined, it is impossible to forecast precisely the total population of the new State, but the figure will probably approximate 25,000,000. The total German population in this area, including that assigned to Poland under the recommendations of the Report of the Commission, will amount to not more than 3,000,000; thus the Germans will at most constitute about ⅛ of the total population, not allowing for the considerable emigration of Germans which is certain to ensue; and for which easy facilities are being arranged under the treaty clauses.

The Commission have made a careful scrutiny of the ethnographic distribution in the territories bordering on the proposed new frontiers.

In five localities only (leaving the Danzig corridor out of consideration) has any appreciable departure been made from the ethnographic line, and the total number of Germans involved is not more than 200,000. The economic and other reasons which led the Commission to take the decisions in question have already been

explained in Part III (*a*) to (*e*) of their report, and the sufficiency of these reasons has not been questioned.

One general fact therefore becomes clear—that the large number of Germans assigned to Poland is primarily the result of the nature of the intimate racial distribution in this part of Europe, and not of any neglect on the part of the Commission to consider ethnographical facts. Before Poland was partitioned there were large German minorities permanently settled on Polish territory. Since the partition, and more especially since the creation of the German Empire, the immense energy of one of the most efficient of modern states has been directed towards the Germanization of this area by all possible means, and the most extreme measures have been taken to maintain and to increase the proportion of Germans to Poles. The German minority in the area assigned to Poland is not gathered together in the western boundaries of Polish territory, but is widely distributed over the whole area and intimately mixed with the Polish population. However unfortunate may be the inclusion of the German minority in the Polish State, no adjustment or modification of the boundary can avoid this result.

The general conclusion is that the cession of the Mlawa railway is a comparatively small factor in causing the large number of Germans to be assigned to the Polish State, and the Commission respectively submit that their original proposals offer the best possible solution to the problem which they were called upon to solve.

MARCH 20, 1919.**Annexure "B"**
A

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
SPA, March 7th, 1919.

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant

WAKO 12.784

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw, in the course of a meeting which took place on the 6th March at the station of Kreuz (German

Posnania) under the Presidency of Ambassador Noulens, insisted on the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig. With reference to my note 11,805 of February 27th, 1919, I recall the fact that the disembarkation of large numbers of Polish troops at Dantzig would undoubtedly cause fresh bloodshed. It would be considered by the excited Polish minorities in West Prussia as a signal for a rising preconcerted by the Entente. Allied officers who are probably to accompany the transports would be unable to oppose it. Moreover, the transport of food from Dantzig in the direction of Poland would be seriously hampered by the simultaneous transport of troops.

I lay special stress on the serious danger which would threaten the German front against the Russian Bolsheviks, the communications of which with its rear would thus be hindered.

If the Allies think it necessary now to bring Polish troops to Poland by the Baltic Sea, it is proposed to send them in the first place by way of Libau where they would not touch German territory at all, and whence they can be sent against the Russian Bolsheviks with the greatest possible speed. In the second place would come the East Prussian ports of Memel and Pillau (Koenigsberg).

According to declarations of undoubted authenticity, the object seriously sought by the Allied Governments is to avoid the outbreak of fresh hostilities between the Germans and the Poles in the East. If it is desired to attain this object, Dantzig should not be chosen as a port of disembarkation for Polish troops.

For this reason I am instructed by the German Government once more urgently to draw attention to the consequences which would ensue.

(Signed) **Von Hammerstein**

B

Spa, March 8th, 1919.

General Von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission, to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission

I forward as an enclosure an extract from the report received by telegraph on the sitting of the International Commission at Kreuz on March 7th. This paper clearly shows that Ambassador Noulens really intends to prepare for a disembarkation of Poles at Dantzig.

I am instructed to make the following observations on this subject:

(1) I ask to be informed whether the Inter-Allied Commission, set up solely to fix the line of demarcation of German Posnania, is competent in principle to settle a question of such serious importance. On the German side nothing is known on this subject.

(2) I observe that Article 16 of the Armistice Treaty does not give the Allies the right to land Polish troops at Dantzig. The Allies are only "to have the right of free passage by Dantzig, in order to be able to revictual the population of the regions evacuated by the Germans on the east of Germany and in order to maintain order".

The disembarkation of Polish troops is not therefore provided for by the Conventions. As it is certain that it would have the effect of disturbing public order it must even be considered that it is contrary to Article 16.

The Allies would thus be acting against their own intentions, which they have constantly proclaimed, of maintaining order and preventing hostilities.

(3) The declaration of Ambassador Noulens, according to which no protest has ever yet been made against the choice of Dantzig as a port of disembarkation, is incorrect (see 11.805 of February 27th and 12.784 of March 7th[4]). The principal reason why this question has not been cleared up is that no such demand has ever been made officially on the part of the Allies.

(4) The admission of Polish officers and officials and other Polish employés to Dantzig and moreover to German territory can only be allowed if the Entente undertakes to guarantee that the people in question will abstain from all agitation and from all political activity and will strictly observe German instructions and conditions as long as they remain in German territory. The text of the Armistice Treaty confers no right to lay down conditions, still less such far-reaching conditions as those set forth in the enclosure, by which Germany alone will be bound.

(5) It has already been stated in the note of March 7th, No. 12.784, that Germany is ready to undertake Polish transport. The conditions can be treated in detail by word of mouth, as soon as the Allied and Associated Governments have officially expressed their desire to examine the question more closely. But I point out now, after an exhaustive study of the state of communications, that, even from the technical point of view it would be far better to use the ports lying further east. I am in a position to give more precise information on the possibility of working transport from these points in the direction of Poland.

C

No. 1.576/0 of March 18th.

Copy of a Telegram From Marshal Foch to General Nudant

(Communicated to General von Hammerstein by General Nudant under No. 716 G)

By letters 11.805 of February 27th.
12.784 of March 7th.
12.944 of March 8th.

General Hammerstein has asked in the name of the German Government that the disembarkation of Polish troops may take place, not at Dantzig, but at Koenigsberg, Memel or Libau.

Now, the President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw telegraphs that the German Government, taking this application as a pretext, claims the right to refuse to allow the passage of officers instructed to make preparatory arrangements for transport by way of Dantzig.

Please remind the German Commission:

(*a*) That the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw has received from the Allied Governments full powers to settle the conditions of the application of Article 16 of the Armistice of the 11th November, and that consequently it is for the Commission alone to lay down these conditions.
(*b*) Consequently that the above-mentioned application calls for no reply and the German Government could in no case make use of this application to postpone the solution of the question.

I am informing M. Noulens of the above measures.

(Signed) **WEYGAND**

D

20TH MARCH, 1919.

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant, Respecting the Disembarkation of Polish Troops in Germany

(Continuation of 698 G. and 716 G.)

I have the honour in the name of the German Government to make the following declaration confirming my verbal declaration at the Plenary Session of the 19th March:—

1. On handing over Note 716 G. of the 18th March 1919[*] General Nudant declared that the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen was empowered to settle the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops at Danzig. The German Government, however, maintains its right, according to Article 34, of the Convention of the 11th

November 1918, to treat this question, which is governed by the aforesaid Convention, at Spa.

2. Note 716 G. of the 19th March cannot be said to be a final declaration as regards the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops. It only concerns my letter of the 7th March No. 12.784.[†] The point of view of the German Government is, however, contained in the note of the 8th March No. 12.9444.[‡] The German Government is waiting to see the effect of the opinions contained in this Note before further steps are taken.

3. The German Government attaches special importance to the fact that, by the offer made in the Note No. 12.944 of the 8th March, para: 5., it declared itself ready to take measures which go beyond its obligations. It must therefore maintain its view that these measures should be taken under the conditions which itself imposes. It is ready to discuss this point.

The German Government can in no way lend itself to the passage of enemy troops through a country where nationalities are mixed, in a case where the right is so plainly on its side. Neither is it possible to suppose that the Allied Governments wish to act contrary to the assurances which they have repeatedly given and in accordance to which they have no other intention in the East than to maintain order, and avoid further bloodshed. The German Government can declare that quiet prevails in the region in question. Unhappily it cannot but fear that the appearance of Polish Troops would mean an attempt at the violent and flagrant oppression of the Germans who are undoubtedly in a majority in West Prussia.

4. In these conditions, the German Government cannot be expected to yield to the demand that it should allow Allied Officers, and among them Polish Officers, to move about in the region to the East of the Vistula, without restriction as regards their journeys, and without supervision. No paragraph of the Convention obliges the German Government to consent to this. In view of its experience with Mr. Paderewski and Colonel Wade in a similar case,[5] it has now to be doubly prudent. The Government however is disposed, in this instance also, to do all it possibly can. It will willingly examine, in

each particular case, whether it can allow these journeys for special objects, without threatening public order, and in what conditions.

(Signed) **Von Hammerstein**

Forwarded by General Nudant under No. 6.039 (as continuation of 758. of 20th March.)

[1] See BC–53, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 21*].

[2] Contained in Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.

[3] BC–53, p. 414 [*Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 21*].

[4] For the latter, see part A of this annexure, *supra*.

[*] Notification of Tel: 1576/0 of 18th March. [Footnote in the original.]

[†] Forwarded under No. 5.492 of 7th March. [Footnote in the original.]

[‡] Note forwarded under No. 5.596 of 9th March. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] See vol. II, pp. 422–424.

March 24, 4 p.m. (BC–57)

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[25] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, March 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/64

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/64

BC–57

[Document 25]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, March 24, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary-General
. . . . . .
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
Secretary-General
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey
Secretary
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Secretary-General Peace Conference
M. Dutasta
Secretaries

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Admiral Benson
Capt. Schofield
Mr. James B. Scott
Dr. I. Bowman
Dr. Haskins
Dr. Lord
Mr. Dickson

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Colonel F. H. Kisch
Dr. Pierce Higgins

FRANCE
M. Tardieu
M. Cambon
M. Fromageot
M. de Lasteyrie
M. Hermitte
Marshal Foch
General Weygand

M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretary-General
Count Aldrovandi
Secretary
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Marquis Saionji
General le Rond
ITALY
Admiral Thaon di Revel
Admiral Grassi
Captain R. N. Ruspoli
Marquis della Torretta
M. Brambilla
JAPAN
M. Yamakawa
Capt. S. Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Kawai.

Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

(1) (See Annexure "A".) Transport of General Haller's Troops to Poland Through Dantzig

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU called on M. Fromageot to give a summary of the report of the Committee on Submarine Cables. Disposal of Enemy-Owned Submarine Cables:

(a) Report of Committee on Enemy-Owned Submarine Cables M. FROMAGEOT said that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council held

at the Quai d'Orsay, on Friday, March 7th, 1919,[1] the following resolution was accepted:—

> "(1) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law to treat as capture or prize submarine telegraph cables of an enemy cut or taken possession of by naval operations?
>
> (2) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law for a Government whose naval forces have cut or taken possession of a submarine telegraph cable of an enemy to retain such cable by way of reparation?
>
> (3) In the event that the cut or captured cable of an enemy is landed on the territory of another nation, what right and authority does such nation possess under contracts or permits granted to the enemy to cancel the same or to control the use of the cable?"

To these questions the Committee had submitted the following replies:—

> *On the first and second questions.*
>
> (1) The Committee is unanimous in thinking that military necessity is a justification for the cutting of enemy cables.
> (2) On the question as to whether the enemy cables can or cannot be the subject of capture or prize the Delegates of the British Empire, France and Japan think that the capture and confiscation of enemy cables are legally justified by the general principle of the right of capture of enemy property at sea. The delegates of the United States and of Italy consider, on the other hand, that in the present state of international law this opinion is not well founded, the property in enemy cables cannot be assimilated to property subject to capture at sea.
> (3) In these circumstances the Committee is unanimous in considering that in the absence of a special rule, recognising the right of confiscation of enemy submarine cables, the treaty of peace must decide the disposal of these cables.

On the third question.

The Committee is unanimous in considering that the answer depends upon the terms of the contracts entered into between the owner of the cable and the third Power on whose territory such cable is landed, and that, in all cases, these contracts are, as regards the belligerents who have cut or seized the cable, a *res inter alios acta*.

(b) British Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables MR. BALFOUR said that as far as he had been able to make himself acquainted with the report of the Committee, he did not think it gave as much assistance as had been hoped for. The question would, therefore, have to be discussed in full conference. In the first place, he thought that two points should be sharply distinguished, namely: a first question, which was relevant to peace with Germany, and a second question, which would have to be left to be settled after peace had been concluded. The latter question was this: "Ought world-arrangements to be made for the regulation of submarine cables?" It might well be that the movement to internationalise waterways, great rivers, straits, certain railways, etc., would have to be extended to cables, which were of the utmost value for commercial purposes. That question, however, could well be postponed.

The other question to be decided was this: "Had Germany any right over cables which had been cut and diverted? Had Germany any right to complain and, if so, what principle should be asserted?" In his opinion Germany had no right to complain of the action which had been taken; and the Allied and Associated Governments had a right to appropriate cables in exactly the same manner as ships captured at sea. That view, he admitted, had not received unanimous acceptance: it had been accepted by the French, Japanese and British members, and rejected by the American and Italian representatives. Consequently, a difference of opinion existed, and it was difficult for a man who was not a lawyer to argue where lawyers disagreed. He maintained, however, that the question had been settled during the Spanish-American War, when the United States Courts had decreed that belligerents had no claims in regard to cables cut during the War. He did not think that the Germans could, with reason,

complain if the Allies seized the cables which, though constructed by private enterprise, had been heavily subventioned by the enemy Governments and used by them for strategic and warlike purposes, until destroyed. Therefore, in his opinion, if the right to appropriate any property at all were admitted, the right to appropriate cables undoubtedly existed. He did not wish to make any pronouncement in regard to the regulation of cables throughout the world. That world-problem could not be discussed during the present conferences, and the consideration of that question would have to be postponed to a more favourable occasion. That was all he wished to say on the subject for the moment and he would like to hear the case argued on the other side before saying anything more.

(c) French Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables ADMIRAL DE BON said that at the Meeting of the Supreme War Council held on March 6th, 1919, when the question of the disposal of German cables first came under discussion,[2] he had expressed the view that submarine cables undoubtedly formed instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages and, since ships had been lost in cutting enemy submarine cables, the latter must be considered to be war material and fair prize, resulting from war operations. At that meeting, the view appeared to have been accepted by all parties that Germany could have no pretentions in regard to the future disposal of her submarine cables. Furthermore, when the matter came to be referred to the Judicial Commission, the conclusion reached was that International Law contained nothing which would upset the views expressed by the Military Authorities. In regard to the principle involved, two points of view had been expressed by the legal experts, which clearly proved that the problem could not be solved on purely legal grounds. The British, French and Japanese experts held that the Allied and Associated Governments had full right to appropriate the cables in question, while the American and Italian experts held the opposite view without having any established principles on which to base their conclusions. In other words, the views expressed were not based on International Law. In this connection he wished, however, to point out that the views expressed by the American Members of the Committee were not shared by other American experts, such as Mr. Grafton Wilson and Admiral Stockton.

He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the question to be answered was this: “Could the Allied and Associated Governments appropriate cables without giving Germany just cause of complaint?” He thought the Conference was entitled to accept the recommendations made by their Military experts since the legal experts had been unable to produce any ruling against such procedure. In other words, the Allied and Associated Governments should decide to keep the cables in question. In regard to the regulation of cables throughout the world, he agreed that the question should form the subject of future study, since it did not appertain to the immediate problem under consideration.

(d) American Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables MR. LANSING said that he had listened with interest to the arguments advanced in favour of retaining possession of the cables seized by France and Great Britain during the war, and he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that the matter of internationalising cables should be taken up as soon as possible so that there should be no monopoly of cables. In the case under consideration, he thought the report submitted by the Committee was excellent in that it did not attempt to solve what had not been solved. The Committee had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that no law existed, which could be applied to the cases referred to it. The Committee had, it was true, unanimously admitted the right to cut cables as a war measure; but he (Mr. Lansing) denied the fact that the cutting of cables as a war measure gave the right of possession. In his opinion there was a very great difference between the capture of ships at sea and the seizure of cables. Cables were attached to a submarine region, which was not in the sovereignty of any nation. The cutting of a cable was merely an expedient of war; and, in his opinion, it was wrong that such a cable should continue in the possession of the nation, who cut it, after hostilities were over. Furthermore, cables could not be considered as belonging wholly to one country since they crossed other territorial waters and terminated in other countries. Consequently, to divert such cables to other uses and to deprive their use to former owners would constitute a dangerous precedent. The basis of capture on the high seas was that the ship could be brought within the jurisdiction of the captor, where it could be reduced to possession. This could not be done with submarine cables. Cables were the result of private

enterprise and represented investments of money by individuals or companies. If it were argued that the keeping of cables deprived individuals of all ownership, no individuals would hereafter invest money in cables, to the great detriment of mankind. Admiral de Bon had given expression to the opinion held by certain naval authorities; but he would invite attention to the fact that there was not unanimity on the subject among naval experts. To sum up, in his opinion, since no basis in law existed for the guidance of the Conference, he thought it would be most impolitic to take over as spoils of war cables useful to all the world and to convert them into the State property of the captors. Such action would be contrary to American opinion as it involved acceptance of the principle that the conqueror could deal with the conquered as he wished.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether Mr. Lansing wished to suggest that cables were less useful to mankind because removed from the property of Germans.

MR. LANSING replied that his contention was that it would make more of a monopoly.

MR. BALFOUR said that he himself was no lover of monopolies, but he thought the word was somewhat out of place in connection with the question under investigation. As far as the connection between the United States of America and Europe was concerned, he would admit that the majority, but not all the cables passed through Great Britain. He believed 13 cables passed through Great Britain; but all of them were owned or controlled by American capital. He quite agreed that a cable landing in a country would be subject to the laws of that country, and in war-time it was only natural that restrictions would be put on the use of such cables, as national interests might require. As a result, cases had occurred when Great Britain had been obliged to take over the control of all the 13 cables just mentioned. But in addition to the 13 American cables to Europe, which passed through Great Britain, there were 3 other cables which went through France and did not touch British soil. Consequently, he thought the word monopoly was somewhat excessive.

In regard to the question of sparing private property amid the horrors of war, he would invite attention to the fact that the United States of America had itself, during the war, put in a claim for acquiring 600 miles of German cables and the British Government had given its consent. He was ignorant, however, whether the United States had used those 600 miles of cable or not. But, at any rate, the American Government had not driven to its extreme logical conclusion the principle which Mr. Lansing had laid down, the justice of which he himself fully recognised. He thought that the case had been very fairly presented on both sides. He quite felt that the question of international communications would have to be dealt with sooner or later; but all were agreed that it could not form part of the problem under consideration.

(e) Mr. Lansing's Proposal to Refer Question to Prize Court MR. LANSING enquired whether the Conference thought it would be advisable to submit to a Prize Court the question of the right to the appropriation of the cables in question.

MR. BALFOUR said he would wish, in the first place, to consult with his experts. He feared, however, that a Prize Court would refuse to give any judgment as no actual precedent existed.

(f) President Wilson's Views on Appropriation of Enemy Cables PRESIDENT WILSON said he had experienced great difficulty in coming to a conclusion. In the first place he would have hesitated to discuss the question from a legal point of view, but as no legal point of view existed he felt warranted in expressing an opinion. It was true that the problem to be solved contained two parts, namely:— (1) Was Germany to be deprived of the ownership of the cables, and (2) what was to be done with them in regard to their use as indispensable means of communication? Up to now the Conference had only considered the question from the point of view of depriving the Germans of the ownership of the cables as a result of the war; but it should not be overlooked that the question also affected the whole commercial world. For that reason he was unable to agree with Admiral de Bon that the cables could be appropriated solely on the ground that they formed instrumentalities of war; for it was evident, that cables were also indispensable instruments of commerce, and

indispensable to the pacific intercourse of nations. He thought, therefore, the cables must be regarded as property from the point of view of habitual use, that is to say, from a peace point of view. As a consequence, it would be impossible to contemplate embarrassing their use as means for reestablishing the ordinary courses and processes of trade, to which the commercial world had become accustomed in times of peace. Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments expected Germany to pay heavy sums as reparation, and she could only do that by establishing favourable international balances to herself; otherwise she would be compelled to pay in her own currencies, which would be of little value to the Allies. It followed, therefore, that the question of the ownership of the cables must also be looked at from the German trade point of view. Four cables existed with one end in Germany itself, namely: the Emden-Vigo, Emden-Brest, Emden-Teneriffe, and Emden-Azores lines. These formed means of communication between Germany and the rest of the commercial world, and, in his opinion, it would be agreed that it made a great difference whether they were administered by one instrument or various.

Reference had been made to the decision reached by the United States Courts in the Spanish-American war, when it had been decided that damages could not be claimed for what had been done to cables during the period of hostilities. That decision related merely to the responsibility of the Government towards the owners of enemy property. Similarly, in his opinion, the cables now under consideration were really enemy private property, unless it could be established that the Government was the only owner. Consequently, the question of the disposal of the cables was one which could only be dealt with in connection with the disposal of other enemy property, since all countries had during the war taken temporary possession of enemy alien property within its borders. He thought the question would have to be considered from that point of view. Those familiar with International Conferences on the Rights of Nations maintained that the United States of America had never willingly assented to the principle of the capture of private property at sea. He would, therefore, hesitate to agree to the appropriation of the cables in question, even if cables could be considered to be private property, captured at sea. Hence he shared the views of the

American representatives on the Committee. In his opinion, no analogy could be drawn between cables, which consisted of fixed lines uniting two shores, and ships, which were built to move from place to place and which could be converted into possession when carried into the harbours of the captors. He begged the Conference to proceed very slowly in deciding to do something, the basis of which had never been discussed in time of peace when a careful and unbiased decision could have been reached. In his opinion, it would be extremely unwise to establish a principle of law as a war measure.

(g) Diversion of Enemy Cables Cut MR. BALFOUR said he wished to make one observation of a practical character without adding anything more to the theory of the principles involved. The Conference had discussed the question of restoring these cables to Germany in order that she might resume her economic existence. That was an error because the belligerents besides cutting the cables had also diverted them. The point, therefore, was that though would be possible to relay the cables at the expense of the Allies, it would not be possible to hand over the cables as they were before the war. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the necessities of war and the pressure of events had compelled France and Great Britain to divert these cables. Therefore, nothing could be done except to relay them in order to revert to the *statu*[*s*] *quo ante bellum*.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether a list of the cables which had so been diverted could be given.

(Mr. Balfour then read a list of the cables which had been diverted.)

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether by diversion was merely meant that the cable had been cut, and the cut end being attached to a new cable which went in the new direction required.

MR. BALFOUR explained that for the purpose of diverting the cables whole sections had been taken up and placed in an altogether different position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he found some difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion. He had at first thought that the suggestion made by Mr.

Lansing to refer the question to a Prize Court would have found acceptance. But he was now given to understand that the Prize Courts both of Great Britain and France would be compelled to rule that the question fell outside their jurisdiction because no precedent existed.

In his opinion a distinction would have to be made between the question of right, which could only be settled by law, and the question of fact. He had been much struck by the statement made by Mr. Balfour that the cables having been rightly diverted as an act of war, could not be restored to their former position, and the act of war constituted an accomplished fact. The question of right could however be referred to a legal committee.

(h) Japan's Views in Regard to Disposal of Cables BARON MAKINO said that the cables mentioned in today's programme comprised two links in which Japan was interested. The Japanese view, as expressed by her experts, coincided with the opinions expressed by Great Britain and France. In regard to the two cables seized by Japan, the one belonged entirely to the German Government; the other was private, but had been heavily subsidized by the German Government out of all proportion to its importance. Both cables had been employed to promote Germany's "Welt Politik" as well as her economic domination. He did not wish to discuss the legal aspect of the case; but from the point of view of preventing military domination and economic abuses Japan was opposed to the return of the cables to Germany, since they might again be used for the same purposes. In conclusion he would add that the two cables in question had also been taken up and diverted for war purposes, and in that respect the situation in Japan was the same as that of Great Britain and France.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Baron Makino to name the two lines he had referred to.

BARON MAKINO replied that the two lines in question were:—

(1) Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai.

(2) { Yap-Shanghai.
Yap-Menado.

(i) Italy's Views in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables M. ORLANDO said that there were evidently two questions involved; the question of law and the question of fact. In regard to the legal aspect of the case he had always maintained that law was not a mystical science and, consequently, any one possessed with an atom of common sense had a right to express an opinion. From a common sense point of view he thought the Conference could not talk of applying to cables the Clauses of International law applicable to ships, since the two cases were quite different: the law applicable to ships was inapplicable to cables.

Next in regard to the possibility of appropriating a particular thing. If the thing were private property, even enemy property, it could not, in accordance with the rules of international law, be appropriated. In his opinion the two principles which he had just expressed must be accepted, namely: the impossibility of applying the rules relating to the capture of ships to the seizure of cables and, secondly, the illegality of appropriating private enemy property. He would add, however, with equal frankness, that the question of fact put forward by M. Balfour had made a great impression on him because, whilst international law could not be applied, the dictum that "what is done is done" could be accepted. In regard to the diversion of the cables it would be necessary to decide whether such action was permissible under the rules of war. That question had been unanimously decided in the affirmative, that is to say, a permissible act of war had been accomplished. Secondly, it was evident that the cables in question could not be restored to Germany, and either an indemnity would have to be paid to Germany or something would have to be done to put the cables back in the position in which they were before the war. In his opinion, to do this would be to admit that what had been done had not been right. He regretted that the fact relating to the diversion of the cables had not been raised before the question had been referred to the special commission, because, in his opinion, that fact altered the whole situation. On the legal aspect of the case he was in complete agreement, with the views expressed by the American and Italian representatives, but if the facts were as stated by Mr. Balfour, that is to say, if the Allied and Associated Governments were faced with an accomplished act which had been carried out in strict accordance with the admitted rules of war, then

the thing had been done, and there was really no question for discussion.

(j) M. Tardieu's Proposal M. TARDIEU thought that the Conference was faced with a question of fact which could not be undone, and a question of law relating to the disposal of private enemy property. Under these conditions he suggested that all the German Government's cables should be appropriated, and the private cables should be kept, their value being entered on the list of reparations, the German Government being charged with the duty of indemnifying private owners.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the principle he was seeking to go on was this. He was interested in seeing that there should be an entirely just Peace, rather than that advantages should be gained by any Country from a material point of view. The decisions embodied in the Peace Treaty should be such that they could hereafter be accepted as precedents. Thus, while he understood that the right to cut cables had been established by law, he was doubtful whether the same right existed to divert cables to other termini, that is to say, to appropriate private property to public uses. On that question he would be glad to have an expert ruling.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not pretend to have sufficient authority to deal with the question of law. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson said that the right to cut cables in time of war had been established. In his opinion, that right had only been established because the United States of America had done it, that was apparently the only justification.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that the question had been referred for decision to a Commission.

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that so far as his opinion went the United States of America had cut a cable, the British Government had complained, the question had then been taken to a Court and tried by the regular machinery, which had justified the action taken by the American Government by ruling that private owners had no right to compensation in the case. President Wilson now made a

distinction between destroying private property and appropriating private property. In his opinion, if the destruction of private property were admissible its appropriation, after diversion, could not be denied.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that, in his opinion, it was permissible to destroy certain property for purposes of war but it was not permissible to use the same continuously for purposes of Peace.

(k) Mr. Balfour's Proposal in Regard to Disposal of Enemy Cables MR. BALFOUR suggested that the German Government should be informed that so much of their property in cables still remained under the sea and so much had been diverted. The Government could be permitted to resume possession of the part lying in its old bed which could be put in order. He thought that would be a solution of the problem.

MR. LANSING pointed out that Great Britain had so far never recognised the fact that the cutting of a cable gave the right to its appropriation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had just been reminded that an important distinction existed between the case of the Spanish American cable, to which reference had previously been made, and the present case. The Spanish American cable had been a neutral cable, whereas the present cable was an enemy cable.

MR. LANSING agreed. He pointed out, however, that the cable in question had been used by the Spanish, and Great Britain had then declared that she would not allow its use unless both belligerents were granted equal rights to usage.

(l) M. Orlando's Proposal to Refer Question to a Commission M. ORLANDO thought the observations just made still further confirmed the view he had previously taken. To be quite frank, he thought the whole question turned on whether by diverting the cables anything had been done contrary to the laws of war. If an Army were to occupy enemy territory, it was entitled to damage communications, railway lines, tunnels, and bridges. No indemnity would be due for such

damage, because the destruction of the enemy railway lines constituted a regular act of war. But it was not permitted to remove the rails as an act of war. In his opinion, exactly the same argument applied to cables. In the present case, however, the property in question had not been destroyed; it had been diverted. Consequently, though he, himself, was not a great believer in Commissions, he thought the whole question was so very complicated that it could only be settled on grounds of equity. On that account, it should be referred to a special Commission.

(m) Mr. Balfour's Resolution MR. BALFOUR said that he had a suggestion to make which he thought would meet the general views. He wished to propose the following resolution:—

> "The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers."

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that since drafting his resolution, his attention had been drawn to the fact that certain of the cables taken by the Japanese and Italian Governments were purely Government cables. That question had been overlooked in his draft resolution. He thought that point should be considered by the Drafting Committee in preparing the necessary clause.

ADMIRAL THAON DI REVEL explained that no enemy Government cables had been appropriated by the Italian Government. In the North Adriatic there was one cable which had been cut. In the Lower Adriatic there were two cables, one between San Giovanni di Medua and Taranto and the other between Otranto and Corfu. Both had been cut, and the latter had been diverted by the British Government.

BARON MAKING enquired whether the resolution as drafted might not be interpreted to mean that all cables might be returned to Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the whole question had merely been referred to the Drafting Committee and would be reconsidered when the Report of that Committee was received.

(It was agreed to refer the following resolution to the Drafting Committee for early submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace:—

The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers.)

(3) DR. LORD said that the proposal laid before the Supreme War Council (see Annexure "B"), was designed to render more effective the work of the Commission at Teschen. That Commission had been established with the object of putting an end to the fighting between the Poles and the Czechs, and to regulate other contentious questions. The Commission, accordingly, had taken up its duties in February last and had endeavoured to work along the lines of their mandate; but without success, because the powers accorded were not sufficient to enable effective action to be taken. The great difficulty was due to the fact that the role allotted to the Commission was only that of adviser and counsellor, to make suggestions to the Czech and Polish Governments. In every case, the questions to be settled had to be referred to the Governments at Warsaw or Prague with the result that great delays invariably ensued. The most important question related to the supply of coal to Poland and the Commission had not so far succeeded in getting a single ton of coal to Poland, because it was unable to put through its wishes. It was now proposed that the four Great Powers, represented on the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission, should request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that, within the limits of the original mandate, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission should become effective the moment they were promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw. It was understood, however, that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would reserve the liberty of

presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission would be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. Proposal of the United States Delegation Relative to the Inter-Allied Commission at Teschen

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the Teschen Commission thought that these proposals would be effective.

DR. LORD explained that he did not speak on behalf of the Teschen Commission as a whole. The proposals he had put forward had the support of the American Representatives of that Commission who were now in Paris; but he believed that the proposals represented roughly the views of the whole of the Teschen Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could answer President Wilson's question as far as the British Government was concerned. Colonel Coulson, the British Representative on the Teschen Commission had made a proposal substantially identical to that put forward by Dr. Lord.

M. CAMBON explained that a copy of Dr. Lord's proposals had been forwarded to him and in consequence he had, that morning, called together the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions. The American Representative on that Commission had, however, expressed his inability to throw any light on the question and in consequence the meeting had been adjourned to a later date.

DR. LORD explained that the proposal put forward by the United States Delegation did not come officially from the Teschen Commission. It had been put forward by himself and Dr. Bowman, but he believed it agreed with the views of the Commission.

M. CAMBON, continuing, said he personally had no objections to offer to the proposal made, but the question had not been examined by his Commission. He was, however, quite prepared to accept the proposal on behalf both of the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions and of the Polish Commission.

BARON SONNINO enquired whether the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would accept the proposal.

DR. LORD explained that the resolution had merely been submitted in order that the principle might be accepted by the Supreme War Council, whose duty it would then be to obtain the acceptance of the proposals therein contained by the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

(It was agreed:—

1. That the four Great Powers represented on the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919)[3] the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Inter-Allied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

2. To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identic note to give effect to the preceding.)

(For text of telegram to be sent see Annexure "B"; paragraph IV.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 24th March, 1919.**Annexure "A"**

[March 24, 1919, 3 p.m.]

Annex to Procès-Verbal

Transport of General Haller's Troops to Poland

In the course of a meeting which took place at 3 p.m. on Monday, March 24th., 1919, in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay between M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Orlando, and Marshal Foch with M. Mantoux as Interpreter, the following Conclusions were reached on the subject of the transport of General Haller's Army to Dantzig:—

1. The negotiations shall be taken up at Spa, under Clause 34 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918.
2. Marshal Foch shall demand that under Clause 16 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, the Germans shall permit the free passage of General Haller's Army as part of the Allied Army, through Dantzig to Poland, for the purpose of maintaining order in that country. They must also undertake to give every facility for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port. Any refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the Armistice by Germany.
3. In the event of a refusal by the Germans to accede to this demand, Marshal Foch shall confer with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken.
4. This decision shall be notified by the Secretary-General to the Warsaw Commission.

Annexure "B"

Proposal for Rendering Effective the Work of the Teschen Commission

I. The Interallied Teschen Commission was created on February 3, 1919, in a communication signed by the following: Woodrow Wilson; D. Lloyd George; V. E. Orlando; G. Clemenceau; Roman Dmowski; E. Benes.

The mandate of the Conference included the following instructions:

(1) To proceed to an inquiry upon the basis of which the Peace Conference could form a decision definitively fixing the respective frontiers of the Czechs, and the Poles in the contested zone.
(2) To supervise the exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district so as to avoid any infraction of the rights of private property, and to supervise the police measures which the situation might require.
(3) To secure to the Poles that part of the output of those mines which might be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.
(4) To prevent conflict between the Czechs and the Poles by ensuring the application of the following rules:
(*a*) No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the Principality of Teschen either to the territory of Poland or of Czechoslovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.
(*b*) Political elections and military conscription are to be suspended in the district of Teschen pending the decision of the Peace Conference.
(*c*) The local administration is to continue the function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of November 5, 1918,[4] and the rights of minorities are to be strictly respected.
(*d*) The Czechs are to put at the disposal of the Poles all their available resources in war materials and to grant them every facility in the transportation of arms and ammunition.
(*e*) The Czech Government is to release immediately, with their arms and baggage, the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.
(*f*) A line of military occupation is to be established giving to the Czechs the mines and railway line north of Teschen and to the Poles the town of Teschen and the railroad line south of the town of Jablunken.

II. The Interallied Teschen Commission reached Teschen on February 13th. In the administration of its mandate it has been confronted with the following difficulties:

(1) It has had to report both to the Interallied Commission at Warsaw and to the Peace Conference at Paris.

(2) In dealing with the local authorities it has been obliged to secure the assent of the Governments at Prague and Warsaw to each of its proposals.
(3) The Czech local authorities long showed themselves unwilling to carry out the terms of the agreement as to the withdrawal of their troops to the line of demarcation.
(4) The Czech local authorities have failed to deliver the stipulated quantity of coal to the Poles.

III. To overcome the difficulties noted above, it is recommended that the Conference adopt the following resolutions:

(1) Resolved:

That the four Great Powers represented on the Interallied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919) the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Interallied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Interallied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Resolved:

To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identic note, to give effect to the preceding.

IV. To make the foregoing resolutions effective, the following telegrams are proposed.

(1) To the Interallied Teschen Commission:

Recognizing the importance of quick and effective decisions in the administration of the powers entrusted to the Interallied Teschen Commission, the Conference has sent an identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia requesting them to instruct the local authorities of the Duchy of Teschen that they are to accept the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission without waiting for the assent of their respective Governments.

The local authorities will keep their respective Governments fully informed of the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission and should either of the Governments concerned protest the decisions of the Commission, due attention should be given to such protestation.

The two Governments may reserve the right to appeal to the Peace Conference should they be unwilling to accept any decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission, but, in each instance, pending a final decision, the local authorities shall follow the mandate of the Interallied Teschen Commission. A resolution of the Conference requires your Commission to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia.

In order to ensure the administration of the Teschen agreement of February 3rd in a more effective manner, the Peace Conference requests your Government to consent to the following arrangement. It proposes that the principle should be established that the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are in each case to become effective as soon as they are announced, without requiring the local authorities to await the agreement of the Governments of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia.

Should your Government desire to do so, it may reserve the liberty of presenting any objections to these decisions either to the Conference at Paris or to the Interallied Teschen Commission, but it is proposed that, pending a reply, the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission should be binding. An identic note to this effect is being

sent to the Government of Poland (Czecho-Slovakia). Should your Government accept this principle it is requested that immediate notification be sent to all the local authorities and to the Conference at Paris.

MARCH 21, 1919.

[1] See BC–46 (SWC–13), p. 254 [*Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 14*].
[2] See BC–45 (SWC–12), p. 226 [*Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 13*].
[3] See annexure B, *infra*.
[4] For text, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz*, annexe B4, pp. 27–31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.3114/5).

April 16, 4 p.m. (BC–58)

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[26] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Wednesday, 16th April, 1919, at 4 p.m.

April 16, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/65

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/65

BC–58

[Document 26]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Wednesday, 16th April, 1919, at 4 p.m.

April 16, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson.
Mr. R. Lansing.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Lord Hardinge.
Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. E. Phipps.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
Secy-General Peace Conference
M. Dutasta.
Secretaries
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.

ITALY
Baron Sonnino.
Marquis Salvago-Raggi.

ALSO PRESENT

ITALY
M. Ricci-Busatti.
M. Piacentini.

Secy-General
Count Aldrovandi.
Secretary
M. Bertele.
JAPAN
Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Secretaries
M. Kawai.
M. Ashida.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. E. C. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Meeting had been called in order to bring together the Council of Four and the Council of Five.[1] It was proposed that the work done separately should be examined in common. His first request, therefore, was that the Council of Five should report what they had accomplished and what still remained to be done. He asked Baron Sonnino if he would make a statement on this subject. Object of Meeting

BARON SONNINO said that on the previous day the Council of Foreign Ministers had before them an agenda of some eleven items. The bulk of these had been remitted to the Drafting Committee, which, he understood, was to meet that day at 5 p.m. The Council of Foreign Ministers was to meet again on Thursday, the 17th instant, to deliberate on the drafts submitted by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee were charged with the task of coordinating

proposals made by Great Britain and by the United States. In other words, to reconcile the two drafts suggested.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired on what subjects the discussion had taken place.

BARON SONNINO said that the subjects dealt with were:—

Opium,
Belgium,
The Suez Canal and Egypt, and
An Article requiring from Germany a general renunciation of rights outside Europe, which were to be surrendered to the trusteeship of the Five Powers.

Reference had been made to the Drafting Committee with the object of ensuring that the whole ground was being covered.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the impression that a fuller Conference had been desired to decide these points was erroneous.

BARON SONNINO remarked that another question discussed had been the upkeep of the Army of Occupation in Germany. On this subject, General Weygand had made certain explanations revealing a difference of opinion in calculating the expenses involved in maintaining these forces. Two theses had been put forward and these had been referred to the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING said that his impression was that they had been referred to the Economic Council.

M. DUTASTA said that the reference had been to the Council of Four.

MR. BALFOUR observed that, if this was so, the matter should be dealt with.

2. BARON SONNINO said that two methods of calculating the cost had been mentioned. One considered only the actual expenses of the moment, food, billetting, etc. The other considered more general expenses. He was not able to specify exactly what the definition was,

as he had not taken an active part in the discussion. Cost of Maintaining Armies of Occupation in Germany

PRESIDENT WILSON said that presumably the latter category included expenses of army administration as separate from the cost of the actual maintenance in the occupied districts.

MR. LANSING remarked that on the 8th March, General Pershing had addressed a written enquiry to Marshal Foch. No answer had been returned. The United States of America were, therefore, somewhat embarrassed in giving an opinion on this subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when the documents relating to the subject were before the Meeting, it would be possible to form an opinion or to remit them to some Committee.

BARON SONNINO said that General Weygand was in a position to state the case fully.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that if General Weygand were called, he could only re-state the question and not offer a solution. He would suggest that the Military Advisers at Versailles be asked to define what was understood by "cost of military occupation."

BARON SONNINO remarked that there were differences of opinion among military authorities.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was desirable to have these differences of opinion laid before the Council.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the divergent views held by the various delegates at Spa.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that a digest of these various views should be prepared and laid before the Council.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that what was required was a brief narrative fitted for civilian understanding. The Council of Four would then be able to reach a decision.

BARON SONNINO observed that the whole discussion had been raised by a question put by the German General von Hammerstein asking for a definition of what was the cost of maintaining a man and a horse in occupied territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the correspondence that had taken place at Spa should be referred to the Military Advisers at Versailles in order that a digest should be prepared of the various opinions.

BARON SONNINO said that he did not disagree, but he thought it right to warn the Council that military opinion was divided as to what should be reckoned in the account.

(It was then decided to remit to the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the drafting of the various points of view regarding the estimation of the cost of upkeep of the Forces of Occupation in Germany).

BARON SONNINO observed that the cost of upkeep of the Armies of Occupation previous to the signature of Peace was distinct from that of a continuance of occupation after Peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that should any occupation subsequent to the signature of Peace be provided for, the same definition and the same interpretation could be adhered to as in the case of occupation previous to Peace.

3. MR. BALFOUR drew attention to Item 6 on the Agenda for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the previous day. There were two amendments before the Meeting. One had been adopted, and the other had been referred to the Council of Four. He suggested that the matter be explained by someone who had been present at the Meeting on the previous day. Amendments to Military Terms: Secret Processes for the Manufacture of Gas

MR. LANSING said that the difficulty had arisen with regard to exacting from the Germans the disclosure of their secret processes for the manufacture of ingredients for the inhuman conduct of war.

As the Allies in another provision had prohibited the manufacture of such things, he regarded the suggested amendment as unnecessary. Further he believed that the disclosure of these secrets would add nothing to the military power of the Allies, who already possessed the secret of making even more deleterious gases than Germany. On the other hand, the revelation of these secrets would be of great economic advantage to Allied industries in that the dye making processes would be revealed at the same time. He believed that this motive very likely was not unconnected with the proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Military Authorities attached great importance to this question. Their opinions were based on military considerations, and they were in no manner concerned with any ambition to obtain industrial secrets. In their memorandum on the subject they took care to state that the dye process was quite divorced from the purpose they had in view. What they required was a purely military piece of knowledge. He did not profess himself to understand or to estimate the value of this knowledge but he was convinced that the Military Experts attached great importance to it.

MR. LANSING said that the American Military Experts did not attach any value to it.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the British proposal demanded the surrender of all chemical processes out of which gases had been or could be made, and for the production of all substances from which gases or other destructive agencies could be produced. This definition was so wide that it was bound to cover the revelation of the secrets of dye making.

PRESIDENT WIUSON said that he believed the framers of the proposal had not this object in view.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that an effective gas mask could not be made without knowledge of the gas which it was to contend with.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that whatever weight might be given to the military opinion on this matter it was certain that many people other than military experts were interested in the revelation of these

secrets. There was a further difficulty. However much the Allies might demand the revelation of secrets, they would never be certain that they possessed them all. Twenty-five years of University experience had made him well aware that the most difficult secrets to obtain were those of inventors. Many researchers were so suspicious of their fellow men that they contrived to keep their formulae in their own head for years. In no sphere of life was there so intense a competition as among inventors, each of whom wished to be the first in the field with his invention. This was certainly no less true of Germany than of other countries. He had made objections of a similar character to other proposals, as he thought it was a mistake to exact more than could with certainty be obtained. It could serve no useful purpose to expose oneself to be deceived. The Allies must trust their own inventors to cope with their German rivals. There was a whispering gallery connecting not only the Foreign Offices, but also the laboratories of the world.

BARON SONNINO agreed that the Germans might reveal their second best secrets, but would probably succeed in keeping their best ones.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that they would certainly not reveal their new ones.

MR. BALFOUR said that though President Wilson's remarks appealed to him, he felt that he was not in possession of military knowledge and did not feel disposed to take a decision before he had heard what the Military Authorities had to say. He understood that both the French and British military authorities were agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the Military experts were doubtless authorities as to what they wanted to obtain, but that he regarded himself as an authority as to what they would get.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would nevertheless like to know what their case was.

M. CLEMENCEAU was also of the opinion that the experts should be consulted.

BARON SONNINO said that in any case the formula suggested was too wide.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was always prepared to hear military opinion, but that he wished to register his dissent from the proposal put forward.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the military experts were unable to answer the objections that had been raised, he would adopt President Wilson's view.

PRESIDENT WILSON then suggested that this question also should be sent to the Military Advisers at Versailles, in order that they should formulate a military opinion on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, but added that the two categories of objection raised should be communicated to them, namely:—

(*a*) That in all probability the secrets would not be obtained;
(*b*) That if obtained they would confer an unfair advantage to competing industries in Allied countries.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:—

> "The Military Advisors of the Supreme War Council at Versailles are requested to state the military advantages of exacting from the Germans the revelation of their secret processes for the manufacture of lethal gases.
>
> It is to be observed:—
>
> (*a*) That no means of supervision exist capable of guaranteeing the veracity of the statements the Germans might make on this subject.
> (*b*) That such a demand for the revelation of German secrets of manufacture might give an unfair advantage to rival industries in Allied countries".)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to raise the question of the Kiel Canal. A document had been submitted to the Council of Four as

being a unanimous report of a Commission on this subject. On examination, the report had proved to be an old report, previously dismissed. It had come up again unamended. He had telephoned to the Secretary of the Naval Committee, who had replied that he knew nothing of it. Kiel Canal

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that there had been unanimity on this subject in the Waterways Commission, which had referred the report back to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the question had a military side, on which naval authorities should be called upon to state their views.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the naval authorities might sit in combined session with the Waterways Commission.

(It was then decided to refer the question of the Kiel Canal to a Joint Session of Naval Experts, and of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways & Railways.)

(5) BARON SONNINO said that two drafts had been proposed on the subject of the validity of Prize Court Decisions. The British draft proposed a clause to be inserted in the treaty stipulating that the validity of Allied Prize Court decisions should not be challenged by the enemy. The American draft proposed, in addition, that the Allies should have the power to invalidate similar decisions taken by German Prize Courts. Both these drafts had been remitted to the Drafting Committee to be fused into one clause. The American draft also contained an additional paragraph, on which he understood the American Delegates did not insist. Prize Court Decisions

MR. LANSING remarked that the United States did not insist on the form, but wished the substance to be preserved. The reason for this was that Prize Courts in America had ceased to function at the armistice. Nevertheless, the United States wished to maintain certain seizures made subsequently, and therefore without Prize Court decisions.

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had another point to submit to the meeting. A resolution had been adopted regarding responsibilities, and it had been considered right that Belgium should undertake the prosecution. This had been agreed, he thought, with the consent of M. Hymans. He had heard since that the President of the Belgian Council had come to Paris, and was prepared to refuse his consent to this proposal. As representative of a monarchical State, he held the view that Belgium could not take the lead in prosecuting a monarch.
Responsibility for Violation of Belgian Neutrality

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not think this obstacle unsurmountable. The essential point was that the Kaiser was to be tried for a high misdemeanour, which might not legally amount to a crime, namely:—for violating the neutrality of Belgium. If Belgium refused to be prosecutrix she would not refuse to be witness. He further pointed out that in the draft adopted, Belgium had not been specifically set down as prosecutrix.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if that was so, he did not wish to press the point any further.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 16th April, 1919.

[1] The minutes of the Council of Four are to be printed in later volumes. For minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Council of Five), see pp. 515 [*Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 31*] ff.

May 1, 4 p.m. (BC–59)

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[27] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 4 p.m.

May 1, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/66

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/66

BC–59

[Document 27]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 4 p.m.

May 1, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

Hon. R. Lansing.

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier.

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

Secretary-General

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

Secretary

Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

M. Pichon.

Secretary-General Peace Conference

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson.

Mr. Rogers.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C.

Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.

Captain C. T. M. Fuller.

FRANCE

Admiral De Bon.

Capitaine de Vaisseau Levavasseur.

Lieutenant de Vaisseau Odend'hal.

M. de Peretti.

JAPAN

Vice Admiral Takeshita.

M. Yamakawa.

Captain Yamamoto.

M. P. Dutasta.
Secretaries
M. P. Gauthier.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.
Secretary
M. Saburi.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU called on M. Pichon to explain how the suggestion of submarine cables now stood.

A Question of German Submarine Cables M. PICHON said that on the 24th March, 1919, the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been passed by the Council of Ten, namely:—

> "The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense submarine cables cut by the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers".

It had been agreed that this text should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the

Treaty of Peace. The Drafting Committee had prepared a text (See I. C. 178)[1] which, however, was only accepted by the American representative subject to the approval of his Government. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d'Orsay on the 30th April, 1919, the text in question had again come under discussion. Mr. Lansing had been unable to accept the draft text proposed by the Drafting Committee and had proposed certain amendments (See I. C. 178), which both Mr. Balfour and Admiral de Bon had been unable to accept. Consequently, it had been decided to refer the whole question to the Heads of Government for final decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Mr. Balfour held the view that the Article, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, carried out the intentions of the Resolution passed on the 24th March, 1919.

MR. BALFOUR, in reply, said he would like to give his version of what had occurred. On the 24th March, 1919, at the Conference of the Ten, which Mr. Lloyd George had not attended, a prolonged discussion of the cable question had taken place. A Resolution had been unanimously accepted, which was to be referred to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Articles of the Peace Treaty. Both Mr. Lansing and he (Mr. Balfour) had adhered to that Resolution, which was to govern the action of the Drafting Committee. The question had now arisen as to the correct interpretation to be given to the original Resolution. Mr. Lansing would no doubt explain his point of view. He, himself, interpreted the clause to mean that all acts taken by the Allies in connection with enemy submarine cables during the war should stand, and that Germany should have no claim to compensation. Thus, for instance, should a cable line have been cut and diverted, the new system so established should stand. On the other hand, Germany would have a perfect right to reconstruct her former cable system as it stood before the war. To illustrate his argument, he would ask the Council to imagine a German cable line going from A to C through B. During the war the cable was cut at B and connected up with a new line from B, to D, so that the line went from A to B to D, as follows:—

Under these conditions, Mr. Lansing held that the piece A–B should now be restored to Germany, whereas the British, French and Japanese representatives contended that as A–B was an essential part of the new line A–B–D, it could not be restored to Germany, though she should have a right to join up the piece B–C with a new line to be laid by her from B to A.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Germans would have the right to the use in common of the line A–B.

MR. BALFOUR explained that it would not be practical for two separate systems to use the same cable line. Consequently, the part A–B would have to be owned by the country that had laid down the line B–D. In his opinion, unless the British interpretation were accepted, the Allies and not the Germans would have to spend an enormous sum of money in making their new cable lines effective. He fully agreed that the number of cables should not be diminished and that the more cables there were, the better it would be; but he thought that it was Germany who should be required to make the expenditure to reconstruct her lost cables. Great Britain had already spent over £400,000 on the changes necessary for adapting the lines taken over from Germany to the new cable systems.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that when he took part in the discussion, it had been with an unfortunate ignorance of technical details. He had not known that the main trunk line could not be used by two parties. He had supposed that the Germans could, at their own expense, connect up their end and operate through the common trunk line. As the trunk line lay at the bottom of the sea, in what might be called no-man's-land, it was not subject to capture, but was subject to use. He realised that there was no International law on this question. He had assented to the resolution, therefore, under an erroneous impression, which was entirely his own fault. He would take an example. There had been a cable line from Emden by the Azores to New York. The European end had been diverted to Brest, and the

American End to Halifax. This had caused great inconvenience to the United States, and he had supposed that a new branch line to New York could be attached to the main trunk line without disturbing the communication with Halifax and similarly that a new German end could be installed without disturbing the line to Brest. But, under the interpretation now given to the resolution, Germany would not have the use of the main trunk line and only the abandoned short ends of the original cable lines would be restored to her, and she would have to replace the main lengths of the line extending to a length of some 3,000 miles. In addition, Germany would have to obtain the right to land in the Azores. This was not what he had assented to, but the error was due to his ignorance. He thought that in a war in which many nations had participated and expended their share of blood and treasure, these indispensable instruments of international communication should not pass into the hands of only three of the parties in the war. He had no desire to re-establish the German cable system, but he had a very decided interest in ensuring the means of obtaining quick cable communication. Wireless, as now developed, had not the same value as cables, since anyone could pick up wireless messages. On the other hand, cables possessed a certain degree of privacy, depending on the good faith of the employees. Again the cable lines across the Pacific passed through the Island of Yap, which thus became a general distributing centre for the lines of communication of the North Pacific. Yap should not, therefore, fall into the hands of one Power.

In his opinion, the case had assumed a new aspect, since he had heard the interpretation now given to the resolution. It was proposed that the German cables were to be turned over entirely to those who had cut them during the war, even though one particular line, Pernambuco to Monrovia, actually terminated at both ends in neutral countries. If any method could be devised to put the cable systems under International control he would be quite satisfied; but it seemed to him a very serious matter that all Powers should not have a common interest in them. He thought a satisfactory solution would be reached, if the enemy cables could be turned over to the Allied and Associated Governments as trustees, and managed under the terms of an International Convention. He asked to correct a slight mistake made in his statement. He found there had actually

been two cables from London to New York. One of these lines had been diverted so as to operate between Brest and New York, thus constituting a Franco-American line. The second line had been connected to run from Land's End to Halifax.

MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to repeat the statement made by him at a previous meeting, when discussing the same question, to the effect that he was entirely against monopolies. But the existing cable systems could not be described as monopolies in the bad sense of the word. The Cable Companies in question though registered in Great Britain were actually owned by a majority of American shareholders, which rather disposed of the idea that any undue monopoly existed.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in accordance with the laws of the United States of America a majority of directors would have to belong to the country in which the Company was registered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not think that the same law applied to Great Britain in the case of international companies. He understood that, although these cable companies were owned by British companies, they were actually operated by American companies.

MR. LANSING thought that the whole question was merely one of investments. The control of the cable lines was wholly in the hands of the British.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that two definite questions called for decision by the Council, namely: Firstly, the use to which the captured German cables should be put, and secondly, the regulations which the Allies, and especially the United States of America, wished to apply to the use of cables crossing the high seas. In regard to the first question, the cables which had previously constituted the German system could be considered under three different heads. Firstly, the lines which had been taken over by the Allied Governments and organised into new systems which were now in use. He thought no one would suggest the return of these cable lines to Germany, with the resulting disturbance of the existing lines of communication. He felt certain that complete agreement existed on this point. Secondly, bits of cables existed which had been disconnected from the main

trunk line and still lay, unused, at the bottom of the sea. President Wilson maintained that these bits of cable belonged to no one and, therefore, Germany should have the right to utilise them in re-constructing her new cable lines. He saw no difficulty in accepting President Wilson's views even though these bits of cables constituted materials of war, captured during operations of war. Thirdly, there remained the question of the cable from Pernambuco–Monrovia which had been cut by the French, diverted, and made ready for use. The Government of the United States had for political reasons requested that this cable line should not be used, and to this the French Government had assented.

To sum up, complete agreement existed in regard to the first point. The second point was debatable but President Wilson's point of view could be adopted. The third point constituted a special case, since the cable in question had been diverted to Monrovia and was ready to function. Had America objected before the completion of the work, the line could have been diverted to Konakry and in that case no discussion would have arisen. In any case, he was strongly opposed to the return of that cable to Germany.

In regard to the question of cable communications in general, which the American Government wished to have assured by constituting an international system of control, the question did not appertain to the Treaty of Peace. It could, therefore, well be put aside for further study on the lines laid down by President Wilson. The present task of the Conference would, therefore, be confined to informing Germany that the cables, which, during the period of the war had been cut and utilised by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be restored to her and that they would remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. On the other hand, Germany would have the right to regain possession of the cables or parts of cables which had been cut and remained unutilised.

The resolution passed on March 24th stated that Germany would not be debarred from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts of submarine cables which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut,

were now in use by any of those Powers. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should not permit Germany to lay down new cables without first obtaining the necessary licences. In his opinion, no clause should be introduced in the Peace Treaty which might appear to give Germany the right to avoid such formalities. The Governments concerned must retain the right to decide whether a new licence should be granted or not.

To sum up, as far as the Treaty of Peace was concerned, he thought it would only be necessary to lay down that the Allied and Associated Governments would retain the cables now being used by them, including the Monrovia Pernambuco cable, which had been made ready for use; and that Germany would be allowed to pick up and re-connect the bits of unused cables. It would be unnecessary to make any statement in the Peace Treaty in regard to the future policy of the Allied and Associated Governments on the subject of the control of cables.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that he had not been able to study the cable situation under discussion very carefully; but Canada was deeply interested in the cables crossing the Atlantic. Though many of the cable lines landed at Halifax, the Canadian Government had no control over that line; the control being American.

MR. LANSING, intervening, pointed out that only the control was American, the property itself being vested in the United Kingdom.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Americans, at all events, controlled the rates to be charged for cables.

MR. LANSING doubted the correctness of that statement. The Western Union Cable Company of America merely controlled the working of the cables; but the cables themselves were owned by British Companies.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN, continuing, said that he was certain of one thing, namely, that the Canadians did not control these cable lines. The Canadian Government had been requested by the British Government to allow the cable line in question to land at Halifax.

The permission asked for had been granted and he would now strongly object to its removal. In his opinion, the whole question of cable control required careful consideration by the Governments concerned.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that he did not wish Sir Robert Borden to imagine that anyone held the idea of diverting the cable from Halifax.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE held that if the line in question were handed back to Germany, it would as a natural consequence be diverted to New York.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the meeting had to decide only the two following definite questions, namely:—

> "(i) Are submarine cables proper objects of appropriation and can they be retained without reckoning them in the total bill of reparations?"
> "(ii) Can any means be devised to place the cable lines under international control?"

He thought if these principles could be accepted, a satisfactory agreement would easily be reached.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN invited attention to the fact that six or seven years ago the Canadian Government had endeavoured to exercise some control over the rates charged for cables. The Government eventually only succeeded in obtaining a reduction by threatening to lay cables of their own.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE maintained that whatever President Wilson's intention might be in connection with the cable line in question, the effect would obviously be to divert the cable from Halifax. The right to take cables was just as strong as the right to capture ships. He agreed that cables had not heretofore formed the subject of capture; but there had never been a war of the same kind before, and serious risks and heavy expenditure had had to be incurred in order to obtain possession of these cables. He, himself, would be quite

prepared to consider the question of the payment of some sort of compensation to Germany for the surrender of the cables, but this was a new proposition and would require careful examination. A direct line of communication to Canada having now been established, the people of Canada who had suffered much in money and life during the war would feel deeply deserted if the suggestion were accepted to return these lines to Germany. In conclusion, he wished to support very cordially what Admiral de Bon had said, namely, that after peace had been established the Governments should meet together and endeavour to arrive at some agreement on the question of the international control of cable lines. The only point, however, now to be decided was whether these particular cables should be restored to Germany or not. He held the view that if such a step were now taken very bitter feeling would be raised.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that there was a side of the question to which Mr. Lloyd George had not referred. If it were merely a question of returning the cables to Germany or not, the solution would be comparatively easy, as this could only be answered in the negative. But the Council was asked to decide whether these cables should remain exclusively in the hands of those who had taken them over, though all parties had taken part in the war. Should a decision to that effect be taken, that might prejudge any ulterior arrangements, whereas, in his opinion, the Treaty of Peace ought to leave the question open.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether President Wilson could make some definite proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Peace Terms should require the cables in question to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees; who would be authorised to determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Trustees would have the power of diverting the cables to other places.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the Trustees would only be empowered to do this as a result of a unanimous decision, on the

grounds that such a diversion would be in the interest of the whole of the Powers concerned.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN explained that the Canadian Government had intended to make the cable in question State property to be linked up with the land telegraphic system, which already belonged to the Government. In this way, it was thought measures could be taken to reduce rates.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the question raised by Sir Robert Borden was not in contradiction with his own proposals, and should be considered when the question of drafting the international convention relating to cables was undertaken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that President Wilson's proposal would apply to all cables, and consequently would also affect the French and Japanese Governments.

BARON MAKINO said he wished to state Japan's position in the matter. At the last meeting on this subject, Mr. Balfour had proposed a resolution which had been accepted after long discussion. He had not then had time to catch the real purport of the resolution. Accordingly, he had wished to obtain some explanation, but he was told that after the text came back from the Drafting Committee, he would have an opportunity of discussing the question further. At the present moment, he was prepared to accept the policy contained in the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour on 24th March last.

In regard to the appropriation of the cables in question, he would invite attention to the policy that had been pursued, vis-à-vis, Germany, as expressed in the Peace Treaty. It would be found that a certain number of questions had been settled not strictly in accordance with the recognised usages of international law. For instance, in regard to the taking over of private property. Again, Article 13 of the Financial Clauses authorised the taking over of undertakings of public utility. That is to say, the Allied and Associated Governments had, in his opinion, gone very far in taking over German rights and much further than had ever been done heretofore. In his opinion, the same procedure could therefore well

be followed in regard to cables. The Cable Company taken over by the Japanese Government had a capital of 15 million marks at its disposal and in addition received from the German Government an annual subsidy of 1½ million marks. These facts clearly proved that the undertaking had not been a commercial one; but part and parcel of the German political system. For this reason, taking into consideration also the general policy introduced elsewhere in the Treaty to which he had just alluded, it was not unreasonable that this cable should be taken over by Japan. That clearly was the Japanese point of view, and after very careful consideration he had been led to the conclusion that the best policy would be to adopt Mr. Balfour's original resolution.

Next, in regard to the International Convention relating to the future management of cables, his personal opinion was that such an arrangement would be desirable. Such a Convention could be drawn up on the same lines as the International Postal Convention, subject to International agreement. But for the moment he was only willing to accept the proposals contained in Mr. Balfour's resolution adopted on March 24th last.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that President Wilson had put forward a new proposal. So far, he had only been able to have a short consultation with Mr. Balfour, who agreed with him that their experts should be consulted before reaching a definite conclusion. He would therefore ask the Council to adjourn the further discussion of the question, in order to give time for proper consideration of the new proposal. He felt very hopeful that an agreement would be reached; but he would like to consult his experts. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to discuss the proposal until it had received further consideration.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that he had put forward his proposal for two reasons. Firstly, because he thought it was right and, secondly, because he thought it afforded a solution in the general interest, which would have the effect of creating a solidarity amongst the Allied Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed provided financial solidarity alone was not intended.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN was particularly anxious to avoid private companies acquiring too large a monopoly. For instance, he was anxious to approach the American Government with a view to reducing cable rates and ship rates.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his complete agreement with Sir Robert Borden's purpose. The common trusteeship he had proposed was intended to bring about these very objects. He thought that one reason why the German cable referred to by Baron Makino had not paid was because it constituted merely an independent piece, which did not enter into the general system. With the permission of the Council, he would formulate a definite draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council.

MR. LANSING thought that the draft resolution might very well be drawn up on the lines of the Article dealing with the surrender of German Colonies.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should formulate a draft resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ten to the effect that all German Cables seized during the war should be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees, who would determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned).

The meeting then adjourned.

PARIS, 1 May, 1919.

[1] FM–10, p. 645 [*Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 40*].

May 2, 5 p.m. (BC–60)

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[28] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, May 2nd, 1919, at 5 p.m.

Paris, May 2, 1919, 5 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/67

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/67

BC–60

[Document 28]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, May 2nd, 1919, at 5 p.m.

Paris, May 2, 1919, 5 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

Secretary-General

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

JAPAN

(During latter half of Meeting)

H. E. Baron Makino.

H. E. Viscount Chinda.

Secretary-General

M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson.

Mr. Rogers.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.

Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G.

Mr. F. J. Brown.

The Hon. C. H. Tufton, C. M. G.

FRANCE

Admiral de Bon.

M. Hayes.

Capt. de V. Levavasseur.

Lieut. de Vaisseau Odend'hal.

JAPAN

Vice-Admiral Takeshita.

M. Yamakawa.

[*Joint Secretariat*]

BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Disposal of German Submarine Cables 1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Japanese Representatives had not yet been able to reach the Meeting. He thought, however, that a preliminary discussion might be held in regard to the draft resolution, which had been prepared by President Wilson, and which read as follows:—

"It is agreed:

(1) That an article shall be inserted in the Treaty of Peace whereby Germany shall on her own behalf and on the behalf of German nationals renounce in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers jointly all rights, titles and privileges of whatsoever nature possessed by her or her nationals in the submarine cables or portion thereof mentioned below:—

Emden–Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.

Emden–Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.

Emden–Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.

Emden–Azores (1) from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Emden–Azores (2) from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Azores–New York (1) from Fayal to New York.

Azores–New York (2) from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.

Teneriffe–Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.

Monrovia–Lome:

from about { lat. 2 deg. 30′ N.
long. 7 deg. 40′ W. of Greenwich

to about { lat. 2 deg. 20′ N.
long. 5.30′ deg. W. of Greenwich

and from about { lat. 3 deg. 48′ N.
loner. 0.00.

to Lome.

Lome–Duala: from Lome to Duala.

Monrovia–Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.

Constantinople–Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza.

Chefoo–Tsingtao–Shanghai: from Tsingtao to Chefoo, and from Tsingtao to Shanghai.

Yap–Shanghai, Yap–Guam, and Yap–Menado (Celebes): from Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island, and from Yap Island to Menado.

(2) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall jointly hold these cables together with any rights or privileges pertaining thereto for common agreement as to the best system of administration and control; and

(3) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall call as soon as possible an International Congress to consider and report on all international aspects of telegraph, cable and radio communication, with a view to providing the entire world with adequate communication facilities on a fair, equitable basis."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be unwise to take any decision on this question in the absence of the Japanese Representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that a preliminary discussion could be held in regard to the Atlantic cables.

(At this stage MM. Yamakawa and Saburi, and Vice-Admiral Takeshita entered the Council Chamber.)

MR. BALFOUR said that since the last meeting he had been able to make careful enquiries in regard to the actual position of the Atlantic cables. This aspect of the case, he thought, was very important as being relevant to the final decision, and it would throw light on what had actually happened. He felt bound to confess that he had only on that day been able to discover the actual position of affairs and, he thought, Mr. Lansing's previous information must have been equally imperfect, since he (Mr. Lansing) had told the Council at a previous meeting that Great Britain had control of too many cable lines. Now, the fact of the case was that Great Britain had control of no cable lines, with the exception of the one recently captured from Germany. This statement had greatly surprised him and it had led him to make further enquiries in order to obtain an explanation. It appeared that there existed 13 cable lines between the United Kingdom and America. Seven of these lines were actually owned by American companies, and the remaining 6 though owned by British companies were leased to American companies for a period which still had some 90 years to run. The explanation for this surprising state of affairs was, however, a very simple one. It showed how monopolies, to which the Heads of Government objected worked. The fact was that a cable running, say between Land's End and New York, would be of no use unless the company owning the cable was able at New York to make satisfactory arrangements for the further transmission of messages along the internal telegraph lines. In Great Britain, the State owned all land telegraph lines: but in America these were apparently owned by two private companies, who so arranged their rates as to "freeze out" British owned cables. In consequence British companies had been driven to say to the American companies: "As we cannot work our cable lines under these conditions, we will lease them to you". The result was that all cables running between Great Britain and America were either owned or leased by American companies. The British did not grumble at the service, which was efficient and good, though the rates were somewhat high; but the fact remained that the whole control was American.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought the inference contained in the last part of Mr. Balfour's statement should be completed. In his opinion it was just as necessary to obtain land connections at the British end of the cable lines as it was at the American end.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the difference lay in the fact that in Great Britain the land telegraph lines were State owned and the policy of the British Government had been to encourage the laying down of cables, and with this object in view, very favourable terms had been given to the cable companies; so much so that the American Companies actually contemplated increasing the number of their cable lines. However that might be, the last thing he wished to do was to make a complaint about American companies. But he did wish to point out that one of the morals of the existing state of affairs was that it was no use to obtain the control of cable lines crossing the Ocean unless international agreements could, at the same time, be made in regard to the rates charged over land lines. Thus, if the Great Powers decided to take over, as suggested in President Wilson's resolution, the Trans-Atlantic cables, and if they quarrelled with the great American Companies owning the land lines, they would be just as helpless as the British cable companies had been and would be "frozen out". Consequently, the American Government would have to consider whether it would not have to modify its system, so as to obtain some control over its land lines. So much in regard to the question of the control of cables in time of peace. On the other hand, in time of war it would never be possible to take away the control which every nation naturally possessed over the landing places situated in her own country. No nation would agree to give up her sovereignty over such landing places. Thus, for instance, Great Britain would never agree to hand over Land's End. Consequently, in time of war, every nation would use its powers to prevent messages hurtful to its own national interests being transmitted from the landing stages. He fully admitted that his statement was based on the system which had existed in the past, and he agreed that other conditions might prevail in the future, owing to altered international relations. It would, however, be an illusion to suppose, firstly, that any international arrangement in regard to cables would necessarily yield satisfactory results unless the land telegraph lines were also controlled and secondly, that

effective control could only be exercised over cables which landed in a country which was at war.

Furthermore, he thought it would not be wise to try to limit the power of nations to lay cables between the different parts of their own Dominions, if they so wished. Thus, for instance, he thought the United States of America should have perfect liberty to lay cables, for instance, between America and the Philippines and America and Panama, and he held that a cable which began and ended on American soil should be wholly controlled by America. He doubted the propriety of preventing any such arrangement. On the other hand, it should be realised that as a result Great Britain would thereby be placed in a position to apply Empire preferential cable rates. He thought that this introduced a question which could not, however, be decided before the International Congress referred to in paragraph 3 of President Wilson's draft resolution, had been appointed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the strongest argument against the kind of international control proposed by President Wilson in the event of war, was that it might become impossible any longer to cut enemy cables. Thus, for instance, had the Atlantic cable lines been controlled in 1914 by America, France, Great Britain and Germany, it would not have been possible to cut the cables, as had been done.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, but maintained that each nation could have stopped messages from passing through their territory. In his opinion this question chiefly affected the Great Sea Powers, for it was particularly advantageous to them to be able to cut cables in the event of war.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the Council was not arguing a question which was not yet in debate. In his draft resolution he had merely attempted to make arrangements so that the cables in question could be placed under the best system of administration and control. As Baron Makino had stated at yesterday's meeting, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken certain liberties with international law in the Peace Treaty, and in his opinion a new decision in international law was being made in regard to taking

possession of cable lengths which lay in No Man's Land, at the bottom of the sea, in order to connect the ends to form new cable systems. He agreed that no clear ruling on this point existed in international law; and such action could only be justified by analogies such as the seizure of private property. The point he wished to make, however, was this, namely, that it was not proposed to assign to one or two of a number of partners in the war, the indispensable means of international communication, though the other belligerents were also vitally interested. He thought, therefore, that all partners of the war should have a voice in the system of administration and control to be adopted in future. The five Allied and Associated Powers who would hold these cables as trustees in accordance with his draft resolution, were the very Powers upon whom the whole system of peace and international understanding would henceforth rest. Consequently power should be conferred upon this group of Great Powers to decide the whole question, and he felt confident they would be in a position to do so equitably. He fully agreed that it would be impossible to interfere with sovereign rights.

In regard to the question of rates and monopolies, he agreed that at the present moment the proposals contained in his draft resolutions would merely be applied to a small number of cables; but he thought means might eventually be devised to break down the existing high rates. It would be admitted that no international understanding could be effective unless international means of exercising pressure were at the same time accorded and, in this connection, it might be found useful for the Great Powers to lay additional cables in order to make new and better communications, and so obtain the means of controlling rates and of preventing the creation of monopolies. But these results could not be reached by conversations which would be held after the property in question had been definitely assigned to particular Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could not altogether accept President Wilson's conclusion. At the present moment the Atlantic cables were almost wholly in the hands of American monopolies, which had been very skilfully engineered. These American companies preferred London for their operations, as it suited them

better for practical reasons. The greater part of their business was in London, which was a great cable distributing centre; and, in addition, the British Post Office had been extremely liberal in its arrangements for the transmission of messages over British land lines. The fact remained, however, that the existing 13 cable lines were all controlled by Americans. During the war the British had captured a German cable and connected it with Canada, and the line now constituted the only Canadian State owned line. The Canadian Government had recently contemplated laying a second cable in order to bring pressure to bear with a view of reducing the rates charged by the monopolist companies. President Wilson, however, now proposed that the cable line in question should be placed under international control. If America desired to break down American monopolies, he thought the only way would be for additional cable lines to be laid. To lay a cable across the Atlantic cost between £700,000 and £800,000. Consequently, whoever wanted to break monopolies would have to pay that sum. On the other hand, he failed to see why Canada should be deprived of something which had been captured during the war just as legitimately as the capture of a ship; the latter representing communications over the seas, the former, communications under the seas.

To sum up, he failed to see the point of dispossessing Canada in order to set up a kind of international control over something which she regarded as essential to her business success, and which had cost her over £200,000 to organise.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Mr. Lloyd George had, in his statement, made various assumptions which were not necessarily justified. In the first place, it was not correct to say that America wanted to deprive Canada of the cable in question. Secondly, he did not propose to establish a permanent international control over the particular cable in question. His proposal had merely contemplated the setting up of some authority, which would possess the right to enquire as to how all existing systems could best be administered and controlled. In other words, should the cable in question be assigned to Canada by the Treaty of Peace; the United States of America would thereafter have no right to ask what it was intended to do with the cable, for the obvious reply would be that the cable

belonged to Canada, and America could not interfere in its management. But since, at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments, were partners of war, he considered it to be part of his privilege to enquire what was to be done with the cable in question. He merely asked, therefore, that an initial enquiry should be made as to what was to be done with the cables mentioned in his draft resolution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not for a moment challenge President Wilson's right to examine what was to be done with any piece of property that had been seized from the enemy during the war. On the other hand, he thought it would be wiser to accept the proposal made by Admiral de Bon at yesterday's meeting, namely, that Germany should be informed that the cables which during the period of the war had been cut and utilised by the Allied and Associated Governments, would not be restored to her, and that they would remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. At the same time, an International body could be appointed to consider and report on the whole question of ocean cables.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the only difference between the two plans was that in accordance with his own proposals the cables would during the intermediate period be vested in trustees. With this exception, his proposal did not differ in principle from Admiral de Bon's.

MR. BALFOUR proposed the following amendments to President Wilson's draft resolution:—

> "(*a*) Para. 1.
>
> The word 'jointly' to be omitted.
>
> (*b*) Para. 2.
>
> To be amended to read as follows:—'These cables shall continue to be worked as at present without prejudice to any decision as to their future status which may be reached by the

five Allied and Associated Powers mentioned in the next paragraph.'"

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would accept the amendments proposed by Mr. Balfour.

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that Sir Robert Borden had suggested the following addition to the end of the new paragraph 2, namely:—

"And without prejudice to any vested right that may be claimed by reason of cutting, possession, expenditure and utilisation."

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the latter addition would be quite unnecessary. He suggested that the whole of the resolution should be re-drafted to embody Mr. Balfour's amendments and taken the first thing at the meeting to be held on the following day.

VISCOUNT CHINDA wished to call attention to one important point in the draft resolution. He thought the submarine cable lines Chefoo-Tsingtao-Shanghai; Tsingtao-Chefoo; and Tsingtao-Shanghai should be omitted from the first paragraph of the resolution, since it had already been agreed by the Council of Four that these cables were to be renounced by Germany in favour of Japan.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. ROGERS invited attention to the fact that Mr. Balfour's amended paragraph 2 merely related to cables at present being worked. He thought the wording should be amended so as to include cables and parts of cables not at present in use.

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed that the following draft resolution, as amended, should be considered at a Meeting to be held on Saturday, May 3rd, at 11 a.m.:—

“Germany renounces, on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals, in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables set out below, or in any portions thereof:—

Emden–Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.

Emden–Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.

Emden–Teneriffe: from off Dunkergue to off Teneriffe.

Emden–Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Emden–Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Azores–New York (1): from Fayal to New York.

Azores–New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.

Teneriffe–Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.

Monrovia–Lome:

from about { lat. 2 deg. 30′ N.
long. 7 deg. 40′ W. of Greenwich

to about { lat. 2 deg. 20′ N.
long. 5.30′ deg. W. of Greenwich

and from about to { lat. 3 deg. 48′ N.
long. 0.00.

to Lome.

Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala.

Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.

Constantinople-Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza.

Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam, and Yap-Menado (Celebes): from Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island, and from Yap Island to Menado.

—2—

Such of the above-mentioned cables as are now in use, shall continue to be worked in the conditions at present existing; but such working shall not prejudice the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to decide the future status of these cables in such way as they may think fit.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may make such arrangements as they may think fit for bringing into operation any of the said cables which are not at present in use.

—3—

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall as soon as possible arrange for the convoking of an International Congress to consider all international aspects of communication by land telegraphs, cables or wireless telegraphy, and to make recommendations to the Powers concerned with a view to providing the entire world with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 2nd May, 1919.

May 12, 4 p.m. (BC–61)

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[29] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 12th May, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 12, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/68

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/68

BC–61

[Document 29]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 12th May, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 12, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. H. White
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary-General
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Secretary
M. Arnavon
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn

ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Seymour
Dr. Day
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Dr. W. E. Lunt
Major D. W. Johnson

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Hon. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. Leeper
Major H. W. V. Temperley
Major Barnes.

FRANCE
M. J. Cambon
M. Tardieu
M. Aubert
M. Hermitte

ITALY
M. de Martino

H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretary-General
Count Aldrovandi
Secretary
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Viscount Chinda
Secretaries
M. Saburi
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee on Jugo Slav affairs.

Frontiers of Austria and Hungary: (a) Frontier Between Jugo-Slavia and Austria M. TARDIEU gave an explanation of the finding of the Committee substantially identical to that given in I. C. 182[1] and in I. C. 184.[2]

MR. BALFOUR asked whether any method of obtaining a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin had been thought out.

M. TARDIEU replied that no methods had been suggested, as the Committee had not thought it necessary to propose any, until the

plebiscite had been accepted in principle.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the principle of the plebiscite was accepted.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied in the affirmative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also agreed.

BARON SONNINO expressed the view that if a plebiscite were resorted to in this area, there should be one in Marburg and in other doubtful corners along the proposed frontier.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was true there were other regions with mixed populations, but if the Conference were satisfied that it possessed sufficient knowledge to solve these problems without a referendum, he could see no reason why a plebiscite should not be resorted to in the isolated case of the Klagenfurt Basin if the Conference did not think itself sufficiently well-informed to decide its fate without one.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Commission had been unanimous not only regarding the rest of the frontier, but in recommending a plebiscite in this area.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the most urgent business before the meeting was to frame a clause for the Treaty. Some definite stipulation should be put down. He read the draft prepared by the Committee on Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, given as Article 5 on page 31 of Report No. 2 (W. C. P. 646.):—

> "In the whole of the basin of Klagenfurt, as defined below, an Inter-Allied Commission will be charged by the five Allied and Associated Powers with the duty of ascertaining on the spot the wishes expressed by the inhabitants as to the attachment of their territory to that of the Jugo-Slav State.
>
> If the conclusions of this Commission establish the formal desire of the population to be attached to the Jugo-Slav State,

the five Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to give satisfaction to such desire".

MR. BALFOUR agreed that all Austria need know was that the people in the area in question would be consulted.

M. ORLANDO said that if he understood the clause aright, it meant that the fate of this territory was reserved until the conclusion of the labours of the Commission set up by it. On these terms he would accept the draft Article.

(The draft Article regarding the consultation of the population in the Klagenfurt Basin by an Inter-Allied Commission was accepted.)

M. TARDIEU then proceeded to explain the difficulty regarding the triangle south-east of Tarvis. (See I. C. 184 and Annexure.)[3]

BARON SONNINO asked at what date the final attribution would be made. He expressed the opinion that the occasion of making a Treaty with Austria was the best moment for settling this.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the result obtained at the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers (see I. C. 184) a compromise had been reached solely in order to obtain means of settling speedily with Austria. He agreed with Baron Sonnino that the final attribution of this territory must be made at some date. He suggested that if it were not settled immediately, it might be considered when the Conference came to decide on the boundaries of Jugo-Slavia.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that this course should be adopted.

BARON SONNINO adhered to the view that the matter should be settled immediately; not only was it an Italian interest, but it was also a first rate Austrian interest. It concerned the Austrians to know by what means they would communicate with the sea. The territory in question was a small mountainous wedge with a very small population. It was quite separate from the question of Fiume, and it could readily be decided in connection with the forthcoming Treaty with Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that two questions were involved. One was that of the ultimate sovereignty to be acknowledged by the population of the district. As this population was predominantly Jugo-Slav, the natural answer would be that the sovereignty should be Jugo-Slav. The second question was that of direct railway communication between Austria and Italy. In a similar instance the Conference had found no great difficulty in settling an almost identical problem. Arrangements had been made to ensure unimpeded transit between Eastern and Western Prussia.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that in order to give Czecho-Slovakia some 60 kilometres of railway, about 60,000 Magyars were to be subjected to Czecho-Slovak sovereignty. This had been done in order to ensure unimpeded railway communication between Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. Similarly, no less than 280,000 Magyars had been handed over to Roumania, and in Poland, together with 100 kilometres of railway, some 100,000 Germans had been made Polish subjects.

(Considerable dissent was expressed from this statement. Such solutions might have been proposed by Committees, but had not yet been accepted by the Council.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the proposal which he asked the Council to accept or reject was, that the limits of Austria should be fixed provisionally, and that the final attribution of the triangle in question be reserved until the frontiers of Jugo-Slavia were determined. This would be in accordance with the decision of the Foreign Secretaries of the previous Saturday. (I. C. 184.)

(This was finally agreed to and the frontier of Austria as proposed by the Committee on Jugo-Slavia in the report, and in the annexure to I. C. 184 was accepted.)

(The southern frontier of Hungary as set forth in the document annexed to these Minutes (Annexure A) was also accepted.)

B. Frontier Between Czecho-Slovakia and Austria M. CAMBON made a statement explaining the findings of the Committee on Czecho-

Slovak affairs. He pointed out that the administrative boundary between Austria and Bohemia had been followed almost throughout. There were two small deviations. Firstly, at Gmund, the railway junction of which was to be left within Czecho-Slovakia. This junction was situated at some 4 kilometres from the town and was the junction of the two main lines serving Bohemia. The second deviation was near Feldsberg, at the join of the rivers Thaya and Morava. These two streams were the main arteries of Moravia and gave access to the Danube. The line had therefore been drawn in such a way as to give the stream to Czecho-Slovakia, while the railway parallel with the stream which was necessary to Vienna, was left within Austria.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether any objections were raised to the solution proposed by the Committee.

(No objections were raised, and the frontier proposed by the Committee was adopted.)

C. Frontier Between Austria and Hungary PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it would be necessary to specify the frontier between Austria and Hungary in the Treaty with the former. He reminded the Meeting that it had been decided to set up a Commission to investigate this matter in order to prepare the Conference for the raising of the question by either of the parties interested. He was informed that the Austrians would raise the question, and that the Allied and Associated Powers would be called upon to decide it. He read the decision recorded in I. C. 182 Para. 1, D,[4] and asked whether any nominations had been made.

(No nominations had been made.)

BARON SONNINO asked whether it would not be enough to require Austria to recognise the independence of Hungary, and Hungary that of Austria, without raising the frontier question at all.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was informed the Austrians would raise the question.

(After some discussion it was decided that Austria would be required to recognise the frontier of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, and that if any difficulty arose regarding this frontier, the Allied and Associated Powers might if necessary arbitrate.)

D. Remaining Frontiers of Hungary After a short statement by M. Tardieu the frontiers of Hungary, as laid down in Annexure A, were accepted.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, May 12th, 1919.

Annexure "A" to IC 185 [BC–61]

PARIS, 8th May, 1919.

Articles Regarding Hungarian Frontiers Proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary

In accordance with the instructions given to it by the Supreme Council of the Allies, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs studied the question of Hungarian frontiers at its meeting of 8th May.[5]

It begs to suggest to the Supreme Council the adoption of the draft Articles proposed:—

1. By the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions in Annex III of its Report, relating to the frontier between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Hungary.

This frontier is fixed as follows:—

(1) From the point where the frontier between Austria and Hungary meets the Danube as far as its confluence with the Eipel.

The *Talweg* of the main stream of the Danube, as far as the confluence of the Danube and the Eipel (Ipoly).

(2) Between the confluence of the Eipel and the Sajo.

The course of the Eipel as far as a point about 10 kilometers south-south-west of the Losonez station;

A line following the watershed running from north-west to south-east; cutting the Salgo-Tarjan; Losonez railway; continuing along the watershed towards the south-east, and then south as far as point 628, 7 kilom. east-north-east of Salgo-Tarjan.

Following the watershed, at first in a general north-easterly direction, and then, after reaching point 278 (south of the confluence of the Sajo and the Rima) in an east-north-easterly direction to meet the Sajo.

(3) Between the Sajo and the Ung.

A line cutting the Putnek-Losonez railway at Banreve station (about 6 kilometres west of Putnek) so as to pass between the bifurcations of the two railways, leading respectively, northwards to Pelsocz, and southwards to Borsodnadasd.

Following the watershed in a general north-easterly direction as far as a point 7 kilometres east of Pelsocz.

Following a general east-north-easterly direction and cutting the Torna-Edeleny railway 4 kilometres southwest of Torna.

Following in an easterly direction the ridge of the left bank of the Bodva, passing north of Keny and South of Buzita, to meet the Hernad 6 kilometres north-east of Hidasnémeti, then following this river upstream as far as a point just west of Nádasd.

Turning east and passing south of Nádasd, meeting and following the watershed between the Bozsva and the Ronyva.

Meeting this latter river 8 kilometres north-north-west of Satoralja-Ujhely and following its *Talweg* southwards.

Cutting the railway triangle south-east of Satoralja-Ujhely, in such a way as to leave to the Czechoslovaks the complete possession on their territory of the Kassa–Csap railway.

Crossing the Bodrog about 5 kilometres south of Bodrog-Szerdahely.

(4) Between the Bodrog and the frontier of Ruthenian territory.

A line parallel to and to the south of the Satoralja-Ujhely-Csap railway, passing north of Lacza and south of Perbenyik and Tarkany to meet the Tisza (Theiss) west of the latter village.

Following the *Talweg* of the Tisza upstream to the point (2 kilometres east-south-east of Csap) where the frontier between Ruthenian territory and Hungary touches that river.

2. By the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs in Annex VI of its Report No. 1 relative to the frontier between Roumania and Hungary.

This frontier is fixed as follows:—

> Leaving the point of junction of the frontiers of Roumania, the Czecho-Slovak State (Ruthenian territory) and Hungary; the boundary between Roumania and Hungary runs in a general south-south-westerly direction, roughly parallel to and to the west of the railway Halmi; Szatmár-Németi; Nagy Károly; Nagy-Várad; Nagy-Szalonta.
>
> Cuts the railway Nagy-Szalonta; Gyula about 12 kilometres from Nagy-Szalonta, passes between the two bifurcations formed by the junction of this railway and the railway Szeghalom-Erdögyarak.
>
> Passes east of Kötegyan, east of Gyula, west of Ottlakam, east of Kevermes, and east of Dombegyhaz, between Battonya and

Tornya, where it meets the administrative boundary between the Comitats of Csanad and Arad.

Following this administrative boundary to its salient north-north-west of Nemet-Pereg, whence it runs towards the river Maros which it reaches about 1 kilometre south of Nagylak station, passing between the town and the railway station.

Follows the *Talweg* of the Maros downstream to a point about 3.5 kilometres upstream from the railway bridge on the line Mako-Szeged. Thence it runs west-south-west, following the *Talweg* of a backwater as far as the bend which it makes at a point about 1 kilometre south-east of point 84 and about 9 kilometres south-west of Makó, of approximate position 46°10′ North and 20°22′ East of Greenwich. This point is the meeting place of the three frontiers of Roumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

3. By the Committee for Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, in Annexe VI of its 2nd Report, relative to the frontier between Yugoslavia and Hungary.

This frontier shall be fixed as follows:—

Leaving the meeting-place of the frontiers of Yugoslavia, Roumania and Hungary, 9 kilometres south-west of Makó.

A line running in a general north-westerly direction, passing between Szt-Ivan and Gyalo and meeting the main stream of the river Tisza.

Following downstream the *Talweg* of the main stream of the Tisza, and then following upstream that of its backwater, thus making a *détour* round the south of the island of Nagyret.

A line in a general E. W. direction, passing south of Roszke; cutting the railway line from Szabadka to Kishunhalas at about 3 kilometres to the south-east of the station of Kelebia.

A line in a general north-easterly-south-westerly direction, cutting the railway line from Szabadka to Baja at about 1.5 kilometres to the east of the station of Csikeria.

Meeting the river Kigyos at the bend which it makes 4 kilometres east-north-east of Bacsmadaras;

Following the *Talweg* of this river westwards;

Crossing the marshy region lying north and west of Rigyicza leaving this village to Yugoslavia, the exact trace to be determined on the ground by the Boundary Commission.

Rejoining the *Talweg* of the river Kigyos west of Rigyicza and following it to a point about 8 kilometres south-west of the railway junction at Rigyicza.

Turning west-south-west, passing between the villages of Szantova and Bereg, reaching the main stream of the Danube at about 8 kilometres to the north of point 169 (Kisküszeg).

The *Talweg* of the main stream of the Danube southwards to its confluence with the river Drave.

The *Talweg* of the main stream of the Drave towards the north-west of its confluence with the river Mur.

The *Talweg* of the Mur to the point where the frontier between Hungary and Austria meets that river from the north.

In the region between Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslavia territory, Hungary is coterminous with Austria.

[1] FM–12, p. 671 [*Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 42*].
[2] FM–14, p. 697 [*Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 44*].
[3] FM–14, pp. 696 [*Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 44*], 701 [*Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 44*].
[4] FM–12, p. 674 [*Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 42*].
[5] See FM–12, p. 670 [*Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 42*].

June 17, 11 a.m. (BC–62)

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[30] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers Held in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 11 a.m.

June 17, 1919, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/69

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/69

BC–62

[Document 30]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers Held in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 11 a.m.

June 17, 1919, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary-General
Mr. J. C. Grew

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
Secretary-General
Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Secretary-General Peace Conference
M. Dutasta

ITALY
Baron Sonnino
Marquis Imperiali

JAPAN
Baron Makino

ALSO PRESENT

Secretaries

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. H. Norman
Mr. E. Phipps
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.
Mr. P. Kerr

FRANCE
M. Berthelot
M. Gautier
M. Arnavon
M. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn

ITALY
M. Bertele
M. Trombetti

JAPAN
M. Saburi

Viscount Chinda

TURKEY

S. A. Damad Ferid Pacha

S. E. Riza Tewfik Bey

S. E. Tewfik Bey

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia. Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Mantoux.

Audience of the Delegates of the Ottoman Empire M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing the Delegates of the Government of the Ottoman Empire, said that they had been good enough to request leave to submit their views in regard to the questions before the Peace Conference in regard to the Turkish Empire. The Allied Representatives hastened to reply to their request in the sense that they were at the disposal of the Ottoman Delegates. The latter had been good enough to undertake the journey, and it was hoped that it might be a useful one for all the parties concerned. The Ottoman Delegates were requested to be so good as to state their views.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PACHA then read out the following statement:—

"Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this high Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any share of responsibility in the war which has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword.

“I apologise in advance for the development which I must give to my statement, for I am in point of fact defending to-day before the public opinion of the whole world and before history a most complicated and ill-understood case.

“In the course of the war, nearly the whole civilised world was shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavour to minimise the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim which I have set myself is that of showing to the world, with proofs in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible crimes.

“We are under no illusions in regard to the extent of the dissatisfaction which surrounds us; we are absolutely convinced that a mass of unfortunate events has made Turkey appear in an unfavourable light; however, when the truth has once been brought to light, it will warn civilised nations and posterity against passing an unjust judgment on us. The responsibility for the war in the East—assumed, without the knowledge of the Sovereign or of the people, in the Black Sea, by a German ship commanded by a German Admiral—rests entirely with the signatories of the secret Treaties, which were unknown alike to the Ottoman people and to the European Chanceries. These agreements were concluded between the Government of the Kaiser and the heads of the revolutionary Committee, who at the beginning of 1913, had placed themselves in power by means of a *coup d’état*. I call to witness the official despatches exchanged between the representatives of France and Great Britain and their respective Governments during the three months which preceded the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and the Empire of the Czars. When war had once been declared, the eternal covetousness of Russia as regards Constantinople was skilfully represented to the people as an imminent danger, and anxiety for the preservation of national existence thereupon rendered the struggle a desperate one. Our archives are moreover, thrown entirely open to an enquiry which would enable the statements which I have the honour to make to this high Assembly to be amply confirmed.

“In regard to the other tragic events I beg leave to repeat here the declarations which I have repeatedly made to the Ottoman Senate. Turkey deplores the murder of a great number of her Christian co-nationals, as much as she does that of Moslems, properly speaking. In point of fact, the Committee of Union and Progress, not content with the crimes perpetrated against Christians, condemned to death by every means three million Moslems. Several hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate beings, hunted from their homes, are still wandering about today in the middle of Asia Minor without shelter and without any relief for their very existence; and even if they returned to their provinces they would find themselves just as destitute, for a large number of towns and villages, both Moslem and Christian, have been completely destroyed. Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins. The new Government notwithstanding its vigilant care, has been as yet unable to mitigate the disastrous effects of the cataclysm. It will always be easily possible to confirm my assertions by an enquiry undertaken on the spot. It is necessary, however, to dismiss any theory of racial conflict or of any explosion of religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkish people, at a time when violence could strive successfully against right, showed itself able to respect the lives, the honour and the sacred feelings of the Christian nation[al]s subject to its laws. It would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light.

“Whatever be the names by which they are called, the principles and the methods of both the Russian and Turkish revolutionaries are the same, namely to destroy society in order to seize its ruins by putting its members out of the way and taking possession of their property. Europe and America are endeavouring at the cost of immense sacrifice to deliver the Slav people, whose ostensible attitude towards the Entente is scarcely different at the present time from that of the Turks, for both have been reduced to silence and both paralysed by an unheard of tyranny. The Turks, who thus find themselves, under the domination of the Committee, in the same situation as that of the Russians under the Terrorists, deserve the same sympathy and the same humanitarian and kindly assistance at the hands of the rulers

of the Great nations which hold the destinies of the world in their hands.

“Latterly the truth has begun to filter through into European public opinion. The great trial of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the Committee—who all of them occupy high positions in the State—for the war and the other tragic events; that is the rehabilitation of the Ottoman nation.

“Thus rehabilitated in the eyes of the civilised world, our mission will henceforward be that of devoting ourselves to an intensive economic and intellectual culture in order thus to become an useful factor in the League of Nations. The Ottoman People hope that the chaos in the East, fostered as it is by this abnormal state of affairs which is neither war nor peace, may at last be replaced by order, and it likewise desires to see the end of the continued occupation of its territories in spite of the Armistice. This occupation has in fact resulted at Smyrna in the most deplorable excesses which have been committed to the hurt of the defenceless Moslem population.

“It desires with equal earnestness the maintenance, on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which, during the last 40 years, has been reduced to the least possible limits. It lastly wishes to be granted in Thrace, to the North and West of Adrianople where the Mohammedan population is in an overwhelming majority, a frontier line which will render possible the defence of Adrianople and Constantinople.

“What we ask for thus is, moreover, completely in conformity with President Wilson’s principles, which we invoked when requesting an Armistice, being convinced that they would be evenly applied in the interests of the peace of the world. On the other hand a fresh parcelling out of the Ottoman Empire would entirely upset the balance in the East.

“The ranges of the Taurus are moreover nothing more than a geological line of demarcation. The regions situated beyond those mountains, from the Mediterranean up to the Arabian Sea, are, although a language different from the Turkish language is spoken

there, indissolubly linked with Constantinople by feelings which are deeper than the principle of nationality; on either side of the Taurus the same ideals, the same thoughts, the same moral and material interests bind the inhabitants. These form a compact block and its disintegration would be detrimental to the peace and tranquillity of the East. Even a plebiscite would not solve the question, for the supreme interests of more than three hundred million Moslems are involved, and they form an important fraction of the whole of the human race.

The conscience of the world could only approve conditions of peace which are compatible with right, with the aspirations of peoples and with immanent justice.[”]

M. CLEMENCEAU, after thanking the Turkish Grand Vizier for his communication, proposed with his leave to adjourn the meeting for a few moments in order to deliberate, and undertook to make to him a quarter of an hour later whatever communication was decided on.

(The meeting was adjourned at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.55 a.m.)

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing the Ottoman Delegates, said that he had been requested by the Heads of Governments and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers to inform them that the statement made by the Grand Vizier had been listened to with the utmost attention, that it was intended to subject that statement to detailed examination and to make a reply as soon as one was ready. He added that the Heads of Governments and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in view of the occupations which then absorbed their time, would be unable to make their reply before Saturday; and that one of the Heads of Government was leaving Paris that evening and would only return on Friday. He therefore proposed that a meeting should be held on the following Saturday at 11 a.m. for the presentation of the Allied reply. He further stated that if the Ottoman Delegates had any comments to offer or requests to make or anything to say in regard to the programme which he had just outlined the Allied representatives would be glad to hear them.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA said that the Ottoman Delegation was preparing a memorandum which would be forwarded as soon as it was ready.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired on what day it would be sent.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA said that it would be sent on Friday evening.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Allied representatives would defer their reply until after the receipt of the Turkish memorandum, and would then fix a date for the next meeting.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA expressed his agreement.

(The meeting was adjourned at noon.)

PARIS, June 17th, 1919.

The Council of Foreign Ministers: Minutes of Meetings (1919):

Contents

March 27, 11:30 a.m. (FM–1)

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[31] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Foreign Office, Paris, on Thursday, March 27th, 1919, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, March 27, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/1

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/1

FM–1

[Document 31]

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Foreign Office, Paris, on Thursday, March 27th, 1919, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, March 27, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Mr. Lansing.	Mr. Balfour.	M. Pichon.
Mr. Hoover.	Lord Robert Cecil.	M. Seydoux.
	Sir Maurice Hankey	M. Arnavon (*Interpreter*)
	ITALY	
	Baron Sonnino.	
Count Aldrovandi.		

(NOTE:—This Meeting was arranged at short notice at the beginning of a Meeting between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and M. Orlando, held at 11.00 a.m. at President Wilson's house at the Place des Etats-Unis.)

(1). M. PICHON explained the political importance of allowing Bavaria to get supplies from other directions than the north. At present all the supplies for Bavaria were sent by the Berlin organisation, and this tended to increase the political influence of Prussia. The best way to obviate this was to enable Bavaria to receive supplies from the south. M. Calonder, the President of the Swiss Republic, was now in Paris, and he understood from him that Switzerland would facilitate the supply of Bavaria through Switzerland, provided that her own

stocks were made up to the extent on which they were drawn, and that the necessary coal for transportation purposes was forthcoming.
The Revictualling of Bavaria

M. SEYDOUX thought that the revictualling of Bavaria from the south could be carried on outside of the decisions taken at Brussels. There it had been decided that the revictualling of Germany should be compensated for by exports. France needed coal and glass, which Bavaria could export, and he suggested that food might be supplied in exchange. It was difficult for France to obtain credit in dollars or sterling in neutral countries to pay for what she required. He therefore suggested this exchange of goods. At Brussels it had been agreed that a fair price should be given for the exports of Germany. Why, therefore, should we not exchange French goods against Bavarian? Since the beginning of the war the supply of Switzerland had had to be carried out through France. Now, however, the line was open for traffic as far as Strassburg. Consequently, our means of supply were greatly improved, as this would supplement lines formerly used for the supply of Switzerland. His proposal was to supply Bavaria by rail from Strassburg. In the same manner the goods which Bavaria could supply would be brought back through Strassburg.

LORD ROBERT CECIL pointed out the transportation difficulties involved in revictualling Bavaria through Switzerland. It would be better to send the supplies from Strassburg to Bavaria direct. In order to reach Bavaria through Switzerland, it would be necessary to send the supplies through France. M. Loucheur,[1] however, had emphasised the very difficult transportation situation in France. He thought it of the first importance not to overstrain this, and particularly not to interfere with the transportation of coal to Italy.

MR. LANSING said that the real question involved was one of policy. Did we want to separate Bavaria from Germany?

MR. HOOVER said that the Allied and Associated Powers had entered into a series of contracts with the German Central Government, under which the latter had undertaken the fair distribution of supplies throughout the whole of Germany, including Bavaria. There

was a financial problem involved. The people with whom the Allied and Associated Powers were dealing drew on the resources of the whole of Germany for payments. To make a separate financial arrangement would involve separate means of payment being found for Bavaria. If these goods came to France from Bavaria, it was doubtful if France had supplies to furnish in return. To replace them, therefore, food supplies would have to be imported from elsewhere, and dollars or credits would have to be found. One difficulty was that there was a serious shortage of food stuffs available for Europe. As far as he knew, they did not exceed from 130,000 to 140,000 tons, which he had under his control at Rotterdam and Copenhagen, and some 20,000 tons which he understood the British Government could spare.

LORD ROBERT CECIL interjected at this point that 150,000 tons was probably an over-estimate.

MR. HOOVER, continuing, said that in any event the supplies would have to receive access to Bavaria by the Rhine. Otherwise, they would have to be brought from Bordeaux right across France, whereas, by using the Rhine, an immediate and easy transport was available.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that Mr. Lansing's point was fundamental. First, however, he asked Mr. Hoover to explain how supplies to Bavaria could be paid for. Had Bavaria special commodities she could use for exportation apart from and independently of supplies to be exported by arrangement with the Central German Government?

MR. HOOVER said that Bavaria had some supplies. The amount of supplies, however, available for export from the whole of Germany was trivial. He estimated the value of the food supplies that Germany must import in the next three months at 300 million dollars. The amount she could export did not exceed 40 million dollars in value.

M. SONNINO asked whether the quantity approved of food that could be sent to Bavaria was an addition to the supplies promised to Germany? He understood it was not. If it was part of the German

ration it could be sent to Bavaria after agreement with Germany. If Germany would agree there would be no great difficulty.

M. SEYDOUX suggested that what we wanted was to revictual Bavaria as soon as possible, in fact, to show special good-will to Bavaria. To do this we must use the Rhine, but he agreed that there were no additional supplies available for this. We could not increase the total supplies but we might find some small quantities for Bavaria which could be sent by the Rhine or by rail. During the War "we had always managed to supply Switzerland, though" at times she had gone short. Now, however, we had at our disposal means of communication vastly superior to what we had during the War. Moreover, the Rhine route would be much cheaper. Hence he asked why should we not send goods to Bavaria to enable her to resist anarchy.

MR. LANSING pointed out that this brought us back to the question of policy.

M. SONNINO said it would not be a question of policy if it were done with the assent of the German Government.

LORD ROBERT CECIL summed up the real situation as he understood it. At Brussels we had concluded an agreement in regard to supplies to Germany. The principal difficulty had been one of payment. Ultimately certain methods had been arranged whereby Germany would pay partly in gold, partly in securities, etc. The whole of these resources for payment were disposed of by the Central German Government. Consequently any food sent to any part of Germany belonged to the people who had undertaken to pay for it. It could not be sent to Bavaria without the consent of Berlin. Also part of the arrangement was that the food should be fairly distributed by the Central Government. To send food to one part of Germany was to upset the bargain. If we had additional supplies to spare it might become a matter of consideration whether we should furnish them to Bavaria, but then the political question would arise.

M. PICHON suggested to remit the question to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LANSING said not until the question of policy is decided.

MR. HOOVER said that the arrangement with the Germans comprised two methods. (1) An arrangement with the Central Government at Berlin, (2) a relaxation of the Blockade which would enable German merchants to buy in neutral countries on the understanding that what they bought would be deducted from the total ration for Germany. There was nothing to prevent Bavarian merchants purchasing from the Swiss and we had undertaken to make good to Switzerland what they sold, but without increase to the total ration.

MR. BALFOUR enquired how could Switzerland obtain additional food if there was no surplus of food available?

MR. HOOVER said there was sufficient food in the world, but the difficulty of making it available was one of transport. The Swiss had certain stocks which they might send to their neighbours, replacing them later. This, at any rate, was one method by which what was desired could take place though he did not know whether there was any probability that it would work out in this manner.

M. SEYDOUX said that if Germany was allowed to buy goods in Switzerland it would change nothing. What Bavaria took from Switzerland would be treated as part of the German ration which remained a fixed quantity. Switzerland would revictual Bavaria and the Allies would have the trouble of transporting it to Switzerland across France and would derive no benefit from the transaction. The difficulties of transport, however, were just as great in supplying Switzerland as in supplying Bavaria direct. Why should we not obtain the political advantage of sending supplies straight to Bavaria.

M. SONNINO said that some political effect would be obtained by sending supplies direct from Switzerland inasmuch as Bavaria would get some relief.

MR. BALFOUR asked that before discussing the political situation the economic situation should be cleared up. He understood that there was only a certain quantity of food available for Europe. It was known perfectly well where it was, in Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Great

Britain or in America. If it was sent to Bavaria either through Swiss merchants or through any other channel—

LORD ROBERT CECIL interrupted to explain that the difficulty was entirely one of transport. If the Swiss would supply from their own stocks the effect would be to increase the total stock of food available, because later on the transport situation would be better and Switzerland could be supplied.

M. SEYDOUX asked why France should not be allowed to do what it was proposed to allow Switzerland to do? If the Swiss could give part of their supplies to Bavaria why should France not do the same and obtain in exchange the glass and coal which she required?

MR. LANSING said he understood that France had given an undertaking that all possible surplus should be sent to Rotterdam.

LORD ROBERT CECIL confirmed this. If France had surpluses he hoped she would save them as it would affect the shipping situation all over the world.

M. SEYDOUX said that any surplus which could be sent to Bavaria would only amount to a small quantity, which however, might have some political effect.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the whole question came back to its political effect.

MR. HOOVER said that small operations of this kind had no real value. The arrival of small quantities of supplies in Vienna had only encouraged false hopes and it was not until a regular system of supplies had been arranged that we had with difficulty obtained control of the food situation in Vienna.

(Count Aldrovandi withdrew at this point.)

LORD ROBERT CECIL agreed with Mr. Hoover. He said that he did not understand that we had permitted German merchants to buy in neutral countries as they liked on condition that what they imported was deducted from the ration. He did not think we had promised

this. His impression of the bargain was that the German Government should be allowed to make its own arrangements in neutral countries for the purchase of food and to distribute it as part of their total ration. He did not understand that anything an individual bought was to come off the ration.

MR. HOOVER remarked that we had said that any German could buy, but that his purchase would come off the general ration. It was the responsibility of the German Government to control individual purchases as they thought fit.

M. SEYDOUX pointed out that the blockade organisation in neutral countries controlled and supervised these operations. When the food sections heard that supplies had been sold to Germany they had to replace them out of the total rations. If they authorised their replacement, this was allowed, otherwise it was not.

MR. HOOVER said the German Government would not allow a large amount of trading round the frontier.

M. SONNINO suggested that we should ask the agreement of the German Government to send a certain quantity of food by the Rhine direct to Bavaria.

M. PICHON said that in this case the best way to handle the question was to send it to the Supreme Economic Council as the political question did not arise in the first instance. We should remit to them the question of whether it was feasible to find some way of improving the revictualling of Bavaria rapidly and in full agreement with the Brussels arrangement. There was a political question involved but the first question was to decide whether it could be done consistently with our agreements.

MR. LANSING asked why we should study the question unless we wished to give special treatment to Bavaria.

M. PICHON said that one reason was that we wanted to prevent the developing of Bolshevism in Bavaria which was a country in which we could rely on for order being maintained. In Bavaria there were

men who had always been favourable to the Entente, and we should facilitate their tasks.

MR. LANSING said that if our object was to get rid of Bolshevism the best way was to consider the Berlin Government which was certainly not Bolshevist. He doubted the expediency of interfering with the internal affairs of any country.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question was one of the first political importance but he did not think it could be decided here. Those present might lay the case before their colleagues and ask their views. Before discussing the political question however there were other aspects such as our agreement with Germany and the quantities of supplies available, which ought to be settled. He thought that these questions could be settled here, if they could not they might be remitted to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. HOOVER said that if the question was sent to the Supreme Economic Council the first thing they would do was to ask "What was the policy"?

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that if the present body decided the economic question it would create confusion. The economic aspect of the question should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council, and the political question could be settled by some such body as that present.

M. SONNINO proposed that a definite reference should be made to the Supreme Economic Council enquiring whether it was possible without violating the Brussels engagement to send supplies to Bavaria.

(After some further discussion the following question was referred to the Supreme Economic Council:—

Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels agreement, it is economically possible to send food independently to Bavaria, apart altogether from the political expediency of doing so.)

3. [*sic*] LORD ROBERT CECIL asked whether the Ministers present could decide the question raised by the Supreme Economic Council as to the blockade of Austria and of Esthonia.

Blockade of Austria and Esthonia MR. BALFOUR referred to the question raised by the British Admiralty as to whether, in view of the fact that the Germans in Latvia were fighting the Bolshevists some relaxation of the blockade should not be permitted so as to allow ships of under 1,800 tons to carry food and coal to Latvia.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that this did not affect the Esthonian question which was merely one of sending food to Esthonia with very careful provisions to prevent it reaching the Bolshevists.

(It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers should meet again on the following day to consider questions of the Blockade of Austria and Esthonia and other questions which Mr. Balfour undertook to remit.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27th March, 1919.

[1] Louis Loucheur, French Minister of Industrial Reconstruction and representative on the Supreme Economic Council.

March 28, 11 a.m. (FM–2)

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[32] Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Foreign Office, Paris, on Friday, March 28th, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, March 28, 1919, 11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/2

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/2

FM–2

[Document 32]

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Foreign Office, Paris, on Friday, March 28th, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, March 28, 1919, 11 a.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Mr. Lansing.	Mr. Harrison.
British Empire	Prof. Haskins.
Mr. Balfour.	Mr. Beer.
Lord R. Cecil.	Mr. Baruch.
Secretary	Mr. McCormick.
Sir M. P. A. Hankey.	Mr. Davis.
France	Mr. Robinson.
M. Pichon.	British Empire
M. Seydoux.	Admiral Hope.
Secretary	France
M. Berthelot.	M. Tardieu.
Italy	M. de Peretti.
Baron Sonnino.	M. Laroche.
Secretary	Italy
M. Bertele.	M. Attolico.
Japan	
Baron Makino.	

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham
France	Capt. A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi
Japan	M. Ashida

Interpreter:—M. de Cammerlynck.

(1) M. Pichon opened the Meeting and asked Lord Robert Cecil to make a statement regarding the raising of the Blockade of German-Austria.

Raising of Blockade of German-Austria Lord Robert Cecil said that on March 12th the Supreme Economic Council had resolved that all blockade and trade restrictions with German-Austria and Hungary should be abolished, and that commerce should be free with all parts thereof, as soon as the necessary machinery of control against re-exportation to Germany had been set up. He was not prepared to ask the Council to affirm the part of this resolution which concerned Hungary. In view of the events that had lately taken place in Hungary he would suggest that this portion of the resolution should be referred back to the Supreme Economic Council. The portion of the resolution relating to German-Austria, however, he would ask the Council to adopt. A certain number of articles susceptible of use for military purposes were to be excepted. These articles were enumerated in the paper forwarded by the Supreme Economic Council (see Annexure "A"). There were also in this paper certain provisions for the establishment of the necessary control, with the object of preventing re-export to Germany. In a word, the general principle recommended was that the blockade should be raised except in respect to articles of military use, as soon as an international control had been established, and was in a position to guarantee that no re-export should be made to Germany.

Baron Sonnino said that he had no objection to raise to the resumption of traffic with German-Austria, provided Hungary were not included. He wished, however, to draw attention to a decision

taken by the Ban of Croatia-Slavonia, forbidding all import, export and transit of goods between Italy and Yugo-Slav territory. Such a policy, if persisted in, would not harmonise with that recommended by the Supreme Economic Council. Unless these decisions on the part of the Yugo-Slavs were revoked, Italy would be forced to take some counter-action. Up to the present no retort had been made, and he had for the time being stopped any move on the part of Italy.

(For reported action taken by Ban of Croatia, see Annexure "B")

MR. BALFOUR said that the matter alluded to by Baron Sonnino was a delicate question, though it had no very direct bearing on the proposal under discussion. The affair, however, was new to him.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that at the earnest request of the Supreme Economic Council Italy had consented to the complete cessation of blockade in the Adriatic. It was, consequently, a very serious matter that the Yugo-Slavs should answer this with a blockade of Italy.

MR. LANSING enquired whether there had been any restriction on the passage of foodstuffs to Yugo-Slavia.

BARON SONNINO said that as far as he knew, food had been allowed to pass, even before the removal of the blockade. With regard to the alleged order by the Ban of Croatia, he was not able to vouch for the correctness of the information he had put before the Meeting, as he had no official intimation of it and only knew what he had related to the Meeting from newspaper reports. He thought, however, that it was right to draw the attention of the Meeting to the matter.

MR. LANSING observed that in view of the presumed action on the part of the Yugo-Slavs, the action proposed by the Economic Council appeared all the more necessary.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, and expressed the opinion that though there was no immediate practical connection with the proposal under discussion, Baron Sonnino had been right in drawing the attention of the Meeting to this matter. It might perhaps be advisable to ask the

Yugo-Slav authorities whether they had issued such a decree, and, if so, in what manner they justified it.

M. PICHON agreed that it would be reasonable to adopt this proposal. The Yugo-Slav authorities should be asked to give an explanation and their answer might be placed before the Council.

(It was then resolved that M. Pichon, on behalf of the Council, should undertake to see the Serbian representatives in Paris about the alleged prohibition of trade between Croatia-Slavonia and Italy and to report to the Council.)

BARON SONNINO made reservations regarding the above decision, pending the result of M. Pichon's enquiries. He said that Italy must have the right of taking counter-measures if the result was not satisfactory.

(It was further resolved that all blockade and trade restrictions with German-Austria should be abolished and that commerce should be free with all parts thereof, as soon as the necessary machinery of control against re-exportation to Germany had been set up, with the exceptions and other provisions set out in detail in Annexure "A".)[2]

(2) LORD ROBERT CECIL read a resolution of the Supreme Economic Council, for the text of which see Annexure "C".

Reopening of Trade With Esthonia He explained that the object was to facilitate commercial intercourse with Esthonia, after taking precautions to prevent the re-export of goods to Germany and Bolshevik Russia.

MR. LANSING inquired why the same proposal was not extended to Latvia and Lithuania.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that there were political objections to doing so, as the Governments of Latvia and Lithuania were still sketchy, and the delegates had thought it unsuitable to enter into immediate commercial relations with them.

MR. MCCORMICK said that the delegates had been led to believe that there were military reasons against this. He himself, however, thought that some such arrangement might be made.

MR. BALFOUR observed that all the main ports of entry into Latvia and Lithuania were in the hands either of the Germans or the Bolsheviks. This rendered it difficult to resume commercial relations with these countries. He would propose, therefore, that the resolution of the Supreme Economic Council be adopted, with a note that as soon as the military situation was favourable, the same principle be extended to the other Baltic States.

MR. MCCORMICK expressed the view that Libau and Riga were no more under German control than Dantzig. As long as a local Committee of Control could fulfil its functions in any of these ports it would be safe to resume traffic.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the position of Riga and Libau was somewhat different from that of Dantzig. At the last there was at least law and order, but the others were in an area in which military operations were either going on, or had taken place, and were about to start again. In fact, they were within the zone of active hostilities.

M. PICHON observed that he feared that order at Dantzig might soon cease. He had received reports of turmoil in that place which might threaten the security of the Inter-Allied Commission.

MR. BALFOUR observed that Riga was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, and at Libau there were 20,000 Germans. He asked M. Pichon what news he had received concerning Dantzig.

M. PICHON said that he had no official information, but he had press news of a German insurrection at Dantzig against the Poles. He agreed with Mr. Balfour regarding Lithuania. He added that even if the principle of extending the resumption of commercial relations to Latvia and Lithuania be accepted, any decision to do so must be subordinated to the opinion of the military authorities. Failing this, great inconvenience, and even danger would ensue.

MR. LANSING suggested that the proposal relating to Esthonia should be adopted, and that the Supreme Economic Council be requested to report on the advisability of extending the same provision to Latvia and Lithuania.

M. PICHON said that he would agree, provided their decision be subordinated to the political and military considerations previously mentioned.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Supreme Economic Council would obtain the evidence of military witnesses.

(With the above recommendation to extend the same principle to Latvia and Lithuania when the political and military situation became favourable, the resolution of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the resumption of trade with Esthonia, as set forth in Annexure "C", was adopted.)

(3) LORD ROBERT CECIL said that the same question arose regarding Poland. The Supreme Economic Council had passed a Resolution freeing Poland from blockade and trade restrictions as from April 1st next, subject to the establishment of a proper control at Dantzig. Removal of Restrictions on Trade With Poland

He asked whether the meeting would endorse this proposal.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that the disorder at Dantzig alluded to by M. Pichon was in the nature of a riot against the Poles, instigated by German officers. Events of this kind were bound to occur wherever people were transferred, or feared they were to be transferred, against their wishes, to an alien allegiance.

MR. MCCORMICK pointed out that the despatch of food through Dantzig to Poland had been carried out without obstruction. The supplementary proposal now before the meeting related to raw materials.

M. SEYDOUX observed that the import of these raw materials could be carried out by the same agency as the import of food.

LORD ROBERT CECIL then proposed the following resolution:—

> "That all blockade and trade restrictions with Poland be abolished and all commerce be free with all parts thereof, as soon as satisfactory machinery is set up for the proper control at Dantzig."

MR. LANSING suggested the substitution of the word "provided" for the words "as soon as".

(The Resolution as adopted was as follows:—

> "That all blockade and trade restrictions with Poland shall be abolished, and all commerce shall be free with all parts thereof from April 1st, 1919, provided satisfactory machinery is set up before that date for the proper control at Dantzig.")

(b) Question of Polish Participation in Control at Dantzig M. SEYDOUX observed with reference to this decision that he had been asked by the Supreme Economic Council to invite the Polish National Committee in Paris to depute some Poles to take a share in this control. He enquired whether the new situation at Dantzig did not make it inadvisable to make this request.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that the intention of the Supreme Economic Council had not been so much to ask the Poles to take a share in the control at Dantzig, as to entrust the distribution of food within Poland to them, rather than to allied officers. Distribution by the latter was burdensome to the Allied Powers and demoralising to the people.

MR. HOOVER expressed the opinion that the reports had greatly exaggerated the disturbances at Dantzig. Even during the trouble there had been no difficulty in handling the food destined for Poland. 4,500 tons of food had been shipped to Warsaw on the day of the riot. The trouble was that some of the Poles on the Food Commission had thought fit to engage in propaganda among the Polish inhabitants of Dantzig. In consequence of this they had been sent home. He was therefore not in favour of any Polish Commissioners

in Dantzig as it was difficult for the Poles to refrain from canvassing their fellow countrymen.

(It was decided that the Polish National Committee should not be invited to arrange for Commissioners to proceed to Dantzig, but that the distribution of food within Poland should, as far as possible, be performed by the Poles themselves.)

(4) MR. MCCORMICK said that in connection with the request of the Swiss Government presented through the French General Staff for the re-opening of traffic on the Rhine, and for permission to send a Swiss engineer on a patrol boat to examine the Channel between Bâle and Strassburg, the Supreme Economic Council had passed a resolution favouring the Swiss proposal. This resolution was to have been submitted to the Supreme War Council. Re-opening of Rhine Traffic

M. SEYDOUX observed that an Inter-Allied Military Commission regulated the movements of boats on the Rhine, and it would therefore have to be consulted.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that all the resolutions of the Supreme Economic Council were sent to Marshal Foch as a matter of course. Marshal Foch, however, was represented on the Council by General Pyot. He had no reason to suppose that Marshal Foch had any objection to the scheme.

M. PICHON said that before accepting the resolution he would ask for time to consult Marshal Foch.

MR. LANSING observed that the resolution under discussion was analogous to that adopted on the previous day, regarding the revictualling of Bavaria. It did not appear to him that this question was of a more military character than the other.

(It was then resolved that there was no objection from a blockade point of view to the re-opening of the Rhine to traffic for the purpose of permitting the resumption of Swiss trade with Holland, Scandinavia and the Entente countries, subject to the existing

blockade agreements, and that the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council to this end was approved, subject to their obtaining the consent of the Military Authorities.)

(5) M. PICHON read the following draft Resolution to which he understood Mr. Balfour had given his assent:—

> Appointment of Commission on Moroccan Question "The Supreme Council of the Allies, after hearing the statement made by the French Government of its claims against Germany regarding Morocco, considers that in the Peace Treaty all servitudes of an international character, to which that country was subjected as a result of German intervention, should be cancelled; that certain sanctions should be adopted against Germany for her attitude in the past, as well as certain guarantees for the future.
>
> "Consequently the Supreme Council, taking note of the declarations of the French Government regarding the maintenance of the "open" door" in Morocco, that is to say economic, commercial, and industrial equality for all the Allied nations, in consideration of their surrender of all servitudes of an international character, entrusts a commission on which Belgium, France, United States, Great Britain, Italy and Portugal, allied powers signatories of the Algeciras Convention[3] shall be represented with the task of examining the provisions, it will be necessary to introduce to that end in the Treaty of Peace in accordance with the proposal of the French Government."

BARON SONNINO expressed his agreement with this proposal.

MR. LANSING enquired what was the meaning of the expression "certain sanctions"? He enquired whether penalties were contemplated.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was inclined to think that the first paragraph of the Resolution ought to be modified. This paragraph had originally been the first of a series which had formed the text of a

long Resolution. The Resolution had eventually been cut down to one operative paragraph, which was the second in the draft before the meeting. The first and prefatory paragraph, however, had been left unaltered, and it would probably be advisable to modify it a little.

MR. LANSING enquired whether it would not be best to omit it entirely.

M. PICHON observed that the portion to which Mr. Lansing took exception was really the last two clauses. He would suggest that these be omitted and that the remainder of paragraph 1 be maintained.

MR. LANSING expressed his assent to this.

BARON MAKINO enquired whether the principle of the open door thus laid down applied with equal force to Allied States who were not signatories of the Algeciras Act.

M. PICHON said that it did, but that special Conventions with each country not signatory of the Algeciras Convention would be required.

MR. LANSING asked what would be the situation with regard to Spain.

M. PICHON said that France had special agreements with Spain which would have to be revised after the report of the Commission.

The following Resolution was then adopted:

> "The Supreme Council of the Allies, after hearing the statement made by the French Government of its claims against Germany regarding Morocco, considers that in the Peace Treaty all servitudes of an international character, to which that country was subjected as a result of German intervention, should be cancelled.
>
> "Consequently the Supreme Council, taking note of the declarations of the French Government regarding the maintenance of the 'open door' in Morocco, that is to say economic, commercial and industrial equality for all the Allied nations, in consideration of their surrender of all servitudes of

an international character, entrusts a commission, on which Belgium, France, United States, Great Britain, Italy and Portugal, allied powers signatories of the Algeciras Convention shall be represented, with the task of examining the provisions, it will be necessary to introduce to that end in the Treaty of Peace, in accordance with the proposal of the French Government."

The following nominations were made to the Commission:—

For Great Britain	Mr. Akers-Douglas
" United States of America	Mr. Beer
" France	M. de Peretti
" Italy	(reserved)

It was further decided that the other Powers to be represented on the Commission should be asked by the Secretary General to designate their members.

(6) M. TARDIEU said that he represented both the Committee on Danish Affairs and the Central Co-ordinating Committee for Territorial Adjustments. He would therefore be able to answer questions that might arise regarding the Report of the Committee which had been accepted with two small alterations by the Co-ordinating Committee. Report of Committee on Danish Affairs

MR. BALFOUR said that he had two questions to ask which related to the procedure adopted by the Committee. If he understood the procedure aright, the plan adopted was to divide the contested country into three zones. In the first zone there was to be a plebiscite the result of which was known beforehand. He had no criticism to make regarding that. It might even be possible to proceed without a plebiscite. In regard to the other two zones, the first question that arose in his mind was why two, seeing that both were to be treated roughly in the same manner. Voting was not to be conducted over the whole area, but commune by commune. Each of these small units was to be treated as an entity, and asked to declare under which

sovereign state it wished to live. The probable result would be that the map when drawn according to the decisions of the local communities would present a piebald appearance. One commune might like to be German, and its neighbour Danish. The Committee apparently was quite reconciled to this, and was prepared to proceed with the plebiscite, even should a continuous belt of communes adopt German nationality and thereby interpose an uninterrupted German area between two Danish areas. He alluded to the third paragraph on page 6 of the report. In addition to this, one of the communes to be consulted was Flensburg. The history of Flensburg was, as he understood it, that when Denmark in 1863 had lost these territories to Germany, the latter had made a great effort to convert Flensburg into a big port with a large shipbuilding industry. For this purpose German workmen had been imported and the population at the present time was more German than Danish. As regards Flensburg, therefore, the result of a referendum might be safely anticipated, that Flensburg would doubtless declare for Germany. No doubt this was a difficult case, presenting difficulties that were bound to arise elsewhere. It would in many parts of the world be necessary to modify the ethnological principle by geographical and economic considerations. It had seemed to him that confusion would be increased and difficulties doubled by first offering votes to the population, and after recording the result of their votes, disregarding it. Would it not be better to say beforehand that there were certain considerations which must outweigh national sentiments, rather than by consulting the latter to make it almost impossible to allege the former. He felt sure the Committee had considered these points, and he would be glad to hear in what manner M. Tardieu would deal with these comments.

M. TARDIEU said that the problem had not been raised by the Allied and Associated Powers. It had been raised by Denmark. The Danish Government itself was responsible for the system of consultation by zones. The Committee had realised that the results foreseen by Mr. Balfour were likely to come about. It was clear that, as Germans and Danes were much mixed up in South Schleswig, some Germans would have to be incorporated in Denmark. This trouble was in the very nature of things, and could not be cured by any Committee.

Mr. Balfour's question was whether the Committee had not made the trouble worse by suggesting that votes should be taken commune by commune. It had been thought that by this method Denmark would gain more areas of Danish nationality than by an indiscriminate referendum to the country as a whole. Denmark had shown great timidity in making its claims. Central Schleswig was so saturated with Germans that a vote taken over the whole area might attribute the country to Germany, whereas a proportion of the communes might, if consulted in isolation, find the courage to assert their Danish sympathies. Once the Communes had voted, the International Commission which would be sent to the spot to work out the frontier in detail, would at least have a basis to work on. As to Flensburg, the majority of the inhabitants were admittedly German. There was, nevertheless, an important Danish element, and it was possible that the economic argument would touch even the German residents in Flensburg. Should the hinterland be assigned to Denmark, it might appear to them more profitable to throw in their lot with the Danes than to maintain their national connection with Germany. In any case, perfection could not be expected in this or in any other instance of mixed populations which the Conference had to disentangle. The idea of dividing the country into two zones had emanated from the Danes, and the Committee had not thought it right to refuse them satisfaction, as this method seemed likely to win for Denmark a greater number of adherents than any other. As to the third zone, this had been suggested by the Committee. It was thought that fear of Germany had so long and so deeply affected the population in Southern Schleswig that it would be desirable to encourage the people to express their mind freely by presenting them with the results of a referendum in the areas to the North; thus the plebiscite in the first zone would precede that in the second, and the third would not be consulted until the other two had expressed their will. This might produce sufficient confidence for national feelings to assert themselves in the third zone.

MR. LANSING said that he had a question to put: If in the Southern portion of the second zone a row of communes opted for Germany, was it proposed to proceed with the consultation of the population in the third zone? The situation that might result would be a continuous

line of German communes, separating two contingents of Danish Communes from each other.

M. TARDIEU said it must not be assumed and, in fact, it was not likely, that a continuous row of communes in the area referred to by Mr. Lansing would all adopt German nationality. It was possible that a few at one or other extremity of the line would do so: in consequence the frontier instead of running more or less straight from east to west would follow a more sinuous line diagonally. At any rate the local International Commission would have to deal with the situation and it was not necessary to prejudge its decisions.

MR. LANSING said that he was satisfied with this reply and was prepared to accept the Report.

M. LAROCHE drew attention to Article 2 of the Report which empowered the International Commission to take into account geographical and economic conditions. What had led the Committee to establish the third zone was the information received that many people in that area had Danish sympathies but dared not express them out of fear of Germany.

BARON SONNINO observed that the arrangement by which voting in the second zone was to precede voting in the third zone by a fortnight was obviously artificial. As the voting was being conducted by communes would it not be as well that the voting in both areas should synchronize?

M. TARDIEU said that this arrangement was justified by the moral condition of the country. The people had been long oppressed and were still unprepared to express their real preferences, unless encouraged. It was hoped that the second zone in its voting would give an example to the third.

Mr. BALFOUR said that he could resume his objections in two sentences. It was universally agreed that frontiers could not be made exclusively on ethnological grounds, but if a vote had been taken which was intended to reveal ethnological realities, it was difficult to upset it on any other consideration. Secondly, a system was being

adopted in this area which was not being adopted elsewhere, for instance, in fixing the limits of Poland and Bohemia. An awkward question could certainly be asked in regard to this discrepancy. The only answer available was apparently that the Danish Government had asked the Conference to adopt this method in this instance.

M. TARDIEU said that he would attempt to answer in as few words. To put the matter quite frankly, the Committee had feared that there might prove to be a majority for Germany between the red and blue lines on the map. They hoped that by consulting the people commune by commune this result might be averted. As to Mr. Balfour's second objection, he had no answer and the difficulty had occurred to him before.

MR. BALFOUR doubted whether the Meeting could adopt the Report of the Committee. He thought the best course would be to forward it to the Supreme Council with the arguments adduced for and against.

MR. LANSING said that he assumed that any resolution of the Meeting must be *ad referendum* to the Supreme Council.

The Report of the Committee on Danish Affairs was approved in principle, *ad referendum* to the Supreme Council, with the reservations expressed by Mr. Balfour.

BARON SONNINO reserved approval as in his view the case could not be dealt with in isolation but must be considered in connection with all other territorial settlements.

(The Meeting then adjourned until the following Tuesday afternoon.)

PARIS, 28th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

TRADE WITH GERMAN AUSTRIA

Resolution Forwarded by Supreme Economic Council to Supreme War Council

In accordance with the decision of the Superior Blockade Council at its Meeting of March 12th (see Minutes No. 26) the C.B.O.[4] has examined and discussed the methods of control to establish in case of resumption of trade with German Austria. It was decided to submit to the Superior Blockade Council the following propositions:

[*] ARTICLE 1. The importation of the following products, of which the importation into Bulgaria is forbidden, shall also be forbidden into German-Austria. The exportation from Austria of the same products shall also be forbidden.

Aircraft of all kinds including aeroplanes, airships, balloons and their component parts, together with accessories and articles suitable for use in connection with aircraft.
Apparatus which can be used for the storage of [*or*] projection of compressed or liquefied gases, flame, acids or other destructive agents capable of use in warlike operations, and their component parts.
Armour plates.
Armoured motor cars.
Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes and their component parts.
Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting same.
Camp Equipment. Camp equipment articles of, and their component parts.
Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.
Electrical appliances, adapted for use in the war, and their component parts.
Explosives specially prepared for use in war.
Field glasses.
Gases tor war purposes.
Guns and machine guns.
Gunmountings.
Limbers, military wagons of all descriptions.
Harness or Horse equipments of a military character.
Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war or for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land or sea.
Mines, submarines and their component parts.

Projectiles, charges, cartridges and grenades of all kinds and their component parts.
Range finders and their component parts.
Searchlights and their component parts.
Submarine Sound Signalling apparatus.
Materials for wireless telegraphs.
Torpedoes.
Warships, including boats and their component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.

ARTICLE 2. All other commodities can be freely imported into Austria.

ARTICLE 3. The re-exportation by Austria & Hungary to Germany of the following commodities shall be forbidden except under special authorization of the Interallied Commission at Innsbruck:

ARTICLE 4. Austria can import from Germany only those commodities which Germany has been authorised to export.

ARTICLE 5. The C. B. O. suggests that the Financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council shall examine the conditions under which exportation from Germany to Austria of other commodities can be made.

ARTICLE 6. The C. B. O. is of the opinion that it is necessary to establish a control on the Bavarian Frontier.

ARTICLE 7. The control shall be exercised by an Interallied Commission which will sit at Innsbruck. The composition of this Commission shall be decided upon by agreement between the Associated Governments.

ARTICLE 8. To carry out this control the Innsbruck Commission will place at the railway station and at points of communication on the Bavarian Frontier agents who will have the necessary power to examine, and, in case of need, cause to be stopped the prohibited traffic. These agents will obtain control and communicate to the

Innsbruck Commission any relevant documents and statistics of the Customs Railways and Steamships Authorities.

The Austrian Customs shall, at the request of these agents, take all preventive and penal measures necessary both as regards exportation and importation.

ARTICLE 9. The Innsbruck Commission will receive its instructions from the C. B. O., which itself is under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Blockade Council.

The Innsbruck Commission will, however, be given all latitude to not [*act*] within the limits of the above authority. In case of doubt or divergence, it shall immediately refer the question to the C. B. O., which it will keep regularly informed of its operations and of the results of its activities.

Annexure "B"

Telegram No. 6211 from Rome

Newspapers publish the following text of the Proclamation of the Bano of Croatia, published by the official Newspaper of Zagabria, the *Narodna Novi:—*

> The Bano of Croatia and Slavonia in compliance with the Decree issued by the Council of Serbian Ministers at Belgrade directs:—
>
> 1. That all trade with enemy countries, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Hungary, Bulgaria, shall be stopped.
> 2. All importation of goods for Italy, and the exportation of goods from Italy, across territories occupied by us, is prohibited:
> 3. A similar embargo is placed on the transit through our territory of goods from enemy countries directed to Italy, as likewise the transit of goods from Italy to enemy countries—all transit across (our) occupied territory is prohibited. This

prohibition shall be applied without regard to the circumstances of origin of [*or?*] destination of the goods.

4. The exportation of goods from the Kingdom to occupied territories is allowed when same are required for the needs of the local population, and are not intended for exportation to Italy, or for the requirements of the Italian troops. Meanwhile publicity is given to this Decree and the liquidation and severance is recommended of all business with the said countries, which are excluded from trade relations.
5. All the Railway and Military and Civil Police Authorities, especially of the Stations of Buccari and Koprivnica, have received orders to prevent the importation of goods from Italy or exportation to Italy even in cases where proper transport permits have been issued. They have received similar orders to prevent the transit of goods from enemy countries directed to Italy, through our territory, and the transit of goods directed from Italy to enemy countries.

(Signed) **Dr. John Paleck**, *Bano*

Annexure "C"

ESTHONIA

Resolution by the Supreme Economic Council

At the Meeting of the Supreme Economic Council held on Monday, 24th March, 1919, the following resolution presented by the Blockade Section was approved for submission to the Supreme War Council:—

WHEREAS it is desirable that reasonable quantities of commodities should be permitted to reach Esthonia,

RESOLVED that subject to guarantees being given that no imported commodities and no articles manufactured therefrom will be exported to Germany and Bolshevik Russia,

1. Applications for permission to ship commodities to Esthonia shall be made to and decided by, the Allied Blockade Council in London, except in so far as such shipments are made from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland.
2. The Inter-Allied Trading Committees in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland shall be authorised to endorse licences for the export of commodities from these countries respectively to Esthonia and shall notify the Allied Blockade Council of the exports affected under this arrangement in order that the rations of the exporting countries may be credited to the extent of the exports made.
3. The Allied Blockade Council shall be requested to prepare at once an estimate of the quarterly requirement of Esthonia in the matter of foodstuffs and most important raw materials, based in the case of foodstuffs on the instructions of the Food Section and in the case of other commodities upon the best material available.
4. The Inter-Allied Trading Committees in the Northern Neutral Countries shall be requested to authorise exports to their respective countries from Esthonia.
5. The Allied Blockade Council shall be empowered if they consider it necessary to set up an Inter-Allied Trading Committee at Revel.
6. The announcement of these arrangements to be made on the 1st April, 1919.

NOTE:—In the event of the above Resolution being approved it will be necessary for the Naval Authorities to issue appropriate instructions regarding the passage of trade to and from Revel.

[2] A correction to FM–2a (constituting a brief summary of the minutes given in full as FM–2), dated March 29, 1919, reads thus:

"The resolution of the Supreme Economic Council was approved, insofar as it concerned German-Austria, with a reservation by Baron Sonnino, subject to the receipt of a satisfactory reply by the Jugo-Slavs to M. Pichon's inquiry.

The question as relating to Hungary was, however, referred back to the Supreme Economic Council."

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

[4] Abbreviation for *Comité du Blocus de l'Orient* (Committee on Blockade of the East).

[*] NOTE: This list is drawn short on the assumption that the Allied Military Authorities will be in a position satisfactorily to supervise the factories capable of producing munitions of war. [Footnote in the original.]

April 1, 3 p.m. (FM–3)

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[33] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, April 1st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/3

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/3

FM–3

[Document 33]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, April 1st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Mr. Shotwell
Secretary	Mr. Dulles
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Robinson
British Empire	Mr. Seymour
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	British Empire
Secretaries	Item 2
Mr. H. Norman	Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	Sir M. Delevingne
France	Item 3
M. Pichon	Sir Eyre Crowe
M. Tardieu	Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Secretaries	Lt. Comdr. J. G. Latham
M. Berthelot	France
M. Arnavon	M. Cambon
M. de Bearn	M. Hermitte
Italy	M. Laroche
H. E., Baron Sonnino	Japan
Secretary-General	M. Oka
Count Aldrovandi	
Secretary	

M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E., Baron Makino
Secretary-General
M. Otchiai
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY	Lt. Zanchi
JAPAN	M. Saburi

Interpreter:—M. de Cammerlynck.

1. Arrangements for Meeting the Germans M. PICHON said that he had been asked to defer the first question on the Agenda as M. Clemenceau proposed to raise the question in the Council of Four.

2. Proposed Plenary Conference to Consider Report of the Commission on Labour MR. LANSING said that it seemed to him to be more suitable that the heads of Governments should decide whether or not a Plenary Session should be held. It would be possible however for the Meeting to consider the question and make a recommendation, but it was a matter of high policy.

MR. BALFOUR said that the alternatives were to decide on the holding of a Plenary Conference without consulting the heads of Governments; or on the merits of the report itself to recommend the holding of such a Conference.

MR. BARNES said that on behalf of the Labour Commission he was not asking the Meeting to discuss the merits of the report. He was

the bearer of a message from the Commission—a message already transmitted some time ago through the Secretary of the Conference before the departure of Mr. Gompers[1] —to the effect that the report of the Commission be heard by the body which had set up the Commission, namely the Peace Conference. Since the framing of the report certain amendments had been suggested and without the authority of the Peace Conference the Commission could not reassemble to deal with them.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether Mr. Barnes proposed a debate in the Plenary Session on controversial questions. This appeared to him a very alarming prospect.

MR. BARNES said that the procedure in the Plenary Conference would probably be very similar to what had taken place regarding the League of Nations. The main result would be that due publicity would be given to the subject. This would lead to the suggestion of useful amendments which the Commission might then be asked to study.

M. PICHON thought that the method proposed by Mr. Barnes would be satisfactory as providing both for the ventilation of the subject desired by Mr. Barnes and also for the discussion of any changes that might be suggested, not in the Plenary Session as feared by Mr. Balfour, but in the Commission itself.

BARON MAKINO said that he wished to make an observation on this point. The Japanese expert Delegates had from time to time as the Convention was discussed, expressed their opinion and made reservations. Among the points in reserve were some which were very important for Japan, and on the solution of these points Japan's final attitude to the Convention depended. If there was to be a serious discussion, the Japanese Delegates would ask for the earliest opportunity to express their views regarding these reservations. Labour conditions in Japan were very different from those prevailing in Europe and America. Japan had a large and growing population, and a narrow field for its energies. The result was a relative insufficiency of employment and comparatively low wages. The object of the Labour Conference was to establish throughout the

world uniform standards. These standards in some respects were very remote from those at present prevailing in Japan. Should they be enforced in Japan the result might be a destruction of Japanese industries. Though there was a clause providing for the ratification of the Conference by the various Powers concerned, it was a foregone conclusion as matters now stood that many would not be able to adopt the standard proposed. Japan would be in a very difficult position unless some proviso were introduced permitting some elasticity in the application of the principles set out in the draft Convention. Failing this, Japan would not be able to accept the Convention.

MR. BARNES said that Baron Makino's statement strengthened the request for a Plenary Meeting. The Japanese Delegation wished to put in proposals after the passing of the report. It might be suggested that the Commission should discuss these proposals. To this the Commission would reply that it had no authority to reassemble until its report had been submitted to the body which had entrusted the task to it.

BARON SONNINO said that the procedure suggested by Mr. Barnes might be a little dangerous if used as a precedent. Mr. Barnes said that the Commission could not examine amendments made after its report had been concluded, until reauthorised to meet and do so by the Peace Conference. On the other hand, it was regarded as undesirable that the debate should take place in the Conference itself. But if all the amendments were to be brought up in the Conference, a debate could not be prevented. If discussion took place in the Conference, great delay would ensue. He therefore suggested that when any Delegation presented amendments, the Commission dealing with the subject should examine them, and present a supplementary report. Otherwise, a discussion in the Conference itself leading to further discussions in the Commission would conduce only to waste of time.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed with Baron Sonnino. It was desirable to avoid setting a precedent in so cumbersome a method of procedure. Other Commissions would also make reports subject to reservations by one or other of the Delegates whose counter

proposals could be appended to the report as memoranda and then referred to the Peace Conference. In respect to publicity he did not think there was much to seek, as "The Times" of the previous day had published the whole report. In this connection he wished to draw attention once more to the constant leakage that occurred from the various Commissions. From this he wished to exclude the Committee on Responsibilities over which he presided, and to every member of which he had explained that he would be held personally responsible for any news he might divulge to the Press.

MR. BARNES explained that the Commission as such had no amendment or reservations to deal with, and for that reason no ground or authority for reassembling.

MR. LANSING said that this might be so but his suggestion was that the framers of any amendments subsequent to the acceptance of the report should append them to the report.

BARON SONNINO said that this would not prevent discussion at the Conference.

MR. LANSING agreed that it was quite impossible to do so.

BARON SONNINO remarked that to offer the Conference conflicting conclusions was to force the Conference to indulge in a debate.

MR. BARNES said that what had been said regarding publicity was entirely in favour of the holding of a Plenary Meeting. The draft of the Commission's Report was coming out piecemeal in the Press. It would be far better that all newspapers should obtain the whole report at once. Indiscretions had occurred in "The Times" but "The Times" was not read by workmen. It was the desire of the Commission that workmen throughout the world should have a chance of knowing the whole of the Commission's proposals, and of discussing them. After general criticism and the suggestion of amendments by the Japanese and others, the Commission could meet again just as the Commission of the League of Nations had done.

MR. LANSING proposed that the Commission should publish its report and thus save a Plenary Meeting.

MR. BARNES said that this would not satisfy the Commission as the papers would not give the same prominence to the report of a Commission as to the report of a Plenary Conference.

MR. LANSING said that he was strongly opposed to the holding of a Plenary Conference at this stage, unless the report were accompanied by all the amendments proposed.

M. PICHON enquired whether Mr. Barnes had any objection to annexing to the report of the Commission any modification that might be suggested by the Japanese Delegates or others.

MR. BARNES said that the labour question was one of the most important submitted to the Peace Conference. He thought, therefore that it should be given a prominent place in the Agenda. To speak quite plainly, the work of the Commission had been shelved. The Commission had sat for two months and had failed to secure the attention of the Peace Conference for the result of its work. The whole world was in a ferment and very largely on this very question. Late events in Hungary pointed the moral. He thought it was most important to issue this report in the most striking manner possible, in order to convince the world that the Peace Conference was taking the labour question seriously. Working men all over the world should have their attention aroused, and be stimulated to consider and criticise the Commission's proposals. The alternative was merely to issue the report of the Commission to the newspapers. He did not think that without the Plenary Meeting all the newspapers would print it.

MR. LANSING said that he had a suggestion to offer which might, he hoped, meet Mr. Barnes' views. He quite agreed with Mr. Barnes that prominence should be given to the Report of the Commission but there were many other Commissions, all of which regarded their work as of great importance to the world and so indeed it was. His suggestion was, therefore, that each Commission should print its Report and circulate it to all the delegations represented at the Peace

Conference. These delegations, after considering the Reports, would reach their own conclusions and ultimately present them in concrete form at the discussion which must ultimately take place in the plenary session, the powers of which could not be limited or eliminated.

MR. BARNES said that, if he understood this suggestion aright, it was that the Commission should circulate a certain number of copies of its Report before the meeting of the Plenary Conference. Copies were to be sent to plenipotentiaries alone. This could be done in a day; but unless the Plenary Conference were held promptly, the Conference would be liable to the charge of refusing to make open covenants openly. The Plenary Conference would gather in the end and make its decisions before the labour world outside had had an opportunity of discussing the proposals.

MR. LANSING said that this would result in keeping the question open for months until all the labour organizations in the world had digested the puzzle.

MR. BALFOUR thought that nothing would be gained by bringing the matter before the plenary session at the present stage. It was quite true that the question was bound to be discussed at sometime in the plenary session. But in the case of the League of Nations there had been a very limited discussion. Big speeches had been made by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and others. The Conference which had no very clear ideas on the subject had adopted the general principles and left the details to be worked out by the Commission. On this subject, however, there would be a long debate which might not be concluded in the course of one afternoon. Neither could he anticipate any advantage from the discussion of the amendments in a plenary session. On the other hand, he could see great force in Mr. Barnes' main contention which was not concerned only with technical questions of procedure. Mr. Barnes feared that among the multiform interests dealt with by the Conference prominence would not be given to labour questions which high expediency rendered desirable. He thought this point sufficiently important to be submitted to the Prime Ministers. He therefore suggested that the views expressed should be summarised and that they should be

asked to decide whether the small inconveniences arising from the holding of a plenary conference should not be made to yield to the greater interest of displaying to the world the work that was being done in Paris to satisfy the needs of labour. The Secretaries might be asked to give a brief summary of the points at issue and to submit them to the Meeting of the Heads of Governments.

BARON SONNINO said that he thought the Meeting was agreed on two points (*a*) that some publicity was required. Such publicity would be better if general than if brought about by indiscretions of "The Times". This matter it was within the discretion of the Meeting to decide, (*b*) The Summoning of a plenary session of the Conference immediately or at a later stage was a matter presenting a political aspect of some importance. It should therefore be determined by the Heads of Governments. He would further add that if publicity was given to the Report, it should equally be given to the reservations or amendments made by Japan.

MR. BARNES said that he wished to make a final appeal to the Meeting to have the Report of the Commission published in the most striking manner possible, in order to arouse the interest of labour throughout the world. By the procedure which it seemed the Meeting was inclined to favour, the work of the Labour Commission would taper off to an inglorious end. So important had it seemed to the Commission to avoid delay that it had decided that a Labour Congress should be held at Washington during the year. An Agenda for this Congress had even been prepared. This Agenda contained such questions as the 8-hour day or its equivalent, the employment of women at night, the use of poisonous processes and other serious questions, the preparation of which involved lengthy enquiries in many Countries. These enquiries would be hampered by the complication of languages and in some countries by the lack of organized Labour Ministries. If further delays were imposed, it would be impossible to get this mass of work done before the meeting of the Congress. As to the amendments suggested to the Report, unless the Commission received a mandate from the Plenary Conference, it would be unable to deal with them and to begin working the convention within the year.

BARON SONNINO said that the proposals he had made had not diminished the importance of the publicity in any manner. He proposed that full publicity for the Report should be authorised at once. This would stir public interest and the question would come before the Conference with all the added zest of public discussion. Should a plenary meeting be summoned at once, little advantage would result. A discussion would be immediate, no doubt, but interest was at present chiefly concentrated on territorial questions. It would be better, therefore, to ask for the decision of the Heads of Governments.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed that publicity was desirable for the report of the Commission, but the precise form of publicity desired by Mr. Barnes could not be granted without consent of the Heads of Governments. Mr. Barnes thought that if the Heads of Governments did not take his view the Commission would not have power to consider the amendments proposed. This might be cured by directing the Commission to deal with any amendment brought forward whether by Governments or by spontaneous suggestions provoked by publication. The Commission could then take up any such question as it thought fit on its own initiative.

BARON MAKINO said that the Japanese Delegation had attended meetings of the Commission at which from time to time various articles of the Convention had been modified. This had entailed continual telegraphing to Japan and inevitable delay in framing the final proposals of the Japanese Government. He was now, however, in a position to give the final views of Japan. If the Heads of Governments were to make a decision on this matter, he would ask that he be empowered to explain the peculiar position of Japan to them personally.

M. PICHON said that he would transmit to the Heads of Governments Baron Makino's request.

MR. LANSING said that he understood it was agreed that the report would be circulated at once by the Secretary-General to all Delegations and that it would be published at once.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON suggested that if the Japanese Delegate was to go in person to the meeting of the Heads of Governments, Mr. Barnes should also be authorised to go in person, as representing the Labour Commission.

The following statement to be forwarded to the meeting of the Heads of Governments was then adopted:

> That the Prime Ministers be moved to decide whether they consider that the report of the Commission on Labour should be laid before the Conference at a plenary session in the immediate future, in addition to copies being sent to all the delegates, as was authorized.
>
> The view set forth at this meeting by Mr. Barnes, the British Delegate, is that it is of the highest importance to secure the fullest publicity for the conclusions of the Commission; he considers that only a plenary session can ensure that the decisions taken concerning the international regulation of Labour should produce the requisite impression on public opinion throughout the world.
>
> Mr. Lansing considers that a plenary session of the Conference would add nothing to the publicity which would be secured by the distribution of the papers to the different Delegates and to the Press. He also considers that a discussion at a plenary session would involve delay. If, after an exhaustive study of the report by the Delegates a plenary session is demanded, the question of holding one can be usefully raised.
>
> Should the Prime Ministers decide not to adopt the plan of an immediate plenary session, it would be necessary to give the Commission new instructions without which it could not resume its labours.

Baron Makino, wishing to present reservations in the name of Japan, desires to be present at the meeting of the Prime Ministers at which this question will be examined.

It was proposed that Mr. Barnes should also attend this meeting as the representative of the Commission on Labour.

MR. BARNES said that he was not satisfied with this decision as he had been charged by the Commission to ask for a plenary session of the Conference.

(At this stage Mr. Barnes and his colleagues withdrew.)

Report of the Czecho-Slovak Commission MR. LANSING suggested that only that part of the report dealing with the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany should be considered, as it was desired to collect all the elements of a preliminary treaty with Germany. The boundaries between Czecho-Slovakia and other countries might be considered at a later stage.

M. SONNINO agreed to this procedure.

M. CAMBON said that the task of the Commission had been one of considerable intricacy. It has attempted to do justice to ethnic claims but economic and strategic considerations had also to be given weight as a purely racial frontier would have left Czecho-Slovakia defenceless and economically crippled. He did not propose to explain the frontier in minute detail, as many points had been left to the decision of the Frontier Commission which would ultimately be sent to mark the boundaries. The Eastern point of contact with Germany began at Neustadt.

MR. BALFOUR observed that it could not be laid down as certain that this would be the point of contact between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany until the frontier between Poland and Germany had been fixed.

M. CAMBON said that the Commission had framed certain proposals regarding Teschen and Ratibor, but had found that its recommendations did not accord with those made by the Polish

Commission at Warsaw. These areas were therefore reserved, pending a joint session of representatives of the Committee on Polish Affairs and of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak questions, which, it was hoped, would be able to harmonise the views of both. In any case it was probable that the point of contact of Germany would be in the region of Neustadt. The boundary from this place westward followed as a rule the old administrative boundary along the mountains. Some alteration of this line, however, was recommended near Glatz. The red line on the map indicated the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Commission had not thought it right to grant them, but by diminishing the salient made by the German territory surrounding Glatz, had improved the strategic position of the new State in this quarter.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether this modification transferred a German population to Bohemia.

M. CAMBON replied that the population transferred was not numerous.

MR. LANSING asked whether the reservations made by the American delegates applied to this area or not.

M. CAMBON said that they did not apply to this area.

MR. LANSING thought that the reservations had a general character and a general application. The American Delegates objected to the whole method of drawing frontier lines on strategic principles.

M. CAMBON said that it was not strategic interests but considerations of national defence that guided the Commission.

MR. LANSING enquired whether there was any difference.

M. CAMBON replied that he had himself heard President Wilson declare that the new States should be set up under conditions which would enable them to survive. The Commission had been entrusted with the task of setting up a new State in Central Europe. This State had perforce an odd shape, its territory was so narrow as to run the risk of being over-run at the very outset of hostilities. It was for this

reason that the Commission had thought it advisable to reduce the glacis surrounding Glatz.

MR. LANSING said he did not wish to debate the question of Glatz. He wished, however, to point out that the fixing of frontier lines with a view to their military strength and in contemplation of war was directly contrary to the whole spirit of the League of Nations, of international disarmament, and of the policy of the United States as set forth in the declarations of President Wilson.

M. CAMBON, in reply, said that the report would reveal that the American delegates had not made any general reservations. They had only made two reservations on special points, to which he would refer later. It was not his province to discuss general policy, but he thought he might be allowed to say that the ethnological principle was not the only one the Commission was to apply. If a nation was to be composed strictly according to the national sentiments of each village, the result would be a country as discontinuous as the spots on a panther's skin. Such, he presumed, was not the result the Conference desired the Commission to recommend. The Commission had received deputations from many localities requesting the constitution of numberless small republics on the pattern of San Marino and Andorra. He assumed that the Conference did not wish this tendency encouraged, especially in Central Europe, where national security was not well established.

M. Cambon, continuing, said that there was not much to say about the line traced to the West of the Glatz salient until it reached the neighbourhood of Reichenberg. At this point the Commission had ceded a salient of territory surrounding Friedland to Germany, though it had previously been Austrian territory. This was done as a compensation for the ground lost by Germany near Glatz. Germany, moreover, gained the advantage of holding the railway from Zittau to the North, and therefore gained more than she lost. Further West, near Romburg, the Bohemian frontier made a bulge into Germany. The majority of the Commission, namely, the British, French and Italian delegates, had been in favour of maintaining the old administrative line. The American delegate, however, had made a reservation on this point.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Cambon to explain for what reasons the Commission had decided to leave the salient within Bohemia.

M. CAMBON said that there were historical reasons for doing so.

MR. LANSING observed that in this salient there were 90,000 Germans and no Czechs.

M. CAMBON replied that the Commission had come to the conclusion that nature had so clearly marked the outlines of the country that it was undesirable to alter them without very cogent reasons. Further, it had thought it inadvisable to make a gratuitous offer to Germany of additional population, and thereby to create a precedent for the attribution of other Austro-Germans to the main federation.

MR. LANSING remarked that the Commission had, nevertheless, done this in respect of Friedland. He further pointed out that the line recommended by the American Delegation was a better geographical line than that proposed by the majority of the Commission.

M. CAMBON said that the majority had thought it reasonable to follow the old administrative border, which roughly followed the crests of the hills and had seen no sufficient reasons for disturbing the habits of the people formed by long connection with the administrative unit of Bohemia.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Commission would approve of a plebiscite in this area.

M. LAROCHE said that this question had been raised in the Commission, which, after consideration, had decided that a plebiscite could not be proposed in an isolated salient without extending it to the remainder of the German Bohemians. If this were done, the Czecho-Slovak State would be reduced to very slender proportions.

MR. LANSING observed that this was not a good reason to justify an injustice.

M. LAROCHE denied that an injustice was being done. The inhabitants of these regions were accustomed to live in close connection with the rest of Bohemia, and did not desire separation. Moreover, the German colonisation was of recent date. The result of the policy suggested by Mr. Lansing might be that the whole of Bohemia would elect to join Germany in order not to be separated from the German-Bohemians.

M. CAMBON said that there was little to remark about the boundaries further West up to Asch. This place the Czecho-Slovak Government had agreed to give up. The Commission took note of this, but the American Delegation desired to cut off a considerable salient in addition. The British, French and Italian delegates had not concurred, and had thought it better to leave the people in this area in their old entourage.

MR. LANSING observed that in the two salients discussed the line drawn by the American Delegation cut four railroads whereas that adopted by the other delegations cut ten. In the last salient mentioned there were 175,000 Germans and 3,000 Czechs. As far as he was able to judge, there was no valid reason against assigning this salient to Germany. Bohemia would lose nothing essential. There were in it some lignite mines, producing 7 per cent of the lignite in Bohemia, but as Bohemia exported lignite it was clear that it could get on without these mines.

M. CAMBON said that it was for the defence of Bohemia that the Commission had decided to keep the railway lines alluded to by Mr. Lansing within Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. LANSING said that he made reservations on this point.

M. PICHON said that on behalf of France, he also had reservations to make. He could not allow Germany to be fortified by populations taken from what had been Austrian Dominions, taken, moreover, from Bohemia, which, he trusted, would remain an Ally of France, and handed over to Germany, which, as far as he was concerned, still remained a country to be feared. If America refused to take into

account considerations of national defence, France was not in a position to neglect them.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Pichon had noted that in yielding Friedland to Germany the Commission had reinforced Germany by 60,000 inhabitants.

M. PICHON said that he was not prepared to generalise this practice.

M. CAMBON observed that this was done in compensation for the readjustment of the frontier near Glatz. He further pointed out that the railways at Eger were all directed towards Czecho-Slovakia. They were lines of penetration and any power commanding the junction would have control of the lines.

The boundary further South called for no special remark.

(Further Discussion on the Commission's Report was deferred until a solution of the differences between that Committee and the Committee on Polish Affairs had been adjusted.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 2nd April, 1919.

[1] Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor and United States representative on the Commission on International Labor Legislation.

April 15, 3 p.m. (FM–4)

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[34] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 15th April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/4

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/4

FM–4

[Document 34]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 15th April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 15, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT	ALSO PRESENT
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. R. Lansing	Mr. Davis
Secretary	Mr. Scott
Mr. L. Harrison	Major Kountz, Captain Smith } For Question 1 only.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Dr. Williams, Mr. Beer, Capt. Hornbeck } For Questions onwards
The Rt. Hon. Sir R. Borden	BRITISH EMPIRE
Lord Hardinge	Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Secretaries	Mr. L. C. Christie
Mr. H. Norman	FRANCE
Mr. E. Phipps	General Weygand
FRANCE	M. Fromageot
M. Pichon	M. Lasteyrie
Secretaries	ITALY
M. Berthelot	M. Ricci-Busatti
M. de Bearn	M. Piacentini

M. de Peretti
Cdr. de St. Quentin
ITALY
Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E., Baron Makino
Secretary
M. H. Ashida

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. PICHON declared the Meeting open, and said that the Agenda of the Meeting had been circulated, together with a large number of draft articles relating thereto. With the approval of the Meeting he proposed to take up the various questions in regular sequence. Cost of Allied Army of Occupation in Rhenish Districts

The first question dealt with the cost of the Allied Armies of Occupation in the Rhenish Districts. He would call upon General Weygand to make an explanatory statement.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that Marshal Foch had circulated to all the Missions a note concerning the expenses of the troops of the Armies of Occupation in the Rhenish districts. The paper gave full details in

regard to the manner in which the estimates had been drawn up, and the manner in which payments should be made by the Germans. An Inter-Allied Sub-Commission had been convened at Spa and to it had been entrusted the duty of determining the extent of the obligations for which Germany was liable by virtue of the Second Paragraph of the Armistice Convention.[1]

The Sub-Committee had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the reckoning of the expenses should be fixed at the rate of an average daily sum per officer, per man and per beast. In arriving at this figure it had been agreed that all possible charges should be included; that is to say, not only the actual maintenance charges, but also pays, transport charges and upkeep. As a result, it was found that the total expenses would amount to a comparatively high figure, more than 600 million francs a month, and they would therefore probably reach a sum of about three milliards of francs at the end of the fifth month of occupation. Marshal Foch had been struck by the high figures of these costs, and had come to the conclusion that they should properly be divided into two parts: a first part to include the actual cost of maintenance, and the items which the Allied and Associated Armies, when they entered the Rhineland, would have had the right to demand, by levies on local resources, and apart from lodging and billeting, the ordinary supplies and provisions necessary to satisfy their immediate wants. This first part should be immediately payable by the German Government. A second part would include all other expenses, such as general items of maintenance, transportation, salaries, and such other items as were properly a part of the cost of the war in general, and should be reckoned under war costs, subject to arrangement in a special order in proportion to their urgency. Accordingly, Marshal Foch had asked the Sub-Commission to enquire whether it would not be desirable to limit the cost of maintenance to be at once claimed from Germany to the amount representing the keep of the men and beasts and to that of billeting, charging the other expenses under the head of war costs, and in his report to the Governments, the Marshal had clearly shown what should be the distribution of the total of those two categories of expenses between the different armies. It was only right to state that the conclusion so reached by Marshal Foch was not based on the unanimous decision of the members of the sub-commission, and that

various delegates had dissented from his recommendations, as would be seen from perusal of the Minutes of their Meetings.

M. LASTEYRIE said that the matter had been submitted to the Financial Committee, and that the latter had passed the following resolution in this regard:—

> "I. The Treaty of Peace with Germany shall establish a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States, for the purpose of defraying the cost of reparation and all other costs arising out of the Preliminary Treaty or any supplementary Treaty or out of arrangements concluded between Germany and the Allied or Associated Powers during the Armistice or its extensions.
>
> "The first charge hereby established shall be deemed to extend to the assets and revenues of the Nationals (persons individual or corporate) of the German Empire who will remain within its jurisdiction after the Treaty of Peace.
>
> "II. The priority of the charges established by Article I shall, subject to the qualification made below, be as follows:
>
> (*a*) The total cost of the maintenance of the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation during the Armistice and its extensions.
> (*b*) The total cost of the maintenance of any armies of occupation after the signature of the Treaty of Peace."

The United States of America, Great Britain and Japan had asked that the words "total cost" should be substituted for "cost of maintenance" in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) of Article II, since they held that the total cost of the Armies of Occupation should be recovered from the Germans at once.

On the other hand, France, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece and Serbia had voted in favour of the words "total cost of the maintenance".

MR. LANSING said he would first of all like to ask how this question had come before the Council of Foreign Ministers, and by what authority. It seemed to him to be a question for the Supreme Council to settle.

M. PICHON agreed, and said that he himself had intended to raise this question. In his opinion, the question fell outside the province of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, as they had no means of appreciating the financial aspects of the case. Furthermore, the conclusions which had been reached by the Council of Four on this question and embodied in the Peace Terms were not known. Consequently, no decision could be taken without first obtaining further information from the Council of Four.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN called attention to the fact that the question seemed intimately connected with that of Reparations, which was still before the so-called Council of Four, For that reason he agreed that the question had better be left for that Council to settle.

BARON MAKINO stated that the general question of reparations was of great interest to Japan, who was represented on the Commission handling that subject, but not on the Council of Four. On the other hand, Japan was not specially interested in the question of the cost of the Army of Occupation in the Rhenish districts. He was, therefore, in favour of the action recommended in regard to the question under consideration.

M. SONNINO said that Italy also was interested in the general question of reparations; but not, in the limited question of the cost of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. He had no objection, therefore, to offer to the question being referred, as proposed, to the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING said that on March 8th General Pershing had written a communication to Marshal Foch on this subject which had remained unanswered. He did not think the United States could discuss the subject until some answer had been made to General Pershing's enquiry.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that he was not clear what answer should have been made to General Pershing's letter, since he had thought the latter was itself an answer. But the question on which General Pershing and Marshal Foch were not in agreement was the very question which the Governments were now asked to decide. He would observe that the Armistice was already in existence, and that the payment by the Germans of the cost of maintenance of the Army of Occupation was due under the terms of the Armistice. If all the costs were entered under the head of reparations the Allied and Associated Governments would be foiled. It would be better to collect what was due under the terms of the Armistice as a separate item than to include it in reparations, all of which would not be paid.

MR. LANSING said he was very much obliged to General Weygand for his explanations, as it had brought out the fact that this was really a political and economic question, rather than a strictly military one. He, therefore, recommended its reference to the Supreme Economic Council and not to the Supreme War Council.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that on several occasions the Germans had expressed a desire to know what they owed, and had asked the Allied Chief Command that their enquiry on this subject should be answered. The Military Authorities had established a basis for such a reply, which they now submitted to the Governments. If further enquiry was made by the Germans, they would have to say they were not ready to give a definite reply.

M. PICHON stated that he was in full agreement with General Weygand, and concurred as to the distinction to be drawn between the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, but he thought the matter could only be referred to the Heads of the Governments to settle. If the latter should say that the Council of Foreign Ministers were competent to decide the question, they could then proceed under that authority.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should inform the Heads of the Governments that the Council of Foreign Ministers were of opinion that the question of the cost of the Allied Armies of Occupation in the

Rhenish districts should be submitted to the Council of Four for decision.)

2. Insertion of an Article in the Treaty of Peace Regarding Opium Traffic M. PICHON said that the British Delegation had proposed the following draft, which had been circulated:—

> "Germany agrees to proceed at once to ratify the Opium Convention signed at the Hague on the 23rd January, 1912.[2]
>
> As soon as its ratifications have been deposited Germany undertakes to sign the special protocol, providing for the bringing into force of the Convention, which was opened at the Hague as a result of the resolutions adopted by the Third International Opium Conference held in that City on the 15th–25th June, 1914.[3]
>
> Germany recognises that the signature of the above-mentioned special Protocol involves the obligation on her part to bring the Convention of 1912 into force and to enact forthwith the legislation required for this purpose."

M. SONNINO said that he had a slight amendment to suggest, namely, that for the word "forthwith" some definite period of time, such as "within six months" should be substituted.

MR. LANSING said that the American Delegation had written on the subject at the same time as the British Delegation. In fact, the two drafts had crossed in the post. He proposed, as a substitute, the following text which he thought would cover the objection made by M. Sonnino to the British text:—

> "Germany agrees to ratify and hereby ratifies the International Opium Convention concluded at The Hague, January 23, 1912, whereof it is a signatory Power and Germany further agrees to pass the legislation necessary to give effect to the provisions of the said Convention within a period not exceeding three months after the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty. Germany likewise agreed to

notify the five Allied and Associated Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) immediately upon the passage of such legislation.

The Allied and Associated Powers which have not hitherto signed or ratified the International Opium Convention or passed the legislation necessary to carry its provisions into effect, hereby agree to sign and ratify the said Convention, and by their acceptance of this article hereby sign and ratify the same, and the said Allied and Associated Powers hereby agree to pass the legislation necessary to give effect to the provisions of the said Convention within a period not to exceed three months from the deposit of ratifications of the present treaty."

Mr. Lansing, continuing, pointed out that this latter text provided for the ratification of the Opium Convention by the very act of signing the Peace Treaty, and that there were several Allied and Associated nations who had never signed or ratified the Opium Convention.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN was very glad to have the support of the American Delegation in favour of the inclusion of the Opium Convention in the Peace Terms. He would point out however, that whereas in the draft proposal put forward by the British Delegation it would be possible to obtain the assent of all the powers in the world to the Convention; the American draft would have the effect of excluding all Powers that had not been a party to the Convention.

MR. LANSING said that his attention had just been called to an item in the British draft which would bring the Opium Convention into force immediately, while the American draft might require its execution to be left until ratifications had been exchanged with the last Power. He therefore recommended a reference of the two drafts to the Drafting Committee.

BARON MAKINO said that Japan was in favour of the action proposed, as they were parties to the Hague Convention, but there might be technical difficulties, since it was proposed that legislative action should be begun within three months. In his country the Legislature met in the spring, and then for three months only. It might therefore

be technically impossible to secure legislative action within three months, as required. Provision should be made to meet this difficulty.

M. PICHON called attention to the fact that Japan had a representative on the Drafting Committee, who could see that this objection was provided against.

BARON MAKINO said that with that understanding he was satisfied with the reference proposed.

(It was agreed that the British and American draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace regarding Opium Traffic should be referred to the Drafting Committee for revision with a view to including in a new text the principles contained in both.)

3. Draft Article in Regard to Belgium M. PICHON read the following draft article, prepared by the British Delegation, for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, whereby Germany bound herself to recognize a new regime, replacing the Treaty of 1839 in regard to Belgium[4] :—

> "Belgium. Treaties of 1839.
>
> Germany, recognizing that the treaties of April, 19, 1839, which established the status or Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation, consents to the abrogation of the said treaties and undertakes to adhere, when invited, to whatever conventions may be entered into by the Five Allied and Associated Powers, or by any of them, in concert with the Governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands, to replace the said treaties of 1839".

M. Pichon, continuing, enquired whether the British draft was accepted.

MR. LANSING said he wished to submit the following alternative draft for consideration:—

> "Germany agrees to recognize and hereby recognizes the abrogation of the status of neutralization created by the Treaty of April, 19, 1839, to which Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia were High Contracting and Guaranteeing Parties on the third day of August, 1914, when the neutrality of Belgium, thus created, and guaranteed, was violated by the civil and military authorities of the then German Empire. Germany further agrees to recognize and hereby recognizes the new regime which may be created in respect to Belgium in lieu of the status of 1839, the provisions of which new regime shall be communicated to Germany by the Five Allied and Associated Powers; and Germany further agrees to obligate itself and hereby obligates itself, not merely to recognize such new regime, but also to observe its provisions, to conform its actions thereto, and to take no action inconsistent therewith."

M. PICHON suggested that the same procedure should be followed as in the case of the two drafts relating to the opium traffic, namely, that the alternative drafts should be referred to the Drafting Committee to collate.

(It was agreed that the British and American draft clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, by which Germany recognizes the new regime replacing the Treaty of 1839, in regard to Belgium, should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the purpose of drafting a single clause embodying the ideas contained in the two proposals.)

4. Renunciation by Germany of Territorial Privileges in Egypt MR. LANSING said that the following draft article regarding the recognition of British Protectorate of Egypt had been circulated by the British Delegation:—

5.

> "The German Government, recognising the Protectorate over Egypt declared by Great Britain on the 18th December, 1914, renounces all rights of extraterritoriality in Egypt. The German Government agrees that pending the coming into

> force of an Egyptian Law of Judicial Organisation creating Courts of Universal Jurisdiction, provision shall be made by decree of His Highness the Sultan for the exercise of jurisdiction over German nationals and their property by the British Consular Court. Question of Morocco
>
> "The German Government agrees to the repeal or to the modification to such extent as the Egyptian Government may think desirable of the Decree issued by His Highness the Khedive on November 28th, 1904, relating to the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt.[5]
>
> "The German Government agrees to the transference to the Government of His Britannic Majesty of the powers conferred upon His Majesty the Sultan by the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29th, 1888, respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal."[6]

MR. LANSING expressed his inability to accept the draft articles relating to these two questions, for the reason that, in his opinion, a "blanket" clause should, in the first place, be prepared to cover all German interests outside the actual territory of Germany in Europe. In his opinion, a general clause should be prepared, clearly stating that Germany, once and for all, agreed to abrogate all her rights outside the recognised territorial boundaries of Germany in Europe. Such a procedure would obviate the necessity of preparing an indefinite number of Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, dealing with territorial and other rights and privileges possessed by Germany in various parts of the world. He would point out that in addition to the rights and privileges owned by Germany in Morocco and in Egypt, dealt with in the draft clauses under consideration, the meeting would be asked later on to deal with the question of the abandonment of German claims in the Antarctic regions.

He thought that following the same train of thought, the meeting would next be asked to deal with Germany's claim in the Arctic regions. There would, therefore, be no end to the questions which would thus have to be dealt with.

M. PICHON thought that Mr. Lansing's proposal raised a very broad and difficult question. In his opinion it was essential that the renunciation of Germany's claims and privileges should be made in favour of some one party or other. Therefore, should a general clause be introduced, as proposed by Mr. Lansing, it would not be possible to say in each case in whose favour Germany abrogated her rights and privileges. That being the case, it was, in his opinion, absolutely necessary that each case should be dealt with separately.

MR. LANSING held that if the course suggested by M. Pichon were followed, things would not be ready for the Peace Conference. He maintained that Germany should renounce her rights and privileges in favour of the Five Great Powers; a clause being inserted in the Peace Treaty, empowering the latter forthwith to appoint Commissions to determine without delay the fate of the territories so abandoned.

M. PICHON pointed out that the questions relating to Morocco and Egypt were not territorial ones; the draft clauses merely related to rights and privileges. In regard to Morocco a Commission had been appointed by the Council of Four and that Commission had submitted a draft text, which had been unanimously adopted. Should Mr. Lansing's proposals now be accepted, it would amount to the rejection of the work carried out by the Council's Commission.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that all questions relating to the renunciation of territorial rights and privileges and to the abandonment of claims by Germany should be decided en bloc. In his opinion the question of Morocco could not be given special treatment. He enquired whether France and Great Britain would be prepared to discuss the Chinese question and other German territorial rights in China.

M. PICHON pointed out that the latter constituted a territorial question, whereas Morocco and Egypt dealt purely with a matter of status.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the question of Shantung was also merely a matter of status. Similarly, the question of Consuls not only

in China but also in Siam would come under the same head.

BARON MAKINO said that the matter of China having been raised, he wished to invite the attention of the Meeting to the fact that the territory in question was a leased territory, and not a purely German one. Furthermore, in regard to the disposition of that territory, a Treaty had been entered into between Japan and China and in consequence he maintained the question required special treatment. That being the case, the question of the disposal of German Territory in China could not be dealt with in a general clause dealing with the abandonment of German claims in other regions.

MR. LANSING drew attention to the fact that China had prayed the Conference that the territory in question should be restored to her.

BARON MAKINO explained that the Treaty between Japan and China to which he had referred, dealt with the restitution of the territory in question to China. It had been agreed that the areas leased by Germany in China should positively be returned to China.

MR. LANSING enquired in view of Baron Makino's statement that the German leased territory would be returned to China, and that it was meanwhile merely being held in trust by [*for?*] China, whether Japan would object to the Five Great Powers acting as trustees.

M. PICHON said that the Meeting was perhaps getting far away from the question under reference. The question of Kiauchau was not one of the items included on the Agenda paper. On the other hand, to give effect to Mr. Lansing's views, he submitted the following resolution for consideration:—

> "Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatsoever which may appertain to her in any form in regard to territories outside the territory of Germany proper as defined by the present treaty. She binds herself to recognise and to accept all measures which may be taken by the Five Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these rights, titles or privileges."

MR. PICHON, continuing, pointed out that the draft he had just read only related to territorial questions.

MR. LANSING said that he would be prepared to accept M. Pichon's draft; but suggested that the whole question should be referred to the Drafting Committee, with instructions that the clause should be so re-drafted as to include all rights, privileges and claims possessed by Germany. The draft so amended would be referred back to the Committee of Foreign Ministers for final acceptance.

M. PICHON pointed out that Mr. Lansing's proposal would not in reality solve the question of Egypt and Morocco.

M. SONNINO thought that the Drafting Committee might be able to produce a draft Article which would cover those two questions also.

M. DE PERETTI, (President of the Morocco Commission), held that it would be quite impossible to draw up an Article that would cover all these questions. Should the Committee stipulate for a clean sweep of all Germany's rights and privileges throughout the world, the Allied and Associated Governments would run the risk of perpetrating a grave injustice. In justice, Germany could only be asked to renounce certain definite rights and privileges and these would in each case have to be specified, otherwise endless trouble would hereafter arise.

MR. LANSING reiterated his view that a clause should be drawn up whereby Germany made a general renunciation of all her rights, privileges and claims throughout the world; Commissions would then forthwith be appointed to consider each case individually.

M. DE PERETTI said that he would gladly accept Mr. Lansing's proposal. On the other hand, in his opinion, the question could forthwith be settled by appointing the necessary Commissions. As a matter of fact, a certain number of Commissions had already reported. It was therefore merely a question of appointing other Commissions. But even should a general clause be drafted for inclusion in the Peace Treaty, as suggested by Mr. Lansing, such a clause would be extremely dangerous, unless Commissions were at once appointed to consider each case individually, as otherwise

Germany might thereby be deprived of rights which she should, in reality, be permitted to retain.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN expressed the view that the draft clauses contained a number of provisions which it would be impossible to include in a general clause. For instance, should an attempt be made to put everything included in the draft articles relating to Morocco in a general clause, it would become extremely lengthy and unwieldy. He inquired whether the Committee would be prepared to accept the draft articles relating to Morocco, subject to the proviso that all matters which could be included in a general clause would be omitted from the special articles relating to Morocco.

M. SONNINO said that it would be impossible for him, without further consideration, to accept the concluding portion of the draft article relating to Egypt, wherein it was stated that the German Government agreed to the transference to the Government of His Britannic Majesty of the powers conferred upon His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29th, 1888, respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal. He pointed out that it was proposed to make over to the British Government the rights of the Sultan of Turkey, which meant a great deal more than the mere surrender of rights by Germany. In his opinion, such a proposal would require the approval of all the Powers.

MR. LANSING agreed that special reasons existed in the case of Egypt, which called for special treatment. At the same time he thought it would be felt by the world at large that the Great Powers represented here had paid special attention to their own interests. For instance, the question of the German rights in Liberia and in Turkey; the extraterritorial rights of Germany in Siam and in China; Germany's claims in the Arctic and Ant-Arctic regions had apparently so far received no proper consideration. In his opinion the further consideration of the questions of Morocco and Egypt should be postponed until the Drafting Committee had tried their hand at drafting a clause which would cover all the rights and privileges of Germany everywhere. As soon as such a clause had been prepared by the Drafting Committee, it would be time enough to decide whether Egypt and Morocco required special treatment. He wished to

suggest, therefore, that the question be referred to the Drafting Committee with a request that they should submit a draft of a general clause to this Committee by Thursday next.

M. PICHON pointed out that Commissions had already reported on some of these questions. For instance, in regard to Morocco definite recommendations had unanimously been made. He wished to enquire whether Mr. Lansing proposed to ignore the work of these Commissions.

MR. LANSING replied that he did not object to the Morocco clauses as such; but before taking any further action in the matter he asked that a general renunciation clause should be drafted and then each question could be disposed of separately in connection with the general clause. Unless this procedure were followed the Great Powers would undoubtedly be accused of taking care of their own interests whilst neglecting the rights of all other nations.

M. PICHON expressed the opinion that in the Peace Treaty all questions directly concerning Germany and the other signatory Powers should alone be included. All other questions could then be postponed to a later date. No doubt questions such as those relating to Liberia, China and Siam would eventually have to be studied; but in his opinion that was no reason for postponing the immediate consideration of such questions as Morocco and Egypt which were ready for settlement.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN wished to press for the acceptance of the draft article relating to the British Protectorate of Egypt, subject to the reservations he had already made. It appeared, however, that this procedure was objected to by the American and Italian representatives. Therefore he would agree to the Drafting Committee being instructed to endeavour to draft a general article as suggested by Mr. Lansing. He foresaw, however, great difficulties in introducing in such a general article all the conditions contained in the draft relating to Egypt. Consequently should the Drafting Committee not be able to draw up a satisfactory general article he would then press for the acceptance of the British draft article

relating to Egypt, failing which the whole question would have to be referred for decision to the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING explained that he held the following theory: a "blanket" article should be drafted to cover the renunciation of all territorial privileges, rights, and claims of Germany throughout the world outside European Germany. Should it be found that the general clause did not cover all cases then special additional clauses could be added to the general clause.

M. PICHON understood that the Drafting Committee would be instructed to draw up a summary of all the draft articles so far prepared and then all special cases that were not covered by the general clause would form the subject of special additional clauses.

BARON MAKINO said that if Mr. Lansing's proposal were adopted it would be necessary to make a reservation in the case of Kiauchau since that formed the subject of a special treaty and could not therefore be included in a general clause.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that Japan had a special representative on the Drafting Committee who would be able to raise any question requiring special treatment.

M. PICHON agreed that the question of Morocco would likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee. He understood, however, that the Committee did not wish to raise any objection in regard to the unanimous findings of the Morocco Commission. Therefore the report presented by the Committee for the examination of the provisions to be inserted in the preliminaries of peace with regard to Morocco was adopted in principle by the Committee and it would merely be referred to the Drafting Committee with a view to these provisions being included as far as possible in a general clause. The balance of the clauses would then form the subject of special articles.

(This was agreed to.)

M. DE PERETTI suggested that in order to facilitate the work of the Drafting Committee it would be advisable also to refer to them

definite draft clauses relating to China, Liberia and Siam and so forth.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN pointed out, in regard to the report relating to Morocco, that some of the articles (namely 6 to 9) might be open to revision in the event of their not being in conformity with the general principles of the clauses proposed by the Economic Committee or by the Committee on Reparation and accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allies and the duty of ensuring such conformity was left with the Drafting Committee. He thought, therefore, that the attention of the Drafting Committee should also be drawn to this matter.

M. PICHON explained that the Commission on Reparation had so far merely submitted a report, but no draft clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty.

(It was decided to instruct the Drafting Committee to draft a general clause whereby Germany would renounce all her claims, rights and privileges outside the territory of Germany in Europe as defined in the Peace Treaty. The Drafting Committee would at the same time be instructed to submit additional clauses to include such special rights and privileges of Germany as would not be covered by the general clause.)

6. Minor Amendments of the Military Terms M. PICHON said that the following two amendments to Military Peace Terms[7] had been proposed by the British Delegation:—

> I. "To Article 11 add the following Sub-Section".
>
> "Within the same period the German Government shall put the Allies in effective possession of all chemical processes (including drawings of plant, works instructions, and reports of research to the latest date) used during the war for the production of munitions (including explosives, and also gases and analogous matters as defined in Article 13 of these stipulations) or for the production of substances from which such things were or can be made".

II. “In Article 10, Sub-Section (i) add after the words “the location of which shall be communicated to …” the words “and approved by”.

MR. LANSING said that he was altogether opposed to the inclusion of the proposed amendment to Article 11 of the Military Peace Terms. In making this statement, he expressed the views of President Wilson. As a matter of fact the communication of details relating to chemical processes really constituted an economic question rather than a military one and since the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous matters or devices had been prohibited, including their manufacture and importation, he thought that was sufficient safeguard without asking the German Government to put the Allies in an effective possession of all their chemical processes, including the production of substances from which such things could be made.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN explained that the proposal had been put forward by the British Delegation from the standpoint that during the war Germany had made great progress in production of chemicals for the destruction of life. He fully admitted that the processes employed for the production of asphyxiating and poisonous materials were also required for commercial purposes, but the British Military authorities were of opinion that those chemical processes so employed should be divulged in order to reduce the danger of their use in any future wars. Should the Allied Nations be prepared to allow Germany to preserve her secrets, he would bow to that decision, but he must point out that the danger was one which affected the European Nations to a far greater extent than America.

MR. LANSING said that he had very little to add to the statement which he had just made. He wished, however, to say that the American Military Authorities considered the insertion of such a clause to be superfluous and President Wilson held that the clause could not be justified from an economic point of view.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN expressed the view that from an economic point of view, if Germany diverted her manufacture for the production of death-dealing gases, she could not complain if she were obliged to

disclose her methods of manufacture. A knowledge of the methods by which these tortures were produced would enable steps to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to protect themselves. He spoke with considerable emotion on this subject after having witnessed Canadian soldiers still gasping for breath two or three months after having been gassed.

MR. LANSING said he did not excuse inhuman methods of warfare. At the same time, he believed that the secrets of gas manufacture were with Great Britain and America. Why, therefore, should they wish to be placed in a position to manufacture an inferior article?

M. SONNINO enquired how the knowledge of these secrets could bring about a cessation of the manufacture of the gases in question. The knowledge would only place the other Powers in a position to manufacture the same articles. In his opinion, from an economic point of view it would be extremely difficult to define what exactly was included in the secrets of manufacture to be divulged by the Germans.

MR. LANSING expressed a view that all the processes could be covered by the term "dyes".

SIR ROBERT BORDEN asked that the question should be referred to the Council of Four.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the proposed amendments to the Military Peace Terms included a second proposal relating to Article 10 which he would be prepared to accept.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN explained that the first paragraph of Article 10 read as follows:—"The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war materials shall only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Governments, the number of which they retain the right to restrict." It was now proposed that this sentence should read:—"The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war materials shall only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which shall be communicated to *and approved by* the Allied and Associated

Governments, the number of which they retain the right to restrict". Sir Robert Borden continuing said that the effect of the addition of the words "and approved by" would be that the Allies would have the right of naming the particular works which would have to be closed if so decided by the Allied and Associated Governments. For instance, if the Germans were carrying out the manufacture of arms and munitions in, say, twelve places, of which two were important and ten unimportant, the Allies could restrict the work by suppressing one or other of the important factories, but without the insertion of the words "and approved by" the Germans would be entitled to suppress the unimportant works.

(It was agreed that article 10 sub-section I of the Military Peace Terms should be amended to read as follows:—

> "The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war materials shall only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which shall be communicated to *and approved by* the Allied and Associated Governments, the number of which they retain the right to restrict".

It was further agreed that the amendment to article 11 of the Peace Terms should be provisionally rejected owing to want of unanimity. The British Delegation should be entitled, if it so desired, to re-submit the question for the consideration of the Council of Four.)

7. M. PICHON read the following draft article, submitted by the British Delegation, binding Germany to recognise Allied and Associated Prize Court decisions:—

> "Germany accepts and recognises as valid and binding all decrees and orders concerning German ships and cargoes and all orders relating to the payment of costs made by a Prize Court of any of the Allied or Associated Powers, and undertakes not to put forward any claim arising out of such decrees or orders on behalf of any German national".
> Insertion of Articles in the Treaty of Peace Providing for the Acceptance by the Enemy of Allied Prize Court Decisions

MR. LANSING said that he had an alternative draft which read as follows:—

> "Germany agrees to accept and hereby accepts all decisions and orders of the Allied and Associated Courts of Prize rendered or issued before the deposit of ratifications of the present treaty as a final disposition of the property involved and of the questions decided, involved, or raised in the decisions and orders of the said Prize Courts.
>
> The five Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to examine all such decisions and orders of German Prize Courts, whether affecting the property, rights of Nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, or the nationals of neutral Powers; Germany agrees to furnish, upon request, to the Allied and Associated Powers certified copies of all such decisions and orders, the evidence submitted and the proceedings of the German Prize Courts since the outbreak of the War; agrees to accept and hereby accepts the modifications of such decisions and orders which the five Allied and Associated Powers may make therein, and agrees to accept and to give effect to the modifications of such decisions and orders which shall be contained in the Convention to this effect, to be concluded subsequently and at a date to be fixed by the five Allied and Associated Powers.
>
> Germany further agrees to recognise and hereby recognises the validity of the seizure, capture or confiscation, of all German merchant vessels, together with the cargoes thereon, which the Allied and Associated Powers, or any of them, have seized, captured or confiscated since the 1st day of August 1914, the disposition of which shall not have been decided by a Court of Prize of an Allied or Associated Power before the deposit of ratifications of the present treaty; and Germany also agrees to recognise and hereby recognises the right of any of the Allied and Associated Powers to retain possession of such vessels, together with the cargoes thereof, and to apply the same (their value) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, to the satisfaction of the claims against Germany of the Allied or

Associated Governments so having seized, captured, confiscated or possessing the same."

MR. LANSING continuing said, he did not wish to insist on the third paragraph of his draft, but from the American point of view, it was very undesirable to continue Courts of Prize and similar War organisations after the signature of the Peace Treaty. The last clause was intended therefore to perfect titles without the necessity of maintaining such Courts of Prize.

He wished to propose that the British and American drafts should be referred to the Drafting Committee for consideration and report, and the submission of a single draft embodying the principles contained in both.

M. FROMAGEOT observed that in regard to the French Prize Courts, a very great difficulty would arise, should it be laid down that only such captures should be validated as had been decided before the ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance with French Procedure, delays were deliberately imposed in order to benefit the claimants. Consequently, the clause should be amended to read that Germany agrees to accept all decisions and orders of the Allied and Associated Courts of Prize which "have been or shall be" rendered or issued before the deposit of the ratification of the present Treaty.

MR. LANSING pointed out that since M. Fromageot was a member of the Drafting Committee, he thought his proposal to submit the drafts to the Drafting Committee should be accepted, in order that a single draft could be drawn up harmonising the American and British proposals.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN pointed out that the American draft raised certain differences in questions of principle. In the case of the British Empire it would be extremely difficult to break off proceedings in Prize Courts, particularly where neutrals were concerned.

Further, the second paragraph of the American proposed clause contained the suggestion that the Allied and Associated Powers

should revise the decisions taken by the German Prize Courts but none in regard to the procedure necessary to effect the revision.

Furthermore, in regard to the third paragraph, the Economic Commission had made certain recommendations relating to the liquidation of German property inside Allied territories, and it had suggested the creation of certain machinery which might be used to deal with this very question.

MR. LANSING explained, in reference to the second paragraph of the American draft, that the British draft contained no provisions covering a decision taken by the German Prize Courts, and consequently, this clause had been inserted to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to take the necessary action in the matter if they thought it necessary.

He asked, therefore, that the Allies should accept the principle that they had the right to question German Prize Court decisions which might attempt to justify submarine destructions.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN explained that the British representatives had fully expressed their reprobation of unrestricted submarine warfare. It was unnecessary, therefore, to say anything more on that question, but when it [came] to the decision of German Prize Courts, the question naturally arose as to whether such revision as might be found necessary was to be carried out on the basis of German law or on the basis of Allied laws. That was where the great difficulty lay, should the question of the jurisdiction of the German Courts come under discussion.

M. PICHON suggested that the question should be referred to the Drafting Committee, who would bear in mind the remarks made by Mr. Lansing and Sir Robert Borden.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee be asked to frame a single clause for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, containing as far as possible the British and American proposals concerning Prize Court decisions).

8. Abandonment of German Claims in the Antarctic Regions M. PICHON proposed that the following draft Article in regard to the Antarctic regions should also be referred to the Drafting Committee, in accordance with the conclusion taken on Items 4 and 5 above:—

> "Germany renounces in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers all claims to any territories lying to the south of latitude 60° south."

(This was agreed to.)

9. (It was agreed to instruct the Polish Commission to proceed forthwith with their investigation of the Polish territorial question). Commission on Polish Affairs

(The Meeting then adjourned to Thursday, 17th April, 1919, at 2–30 p.m.)

PARIS, 15th April, 1919.

[1] For text of the Armistice, see vol. II, p. 1.
[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1912, p. 196.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1914, pp. 938–939.
[4] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXVII, pp. 995–1002.
[5] *Ibid.*, vol. XCVII, p. 41.
[6] *Ibid.*, vol. LXXIX, p. 18.
[7] See annexure "A," BC–52, p. 385 [*Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 20*].

April 17, 3 p.m. (FM–5)

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[35] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 17th April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/5

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/5

FM–5

[Document 35]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 17th April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 17, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Mr. R. Lansing	Mr. Beer
Mr. Brown Scott	British Empire
Secretary	Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. L. C. Christie
British Empire	France
Sir Robert Borden	M. Fromageot
Lord Hardinge	M. de Peretti
Secretaries	Italy
Mr. H. Norman	M. Ricci-Busatti
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	M. Piacentini
France	
M. Pichon	
Secretaries	
M. Arnavon	
Cdr. de St. Quentin	
Italy	
H. E. Baron Sonnino	
Secretary-General	
Count Aldrovandi	
Secretary	

M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Viscount Chinda
Secretaries
M. Nagaoka
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. C. G. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck

1. Insertion of an Article in the Treaty of Peace Regarding Opium Traffic M. PICHON said that the Drafting Committee had circulated a number of draft articles for the Treaty of Peace: the first for consideration was that relating to the Opium Convention. The following draft article was before the meeting:—

> "Germany undertakes to ratify forthwith the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912, and as soon as possible thereafter to sign the special protocol for putting the Convention into force, which was agreed at The Hague in accordance with the resolution adopted by the third International Opium Conference held in that city June 18–25, 1914.
>
> Furthermore, Germany recognises that her signature of the special protocol referred to above entails an obligation to put the Convention of 1912 into force and to enact the necessary

legislation within three months after the coming into force of this treaty; such legislation will be communicated to the Allied and Associated towers."

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the majority of the Drafting Committee had been unable to give effect to the American proposal that all the Allied and Associated Powers which had not hitherto signed or ratified the Convention should agree to sign and ratify it in the Treaty. It was considered by the Committee that such a clause had no right place in a Treaty as between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. It should properly form the subject of an agreement among the Allied and Associated Powers independently.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Convention had been signed more than 7 years ago. It had hitherto failed to obtain ratification, and, saving in the United States, the requisite legislation to give effect to it had not been undertaken. The present, he thought, was a fitting opportunity to put the Convention into operation. Should this opportunity not be taken, the inference would be that some Governments among the Allied and Associated Powers were reluctant to act. He believed that this inference would be unfair, but it would nevertheless be made. He therefore urged most earnestly that this opportunity of enforcing the Convention be seized, and he believed that the American proposal for general ratification was the simplest method. The objections to this course appeared to him to be of a purely technical order and he thought they should be waived.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that he concurred with Mr. Lansing in the view that the Convention should be put into force at the earliest moment and he was ready to adopt any method which might conduce to that end. He understood, however, that in the view of the Drafting Committee, a separate understanding among the Allied and Associated Powers was a better method than that suggested by Mr. Lansing. He would point out that Mr. Lansing's statement that only the United States had taken any steps to give effect to the Convention was not strictly accurate, as effect had been given to it in the United Kingdom and in India by the Defence of the Realm Act. This, indeed, was only a war measure, which, to be perpetuated, would require

further legislation, but he was confident that this legislation would be undertaken.

M. PICHON suggested that the adoption of the Opium Convention should be made a condition of admission to the League of Nations. A clause to this effect could be added to the Covenant.

MR. LANSING objected that this would involve still further postponement, which, after 7 years' delay, was to be deprecated. He failed to see that any matter which was for the good of the world was unfitting for a Treaty of Peace.

M. FROMAGEOT asked leave to explain the view taken by the Drafting Committee. An undertaking as between the Allies only appeared unsuitable in a document regulating the relations of the Allies and Germany. The Convention, moreover, as between the Allied and Associated Powers was one which could not even remotely affect German interests.

MR. LANSING said that he regretted he was unable to agree. He thought that it was quite right to insert reciprocal agreements in a Treaty of Peace, as well as obligations imposed on the enemy.

BARON SONNINO said that he was inclined to agree with Mr. Lansing. If the Allied and Associated Powers meant to force Germany to undertake this engagement, there seemed no good reason why they should not undertake it among themselves. History furnished many examples of reciprocal arrangements included in Treaties.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN agreed. He thought each Power could engage to introduce legislation with the object of ratifying the Convention.

M. PICHON suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to draw up another clause embodying the views of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Sir Robert Borden.

MR. LANSING said that the advantage of such a clause would be that all Nations signing the Treaty which had not signed the Convention would thereby be compelled to adhere to the latter. Thus the maximum number of adhesions would be secured.

BARON MAKINO said that he must make the same reservation as he had made previously regarding the time within which ratification was undertaken, as the Japanese legislature met only in the Spring. It would, therefore, be impossible for Japan to undertake to ratify the Convention within three months. He wished the Drafting Committee to take this into consideration.

MR. LANSING expressed his agreement with Baron Makino that nothing should be done to embarrass legislation in the various Allied countries. There should be a reasonable time limit assigned for ratification. He would suggest, in this connection, that the term be one year.

(This was agreed to and it was decided that the Drafting Committee should add a paragraph embodying the views expressed in the foregoing discussion.)

2. The following draft article was before the meeting and was adopted without discussion:—

> "Belgium. Treaties of 1839.
>
> Draft Article in Regard to Belgium Germany, recognising that the treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation, consents to the abrogation of the said treaties and undertakes to recognise whatever conventions may be entered into by the Five Allied and Associated Powers, or by any of them, in concert with the Governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands, to replace the said treaties of 1839.
>
> If her formal adhesion should be required to such conventions or to any of their stipulations Germany undertakes immediately to give it."

3. The following draft article was before the meeting:—

> Draft Article in Regard to General Renunciation "In territory outside her frontiers as fixed by the present treaty, Germany

> renounces all rights, titles and privileges in territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Five Allied and Associated Powers or the other belligerent Powers who sign this treaty.
>
> Germany undertakes immediately to recognise and to conform to the measures which may be taken now or in the future by the Five Allied and Associated Powers in agreement where necessary with the Powers in order to carry the above stipulation into effect.
>
> In particular Germany declares her acceptance of the following provisions relating to particular questions:—["]

BARON MAKINO asked, with reference to the last paragraph, whether particular questions were reserved.

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee had thought that the general formula proposed would fulfill the desires of the Council. It covered all the rights of Germany in or over Allied and Associated countries, as well as special rights in Colonies and any such countries as Siam, Liberia and Shan Tung. As regards Liberia, Germany would have to sign certain special clauses relating to finance and economic rights. There might be further rights of a special character which were introduced by the last paragraph in the draft article. The paragraph had been put in these terms as the Committee itself did not know exactly what provisions it would have to cover. It had appeared to the Committee, however, that there were many possible contingencies for which a general heading must be found.

MR. LANSING said he was prepared to agree to the proposed article, but suggested that the last paragraph be reserved until it appeared clear that special clauses would be required.

M. PICHON pointed out that certain special clauses would be required in respect to Egypt and Morocco.

BARON MAKINO observed that he must insist on the reservations made by the Japanese Delegation in respect to Shan Tung and Kiau Chau. He had on a previous occasion drawn attention to the fact that Japan claimed all the rights acquired by Germany from China.

MR. LANSING inquired whether these rights were claimed by Japan from China or from Germany.

BARON MAKINO replied that they were claimed from Germany.

MR. LANSING said that in the event of special treatment being required for Shan Tung, he would ask the Japanese Delegation to propose a special clause. Once a precise text was before the meeting, it would be possible to debate on the reservation made. At present he was not aware of its purport.

BARON MAKINO reminded the meeting that towards the end of January, he had presented the Japanese claims in a general statement.[1] He had then declared that the claims would subsequently be presented in such a form as to be introduced into the treaty. He proposed, therefore, to bring forward a few articles embodying these claims. All he meant by recalling his reservations was to give notice that he proposed to put forward these articles.

MR. LANSING then suggested that these draft articles be submitted together with the agenda for the next meeting of the Council, in order that time for their consideration before the meeting might be gained. He suggested that a similar course might be followed with regard to Egypt and Morocco.

BARON MAKINO observed that the Japanese statement had been made before the Council of Ten, and that it had been understood that the draft articles for the Treaty of Peace should also be submitted to that Council. In consequence, he thought that it would be right that the Council of Ten and not the present Council should take this matter into consideration.

MR. LANSING enquired whether there was to be another meeting of the Council of Ten.

MR. PICHON said that the meetings of this Council had become rare and that he had no notice of any future meeting. The procedure proposed, therefore, might delay a decision for a considerable time.

BARON MAKINO said that he was engaged in certain *pourparlers* which he thought might lead to an early settlement of the question.

MR. LANSING then suggested that the General Renunciation clause be accepted, with the proviso that any Power wishing to put forward special cases should do so as early as possible.

BARON MAKINO agreed, with the reservation previously stated.

(The General Renunciation Article, as quoted above, was then adopted.)

4. SIR ROBERT BORDEN asked whether the case of Morocco came under the general clause.

Special Articles Relating to Egypt & Morocco M. SONNINO, referring to the draft article prepared by the Drafting Committee, and appended to these Minutes (See Annexure "A"), observed that at the previous Meeting it had been pointed out that the transference from the Sultan of Turkey to the British Government of the former's powers respecting free navigation of the Suez Canal was irrelevant to a Treaty of Peace with Germany. No such objection had been raised to the insertion of a provision relating to the capitulations and to the recognition of a British Protectorate. He now saw in the draft an additional article providing for the transference of all German goods, moveable and immoveable, to the Egyptian and Moroccan Governments, respectively, and for the sale by auction in favour of these Governments of private property belonging to German subjects. This was an entirely new provision, and had not appeared in the draft concerning Egypt which had previously been submitted to the Council (See Clause 4 of Annexure "A").

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee had not taken upon itself to introduce a new clause. This clause had been adopted in regard to Morocco, and the Committee had taken the view that the

same provisions *mutatis mutandis*, should be made to apply in the case of Egypt. Moreover, the clause was introduced by a proviso that it was subject to any adverse ruling by the Commission on Reparations or by the Economic and Financial Commissions. In so far as the clause affected Morocco he pointed out that the Italian Representative on the Committee had given his consent.

M. SONNINO said that in his opinion the provision was contrary to all international law.

MR. LANSING said that it amounted to confiscation of private property and that he objected to this clause.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that whatever was adopted in regard to Egypt must be subject to the general principle approved by the Economic Commission. He believed that they had taken the view that enemy private property in Allied countries could be liquidated and the proceeds utilised for the satisfaction of the claims of Allied subjects. The German Government would have to indemnify the victims. Any surplus that might remain after satisfying individual claims would be set off against the general claim against Germany or accounted in the bill for reparation. If this were the general principle there would be no objection to the special article framed regarding Egypt and Morocco.

M. PICHON suggested that the article in question be reserved until the Council knew what general principles had been adopted by the Commissions on Reparation and Finance.

MR. LANSING suggested that the article be referred to the Economic and Financial Commissions in order that they should not overlook the point.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN observed that the general principles adopted by these Commissions would be examined by the Council of Four and then remitted to the Drafting Committee which would then harmonise all the special clauses.

MR. LANSING enquired whether Morocco had been at war with Germany.

M. PICHON said that as Moroccan troops had fought against Germany it was clear that Morocco had been at war.

M. SONNINO said that he was not quite sure what decision had been taken by the Economic Commission. He believed that the decision was that each Power might liquidate enemy property within its territory to recoup the losses of its subjects. In other words, liberty was given to each Power to do this if it thought fit in extreme cases. In the article under consideration more than this was stipulated. The Allied and Associated Powers said that in Morocco this was to be done. In consequence, they committed themselves a great deal further than the Commission had recommended. In his view the proceeding suggested was a barbarous one, and he was unwilling to take the responsibility of decreeing in Egypt or Morocco what he would not allow in his own country.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said he quite agreed that nothing should be done in Egypt that was not done in other countries.

M. SONNINO suggested that for the word “seront” in the second paragraph of the proposed article, the words “pourront être” be substituted.

MR. LANSING asked whether the stipulation proposed concerned Tangier and the rights possessed by Germans there.

M. DE PERETTI replied in the affirmative. He said that the Moroccan Commission had been unanimous on this point. The private property of Germans there would be dealt with in the same way as German private property in European countries. If the proceeds were assigned to the Governments ordering the sale, the proceeds of the sale of such property in Morocco would accrue to the Shereefian Government. If, on the other hand, a general pool were constituted, among the Allies, the proceeds would be included in that pool. The utilisation of the proceeds therefore depended on the decision of the

Economic and Financial Commissions. He understood that the same procedure would be followed in the United States.

MR. LANSING said that the United States would only hold such property as security and would, if it were unnecessary to hold it, return it to the owners. This procedure had been followed in respect to the Boxers. He objected to the mention of any special category and was of the opinion that the whole subject should be covered by a general clause. Everything concerning the liquidation of private property in Egypt or Morocco should be deleted. The general principles should be determined by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN suggested that the decision of the Council should be that the clauses relating to liquidation of German private property in Egypt and Morocco should be reserved, pending the formulation of a general clause. All the stipulations of Articled should therefore be eliminated.

M. DE PERETTI observed that the last paragraph of the article regarding mining rights should be accepted, as there was a Tribunal of Arbitration at work on the subject, the labours of which should not be interrupted.

(It was then decided that the draft articles contained in Annexure "A" should be sent back to the Drafting Committee for revision in view of the preceding discussion. Article 4 was provisionally eliminated in as far as it related to the liquidation of private property until the general principle on this subject had been formulated.)

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that the recognition clause which was to be enforced on Germany regarding the Protectorate of Egypt did not *ipso facto* imply the recognition of that Protectorate by other signatories of the Treaty. A separate convention, therefore, would be necessary to bring about such recognition.

5. M. PICHON observed that the Drafting Committee was not ready with the draft on this subject.

Draft Articles Relating to Prize Court Decisions M. FROMAGEOT explained that the Committee was faced by difficulties not of form but of substance. The various delegations were not in agreement. Some were of opinion that past and future decrees of Allied and Associated Prize Courts should be accepted by Germany. Some thought that only past decisions should be taken into consideration. It was hardly possible to make a draft until the delegations had come to an agreement. Furthermore, some delegations wished to retain seizures made without reference to Prize Courts as security. Other delegations did not agree with this point of view. Some delegations were of opinion that German Prize Court Decrees should be challenged and made subject to revision by the Five Powers, whatever the nationality of the persons party to the case. This view was not accepted by all. The Committee therefore felt that it would be useless to propose a draft until agreement had been reached.

MR. LANSING remarked that the American Delegation wanted a clause recognising the validity of seizures of German ships and cargoes which had not been subjected to Prize Court orders. It would be impossible to obtain orders from Prize Courts relating to such seizures, as, after the cessation of war, American Prize Courts automatically ceased to function. On the other hand, the Government of the United States did not wish such seizures to be invalidated by decrees of German Courts.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said he did not feel he had authority to accept the American proposal without the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom, as it appeared to involve the suppression of Prize Courts immediately after the cessation of war. Referring to the last paragraph of the American proposal (See I. C. 171, Minute 7)[2] Sir Robert Borden observed that the liquidation of those properties would apparently be covered by the general clauses to be framed by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

M. PICHON said that he thought no decision could be taken by the Council on this subject, and suggested that reference be made to a Commission composed of one Naval expert and one jurist from each of the Five Powers. Their report could be subsequently considered by the Council.

MR. LANSING said that he was himself prepared to decide the question forthwith. He was willing, however, to postpone the decision until each representative had consulted his own experts.

M. SONNINO said that Prize questions were so complex that he would prefer that they should be referred to a Commission. Mr. Lansing was himself no doubt an expert, and might perhaps consent to be Chairman of the Commission.

M. PICHON remarked that if each representative consulted his own experts, they would at their next meeting face one another with divergent views. It would be far better for the experts to arrive at an agreement before the discussion was resumed at the Council.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN observed that the substance of the third paragraph was under consideration by the Reparation Commission. The only matter about which he felt some concern was that the American proposal, as he understood it, tended to abolish the action of Prize Courts, on the termination of war, in other countries as in the United States.

MR. LANSING said that this was not a necessary consequence of accepting paragraph 3.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN further pointed out that it must be decided whether German Prize Court decisions were to be attacked under German law or under International law. There was no objection to subjecting German Prize Court decisions to revision, but the revision should be efficacious if undertaken at all.

M. FROMAGEOT observed that should the Conference decide to impugn German Prize Court decisions, it must of necessity appeal to international law. German Prize Courts consistently neglected what they termed the "so-called" international law. They only administered their own domestic regulations. In Allied Prize Courts, if any alternative to international law were followed, in any particular instance, that alternative must be one favourable to the owner of the captured property; failing this, a neutral might appeal to international law from any decree of the Court. It followed, therefore,

that any revision of Prize Court orders must be made in accordance with International Law. Should the Conference so decide, the decision would be welcomed by many neutrals whose ships and cargoes had been seized by the Germans and whose subjects had in many cases lost their lives without compensation, as the German Courts had declared the action of the Germans to be justified.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN observed that international law was not a code, but was rather a series of agreements between civilized nations. The revision of certain isolated acts of German authority would not be sufficient to enforce on Germany the respect of civilized usages. It would be necessary to go further and declare that Germany must be bound by certain obligations, and a special clause to that effect would have to be inserted in the Treaty.

MR. LANSING said that his proposal covered every form of misconduct on the High Seas. In America, International Law was recognised as a code and applied as such. In principle all were agreed that Germany must be compelled to admit the validity of Prize Court decisions already given in Allied and Associated countries. The question of future decisions remained. Germany might be compelled, if the third paragraph of the American proposal were accepted, to recognise future judgments also. He had already explained the importance of this to America. As to the examination of the German Prize Court procedure it would give an opportunity for probing the crimes committed by Germany at sea.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN suggested that the Drafting Committee should make another attempt to draft an Article. He still thought that the second paragraph of the American proposal was not quite adequate and he suggested that before dealing with the third paragraph the Drafting Committee should enquire how matters stood in the Economic and Financial Commissions.

MR. LANSING observed that if the British view were adopted the third paragraph of the American proposal must also be adopted, otherwise British Prize Courts would continue condemning prizes and obtaining the proceeds, while the United States could not. To such an unequal bargain he could not agree. There was one other possible

solution, namely that the United States Congress should pass legislation to extend Prize Court jurisdiction after the cessation of War. This would have to be done before the insertion of the Article in the Treaty. He did not like to ask the Congress to do this as it was against American tradition.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that he was not authorised at present to express acceptance.

MR. LANSING then suggested that the Drafting Committee be instructed to make a draft preserving the substance of the third paragraph of the American proposal: the result might then be examined.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN agreed subject to the reservation he had previously made.

(It was then decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft taking into consideration the above discussion.)

6. The following draft article was before the meeting.

> Article Regarding Termination of War From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war into which Germany successively involved the five Allied and Associated Powers and the other belligerent signatory Powers will come to an end.
>
> From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations between these Powers and Germany will recommence.

BARON SONNINO asked why a distinction was made between the "five Allied and Associated Powers" and the "other belligerent signatory Powers".

M. FROMAGEOT said that as the situations of these Powers varied in several respects it had been necessary to adopt this somewhat cumbrous formula in every instance in order to avoid misunderstanding.

MR. LANSING stated that he had an alternative formula to propose. He then read the following draft.

(5) American.

1. Proposed Clause in the Treaty of Peace terminating the State of War with Germany.

The Allied and Associated Powers and Germany hereby agree that the status of war created by Germany's declaration of war against Russia on the first day of August, 1914, and to which status of war the Allied and Associated Powers have subsequently become Parties, shall terminate upon the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty of Peace at . . . . ., by Germany and by any three of the five Allied and Associated Powers, in so far as they are concerned, and that the status of peace between Germany and such Powers shall immediately thereupon be restored. As regards the other signatory belligerent Powers, the status of war shall terminate and the status of peace shall be restored with Germany upon the dates of the respective deposits of ratifications by them.

The Allied and Associated Powers, including herein the Powers which have only severed diplomatic relations with Germany, believing that a strict compliance with the terms of the present Treaty should precede the resumption of that intercourse usual between civilised countries in a state of peace, in so far as such intercourse is not modified by the provisions of the present Treaty or is not inconsistent with its terms, severally agree from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty, the restoration of peace as aforesaid, and a strict compliance by Germany with its provisions, to resume the ordinary diplomatic, consular and other official relations with Germany in so far as such relations are consistent with the provisions of the present Treaty, and from and after the said period of three months to appoint and accredit diplomatic and consular representatives to Germany; and Germany on its part agrees to appoint and accredit diplomatic

and consular representatives to each of the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. LANSING explained that the draft of the Drafting Committee required the deposit of all ratifications before the cessation of the state of war. This would involve legislation which would necessarily be lengthy. Peace might therefore be delayed for an unconscionable time. His suggestion was that peace should ensue as soon as three of the big Powers had ratified the treaty. That was to say a cessation of the state of war as between these Powers and Germany would be brought about and the same result would follow as between Germany and the remaining Powers, as soon as their ratification of the treaty had been obtained.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the question of determining when the Treaty should cojne into force, when and how ratifications were to be obtained, whether there must be unanimity or not, required general consideration. The Drafting Committee were dealing with a special point, and were not empowered to enter into political considerations which must be decided by the Supreme Council. The proposal made by Mr. Lansing that peace could be brought about by the ratification of three powers was a political question which the Drafting Committee had no authority to solve. He would suggest, however, that the proposal might not be acceptable to the Powers which had signed the Pact of London.[3] With reference to the proposed delay of three months in resuming diplomatic relations, he would also observe that experience showed that the reestablishment of diplomatic agents might be necessary at once. The Drafting Committee had therefore thought it right to provide for an immediate resumption of official relations without mention of any postponement.

M. PICHON said that he could not agree to the proposal that three powers alone could pledge the remainder, France was bound by the Pact of London not to conclude a separate peace apart from the other signatories.

MR. LANSING said he wished to see the operation of peace begin before all the belligerents had furnished ratifications, as this process

might take a year or more.

M. PICHON suggested that peace might come into operation when the Five great Powers had ratified the Treaty.

MR. LANSING thought that this was a matter that should be referred to the Council of Four together with the arguments put forward in the discussion.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN suggested that the second paragraph of the Article put forward by the Drafting Committee might with one alteration be substituted for the second paragraph of the American text. Instead of the words "from that moment", some definite period might be substituted.

M. FROMAGEOT observed that the second paragraph of the proposed article was a direct consequence of the first paragraph. The Conference would determine the conditions of the beginning of Peace and Peace would automatically start the moment these conditions were fulfilled.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that his intention was that the first clause of the American proposal should be substituted for the first clause of the drafting Committee's proposal and that the second clause of the Drafting Committee's proposal should be amended and substituted for the remainder of the American text.

MR. LANSING said that the real problem was being eluded. It was said that Peace would ensue on the coming into force of the Treaty. How and when the Treaty should come into force was not determined.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that the expression "from the coming into force of the present Treaty" was repeatedly used. The Drafting Committee had asked the Conference what were to be the conditions of the coming into force of the Treaty. No reply had been vouchsafed. The Committee was therefore compelled to use the phrase repeatedly without offering any explanation of what it connoted. Under the circumstances this was unavoidable.

MR. LANSING said that the Council of Four had asked the Council of Five to determine when the war would end, and the answer apparently was when the treaty came into force.

At this stage M. Pichon was called away.

After a short interval the discussion was resumed.

MR. LANSING said that two proposals were before the meeting. The one, brief, and the other somewhat lengthy. He suggested that the Drafting Committee should endeavour to reconcile the two. It was important in any case to assert the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of the war. He had, however, another draft to submit to the meeting regarding a supplementary treaty or convention to carry into effect the principles established by the present Treaty. He then read the following draft:—

> "The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to draw up, after consultation with Germany, and to conclude a further Treaty or Treaties with Germany, and Germany by the present treaty agrees to accept such treaty or treaties, which shall incorporate such terms and conditions as the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem necessary to supplement and to give full force and effect to the present treaty and to establish upon a permanent basis the relations of Germany with the other High Contracting Powers.
>
> The Five Allied and Associated Powers shall determine the date when and place where negotiations shall take place for the subsequent treaty or treaties."

M. FROMAGEOT said that with regard to the assertion of Germany's responsibility the draft put forward by the Drafting Committee fully dealt with this matter. He referred to the words "the state of war into which Germany successively involved the Five Allied and Associated Powers and the other belligerent signatory powers". Mr. Lansing's second proposal was that a general clause should be framed in the Treaty, providing for any additional conventions that might be required. This could easily be done, but he would point out that a

great number of special conventions were already stipulated for in the body of the Treaty.

M. SONNINO questioned whether it was possible to impose on Germany the acceptance of a future convention without any specification whatever. Were Germany to sign an undertaking to agree to a blank treaty in the future, she would not be free when the time came to negotiate in any way. Germany would probably refuse to tie her hands in advance.

MR. LANSING observed that the subsequent convention was intended to supplement the principles of the first treaty.

M. FROMAGEOT said that if he understood the proposal aright, its purpose was to provide an executive postscript to the treaty, such a procedure would not shock the Germans, as it was a method commonly employed by them in their own legislation.

M. SONNINO said that it was desirable to avoid giving the Germans a pretext for telling the Allies they did not know what they wished them to agree to. Care must be taken in framing the draft to avoid this.

(It was then decided to refer the various proposals to the Drafting Committee, in order that an Article be framed in accordance with the tenour of the above discussion.)

7. The following draft article was before the meeting:—

> Draft Article Binding Germany To Accept Treaties of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey "Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and additional Conventions which may be concluded between the Five Allied and Associated Powers and by the other signatory belligerent Powers with the Powers who fought on her side, and to recognise whatever dispositions may be made concerning territories of the former monarchy of Austria-Hungary, of Bulgaria, and of Turkey."

It was pointed out by M. Sonnino that the form of words employed in the last line was somewhat ambiguous.

(Subject to rectification by the Drafting Committee, and to M. Pichon's acceptance, the above article was accepted.)

8. The following draft article was before the meeting:—

> Draft Article in Regard to Russia "Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of whatever treaties or arrangements may be entered into by the Five Allied and Associated Powers, and the other signatory Belligerent Powers with the States which have been or may be constituted out of Russia, or part of whose territory may in August, 1914, have formed part of Russia, and to recognise the frontiers of any such States as determined therein."

M. SONNINO remarked that an expression of opinion was contained in this article regarding Russia, which it might be better not to express.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee had not intended to pre-judge anything concerning Russia. He did not think the form of words employed prejudiced any ultimate decisions.

M. SONNINO pointed out certain discrepancies between the French and the English versions of the Article. The French version appeared to be the more adequate.

(It was agreed that the English version should be made to harmonise with the French, and, subject to agreement by M. Pichon, the Article, as in the French version, was accepted.)

MR. LANSING proposed that an additional paragraph be added to this article, decreeing the abrogation of the treaties made in 1917 [*1918*] at Brest-Litovsk[4] and Bucarest.[5]

M. SONNINO pointed out that this had been already attained in the terms of the Armistice.

MR. LANSING remarked that the Armistice would be itself abolished by the Treaty.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the Economic Council had framed a clause covering this very question. (He referred to Article (*n*) Part II of the Report of the Economic Commission).

He asked in this connection what effect the abrogation of these Treaties would have on the relations of Germany and Russia. Could the abrogation of a Treaty between two parties at the instance of third parties bring about a state of war between the first two, even without their consent?

(It was agreed that the recommendation of the Economic Council should be harmonised with the Article proposed by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee was asked to undertake this.)

9. Arms Traffic M. SONNINO said that it might be desirable in the Treaty to insert a clause requiring Germany's assent to any regulations the Allied and Associated Powers might make with regard to traffic in arms. It had been agreed that Germany was to forfeit all her colonies. She might therefore be disposed to make mischief in the colonies belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers, and with this object to engage in illicit traffic in arms.

MR. LANSING observed that the Military Clauses already contained a prohibition of the manufacture and export of arms.

M. SONNINO pointed out that this clause did not affect the trade in arms manufactured in other countries than Germany and their transference by German agency from any such country to Allied colonial possessions. It was therefore desirable to frame a clause protecting the Allied and Associated Powers from this form of mischief.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should undertake to frame a clause to the above effect.)

10. Agenda for Next Meeting It was decided that the report of the Drafting Committee on these various subjects should be considered

on the following Saturday, at 3 p.m.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 18th April, 1919.

Annexure "A"[6]

[*Special Draft Articles Relating to Egypt, Morocco, and Shantung*]

4. SPECIAL PROVISIONS REGARDING MOROCCO

ARTICLE 1

Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges conferred on her by the General Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906, and by the Franco-German Agreements of February 9 [*8*], 1909, and November 4, 1911.[7] All treaties, agreements, arrangements, and contracts concluded by her with the Sherifian Empire are regarded as abrogated from August 3, 1914.

In no case can Germany take advantage of these instruments and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and the other Powers.

ARTICLE 2

Germany having recognized the French Protectorate in Morocco, hereby accepts all the consequences of its establishment, and she renounces the regime of the capitulations therein.

This renunciation shall take effect as from August 3, 1914.

ARTICLE 3

The Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals in Morocco and the conditions in which they may establish themselves there.

German-protected persons, semsars and “associés agricoles” shall be considered as having ceased, as from August 3, 1914, to enjoy the privileges attached to their status and shall be subject to the ordinary law.

Article 4

(Under reservation of contrary resolutions by the Reparation Commission or the Economic and Financial Commission.)

All rights of personal and real property of the German State in the Sherifian Empire pass to the Maghzen without any compensation.

All rights of personal and real property belonging, in the Sherifian Empire, to German nationals shall be sold at public auction, and the price of sale shall be turned over to the Sherifian Government and shall be allowed in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay for reparation of damages caused by the war. Germany shall indemnify the German owners.

Mining rights which may be recognized as belonging to German nationals by the Court of Arbitration set up under the Moroccan mining regulations, shall form the subject of a valuation, which the arbitrators shall be requested to make; these rights shall then be treated in the same way as property in Morocco belonging to German nationals.

Article 5

(Under reservation of contrary resolutions by the Reparation Commission and the Economic and Financial Commission.)

The German Government shall ensure the transfer, to a person nominated by the French Government, of the shares representing Germany’s portion of the capital of the State Bank of Morocco. The value of these shares, as assessed by the State Bank shall be repaid to the claimants by Germany; the sums paid on this count shall be allowed in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay for reparation of damages caused by the war.

This transfer will take place without prejudice to the repayment of debts which German nationals may have contracted towards the State Bank of Morocco.

Article 6

(Under reservation of contrary resolutions by the Reparation Commission and the Economic and Financial Commission.)

Moroccan goods entering Germany shall enjoy the treatment accorded to French goods.

5. Special provisions regarding Egypt

Article 1

Germany declares that she recognizes the Protectorate declared over Egypt by Great Britain on December 18, 1914, and that she renounces the regime of the Capitulations in Egypt.

This renunciation shall take effect as from August 4, 1914.

Article 2

All treaties, agreements, arrangements, and contracts concluded by Germany with Egypt are regarded as abrogated as from August 4, 1914.

In no case can Germany avail herself of these instruments and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Egypt which may take place between Great Britain and the other powers.

Article 3

Until an Egyptian law of judicial organization establishing courts with universal jurisdiction comes into force, provision shall be made, by means of decrees issued by His Highness the Sultan, for the exercise of jurisdiction over German subjects and nationals and over German property by the British Consular Tribunals.

Article 4

The Anglo-Egyptian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in Egypt.

Article 5

Germany consents to the abrogation of the decree issued by His Highness the Khedive on November 28, 1904, relating to the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt, or to such changes as the Egyptian Government may think it desirable to make therein.

Article 6

Germany consents, insofar as she is concerned, to the transfer to His Britannic Majesty's Government of the powers conferred on His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal.

She renounces all participation in the Sanitary Board of Egypt and consents, insofar as she is concerned, to the transfer to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities of the powers of that Board.

Article 7

(Under reservation of contrary resolutions by the Reparation Commission or of the Economic and Financial Commission.)

All rights in personal and real property of the German State in Egypt pass to the Anglo-Egyptian Government without any compensation.

All rights in personal and real property belonging in Egypt to German nationals may be sold at public auction; the price of sale shall be turned over to the Anglo-Egyptian Government and shall be allowed in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay for reparation of the damages caused by the war. Germany shall indemnify the German owners.

ARTICLE 8

(Under reservation of contrary resolutions by the Reparation Commission or of the Economic and Financial Commission.)

Anglo-Egyptian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods.

6. SPECIAL CONDITIONS REGARDING THE CHINESE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

(Articles to be adopted by the Supreme Council.)

[1] BC–12, vol. III, p. 738.
[2] FM–4, p. 563 [*Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 34*].
[3] Great Britain, Cd. 7737, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 1; Cd. 8014, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 9; and Cd. 8107, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 14.
[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.
[5] *Ibid.*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.
[6] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
[7] Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911), pp. 7, 8.

April 19, 3 p.m. (FM–6)

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[36] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Saturday, April 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/6

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/6

FM–6

[Document 36]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, on Saturday, April 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman
Mr. E. Phipps
FRANCE
M. Stephen Pichon
Secretary
Capt. de St. Quentin
ITALY
M. G. de Martino
Secretary
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
Secretaries
M. Kawai

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
For Questions 2 & 3
Mr. Hoover
Mr. McCormick
For Questions 4 & 5
Mr. J. Brown Scott
BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch
Mr. Waterlow
FRANCE
M. A. Tardieu
M. Seydonx
M. Fromageot
ITALY
M. A. Ricci-Busatti

M. Ashida

Joint Secretariat

United States of America	Col. U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Enrolment of German Subjects in the Army of Foreign Powers M. Pichon said that he had received a letter from Baron Sonnino expressing his regret at his inability, owing to a pressing engagement elsewhere, to attend the meeting that afternoon. The Italian Government would, therefore, be represented by M. de Martino.

The first subject on the Agenda paper related to the enrollment of German subjects in the army of foreign powers for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof. The following draft had been submitted for approval by the British Delegation:—

> "No German male subject shall be permitted to become enrolled in the Army of any Foreign Power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof."

It was proposed that the clause should form Article 19A of the Military Peace terms.

Mr. Balfour said that the arguments in favour of the Article proposed were very obvious. Germans had before the war been the greatest instructors of aggressive armies. Shortly, as a result of the Peace Treaty, large numbers of German officers would be thrown out of employment, and should they offer their services to all would-be militant powers, it was doubtful whether the last stage of the military situation of the world would be any better than the first. In his

opinion, it was a moot question whether it would be worth while entering a special clause dealing with this matter in the Peace Treaty, but a good deal could obviously be said in favour of the proposal made by the British Delegation.

MR. LANSING declared himself heartily in accord with the purpose of the proposed resolution; but he was doubtful as to its ensuring the object sought. He thought the burden should be placed on the employer rather than on the employee. He wished particularly to call attention to the fact that German officers when so employed as military instructors in the Army of Foreign Powers would cease to be under German jurisdiction. In his opinion, the more sensible solution would be obtained by the Allied and Associated Governments entering into an agreement not to employ German officers as instructors in their armies.

M. PICHON thought that under the circumstances, the question should be dealt with by the League of Nations.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that something of the same sort had already actually been done in respect to the export of other war materials from Germany. This being the case, he failed to see why measures should not be taken to prevent Germany from exporting human war material in the shape of military instructors.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was greatly impressed by what Mr. Lansing had said. M. Tardieu had enquired why Germany should not be made to forbid the export of human war material. He would point out, however, that whereas "inhuman" war material could only be exported with the consent of the Government, no Government could stop any human being from taking a ticket to proceed to a foreign country where, after arrival, he could take employment as a military instructor.

M. TARDIEU thought that though the Government could not definitely prevent a subject from proceeding to a foreign country, it might nevertheless be possible to frame a law preventing or prohibiting a subject under definite penalties from taking service in a foreign army.

MR. LANSING said he was very much in sympathy with the proposal to attempt to prevent German military training from being dispersed throughout the world. The question, however, was how best to accomplish this purpose. In the first place, Germany should be made to agree to send no military missions to foreign countries, and to take no official cognisance of military instructors sent abroad. Secondly, as a supplement to the above, all the signatories; of the Peace Treaty must agree not to employ German military instructors. Thirdly, this prohibition should extend to the employment of Germans, naturalised after the signature of the peace treaty: otherwise there would be no security, as it would easily be possible for Germans to change their allegiance for the purpose of taking military service abroad.

MR. BALFOUR thought that similar provisions should be inserted in their respective treaties prohibiting all other enemy countries, e. g. Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria, from employing German instructors.

MR. LANSING added that they should also get the Governments to agree not to send military students to Germany for military training.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lansing should draft a clause for presentation to the Foreign Ministers at their next meeting, embodying the ideas set forth in the preceding discussion.)

2. M. PICHON proposed that these two subjects should be adjourned to the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers, as it would be necessary for him to consult the French technical advisers, and to receive replies from the French representatives on the Economic Council. Establishment of a German Commission at or Near Paris To Facilitate the Conduct of Current Economic Negotiations

3. Present Status of the Commissions Set Up Under the Armistice With Germany & Their Relations to the Supreme Economic Council MR. BALFOUR said that he wished in this connection to invite the attention of the Conference to the very real inconvenience which was now being caused by divided control in both the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. In these territories there were a number of purely civil questions to be settled, which required co-

ordination between the various organizations, both in the area occupied by the French, British and American troops, and in the unoccupied areas. He felt very strongly that nothing should be done to interfere with the military control those areas, or with the full freedom of action of Marshal Foch. But since the questions of food, finance, and commerce were far more important than the narrow military standpoint, something should forthwith be done to improve the organisation which at the present moment was acting very slowly and in a very unsatisfactory manner. Consequently, though he did not press for the question to be discussed and settled at once, especially in view of M. Pichon's request that the matter should be postponed to the next meeting, he wished, nevertheless, to point out that the question, in his opinion, brooked no delay and should be settled as quickly as possible.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation were also studying the question and they would not be in a position to discuss it that afternoon. He supported M. Pichon's proposal that the question should be adjourned to the next meeting.

(It was agreed to postpone the question of the establishment of a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of current economic negotiations, and the question of the present status of the Commission set up under the Armistice with Germany and their relations to the Supreme Economic Council to the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers.)

4. M. PICHON read the following note, which had been submitted by the British Delegation:—

> Dutch Proposal for the Revision of the Treaties of 1839 as Between Belgium and the Netherlands "Mr. Balfour has received a suggestion from Mr. Van Swinderen[1] that a Conference should immediately be set up in Paris', for the purpose of considering the question of the revision of the 1839 treaties, consisting of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs with the Allied and Associated Great Powers, (or four, if Japan were to disinterest herself), and of the representatives of Holland and Belgium".

M. PICHON continuing, enquired whether the proposal therein contained was accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said, in regard to the date for holding the proposed meeting, the question to be considered would not be included in the Peace Treaty with Germany. At the present moment, all the Foreign Ministers were overburdened with work in connection with the preparation of the Peace Treaties with the enemy powers. Consequently, he himself would not be prepared at the present moment to meet the representatives of Holland and Belgium, as suggested.

M. PICHON enquired whether a mission of plenipotentiaries could not be appointed to deal with the question.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the Dutch Government would very much prefer to discuss the question with the Foreign Ministers themselves. They were anxious not to be put under a Commission.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Belgian Government was also anxious to discuss the question at an early date with the Foreign Ministers.

BARON MAKINO said that it was the first time he had heard of this matter. He would therefore be obliged to reserve his definite adhesion for the present. This did not mean that any difference of opinion existed, but he would like to have an opportunity of examining the question.

(It was agreed that a Conference should be held in Paris as early as possible, for the purpose of considering the question of the revision of the 1839 treaties, consisting of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Great Powers and of the representatives of Holland and Belgium.

It was thought that this meeting could be held during the week commencing 28th April, 1919.

It was understood that the Japanese representative would participate in the Conference unless a notification to the contrary were

communicated to the Secretariat General within the next 3 days.)

5. Situation in Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia M. PICHON presented the following memorandum, dated April 11th, 1919, submitted by the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the latter Council: —

> "The Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council has received the most urgent appeals from the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, and from the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in these countries.
>
> The Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council finds it impossible to reply to these appeals until answers to the following questions have been obtained:—
>
> 1. Do the Allied and Associated Governments intend to support the maintenance of independent Governments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia?
> 2. If so, would this decision be in any way affected should an agreement be entered into between any one or all of these States and the Bolshevists Government, whereby their integrity and their territorial independence would be guaranteed?
> 3. Are the Allied and Associated Governments agreed that one or more of the Associated Powers should, once this responsibility has been accepted, help these Governments by every means in their power (e. g. financial, moral, and material assistance) other than the despatch of Allied troops?
> 4. Are any of the Associated Powers prepared to make to any one or all of these Governments a loan or to open credits in their favour?
> 5. Is the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council correct in assuming that the effective occupation of Latvia and Lithuania by the German troops must continue until the next harvest?
> 6. Are the Allied and Associated Governments agreed that the Russian white troops in Esthonia must be assisted, both

morally and materially, by the supply of food and by giving them other assistance, both—
(*a*) in order to maintain the independence of Esthonia, or
(*b*) in order to carry out a possible attack against the actual Russian Government?

7. What is the line of demarcation that the Allied and Associated Governments intend to lay down between Poland and Lithuania in connection with the distribution of food supplies?"

MR. MCCORMICK said that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers had authorised the relaxation of the blockade in the case of Latvia, provided the military authorities approved. The military authorities had approved, and the Blockade Committee had taken steps to obtain the necessary guarantees. But during the last 2 or 3 days, news had been received to the effect that the Germans had taken over the Government of Latvia, and at the meeting of the Blockade Committee held on that day, it had been decided: first, to continue the individual licensing of imports, because it was thought that these could be supervised by the representatives of the Admiralty; second, to stop all shipments from Germany, except coal, which was needed for transportation purposes in connection with the maintenance of the German front against the Bolshevists.

M. SEYDOUX pointed out that the London Blockade Council, who had been instructed with the duty of obtaining the necessary guarantees from the Letts, had so far been unable to do so. Consequently, the blockade still continued unaltered. Furthermore, according to latest information, the Germans had taken control of Libau, which was the only available port of access. Under these circumstances, he thought the British and French ships in the Baltic would automatically stop all trade.

M. PICHON explained to the Committee that the Germans now controlled Libau; they had overthrown the Lettish Government, but it was not clear whether this had been done by the Germans themselves or at their instigation. In his opinion, it would be very difficult to arrive at a decision in regard to the question presented to the meeting.

MR. MCCORMICK understood there would be no difficulty in ensuring that shipments of food should reach the proper authorities. He could therefore see no reason why relief measures should not continue.

M. SEYDOUX agreed. He thought that since food went to the Germans it could also go to the Letts. That, however, instituted only one side of the question. There was also the question of ordinary trade, which he considered should not be permitted.

MR. LANSING said that he could not understand how this question had come to be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. In his opinion, it fell altogether outside their province.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Meeting did not think that the whole question could be summed up in the following two proposals:

(1) Food should continue to be sent to the Baltic provinces in question, provided the local allied authorities were agreed that it would reach the right people, and
(2) Coal should continue to go through on the understanding that it should only be used for the purpose of supplying the front now set up against the Bolshevists.

MR. HOOVER explained that German troops and authorities in Latvia had seized the Government and disarmed the Army, and had set up there a Government of their own, probably controlled by the German Landowners. This Government was in entire opposition to the wishes of the Lettish people. The question was whether the Allies would continue to feed the Letts, or not. On the one hand, there was no desire to starve the people of Latvia; on the other hand, there was equally no wish to support the German Government.

MR. MCCORMICK thought that if the Allies were feeding the Germans in Germany, there was no good reason why they should not continue to feed the Letts.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that the Germans were doing two things, firstly, fighting the Bolshevists, a measure the Allies

thoroughly approved of, and, secondly, oppressing the Letts, a measure which the Allies disapproved of.

M. PICHON thought that the Germans had carried out a regular "coup d'état" against the Letts, and by sending food into the country the Allies would indirectly be supporting the German usurpation.

MR. LANSING enquired as to the reliability of the information received. He had seen various reports, but had not been impressed by their apparent validity.

MR. HOOVER said that the Lettish Commander-in-Chief and some of the Government officials had come to the American Food Mission and had asked for protection. At the present moment, the American representatives in Latvia were defying the Germans.

M. PICHON pointed out that there were English men-of-war on the spot, and enquired whether correct information could not be obtained from that source.

MR. BALFOUR replied that the information received from that source agreed with all other reports received from those regions.

M. PICHON expressed the view that if all sources of information concurred, the Ministers would be entitled to accept the information as correct.

MR. LANSING said that if he remembered the circumstances correctly, they had been told that the withdrawal of the Germans from Latvia would result in the whole country being over-run by the Bolshevists. He thought the feeding of the Letts should be continued, and, by the Treaty of Peace the Germans should be required to evacuate Latvia.

MR. BALFOUR thought there might be some objection to that procedure. Under the Armistice the Allied and Associated Governments were fully empowered to order the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by the German troops. The reason, however, why that had not been done, was that the Allied and Associated Governments had no troops wherewith to replace the Germans. The Allied and Associated Governments were therefore in the

"humiliating" position of having to employ Germans to suppress the Bolshevists whilst the Germans had stopped the Letts from raising armies of their own. Obviously had Allied troops been available it would have been easy to order the withdrawal of Germans, leaving the former troops to assist the local levies in re-constituting the countries in question.

M. DE MARTINO expressed the view that food supplies should continue to be sent to these provinces, all necessary precautions being taken to ensure that none of this food should reach the Bolshevists. He must warn the meeting, however, that the Italian Government would be unable to take any share in furnishing supplies for this purpose.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Letts were wholly anti-Bolshevists, and at the same time the Germans were fighting the Bolshevists. He saw no reason, therefore, why food relief should be stopped.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the difficulty lay in the fact that though both the Germans and the Letts were anti-Bolshevist, the Baltic Barons were also anti-Letts.

COLONEL KISCH explained that according to latest information the Germans had arrested all members of the Lettish Government; they had also disarmed the Lettish troops and seized all arms and munitions. A further report stated that the food stores landed at Libau had been looted, but it was not clear by whom this had been done. It was, however, thought that the German Army of Occupation was behind the whole trouble that had now arisen in that country.

MR. LANSING said that the situation was as follows: for a time the Germans and Letts had co-operated against the Bolshevists. Now, either at the instigation of the Germans or as an independent movement, a rising had occurred, and as a result the Letts might be driven to become Bolshevists, which would constitute a very dangerous situation. In his opinion, under these circumstances, all that the Allied and Associated Governments could do would be to insist on the withdrawal of the German troops and on the restoration of the Lettish Government. But if that were done the Allied and

Associated Governments would then have to rely upon the ability of the Letts to resist the Bolshevists.

MR. HOOVER called attention to the fact that the Lettish Government had been dispossessing the Baltic Barons of their property as fast as possible, and not without violence.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that food should continue to be sent, instructions being issued to the Allied authorities on the spot not to land it unless reasonable security existed that it would not find its way into the hands of either the Bolshevists or of the Baltic Barons.

MR. HOOVER said that Mr. Balfour's proposal raised another difficulty due to the difference of opinion existing between the local British and American authorities. The former thought that no further food supplies should be landed; while the latter thought that local machinery could be set up to ensure its distribution to the proper people. In his opinion, both the British, who were furnishing a considerable portion of the food supplies, and the Americans, should continue to send relief as long as there was reasonable assurance that the food so sent would reach the people and not the Bolshevists.

MR. BALFOUR reminded the Conference that on Thursday last April 17th, the Council of Four had decided to despatch an Inter-Allied Commission to the Baltic States. The particular question under reference could obviously not be referred to that Commission since it would not reach those regions for some time to come.

(It was agreed:—(1) to continue to send food supplies into Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia, provided the local Allied authorities were satisfied that these supplies would reach the right people, and (2) to continue to allow coal from Germany to go through, provided it was only used for supplying the front now set up against the Bolshevists.

It was further agreed that instructions should be issued to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the spot that the food should not be landed unless reasonable security existed that it would reach the people and not the Bolshevists.)

6. M. PICHON read the following draft article relating to the disposal of property of enemy religious missions in Allied territory:—

> Disposal of Property of Enemy Religious Missions in Allied Territory "The Allied and Associated Governments agree that in all territories belonging to them, or of which the government is entrusted to them in accordance with this Treaty, the property which the German Missions or Missionary Societies possess, including that of Trading Societies whose profits were devoted to the support of the Missions, shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes. In order to assure the due execution of this undertaking, the Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control and disposition of such property, and full control as to the persons by whom the Missions shall be conducted and as to the application of the property for missionary purposes.
>
> Germany, taking note of the above undertaking, agrees to accept all arrangements made or to be made by the Allied or Associated Government[s] concerned for carrying on the work of the said Missions or Trading Societies, and waives all claims on their behalf."

MR. BALFOUR explained that a very large German missionary organisation existed in Western Africa which, whilst carrying out admirable educational work, had also undertaken important industrial work. The profits of the commercial part of the undertaking had annually been handed over for missionary purposes. It was felt that the commercial asset should not be merged in the general assets taken over from the Germans in conquered territories; but that the profits should be kept in order to carry on the missionary work in those territories.

MR. LANSING agreed with Mr. Balfour, but he thought it should be made clear in the text that the proposed article related to religious missionary enterprises and not to diplomatic or other missions.

BARON MAKINO enquired whether the draft article was intended to apply to all German foreign religious enterprises. He called attention to the fact that it would be necessary for someone to decide whether the work of such missions was really benevolent or not.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the draft article was intended to apply to all German foreign missions. In addition to those in West Africa to which his previous remarks had particularly referred, he understood there were others in India and China. He thought the idea would be for the property so taken over to be kept in trust with a view to continuing the same religious work.

MR. LANSING called attention to the fact the second paragraph of the English text read "the Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control" whereas the French text said "the Five Allied and Associated Governments will retain full control."

MR. SCOTT pointed out that in the French text the expression "the five Allied and Associated Governments" alone was used.

MR. FROMAGEOT explained that the Drafting Committee had invariably to employ definite formulas to cover definite cases. Thus by "the five Allied and Associated Governments" would be meant France, Great Britain, Italy, United States and Japan; while the words "Allied and Associated Governments" would be used to mean all the nations who had participated in the war on the side of the Allies.

MR. LANSING suggested that the proposal of the British Delegation be accepted in principle, but that the draft article be referred back to the Drafting Committee to be re-drafted in the light of the discussion just held. He thought the text should be made perfectly clear, even though some difficulty might be experienced in doing so. As at present drafted it was not clear whether the control rested with all of the five Allied and Associated Governments as a whole, or whether it would rest in each case only with the one Government particularly concerned.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that it was his understanding that the control would rest with the Power specially concerned in each case.

M. DE MARTINO suggested that the following words should be added at the end of the first paragraph, namely: "in conformity with the principles of the local laws now in force in the respective territories". He was anxious that no difficulty should arise through interference with local laws in the country where the mission was operating.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the idea that M. de Martino had in mind was right; but he thought it should be left to the Drafting Committee to give effect to the proposal.

BARON MAKINO expressed the view that in re-drafting the clause the object of the missions should be made quite clear.

(It was agreed to refer the text of the draft article submitted by the British Delegation to the Drafting Committee for the preparation of a revised text embodying the ideas set forth in the course of the above discussion.)

7. M. PICHON read the following new proposed draft article relating to the Opium Traffic which had been submitted by the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty of Peace:—

> Draft Article Regarding the Opium Traffic "Those of the High Contracting Parties who have not yet signed, or have signed but not yet ratified the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty.
>
> Furthermore they agree that ratification of this treaty should in the case of the Powers which have not yet ratified the Opium Convention be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention and to the signature of the special protocol which was opened at The Hague in

accordance with the resolutions adopted by The Third Opium Conference in 1914 for bringing the said Convention into force; and for this purpose the Government of the French Republic is requested to communicate to the Government of the Netherlands a certified copy of the protocol of the deposit of ratifications of this treaty and to invite the Government of the Netherlands in accordance with the provisions of the article to accept and deposit the said certified copy as if it were a deposit of ratifications of the Opium Convention and a signature of the additional protocol of 1914."

(It was agreed to accept the above draft regarding the Opium Traffic for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

(The Meeting then adjourned to Monday afternoon, 21st April, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

PARIS, 19th April, 1919.

[1] Jonkheer R. de Marees van Swinderen, Netherlands Minister at London.

April 21, 3 p.m. (FM–7)

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[37] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 21st April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/7

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/7

FM–7

[Document 37]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 21st April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 21, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Mr. R. Lansing	Mr. McCormick
Secretary	Mr. Legge
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Hoover
British Empire	British Empire
Lord Hardinge	Maj. Gen. W. Thwaites (Item 1 only)
Lord Robert Cecil	M. E. F. Wise
Secretaries	France
Mr. H. Norman	M. Seydoux
Mr. E. Phipps	M. Tirrard
France	Italy
M. Pichon	M. Ricci-Busatti
Secretaries	
M. Berthelot	
M. Arnavon	
Capt. de St. Quentin	
Italy	
M. de Martino	
Secretary	
M. Bertele	
Japan	

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Viscount Chinda

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. G. Burden.
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi. M. Kawai.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Enrolment of German Subjects in Foreign Armies M. Pichon said that the first item on the agenda paper concerned the enrolment of German subjects in foreign armies. The following article had been drafted by Mr. Lansing for insertion in the Treaty of Peace:—

> "Germany hereby agrees from and after the signature of the present treaty not to accredit to any foreign country or to send or to allow any military mission to leave its territory for any foreign country, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country.
>
> The Allied and Associated Powers agree, on their part, from and after the signature of the present treaty not to enroll in their armies, or to attach to their armies or naval or air forces, any German national, for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor;

> and the Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to enroll or employ as aforesaid, any former German national."

M. PICHON, continuing, said that he understood that the draft article would apply only and solely to military instructors, and on that understanding he would be prepared to accept it. He would, however, be glad to have an assurance on that point.

MR. LANSING replied that M. Pichon had correctly interpreted the intention of the article. It was merely intended that Germans should not be employed as instructors in any armies. He himself, would however, be quite prepared, with M. Pichon's approval, to prohibit the enrolment of any German nationals in foreign armies; and, to give effect to this suggestion, he would propose that the concluding portion of the first paragraph of the draft article be altered to read somewhat as follows:—

> "... and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign Power or for the purpose of instruction in the military training of such army to be attached thereto, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country."

Should this proposal be accepted, he would ask that the whole text should be referred back to the Drafting Committee to be redrafted in such a manner as to prohibit the employment of any German nationals in any army.

M. PICHON said that, in his opinion, if the Article were redrafted as suggested by Mr. Lansing, it would prevent the enrolment of German nationals in the French Foreign Legion. He would point out that according to the existing regulations no enquiries were made as to the nationality of men wishing to join the Foreign Legion; but he agreed that the men so enrolled could not be defined as instructors.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that the procedure followed by France in regard to their recruitment for the Foreign Legion would, if

retained, leave a very wide door for the enrolment of Germans in large numbers by other countries. The American Army, for instance, contained large numbers of Germans; but the United States' Government were anxious to get rid of them.

M. PICHON said that, if Mr. Lansing's proposal were adopted, he could only accept the clause under reserve, for the following reasons. Firstly, recruitment for the French Foreign Legion, constituted a military question, which the President of the Council as War Minister would alone be competent to decide. Secondly, the employment of any German nationals in foreign armies constituted a political question, which he thought would have to be submitted to the Council of Four for final decision. Subject to those reservations, he was prepared to accept the draft clause.

MR. LANSING suggested that a new paragraph should be drafted, whereby the Germans would further agree not to admit into Germany persons of foreign nationality either for instruction at a military school or for the purpose of receiving military instruction of any kind.

M. DE MARTINO enquired what was the correct interpretation to be given to the last four words of the draft article, namely:— "any former German national", particularly in regard to the word "former". If those words were intended to mean that Germans who had acquired the nationality of a new country would be excluded from enrolment in the army of the country of their allegiance, he thought very important questions of national law would thereby be involved, and very serious difficulties would arise.

MR. LANSING agreed with M. de Martino, and suggested that the words quoted might be modified to read as follows:— "Any person of German origin naturalised after the signature of the Treaty of Peace."

LORD ROBERT CECIL asked why so much importance was attached by Mr. Lansing to the second paragraph of the draft article. He enquired why the Allied and Associated Powers should not be left a free hand in the matter.

M. PICHON agreed. Furthermore, he wished to point out that the clause would be in entire contradiction with the existing laws of France, which allowed the enrolment of volunteers after naturalisation. In his opinion, the second paragraph as it stood at present could not be accepted as long as the present laws existed in France.

MR. LANSING pointed out that unless some regulation to that effect were included in the draft article, certain nations not represented at that Meeting, whose armies had always been organised by German instructors, would continue to employ such instructors, merely naturalising them for the purpose.

M. PICHON agreed. On the other hand, he thought it would be impossible to adopt a text which would be in direct contradiction with the existing laws of the country.

LORD HARDINGE enquired whether the difficulty would not be met by omitting the last two lines of the draft article, namely, the words: "and the Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to enrol or employ as aforesaid, any former German national."

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed to accept the following draft article, which would be referred to the Council of Four for final decision in view of the reservation made by M. Pichon.

> "Germany hereby agrees from and after the signature of the present treaty not to accredit to any foreign country or to send or to allow any military mission to leave its territory for any foreign country, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army of any foreign power or to be attached to such army for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval or aeronautic instruction in any foreign country.

> The Allied and Associated Powers agree, on their part, from and after the signature of the present treaty not to enrol in their armies, or to attach to their armies or naval or air forces, any German national, for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor.")

2. The Establishment of a German Commission at or Near Paris to Facilitate the Conduct of Economic Negotiations M. PICHON said that the next question on the Agenda Paper related to the creation of a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of economic negotiations. The following memorandum dated April 15th 1919, submitted by the Supreme Economic Council had been circulated to the delegates of the Five Great Powers:—

> "With a view to facilitating, giving unity to, and expediting the current negotiations in Germany of the Associated and Allied Powers, in connection with the provision of foodstuffs to Germany, the Supreme Economic Council strongly recommends that the German Government shall be requested to send immediately to a place to be designated in the very near neighbourhood of Paris technical experts on food, shipping, finance, raw materials, trade, and communications.
>
> These delegates should be entrusted by their Government with full power to decide on all questions arising out of the provision of foodstuffs to Germany and on immediate economic relations with Germany.
>
> They should be provided with proper and sufficient means of communication with their Government and with all necessary facilities to enable business to be transacted conveniently and rapidly."

(It was agreed to accept the proposal to establish a German Commission at or near Paris to facilitate the conduct of economic negotiations, as above proposed.)

3. Present Status of the Commissions Set Up Under the Armistice With Germany and Their Relations to the Supreme Economic Council M. PICHON said that a memorandum (See W. C. P. 578) had been submitted by the Supreme Economic Council dealing with such questions as were not economic in their nature, and fell therefore outside the scope of the Supreme Economic Council. The proposals contained in the memorandum had received the approval of the French authorities. Briefly those proposals could be summed up as follows:—

> "1. That an Inter-Allied Commission, consisting of four Commissioners, one from each Ally concerned with the administration of the occupied territories, should, together with an Italian liaison officer, be set up with full authority to co-ordinate the administration of the four Army Commands on all economic, industrial and food questions, in accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the Supreme Economic Council.
> 2. That orders should be issued under the authority of the Supreme War Council to the Army Commands in the various areas, that directions given by the Commission shall be uniformly executed throughout the whole area."

MR. LANSING enquired for what period of time the proposed Inter-Allied Commission would be expected to function.

M. PICHON explained that the Supreme Economic Council had only been created for the period of the armistice. Consequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty came to be signed, the armistice would end, and the Supreme Economic Council would cease to function, unless steps were taken to prolong its existence. The same procedure would obviously apply to the new proposed Inter-Allied Commission.

LORD ROBERT CECIL agreed.

MR. LANSING said that on that understanding he was quite willing to accept the proposals contained in the memorandum submitted by the Supreme Economic Council for the Council of Ten.

(It was agreed to accept the proposals contained in the Memorandum submitted by the Supreme Economic Council. See W. C. P. 578.)

(The Meeting then adjourned to Tuesday afternoon April 22nd at 3.00 p.m.)

PARIS, 21st April, 1919.

April 23, 3 p.m. (FM–8)

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[38] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 23rd April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 23, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/8

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/8

FM–8

[Document 38]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 23rd April, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 23, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. Henry White	Captain L. McNamee
Secretary	Colonel E. G. Gorrell
Mr. L. Harrison	Captain Perrin
British Empire	Dr. R. H. Lord
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	Mr. J. F. Dulles
Secretaries	Dr. Seymour
Mr. H. Norman	Dr. S. E. Mezes
Mr. E. Phipps	British Empire
France	Sir Eyre Crowe
M. Pichon	Sir Herbert J. Read
Secretaries	Sir Robert Garran
M. Arnavon	Brig. General P. R. C. Groves
Capt. de St. Quentin	Lt. Col. J. H. M. Cornwall
Italy	Capt. E. H. Tindal Atkinson
M. de Martino	France
Secretary	M. Simon
M. Bertele	M. Cambon
Japan	M. de Peretti
H. E. Baron Makino	Capt. Roper
	Italy

Marquis della Torretta
M. Piacentini
Commdt. Guidoni

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham
France	Capt. A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi
Japan	M. Kawai

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. Pichon asked Mr. White to read the draft Article which he understood had been prepared by the American delegation.

Article for Insertion in Treaty of Peace, Freeing From Responsibility to Germany, Powers Which Broke Off Diplomatic and Commercial Relations Mr. White read the following draft which had been prepared by Mr. Lansing, in accordance with the general principle agreed to by all Powers:—

> "Germany hereby agrees not to make any pecuniary claim of any kind directly or indirectly against any of the Allied and Associated belligerent Powers, or against any of the Powers which have severed diplomatic relations with her, based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present treaty. All such claims, whether by Governments, states, municipalities, corporations, or private individuals, are hereby declared to be barred, and finally extinguished."

M. Pichon inquired whether any delegates had any comments to make on this draft.

MR. BALFOUR said that the draft appeared to him to be unobjectionable, but he would enquire whether it had been before the Drafting Committee; if not, it would seem reasonable that it should be referred to it after the meeting had considered it in principle.

MR. WHITE concurred that if the Council approved the tenor of the proposed Article, the draft should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(The proposed Article was approved in principle, and the American draft was referred to the Drafting Committee for adaptation and insertion among the clauses of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.)

2. The following draft was before the meeting:—

1. Articles for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace Giving the Allied and Associated Powers the Right To Fly and Alight on Enemy Territory After the Conclusion of Peace Without Reciprocity "The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall while exercising any rights of passage or landing in Germany enjoy full national treatment particularly in case of distress by land or sea.
2. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall, while in transit to any other State, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing.
3. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of Allied and Associated States, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regard charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation. In addition to the aerodromes mentioned above Germany undertakes to provide and construct aerodromes in such other places as may, within one year from the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace, be designated for this purpose by the Allied and Associated

States and the provisions as to charges mentioned above shall apply in the case of any such aerodromes.

4. All certificates of nationality, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licences, issued or rendered valid by any of the Allied or Associated States shall be recognised by Germany as valid and as equivalent to corresponding certificates and licences issued to German aircraft.
5. As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment accorded to aircraft of the most favoured nation.
6. Germany undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying above its territory shall comply with the Rules as to Lights and Signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made between the Allied and Associated States.
7. The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until such time as Germany (is admitted either to the League of Nations or,) by consent of the Allied and Associated States, is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.

NOTE: Similar clauses can be adapted for application to other enemy powers."

M. PICHON said that he understood this draft was agreed to by the French and British Delegations.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had examined the draft together with his experts, and the only article which appeared to him questionable was Article 3. The second clause of this Article stipulated that the Germans should construct aerodromes wherever it might appear convenient to the Allied and Associated Powers to have aerodromes established. This, he thought, was an irritating clause, and one from which the Allies would derive little benefit. He raised no objection to

the first clause in the third Article, but the second clause appeared to him unreasonable, and he would prefer to suppress it.

MR. WHITE expressed agreement with Mr. Balfour.

M. DE MARTINO said he was informed that the object of this provision was to give power to demand the creation of aerodromes in Germany, which might be required for the establishment of big International air routes. It was quite possible that the Germans might exhibit systematic ill-will towards international arrangements of this kind. Without some such clause as the one under discussion the Allies would have no power to enforce compliance from them.

MR. BALFOUR admitted that there was much force in the argument put forward by M. de Martino. He pointed out, however, that for traffic from east to west, there already existed in Germany a sufficient number of aerodromes. The use of these aerodromes by the Allied and Associated Powers was ensured by the first part of Article 3. The second part of Article 3 stipulated that the Allied and Associated Powers must signify their wishes within one year of the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace. He questioned whether this interval was sufficient to give the means of fulfilling M. de Martino's purpose.

M. DE MARTINO said that he did not wish to insist, in as much as he felt that the obvious advantage of facilitating international traffic would ultimately be sufficient to prevail over any remaining ill-will from the Germans. It would alone in time, induce them to build the desired aerodromes.

BARON MAKINO agreed to the suppression of the second clause of Article 3.

M. PICHON then declared this clause suppressed and the remainder of the Article accepted.

CAPTAIN MCNAMEE said that he had a comment to make on Article 7. This Article provided for the admission of Germany to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, either as a

consequence of admission to the League of Nations, or by consent of the Allied and Associated States. He pointed out that this was inconsistent with the Convention, itself, which contained no provision for the adhesion of Germany. Article 40 of that Convention provided that powers which had not taken part in the present war should be admitted to adhere, but there was no provision for Powers other than the signatories which had taken part in the war.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee with the object of reconciling the two texts.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that there was really no contradiction as the Commission dealing with the Convention on Aerial Navigation had never intended to exclude Germany for ever from the Convention. He thought the period after which Germany might be admitted was a matter for the Supreme Council to decide. The present text of the Convention was not final, and was being considered by the Drafting Committee of the Commission. A change could easily be made in order to produce harmony between the Convention itself and the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty.

CAPTAIN MCNAMEE expressed the opinion that there should be a time limit expressed; otherwise there was an appearance of tampering indefinitely with the sovereignty of Germany.

M. PICHON said that if this were regarded as a derogation to German sovereignty, Germany would have to complain of many other such. The same might be alleged with regard to her admission to the League of Nations, which could only be by the consent of the original members.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the clause contained two alternatives; one, that Germany should become a party to the Convention as soon as admitted to the League of Nations; secondly, that she might become a party to the Convention when the Allied and Associated Powers consented. He was personally willing only to state the first alternative, should the American Delegates prefer it.

CAPTAIN MCNAMEE said that he preferred the second alternative.

M. PICHON said in that case, it would be preferable to maintain both.

MR. WHITE said that he would prefer to reserve consent of the American Delegation to this Article until he had had time to consult Mr. Lansing, who was an authority on International Law.

CAPTAIN ROPER observed that the preservation of both alternatives in the Article was advantageous to Germany, as she might be admitted to the Convention before becoming party to the League of Nations. Commercial reasons might make it desirable to allow this.

(The draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty as stated above, with the omission of the second sentence in Article 3, and subject to the agreement of Mr. Lansing, were adopted.

It was further decided to ask the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the Convention on International Air Navigation to adapt the Convention to the above Articles.)

3. The Meeting had before it a French proposal for the text of which see Appendix "A".

Articles for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace Regarding the Disposal of the German Colonies MR. BALFOUR said that he had one general observation to make. The French Delegation proposed an elaborate code applicable only to German Colonies. He asked whether it would not be simpler to apply to such territory stipulations already made for European territory to be ceded by Germany. He was not aware of any reason which necessitated a different system in Togoland, for instance, from the system imposed in territory to be ceded to Poland, or to any other country in Europe.

M. PICHON said perhaps the Drafting Committee might be able to judge whether there were colonial cases which were not covered by the principles laid down for European territory. It was desirable to see that all cases were covered, and he therefore suggested that the proposals be referred to the Drafting Committee.

M. SIMON said that there was little analogy between the way Germany was asked to part from European territory, and that in

which she was compelled to cede territory in Africa or in the Pacific. He gave as an example the demand made on Germany that all European Germans in the Colonies should be repatriated within a certain time.

M. PICHON said that this made it clear that a comparative study was necessary.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he did not deny the existence of differing cases. The differences, he thought however, were rather between the conditions of the various Colonies than between Colonial territory as such and European territory. He suggested, with reference to the former, that it might be better to leave the Mandatory Power freedom to deal with German subjects and property in the territory entrusted to them.

M. PICHON said that, even so, mention of the matter must be made in the Peace Preliminaries. Otherwise the Powers to whom control of Colonial territories was entrusted would be without legal status as regards Germany to take any action concerning German subjects. Some general principles should, therefore, be inserted in the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that as the matter was one of policy it might be as well, before referring it to the Drafting Committee, to have it dealt with by a Commission composed of one expert from each of the five nations.

MR. WHITE expressed the opinion that many of the questions involved had already been dealt with by the Economic and Financial Commissions. The remainder, he thought, should be left to the League of Nations.

M. SIMON said that the task of the Commission suggested by Mr. Balfour would be to adapt to Colonial territory the principles already adopted by the Economic and Financial Commissions.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be possible to refer the question to the Economic Commission.

It was pointed out that this Commission had terminated its work.

BARON MAKINO said that he noticed after reading the proposed Articles that some were of general application while others appeared to concern French interests alone. There were other special interests to be considered. He therefore thought that there should be a body whose task it would be to see that no special cases were missed. He was afraid that the conclusions reached by the Economic Commission might not cover all the special cases relating to the Colonies. The lacunae could be filled by the Commission proposed by Mr. Balfour. He therefore supported Mr. Balfour's proposal.

M. DE MARTINO also expressed his agreement.

M. PICHON said that the task of the Commission would be to take into consideration the decisions of the Economic and Financial Commissions affecting the subject under discussion, to examine to what extent they covered the cases of Colonial territory and, if necessary, to suggest supplementary clauses for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty.

(It was then decided that a Commission, with the terms of reference expressed by M. Pichon, be set up immediately, and that it be asked to report to the Council as early as possible. The following Members were then nominated:—

For United States of America	Mr. G. Beer
For Great Britain	
For France	M. de Peretti
For Italy	M. Piacentini
For Japan	M. nagaoka.)

4. M. PICHON proposed the following draft:—

> Article for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace Regarding Arms Traffic "Germany undertakes to recognise and approve special provisions agreed upon or to be agreed upon by the Allied and Associated Powers with all other Powers, relating to traffic in arms and spirits, as well as other substances considered in the

general Convention of Berlin of February 26th, 1885[1] and of Brussels of July 2nd, 1890."[2]

(This Article was adopted for insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.)

5. M. PICHON said that as M. Cambon was detained in a Meeting of the Central Committee he would ask Mr. Laroche to explain the question.

Report on Czecho-Polish Frontiers, Particularly in the Region of Teschen, W. C. P/625: (a) Region of Spisz and Orava MR. LAROCHE said that there were three questions for examination, that of Teschen, that of Spisz and Orava and that of Ratibor. The line of demarcation between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland in the East had first been fixed so as to follow the crest of the Carpathians. There were a few Polish villages south of that line, but it had been held preferable to follow the crest as offering a natural frontier, which, moreover, had the advantage of being identical with the administrative frontier between Galicia and the Hungarian province south of it. This solution preserved established administrative habits.

At the request of the Polish delegates who appealed to ethnic considerations, the matter was studied afresh by the Commission on Polish affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak affairs jointly.

This re-examination confirmed the conclusions previously reached regarding the region of Orava. The frontier following the watershed appeared incontestably the best.

As regards the region of Spisz, the Special Commission made some modifications; the frontier in this region did not follow the crest of the mountains. A frontier geographically more satisfactory was adopted which yielded some dozen villages to the Poles. The possession of Orava, on the other hand, would have given the Poles a footing in the upper valleys of Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no criticisms to make. The question had been studied in a most careful manner, not by a committee

which might have been suspected of partiality, but by two committees jointly, both extremely well-informed of the questions in hand. This mixed commission had reached an almost unanimous conclusion and he did not feel competent to question what had been decided.

(The Report of the Joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Commissions dated April 6th, 1919 (WCP/625) relating to the regions of Spisz and Orava was adopted.)

(b) Region of Teschen M. LAROCHE said that this region had been the subject of bitter contest between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks. The larger part of the region was Polish but it also contained a considerable number of Czechs. The object of the controversy was firstly, the mining district of Karwin, secondly, the railway line running east and west from Cracow to Ratibor and the line Oderberg–Teschen–Jablunkau, requisite to establish communications in the Czecho-Slovak State with the Slovak regions south of the Carpathian.

The Duchy of Teschen was part of regions attached to Austria and the view had been frequently put forward in the Commission that the Duchy should be attached to Galicia, also formerly part of Austria. In reality the district had been chiefly connected with Hungary, whereas Poland would mainly be constituted out of territory taken from Russia and Silesia.

The ethnological question had been taken into account. One district had been assigned to Poland and the three districts of Friedek, Freistadt and Teschen were assigned to the Czecho-Slovak State. The question was really a larger question—that of reconciling the Czechs and the Poles. On the Czech side the economic argument has been used showing the absolute necessity of coal and coke for the new State. On the Polish side ethnological reasons had been given first place and economic reasons had also been alleged; but Poland was able to find coal elsewhere. As to the railway lines 4 delegations voted in favour of the partition described; the Italian Delegation offered a line more favourable to the Poles.

At an earlier stage a solution had been unanimously accepted which left the eastern portion to the Poles, keeping for the Czechs the railway line Oderberg-Jablunkau, giving to the Poles the town of Oderberg and the line Cracow-Ratibor. This solution was impracticable.

At the request of a delegation from Teschen the creation of an independent State was considered but the proposal was rejected. It would have set up in the centre of Europe at a very point where national struggles are so acute, a frail state unable to survive.

It then became necessary to consider the attribution of this region as a whole to one State or its partition. Partition was unanimously agreed on, even by the Italian Delegation, though the latter proposed a slightly different line of demarcation.

This long summary indicated the care with which the Commission had dealt with this delicate matter. Though there was not unanimity, 4 delegates had adopted a line slightly at variance from the first; because, seeing that an ideal line was not to be found, they thought it best to disturb as little as possible the administrative habits of the populations concerned. The division proposed left Bielitz to the Poles and gave to the Czecho-Slovaks 3 districts, one of which was undoubtedly Czech—that of Friedek and the other Freistadt and Teschen, mainly Polish. The Czechs further obtained the mining district of Karwin and the line connecting Moravia and Slovakia. The Commission was in the following dilemma; it must either reject the ethnological principle or sacrifice the economic future of the country. The Teschen Commission had proposed a line ethnologically more accurate but it was thought undesirable to cut in two the mining district of Karwin which represents an economic unit chiefly in relation with Czecho-Slovak districts. Many of the delegates reluctantly abandoned the ethnological principle, but nevertheless did so in the hope that in a few years the passions of the moment would be appeased and that economic interests would preserve their importance. The Italian Delegation nevertheless had held fast to a slightly different line. The majority was unwilling to neglect ethnological considerations entirely and concluded that the feelings of the populations might more easily be appeased if they were not too

directly in contact with Czecho-Slovak administration. In consideration of the mixture of races, tempered no doubt by community of interest, it appeared desirable to arrange for local autonomy in as large measure as possible for this region, by common agreement between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. Finally, though the economic reasons were more vital to the Czechs than to the Poles, the latter had not been sacrificed in this respect and the Commission had suggested that an economic agreement be made at once in favour of the Poles in order that friction should in future be avoided.

M. MARTINO said that he proposed to explain briefly the slightly different point of view of the Italian Delegation, especially as the American Delegates at the beginning had appeared to share that point of view themselves. The Italian Delegation was of the opinion that the solution just explained to the Meeting did not take sufficiently into account the Ethnological conditions, and that it damaged Polish economic interests. No doubt economic unity deserved consideration, but as regards communications this consideration should not be too narrowly adhered to, seeing that there were quite separate mines in the district. Many Polish industries in these areas depended on local coal; these industries should not be sacrificed. It was true that Poland had coal elsewhere but this coal was far distant. The solution adopted by the majority gave no coal to Poland. The Italian proposal would give Poland three to four million tons out of a yearly output of eleven million tons. From the ethnological point of view the majority solution handed over to Czecho-Slovakia a Polish population of 167,000 souls. This was a great danger and various persons lately returned from these regions asserted that this would produce a very perilous future for the country. The Italian Delegation considered therefore that the line it proposed safeguarded national sentiment to a greater degree, as it only attributed 50,000 Poles to the Czecho-Slovak state. It also divided the mining resources more equitably, in the proportion of one quarter to Poland and three quarters to Czecho-Slovakia. Finally, out of the four railway lines, the frontier only cut the line Oderberg-Teschen. To preserve Czecho-Slovak interests all that was required was to put down a connecting line, no longer than 15 kilometres, which would make the whole line independent. While this work was

in hand the line might be worked under the control of the Allies. Further, this shortening of the line would be very favourable to the Czecho-Slovaks as goods sent from Prague to Jablunkau would be saved the detour to the North via Teschen. It would seem therefore that the connecting line was sure to be built at some date. Lastly, the agitation among the mining population of Karwin must be taken into account. There were among this population more than 20,000 Poles absolutely determined to be attached to Poland. The Italian Delegation did not think that the proposal for wide local autonomy would satisfy the ethnological and economic desiderata of the Poles. The Italian Delegation therefore requested the Council to consider their proposal, which like the proposal of the majority, only sought the best means of reconciling two future states which ought to preserve friendly relations.

MR. WHITE said that Mr. Lansing who was unfortunately unwell, had asked him to make a statement on his behalf. He greatly regretted that Mr. Lansing had been unable to attend as he had studied the question very carefully. Mr. Lansing did not consider that the decision on the subject of Teschen was very urgent, as it did not affect the frontiers of Germany with which the Conference was at present concerned. Mr. Lansing thought that it would be far better that representatives of the two states, namely, M. Paderewski and M. Benes, should discuss this problem in order that, failing complete agreement, they should at least reduce the divergences of view to the finest possible point. Should there remain any difficulties, an umpire could then be appointed. Mr. Lansing further proposed that the Drafting Committee should slightly modify the article by which Germany undertakes to recognise new states, among others, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, in such a way as to require from Germany recognition of this state "within the frontiers subsequently to be laid down for it by the Allied and Associated Powers." Mr. Lansing's impression was that there had already been conversations between M. Paderewski and M. Benes and that little remained to bring about an agreement between them. Both these statesmen were Allied statesmen and it was in the interests of all that they should come to a mutual agreement if possible, without having any solution imposed upon them by the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR said that the statement just made by Mr. White was very important. He was not aware that M. Paderewski and M. Benes were on the point of reaching an agreement; such a solution was undoubtedly the best as it would avoid any dictated agreement. For this reason, even if the chances were very small, he would prefer to adjourn the discussion, seeing that an immediate solution was not indispensable for the framing of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He therefore supported Mr. White's proposal.

M. PICHON agreed that this appeared to be the best solution and asked whether the Commission had any objection.

M. CAMBON said that he saw none. He would point out, however, that the matter must form part of the Treaty with Austria. The solution therefore should not be too long delayed.

MR. WHITE said he would see M. Paderewski that evening and would, if so desired, beg him to hasten the solution as much as possible.

M. CAMBON said that, as Mr. Lansing had been informed of these conversations, he thought it would be as well if he begged the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Ministers to reach not only a speedy agreement, but one likely to avoid any sense of soreness in future for either party. It must be remembered that Czecho-Slovakia was a state with a curious outline; this state would have to reorganise its means of communication radically. The connecting line proposed by M. de Martino might appear trifling in itself, but was not unimportant in connection with many other works of this kind that would have to be undertaken.

M. MARTINO said that he very willingly supported Mr. White's proposal and was glad to learn that there was good hope of a solution. He had been quite unaware of any such conversations, but he had hopes that an agreement would be reached, as on November 5th last the two governments had already signed a compact,[3] both concerning territorial questions and the possession of the mines.

MR. WHITE said that he would inform Mr. Lansing of the opinions just expressed. Mr. Lansing had not been present at the

conversations mentioned but had only been informed that they had taken place.

M. CAMBON said that as the Council proposed to allow conversations to continue between M. Paderewski and M. Benes, he could only express the wish that they would reach a satisfactory conclusion. He would point out, however, that the agreement of the 5th November had never been executed and for this reason the Commission had prepared a Note, in view of the decision to be taken by the Council, with the object of requesting the Governments at Prague and Warsaw to see that any decision reached should be executed. He suggested that this point should be made clear by Mr. Lansing.

MR. WHITE said he would inform Mr. Lansing.

(It was decided to postpone for the moment any solution of the Teschen question in the hope that M. Paderewski and M. Benes would reach an agreement).

(c) Region of Ratibor M. CAMBON said that this question was intimately connected with the question of Teschen. He thought that the Council might wait for the solution of the latter question.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that it was urgent to settle the Ratibor point as it concerned the frontiers of Germany.

M. LAROCHE said that the Commission had unanimously adopted a line which was submitted to Council. The object of this line was to attach to Moravia certain islands of Moravian population while respecting the Leobschutz-Ratibor line of communication which remained in Polish territory.

(The line of demarcation proposed by the Commissions on Polish and on Czecho-Slovak affairs in their report of April 6th (W. C. P. 625) was accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 24th April, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Clauses Relating to the German Colonies, To Be Inserted in the Preliminaries of Peace[4]

I

The German subjects of European origin may not own property, reside, trade, or practice a profession in the former German colonies except by special authorization to that effect granted by the local authority.

II

Goods of former German colonies shall, upon entering Germany, enjoy without reciprocity the treatment accorded to goods of the mandatory country.

III

All personal and real property of the German State in former German colonies, pass in full right, without any compensation, to the Mandatory Power.

IV

All personal and real properties, belonging to Germans of European origin in the former German colonies, shall become the property of the Government of the Mandatory Power, and the price of these real properties, as fixed by experts, shall be applied in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay in as reparation for damages caused by the war. The German Government shall indemnify the German owners.

V

The German Government shall repatriate, at its own expense, within a period of three months from the date of the signing of the Preliminaries of Peace, those of its European nationals who still actually reside in the German colonies. It shall repatriate, on the

same terms, those of its subjects who are from the mother country and who have taken refuge in the Spanish colonies of the Gulf of Guinea. Natives of the German colonies, now in refuge in these Spanish possessions, shall be left free by the German authorities, upon the signing of the Preliminaries of Peace, to return to their country of origin.

VI

Conventions concluded for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German colonies, as also the sub-concessions or contracts resulting therefrom, whether for the advantage or at the cost of German nationals are cancelled outright.

The compensations to be paid under this head to German nationals, after having been determined by the local courts, shall remain a charge upon the German Government. The total of the amounts thus expended by the German State shall be allowed in deduction of the sums which Germany will have to pay out for reparation of damages caused by the war.

VII

The German Government undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government, reparation for damages suffered by French nationals in the former colony of the Cameroons or in adjoining regions by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals before or during the period of hostilities.

VIII

The conventions which determined the ownership of territories situated formerly in the German zones of the continent of Africa, having now given place to the provisions of the present treaty, the German Government recognizes that claims which might be presented in reliance upon the terms of those earlier instruments, are hereafter without purpose. Surety-bonds, guarantees of accounts, advances, etc., which would have been realized, by virtue of these

instruments, in favor of the German Government, are transferred to the French Government.

IX

Germany renounces in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles in her oversea possessions.

[1] Great Britain, C. 4739, Africa No. 3 (1886).

[2] Great Britain, C. 6048, Africa No. 7 (1890).

[3] For text of compact, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz*, annexe B 4, pp. 27–31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.3114/5)

[4] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

April 26, 3 p.m. (FM–9)

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[39] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, April 26th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/9

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/9

FM–9

[Document 39]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, April 26th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K. G.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Arnavon
Capt. de Saint Quentin
M. de Bearn

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Capt. McNamee, Colonel Gorrell, Lieut. Kiely — For Question I.

Dr. Lord. For Questions II–V.

Mr. Beer. For Question VI.

Rear Admiral Long, Brig. Gen. McKinstry — For Question VIII.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Maj. Gen. W. Thwaites
Capt. E. H. Tindal Atkinson
Mr. H. J. Paton
Mr. E. H. Carr
Sir H. J. Read
Mr. H. A. Payne
Mr. E. F. Wise

FRANCE

Secretary	M. Simon
M. Kawai	M. J. Cambon
	General Le Rond
	M. Hermitte
	Lieut. de Percin
	Capt. Roper
	M. de Peretti
	M. M. G. Cahen
	JAPAN
	Lt. Col. Ninomiya

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Maj. A. M. Caccia.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

[1.] Clauses Relating to the Right of Aerial Transit Over Enemy Territory After the Conclusion of Peace M. PICHON, having declared the Meeting open, said that the first item on the Agenda paper related to the right of aerial transit over enemy territory after the conclusion of Peace. The question had come under discussion at the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (I. C. 176),[1] and the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with the omission of the second sentence in Article 3 had been adopted, subject to the agreement of Mr. Lansing.

MR. LANSING said that his chief objection to the proposed articles was that there was no reciprocity about them; Germany was given no rights and it appeared as though the Allied Governments were trying to suppress all economic aerial activity on her part. He thought this was an unfair attitude to assume, and he did not see why Germany was not given the right to pass through the air of other countries

when the Allies reserved for themselves full powers to use the air routes of Germany.

M. PICHON invited attention to Clause 5 of the draft Articles under consideration which read as follows:—"As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy through Germany, treatment according [*accorded*] to aircraft of the most favoured nation".

CAPT. ROPER explained that the Aeronautical Commission in drafting these regulations had not intended to suppress Germany's commercial aerial activity. Indeed, that was not a question which the Commission could have dealt with, as it constituted a political matter which fell outside its functions. The Commission had originally intended to put a stop to all German aerial activity, but the Supreme Council had disapproved of any such arrangement. The object the Commission had kept in view in drafting the Articles under consideration had not been to interfere with Germany's freedom of the air; but to prevent her from interfering with the free passage of Allied and Associated aircraft over German territory.

LORD HARDINGE explained that from a military point of view it was realised that aeroplanes used for commercial purposes could easily be converted to warlike purposes. He invited attention, however, to Clause 7 of the draft articles, wherein it was clearly laid down that as soon as Germany entered the League of Nations she would obtain the same facilities as were at present claimed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. PICHON added that under Article 7, Germany could also at any moment ask to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, and she would thereby obtain the facilities now claimed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made no provision for a former enemy country to become a party to that Convention. In this connection he invited attention to Article 40 of the Convention.

CAPT. ROPER explained that that Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission in drafting these articles had confined itself to aeronautical matters. It could not take cognisance of political matters. The Commission had provided for the participation of neutral countries in the Convention: but the question as to whether enemy countries should also be permitted to adhere to the Convention was a political matter and consequently the Commission did not feel authorised to determine the conditions under which enemy countries could become parties to the Convention.

MR. LANSING said that the fact remained that no provision had been made for Germany to become a party to the Convention.

M. PICHON pointed out that it would be difficult to make provisions to cover every possible case; but it had been clearly stated in the draft articles under consideration that with the consent of the Allied and Associated States, Germany would be permitted to adhere to the Convention.

MR. LANSING thought that this regulation by itself would not suffice unless a similar provision were entered in the Convention relating to Air Navigation.

M. PICHON pointed out that Germany would also be entitled to adhere to the Convention as soon as she gained admittance to the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING inquired what would happen if Germany never joined the League of Nations.

M. PICHON thought that she would in that case hardly be qualified to be a party to the Convention.

MR. LANSING said that the crux of the whole matter lay in the fact that Germany would not be entitled to participate in the Convention until she became a member of the League of Nations, and her entry into the latter would depend upon the assent of her economic rivals, who would necessarily be opposed to her obtaining any aerial commercial privileges.

CAPTAIN ROPER thought that some confusion appeared to exist between the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, submitted by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission, and the Convention relating to International Air navigation. The latter Convention merely dealt with the regulation of air traffic. Neutrals were entitled to adhere to that Convention by a simple declaration of their intention to do so; but enemy countries could only be admitted with the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission had attempted to draft certain regulations to cover the period between the signature of the Treaty of Peace and Germany's adhesion to the international air navigation Convention. During that period it was essential that the Allied and Associated Governments should have the free use of the air routes across Germany without any possibility of interference by the enemy countries. Accordingly, the Aeronautical Commission in the first place, submitted to the Supreme Council a recommendation to that effect. Subsequently, under instructions from the Supreme Council, that recommendation had been put into the form of the seven Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, which were now under consideration. He would point out, however, that the seven Articles in question were intended to deal merely with the intermediary period above-mentioned.

MR. LANSING maintained that no method had been established whereby Germany could become a party to the air navigation Convention.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that in accordance with draft Article 7, Germany could become a party to the Convention either by gaining admittance to the League of Nations, or by making a demand to adhere to the Convention.

MR. LANSING enquired why Allied aircraft should not be permitted to participate in commercial enterprises in Germany.

CAPTAIN ROPER drew attention to Article 5, wherein it was clearly stated that:—

> "As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment according [*accorded*] to aircraft of the most favoured nation".

He thought that Article covered the particular point raised by Mr. Lansing.

MR. LANSING held that the words "in transit" should specifically be mentioned.

MR. PICHON thought that the words "internal air traffic ... throughout Germany" would be interpreted to mean "in transit".

MR. LANSING expressed the view that Article 5 would give tremendous opportunities for smuggling.

CAPTAIN ROPER thought that the same objection would apply to Allied aircraft flying from one Allied country to another in transit through a third Allied country.

MR. LANSING disagreed and pointed out that in accordance with the Convention the Allied Powers had a right to signal to Allied craft to land; whilst Germany would have no such power.

CAPTAIN TINDAL ATKINSON asked permission to make certain explanations in regard to the draft Articles under consideration.

The first Article was intended to deal with aircraft entering Germany from foreign countries and calling at two or more places. All such aircraft would be under the type of control that Germany might wish to impose on its own aircraft.

Article 2 had been inserted not so much with the object of securing to the Allied and Associated States the right of flying about over Germany, without reciprocity, as to obtain free transit through Germany to eastern countries, such as Poland, Czecho Slovakia, and so on.

Article 5 had been drawn up to meet a special case. In accordance with the International Air Navigation Convention, any country could reserve to itself the right of traffic between two national aerodromes. The regulations contained in Article 5 were extremely moderate. The Allied and Associated States thereby merely claimed that their aircraft should enjoy throughout Germany the privileges accorded to aircraft of the most favoured nation in regard to internal commercial air traffic while leaving to Germany the right of "cabotage". He thought Mr. Lansing's objection in regard to the control of aircraft in transit over Germany was fully met by inference in Article 1. In his opinion, it would be impossible, without reproducing all the Articles of the International Air Navigation Convention, to cover all matters, and in the draft Articles under consideration an attempt had merely been made to cover the principal points.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace were to be imposed for purely military or for economic purposes.

CAPTAIN TINDAL ATKINSON said he would explain the reason for the exclusion of Germany from the Convention. The Aeronautical Commission had originally passed a Resolution to the effect that owing to the great danger due to the facility of converting commercial craft into military craft, the use of aircraft in Germany for a given period should be entirely suppressed. That proposal had been rejected by the Supreme Allied Council. Consequently, in order to keep some control over German aircraft activity for a period of time, the exclusion of Germany from the Convention had been contemplated by the inclusion of Article 40 of the Convention. He admitted that the Article in question would have the effect of placing Germany into a ringed fence. That is to say, she would not be able to fly outside her own frontiers. But he maintained that this Article had been inserted not with any object of obtaining economic profit for the Allied and Associated Governments, but with the object of securing free transit across Germany, which, in his opinion, constituted a far more valuable asset.

M. PICHON inquired whether Mr. Lansing had any formal objection to offer to the draft Articles as they now stood.

MR. LANSING replied that he seriously objected to Article 7, namely:—

> "The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until such time as Germany is admitted either to the League of Nations or by consent of the Allied and Associated States is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States."

Furthermore, under the draft Articles, Germany would be compelled to allow all aircraft to fly freely across Germany. On the other hand, she would have no power over such, aircraft whilst in German air and she could not signal to Allied machines to land. In his opinion, this would be a source of smuggling since false signals and markings could be used.

CAPTAIN ROPER explained that the draft Articles submitted by the Aeronautical Commission were merely proposals and the Council naturally had full power to modify them in any manner it thought best in order to prevent any injustice being done. On the other hand, he maintained that Article 7 was of the greatest importance since the whole of the clauses hung on it. That clause alone provided for the intermediary period between the signing of the Treaty of Peace and the time when Germany would adhere to the Convention. Furthermore, he would invite attention to the fact that Article 7 had been unanimously adopted by all the representatives, including the technical American experts.

MR. LANSING, nevertheless, objected to it. He proposed that Article 7 should be amended to read as follows:—

> "The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until 1st January, 1923, provided that unless prior to that time enemy countries admitted either to the League of Nations or by consent of the Allied and Associated States are permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States."

He considered that some definite period of time should be laid down.

(The amendment to Clause 7 proposed by Mr. Lansing was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING, continuing, said that he still awaited an answer as to whether the draft Articles under consideration dealt with a Military or an economic question. In his opinion, that constituted a vital matter.

LORD HARDINGE thought that the draft Articles related partly to both.

MR. LANSING enquired whether it was really purposed to discourage the manufacture of aircraft in Germany.

M. PICHON pointed out that in the Military terms of Peace, a clause had been inserted dealing with the subject of aircraft.

MR. LANSING held that if the Articles under consideration dealt with a Military matter, all the provisions should apply only to craft that were public property, the property of the State.

LORD HARDINGE proposed, in order to meet Mr. Lansing's objections in regard to Articles 1 and 2, that the following additional clause should be inserted after Clause 3:—

(New Clause 4.)

> "The rights of passage, transit, and landing provided in clauses 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the observance by the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States of such necessary regulation[s] as Germany may impose in the interests of her own municipal legislation, but such regulations shall be applied without obstruction to German aircraft, and to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States."

MR. LANSING said he would accept the proposed new clause.

CAPTAIN ROPER pointed out that in accordance with draft Article 6 the Germans undertook to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying over German territory, should comply with the rules as to lights and signals, rules of the air, and rules for air

traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes, contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, made between the Allied and Associated States. He thought that Lord Hardinge's proposal was in conflict with the rule he had just mentioned.

MR. LANSING thought that no inconsistency really existed since the Germans were required to accept the rules on this subject laid down by the Convention.

(It was agreed to accept Lord Hardinge's proposed new clause.)

MR. LANSING, continuing, said he would ask the Council to consider the period after 1923, or after the adhesion of Germany to the League of Nations or to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation. In that connection he wished to propose the following addition to Clause 7, namely:—

> "Provided that if at the end of the period stated any Powers shall not have been admitted to the League of Nations nor permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to national air navigation, any obligations then imposed upon the enemy countries shall be reciprocal between former enemy countries and Allied and Associated Governments, both as to rights and privileges."

CAPTAIN ROPER gathered that this additional clause would place Germany on the same footing as the Allied and Associated Powers, after the 1st January, 1923. He thought if that date coincided with the one fixed by the other Commissions, it would be acceptable; otherwise, in his opinion, the question should be referred to the heads of Governments for decision.

MR. LANSING explained that the 1st January, 1923, had been selected as it was the first day on which any nation a party to the Convention relating to Aerial Navigation could denounce its adherence to the same.

CAPTAIN ROPER explained that the date in question had been chosen on account of the uncertainties connected with the advances which

might be made in aircraft developments in the near future. An early date had to be selected, otherwise the Convention might, in the distant future, be found to be no longer in agreement with the altered circumstances. In other words the date had been fixed purely for technical reasons.

M. PICHON thought it would be very difficult to fix a régime to be applied in 1923 in view of the great changes that might occur in aircraft development. In his opinion, this question should be left to be settled by the League of Nations should it then be in existence; otherwise the matter would, when the time came, have to be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments. He (M. Pichon) was quite willing to accept Mr. Lansing's amendment to the first part of Article 7 limiting the obligations imposed on Germany to 1923, but he could not accept Mr. Lansing's proposals to add a new paragraph to Article 7 relating to reciprocity. He understood, however, that it had been agreed that the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right of determining the régime to be applied to Germany after the 1st January, 1923.

LORD HARDINGE thought that the aerial situation might by 1923 have so greatly changed that it would be unwise for the Governments at present to say what should then be done. He wished to invite attention to the fact that the parties to the Convention were first entitled to denounce their adhesion to the Convention on the 1st January, 1923.

CAPTAIN MCNAMEE called attention to the fact that in 1923 Germany would under the Articles as they stood at present be free to refuse the right of flight to the Allies across her territory.

MR. LANSING expressed his willingness to withdraw his proposed addition to Article 7 and so to omit all reference to reciprocity.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING, continuing, proposed that the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the Convention on International Air Navigation should be instructed to redraft Article 40 of the

Convention so as to permit Germany and other enemy countries to adhere under certain conditions to the Air Convention should they so desire.

(This was agreed to.)

(The following draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty were adopted:—

1. "The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall while exercising any rights of passage or landing in Germany enjoy full national treatment particularly in case of distress by land or sea.
2. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall, while in transit to any other State, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing, subject to such regulations as Germany may establish which will De applicable to the aircraft of both Germany and the Allied and Associated Governments.
3. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.
4. The rights of passages, transit and landing provided for in Clauses 1, 2 and 3, are subject to the observance by the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States of such necessary Regulations as Germany may enforce in the interests of her own Municipal legislation, but such regulations shall be applied without obstruction to German Aircraft and to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States.
5. All certificates of nationality, certificates of air worthiness, certificates of competency and licenses, issued or rendered valid by any of the Allied or Associated States shall be recognised by Germany as valid and as equivalent to

corresponding certificates and licenses issued to German aircraft.

6. As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment accorded to aircraft of the most favoured nation.
7. Rules as to Lights & Signals Germany undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying above its territory shall comply with the Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made between the Allied and Associated States.
8. The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until 1st of January, 1923, unless prior to that time Germany is admitted to the League of Nations or, by consent of the Allied and Associated States, is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.[”]

It was also agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the convention on International Air Navigation should be instructed to redraft Article 40 of the Convention so as to permit Germany and other enemy countries to adhere under certain conditions to the air convention, should they so desire.)

2. M. PICHON called on M. Cambon to explain his proposals relating to the amalgamation of the Warsaw Commission with the Commission on Polish Affairs.

Eventual Amalgamation of the Warsaw Commission With the Commission on Polish Affairs M. CAMBON said that M. Noulens had explained to him in his own name and that of his colleagues on the Warsaw Commission, the desire that the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission sent to Warsaw under his presidency should be amalgamated. The Commission on Polish Affairs, which he had informed of this, considered that it was not entitled to modify, on its own initiative, its own composition, which had been settled by the Supreme Council itself. It wished therefore that the question

asked by M. Noulens should be referred to the Supreme Council for decision.

LORD HARDINGE expressed the view that the mandate accorded to M. Noulens' Commission had come to an end. Consequently the British Delegation thought that Polish Affairs had best be left entirely in the hands of the existing Commission on Polish Affairs, which sat here in Paris under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon.

MR. LANSING said he personally objected strongly to increasing the size of Commissions, if it could possibly be avoided. He considered that M. Cambon's Commission on Polish Affairs could, if it so desired, confer with the individual members of M. Noulens' Commission. That is to say, in his opinion, M. Noulens' Commission should be dissolved and individual members could be called by M. Cambon's Commission to give evidence, if so required.

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed that the Warsaw Commission presided over by M. Noulens should forthwith be dissolved.)

3. M. CAMBON said that the following note had been drawn up and distributed to all Members present:—

> "The work of the Commission on Polish Affairs in considering the frontiers of Poland has reached the following stage:
>
> (*a*) Note From the Commission on Polish Affairs Asking for Instructions Regarding the Frontiers To Be Assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia Proposals in regard to the frontier between Poland and Germany were submitted in Report No. 1 dated March 12, 1919;
> (*b*) Proposals in regard to the frontier between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State were submitted in the note dated April 6, 1919, which was presented jointly by the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs;
> (*c*) Proposals in regard to the Eastern frontier of Poland north of the latitude of Kholm were submitted in Report No. 2

dated April 21, 1919. No proposal has been made in regard to a frontier south of this latitude owing to the close connection between this part of the frontier and the frontier to be determined in Eastern Galicia;

(*d*) In regard to Eastern Galicia the Commission consider themselves at present debarred from making any definite recommendation as to the frontier in view of the decision taken by the Supreme Council at the meeting on the 19th March, 1919[2] that the Polish and Ukrainian Representatives should not be heard with regard to their respective claims in Eastern Galicia until the cessation of hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian troops in that region.

In view of the constitution at Paris of an Inter-Allied Commission to establish an armistice between the Polish and Ukrainian troops there appear to be grounds for hoping that a truce may be arranged in the near future, and accordingly, that it would be possible for the Commission to undertake the description of the frontier in Eastern Galicia.

Elsewhere, the Commission has been guided primarily by ethnic considerations modified to a certain extent by various economic factors and the necessities of transport.

In regard to Galicia, however, if primarily ethnographical considerations were followed it is certain that in spite of the large Polish minority in Eastern Galicia the frontier of Poland would run west of Lemberg, unless an area containing a Ruthenian majority were to be assigned to Poland.

This question thus introduces problems of general policy involving consequences of the utmost gravity. Several solutions may be considered, namely; the creation of an independent state, the establishment of an autonomous state under the control of the League of Nations, the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and the Ukraine. Either of these might, owing to the attraction which Russia would undoubtedly exercise upon a weak Slav State, result in the extension of the Russian frontier to the Carpathians.

> On the other hand, it may be thought desirable to consider the political advantage which might result from the establishment of a common frontier between Poland and Roumania while securing for Eastern Galicia adequate guarantees in the way of local autonomy.
>
> The Commission is of opinion that it is not possible to settle the frontiers of Poland in this region without determining at the same time the future status of Eastern Galicia. Considering that this question goes somewhat beyond its original mandate, the Commission respectfully approaches the Supreme Council with the request that it may be given:
>
> Either explicit instructions as to the basis on which to carry out its work in this region; Or a new mandate authorising it to proceed with the study of this question."

MR. LANSING thought it would be wise for the Commission on Polish Affairs to continue its study with an extension of authority, which would empower it to consider the question not only from the ethnic, economic and strategic point of view, but also from all other standpoints, and since political questions were involved, their deliberations should be especially confidential.

LORD HARDINGE said that he did not oppose Mr. Lansing's views, but he thought the question raised was so important as to be too big for a Commission to settle. In his opinion, the Commission could be asked to make a recommendation, but it could not be expected to settle the question.

MR. LANSING agreed. He had not intended to suggest that the Commission should "settle" the question. In his opinion, the Commission should not even make a recommendation: it should only make a full report clearly indicating the possible solutions, taking into consideration all the different aspects of the case.

LORD HARDINGE thought the only objection to that proposal was the great delay that would be incurred, as time was now so short.

M. CAMBON explained that no-one belonging to the Commission had ever suggested doing more than submitting a report, which would naturally be dealt with in the most confidential manner. The Commission would work as rapidly as possible; but he wished to invite the attention of the Council to the fact that the question under discussion did not concern the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The question related to Austria and Russia. Therefore, without wishing in any way to criticise the work of the Supreme Council, he thought he would be a bold man who would attempt to fix the date when the Russian question would finally come under settlement. For two months he had been trying to obtain permission to interview the Lithuanian representatives in Paris, but so far he had received no mandate.

M. MAKINO said he was prepared to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal.

(It was agreed to authorise the Commission on Polish Affairs to proceed with the study of the frontier to be assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia and to submit a full report.)

4. Note From the Commission on Polish Affairs Asking Whether It Should Hear Representatives of the Russian Political Conference M. CAMBON said that the Commission on Polish Affairs had now reached the study of the future frontiers between Poland and Russia. All possible information had been collected, but so far no representative of Russia had been heard. There existed in Paris at the present moment a Russian Political Conference under the presidency of Prince Lvoff, which represented all Anti-Bolshevik parties in Russia. This conference had asked to be heard, and he was authorised by his Commission to inquire whether this could be done. In this connection he wished to invite attention to the fact that during the last few days an incident had occurred which had a direct bearing on the question he now put to the Council. The Commission on Polish Affairs having advised the Supreme Council that it would be advisable in continuance of its work to hear the Warsaw representatives and that it was not its intention to call them together unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Council; the Council of Foreign Ministers had decided at their meeting on April 15th[3] to instruct the Commission on Polish Affairs to continue its study of the

territorial questions relative to Poland. The Commission on Polish Affairs decided under these conditions that the Sub-Committee specially charged with the preliminary study of the Eastern Frontier of Poland would call before it the Eurasian [*?*] representatives delegated by the Lithuanian Assembly, namely, Dr. Walderman [*Voldemar*] and Mr. Ytchas. These gentlemen had appeared on the 23rd April in compliance with a summons addressed to them. They had immediately read a letter addressed to the President of the Peace Conference which had been circulated.[4] After having taken cognisance of this document the Sub-Committee had unanimously agreed that the hearing of Dr. Walderman [*Voldemar*] and Mr. Ytchas should be postponed and they accordingly withdrew immediately. The Commission on Polish Affairs, therefore, now requested the Supreme Council to instruct them as to the action to be taken in regard to the Lithuanian representatives and as to the answer to be given them. The Commission on Polish Affairs also considered it its duty to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that the work relative to the Eastern Boundaries of Poland would be greatly facilitated by hearing the competent Russian representatives. But the Commission did not consider itself authorised to take a decision on its own account in regard to this matter and begged the Supreme Council to inform it as soon as possible if it might convoke the members of the Russian Political Conference now convened in Paris.

MR. LANSING enquired what was going to be done about the Lithuanians.

M. CAMBON thought that the Commission could only wait until the attitude of the Lithuanians had somewhat changed. The Commission on Polish Affairs had been appointed to consider Polish interests. The Commission was naturally anxious to hear the views of all people surrounding Poland, but the Lithuanians had stated that they were not prepared to give information to the Commission on Polish Affairs, as they wished a special Commission to be appointed to deal only with Lithuanian affairs. He thought under these circumstances, it would be unwise for the Allied and Associated Governments to give way to their pretensions.

M. PICHON said that on the 23rd April, 1919, a letter had been addressed by the Lithuanian Delegation to the President, M. Clemenceau, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows:—

> "In spite of the difficulties above-mentioned the Delegation has decided to send the Members summoned by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference with instructions to give to the Commission on Polish Affairs all information relating to the frontiers between Lithevia [*Lithtunia*] and Poland".

M. CAMBON said that under these circumstances the Commission on Polish Affairs should now proceed to hear the Lithuanians.

MR. LANSING thought that instructions should be issued to the Commission on Polish Affairs to call in, and obtain the evidence of, any individual Russians that might be able to give information on the subjects under consideration; but the Commission should not give a hearing to any Russian Delegation or Commission, as such.

(It was agreed that the Commission on Polish Affairs should hear the Lithuanian Delegates and also individual Russians who might be able to give information on the question relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Poland.)

5. M. CAMBON said that the following report dated April 10th, 1919, had been submitted to the Conference by the Conference [*sic*] by the Commission on Polish Affairs:—

> Proposals To Address a Warning in the Name of the Conference to the Polish and Lithuanian Governments to Refrain From Hostilities at Vilna and Grodno "As a result of recent successes gained over the Bolsheviks, the Polish troops on the one hand, and the Lithuanian troops on the other, are at the present moment, at a short distance from one another. The animosity existing between the Lithuanians and the Poles and the occupation by the latter of a part of the Province of Grodno, which the Lithuanians claimed gave cause to fear that an armed conflict between the two parties might take place.

> The Commission on Polish Affairs considered that it would be advisable to take steps immediately to relieve a situation which threatened to provoke a serious incident similar to those which had taken place between the Poles and Lithuanians [*Ukrainians*] in the region of Lemberg. With a view to avoiding such an occurrence, the Commission on Polish Affairs had the honour to recommend to the Supreme Council of the Conference that Marshal Foch be instructed to study means to prevent a conflict between the Lithuanians and Poles, either by bringing about a direct agreement between the Polish and Lithuanian military leaders, or by establishing a line of demarcation which both parties should agree not to cross, or by any other arrangement likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the Poles and Lithuanians and if possible to assure their union against their common adversaries, the Bolsheviks.[”]

MR. LANSING said he had a decided objection to offer to this question being dealt with as a purely military matter, since, in his opinion, at the present moment, it was far more a political question. An Inter-Allied Military Commission was at present on its way to Warsaw, and its work should now be permitted to proceed without hindrance. In his opinion, the Lithuanian Delegation here in Paris, as well as the Polish Delegates, could be informed that whatever decision might be reached at the present moment would in no way affect the final issue.

LORD HARDINGE explained that a few days ago the British Foreign Office had received from Warsaw information similar to that contained in the note read by M. Cambon. Mr. Balfour had asked him to see the Polish representative here in Paris in order to point out to him the grave situation that would be caused by the outbreak of hostilities in Grodno, and to have instructions issued to the Polish Armies. As a result he (Lord Hardinge) had seen M. Zaleski and he had done his utmost to persuade him to approach M. Paderewski in order to put a stop to all hostile operations in the direction of Grodno. The bad effect which the outbreak of any conflicts in that region would have, now that the Polish question had come under discussion at the Peace Conference, were explained to M. Zaleski. If the Polish Government would agree to take action as suggested, he

promised that similar warnings would also be issued to the Lithuanians not to attack the Poles in the direction of Vilna, and not to interfere with the transportation of supplies for Poland along the lines of communication between Grodno and Vilna. M. Zaleski had listened with great interest to these remarks and, in reply, had stated that the relations between the Poles and Lithuanians had recently greatly improved. He had agreed to lose no time in placing the matter before M. Paderewski with a recommendation that he should issue the necessary instructions.

BARON MAKINO said he was prepared to accept Mr. Lansing's proposals.

MR. LANSING said that his proposal implied that the Council should issue the necessary notifications to the Polish and Lithuanian Delegates here in Paris.

M. PICHON pointed out that similar measures to those indicated by Lord Hardinge had apparently also been taken, independently, by each of the Allied Governments.

MR. LANSING proposed that in addition to the note to be issued by the Council to the Polish and Lithuanian Delegates in Paris, the Allied and Associated Governments should also notify their respective representatives in Warsaw to use their good offices to obtain the cessation of hostilities, with a view to an agreement being reached between Poles and Lithuanians in the regions of Vilna and Grodno.

(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should notify the Polish and Lithuanian representatives in Paris that whatever arrangements might be reached at the present moment in order to avoid hostilities in the regions of Vilna and Grodno, would in no way affect the final decision.

It was also agreed that the Allied and Associated Governments should notify their respective representatives in Warsaw, to use their good offices with a view to an agreement being reached between the

Poles and the Lithuanians in the regions of Vilna and Grodno in order to avoid hostilities.)

6. Clauses Relative to the Disposal of the German Colonies M. DE PERETTI said that the Committee appointed to draft clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty, dealing with the question of the disposal of German Colonies, had received instructions to take up all such special cases regarding German Colonies not already covered by other Commissions. As a result the following clauses had been drafted for insertion in the Peace Treaty.

CLAUSES RELATING TO THE GERMAN COLONIES TO BE INSERTED IN THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE

Article I. Germany renounces in favour of the five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions.[*]

Article II. All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over these territories, in the same manner and upon the same terms as such property passes in the case of territory ceded to an Allied or Associated Power. The decision of the local Courts in any dispute as to the nature of such property shall be final.

Article III. The provisions of Section ... Part I (Commercial Relations) and Part IV (Property, Rights and Interests, Article B, paragraphs (*b*), (*c*) and (*i*)) shall apply in the case of these territories whatever be the form of Government adopted for them.

Article IV. The Government exercising authority over such territories may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a profession in them.

Article V. The provisions of article 13 of Annex A of the Report of the Financial Commission shall apply in the case of all agreements concluded with German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German oversea possessions, as well as any sub-concessions, or contracts resulting therefrom which may have been made to or with such nationals.

Article VI. Germany hereby undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the Cameroons or the frontier zone, by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals during the period from 1 January, 1900, to the 1st August, 1914.

Article VII. Germany renounces all rights under the Conventions of the 4th November, 1911,[5] and the 28th September, 1912.[6] She undertakes to pay to the French Government, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by that Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, all the deposits, credits, advances, etc., which may have been effected by virtue of these Acts in favour of Germany.

Article VIII. Germany undertakes to accept and observe the provisions made or to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, or certain of them, with any other Power with regard to the trade in Arms and Spirits as well as the matters dealt with in the General Act of Berlin of 26th February, 1885, and the General Act of Brussels of 2nd July, 1890.

Article IX. The inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.

M. DE PERETTI continuing said that these articles would not apply to the province of Shantung, which would be dealt with separately. The Japanese representative on his Committee had enquired whether the nations acquiring former German territory would have to take over part of the German National Debt. The Committee had agreed that

this question did not fall within its province: but it had been decided to bring the question to the notice of the Supreme Council.

BARON MAKINO said he accepted the clauses relating to the German colonies, subject to the reservation made by the Japanese representative.

(It was agreed that the above clauses relating to the German colonies be adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

(7) M. PICHON said that the Supreme War Council had referred to the Supreme Economic Council the following item for consideration and report:—

> Report of the Committee of the Supreme Economic Council, in Reference to Revictualling of Bavaria "Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels Agreement, it is economically possible to send food independently to Bavaria, apart altogether from the political expediency of doing so."

To that enquiry the following reply dated 8th April, 1919 had been received from the Supreme Economic Council:—

> "Without expressing opinion on the political aspects of this question, the Supreme Economic Council is of opinion that the course proposed would not be from the point of view of food and finance desirable, nor, so far as they can see, possible. But, if any definite proposal for carrying it out is placed before them, they will be ready to give it their consideration."

M. PICHON, continuing, said that he thought the Meeting should merely take note of the answer submitted by the Supreme Economic Council.

(This was agreed to.)

(8) M. GEORGES CAHEN read the following report of the Commission on Prisoners of War:—

“The Commission on Prisoners of War, constituted on the 21st April, 1919, met on the 22nd April, and on account of the urgency of its task, has continued its deliberations daily until the 26th April.

Report of the Inter-Allied Committee of Naval and Military Representatives on the Repatriation of Prisoners The Governments of the five great Allied and Associated Powers were represented as follows:—

General MacKinstry Admiral Long	United States of America.
General Thwaites Admiral Hope	British Empire.
M. Georges Cahen (Directeur au Ministère de la Guerre) Lieut. de Fabre	France.
General Calcagno Admiral Grassi	Italy.
Lieut. Col. Ninomiya	Japan.

The Commission not having received clearly defined instructions, devoted its first deliberations to defining its task. According to the instructions received by the American and British Delegations all questions of a financial character were to be disregarded, such as claims formulated by the Allied and Associated States, whether under the head of regulation of accounts for the maintenance of prisoners of war, or under the head of restitution of costs of relief occasioned by the presence of Allied and Associated prisoners in Germany, or under the head of reparation for damages caused to the states by the presence of their nationals in captivity: claims of a pecuniary character formulated by ex-prisoners of war belonging to the Allies (reimbursement of money or compensation due for damages).

These problems, as a matter of fact, have been examined and specially treated by the Commission on Reparation.

At the suggestion of the American Delegation, furthermore, it was considered that it was better for the Commission to put aside any examination of the penalties to be imposed on German Authorities alleged to be guilty of mal-treatment of Allied or Associated prisoners of war during their captivity. The responsibility of the authors of crimes or offences contrary to International Law is the subject of special stipulations presented by another Commission.

The Commission has thus found itself led to limit its examination to executive measures appropriate to ensure the repatriation of German prisoners, and to the questions raised by the captivity in Germany of Allied and Associated nationals who have been repatriated.

On these different points the five delegations have been sufficiently fortunate to arrive at a unanimous agreement, and it is the text of the Articles thus adopted that the Commission has the honour to submit to the approbation of the Conference:—

(1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

In each of the Allied and Associated countries a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the country and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution.

(2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said Authorities.

Those amongst them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

(3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

(5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

(6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause — of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

(7) *a*. The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without

discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

(8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

(9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.
(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

(10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and

which have been taken possession of by the German Authorities.

(11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause—of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.
(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

The seven first articles relate to the repatriation of German prisoners: they reserve for the decision of the Allied and Associated Governments the question of fixing the date of repatriation of the prisoners, as also the determination of the conditions which shall govern this repatriation. It is possible, indeed, to contemplate a repatriation which might be simultaneous for all the Allied and Associated Powers, or on the other hand a repatriation which, for special reasons of an economic, geographical or political character, might be delayed in the case of those countries of the Entente which have experienced more than the others the damages of the war. This repatriation may be definitively fixed, or on the other hand it may be made subject to the supply of civilian labour by way of substitution. It may commence from the date of the signature of the Peace, or it may be delayed until the Peace Treaty is ratified.

The Commission have abstained from drafting the clause referred to in Article 1 on account of doubt as to the decisions of the Council of Four on the conditions under which prisoners of war shall be repatriated. If the Council of Four

decide not to retain prisoners of war for work in devastated regions, and not to require Germany to furnish civilian labourers for that purpose, the American, British and Japanese Delegations would recommend that that clause provide that the repatriation of prisoners of war commence as soon as possible after the signature of the Peace Treaty, and be carried out with the utmost rapidity. The French Delegation were of opinion that the question was essentially a governmental one. The French Delegation did not feel itself qualified in the absence of precise instructions, to examine it, and they could not fall in with the above suggestion for fear that this suggestion would be interpreted as forestalling the decision that might be arrived at on the question of demanding from Germany a supply of labour for the purpose of restoring the devastated region. The Commission has taken for granted the utilisation of an Inter-Allied organisation in which representatives of the German Government would find a place in order to ensure the execution of any decisions that may thus be arrived at. In each country Sub-Commissions shall be permanently entrusted with the carrying out of all difficulties of a technical nature.

Charging Germany with all expenses occasioned by such repatriation, and obligation on her part to furnish means of transport, measures to be taken both as regards prisoners under sentence and prisoners who decline to be repatriated, such is the object of the provisions concerning German prisoners of war.

As regards nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers it has seemed necessary to the Commission that the Treaty of Peace shall sanction the measures already imposed on Germany in the Armistice Convention, that all guarantees be taken in favour of nationals who have returned from captivity to ensure that their just claims are satisfied, to ensure decent burial for those who died without returning to their homes, bearing in mind the general text which is to be included in the Treaty as regards all soldiers fallen in enemy territory. This is the object of paragraphs one and two of Article 11 of the text.

> The Commission further considered it essential to set forth and strengthen the undertakings by the German Government for the purpose of facilitating the search for missing men.
>
> In the short space of time granted to it, the Commission considered it its duty to settle likewise the essential dispositions concerning the lot of prisoners of war, without tying themselves down to questions of detail which will be settled by the Commissions referred to in Article 1 of the draft, and without entering on an examination of the essential problems which might have occupied it if it had not thought that its new work would overlap that of other Commissions, or if it had not been thought well to reserve settlement thereof for the Governmental authorities".

MR. LANSING congratulated the Commission on the success of its work, and the clear statement made by it. He must confess, however, that he was at a loss to understand why there should be any hesitation in saying that the prisoners would be repatriated as soon as possible after the ratification of peace. In his opinion, anyone retained for forced labour after the signature of peace would be a slave, and such action would constitute a reproach to the nation who enforced any such regulation. If their own Government liked to say that their own people should do work which would be credited as reparation, that would be quite a different thing. But, a foreign Government could not take prisoners and convert them into slaves. Such action would be abhorrent to his own country, and he was sure it would be so also to the French, and British, and Japanese nations. Therefore, he recommended that a definite statement should be inserted in Clause 1 to the effect that upon the establishment of peace, prisoners would be returned as soon as possible.

M. PICHON said that in principle he fully agreed with Mr. Lansing, and he was sure France had no intention of retaining prisoners of war after peace had been signed. But it seemed to him that this was a question which must be referred to the Council of Four for decision. He undertook, in doing so, to transmit to the President of the Council, the views expressed by Mr. Lansing.

LORD HARDINGE intimated that he shared Mr. Lansing's views.

M. PICHON added that on the understanding that the question would be submitted to the Council of Four, he also was agreed with Mr. Lansing's way of thinking.

MR. LANSING asked that whatever was reported to the Council of Four should previously be shown to him in order that there should be no possibility of error in his statement. Furthermore, he wished to call attention to something of a similar character in Article 6, namely, to the provision that hostages should be retained. He thought that such action would be contrary both to Military and to International Law. Sooner or later, Germany would have to be trusted to fulfill her obligations, and, if she failed, in this, she must be made to suffer; but he did not think it right that innocent individuals should be made to suffer. He thought that in proposing forced labour and the retention of hostages, the Allied and Associated Governments would be manifesting the same spirit that the Germans had displayed in Belgium.

M. CAHEN said that this Article had been suggested by the British representatives. It had not been contemplated to punish individuals nor to retain them for specially harsh treatment. What the Commission had had in mind was to give validity to what had been attempted by an Article in another part of the Treaty of Peace relative to the punishment of persons guilty of special atrocities. Consequently, the Article under consideration was merely intended to give sanction to that idea, and to give practical effect to a decision which had been reached, elsewhere. Accordingly, it had been proposed that hostages should be retained until the people guilty of offences against the laws of humanity had been surrendered by Germany.

LORD HARDINGE stated that the British Delegation considered it very necessary to retain the means of making the Germans surrender certain officers, who had been guilty of atrocities. If this right to retain individual prisoners of war were not retained, the Allies would have no practical power to force the German Government to deliver the guilty people.

M. PICHON thought that this Article was in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Four, which contemplated the punishment of persons guilty of crimes.

MR. LANSING doubted whether such a step had been contemplated. It seemed to him a method similar to that by which Bolshevist officers were kept at their posts, owing to hostages being taken from their families. To him the idea of hostages was abhorrent, especially in time of peace; the taking of hostages had been bad enough during the war, and all the Allied Governments had complained of the practice even then.

M. PICHON said that unless such an Article were adopted, the Allied and Associated Governments would be deprived of the means of obtaining the surrender of guilty persons such as the officers who had participated in the murder of Captain Fryatt.

MR. LANSING asked whether if these criminals were not delivered, it was intended to keep the innocent hostages forever.

M. CAHEN explained that two reasons had influenced the Commission in accepting the clause under discussion. In the first place, it would be noticed that officers alone had been referred to, because the atrocities as a whole had only been committed by a certain military caste, who had worked hand in glove. For this reason, it had been clearly stated that officers alone should be selected by the Allied and Associated Governments for detention as hostages. Consequently, the persons so selected would be those who had approved of the commission of such atrocities. In other words, the persons so selected would indirectly be responsible for the crimes committed. In the second place, the insertion of a clause as suggested would constitute the only method of preventing the clauses of the Treaty relating to the surrender of persons alleged to be guilty of offences against laws and customs of war from becoming inoperative.

MR. LANSING said that he appreciated the reason for this Article, and the argument, but he was strongly opposed to it. Why not for the same reason retain hostages to ensure the fulfilment of every Article of the Treaty? If there were doubt as to Germany's good faith in

accepting one Article, her good faith in accepting any or all Articles might equally be doubted. He could not consent to this Article. He understood that a Commission was working or was about to begin work on a study of the means of obtaining guarantees for the fulfilment of all the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, and he thought this question should also be referred to that Committee, to whom it really belonged. But he would most strongly urge the rejection of any proposal to retain hostages after the signature of Peace, as such a proposal would be contrary to the principles of civilized war and the laws of humanity.

LORD HARDINGE said that pending the substitution of a clause by some other Commission, which would ensure the same results as were obtained by the Article under discussion, he could not agree to the omission of the Article from the Treaty of Peace.

MR. LANSING said that under the circumstances the only course would be to submit the two questions relating to slavery and to hostages to the Council of Four.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING, continuing, proposed that the second paragraph of Article 1 should be made to read somewhat as follows:—

> "On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government shall regulate the details of execution for the return of prisoners".

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed to adopt the following Articles, with the proviso that Article 1, relating to the repatriation of German prisoners, and Article 6, relating to the detention of hostages, should be referred to the Council of Four for decision:—

> "(1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the

Present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution for the return of prisoners.

(2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their house by the said Authorities.

Those amongst them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

(3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

(5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

(6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause — of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

(7) *a*. The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

(8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

(9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary

means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.

(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

(10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present Treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and which have been taken possession of by the German Authorities.

(11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause — of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand, mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.

(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 27th April, 1919.

Annexure "A"

PARIS, 23rd April, 1919.

24, rue Bayard, Paris.

Tel. Passy 19–62

Telegraphic address. Lietuva–Paris.

No. 759

To His Excellency,
The Chairman of the Peace Conference.

Sir: The Lithuanian delegation begs to submit to you the following statement, requesting you to lay it before the Peace Conference.

The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference called Messieurs Voldemar and Ytchas to come before it 23rd April, for the purpose of giving to the sub-Commission on Polish affairs at the Peace Conference statistical, ethnographic, economic and other information which they were capable of giving upon the Lithuanian territory. This is the first step of the Peace Conference towards a solution of the Lithuanian question. We rejoice in it, and thank the Conference.

Nevertheless, we cannot conceal the apprehensions caused by the method used by the Peace Conference in studying the Lithuanian question. Our apprehensions are caused by the fact that the sub-commission on Polish affairs is taking up the study of our question in its entirety. There is surely nothing surprising in the fact that this commission is interesting itself in the facts concerning the frontier to be traced between Lithuania and Poland. Nevertheless, in leaving the sub-commission the liberty of taking up the Lithuanian question in all its complexity, there is the risk that the impression will be created that this question is only a corollary of the Polish question; in other words, that the Peace Conference has already decided upon the future of Lithuania by attaching it to Poland. This impression will have still more foundation if it is borne in mind that the Poles have not ceased to claim the annexation of Lithuania to Poland under some form. In any case, it is certain that the Poles will give this interpretation to the examination of the Lithuanian question by the

Conference and will use it for their propaganda. The result will be the increasing of the Lithuanian-Polish tension.

Moreover, the Lithuanian question has an especial importance in the policy of Eastern Europe, for it directly concerns the interests of the three great neighbouring States, Poland, Germany and Russia; and when it is considered that Lithuania has for centuries been a great and powerful centre of culture, the inevitable conclusion is reached that only the creation of a Lithuanian Commission analogous to the Polish Commission, should be instituted for an equitable settlement of the Lithuanian question. The creation of a Commission of this kind would not risk engendering misunderstandings, for it would not have the slightest influence upon the future decisions of the Conference.

Finally, we must express the regret that liberty has not been accorded to the Lithuanian Delegation to appoint itself the members who are to give the information in question. The choice of the Secretariat General could easily have fallen upon Delegates who were less qualified than others to elucidate the desired question.

In spite of the inconveniences raised above, the Delegation has resolved to send the members called by the Secretariat of the Peace Conference instructing them to furnish to the sub-commission on Polish Affairs all information relative to the frontiers between Lithuania and Poland.

Accept [etc.]

A. Voldemar
President of the Delegation

P. Klimas
Secretary

[1] FM–8, p. 602 [*Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 38*].
[2] See BC–53, p. 405 [*Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 21*].
[3] See FM–4, p. 565 [*Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 34*].

[4] For letter of April 23, 1919, see annexure "A," *infra*.

[*] The question of Shantung is dealt with in another Article of the present Treaty. [Footnote in the original.]

[5] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CIV, p. 956.

[6] *Ibid.*, vol. CVI, p. 974.

April 30, 3 p.m. (FM–10)

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[40] Secretary's Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 30, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/10

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/10

FM–10

[Document 40]

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 30, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Admiral W. S. Benson
Secretary	Dr. R. H. Lord
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Morison
British Empire	Mr. Whitehouse
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	Mr. Rogers
Secretaries	British Empire
Mr. H. Norman	Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Mr. E. Phipps	Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G.
France	France
M. Pichon	Admiral de Bon
Secretaries	M. Laroche
M. de Bearn	Capt. Levavasseur
M. de St. Quentin	Lieut. de V. Odend'hal
Japan	Japan
H. E. Baron Makino	M. Yamakawa
Secretary	M. Kawai
M. Saburi	

Joint Secretariat

BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. PICHON said that the first item on the Agenda had been brought forward at the request of the British Delegation.

Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Baltic States MR. BALFOUR said he was surprised to hear this. The matter, no doubt, was one of great importance which should be discussed at an early date. The British Delegation felt that matters should not be left as they were and it appeared that the American Delegation shared the same feeling. All he had before him, however, was the report made by Messrs. Lord and Morison, American Members of the Russian Section of the Territorial Division. (For Report, see Appendix "A".) All the recommendations in this report he was not quite prepared to accept. It would be necessary for the British Delegation to examine the proposals seriatim.

MR. LANSING said that the report had been prepared for the use of the American Delegation alone. It was still under consideration. The questions involved had a large political bearing and he was not, himself, prepared to discuss the matter at the present meeting, until it had been thoroughly considered by the American Delegation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was quite ready to make certain observations on the proposals, if it was so desired.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer postponement.

(It was then agreed that the question be postponed to a later meeting and that the subject should be brought on the Agenda at the instance of the American Delegation. Mr. Balfour observed that, as the situation was critical, it would be desirable that a decision should be taken as early as possible.)

2. M. PICHON read the following memorandum, presented by the French Delegation:—

Organization of Temporary Regime in Slesvig After the Conclusion of Peace “The French Delegation considers it advisable to draw the attention of the British Delegation to the fact that the articles of the Treaty of Peace concerning Slesvig contain provisions regarding decisions which the Allied and Associated Governments must take before the execution of this Treaty.

The question concerns the formation of an International Commission composed of five members, three to be appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments and the remaining two by the Norwegian and Swedish Governments respectively. This Commission would have general powers of administration and would, therefore, be responsible for the maintenance of order within the zone evacuated by the Germans.

The French Delegation considers that it would be advisable to come to an immediate agreement regarding the choice of the three Governments nominated by the Allied and Associated Governments to appoint delegates to the Commission—which, in the opinion of the French Delegation, should be the American, British and French Governments. A decision on the matter should be speedily reached.

The appointment of the Norwegian and Swedish members might be postponed until the signature of the Treaty of Peace. Opinions should, however, be taken at once to see whether the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments at Christiania and Stockholm should be asked to request the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, immediately after such signature, each to appoint a delegate to the International Commission.

A more urgent question is that of the composition of the Allied forces intended to maintain order in the part of Slesvig evacuated by the Germans, until the allotment of the territory in which the plebiscite will be taken.

The report of the Commission[1] suggests (in accordance with the request of the Danish Government) that Allied naval forces, accompanied by landing parties, should be sent to the port of Flensborg. The troops required for maintaining order would be divided up according to the Commission's instructions.

The French Delegation considers that it would also be advisable to decide which Powers should send ships, the number thereof, and the strength of the landing parties.

The Danish Government considered that 1,000 men would suffice, but Germany has, during the last few weeks, brought about a state of affairs in Slesvig which might render a larger number necessary.

This question should be urgently referred to the naval experts now in Paris, in order that they might come to an agreement regarding the steps to be taken.

They should be informed that the Allied ships should arrive at Flensborg immediately after signature of the Treaty of Peace, without waiting for the ratification thereof—as evacuation must take place ten days after its signature, and the population must also be reassured and a régime instituted in Slesvig which will stop German machinations.

The French Delegation is of the opinion that these various questions could usefully form the subject of discussion at one of the earliest meetings of the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs."

He asked if any member had any objections to raise to these proposals.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that the sooner an invitation was sent to Sweden and Norway the better.

M. PICHON explained that it had been thought desirable not to make a formal invitation until the signature of the Treaty. An informal request, however, might be sent immediately.

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether it would not be advisable to consult the military as well as the naval experts. He thought that the question of policing the area was rather a military than a naval one.

M. PICHON said that, as the main item would be the occupation of the port of Flensborg, he thought that the naval forces would probably be adequate.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in the policing of the coast the Navies could assist, but it was obvious that the Military would have to play the main part on shore.

MR. LANSING suggested that the naval experts be asked to decide among themselves whether they could undertake the whole operation. If not, the military authorities might be asked to supply any supplementary forces required.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that it would save time for the naval and military experts to meet at once.

MR. LANSING said that, if the proposal was that the operation should be primarily a naval one and that a naval officer should be in general charge, it was desirable that the military contribution should be clearly subordinate. A joint meeting of the military and naval experts at the start might produce a different impression. He suggested that the naval experts, without referring the matter again to the Council, should call in their military colleagues, should they find that they could not undertake the whole task themselves.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that he anticipated that a considerable force would be required and that the naval authority would inevitably be compelled to apply to the military authorities for assistance. It did not seem likely that the British Fleet would be able to spare a large detachment, and the American Navy and the French would only be

able to send small ships. Hence, it appeared to him from the very outset clear that military aid would be required.

(It was then decided that the naval advisers of France, Great Britain and the United States of America should meet to devise means of carrying out the policy outlined in the memorandum. They should, if necessary, confer with the military advisers of the same Powers, with the object of supplementing naval by military effort on land. The memorandum quoted above was adopted.)

3. Draft Article for Treaty of Peace Relating to Treaty Concluded Between the French republic and the Prince of Monaco on July 17th, 1918 M. PICHON said that a Treaty had been signed between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, copies of which had been circulated to the various Delegations. (See Appendix "B".) At the time had been signed, there was a fear that the German branch of the dukes of Urach might urge their claim to the succession. The Treaty had then been made by common accord between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, ensuring that his successor should be his grand-daughter. It would be necessary to guarantee this Treaty by an article recording the fact that the High Contracting Parties had cognisance of the agreement.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the High Contracting Parties were asked to recognise the validity of the Treaty.

M. PICHON replied that they were only asked to recognise that they had taken cognisance of the Treaty.

MR. LANSING said that he could see no reason why the Allies should not go further and recognise the Treaty.

(It was then decided unanimously that an article to the following effect should be included in the Supplementary Clauses of the Treaty of Peace:—

> "The High Contracting Parties recognise the Treaty signed by the Government of the French Republic on July 17th, 1918,

with His Serene Highness, the Prince of Monaco, defining the relations between France and the Principality.")

4. Question of German Submarine Cables MR. LANSING said that Article 38 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses had been, he understood, drafted on the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour after a long discussion on March 24th.[2] The record of the meeting was that, "in order to meet the general view, Mr. Balfour proposed the following resolution:—

> "The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables, or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers."

Article 38 as at present drafted did not appear to him to carry out the purpose of this resolution, which had only been adopted by the meeting as reconciling the two sides of the controversy, if this were the correct interpretation of the expression "to meet the general view." He had interpreted the resolution as meaning that the German cables would be return[ed] to Germany subject to her repairing them at her own expense. She could clearly not be expected to spend money on repairing cables for the exclusive benefit of other parties. The same, he had concluded, was to apply to diverted cables. The resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been reached after a very long discussion and after the legal experts had failed to discover any law applicable to the point. The matter, he thought, had been made quite clear by the question of Baron Makino, recorded in the minutes of March 24th, as to whether the resolution as drafted might not be interpreted to mean that all cables might be returned to Germany. The answer to this question, he had presumed, was in the affirmative, and he knew that the President of the United States was strongly of this opinion. Article 38 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses was drafted as follows:—

> "*Submarine Cables*. Germany will be at liberty to repair at her own expense the German submarine cables which have been

merely cut during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers and are not being utilised.

She will similarly be at liberty to replace at her own expense all portions of cables which, after having been cut, have been removed, or without having been removed, are at present being utilised by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers. In such cases the cables or portions of cables which have been removed or utilised remain the property of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Consequently, the German cables or portions thereof mentioned below, which have been removed or utilised by the Allied and. Associated Powers, will not be restored.

Emden-Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.

Emden-Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.

Emden-Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.

Emden-Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Emden-Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Azores-New York (1): from Fayal to New York.

Azores-New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.

Teneriffe-Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.

Monrovia-Lome:

from about { lat.: 2°30′N.; long.: 7°40′W. of Greenwich;

to about { lat.: 2°20′N.; long.: 5°30′W. of Greenwich;

and from about { lat.: 3°48′N.; long.: 0°00′.

to Lome.

Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala.

Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.

Constantinople-Constantza: from Constantinople to Constantza.

Chefoo-Tsingtao-Shanghai: from Tsingtao to Chefoo and from Tsingtao to Shanghai.

Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado (Celebes): from Yap-Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island and from Yap Island to Menado.

These provisions do not affect the rights of the German owners of other cables or portions of cables.

In no case can the landing rights of any cable which remains German be reinstated on territory under the authority of an Allied and Associated Power without a new licence."

With reference to the last clause of the first paragraph, he questioned whether there were any such cables not utilised by any of the Allied and Associated Powers. The second paragraph appeared to be in accord with Mr. Balfour's resolution. The third paragraph appeared to cover all the cables under consideration, and the conclusion was that none would go back to Germany save those between Germany and Great Britain. He would like to ask Mr. Balfour if he thought this paragraph accorded with the resolution of March 24th.

MR. BALFOUR said that if he re-called aright the policy he had proposed on March 24th, it was that if any of the Allied or Associated Powers had only cut a German cable, Germany could repair that cable at her own expense and make use of it. If any of the Allied or Associated Powers had removed a section of German cable and used it elsewhere, Germany could not claim the return of that section but could replace it at her own expense.

The broad principle, therefore, appeared to be that Germany might, if she chose, at her own expense restore her cables to their pre-war state. She could not make the Allies responsible for the damage done to them during the war or ask them to restore any portion of her cables they had removed, nor could she claim control of any cable line set up by any of the Allies and partly composed of pieces of German cables.

MR. LANSING agreed. It followed that the list given in Article 38 should be eliminated, as well as the paragraph immediately preceding the list. America was not prepared to yield the cable line from New York to the Azores merely because the Allies had diverted it. America would prefer to see the line between Monrovia and Pernambuco in German hands than cede it to any of the Allied Powers.

MR. BALFOUR said that the British Government did not wish to tamper with property in cables. He understood that American subjects owned considerable shares in many of the trans-Atlantic cables.

MR. LANSING said that these lines, however, were not controlled by America.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that originally it had been thought that the matter could be settled on military considerations. Legal questions had then been raised and referred to legal experts. Their deliberations had not materially altered the position. Military considerations were therefore still in possession of the field. He admitted that the offer of returning the cables to Germany was an empty offer. The case specially referred to by Mr. Lansing was that of the cable between Monrovia and Pernambuco. This cable had been lifted and altered by the French Navy in agreement with Great Britain before Brazil and the United States had come into the war. The work was complete when the United States declared war on Germany. The United States had then requested the French Government not to make use of the altered cable. France, though she had acquired the cable in a perfectly regular manner as a war measure, and although she had spent money on it and taken war

risks to effect the work, agreed to make no use of it. Under ordinary circumstances, France would have acquired a right to the cable. Failing this, she should at least be entitled to reparation for the cost and risk entailed. There was no legal argument against this contention. But for the request of the American Government by cutting it again and linking it to a French cable line, for instance, that running from Konakri, France might have diverted this line and thereby acquired complete title to it. The French Government, however, though they were not precluded by any question of right, had deferred to the wishes of the United States. If the American Government were unwilling to allow France to keep this cable, the case was a special one. Setting this case aside, the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour could stand. It restored no other cables to Germany, as all other German cables had been cut, moved or utilised. He suggested, therefore, that this particular case should be studied in isolation and in reference to the question of reparation. It appeared clear to him that Germany could not be given cables on which any of the Allies had spent money.

MR. LANSING pointed out that France had perhaps the right to cut this cable as an act of war. He would point out, however, that it was a neutral cable, though worked by Germans. It was a fair legal question whether the cutting of a cable between two neutral countries was a legitimate act of war. An act of war was not just because it cost money, and did not *ipso facto* give a title to recompense. If so, all the costs of the war would fall on Germany alone. The American position was one of strong opposition to this point of view. Costs of war had been excluded from the bill to be presented to Germany. It was now proposed to keep a cable between two neutral countries merely because its ownership was German.

ADMIRAL DE BON said he could not quite agree with Mr. Lansing. He thought that the facts were not quite in accordance with the view he had expressed. The cable, far from being neutral, had been of such interest to the Germans that they had sent a submarine to bombard the cable station at Monrovia after the capture of the cable. If, as Mr. Lansing admitted, the French Navy had a right to cut the cable as an act of war, it could also have utilised portions of it to attach it to a French line, and, had it done so, it would have been entitled to retain

possession of the pieces removed. Only the wish expressed by the American Government had prevented France from carrying this out. The case was therefore a special case that ought to be treated separately from the rest.

MR. LANSING said that the case might be a special one, but it was not therefore a strong one. The whole question of the right of a belligerent to cut a cable between two neutral countries was open to legal argument. This, however, was related to the past, and he did not wish to raise the question. In any case, he did not think that the cutting of such a cable or the use of it gave rise to any right to its retention or, as an alternative, to compensation.

M. PICHON said that there was apparently no means of reconciling the two views. The divergence, however, appeared only to relate to one cable.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that all other cases save this were disposed of. Briefly, the Allies kept all the cables, and Germany had a right to make new ones.

MR. LANSING pointed out that even this right was denied the Germans by the last paragraph of Article 38.

ADMIRAL DE BON pointed out that the Germans before the war could not land a cable on the territory of any power without the authority of that power. It was hardly credible that the war should have given them rights which they were not entitled to before.

MR. LANSING said that each Government did as a matter of fact preserve its right to give or refuse a licence. It was unnecessary to bind the Governments by a Treaty.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the meaning of this paragraph was that the rights enjoyed by Germany before the war had been terminated by the war.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not see that any valuable advantage was gained by this paragraph. If all German rights had been abolished by the war, they could only be renewed by fresh licences.

Presumably the Germans had landing rights in Great Britain. If so, they could not revive them except by the consent of the British Government.

MR. LANSING said that if this paragraph be left out, old rights could be revived without the necessity of granting new ones. For instance, in the case of the Azores, Great Britain had acquired exclusive landing rights. If Portugal had the right to renew previous grants, the United States could have a cable to the Azores.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was unable to follow this argument. He was prepared to accept the first and second paragraphs of Article 38 and the penultimate paragraph. He would agree to the suppression of the remainder. A decision on this matter was urgent, and he was prepared to do this without waiting to consult jurists.

MR. LANSING said that he had certain amendments to offer regarding the first two paragraphs. He would present them at the meeting if so desired, and Mr. Balfour could have an opportunity of consulting lawyers before accepting them.

MR. LANSING suggested the excision in the first paragraph of the word "merely", and at the end of the paragraph of the words "and are not being utilised".

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the first paragraph in any case did not control the fate of the Monrovia-Pernambuco cable, unless it be admitted that this cable was being utilised by reason of the operations performed on it by the French Navy.

MR. LANSING said that this did not constitute utilisation.

ADMIRAL DE BON pointed out that France was about to make use of this cable when the United States Government intervened.

MR. LANSING asked whether Admiral de Bon would favour the suppression of the last words of paragraph 1.

ADMIRAL DE BON said he would not. The paragraph would then give Germany the right to re-establish all her cables.

MR. BALFOUR said this was so, provided the expense were borne by Germany.

ADMIRAL DE BON said it must be clearly understood that Germany was not entitled to use any portion of the old cables, except any portions directly on the bed of the ocean. In a word, the old German system no longer existed, as the Allies had captured it. Germany could create a new system if she so desired.

MR. LANSING said that it was a question for each power to decide whether or not previous German landing rights should be granted anew or not. As to depriving the Germans of their property in cables, he was opposed to doing any such thing as much as to depriving Germany of ships necessary to carry German mails.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that any mention of a German right to retain cables implied that Germany at the present moment had any. In point of fact, she had none. He would not be prepared at the present time to take from Germany any cables she might have, but, as she had lost them all during the war, the case did not arise.

MR. LANSING observed that this applied to the control of cables, but not to property rights in cables. Ownership titles to cables existed in Germany at the present time. This was the point of view of the American Delegation, and the point of view he was instructed by the President to maintain.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that this theory would lead to giving a predominant importance to the interests of private owners of cables in Germany. If so, the Allies would be under the obligation of repairing their property for them and making good all the damage done to it during the war. This would be the consequence of the theory advocated by Mr. Lansing.

MR. LANSING observed that reparation for acts of war could only be demanded by the victor and not by the vanquished.

ADMIRAL DE BON agreed, and said that it was for this reason that the Allies had maintained they owed nothing to Germany for seizing the

cables.

MR. LANSING said that his amendment to the second paragraph would make it read as follows:—

> "She will similarly be at liberty to replace at her own expense all portions to cables which, after having been cut, have been removed or diverted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers. In such case the portions of cables which had been removed or, from the point of cutting, have been newly laid remain the property of the Allied and Associated Powers."

MR. BALFOUR said that he was unable to accept these amendments immediately. He adhered to the statement of policy made by him at the beginning of the meeting which he understood both Mr. Lansing and Admiral Benson had agreed to. He wished to see that policy framed in legal language.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that the whole trouble arose from the phrase in Mr. Balfour's resolution of March 24th:—

"which, after having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers".

To give effect to this clause the numeration in Article 38 had been made. If the matter were again to be referred to the Drafting Committee he thought it desirable that the principles should be clearly expressed by the Council.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in his opinion the list did no harm.

M. PICHON observed that it included the cable from Monrovia to Pernambuco.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the difficulty regarding this line lay between two Associated Powers, not between the belligerents on one side and the belligerents on the other. For the purpose of the Treaty it would be sufficient to say that this cable would not be restored to Germany—its ultimate fate would be settled among the Powers.

MR. LANSING said that the cable was German property in the hands of France, and now not even in French hands but derelict in the sea.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that its last possessors were the French. It had only not been made use of at the request of the United States.

MR. LANSING said that France had no license to land a cable either in Liberia or Brazil.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that had this objection been made earlier the cable would have been diverted and attached to the French line. Had this been done, France would have been incontestibly master of the cable.

MR. LANSING said that the points of view were diametrically diverse. The United States considered these cables were German property which would revert to their owners. The Treaty should allow Germany to resume control provided she made the necessary repairs. He could not recede from this position which had been adopted that very day at a meeting between himself and President Wilson. He, therefore, thought the question should be referred to the Council of the Heads of the States as he could see no other way out of the dilemma.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that he also could see no other way. He wished to state, however, that the only reason for the dilemma was that the United States wished a particular cable to be treated differently from the rest. France had obtained possession of this cable by regular means and could have made use of it. This was a question he thought that might be settled between France and the United States, and he wished to add that should France be deprived of it he would feel that a damage was being done to France. The cable would be taken from France for the advantage of Germany. This was the feeling that he, personally, would preserve.

M. PICHON suggested that the case of this particular cable should be reserved, and that a formula be found to cover the remaining cases.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to put in more adequate terms the policy he had previously suggested and which had obtained general agreement.

MR. LANSING said that the Drafting Committee could not be asked to lay down a policy.

MR. BALFOUR said it would only be asked to find words for a policy previously laid down.

MR. LANSING said that the policy had obviously been one which the Drafting Committee was unable to understand. He would ask Mr. Balfour whether the amendments he had suggested did not fulfil this policy.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the amendment suggested by Mr. Lansing were accepted the result would be that parts of the cables now in use by the Allied Powers would become German again. While not objecting to the re-establishment by Germany of her pre-war system, the British Delegation did object to the destruction by Germany of systems established at British expense, partly out of elements taken from the German lines. The Germans might restore all their previous systems if they wished. No doubt this would lead to a duplication of lines, but Great Britain had no wish to monopolise the cables of the world.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that it might be well to quote concrete instances. There were two cables from the Azores to the United States. The end of one of them had been cut off some 600 miles from the American coast, and the line had been connected with Halifax. The second had been diverted and used in the English Channel. What America understood was that Germany might replace the portions removed and thereby resume possession of the whole line. The only portion that remained British was that portion connecting Nova Scotia and the point at which the cable had been cut in the Atlantic. The same would apply to the cable from Emden to the Azores which had been cut and diverted to Brest. All the Germans had to do was to reconnect. They were not bound to make a new cable from the Azores to Emden, or from the Azores to New York.

MR. BALFOUR said he could not quite take this view. All would agree that the multiplication of cables would be for the benefit of the world. Some German cables had been cut and diverted during the war. They had not been destroyed. There were at the present time the same number of cables as before the war, though some had been diverted to other places and worked under new control. There was no objection to the restoration of the old lines, but this should not be done at the expense of new ones. Should Great Britain accept Admiral Benson's theory, there would be a piece of cable in British possession from Halifax to a point of junction with an old German line in the Atlantic, and this piece, after the Germans had reconnected their line would be of no conceivable use to anyone at all. If any portion of the world's cables were to be made derelict it should be the German portion and not the British. It was admitted that Germany might use derelict cables to restore her own system, but not that she might do so at the expense of any cables used by the Allies. As a result of the war France and Great Britain were richer in cables, but the world was no worse off. If the German cables were to be restored, it must be at Germany's expense. He was, therefore, at variance with Admiral Benson.

MR. LANSING said that if Mr. Balfour's procedure were adopted, the United States of America would lose direct contact with Europe through the Azores. The line would be controlled by the British and French. The American view was that when an Allied Government had cut or diverted a cable at its own expense, Germany might repair the link up to the point of cutting. The Allied Power could then if it liked remake the main part. Otherwise cables became spoils of war.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought this was re-opening a question which had been settled. Inasmuch as capture conferred title to the pieces removed from a German cable, cables were spoils of war.

MR. LANSING said he did not agree. His theory was that the equivalent of the piece removed had been destroyed in war. He pointed out that when the Azores line had been diverted, the United States, then neutral, was deprived of the use of the cable; no compensation for this deprivation was offered.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that confusion arose through the mingling of two questions. One was the question of restoring cables to Germany, and the other was the establishment of communication between the United States and Europe. The first could be settled by making it quite clear that Germany would not resume control of her cables. The second could be settled between the powers concerned.

MR. LANSING said he did not agree that no cables should be restored to Germany. He, therefore, reiterated his proposal that the question be referred to the Council of the Heads of States, and suggested that his amendment should be submitted to them at the same time.

(It was therefore decided to refer the question, together with the record of the discussion, to the Council of the Heads of States.)

BARON MAKINO said that he had not taken part in the discussion, but as the whole question of principle had been raised, and as the question was being referred to the Council of Heads of States, he would wish to be present in order to state the case for Japan.

(This was agreed to.)

5. The Island of Yap MR. LANSING said that there was a question connected with that of submarine cables which he would like on a future occasion to discuss. The question was whether in the interests of cable communication it would not be desirable that the Island of Yap be internationalised, and administered by an international commission in control of the cable lines.

BARON MAKINO stated that the Island was at present occupied by Japan. Japan would, therefore, have a good deal to say on this question. There were agreements entered into by Japan regarding the status of the Island. The question raised by Mr. Lansing affected that status, and he regarded the suggestion as a very grave matter. In his opinion before deciding the question of cable control, the question of the status of the Island should be settled.

MR. LANSING said that he had raised the question though it was not on the agenda in order to give warning that the question was in his

mind and that he would propose it for discussion at a later time. He would suggest that it was not necessary to maintain that all the Islands must have the same status. The Island of Yap might be held to constitute a special case.

BARON MAKINO said that he wished it to be understood his point was that the status of the Island itself should be decided before the question of the cables, which constituted only a minor element in the problem.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the status of the Island was a matter of great importance. He did not think, however, that the question of cables could be deferred, as it must be settled in time for the Treaty with Germany. Germany could be required to give up all title to the Island; its status thereafter could be discussed amongst the Allies.

BARON MAKINO said he had no objection whatever to the settlement of the cables in as much as this question affected the Treaty with Germany.

6. Procedure for Interpretation of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace
MR. LANSING observed that some of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty were clauses with a continuing effect which might last for 30 years. It had been proposed that the interpretation of these clauses whenever difficulties arose should be left to a Reparation Commission, representing the Five Powers. It had further been proposed that the interpretation must be unanimous. It was probable that the representatives on such a Commission would not be jurists. He thought it would be far better to appoint a single judge, whose finding should be final on all points of interpretation. He would, himself, suggest that this function of arbiter be exercised by the Lord Chief Justice of England.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had had no notice of this proposal and asked whether Mr. Lansing had circulated any memorandum on the subject.

M. PICHON said that he was also taken unawares by this proposal. He would like time to consider it and asked Mr. Lansing to set forth his

reasons on paper.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether this provision would have to be inserted in the Treaty.

MR. LANSING said that the Germans would have to agree to it. He agreed, however, to circulate a memorandum on the subject.

7. Publication of Treaty BARON MAKINO asked whether the text of the Treaty would be made public when it was handed to the Germans. Peace was to be established when the Treaty was ratified, and it was the general hope that this would be achieved in one or two months after the signature. He pointed out that it would take a long time to telegraph the whole Treaty in cipher to Japan. It would take less time should the Treaty be made public and should it be possible to telegraph it *en clair*.

MR. BALFOUR thought that it would be possible to telegraph the Treaty *en clair* the day it was communicated in a plenary session to the Powers with special interests.

BARON MAKINO further asked that the French Government should facilitate the telegraphing of the Treaty to Japan.

M. PICHON undertook to do this.

MR. LANSING said that the Treaty would be telegraphed to the State Department in Washington and that he would arrange that it be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador who would be able to forward it thence to Japan. He would ask, however, that the Treaty be not made public until communicated to the Germans.

(This was agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 30th April, 1919.

Appendix "A" to IC–178 [FM–10]

Recommendation to the Commissioners for immediate action on the Baltic Situation.

From: R. H. Lord and S. E. Morison, Russian Division.

It is recommended:

(1) That the Supreme Council transmit through representatives of the Associated Governments now at Libau to the "Committee of Safety", or whatever *de facto* authority exists at Libau, a demand that the imprisoned members of the Provisional Government of Latvia, and all officials and troops formerly acting under its authority, be immediately released, and that this Provisional Government be restored at once to its previous functions and be respected as the *de facto* government of Latvia.

That General von der Goltz[3] be similarly notified that the German Military authorities must refrain from any interference in the internal administration of Latvia and must restore to the Lettish Government all arms and other property belonging to it.

It is recommended:

(2) That, in accordance with the suggestion of Mr. Lansing at a session of the Council of Five on April 19th,[4] it be stipulated in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace that the German troops now in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania evacuate these countries: that this evacuation begin immediately and be completed within a period of ... weeks; that it be carried out under the supervision of Allied representatives: that until the completion of the evacuation there shall be no interference with the civil administration of these countries, or with such measures for national defence as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It is recommended:

(3) That the Supreme Council recognise the Provisional Government of Latvia, as it existed before the *coup d'état* of April 16th, as an

independent *de facto* government: and that a similar recognition be extended to the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Lithuania. Any declaration or recognition made to the governments in question should contain the provision that the final status of these three countries is to be settled only in accordance with the wishes of the population as expressed through properly elected constituent assemblies: and that, as soon as a recognised Russian Government exists, the Allied and Associated Powers will use their good offices to facilitate an amiable settlement of the relations of these countries with Russia.

It is recommended:

(4) That, in order to assure the defence of these three countries against the Bolshevists, in view of the impending evacuation by the German troops, the Allied and Associated Governments should undertake to supply Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the necessary military equipment, food and credits.

It is recommended:

(5) That an article be inserted in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, insuring that the question of the reparations due from Germany to Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, be referred to a mixed commission or other appropriate body for decision.

NOTE. Practically identical recommendations are being made to the British Delegation by Sir Esme Howard.

PARIS, 29th April, 1919.**Appendix "B" to IC–178 [FM–10]**

[*Translation of Treaty Between the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, Signed July 17, 1918*]

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND HIS SERENE HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF MONACO, being desirous of confirming by a formal Act of mutual confidence the protective Friendship which, in continuance of a happy tradition, the Principality has always encountered at the hands of the French Government, AND WHEREAS

the interests of the Principality of Monaco are, on account of its geographical situation, necessarily bound up with those of France,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty to that effect and have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:—

The President of the French Republic:
Mr. Stephen Pichon, Senator, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic:
And His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco:
Count Balny d'Avricourt, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the President of the French Republic:

who, duly empowered, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article I

The Government of the French Republic assures to the Principality of Monaco the defence of its independence and sovereignty and guarantees the integrity of its territory as though that territory formed part of France.

The Government of His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco undertakes, for its part, to exercise its rights of sovereignty entirely in accord with the political, military, naval and economic interests of France.

Article II

Measures concerning the international relations of the Principality shall always form the subject of a prior understanding between the Princely Government and the French Government.

This likewise applies to measures relating either directly or indirectly to the exercise of a Regency or to the succession to the Crown which may only be transmitted, whether through a marriage, by adoption or otherwise, to a person possessing French or Monegasque nationality and agreeable to the French Government.

Article III

His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco, in pursuance of the additional Articles of the Treaty of February 2nd, 1861,[5] confirms both on his own behalf and on that of his successors the undertaking given to the French Government not to alienate the Principality, either wholly or in part, in favour of any Power other than France.

In the event of the Crown falling vacant, especially in default of an heir whether direct or adoptive, the territory of Monaco shall form, under the protectorate of France, an autonomous State called the State of Monaco. In such an event, private immovable property not devoted to a public use which, on that account, might form the subject of a special claim on the part of the rightful claimants, shall be repurchased by the State of Monaco with the aid, if necessary, of the French State.

Article IV

The French Government may, either on its own initiative, with the assent of the Prince, or in an emergency, after notification, or at the request of His Serene Highness cause to enter and remain in the territory and territorial waters of the Principality the military or naval forces required for upholding the security of the two countries.

Article V

The French Government will lend its good offices to the Princely Government in order to facilitate its admission, together with the French Government, to international Conferences and Institutions, and especially to those which have in view the organisation of the League of Nations.

Article VI

Special stipulations shall determine the arrangements to be made, notably in regard to the economic consequences of the Customs Union provided for by the Treaty of February 2nd, 1861, the prosecution and prevention of fiscal frauds, of offences, misdemeanours and crimes of every kind, the organisation of common public services, education, the recruitment of public

officials, the status of foreigners principally in respect of their naturalisation and their liability to taxation, the co-ordination of police measures, the supervision of frontiers, on the understanding that the Princely Government alone is qualified, with the assent of the French Government, if required, to enact provisions in regard to public order within the Principality.

ARTICLE VII

The present Treaty shall, as soon as circumstances may permit, be brought to the notice of the Powers by the French Government.

IN FAITH OF WHICH the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their Seals thereto.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 17th of July, 1918.

(L. S.) **S. PICHON**
(L. S.) **BALNEY D'AVRICOURT**

[1] Report of the Commission on Belgian and Danish Affairs, March 22, 1919.
[2] See BC–57, p. 460 [*Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 25*].
[3] Gen. Rudiger von der Goltz, commander of the German armies in the Baltic Provinces and Governor of Libau.
[4] FM–6, p. 585 [*Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 36*].
[5] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LI, p. 673.

May 3, 4 p.m. (FM–11)

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[41] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/11

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/11

FM–11

[Document 41]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 3, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst
Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman
Mr. E. Phipps
FRANCE
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. de Bearn
Capt. de Saint Quentin
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Viscount Chinda
Secretary-General
M. Saburi
Secretary
M. Kawai

ALSO PRESENT

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. E. H. Carr
Hon. H. Nicolson
FRANCE
M. de Peretti
M. Laroche

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia
France	Captain A. Portier

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Amendment of Article I of Clause in Treaty of Peace Relative to German Colonies M. Pichon said that the first item on the agenda paper had reference to an amendment of article I of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relative to German Colonies, proposed by the French Delegation. He called on M. de Peretti to explain the case.

M. de Peretti said that Article I of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace relative to German Colonies read as follows:—"Germany renounces in favour of the Five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions". The Belgian Government, after duly considering the article in question, feared that it might be deduced therefrom that only the Five Allied and Associated Powers would hereafter be entitled to be appointed mandatories in the former German oversea possessions. The Belgian Government was obviously not correct in this assumption since the Peace Treaty did not attempt to settle the question of the appointment of mandatories. Nothing, therefore, would prevent Belgium from putting forward in due course her claims to obtain a mandate. Nevertheless, in order to remove all possible cause of complaint and to quiet Belgian public opinion, it had been proposed by the French Delegation that the article in question should be amended to read as follows:—"Germany renounces all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions". The amendment proposed would in no way alter the substance of the article, and at the same time it would prevent the impression that it had been intended in any way to prejudge the question of the appointment of mandatories.

MR. LANSING enquired in whom the title of these German Colonies would rest.

M. PICHON said that the new text proposed in no way prejudged the case. He wished to point out that in omitting the words "Five Allied and Associated Powers" an additional inconvenience would be avoided, since it was not known whether Italy intended to participate in the negotiations with Germany, or not. Consequently, it would be better to suppress any reference to the Five Powers. Belgium maintained that she had, at the request of the Allied Governments, taken a very active part in the military operations in Africa, and she now occupied and administered valuable territories in East Africa. Consequently, were anything done to give the Belgian people the impression that in the allocation of mandates their claims would be excluded, would be interpreted by them as an unfriendly act, and would place the Government in an awkward position.

LORD HARDINGE expressed the view that Mr. Lansing's objection to the amendment proposed by the French Delegation could be met by omitting the word "Five" from the original text.

MR. LANSING suggested that in place of the word "Five" the word "Principal" should be introduced. In addition, a letter should be transmitted by the "Principal" Allied and Associated Powers to the Belgian Government clearly stating that this article was in no way prejudicial to her claims eventually to become a mandatory power in Africa. The difference between the amendment suggested by himself and that proposed by Lord Hardinge lay in this, namely, that many of the small nations, possessing no interests whatever in these territories would be included in the term "Allied and Associated Powers" and, in his opinion, it would be a calamity for such Powers to vote and discuss as to who were to be appointed mandatories. To sum up, he thought the principal Powers should hold the titles, as trustees for the future, until the determination of the mandatories.

VISCOUNT CHINDA accepted Mr. Lansing's proposal on the understanding that the territories in question would be kept in trust by the Allied and Associated Powers only until the mandatory Powers were designated.

(It was agreed that the first article of the clauses in the Treaty of Peace, relative to German Colonies should be amended to read as follows:—

> "Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her over-sea possessions".

It was further agreed that the following letter dated Paris, the 3rd. May, 1919, should be sent to Mr. Hymans, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the signature of M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference:—[1]

> "Monsieur le Ministre,
>
> Le Conseil Suprême des Alliés avait adopté l'insertion dans le traité de Paix d'une clause ainsi conçue:
>
> > "L'Allemagne renonce, en faveur des cinq puissances alliées et associées, à tous ses droits et titres sur ses possessions d'outre-mer".
>
> Le Gouvernement Beige ayant fait remarquer qu'une telle clause semblait exclure toute prétention de la Belgique a obtenir le mandat sur une partie des colonies allemandes, où cependant elle a coopéré avec les forces alliées, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Conseil Suprême, tenant compte de cette observation, a décidé de remplacer dans cette clause les mots "en faveur des cinq puissances alliées et associées" par les mots "en faveur des principales puissances alliées et associées".
>
> Il est bien entendu que cette décision ne préjuge en rien l'attribution des mandats pour les territoires des colonies allemandes.
>
> Veuillez agréer ...
>
> Signé Clemenceau")

2. Recognition of Independence of Finland M. PICHON said that the second question on the Agenda paper related to the recognition of the independence of Finland. The question had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the heads of Governments. A full statement of the case would be found in a letter addressed by Mr. Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, (see Annex A).

M. LAROCHE explained that the French Government had long ago recognised the independence of Finland. For a time the Finnish Government had been hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers and negotiations had in consequence been broken off. But, since the appointment of Gen. Mannerheim's Government, friendly relations had again become established. A Finnish Diplomatic Chargé d'Affaires had been accredited to the French Government in Paris. A Finnish Chargé d'Affaires had also been sent to London, but Great Britain had not as yet recognised the independence of Finland. The French Government had frequently expressed the wish that the independence of Finland should be recognised by all the Allied and Associated Powers. It, therefore, cordially supported the proposal now made by the American Delegation.

MR. LANSING said that he did not favour a joint recognition of the independence of Finland.

M. PICHON replied that a general recognition was not intended as France had already recognised the independence of Finland.

MR. LANSING said that the Government of the United States of America would recognise the independence of Finland and the Government that now existed as the *de facto* Government.[2]

LORD HARDINGE said that the British Government was also quite ready to recognise the independence of Finland. It was felt that it would be very desirable to support Gen. Mannerheim's Government, as it constituted the best guarantee against the outbreak of Bolshevism. Furthermore, the Finnish Government had recently given proofs of its goodwill in expelling German agents from Finland, and also in consenting to take part at a Conference with representatives of the Red Finnish Legion of Northern Russia. It was

quite evident, therefore, that the present Finnish Government was anxious to meet the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers in every way it could. Nevertheless, two questions of considerable importance remained to be settled. The first question concerned the frontiers of Finland in Petchenga, Eastern Kola and the Aaland Islands. No decision need be taken on this question immediately; but it was very desirable that a stipulation should be made that the Finnish Government should agree to accept the decision of the Peace Conference in regard to the frontiers of Finland. The second question related to the grant by the Finnish Government of an amnesty to the Red Finns, who had served with the Allied Forces in Northern Russia. A formal stipulation on this question could not be introduced in the document, recognising the independence of Finland; but the Allied representatives at Helsingfors should inform the Finnish Government that, in recognising the independence of Finland, their Governments felt confident that the Finnish Government would act in a liberal and generous spirit towards the Red Finns, and that it would do its best to carry out the wishes of the Allies in that respect. With the above provisos, Great Britain was very desirous to recognise the independence of Finland.

M. MAKINO informed the Council that he had received no instructions from his Government in regard to the recognition of the Finnish Government. He could not, therefore, give an official adhesion to the proposal before the Council: but, as a matter of fact, his personal opinion was that it was very desirable that the independence of Finland should be recognised, and he would endeavour to get a definite answer from his Government as soon as possible. In regard to the frontier question, he entirely concurred with the remarks made by Lord Hardinge, namely, that Finland should agree to accept the decisions of the Peace Conference. He wished, however, to add another remark. His information went to show that Gen. Youdenitch was trying to organise a volunteer force for the purpose of attacking the Bolshevik Armies around Petrograd; but the Finnish Government were putting obstacles in the way. It was agreed that the most convenient direction from which General Youdenitch could descend on Petrograd was from Finland, and if the Finnish Government were induced to give him a free hand, it would greatly facilitate his operations and so force the Bolshevists to retire.

He understood that Gen. Youdenitch was acting in consultation with Admiral Kolchak and the other anti-Bolshevik parties in Russia. If his facts were correct, he thought this question might also be brought to the notice of the Finnish Government.

M. PICHON explained that the situation of France, *vis-à-vis* the other Allied and Associated Governments, was exceptional since she had already recognised the independence of Finland. She could not, therefore, now attempt any new stipulations to the original terms of recognition. Nevertheless, he would be prepared in due course to give instructions to the French official representative at Helsingfors, when appointed, to act on the lines laid down by Lord Hardinge and Baron Makino. He wished to invite the attention of the Council, however, to the fact that for the present France was only represented in Finland by an unofficial Chargé d'Affaires for the reason that France had awaited the recognition of Finland by the other Great Powers before making an official appointment.

LORD HARDINGE said that he must dissociate himself entirely from the proposal made by Baron Makino. The British Government held the opinion that any military action by General Youdenitch against Petrograd from Finland would constitute a grave danger to Finland, besides being very speculative in its results. In his opinion, if any action were to be taken against Petrograd, it should form part of a combined action in accordance with the agreed policy of the Great Powers. It should not constitute merely an isolated action of an independent leader, like General Youdenitch.

BARON MAKINO admitted that he was not sufficiently informed in regard to the real facts of the case. He had been told that General Youdenitch was acting in co-operation with Admiral Kolchak and the other recognised anti-Bolshevik elements. Consequently, General Youdenitch's operation could not be described as an isolated action. He did not, however, wish to insist on this point. He had merely intended to throw out an observation for consideration. In conclusion, he would enquire whether the Finnish Government did not have territorial ambitions in the Murmansk District and in the region of Petrograd.

LORD HARDINGE thought that the Ministers were wandering away from the question at issue, and beginning a discussion of Russian policy, which was not within their present mandate. In his opinion, the question of a Finnish attack on Petrograd had nothing to do with the recognition of the independence of Finland.

MR. LANSING said that he had listened to the discussion with great interest and, as far as the question of making conditions was concerned, he thought that M. Makino's suggestion was as justifiable as Lord Hardinge's; but he did not favour either. In his opinion, a nation was entitled to the recognition of her independence, and her government was equally entitled to recognition as a *de jure* or *de facto* Government, as a matter of right, and it was not justifiable to put conditions on such a recognition simply to serve some political purpose. He was ready, therefore, to recognise the independence of Finland and its *de facto* Government without conditions. Naturally after recognition and after the appointment of official representatives he would be quite ready to join the other Great Powers in making representations to the Finnish Government to urge it to accept the conditions mentioned by Lord Hardinge.

M. PICHON said that the French Government would be prepared to act in the manner suggested by Mr. Lansing.

LORD HARDINGE said that he also would be ready to follow the same course, on the understanding that France and the United States of America would make representations to Finland in regard to the question of her frontiers and in regard to the granting of an Amnesty to the Red Finns, as soon as official diplomatic agents had been appointed.

MR. LANSING said it was understood, therefore, that each nation would act separately.

LORD HARDINGE agreed. He wished to make it quite clear, however, that the recommendation of the British Government to the Finnish Government would only include the two conditions suggested by himself. It would not apply to the proposal relative to General Youdenitch's operations against Petrograd.

(It was agreed—

(1) That the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain would forthwith severally recognise the independence of Finland and the *de facto* Government.
(2) That after the recognition of the independence of Finland and after the appointment of official diplomatic representatives, the Governments of America, Great Britain and France would issue instructions to their representatives to urge the Finnish Government to accept the decisions of the Peace Conference in regard to the frontiers of Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish Government would be urged to treat the Red Finns, who had fought with the Allies, in a liberal and generous spirit by the grant of an Amnesty.
(3) That M. Makino would forthwith communicate the above decisions to his Government with a view to its taking similar action.)

3. Eventual Modification of the Frontier Between Czecho-Slovak State and Hungary M. PICHON said that the next question on the Agenda paper (i. e. the proposed modification of the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary) had arisen from a report submitted by General Smuts, as a result of a conversation the General had had with President Mazaryk. (See annex B.) He, (M. Pichon), proposed that the question should in the first place be referred to the Inter-allied Commission dealing with Czecho-Slovakia affairs, for report.

MR. LANSING concurred.

LORD HARDINGE said that the British Delegation had prepared the following resolution, which he would submit for approval:—

> "It is resolved
>
> That in view of the explanations furnished to General Smuts by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, the general question of the southern frontier of Slovakia shall be referred for further examination to the Sub-Committee of the Tchecho-Slovak Commission. This Committee shall proceed from the

assumption that the island of the Grosse Schütt shall be excluded from Tchecho-Slovak territory provided that in return a small enclave opposite Presbourg is ceded to the new Republic, and they shall consider whether the exclusion of this Magyar population renders it possible to modify in favour of Tchecho-Slovakia the frontier proposed in the Eipol valley.

The Sub-Committee shall report at the earliest possible minute."

MR. LANSING said he would agree to the first sentence of the draft resolution, but he would oppose the remainder of the text.

M. PICHON expressed his agreement with Mr. Lansing's point of view. In his opinion, the Council should not prejudge a case until it had received careful examination. He feared there had been some misunderstanding as to what President Mazaryk had said, and that the whole question required to be cleared up.

M. LAROCHE stated that Mr. Benes had formally stated that after obtaining cognisance of General Smuts' report of his interview with President Mazaryk, he had referred the matter to the President who had replied that General Smuts had seriously misunderstood what he had said. President Mazaryk in his interview with General Smuts had merely stated that certain parties in Bohemia held the view that the Island of Grosse Schütt might be exchanged for a small enclave opposite Presbourg. President Mazaryk himself, however, did not support that proposal. He maintained that the Island of Grosse Schütt was indispensable in order to ensure free navigation of the Danube. Furthermore the President had received a deputation composed of the inhabitants of the Island of Grosse-Schütt, imploring that the Island in question should be attached to Czecho-Slovakia for the reason that the whole of the products of the Island, including corn, were sent to Bohemia and not to Hungary. Under those conditions the Czecho-Slovak delegation asked that the decision reached by the Commission on Czecho-Slovak affairs should be maintained.

M. PICHON held that the Inter-Allied Commission on Czecho-Slovakia could alone throw light on this question. Furthermore, in his opinion, the question should not be referred to the sub-commission of the Czecho-Slovak Commissions, but to the Commission itself.

MR. LANSING expressed his complete agreement with M. Pichon's views. He enquired whether Mr. Benes had submitted a written statement, giving President Mazaryk's explanation.

MR. LAROCHE replied that he had had a personal interview with Mr. Benes, who had expressed his readiness to give evidence before the Commission. Dr. Benes would no doubt also be quite prepared to give a written statement if required.

MR. LANSING thought that the Council could not do more for the present than to refer General Smuts' proposal to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak affairs for investigation and report.

LORD HARDINGE said that in view of what the Council had just heard, specially in regard to the misunderstanding which had occurred, the British Delegation would withdraw its resolution. It agreed that the whole question should be referred to the Czecho-Slovak Commission for report.

(It was agreed to refer General Smuts' proposal (see Annex "B") to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs for investigation and report.)

4. Allied Policy in the Baltic M. PICHON said that the next item on the Agenda paper related to the Allied policy in the Baltic. He understood Mr. Lansing wished to reserve this question.

MR. LANSING said that he had made a reservation on this subject because General Bliss, who had given it special study and who was to be present at its discussion, was indisposed and could not attend the meeting. He would very much prefer to have the discussion postponed until the next meeting, which he hoped General Bliss could attend. He wished, however, to state for the information of the

Council that the proposal, submitted by certain of the American experts,[4] a copy of which had been distributed and attached to the Agenda, did not have the approval of the American Delegation and should not be regarded as embodying the views of the latter Delegation.

(It was agreed to postpone the discussion relating to Allied policy in the Baltic to the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held on Monday next, the 5th May, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourned to Monday, May 5th, 1919.)

PARIS, May 4th, 1919.

Annex "A" to IC–181 [FM–11]

PARIS, 26 April, 1919.

[*The Director General of Relief* (*Hoover*) *to President Wilson*]

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am wondering if there is not some method by which the recognition of the full independence of Finland could be expedited. They have now had a general election, they have created a responsible ministry; this ministry is of liberal character. There are many reasons why this matter should be undertaken, and at once.

1. The United States has always had a great sentiment for the suffering of the Finnish people, and their struggle of over a century to gain independence.
2. By lack of recognition, they are absolutely isolated from a commercial point of view from the rest of the world. They are unable to market their products except by the sufferance of special arrangements with governments at every step. They have ships without flags, and have no right to sail the seas. They are totally unable to establish credits, although they have a great deal of resource, as no bank can loan money to a country of unrecognised government. They are isolated by censorship. Their citizens are not allowed to move as their passports do not run.

3. The most pressing problem is their food supply. In January last the Finns were actually starving in hundreds. Order in the country was preserved by sheer military repression. By one measure and another, and altogether out of Finnish resources without the cost of a dollar to us, we have for the last three months fed Finland. Order has been restored. The populations are rapidly recovering nutritional conditions. They have begun to take hope of the future. They have prepared large quantities of materials for export. All through these operations, they have shown the most sturdy independence and have asked for nothing but the facilities to make their own solutions. Their resources are now practically exhausted. Unless they can have immediate recognition, so that they can create further commercial credits and can sell their products, they are either doomed or we must support them on charity.

If ever there was a case for helping a people who are making a sturdy fight to get on a basis of liberal democracy, and are asking no charity of the world whatever, this is the case. I am convinced from our reports that unless Finland is recognised within a very short time that the present government cannot survive the difficulties with which it is faced. One instance would show the utter paralysis under which they are suffering. Their banks have deposits of upwards of ten millions of dollars in the United States, but, so long as their government is unrecognised, our American banks must refuse to honour the drafts of the Finnish banks, as they can secure no legal assurance that the control and ownership of these banks is the same as that which existed at the time the deposits were made. It is purely a technical question, but it, amongst numerous other instances of this character, threatens absolutely to destroy the Finnish Government.

Nor do I see why any half measures need to be taken in this matter. They have gone through every cycle that the world could demand in political evolution, to the point of an independent people, and I feel that they would long since have been recognised had it not been for the terrible cloud of other questions that surrounds the world. I realise that there are a lot of people who consider that General Mannheim [*Mannerheim*] casts a sinister shadow over the present government, but the very fact that under this same shadow Finland

has established democratic institutions should be enough of an answer.

Faithfully yours,

(Sd) **Herbert Hoover**

Annex "B" to IC–181 [FM–11]

Note of a Conversation With President Masaryk

(*Memo. by General Smuts to the Great Powers*)

In my conversation with President Masaryk at Prague on Monday, 7th April, the future frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak State were referred to. Under the armistice terms, the Czecho-Slovak forces occupy the northern bank of the Danube from Pressburg to Komarom. The object, no doubt, in bringing the Czech occupation so far south was to give the future state a Danube frontier. But in order to do so it will have to include a very large purely Magyar population, which lives north of the Danube. I pointed out to President Masaryk the grave undesirability of this. He agreed, and said that he would prefer to waive all claims to this Magyar territory and withdraw the Czech frontier to the north, so as to leave all this ethnologically Magyar territory to Hungary. But on one condition; that in exchange Czecho-Slovakia should get a small strip of Hungarian territory south of the Danube at Pressburg towards Parndorf. This population here is more German and Croatian than Magyar. But the great advantage to Czecho-Slovakia of such an arrangement would be that the possession of both banks of the Danube for a short distance would enable the future state to build proper harbours and docks along both banks of the Danube. This it would be impossible to do on one bank only, when a possibly hostile power sits a few hundred yards off on the other bank. For this economic advantage Masaryk would be prepared to surrender his claim to a large area with an alien population.

With some millions of Germans already included in Bohemia in the north, the further inclusion of some 400,000 or 500,000 Magyars in

the south would be a very serious matter for the young state, besides the grave violation of the principle of nationality involved. I would therefore press very strongly for effect being given to this exchange, as I am sure it would be both to the advantage of Bohemia, and immensely please the Hungarians, who already look upon this part of their Magyar population as lost to them. In fact the Great Powers thus obtain a valuable bargaining counter in any dealings with the Hungarian Government.

(Sd.) **J. C. SMUTS**

PARIS , April 9th, 1919.

[1] Translation of letter:

> "MR. MINISTER: The Supreme Council of the Allies had adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace the following clause:
>
> > 'Germany renounces, in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers, all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.'
>
> The Belgian Government, having observed that such a clause would seem to exclude all claims of Belgium for acquiring a mandate over a part of the German colonies, when she nevertheless cooperated with the Allied forces, I have the honor of informing you that the Supreme Council, taking into account this observation, has decided to replace in this clause the words 'in favor of the five Allied and Associated Powers' with the words 'in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.'
>
> It is well understood that this decision does not do anything to prejudice the assignment of the mandates for the German colonial territories.
>
> Accept [etc.]
>
> Signed CLEMENCEAU"

[2] The United States recognized the independence of Finland and the *de facto* Government on May 7, 1919. See *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, pp. 210 ff.

[4] See FM–10, and appendix "A" thereto, pp. 641 [*Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 40*], 655 [*Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 40*].

May 8, 4 p.m. (FM–12)

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[42] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, May 8th, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 8, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/12

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/12

FM–12

[Document 42]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, May 8th, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 8, 1919, 4 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of[1]
Hon. R. Lansing.	Dr. C. Day.
British Empire	Prof. M. Jefferson.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	Mr. A. W. Dulles.
Secretaries	Major D. W. Johnson.
Mr. H. Norman.	Mr. Hoover.
Mr. E. Phipps.	British Empire
France	Mr. H. Nicolson.
M. Pichon.	Mr. A. Leeper.
Secretaries	Colonel W. L. O. Twiss.
Capt. de St. Quentin.	Lt. Colonel A. C. Temperley.
M. de Bearn.	France
Italy	M. Tardieu.
Baron Sonnino.	M. Laroche.
Secretary-General	M. Aubert.
Count Aldrovandi.	Italy
Japan	M. de Martino.
H. E. Baron Makino.	Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Secretary-General	M. Stranieri.
M. Saburi.	

Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. Pichon said that it would be convenient to begin with the frontiers laid down for Roumania, and he would ask M. Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee.[2]

Reports of Territorial Committees on Frontiers of Austria & Hungary: (a) Question of Secession of Parts of Austria and Hungary Mr. Balfour thought that before examining the particular reports it might be desirable to define what Austria and Hungary were to be, in terms of territory. He instanced the case of Vorarlberg. Was it to be Swiss or Austrian? In the former alternative, if Vorarlberg was allowed to split off, how was the Conference to prevent other fractions of previous Austrian territory to follow suit, in order to alleviate the debt on the population or for any other reason whatever? Before the Treaty could be made with Austria or Hungary this question must be settled in principle.

Baron Sonnino said that as far as he was concerned, Vorarlberg was part of Austria. He had no knowledge of this territory as an independent unit. Its recognition as such would lead to the secession of other populations, and result in endless confusion.

Mr. Balfour said that if he understood Baron Sonnino aright, it was intended that the discussion should result in a definition of Austria.

Baron Sonnino said that it should result in a definition of Hungary as well as Austria.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the method of defining the frontiers by adopting the results reached by the territorial committees might perhaps be the best. The circuit would then be complete and the various difficulties arising on the way could be considered.

MR. LANSING said that in his view the Council was dealing with the territory which in 1914 had been the domain of Austria and Hungary. It was recognised that this territory was to be dismembered, that Austria and Hungary were to be made separate States, and that their lands were to be limited by new States, whose frontiers were to be determined. No definition of Austria and Hungary, therefore, appeared necessary. The definition would arise automatically as a result of establishing the new States.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question still remained what would the conference do if any other part of Austrian or Hungarian territory wished to split off like Vorarlberg?

MR. LANSING said that this question would have to come before the conference when it arose. In his opinion the population could not be allowed to secede in order to avoid paying taxes.

MR. BALFOUR thought that in the Treaty there should be a clause covering such cases. He pointed out that there was to be a plebiscite in Vorarlberg in fifteen days, and that the Conference was doing nothing to stop it.

M. PICHON observed that the French Government had several times been informed by the Swiss Government that the adhesion of Vorarlberg was not desired. On the last occasion the Swiss Government had said that they would not welcome Vorarlberg, unless a crushing majority in the plebiscite practically forced their hands. The question, however, had not yet arisen, and it did not appear necessary for the Council to deal with it before it arose. He would therefore ask M. Tardieu to begin his explanation of the boundary adopted by the Committee for Roumania.

(After a short discussion it was decided not to consider the boundary of Roumania on the Russian side, but only to deal with its boundary

on the Hungarian side.

MR. LANSING said that in his opinion when the delimitation of Roumania and Russia was made, it would be necessary that Russia should be represented. The Peace Conference could not adjudicate on territory belonging to a State with whom the powers represented were not at war.)

(b) Hungarian Frontier With Roumania M. TARDIEU said that he would explain the finding of the Committee in respect of the Roumanian-Hungarian boundary in Transylvania. Referring to the map attached to Report No. 1[3] (W. C. P. 656) he explained that the red line indicated the demands of the Roumanian Delegation, and the blue line the recommendations of the Committee. There had been long discussions on the subject of the frontier in question, occupying no less than twelve meetings. He would explain in a few words the reasons which had prevailed with the Committee. Had the demands of the Roumanian Delegation been accepted without modification, a very large number of aliens would have been attributed to both sides. These numbers were halved by the recommendations of the Committee. Ethnologically, therefore, he thought that the results obtained were satisfactory. It had also been thought reasonable to keep within Roumanian territory a main line of communication running from North-East to South-West; from Szatmar-Nemeti to Nagy-Varad, while a parallel line connecting Szeged and Debreczen was left in Hungary.

MR. LANSING asked where the proper ethnic line would be.

M. TARDIEU said that the population was very mixed and that the blue line represented an equitable compromise. A truer line might perhaps in some cases be 20 kilometres east but on the whole, as he had explained, he thought the line would be satisfactory.

MR. LANSING asked why a more accurate ethnic line could not be followed.

M. TARDIEU explained that it would cut the railway line and suppress continuous communication.

MR. LANSING asked if anywhere west of the line there could be found a preponderant Roumanian population.

M. TARDIEU said that this might occur in certain isolated places.

In reply to further questions, M. Tardieu said that some 600,000 Hungarians would remain under Roumanian rule while some 25,000 Roumanians would remain within Hungary.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that this distribution did not appear very just; in every case the decision seemed to have been given against the Hungarians.

M. TARDIEU said that any other adjustment would have been all in favour of the Hungarians and correspondingly to the detriment of the Roumanians. The whole question had been discussed with the very greatest care—the solution had been adopted unanimously and represented, he thought, the best that could be done in very difficult circumstances. In some places where the Committee had thought it possible for new lines of communication to be built they had adhered more strictly to ethnographical considerations, but on the main part of the frontier, by reason of the mountainous ground, it was impossible to substitute new lines for those already existing. By reason of the way in which the Hungarians were grouped in Transylvania, it was absolutely impossible to avoid attributing large numbers of them to the future Roumanian State.

MR. LANSING said that he appreciated the efforts of the Committee to make an equitable distribution. After further consideration, he withdrew his criticisms and made no objection to the recommendations of the Committee.

MR. BALFOUR also stated that he raised no objection.

It was not possible for the Council to go over in detail the whole work of the Committee. As long as the Council was satisfied that the Committee had done the utmost to find an equitable solution, he felt that nothing could be done to improve the resolution, unless there had been disagreement within the Committee itself.

BARON SONNINO also expressed his agreement.

(No other objections being raised to the finding of the Committee, the frontier between Roumania and Hungary, as proposed by the Committee from the former frontier of Russia at Khotin to the point of contact with the Danube was accepted.

It was decided that the frontier as between Roumania and Jugo-Slavia in the Banat should be reserved for future discussion.)

The hope was expressed that a solution of the latter question would be reached by agreement between the Roumanian and the Jugo-Slav Government.

(c) Frontier Between Hungary and Jugo-Slavia M. TARDIEU said that the eastern frontier of Hungary had now been determined. There remained the southern frontier between Hungary and Jugo-Slavia. Referring to the map attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee[4] (W. C. P. 646) he pointed out that there was a very considerable variation between the demands of the Jugo-Slavs and the recommendations of the Committee. The Committee had certainly excluded a large number of Slavs from the area to be attributed to Jugo-Slavia, but they were not in sufficient numbers in the Committee's opinion to justify the line claimed by the Jugo-Slavs.

The Committee had therefore unanimously adopted the blue line from west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary.

M. PICHON asked if any criticisms of this line were forthcoming.

No criticisms were made and the boundary proposed by the Committee from the angle west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary was accepted.

M. SONNINO asked whether anything had been done regarding the boundary between Austria and Hungary.

(d) Boundary Between Austria and Hungary M. PICHON said that no Commission had been charged with this subject.

MR. LANSING questioned whether it was necessary to make any alteration in this boundary.

MR. BALFOUR said that it might possibly be necessary to do so, as he understood that there was a German population in Hungary which might wish to join Austria. If so, it might be desirable to be prepared to deal with this eventuality.

M. SONNINO pointed out that up to date neither Austria nor Hungary had raised the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question did not greatly interest the Allies, unless the financial or economic terms were to differ as between Hungary and Austria. In that case, some trouble might arise.

M. SONNINO said that he could see no reason why any difference in the treatment of the two countries should be made.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the Treaties in both cases were identic, it might not be necessary for the Conference to define the areas of the two states. In the other alternative, it might be desirable to do so.

M. PICHON thought it was unnecessary to deal with the question at once.

MR. LANSING said that, in his view, certain economic questions might arise which, unless the frontiers had been adjusted, might cause difficulties. As these two countries were now to be separated, he thought it would be well to ask a Commission to make a report to the Conference as to whether the previous boundary lines required to be changed or not. The Conference would therefore be prepared beforehand to deal with any proposal that might be made either from the Austrian or from the Hungarian side.

M. SONNINO said that if either the Austrians or the Hungarians had raised the question, he would be inclined to agree. As neither had

done so, he could see no reason for setting a Commission to work. As far as he was concerned, he accepted the old frontier. Should either side desire an alteration, he would then be prepared to recommend examination by a Commission.

MR. LANSING observed that neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians were present to raise the question. He suggested that, as the Allies had so often been unready to deal with emergencies when they arose, they should in this case take steps to be prepared in advance.

M. SONNINO pointed out that full liberty had been left to the Serbians and the Roumanians to compose their differences. It was only should they disagree that the Conference would step in. He suggested that the same procedure be adopted regarding Austria and Hungary. He saw no reason for stirring them up. The Hungarians were not represented but had made a very considerable fuss about their frontier with Roumania. It appeared to him quite gratuitous to suggest to them that they should raise needless trouble. The two countries had not quarrelled for fifty years over this frontier; their present Governments were very insecure and the time seemed very inopportune for thrusting a controversy upon them.

MR. LANSING said that his suggestion was that the question should be dealt with without rousing either the Austrians or the Hungarians.

M. SONNINO said that if it could be done without the knowledge of either he would not object.

M. PICHON said he understood the suggestion to be that a Committee should be asked to deal objectively with a possible rectification of boundary between Austria and Hungary.

(It was decided that a Commission be appointed to collect information regarding any possible rectification of frontier between Austria and Hungary which might be proposed by either of the parties concerned. The object of the investigation was to be to place the Council in a position to settle rapidly any trouble that might arise between Austria and Hungary on this subject. No action would be taken unless the question were to be raised by Austria or Hungary.)

(e) Frontier Between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary M. LAROCHE explained that the finding of the Committee[5] had been unanimous. From the point where the ancient boundary between Hungary and Austria met the Danube to the confluence of the Ipoli and the Danube, the frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia followed the stream. The reason for giving this frontier to Czecho-Slovakia was obvious. It was necessary to endow the new State with wide access to this important international waterway. A suggestion had been made to give up to Hungary the Grosse Schütt in exchange for a bridge-head across the Danube at Pressburg. This solution had been unanimously rejected.

MR. LANSING asked whether the population of the Grosse Schütt was Hungarian.

M. LAROCHE replied that it was partly Hungarian and partly German, but that this area was closely connected economically with the Czecho-Slovak hinterland. The people desired to maintain connection with the Czecho-Slovak State, in order to save their economic interests. The problems in this region were complicated and had been studied very carefully at a great number of sittings. The Committee had adopted what appeared to be the most reasonable solutions and unanimous agreements had been reached on all points.

MR. LANSING pointed out that, as a result of the findings of the two Committees, some two million Hungarians were to be placed under alien rule in Roumania and in Czecho-Slovakia.

M. LAROCHE observed that, as far as the Czecho-Slovak Committee was concerned, it had so reduced the claims of the Czechs that only 855,000 Hungarians instead of 1,300,000 would become subjects of Czecho-Slovakia. On the other hand, a great number of Czechs and Slovaks lived outside the boundaries of the new State. According to M. Benes, no less than 638,000 Slovaks would be left in Hungary. This figure might be exaggerated, but the number was considerable, and might be regarded as a guarantee for the good treatment of the Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia.

(After some further discussion, the line proposed by the Committee, from the intersection of the former boundary between Austria and Hungary up to the angle formed by the meeting of the Roumanian and Ruthenian territory, was accepted as the Northern frontier of Hungary.)

(f) Ruthenia MR. BALFOUR said that the problem of dealing with the Ruthenians was one which had not been settled. The Ruthenians had some affinity with the Slovaks, but not enough to be included without some precautions in the same State. Some kind of local autonomy had been suggested for them. The definition of the expression "some form of autonomy" was still to seek. There were, he was told, some 400,000 Ruthenians. They were considered too few to form an entirely separate state. On the other hand, it might be desirable to save them from the various annoyances arising from association with a larger and, to some extent, alien population in the same State. The precise means of dealing with this difficulty had not been thought out. A similar difficulty however, would arise not only in the Peace with Austria and Hungary but elsewhere.

M. PICHON said that the Committee had referred the question of Ruthenian autonomy to the Supreme Council. He suggested that a Commission be asked to make recommendations as to the form of autonomy suitable to the Ruthenians.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the question might perhaps be referred to the Committee dealing with the rights of minorities.

M. SONNINO said that he had no knowledge of this Committee, on which there was no Italian representative.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer to name a new Commission with local knowledge of the area in question. He proposed that the question be referred to the Committee on Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it was proposed to proceed in this manner whenever the question of autonomy should arise.

MR. LANSING said that he would support this, provided that the Council had the opportunity of examining the proposals, in order to ensure that contradictory principles were not applied in the various cases.

M. LAROCHE said that the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Affairs would ask the Czecho-Slovak Government for its proposals. Should these proposals not meet with the approval of the Committee experts could be consulted and the Ruthenians themselves could be asked to make their own suggestions. As far as the Treaty was concerned, all that need be stipulated was that the territory of the Ruthenians be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It was then decided that the Committee on Czecho-Slovakia be asked to make recommendations regarding the future status of the Ruthenians in relation to the Czecho-Slovak State.)

2. Agenda for the Following Meeting The frontiers of Hungary having been defined by the above resolutions, it was decided that the question of the frontiers of Austria should be discussed on the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 9th May, 1919.

[1] According to an attached notation, Mr. L. Harrison should also have been recorded as present.

[2] The Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.

[3] Report No. 1 (April 6, 1919) of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).

[4] Report No. 2 (April 6, 1919), of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).

[5] The Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs in its Report of March 12, 1919.

May 9, 3 p.m. (FM–13)

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[43] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 9th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 9, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/13

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/13

FM–13

[Document 43]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 9th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 9, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. C. Day
Secretary	Dr. C. H. Haskins
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Morison
British Empire	Mr. A. W. Dulles
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.	General Tasker H. Bliss
France	Mr. Hoover
M. Stephen Pichon	Mr. McCormick
Secretaries	British Empire
Capt. de St. Quentin	Sir Eyre Crowe
M. de Bearn	Hon. H. Nicolson
Italy	Mr. A. Leeper
Baron Sonnino	Colonel W. L. O. Twiss
Secretary General	Lt Colonel A. C. Temperley
Count Aldrovandi	Hon. A. Akers-Douglas
Secretary	Sir Esme Howard
M. Bertele	Sir W. Goode
Japan	Captain C. T. M. Fuller, R. N.
H. E. Baron Makino	Captain Woolcombe
Secretary General	Lt. Colonel Hon. C. C. Bigham
M. Saburi	France

Secretary	M. Tardieu
M. Kawai	M. Cambon
	M. Laroche
	M. Hermitte
	M. Aubert
	M. Seydoux
	ITALY
	M. de Martino
	Count Vannutelli-Rey

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. C. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck

1. Territorial Frontiers of Austria: (i) Frontiers Between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia At the Meeting held on the previous day, M. PICHON said that the Council of Foreign Ministers would, in the first place, complete the examination of the remaining territorial frontiers of Austria, as presented in the reports of the Commissions appointed by the Conference. Questions had been left over from the meeting held on the previous day (I. C. 182),[1] and he would ask the Council to commence with the examination of the frontiers between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the members of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak questions had reached a unanimous conclusion on this question.

M. LAROCHE said the Committee were unanimous in recognising that the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Austria should, in

principle, coincide with the administrative boundaries, which formerly separated Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian provinces. With respect to various rectifications asked for by Czecho-Slovakia in this frontier, the Committee were of opinion that for the most part, these demands could only be decided by a boundary Commission on the spot. The Committee had, however, unanimously recommended that the town of Gmünd should be given to Austria, whilst the railway station of Gmünd should go to Czecho-Slovakia, for the reason that the railway station formed an important junction. The distance between the railway station and the town was about two miles, so that the inconvenience caused by this arrangement would not be very great. Furthermore, the Committee considered it to be of great importance that Czecho-Slovakia should be able to control the course of the Morava river in order to be in a position to construct canals to serve the provinces of Moravia. It had been recommended, therefore, that the frontier should be drawn so as to leave the Morava entirely within Czecho-Slovak territory, it being understood, on the other hand, that the railway which followed the Morava at varying distances would be left entirely within Austrian territory.

One important question, however, remained to be provided for in the Austrian Treaty, namely, the renunciation by Austria of the northern provinces of Galicia and Teschen, whose boundaries had not yet been delimited.

(It was agreed to accept the recommendations of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak questions in regard to the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria.)

(j) Frontiers Between Austria and Jugo-Slavia M. TARDIEU said that the Committee[2] had carefully studied the Jugo-Slav claims to the Austrian provinces of the valley of the Drave. After examining the ethnographical, historical, economical and political conditions, it had decided upon the following solutions for the two boundary regions which formed distinct basins, having as their respective centres, Marburg and Klagenfurt.

(*a*) District of Marburg.

The United States, British and French Delegations noted that the district of Marburg was inhabited by a population in which the real Slovene element possessed the majority. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considered that Marburg, of which it recognised the German character, depended on the Austrian economic system, and could not therefore be detached from it without disturbing the economic life of the region and compromising the maintenance of peace.

In consequence, the United States, British and French Delegations proposed to assign to Jugo-Slavia the basin of Marburg; whilst the Italian Delegation opposed to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above.

(*b*) District of Klagenfurt.

The United States, British and French Delegations noted that the basin of Klagenfurt was inhabited by a mixed population, composing important Slovene elements, particularly to the east of Klagenfurt. This basin, moreover, constituted a geographical entity separated from the south by the natural barrier of the Karawanken mountains. For this reason, the basin, and not particularly the town, of Klagenfurt, constituted an association of economic interest more closely connected with the districts situated to the north than with those situated to the south. Nevertheless, the United States, British and French Delegations considered that the information at present in their possession did not appear to be sufficient to allow them to determine with certainty the natural aspirations of the nations of this district. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considered that the Klagenfurt basin formed an integral part of the Austrian geographical system from which it could not be separated, without disturbing the life of the region and compromising the general peace. For the above reasons, the Committee proposed that the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Austria should follow the course of the Karawanken mountains from a point south-east of Eisenkappel as far as the Klagenfurt-Laibach road. At the same time, the United States, British and French Delegations proposed that a local enquiry or consultation (under conditions to be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments) should be held, in order to afford the

inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria, and demanding union with Jugo-Slavia. The Italian Delegation, however, opposed to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above. It declared, moreover, that in its opinion, any question of a consultation or enquiry, as well as of a plebiscite, bore an eminently political character which removed it from the competence of the Territorial Committees.

M. DE MARTINO invited the attention of the Council to the importance of Marburg as a railway centre. In his opinion, the questions of Klagenfurt and Marburg were intimately connected. Consequently the two problems should be studied together and the study should be continued right up to the Italian frontier.

MR. BALFOUR said that before accepting M. de Martino's proposal he wished to enquire whether the arrangement in regard to the boundaries in the district of Marburg had not been something in the nature of a compromise, whereby it had been agreed that a triangle situated to the north of Luttenburg should be left to Austria in exchange for Marburg and the adjoining territory, which was to be included in Jugo-Slavia. As a result, he considered that the Council could not consider one question without the other, as it was by taking the two questions together that a compromise had been reached.

M. TARDIEU agreed that the question should be considered as a whole.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Commission should not be authorised to study the question up to the Italian frontier.

M. SONNINO considered that this could be done then and there. The Council of Four had charged the Council of Foreign Ministers to accept the proposals submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia, or to put up their own recommendations in regard to matters requiring amendment.

M. TARDIEU explained that the Committee had thought that a study of the frontiers beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road must involve the consideration of Italian claims which had been reserved by the Council of Ten.

M. SONNINO said that if he had correctly understood the question, the Committee in fixing the frontiers between Austria and Yugo-Slavia had given careful consideration to the position of the existing railway lines in these regions, with the result that it had decided to leave the railway line between Klagenfurt, Assling and Trieste free, that is to say, outside the territories allotted to Jugo-Slavia. Now, to give effect to this principle, it would be necessary that the frontier which had been delimited up to the Klagenfurt-Laibach road should thence proceed in a southerly direction, remaining east of Assling, until it met the Italian frontier. In other words, it was essential that the whole of the railway line from Klagenfurt to Trieste, via Assling, should remain in Austria until it reached the Italian frontier. In his opinion, that was the idea which the Committee had meant to follow in accordance with the principle accepted in regard to railway communications by other Commissions. Under this arrangement one important direct railway line of communication would exist between Trieste and Vienna, whilst the other railway lines more to the east would pass through Jugo-Slav territory.

MR. LANSING said the Council of Foreign Ministers had received no specific reports on these various questions. The Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia had not reported on the particular questions under consideration. He proposed, therefore, that these should first be referred to that Committee for examination.

M. SONNINO said that he would be prepared to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal. He would point out, however, that the Council of Four had directed the Council of Foreign Ministers to report on these very questions. Should his colleagues, nevertheless, insist on referring these questions to the Committee, he would bow to their decision, but only on the understanding that the terms of reference to the Committee should clearly lay down the principle he had just enumerated, namely, that the main line of railway communication

between Trieste and Vienna, via Assling, and Klagenfurt should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Commission should also be charged to deal with the question of the Italian frontiers in these regions.

BARON SONNINO replied in the negative. He invited the attention of his Colleagues to the fact that the Supreme Council had decided that all frontier questions affecting Italy should be settled by that Council. Consequently the reference to the Committee would relate only to the part between the Klagenfurt-Laibach road, where the Committee had previously stopped, and the frontier of Italy. Now, the principle which governed the Committee appeared to be to leave the Railway line between Trieste and Vienna outside Jugo-Slav territory. He thought that question could, therefore, be accepted at once. Otherwise it should, in his opinion, be referred forthwith to the Supreme Council and not to the Committee on Jugo-Slavia.

MR. LANSING maintained that there was nothing either in the report or in the maps submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia, which supported Baron Sonnino's contention.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood Baron Sonnino to state that the Councils of Foreign Ministers were not competent at present to decide questions relating to the Italian frontiers. In this view he entirely concurred with Baron Sonnino, at all events as far as Great Britain and France were concerned, since there existed the additional complication in regard to the Treaty of London. On the other hand, for the Council to decide at this stage that a certain railway line must be left out of Jugo-Slavia and included in Italy and Austria seemed to him to be hardly justifiable with the information at present available.

BARON SONNINO agreed that the Committee would be quite unable to discuss such a question, especially if the Foreign Ministers themselves could not do so. Consequently in his opinion the question should be referred to the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON remarked that Mr. Lansing had not said that the present Council were not competent to consider the question. He had merely asked that the question should be referred to the Committee for study and report.

MR. LANSING agreed. He explained that he felt himself at present incompetent, because he had received no advice from his experts either on the ethnological aspect of the case or in regard to the Railways.

BARON SONNINO said that he asked himself what the Committee would do when it reached the Italian frontier, since it would not be competent to deal with the question further. The Committee could, therefore, only deal with another 20 kilometres of country beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether it would not be an advantage that the question should be examined by a Committee before it came under consideration either by the present Council or by the Supreme Council. So far the question had not been examined by the Committee because the Italian Delegation had held the view that for political reasons Committees should not do so. He quite agreed with the view put forward by the Italian Delegation in regard to the question of international policy: but the Committee could give the ethnologic and economic aspect of the case which would greatly help the Council to deal with the larger questions. For instance, the area which the Italians desired should be given to Austria and not to Jugo-Slavia was, he understood, largely inhabited by Jugo-Slavs.

That was a question on which the Committee could furnish a statement.

Again, the Italian Delegation maintained that for economic reasons a direct line of communication between Trieste and Vienna and Bohemia should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory without crossing Jugo-Slavia. That constituted partly an economic point. Surely the two questions could be looked into by a competent Committee of experts. He understood that to be the suggestion made by Mr. Lansing.

MR. LANSING agreed that Mr. Balfour had correctly interpreted his proposal.

M. SONNINO said that provided the Council of Ministers were willing to accept the lines proposed by the Committee on Jugo-Slav affairs, he would, himself, withdraw the reservation made by the Italian Delegation in regard to the districts of Marburg and Klagenfurt.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that two reservations had been made: one by the Italian Delegation in regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, which the Delegation considered should remain Austrian on account of its forming an integral part of the Austrian geographical and economic system. On the other hand, the United States, British and French Delegations, considered that a local enquiry or consultation should be held in order to afford the inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria and of demanding union with Jugo-Slavia. It would be seen, therefore, that the Committee had not made any definite proposals. The Italian Delegation considered that the Klagenfurt Basin should be included in Austria, whereas the other three Delegations proposed that a line should be drawn south of the Klagenfurt Basin up to which the enquiry or consultation should proceed.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the procedure adopted in the case of Malmedy could not be followed in the present instance. Malmedy had been incorporated in Belgium, but provision was made in order to allow the inhabitants to protest against their inclusion in Belgium within a certain time; reference would then be to the League of Nations which would decide. He thought that procedure might be found a convenient method of dealing with the problem of Klagenfurt.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the two cases were very different. In Malmedy there was a question of bringing Germans under Belgian sovereignty; whereas the people of Klagenfurt already formed part of the Austrian State.

M. PICHON interpreted the views of the Council to be that the question should be referred to the Committee on Jugo-Slav affairs to report as soon as possible, giving precise details to enable a decision to be taken.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Committee could give ethnic and statistical data relating to this region but it could not give particulars relating to the railway line which would join the Italian frontier at an unknown point.

MR. LANSING agreed that the Council only required the Committee to give ethnological and economic information.

(It was agreed that the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia should submit recommendations in regard to the frontiers between Jugo-Slavia and Austria, up to the Italian Frontier, based on ethnic and economic considerations; the Committee should submit their report on the morning of the 10th May, 1919.)

2. M. PICHON read the following letter which he had addressed to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Netherlands Government in Paris, dated 9th May, 1919:—

> Summons to Belgian and Netherlands Representatives To Discuss the Revision of the Treaties of 1839 "In a note dated 4th April, 1919, you were kind enough to inform me that the Royal Netherlands Government was prepared to take part in a discussion on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.
>
> I am directed to inform you in reply to the Note above mentioned that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Great Powers has decided that a Conference, including the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of those Powers, together with the representatives of the Netherlands and of Belgium should meet as soon as possible, in Paris, in order to examine the question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

I regret that up to the present, it has not been possible to fix exactly the date on which these discussions could commence; but as soon as the Supreme Council is in a position to reach a decision thereon, I shall have the honour of informing you immediately.

Pray accept, mon cher Chargé d'Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Pichon".

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should forthwith issue a further communication to the representatives of the Netherlands and Belgium Governments, inviting them to attend the meeting as above arranged on Monday, 19th May, 1919.)

3. Belgium's Protest Against the Eventual Use of the Belgian National Colours by Germany M. PICHON drew attention to the following letter dated 6th May 1919, which had been addressed by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to the American, British and Italian Delegations:—"The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter which has been addressed to him by the Secretariat of the Belgian Delegation". In this letter the Belgian Delegation requests the Allied and Associated Powers not to recognise the new German flag in the event of the Colours of the latter being as announced, namely, the same as those of the Belgian flag. This question could, if so agreed, be placed on the Agenda paper for the next meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

MR. BALFOUR said he could not see what this had to do with the Peace Conference. It would obviously be impossible to add a new Article to the Peace Treaty on this question. He thought the matter should stand over until the Germans had committed the anticipated outrage.

M. PICHON suggested no action should be taken until Germany had declared her intention in the matter.

BARON SONNINO thought that once Germany had decided on her action it would be far more difficult to insist on a change being made. In his opinion it would be easier to warn Germany beforehand and inform her that the Allied and Associated Governments endorsed Belgium's protest.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the fact that a letter on this subject had been addressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American, British, French and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in March last. To this letter the British Government had already forwarded the following reply, dated 8th May, 1919, which he thought fully met the case:—

> "I have the honour to refer to the Note of March 15th last in which Your Excellency called attention to a statement which had appeared in the neutral press that the German Republican Government intended to adopt for the Republican Flag the same colours as the Belgian national Flag.
>
> Your Excellency asked for the assurance that His Britannic Majesty's Government would not recognise such a flag.
>
> In reply I have the honour to say that His Majesty's Government while feeling it would be difficult to make a demand of the German Government not to choose red, black and gold for the national colours, are of opinion that the Allies might insist that these colours, if adopted, should be so arranged that no confusion between the Belgian and German Flags would be likely to arise".

M. PICHON explained that the French Government had also answered in the same sense.

(The question was then adjourned.)

4. Belgian Protest Against Retention and Publication by Germany of the Documents Taken From the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

M. PICHON said that the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, had been addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General

Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, on the subject of the retention and publication by Germany of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:—

> "In compliance with instructions from my Government I sent to the President of the German Armistice Commission, under date of 10 April, 1919, a protest—of which I sent you a copy (cf. my *procès-verbal* of 10 April, 1919, S 3)—in regard to the retention and the publication by the Germans of documents belonging to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Belgium.
>
> The note of which I send you a copy herewith, reiterates my protest. The Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that joint action by the Allies seems to be indispensable, and he asks whether it would not be possible to obtain the intervention of Marshal Foch against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement.
>
> I have the honour to beg you to be so good as to investigate the possibility of satisfying this request".

M. PICHON, continuing, said that a clause in the Armistice existed which apparently dealt with this question. Consequently, it would be sufficient to request Marshal Foch to enforce the provisions of the Armistice.

M. SONNINO pointed out that Article 19 of the Armistice referred to by M. Pichon merely dealt with economic questions. It required the immediate return of all the documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries.

MR. LANSING enquired whether any of the documents referred to by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had actually been published in Germany.

M. PICHON invited attention to the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission: —

> "In my note of 10 April, I protested against the retention by the German Government, and the publication of political circulars or other documents of public interest belonging to the Belgian Government and I again requested the immediate return of all copies now remaining in Germany, as well as the cessation of the work of publication which is manifestly contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 19 of the Armistice Convention.
>
> Up to the present time, I have as yet received no reply in regard to this matter.
>
> The Minister of War informs me that, according to a report in the "Rhine and Westphalia Gazette" of 2nd April last, two fresh volumes of these circulars have appeared.
>
> I reiterate my protest against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement, and I urge General von Hammerstein to inform me as to the measures taken by the German Government in compliance with the justifiable and repeated requests which I have made in regard to this matter."

MR. LANSING proposed that Marshal Foch should be asked to report what Powers he possessed under the Armistice.

(It was agreed that correspondence received from the Head of the Belgian Mission at Spa, quoted above, should be referred to Marshal Foch with a request that he should report to the Council what powers he possessed under the Armistice to insist on the return of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

5. Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Regions Bordering the Baltic Sea: (a) Esthonia MR. BALFOUR said that all the information which he received from Esthonia as well as that received by the American Delegation went to show that some kind of assistance and encouragement should be given to Esthonia which for four months had been struggling against Bolshevism. Esthonia did not require men; she required equipment, food, and money, though not much. A small allowance of money, with some indication from

the Allied and Associated Governments, that they supported their cause would encourage the Esthonians to continue their struggle against Bolshevism. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should recognise the Esthonian Government as a *de facto* Government, and in addition they should even be prepared to give a certain amount of assistance in the work in which that Government was engaged. The matter was one of pressing urgency, as the fate of Esthonia was hanging in the balance. These remote people were quite unacquainted with the temper of the Allies in Paris. He proposed, therefore, that some form of encouragement should forthwith be given to the Esthonian Government by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The British Government had been giving naval assistance and stores to the Esthonians, and largely owing to that small contribution, the Esthonians had been able to carry on their struggles. But the British Government could not continue this action except in conjunction with the Allied and Associated Governments. The British Government had already acknowledged the Esthonian Government as a *de facto* Government, but as far as he knew, this had not yet been done by any of the other Allied and Associated Governments. However, deeds were more important than words and he felt some action should be taken in the direction indicated.

MR. LANSING said that his recollection was that Great Britain had recognised the Esthonian Government as a *de facto* Government about a year ago and had again confirmed the recognition in September last. The French Government had taken very much the same course.

M. PICHON explained that the French Government had not so far recognised the Esthonian Government, but it had had unofficial dealings with Esthonian representatives and had thereby acted as if according recognition to a *de facto* Government.

MR. LANSING pointed out that at the bottom of the whole question lay a very important principle of policy. The recognition of *de facto* Governments in territories formerly Russian, constituted in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America

had carefully avoided, except in the case of Finland and Poland. In the case of Poland Russia herself had acquiesced.

MR. BALFOUR said he would, under the circumstances, withdraw his suggestion for the recognition of Esthonia if the United States of America objected thereto, especially as he was more interested in the question of obtaining some material assistance for the Esthonians.

MR. HOOVER said that the Food Commission had established a systematic distribution of food in Esthonia but the problem was inseparable from that of public order and means of communication. The Esthonian Government, at the present moment only possessed three locomotives, two of which were broken down and unserviceable. As a result, the people were dying of starvation, and it was impossible to get food into the interior of the country. The Army had succeeded up to the present in maintaining its position: it was sadly in need of ammunition, clothing and supplies, which were not available at the present time. The high rate of casualties was due almost entirely to death from starvation. The scenes witnessed in Esthonia were most heartrending. The problem could not be encompassed without means of transport and the restoration of public order. Humane and not political considerations should prevail.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether Mr. Hoover would not add to his statement of the requirements of Esthonia a certain amount of financial assistance. Furthermore, he would be glad to know whether Mr. Hoover had any plans for improving means of communication.

MR. HOOVER explained that a section of the Supreme Economic Council dealt with questions relating to communications. He thought a certain number of Armistice locomotives and wagons obtained from the Germans could be set aside for work in Esthonia. In this connection, he would invite attention to the fact that the Germans had converted the Russian into the German gauge which would greatly help in arriving at a solution. Food supplies could be sent to Esthonia by the United States of America in accordance with the powers conferred by Congress, but no direct money loans could be made by the United States Government as no authority existed. In

regard to shipping, the British controlled a large quantity of German tonnage which could be put aside for the purpose of bringing munitions and supplies to Esthonia. He thought the whole question was one of co-operation between Allies and if authority were given to the Supreme Economic Council and to the Military Authorities, a solution would be found without difficulty.

MR. LANSING proposed that the matter should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council to prepare definite plans.

MR. BALFOUR thought that something more would be required. He thought that the Supreme Economic Council, the War Department and the Admiralty should be instructed to prepare the necessary plans: the Supreme Economic Council to be authorised to take action without again referring the matter to the Council. He realised that the American Government could do nothing in the way of advancing hard cash: but they did a great deal in the supply of food. On the other hand, only a very small amount of money, some £200,000 would make a great difference and he enquired whether France, Great Britain and Italy would be able to supply this sum.

M. SONNINO did not think that Italy could advance any money for this purpose.

M. PICHON pointed out that it would be necessary for him in the first place to obtain the sanction of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. He would have to address a certain request to that Committee shortly and he would then take the opportunity of pressing for an advance for this purpose.

MR. LANSING pointed out that in this connection the United States of America was already spending £400,000 a month in relieving the situation in Esthonia.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had intended to make it clear that the United States Government could not give money as such for technical reasons. But it was giving much larger sums of money in the shape of food and assistance. He would add that he was, himself, in M. Pichon's position. He would suggest that Great Britain should

give an advance but he would have to get the permission of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister. He would, however, do what he could.

(b) Latvia and Lithuania MR. HOOVER asked permission in the next place to invite attention to the situation in Latvia and Lithuania. The Germans had arrested the Government of Latvia and the British naval authorities had prevented food supplies from entering the country. The difficulty arose from the fact that the Germans were living on the civil population; they were not fighting the Bolsheviks, and they prevented the local authorities from organising the country.

The Bolsheviks had now retreated from Riga because no food was available. As a result the town of Riga was now in the hands of mobs and atrocities of a hideous nature were being committed. The American Food Commission were in a position to send food but this could not be landed without the help of the Navy, since no Government, not even a Bolshevik government existed.

CAPTAIN FULLER reported that the British Admiralty was fully aware of the situation in Riga. A week or 10 days ago an invitation had been received from the Germans asking that the British Navy should help them to recover Riga, the conditions being that the British forces should act in conjunction with the German forces.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. Hoover had not suggested that the British Navy should act in conjunction with the German forces: all he wanted was that the British Admiralty should send ships to Riga to ensure the landing of food.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied that it would not be possible to assure the landing of food at Riga unless the town itself were also occupied.

MR. HOOVER said that he felt certain that if food were landed at Riga, the Bolsheviks would promptly return.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the question stood as follows. Food could only be got to Riga under the protection of the British Navy. In addition, the town must be protected against attack because as soon

as food was available in the town the Bolshevik would enter. The British Admiralty were of the opinion that Riga could not be protected by marines, consequently, it would be necessary to consider whether any other forces were available to maintain order in the town.

MR. HOOVER pointed out that a humanitarian policy would allow the Germans to do the work on land in co-operation with the British Navy acting at sea.

M. PICHON thought it would be impossible to accept German co-operation.

MR. LANSING maintained that unless a solution could be found the Allied and Associated Governments would be responsible for the death of the people. Should the British Admiralty refuse to cooperate with the Germans purely from fear of giving the latter some economic advantages, it would be wholly responsible for the deaths that would occur.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. Lansing had spoken under some misconception. The British Admiralty had not considered either the economic or any other advantages. But so long as war lasted, it was rather a strong order to expect the British and German forces to co-operate. Everyone must feel the strength of the appeal made by Mr. Lansing. But volunteers could be found to go to the scene of action if only paid. Consequently, enquiries should be made as to whether other forces were available before the Allies could agree to march shoulder to shoulder with the Germans, with whom they were still at war.

M. PICHON entirely agreed with Mr. Balfour's standpoint. In Finland, in Russia, and in Scandinavia, other elements could be found to constitute volunteers to do the work required.

MR. LANSING said that paradoxical as it might seem, the Allied and Associated Governments were, by the Armistice, Allies of Germany in the Baltic provinces. The reason the Germans had been asked to

stay there was because the Allied and Associated Governments did not want them to leave.

M. PICHON thought it was one thing to tell the Germans to stay where they were and quite another thing to join and fight with them.

MR. LANSING enquired wherein lay the objection. Was it sentiment or danger to Allied forces?

M. PICHON thought it was both. In his opinion it would be very bad from, a moral point of view. Furthermore, there was great danger in our troops supporting the action of the Germans in Russia.

MR. LANSING agreed that the point was that the Allies did not wish to support the Germans in Russia. At the same time, thousands of people were starving in Esthonia. In his opinion, it was essential to put ideas of humanity above those of sentiment and to do everything possible to prevent people from starving.

MR. BALFOUR maintained that the question was not so simple as Mr. Lansing believed. The Germans had been behaving disgracefully in the Baltic provinces and were acting for their own political ends. They were everywhere preventing and hampering the policy of the Allies which was to encourage the local people to do what they could to organise themselves. Sufficient reason might not exist to force the Allies to occupy Riga, but sufficient reason existed to justify an endeavour to obtain volunteers to do the work required. This was clearly better than to assist the Germans who were merely furthering their own political objects. He agreed that everything possible should be done to save the population from starving, but if it were true that volunteers were available, Mr. Lansing and the Allies should be able to find some means to make use of them.

MR. HOOVER thought that the organisation of a mercenary army would require a considerable time.

MR. LANSING pointed out that he had heard what Mr. Balfour had said in regard to the condition of Esthonia with considerable interest. The American authorities had investigated the charges brought

against the Germans and they had found that the Germans had been behaving far better than had been reported. General Von der Goltz appeared to be behaving with considerable good faith, confining himself merely to military matters. The political situation was wholly due to the people quarrelling among themselves. They had been trying to get a Cabinet that represented all parties, including the Baltic Barons. In his opinion, there existed no danger of German misbehaviour.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether Mr. Lansing intended to imply that the statement relating to the disarmament of the Letts by the Germans was untrue.

MR. LANSING replied that the Germans had certainly disarmed the Letts when a movement against the Government had been started.

M. PICHON thought the Allies at present possessed no means to land forces to maintain order as suggested by Mr. Hoover. He thought that the Commanders of the local Allied Naval Forces should be called upon to make an enquiry and to report as to the means that could be taken to relieve the situation.

MR. BALFOUR invited attention to the curious difference existing between the information received from Esthonia by Mr. Lansing and himself. Under these circumstances he thought it would be a good thing for the Delegates of the various countries who had representatives in the Baltic Provinces to join and consider the information received by their various representatives.

MR. LANSING suggested that Mr. Hoover should be authorised to call such a meeting together and obtain a report. He would point out, however, that the question was also a food one.

MR. BALFOUR said that both Naval and Economic authorities would be available to represent the American, British, French and Italian views. These delegates should meet together to consider the facts available and submit a definite policy to be followed.

MR. LANSING thought the proposal would be acceptable. But he thought that even if the Germans were devils in Hell the people should still be fed. In his opinion, that was the only question regarding which the Commission should be asked to suggest the best policy, that was to say, the Commission should be appointed merely to report how best the Allied and Associated Governments could feed the people.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the terms of reference to the Committee should not be such that the feeding of the people alone should be considered, and that no consideration should be given to the existing state of affairs in the country.

M. PICHON agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Balfour. He thought the question should be considered as a whole; no aspect of the case should be neglected.

(It was agreed that a Committee consisting of an American, British, French and Italian, Economic, Naval and Military Representative should be appointed to report on the best means of keeping and maintaining order in the Baltic States and revictualling the population.

It was further agreed that the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France should consider the question of making a small money advance estimated at a total of £200,000 to the Esthonian Government.

The following were appointed to form part of the Committee, with instructions to report as promptly as possible:—

United States of America	Mr. Hoover.
	Admiral Benson.
	Colonel Logan.
Great Britain	Sir E. Howard.
	Sir W. Goode.
	Admiral Hope.

	General Thwaites.
France	M. Seydoux.
	Admiral de Bon.
	Colonel Georges.
Italy	. . . . .
	Admiral Grassi.
	. . . . . .)

6. M. SEYDOUX said that the Supreme Economic Council had for some time considered the question of the removal of the blockade restrictions on Hungary. It had been proposed to re-open relations with Hungary when the blockade restrictions on Austria had been removed. But on account of Bolshevik outbreaks in Hungary it had been found impossible on the 2nd April to give effect to this proposal. Indeed, it had been found necessary to insist on closing the frontier between Austria and Hungary. Now that the Government of Bela Kun was about to be upset, he thought steps could be taken to remove all commercial restrictions. Hungary was self-contained up to a certain point, but the supply of food and raw materials was becoming an urgent problem. It appeared, however, that a considerable quantity of breadstuffs and meat existed in the Banat and surrounding countries in excess of requirements of Greater Serbia, and was consequently available for export to Hungary. As a result of a study of this question the Supreme Economic Council had decided to enquire from the Council of Foreign Ministers whether the time had not now arrived for the lifting of the blockade on Hungary. Furthermore, the Eastern Sub-Commission of the Blockade were taking measures to prevent the passing of food and other raw materials from Hungary into Russia.

MR. HOOVER pointed out that the proposal referred to by M. Seydoux had been reached by the Supreme Economic Council on the supposition that the Bela Kun Government would fall at once. So far that had not happened; but the Supreme Economic Council asked for a mandate to act as soon as that Government should disappear. The information available went to show that two days ago it appeared certain that the Bela Kun Government would be upset.

Unfortunately, the invitation to Austria to attend the Peace Conference had been interpreted to include the Hungarian Government with the result that Bela Kun's Government had again been put on its feet.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the fact that no invitation had so far been delivered to the Hungarian Government.

M. PICHON expressed the view that the authority asked for by the Supreme Economic Council could be granted—that is to say that as soon as the political situation permitted, and order was re-established in Hungary, the blockade should be removed.

M. SONNINO inquired what interpretation should be placed on the words "reestablishment of order". He enquired whether an unofficial notification could not be allowed to leak out that the blockade would be raised as soon as the Government of Bela Kun was overthrown.

MR. MCCORMICK thought that if Bela Kun was put out of office the blockade could be removed. In his opinion the matter was one of the greatest importance, as Hungary was the last barrier that was still standing and preventing the re-establishment of normal economic conditions in Southern Europe.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the Supreme Economic Council and the General Staff should be the judges in regard to the re-establishment of order.

(It was agreed to authorise the Supreme Economic Council to take all preparatory measures to remove the blockade restrictions on Hungary without further reference to the Supreme Council as soon as the General Staff informed them that order had been re-established in the country.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 9th May, 1919.

[1] FM–12, p. 676 [*Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 42*].
[2] The Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.

May 10, 4 p.m. (FM–14)

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[44] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 10th, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 10, 1919, 4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/14

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/14

FM–14

[Document 44]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, May 10th, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, May 10, 1919, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Arnavon.
Capt. de St. Quentin.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY
Baron Sonnino.
Secretary-General
Count Aldrovandi.
Secretary
M. Bertele.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Day.
Prof. D. W. Johnson.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe.
Hon. H. Nicolson.
Mr. A. Leeper.
Major H. W. V. Temperley.
Mr. Carnegie.

FRANCE
M. Tardieu.
M. Laroche.
M. Aubert.

ITALY
M. de Martino.
M. Vannutelli-Rey.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
Secretary-General
M. Saburi.
Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

1. M. PICHON asked M. Tardieu whether he had any additional explanations to make to the report. (For Report see Annexure A.)

Frontier Between Austria & Jugo-Slavia: Consideration of Supplementary Reports by Committee on Jugo-Slav Affairs M. TARDIEU said that the Report had been circulated and that it explained itself.

BARON SONNINO said that in his opinion the solution finally proposed by the Committee in Part II of the Report appeared to him somewhat complicated. Italy, in the interest of the port of Trieste, wished that there should be uninterrupted communication between that port and German-Austria and Bohemia. For this purpose the Railway line should not pass through the territory of any third State which had no direct interest in the development of the line and possibly an adverse interest. Similar considerations had been given weight in dealing with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, etc. No doubt this might involve the delivery of a certain number of Slovenes to Austrian rule, but similar instances were not lacking elsewhere. For instance, the town of Marburg had been given to Jugo-Slavia though it contained from 18,000 to 20,000 Germans. He did not wish to delay peace

with Austria, and for that purpose, he would, if necessary, agree to the solution proposed, but he pointed out that it was no real solution; it was only a postponement.

M. PICHON said that it had the advantage of rendering an early signature of peace with Austria possible. The ultimate attribution of the territory could then be settled among the Allies.

BARON SONNINO said that the alternatives were to give the territory in question, namely: the triangle surrounding Klagenfurt, to Austria or to Jugo-Slavia. If it were to go to Austria, why not decide at once? Were it to go to Jugo-Slavia, either at once or later, the economic trouble to which he had alluded would inevitably ensue. There was a third possibility, to attribute it to Italy; but this was not desired by Italy, who wished to avoid the inclusion of non-Italian populations, except in cases of territories required for Italian safety.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not wish to express any strong dogmatic views, but he wished to suggest a few points. He felt some difficulty in meeting the views of the Italian Delegation, and in disregarding those of the French, British and American delegations. The Italian solution involved not only the separation of some Jugo-Slavs from the bulk of their nation, but their surrender to an enemy State. It was difficult to justify the handing over to an enemy of the natural subjects of a State it was intended to create. Secondly, he understood that the frontier proposed by all but the Italian Delegation followed the crest of a high range of hills. This crest formed the natural frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Austria. The Italian proposal would bring the Austrians south of the range. This, on the face of it, was an extraordinary thing to do in dealing with a hostile State. The proposal appeared to violate both ethnographical and geographical considerations. It was not a parallel case to that of the Brenner, the acquisition of which by Italy could be justified on geographical grounds, though open to criticism on ethnological grounds. In this case both ethnology and geography agreed, and both were to be violated. The only answer to these objections was that one of the two railway lines connecting Trieste and the north passed through this tongue of territory. It was assumed that if this tongue of territory belonged to Jugo-Slavia, it might be utilised to obstruct the

trade of Trieste with the North. This was a serious argument, as undoubtedly all the Allies wished to promote the trade of Trieste. There was, however, one qualification to this, namely: that there was another railway line connecting Trieste with German-Austria. This line it was true was inferior to the more easterly line. Still it existed and was an element in the situation. A further qualification was that the Allied Powers in dealing with Poland had been faced by a similar, but yet more vital, railway problem. The arrangement with Germany made it possible that the only main line of communication between the capital of Poland and the sea would be intercepted by German territory. This possibility had been contemplated, and in the event of its being realised, arrangements had been thought out to safeguard the traffic. The Polish case was obviously a stronger case than the one in question, as the most vital interests of the whole country were in jeopardy. It could not be held that the railway line from Trieste to the North affected Italian interests to this extent. If, therefore, the provisions made for Poland were sufficient, similar provisions ought to be adequate for Trieste. Lastly, he wished to draw attention to a very serious aspect of the delivery of this territory to Austria. It would give the Northern powers access to a region from which they could advantageously invade Jugo-Slavia. He did not think that Italy would readily grant such an advantage to any of her own enemies. The Council could not, he thought, decide this case against the Jugo-Slavs until this military problem had been studied. The remarks just made represented the reflections suggested by the report just put forward by M. Tardieu. Before concluding he wished to say that he sympathised most cordially with the Italian wish to develop Trieste. All wished to see Trieste prosperous, and possessed of free access to all the countries North of it.

MR. LANSING enquired whether he was wrong in understanding that both of the railway roads were single tracks.

M. LAROCHE said that both lines had a single track, but that tunnels had been made on the Eastern line (Trieste-Assling) for a double track.

MR. LANSING said that he had little to add to the very full consideration given to the subject by Baron Sonnino and Mr.

Balfour. As to the principles on which the solution ought to be based, he agreed with Mr. Balfour. In the case of the Brenner Pass the Council had decided to give precedence to topographical over ethnographical considerations, and had given to Italy territory including a large number of Austrian-Germans. They were now asked to change their principles, and to decide against a natural boundary. It seemed to him that a similar argument might be used in the case of Fiume. If this territory must not be Jugo-Slav, because the Jugo-Slavs might use it to interrupt communications with an Italian port, the Hinterland of Fiume, it might equally be argued, must not be Jugo-Slav because the railways feeding the port might similarly be interfered with.

BARON SONNINO said that he did not admit the cases were parallel. In this instance the railway was to pass through a band of territory about 20 kilometres broad. The Jugo-Slavs would not be interested in the railway at all, and if they possessed this strip they might seize the opportunity of neglecting the line in order to favour traffic to another part. In the case of Fiume, however, the whole trade must come through territory which no one suggested should be withheld from Jugo-Slavia. The contest was really between two ports, and the natural flow of commerce to each should be kept as far as possible separate, and no entanglement between them should be allowed. This was the only way to secure the development of both.

As to the ethnological point, in Poland, some 300,000 Germans were to be made subjects of the new Polish State, and about 280,000 Hungarians were to be Roumanian subjects, as the inevitable accompaniment of some hundreds of kilometres of railway.

MR. LANSING observed that the process of giving to friends rather than to enemies was being reversed. This territory was being taken from the Jugo-Slavs to be given to the Austrians.

BARON SONNINO observed that the Slovenes were not his friends in a greater degree than the Austrians.

MR. LANSING retorted that America regarded them as friends.

BARON SONNINO said that the new States should be considered neither as friends nor foes. Should German Austria, for instance, join the Danubian Confederacy, the Austrians might come to be regarded as friends. Should they join the German Confederation, the Austrians would be counted among foes. The question was really one of permanent commercial relations. Further, if the question of friendship was raised, he claimed a share for Italy.

MR. BALFOUR said that he heartily endorsed the last sentence.

MR. LANSING agreed but pointed out that the question was an Austrian rather than an Italian problem.

BARON SONNINO said that it was an Italian question in as much as it concerned Trieste, Istria and the Adriatic.

MR. LANSING said that he was struck by the fact that if Austria were brought so far south, she might feel she had a claim to reach salt water.

BARON SONNINO observed that she would only be brought some 20 kilometres nearer the sea.

M. PICHON enquired whether any practical solution could be found.

BARON SONNINO said he was ready to accept the proposal made by the Committee at the end of the second section of the Report. He was ready to do this in a conciliatory spirit to avoid obstructing the signature of a Treaty with Austria. He would have, however, a small amendment to make. He would stipulate that the triangle, the ultimate fate of which was to be reserved, should not be made so wide as to include the western line from Trieste, and thereby to leave in suspense the whole of the railway communications between Trieste and the north. In other words, the triangle should not include the line from Trieste to Villach via Udine and Tarvis.

MR. LANSING proposed that the formula suggested by the Committee be accepted with a proviso that the limit of the territory be to the east of Tarvis.

M. TARDIEU observed that the Committee had constantly kept in view the desirability of preserving uninterrupted communication between Trieste and Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was ready to accept the view that it was the business of the Conference to see that direct and free railway communication be assured between Trieste, German-Austria, Bohemia and the north generally.

BARON SONNINO said that on this understanding he would agree to the draft of the Committee.

MR. BALFOUR said that his remark should not be interpreted as a pre-judgment on the question of territorial sovereignty. By direct and free communication, he did not mean necessarily to imply that railway lines were not to pass through ground belonging to a third State.

BARON SONNINO said that he accepted the proposal of the Committee on the understanding that due consideration was given to the necessity of preserving the railway communications of Trieste towards the north. He would make no concession in advance regarding the question of territory just mentioned by Mr. Balfour.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Report of the Committee proposed that the frontier line should pass north of the tunnel of Rosenbach. He thought that it would be better to have the frontier line along the ridge over the tunnel.

(After some discussion it was agreed to omit the last clause of the first paragraph of the Committee's recommendation in part II of the Report.)

M. PICHON suggested that the Committee should formulate a proposal, after taking into consideration the above discussion, for reference to the Council of Heads of States, and that no further reference need be made to the Council of Foreign Ministers, should the Committee reach a unanimous decision.

(This was agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, May 10th, 1919.

Annexure "A"

Report Submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the Committee on Jugo-Slav Affairs

I. EXPLANATORY

(1). The Italian Delegation claim that to the west of the road Klagenfurt-Laibach, the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Austria should follow a south south-easterly direction reaching the frontier granted to Italy by the Treaty of London in such a manner as to leave to Austria the upper part of the valley of the Save as far as Radmannsdorf.

(2). The Italian Delegation supports this demand by economic and military reasons to which it attaches the highest importance.

(*a*) Economic reasons.

The line Udine-Pontebba is insufficient to carry traffic between Trieste and Austria and the north, firstly by reason of its limited capacity, secondly by reason of its greater length, which increases the cost of transport.

Absolutely free use of the line Gorizia-Assling-Rosenbach is therefore indispensable to the life of Trieste, as the proposed link between Tolmino and Tarvis through the Predel Pass, is, according to the Italian Delegation, not realisable for a long time, and the delay would cause serious harm to the commerce of Trieste.

Should even a small part, (twenty-five kilometres) of the line Gorizia-Assling-Rosenbach be in Jugo-Slav territory, the traffic of Trieste will be hampered, firstly by passing through two customs barriers in a short stretch, secondly, by the risks incidental to any difference arising between the two countries concerned.

(*b*) Military Reasons.

The railway line in question, according to the Italian Delegation, does not represent a military threat against Italy on behalf of an enemy attacking from the North, as any attack from that side would necessarily be limited to that single point. On the other hand, it does represent a very serious threat favourable to any attack coming from the East, if supported by a developed system of communications over more open ground. This threat would on the left wing compromise the line of defence from the sources of the Isonzo to the Adriatic.

The experience of the war and the events of October 1917 are proof of this.

(3.) From the ethnographical point of view the Italian Delegation points out that if the consequence of their claim is that a certain number of Slovenes will be included in Austria, on the other hand equally large groups of Germans (Marburg, Gottschee etc.,) have been included in Jugo-Slavia.

It is further argued that in many similar cases, Commissions and the Supreme Council have given precedence over ethnographic considerations to economic interests like those put forward by Italy regarding railway communications.

II. Opinion or the Committee

The Committee after three meetings held on the 9th and 10th May, presents the following report:—

1. The Committee unanimously recognises that the number of Slovenes who, as a consequence of the Italian claim, would remain in Austrian territory, amounts to about 50,000.

2. The Committee unanimously considers that it is not competent to deal with the military argument and suggests that this aspect of the problem should be studied by other Experts.

3. As regards the economic argument, the importance of which is unanimously recognised;

(*a*) The American Delegation considers that the inconveniences pointed out by Italy could be remedied by special stipulations regarding the regulations of customs. These regulations might be placed under international supervision which would ensure to Italy full and free use of the railway line.

The British and French Delegations are of the same opinion.

(*b*) The same Delegations consider that this would permit of the construction of a line from Tolmino to Tarvis by the Predel pass, without jeopardising the traffic of Trieste.

4. The above mentioned Delegations consider that this local problem is intimately connected with the solution of the general problem of frontiers between Italy, Austria and Jugo-Slavia, a problem with which the Committee is not entrusted. The solution of this problem may eventually remove the whole basis of the observations made by the Italian Delegation.

For this reason in order to avoid any delay in the drafting of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, the following formula is proposed:—

> "The southern frontier of Austria should be continued from the point south of Klagenfurt at which the line proposed in the Committee's report ends, in such a way as to follow the crest line of the Karawanken towards the West as far as Hill 2,035, northwest of Tarvis, but in such a manner as to leave to the south of the frontier the northern entrance of the tunnel of Rosenbach.
>
> The district of Tarvis and the zone south east of it, which the Italian Delegation wishes to attribute to Austria, will thus be ceded by Austria to the Allied and Associated Powers.
>
> Italy's interest in preserving all adequate means of communication by rail, free of all obstacles, between Italy and Austria, would thus be safeguarded."

The Italian Delegation made full reservations concerning any solution which might raise questions not entrusted to the Committee.

Note Annexe

It has been recognised that the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt as fixed in the report of April 6th, would have the effect, should the population choose connection with Jugo-Slavia, of changing the sovereignty of the territory over which railway lines connecting Trieste and Vienna pass.

This consideration justifies a revision of the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt within which enquiry should take place with the object of ascertaining the wishes of the population regarding the attribution of the region to Jugo-Slavia.

The Commission therefore proposes to fix the limit of the Basin of Klagenfurt in the following manner:—

South, the crest of the Karavanken.

Wes, a line starting from the crest of Karavanken north-east of Assling, going northwards towards the Drave, reaching it in such a manner as to leave five kilometres to the west of it the entrance of the tunnel of the line Rosenbach-Assling; thence following the course of the Drave up to 5 kilometres east of San-Ruprecht.

North, a line following the crest between Worther-See and Ossiacher-See, continuing towards the North east in such a way as to pass equi-distant from San-Veit and Klagenfurt, thence by the Stein-bruchkogel (1075 metres, map 1/200,000) passing by the extremity of the crest of Sau Alpe (Hill 1458), continuing towards the South east, passing north of Griffen, cutting the valley of the Lavant 5 kilometres north of its confluence with the Drave and meeting towards the east the crest between the Lavant and the River Feistritz.

East, following the crest between the Lavant and the Feistritz and cutting the Drave south of its confluence with the Lavant, continuing towards the south west in such a way as to pass east of Eisenkappel and to meet the crest of the Karavanken at Hill 2559.

This outline from the ethnological point of view results in the exclusion from the Basin, as previously defined by the Committee, of a population of about 60,000 Germans.

PARIS, May 10th, 1919.

May 14, 3 p.m. (FM–15)

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[45] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 14th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 14, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/15

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/15

FM–15

[Document 45]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 14th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 14, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. H. White.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
Secretaries
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.
Mr. E. Phipps.

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Arnavon.
Capt. de St. Quentin.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
Secretary
M. Bertele.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Lord.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe.
General Malcolm.
Col. Twiss.
Hon. H. Nicolson.
Mr. A. Leeper.
Col. Henniker.
Mr. H. J. Paton.
Admiral Hope.
Mr. Fullerton Carnegie.
Col. Kisch.
Mr. Forbes Adams.
Col. Meinertzhagen.

FRANCE
M. J. Cambon.
Admiral de Bon.
Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.
Capt. [*Col.?*] Georges.
M. Laroche.

Secretaries
M. Saburi.
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden.
British Empire	Captain E. Abraham.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

(1) Method of Procedure To Be Followed by Commission on the Revision of the Treaties of 1839 M. Pichon said that the Belgian Minister in Paris had come to see him, and had enquired whether the whole Belgian Delegation was to be present at the first meeting on the 19th May, when the revision of the Treaty was to be considered, or whether M. Hymans should be present alone. The answer had been, subject to confirmation, that the only Belgian plenipotentiary whose presence was necessary was M. Hymans, who might be accompanied by any technical advisers he might consider requisite.

The next question had been whether the Belgian and Dutch Delegations would be called upon to make a statement of their points of view at the beginning of the first meeting, and which of the two would be asked to speak first. The answer had been that Belgium should take the initiative of starting the discussion.

The third question had been whether the Commission, comprising at the first meeting the Foreign Ministers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would nominate a technical sub-commission to elucidate the question. M. Pichon had replied to this in the affirmative, subject to confirmation, as in the case of the other replies made, by the Council. As Baron Gaiffier wished to have a firm

answer by the 14th, M. Pichon asked whether the Council approved of the replies he had given.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his view the matter was very largely a question of form, and that he was prepared to leave it entirely to M. Pichon as Chairman of the Council.

(This was agreed to, and the replies above quoted were approved.)

(2) M. PICHON asked which Commissions had dealt with the frontiers of Bulgaria.

Fixing of Bulgarian Frontiers M. CAMBON said that the Commission on Greek Affairs had concluded its work on the common frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria.

M. LAROCHE[1] said that the Serbian Commission was also ready. The Roumanian Committee had thought that it was not within its terms of reference to deal with the ancient frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria.

M. PICHON said that the question to be decided was whether or not representatives of the countries concerned, Greece, Serbia and Roumania, should be heard in the Council before the frontiers were settled.

BARON SONNINO asked whether the results obtained by the Committees had been unanimous.

M. LAROCHE said that there had been unanimity except on a small point regarding the frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria. There had been complete unanimity in regard to Roumania; there had been considerable difference of opinion in regard to the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether representatives of the countries concerned had not been heard by the Committees.

M. CAMBON replied in the affirmative.

M. PICHON suggested that the best plan would be for the Council to hear an explanation of the reports of the Committees, and then if necessary to call in the representatives of the countries concerned.

(This was agreed to, and it was decided that the reports of Committees relating to the frontiers of Bulgaria should be heard on the following Friday at 3 p.m.)

(3) Repatriation of Russian Prisoners COLONEL GEORGES said that on the 3rd April, 1919, the Inter-Allied Control Commission at Berlin had concluded that the retention of prisoners of war was impossible, and that the Germans should be allowed to organise their repatriation in their own way, provided none were forced to return home who might not wish to. This proposal had been submitted to the Allied Governments and accepted. On the 9th April an order had been given that this decision be communicated to the German Government. On the 17th April General Nudant had asked for details regarding the means adopted for carrying out the repatriation. An interchange of correspondence between General Nudant and the Berlin Commission took place on the 21st and 23rd April, and on the 6th May. This correspondence was sent to the Peace Conference by the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies, together with his remarks. The proposals in question were as follows:—

(1) A stream of transportation by rail through Poland, on one part and Czecho-Slovakia and Galicia, on the other for Great-Russians and Ukrainians.
(2) Transport by coasting vessels for prisoners belonging to the Baltic Regions.
(3) Transportation by sea to Archangel, to the Black Sea and Siberia, of other prisoners.

The Berlin Commission had drawn up a plan for organising these various streams of repatriation. This plan, together with the comments made on it, gave prominence to certain points, to which the attention of the Conference must be drawn.

(*a*) The necessity of obtaining the consent of the Esthonian Government to the landing of Russian Prisoners of War on its

territory. A similar demand would have to be made to the Lettish Government.

(*b*) The necessity of an agreement with the Polish Government regarding the passage of prisoners of war across Polish territory. A month ago the Polish Government had been unwilling, but it appeared by the news brought by General Malcolm, that this attitude had since been modified.

(*c*) It would have to be recognised in principle that part of the tonnage under the control of the Entente Powers should be utilised for repatriation.

M. PICHON said there might be some difficulty in dealing with the Lettish Government under existing circumstances.

COLONEL GEORGES continuing, observed that the liberty left to Germany of repatriating Russians in its own way, was not exempt from certain risks, the principal of which were the probable massacre of the Anti-Bolsheviks and the reinforcement of the Soviet Armies. This point had been very clearly set forth in a letter of April 19th, giving the views of the British War Cabinet. This decision, however, was based on the unanimous opinion of the representatives in Berlin, who had come to the conclusion on the spot that it was impossible to make a selection among the prisoners, and that it was desirable to act quickly and repatriate them en masse. Since then, the Berlin Commission appeared to have modified its views. The proposals made by it appeared to admit more and more the possibility of making selections and of organising, at least by sea, provided tonnage could be found, distinct streams of repatriation for the various categories of prisoner. This being so, it would appear that repatriation should be so carried out as to make use of these possibilities. Humane considerations should also be given weight, and the anti-Bolshevik prisoners of war should not be handed over to the tender mercies of their enemies. There was also a military interest in avoiding any reinforcement of the Bolshevik troops, and in increasing the manpower of all Russian Forces faithful to the Entente. It would follow from this reasoning that an order of urgency should be established regarding the repatriation of these prisoners. Firstly, non-Bolshevik prisoners of war should have priority of repatriation to anti-Bolshevik areas. Anti-Bolshevik areas should be

understood to mean the non-occupied portions of the Baltic provinces, Northern Russia, the Kuban Region, the Caucasus, and Siberia. The situation of the Ukraine was still too disturbed to place that country in that category. Secondly, until the situation in Russia became clear, repatriation of non-Bolshevik prisoners into a Bolshevik area should be deferred, still more that of declared Bolsheviks and agitators. If these principles were admitted, the following executive measures could be taken.

(i) *Baltic Provinces*. Measures for repatriating about 8,000 men by rail across Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and by coasting vessels to Esthonia. This process to begin as soon as the Governments concerned should agree.
(ii) *Northern Russia*. In this direction, North Russians, 10,000; Western Siberians, 17,000; Eastern Siberians, 5,000; and subsequently Great-Russians could be dispatched. The expected junction of the armies of Koltchak and of the Russian Forces in the North would, ere long it was hoped, allow of the transport of the Siberians to their own country, via the Trans-Siberian, a cheaper method than transport by sea to Vladivostock. This plan for repatriation might begin by the dispatch of the Northern Russians as soon as the Conference had accepted in principle the allocation of a tonnage for the purpose, and as soon as the executive Committee had marked off the necessary ships.
(iii) *Kuban. Caucasus*. 2,200 Tartars; 1,400 Cossacks; 2,000 Georgians; 1,000 Roumanians, could be sent. The two former to Novorossiisk, the two latter to Batum. This scheme of repatriation was of less importance from a military point of view than the others. It could therefore be undertaken at a later date when tonnage was available.

GENERAL MALCOLM said that he agreed with the scheme proposed by Colonel Georges in almost every detail. The decision of the Allied and Associated Governments had been taken more than a month ago, and some 1,500 Russians had already gone home. The remainder knew that they were entitled to expect repatriation. By the means suggested, reinforcements could be sent to the friendly forces in Russia, provided ships were supplied to supplement the land transport. This point could only be settled by the shipping

authorities. Colonel Georges had suggested that transport by rail should be deferred, and that transport by sea should have precedence. He would suggest that transport by land should continue without interruption. About 600 a week could be repatriated in this manner via Tilsit and Vilna. So far, this had been well carried out under the supervision of British, French and Italian officers. A good effect had been produced, as the men arrived well supplied with food and clothing. This, moreover, had had the effect of putting a stop to trouble in the prisoners' camps, which had begun to be serious. The number of Georgians and Armenians to be repatriated was small. They could go either via Hamburg or by Fiume, as the Ministry of Shipping might decide. The Georgians, moreover, said that they had a ship at their disposal, which would probably sail from Fiume. It had previously been thought that the Polish Government would object to any transit of Russian prisoners through Polish territory. This attitude appeared to have changed. An invitation had been sent to an Allied Commission to come and study the question. It would be easy to send Allied officers in charge of parties of prisoners as far as the break of gauge in the line. The same could be done for Ukrainians through Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. BALFOUR said that many people were anxious lest the Bolshevik forces be reinforced by the return of prisoners of war. It was alleged that there were 500,000 Russian prisoners in Germany. If these were all to become Bolshevik troops, it would undoubtedly be a serious responsibility to send them back to Russia. Whether they were Bolsheviks themselves, or whether, on arriving in Russia, they were forced to fight for the Bolsheviks, was from this point of view immaterial. He did not make himself responsible for these arguments, but he would like to know how General Malcolm would meet them.

GENERAL MALCOLM said that he thought he could on this point speak not only for himself, but for his colleagues. Had they believed that there were as many as 500,000 Russian prisoners, they would have voted against their repatriation. There were not, however, he believed, more than half that number. Of these 60,000 came from non-Bolshevik areas. This left some 190,000 belonging to Central and South Russia. He believed that the Allies could afford to let all

these return. Many would refuse to do so, probably as many as 50,000. The remainder would be repatriated by land and by a very slow process. On the other hand, those going by sea to non-Bolshevik areas would reach home much sooner. Our friends would therefore be reinforced before our enemies. Moreover, all these men were very home-sick. Any Government attempting to force them into military service would certainly have great trouble with them. They had been on an average some three years in captivity, and their military value was negligible. This consideration applied, of course, to those returning to North Russia and Siberia, as well as to those returning to Central Russia, but, in view of these considerations, he thought the criticism alluded to by Mr. Balfour was not very strong, and that the Bolsheviks would receive no serious military advantage from the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany.

(The proposals outlined by Colonel Georges and General Malcolm were accepted.

It was agreed that M. Pichon should take the necessary steps on behalf of the Council to obtain the co-operation of the Esthonian and Lettish Governments, and that General Malcolm through the British War Office should request the Ministry of Shipping to furnish the requisite tonnage.)

(4) Admirals' Report on the Measures Requisite for the Maintenance of Order in Sleswig ADMIRAL DE BON read and explained the report appended to these Minutes as "Annexure A". He added that the Italian Government had not been asked to co-operate in these measures, but that the co-operation of the Italian Navy would be welcomed should Italy wish to send a few light ships to join the Allied Fleet.

M. SONNINO said that he had not seen the record of the Meeting of the 30th April,[2] and that he was somewhat surprised at the exclusion of Italy from participation in these operations. He thought it would have been more suitable had Italy been asked whether she would take a share.

M. PICHON said that all would welcome Italian co-operation. The omission was due firstly to the absence of the Italian Delegation, and secondly to the feeling that Italy was perhaps not interested in the matter.

(It was commonly agreed that Italian co-operation would be welcomed.)

MR. BALFOUR said that apparently Fleets alone could not do all that was required. He was in some doubt as to where the additional troops were to come from.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that it had been considered sufficient that each of the nations concerned should furnish one battalion.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the respective General Staffs had been consulted. He was in some doubt whether a battalion could be furnished from Great Britain.

M. PICHON said that he was about to make the same remark.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that General Desticker had expressed no doubt as to the possibility of finding the troops required. He had only expressed some hesitation as to the quantity of troops required for the maintenance of order. Admiral Benson had said that he could supply 1,000 to 1,500 marines. He suggested that the question of the Commanding Officer should be settled, and that the question of obtaining the requisite troops from the various nations be left to him to negotiate.

M. PICHON asked whether it would be necessary to refer the question of command to the Heads of Governments.

MR. WHITE suggested that this question should be settled in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the question of command was easy to solve. As the British Fleet would bear the main part, he thought the command should be given to a British Admiral.

MR. WHITE said that he had intended to make the same proposal.

M. SONNINO said that he also agreed.

(It was agreed that the command of the whole force, both at sea and on land, requisite to maintain order in Sleswig during the consultation of the population, should be entrusted to a British Admiral.

It[3] would be his duty to settle with the respective Governments concerned all means required to execute the proposals contained in the Admirals' report.)

(5) M. PICHON read a proposal made by M. Benes. (See Annexure "B".) He suggested this proposal be remitted to the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Affairs.

Railway Clauses for Insertion in Treaty With Austria and Hungary in Connection With Czecho-Slovak Republic M. CAMBON thought that it would be more suitable to refer it to the International Commission on Ports, Railways and Waterways.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether he was not right in supposing that according to Article 52 of the report of that Commission the first step in obtaining agreement relating to a railway connecting one country and another was that the railway administrations concerned should be asked to come to an agreement among themselves. It was only failing agreement between them that the Commission of experts stepped in. The case under consideration appeared to be exactly the sort of case contemplated by the Article.

"It was agreed that the British Admiralty should arrange with the Ministries of Marine and of War of the respective Governments concerned for the provision of the land and sea forces required."

M. PICHON said that he thought Mr. Balfour's view might be adopted, and he was prepared, if the Council agreed, to tell M. Benes to ask the railway administrations to work out a solution.

(This was agreed to.)

(6) Renunciation of Austrian Rights Over Galicia M. CAMBON explained that the Galician question was a very intricate one. The study of the matter had not been completed, and the Commission was not in a position to make a report. It was unlikely to be able to do so in time for the framing of the Treaty with Austria. As, however, it was desired that Poland should not have a common frontier with Austria or Hungary, it would appear sufficient to insert in the Treaty with Austria an Article to the following effect:—

> "Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article ... which previously formed the Province of Galicia."

He would himself propose a slight alteration of this text. In spite of various efforts, the question of Teschen had not been solved, but, in any case, it was clear that Austria was not to have this region. He would therefore suggest that the last clause should read: "which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia".

MR. BALFOUR said that he entirely agreed, but his attention had been drawn to a slight omission. There was a strip of Ruthenia which should be provided for in the Article. This strip intervened between Galicia and the part of Bukovina ceded to Roumania. He would therefore suggest, in addition to the modification suggested by M. Cambon, the addition of the words "as well as that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Roumania".

(After some discussion, the following draft Article was accepted:—

> "Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article ... which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia, as well as to that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Roumania.")

(7) Eventual Cession to the Polish Republic of a Part of the German Fleet MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that this matter should be deferred until the Conference had decided on the fate of the German Fleet as a whole. It would be absurd to attribute any portion of it to a particular State before a decision had been taken on the fate of the whole.

(The question was therefore adjourned.)

(8) Occupation of Armenia by Allied Troops M. PICHON pointed out that this question was connected with a number of other questions which had not yet been settled. It would be a mistake, he thought, to investigate this question in isolation from the question of Turkey, Asia-Minor, etc.

MR. BALFOUR, MR. WHITE, and M. SONNINO expressed their agreement.

(The question was therefore adjourned.)

(9) Request for a Hearing From Essad Pasha[4] (This question was also adjourned.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, May 15th, 1919.

Annexure "A" to IC–186 [FM–15]

[*Admirals' Report on Measures Requisite for Maintenance of Order in Slesvig*]

(Translation of French Text of Report)

In accordance with the decision of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers, dated 30 April, the Admirals representing the navies of the United States of America, France and Great Britain met on Saturday, 3 May, at the Ministry of Marine, to discuss the measures to be adopted immediately on the signature of

Peace with Germany to maintain order in Slesvig during the operation of the plebiscite.

General Desticker, representing Marshal Foch, attended the meeting.

The Admirals considered the report dated 19 March, and also the note of 4 April, of the Committee on Danish Affairs, as well as the letter of M. Pichon to the effect that according to recent news from Copenhagen the Germans might try to foment trouble in Slesvig after the evacuation.

2. The Admirals are of opinion that:—

(*a*) The port of Flensburg should be selected as base for the naval demonstration on the coast of Slesvig.
(*b*) The naval force to be employed should be composed of light vessels (cruisers, destroyers or gunboats) of the three navies.
(*c*) These small vessels could proceed at short notice to any point along the coast but would not be, by themselves, sufficient for maintaining order and could not spare any men from their crews as landing parties. It would consequently be necessary to have at hand troops ready to act. These troops could be stationed at Flensburg, and should be conveyed there in transports.
(*d*) It appears preferable that the troops sent should be provided equally by the three Powers; they should be under the general direction of the naval officer commanding the inter-allied naval forces, who would act in close co-operation with the International Commission charged with the administration of Slesvig.

General Desticker, owing to short notice, had not been able to make a complete study of the question. Subject to any modification which further study may show necessary, he thinks that three or four battalions would be sufficient, if they were suitably constituted for their special police mission and were supplied with the necessary light equipment (cyclists, automatic machine guns, etc.)

3. The Admirals assume that the command of the inter-allied naval force will be decided by the Chiefs of the Governments concerned.

As soon as this decision is communicated and the Governments have approved the proposals outlined above, each Admiralty will make the necessary arrangements in detail with a view to the measures agreed upon being put into operation immediately on the signature of the Treaty.

Signed by	For
ADMIRAL BENSON	*United States of America*
VICE-ADMIRAL DE BON	*France*
REAR-ADMIRAL HOPE	*Great Britain*

PARIS, 3 May, 1919.**Annexure "B" to IC–186 [FM–15]**

PARIS, May 12, 1919.

[*The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs* (*Benes*) *to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference* (*Dutasta*)]

HIS EXCELLENCY M. DUTASTA,
Secretary General of the Peace Conference, Paris

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the clauses upon Railways, the insertion of which in the Peace Treaty with Austria-Hungary is claimed by the Czecho-Slovak delegation.

Please accept [etc.]

(Signed) **EDWARD BENES**

[Enclosure]

SPECIAL CLAIMS OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC FOR INSERTION IN THE PEACE TREATY WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Railway Clauses

The clause provided in Article 52 of the draft of the clauses presented by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways relative to the arrangement of the Exploitation of the lines connecting two parts of a country and crossing another, was voted for in so general a manner inasmuch as the Commission had not learned of the new frontiers. Now that this delimitation is known, the vital interest of the Czecho-Slovak Republic requires that in the Treaty with Austria and Hungary the said clause stipulate as follows:

A Commission of experts designated by the Allied and Associated States in which Austria shall be represented shall determine the conditions of exploitation of the line Breclava (Lundenberg)–Gänserndorf–Marchegg–Devin (Devenujfalu).

A Commission of experts designated by the Allied and Associated States in which Hungary shall be represented shall determine the condition of exploitation of the following lines:

1. Cata (Csata)–Lecenac (Losoncz).
2. Banriev (Banreve)–Sajoecseg–Miskolcz–Zsolcza–Szerencs–Satoraljaujhely.
3. Zsolcza–Hidasnemeti–Kosice (Kassa).
4. Sajoecseg–Torna.

[1] A correction states that this paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

"M. LAROCHE said that the Committee on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav territorial claims was also ready with its report on the frontier with Serbia, but thought, etc."

[2] See FM–10, p. 641 [*Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 40*].

[3] A correction states that this paragraph should read as follows:

[4] President of the Provisional Government of Albania.

May 16, 3 p.m. (FM–16)

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[46] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 16th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/16

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/16

FM–16

[Document 46]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 16th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. H. White
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretary-General
Count Aldrovandi

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. C. Day

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G
Mr. A. Leeper
Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, C. B., C. M, G.
Major H. W. V. Temperley

FRANCE
M. J. Cambon
M. A. Tardieu
M. Laroche
M. Hermitte
M. Aubert

ITALY
Marquis C. Durazzo
Colonel Castoldi
Comdt. G. Mazzolini.

Secretary
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. CAMBON proposed to begin the discussion of the Bulgarian Frontiers from the Greek side.

Frontier of Bulgaria: (a) With Greece M. PICHON said that, in that case, he must communicate to his colleagues a letter just received from M. Venizelos (Appendix I). This letter had been received at noon, and the observations contained in it had, of course, not been considered by any Committee. He was in doubt whether it would be advisable for the Council to consider them before they had been examined by the competent Committee.

M. BALFOUR agreed that it would be useless for the Council to examine the proposals before they had been before a Committee. He thought the method employed by M. Venizelos was a little unusual, as the Committee had heard Greek witnesses, and he had had opportunities of stating his case on many occasions.

M. CAMBON said that it appeared to him, after a hasty glance at the letter, that the modifications proposed were small ones, affecting a few villages and small groups of population. He suggested that the

Committee's report[1] be considered in general, and that later on these questions of detail should be taken up by the Committee, and, if necessary, that an Annex to the report be made upon them.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that if M. Venizelos' observations only related to points of detail, the Committee be allowed to decide, without further reference to the Council, provided that any large questions that might arise should be at least brought to the notice of the Council.

M. SONNINO said that in the Central Territorial Committee, the American Delegate[2] had objected to any decision relating to the frontier of Eastern Thrace until the fate of Constantinople and its surrounding territory was known. In this he had been supported by the Italian Delegate. The question raised by M. Venizelos in relation to various villages could hardly be settled irrespective of the general line of frontiers. If this could not be fixed, neither could the fate of the villages.

MR. BALFOUR agreed with Baron Sonnino, but said that he thought the American Delegation had withdrawn their objections, and were ready to recommend a line in Eastern Thrace.

M. CAMBON said that the unsolved question of Constantinople had overshadowed the work of the Committee on Greek territorial claims throughout. He had himself repeatedly asked for information on the subject. As no information was vouchsafed, the Committee had proceeded on the proposal, he thought, of the American representative, to fix the northern frontiers of Thrace on the hypothesis that the territory to be attached to Constantinople would be bounded by the line Enos-Midia. If, however, nothing could be done until the fate of Constantinople had been decided, the whole question would have to be put off and the report of the Committee re-written.

M. TARDIEU said that the Central Committee on territorial affairs had been inclined to share the view of the Italian and American Delegates, to the effect that the frontiers of Greece could not be fixed in the way suggested by the Committee on a mere hypothesis. Like

Mr. Balfour, however, he had assumed when he saw the subject on the Agenda that some decisions had been taken.

M. SONNINO said that he thought it would be useless to proceed until the fate of Constantinople had been decided. He hoped that a decision on this subject would be taken soon, and he suggested that it should be awaited. Nor did he think that it would be useful to examine the frontier in Western Thrace. There, again, the problem would only be dealt with partially, and the points raised by M. Venizelos, among others, would be omitted. He would even propose that the whole question of Bulgarian frontiers be postponed, as there were other questions in suspense, namely, that of the Dobrudja and that of an area near Sofia, as well as that of Constantinople.

M. TARDIEU said that, in his view, there was a good deal of difference between the question of the frontier between Serbia and Roumania respectively and Bulgaria, and the question of the Thracian frontier. For the latter a necessary element was lacking. In relation to the former, there were differences of view which might be reconciled by the Council.

MR. WHITE said that the American Delegate on the Central Territorial Committee had made a reservation which had not yet been withdrawn. He therefore agreed with Baron Sonnino that the Greco-Bulgarian frontier should not be discussed at present, but he also agreed with M. Tardieu that the remaining frontiers should be examined forthwith.

(It was then agreed to postpone the consideration of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier until the fate of Constantinople had been decided by the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON undertook, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers, to draw the attention of the Heads of the Governments, to the importance of deciding this question in relation to the frontiers of Bulgaria.

It was also agreed that the Committee on Greek territorial claims should examine the proposals made by M. Venizelos.)

(b) With Roumania M. TARDIEU said that the question of the rectification of the frontier in the Dobrudja had been regarded by the Commission[3] as a very delicate matter. It was difficult to ask an Allied country after a victorious war to yield to an enemy State territory which it had possessed before the war. The line shown in blue on the map attached to the report[4] represented the proposal of the American Delegate.[5] There had been qualified unanimity regarding this proposal. The French Delegate[6] thought it inexpedient to alter the frontier at all, but all were of opinion that, if any alteration were to be made, the blue line represented the best alternative frontier.

M. PICHON suggested that the Roumanians and Bulgarians might be informed that, if any rectification of frontier in the Dobrudja was desired by them, the Allies would welcome negotiations between them.

MR. BALFOUR said he understood the Commission was of opinion that the blue line represented a better ethnographical frontier than the green line, which was the 1914 frontier. Had the Conference been dealing with an enemy State, it would have applied its principles without reservation, but, as, in this instance, the case affected an Allied State, no modification, even according to the ethnological principle, could be made without the consent of the Allied State. He thought perhaps an appeal might be made to Roumania to offer a modification of frontier in the interest of peace with her neighbours and the general peace of Europe.

M. PICHON agreed that this was the question to be decided.

MR. WHITE pointed out that in the space between the blue and the green lines, there were 66,000 Bulgarians, and only 867 Roumanians. He agreed that the territory could not be taken from Roumania without her consent, but, in view of the figures quoted, he thought an offer to redress an inequitable frontier should be made.

M. SONNINO asked if there was any reason to suppose that Roumania and Bulgaria had any intention of negotiating.

M. TARDIEU said he thought not. Three months ago Roumania might have been tempted to do so, with the object of inducing Bulgaria to yield Vidin to Serbia in exchange for a strip on the Dobrudja. The result of this might have been that Serbia would have abandoned her claims in the Banat and left Roumania a free hand there. This conclusion now appeared improbable, and Roumania would presumably be unwilling to negotiate with Bulgaria about the frontier in the Dobrudja merely on its merits.

M. PICHON [said?] that a hint might be given to Roumania to modify the frontier in the Dobrudja according to the recommendation made by the Committee. Meanwhile, the previous frontier might be provisionally accepted. It would be very difficult for the Allies to take from Roumania what had been given to her in 1914, especially since Roumania had fought on the Allied side against Bulgaria.

M. SONNINO said that a recognition of the 1914 frontier would make it still harder for Roumania to make a move. He thought that the report of the Committee should not be communicated officially to Roumania, but that it should be allowed to leak out unofficially. This might convey a less pointed hint to Roumania to undertake negotiations on her own initiative.

M. TARDIEU said that, as far as he was concerned, he was a strong partisan of the original frontier. The new line would bring Bulgaria very close to the port of Constanza.

M. SONNINO suggested that the whole question be deferred, in the hope that the two countries would get together and settle the matter between them. Neither should be officially urged to do so, but an informal hint should be given to Roumania enabling her to make a *beau geste*. The Council might take the matter up again, should the two countries fail to reach an agreement.

M. TARDIEU said that Roumania might answer to any hint of this kind that until she was aware of her frontiers in other regions, she could make no proposals. Her frontier in Bessarabia had been left undecided, by reason of Mr. Lansing's remark that this frontier could not be decided in the absence of Russia. The frontier in Bukovina

was also undecided and the frontier in the Banat was in a similar situation.

M. LAROCHE said that if Roumania yielded a little ground to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, she would improve her relations with her neighbours and also confer a benefit on the Allies in general by making the rest of the peace terms more digestible to the Bulgarians.

M. PICHON said that in all probability M. Bratiano, before making any move, would ask for an assurance that Roumania would have the Banat. The Allies would then be forced to confess that the Roumanian frontiers could not be fixed on any side except the Hungarian.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the objection to settling the frontier in Bessarabia, as involving a partial dealing with the Russian problem, was a sound one, but he thought the frontier in the Banat could be dealt with at once. He suggested that the Committee be asked to make a report on the subject.

M. TARDIEU observed that the Committee's report had been ready for 2½ months.

M. LAROCHE remarked that it had been hoped that the two countries concerned would reach an amicable settlement. This now appeared most unlikely and in all probability both sides would prefer that the decision of the Conference should be imposed on them.

(Further discussion of the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria was postponed pending a decision on the Banat.)

(c) Effect on These Questions of Lack of a Russian Policy M. SONNINO observed that a decision on all these questions was continually hampered by the absence of an Allied policy regarding Russia. The Conference hoped to make peace with Germany, Austria and Hungary. The Russian question Policy station still remained without the beginning of a solution. As Mr. Balfour remarked, the problem could not be dealt with piecemeal; nevertheless all sorts of questions would necessarily remain undecided unless something was done to

establish a policy in Russia. A month ago Mr. Lloyd George had said that a Russian policy was absolutely necessary. If it was necessary then, it was more necessary now. The present moment, moreover, was a favourable one, as Russia was now divided into two principal forces, (1) the Bolshevik, and (2) all the anti-Bolshevik Governments, under Admiral Koltchak. Unless some steps were taken promptly, the Allies would be too late. The Allies were doing nothing, and the various Russian parties appeared to be shy of making any move. He suggested that the attention of the Council of Heads of States be drawn to the advisability of framing a Russian policy without delay.

(M. Pichon agreed to draw the attention of the Council of the Heads of States to this question.)

(d) With Serbia M. TARDIEU explained the report of the Committee regarding the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria. He explained the reasons why the committee rejected the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, and why, in three instances, it had adopted a modification of the previous frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia. In all these instances, save one, there had been unanimity. In the area between the Dragoman Pass and Pirot, the French and British Delegations proposed a line leaving the Dragoman Pass to Bulgaria, but giving Jugo-Slavia a more favourable position across the seven roads converging on Pirot. The former frontier had given the Bulgarians command of all these roads, and had put Pirot at their mercy. On the other hand, the frontier proposed by the Jugo-Slavs would have put Sofia at their mercy. The Italian and American Delegates preferred that no change should be made in the frontier at this point, as it was so near the capital of Bulgaria. They agreed, however, that the line proposed by the French and British Delegates was the best possible, should the alteration of the old frontier be considered desirable at all.

M. SONNINO asked what views had been expressed on the Central Committee.

M. TARDIEU said that each Delegation had maintained its own view.

M. SONNINO expressed the opinion that ethnological reasons were in favour of the Bulgarians.

M. TARDIEU said that the population was very small in the area concerned, and that ethnological reasons had no great weight.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought, on the whole, the balance of argument was in favour of a change of the frontier. There was no important question of population changing their sovereignty. The purpose was to make a more defensible frontier. Strong frontiers, as a whole, made for peace. The new frontier rendered Jugo-Slavia more defensible, and did not imperil Bulgaria. A change, therefore, would, he thought, be advantageous to the cause of peace between the neighbouring States.

M. PICHON agreed.

M. SONNINO asked how many inhabitants were concerned.

M. TARDIEU said that there were no certain figures, but, roughly speaking, about 7,700 people might be affected.

MR. WHITE also expressed agreement to the new frontier proposed.

M. SONNINO said that he would not oppose it.

(The frontier proposed by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Jugo-Slavia between Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria was accepted.)

2. M. PICHON read a letter and draft Article sent him by M. Hymans (Appendix 2). He asked whether any objections were raised.

Article Proposed by M. Hymans for Insertion in the Treaties of Peace With Bulgaria and Turkey in Favour of Belgian Subjects MR. BALFOUR said he raised no objection, but he would point out that the Belgians had not been at war with Bulgaria or Turkey. Nevertheless, they wished their countrymen to be placed in the same position as subjects of countries which had been at war. He asked whether the

United States, who were in the same position, would like to claim the same advantages.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that this would set up a somewhat dangerous precedent.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Belgian subjects suffered any disabilities which could not be cured otherwise.

M. PICHON remarked that no such disabilities were alleged.

M. SONNINO said that it was possible that Belgium might have other remedies than the one suggested.

(It was decided that the question should be referred to the Reparations Commission, which would be asked to take note of the above discussion.)

3. Claim to Restoration of Polish Archives, Works of Art, etc. M. PICHON drew attention to the text of three articles submitted by the Polish Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. (Appendix 3.) He suggested that this matter should also be referred to the Reparations Commission.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the claim made referred back to events which had taken place a century ago. If claims relating to events before the period of the Napoleonic wars were to be put forward, Italy might take advantage of the precedent to make certain similar claims.

(The question was referred to the Reparations Commission.)

4. M. PICHON drew attention to the letter from Dr. Benes. (Appendix IV).

Protest by Dr. Benes Against Inclusion in the Austrian Delegation of Germans of Bohemia M. SONNINO expressed the view that it was not open to the Conference to make a formal objection. The Austrian Delegation might be told that they had made an indiscreet choice of Delegates, but an official protest appeared to him to be out of the

question. Had the Austrian Delegation chosen to give powers to persons born in Italian territory, such as Trent, he would have thought the choice a bad one, but he would not have made an official protest.

M. PICHON said that he had returned a similar answer to M. Kramarc.[7] He thought, therefore, that no notice could be taken of Dr. Benes' protest.

M. SONNINO further pointed out that in all territories transferred from one State to another provision had been made for the inhabitants to opt for the retention of their previous nationality.

MR. BALFOUR and MR. WHITE agreed that no official notice could be taken of Dr. Benes' request.

(It was, therefore, agreed that no action could be taken.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, May 16th, 1919.

Appendix I to IC–187 [FM–16][8]

PARIS, May 16, 1919.

[*The Greek Premier* (*Venizelos*) *to the President of the Peace Conference* (*Clemenceau*)]

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a memorandum containing certain observations on the line of the new Greco-Bulgar frontier, as proposed by the Commission entrusted with an examination of Greek claims in Thrace.

Your Excellency will be good enough to note that there is a question of some slight rectifications which, without being of the least importance to Bulgaria, on any ground whatever, offer nevertheless some essential advantages from the Greek point of view, and seem to conform with equity.

Accept [etc.]

Signed: **E. K. Venizelos**

[Enclosure—Translation]

9

Observations on the Greco-Bulgar Frontier in Thrace

(English Map 1/250 [*1/250,000?*])

1. On the east, the line proposed by the Hellenic Delegation, started from Cape Iniada, and following the water-shed between the basins of Katir Chaush Déré and Kezvaya Chai, it passed through the village of Velika to pass afterwards by way of Karaman Dagh, Lisovo Dagh, etc., the line which separates the waters of the Maritza and its affluents from those which fall into the Black Sea. This unbroken chain of elevations did not enclose any Turk or Bulgar village. The amendment proposed by the Commission would result in leaving outside of the Greek frontier a zone containing two Greek villages, Samakovo with 5,000 Greeks and 400 Bulgars, and Troulia with 1,000 Greeks and no Bulgars, and including no other population, either Turk or Bulgar; so that without profiting any one whatever, the amendment would be prejudicial solely to the Greek inhabitants of the villages named above. From, the strategic and topographic points of view, nothing hinders the line from following the natural course proposed by Greece, or at least from following the mountain chain of Karaman Dagh up to the Monastery of St. George, whence it would pass through Velika and Karaman Dagh, to join Lisoro again, this continuous chain of elevations being also a water-shed between the waters flowing northward toward Madiera Tchai and Velika, and those flowing southward toward Krivar and Boulanik.

It is well to state again, moreover, that the villages referred to, and especially Samakovo, are united by communications with both Kirk-Kilissé and Media, having in all times belonged administratively to this latter district; while according to the demarcation proposed by the Commission these villages will go back to a district which has

formed part of Bulgaria since 1913, and to which they are not attached either ethnographically or administratively and geographically.

In these circumstances it would be entirely just to rectify the line slightly, so as to include in Greek territory the two villages in question.

2. Near Adrianople, the line proposed by the Commission is fairly satisfactory. It may be observed, however, that at a trifling distance from this line are to be found the purely Greek villages of Iskudar (1,800 inhabitants), Pacha Mahale (400 inhabitants), Mikelien (700 inhabitants), Haskeuy (100 inhabitants), and Fikeli (300 inhabitants). There is no Turk or Bulgar village, on the other hand, in the zone which includes these five Greek villages. It would suffice, therefore, to remove the line proposed by the Commission 2 or 3 kilometres northward in order to have within Greek territory these five villages, without incorporating in it any Bulgar population. And besides, since in this region the boundary can by no means follow any natural line, and must cut obliquely the water courses and mountain spurs whose general direction is from north to south, the rectifications suggested would have the advantage of establishing the frontier at points which are more elevated and which are 2 or 3 kilometres farther from the city of Adrianople.

3. In the sector to the east of Kirtzali the boundary proposed by the Commission prefers, rather than the Aeda, a parallel line on the south of the stream. From a purely Greek point of view, there could apparently be no objection against, this reduction, since the zone included between the two lines does not enclose either Greek or Bulgar populations and is inhabited exclusively by Turks. Nevertheless, it would be proper to consider whether it is in the interests of these Turkish populations of the Cazas of Egri Deré and Dari Deré to be partitioned between Greece and Bulgaria, and whether it is advisable for the defence of this particularly weak sector of our new frontier to accentuate further the salient of Bulgarian territory which is already sufficiently pronounced to the north of Kantai.

On these points it would be desirable if there were left to the Commission, which will be charged with laying down on the spot the line of the frontier, a certain liberty of action in making slight local rectifications which may be suggested to it either by the configuration of the ground, or by the interests and aspirations of the neighboring villages.

Appendix II to IC–187 [FM–16]

M–155

BELGIAN DELEGATION,
PARIS, May 12th, 1919.

Draft Article Proposed by M. Hymans for Insertion in the Treaties With Bulgaria and Turkey

(Translation)

SIR: In view of the forthcoming discussion of the conditions of Peace between the Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand, and Turkey and Bulgaria respectively on the other, I think it my duty to bring to your notice and also to that of the Supreme Inter-Allied Council the fact that Belgian subjects have been treated as enemies in these two countries, although no state of war had been officially declared between them and Belgium.

In these circumstances it appears to me equitable that a provision should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria placing Belgium and her subjects on the same footing in these two countries as the Allied States and their subjects.

I have the honour to suggest the following text for such a provision:—

> "Belgium shall enjoy the rights and advantages stipulated in favour of the High Contracting Parties of the first part in the present Treaty with regard to reparation for damage caused during the war to Belgian subjects in Turkey (or in Bulgaria) as well as in regard to all economic matters, questions of transport and aerial navigation."

You will notice that this text approximates to that of Article 41 inserted in the draft Treaty with Germany in favour of Luxembourg.

It seems hardly necessary for me to add that unless some such provision be inserted in the Treaties with Turkey and Bulgaria, the position of Belgium and of Belgian subjects would be entirely lacking in the indispensable guarantees.

I avail [etc.]

(Signed) **HYMANS**

To M. CLEMENCEAU.

Appendix III to IC–187 [FM–16]

M–156

Text of Three Articles Submitted by the Polish Delegation for Inclusion in the Treaty of Peace With Austria

RESTORATION AND SURRENDER TO POLAND BY GERMAN AUSTRIA OF ARCHIVES, WORKS OF ART, AND SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS

Article I.

The Government of German Austria undertakes to restore and hand over to the Polish Commissioners, with the least possible delay, all Archive Papers, Registers, Inventories, Maps, Plans and in general all Documents relating to territories which have passed under Polish rule, whether those territories formed part of the Austrian Monarchy, or whether they were occupied by the latter. To be included amongst others, all Documents, Papers and Registers containing Title-deeds, or concerning Justice, or the Civil or Military Administration of the countries forming part of Poland, Staff Maps and Plans, Plans and Projects for regulating Waterways, Mines, etc., Moulds and Casts of the said Plans, as well as all historical Documents which belonged to the Archives of Poland, or were taken

away therefrom, exported and incorporated in the Central or other Archives of Austria from 1772 down to the present day.

Will also be restored to Poland and handed over without delay to the said Commissioners, all Libraries, Museum Collections, Works of Art, Scientific and Religious Objects, as well as historical Souvenirs which for any reason of a political, military or religious nature, were sequestrated, confiscated, removed or exported from the said territories, either by the Civil or Military Officials of Austria-Hungary, or by private persons, and that, even if these objects were incorporated in other Collections of the former Austrian Monarchy from 1772 down to the present day.

It is understood that the objects comprised in the preceding paragraphs will be restored and handed over whether they belonged to the former Republic of Poland, or to any of the successive forms of the Polish State, to the Polish Crown, to Public, Religious, Communal, Scientific and Artistic Institutions, or to private owners, but having a public character.

If the restoration or surrender should not be effected, owing to the destruction or loss of the objects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the Government of German Austria undertakes to indemnify Poland in kind or in money for losses incurred under this head.

If only a part of the Administrative District of the Commune or of the "Mairie" is detached, the Archives concerning it will remain in the part in which the chief County Town is situated.

The Polish Government and the Government of German Austria undertake to communicate to each other, in original, bit by bit, at the request of the superior Administrative Authorities, to be restored, and for a fixed period, all Documents and information relating to affairs which concern both the detached territories and the territories remaining in the possession of German Austria. The same Governments undertake, at the request of the other State, to supply each other free of cost with authentic copies of documents which may be demanded.

Article II.

In order that the preliminary work may proceed without hindrance the Polish Commissioners and their assistants, duly authorised by their Government, will have access to all Public Institutions, Offices, Archives, Libraries, Museums, Palaces and Collections which may contain the above-mentioned Objects, as well as to the Inventories, Minutes, Official Documents, and to the Depositories of the said Institutions, Offices, Palaces and Collections, in order to draw up a precise list of the Objects to be claimed by the Polish State.

The procedure and method of restoration and of handing over will be settled according to the principles established by the principal Allied Powers in other analogous cases.

The present possessors of Objects to be claimed by Poland will not have the right to transfer them before restoration, or to injure them in any way. A reserve is made for cases of absolute necessity, but the Polish Government must be informed thereof immediately.

Article III.

Poland will, moreover, have the right to claim a part of those Austrian State and Crown Collections at Vienna which were acquired formerly, and paid for out of the Revenues of all the States which belonged to the Monarchy. Poland's share will be determined by the general rules which will at a later date be laid down for all countries which formed part of the Monarchy, and especially for Italy.

Appendix IV to IC–187 [FM–16]

PARIS, May 9th, 1919.

Letter From Dr. Benes to M. Dutasta

(Translation)

SIR: According to information which reaches us in the newspapers and in telegrams from Vienna the Austrian Government intend

sending to Paris, either as plenipotentiaries or as experts, specialists on the regions in dispute between Austria and the neighboring States, and in particular the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We have no objection to the Austrian Delegation presenting their case with all the means at their disposal and by the competent persons. We are, however, obliged to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that the Austrian Government perhaps intends to make a kind of special demonstration by appointing as their Delegates and sending to the Conference persons belonging to the regions in dispute.

I think that this procedure is inadmissible. The decisions of the Conference in regard to the regions of the Germans of Bohemia have been arrived at and have been presented to the German Delegation in the Preliminaries of Peace. The question of the Germans of Bohemia is regarded as one which has been definitely established and the Germans of Bohemia are considered to be citizens of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

At the same time the period allowed for opting and the juridical measures to be taken have been provided for when any particular case arises of a German of Bohemia not wishing to become a Czecho-Slovak citizen.

I therefore think, Sir, that each plenipotentiary and expert of an official character who may come to the Paris Conference should be really Austrian, that is to say that he should be domiciled in German Austria and not in any of the regions in dispute whose future has already been decided. It would be impossible from a legal point of view for a man to come to Paris to contest to the Czecho-Slovak Republic certain districts and subsequently to return to Bohemia where, according to the laws of the country, he would have to be punished for the crime of high treason.

It is impossible for the Czecho-Slovak Government to be placed in such a situation and I therefore beg the Secretariat-General to present to the President of the Conference the following request:—

The French representative at Vienna, M. Allizé, might draw the attention of the Austrian Government to the fact that the decisions

already taken by the Conference demand that only persons domiciled in German Austria and not in the regions under dispute should be included amongst their Delegates.

Apart from the decisions of the Conference which have been already taken this solution is necessary from the mere point of view of tact.

I think, Sir, that it would be best to avoid in this manner any incidents which might arise between the Austrian Government and the Delegations of the other States which inherit Austrian territory. I think that those Delegations would be unanimous in disputing the validity of the powers of Austrian Delegates whose legal quality might be doubtful.

I have [etc.]

(Signed) **Edward Benes**

[1] Report of the Commission to Study Territorial Questions Concerning Greece (Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs), March 30, 1919.
[2] Dr. S. E. Mezes.
[3] The Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.
[4] Report No. 1 (April 6, 1919) of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).
[5] The American delegates were Charles Seymour and Clive Day.
[6] The French delegates were A. Tardieu and J. Laroche.
[7] Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.
[8] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
[9] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

May 19, 4:30 p.m. (FM–17)

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[47] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.

Paris, May 19, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/17

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/17

FM–17

[Document 47]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 4:30 p.m.

Paris, May 19, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. C. H. Haskins
Secretary	British Empire
Mr. L. Harrison	Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
British Empire	Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, C. B., C. M. G.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O, R. N.
Secretary	Col. Twiss
Mr. E. Phipps	France
France	M. J. Cambon
M. Pichon	M. Laroche
Secretary-General	Belgium
M. Dutasta	M. Hymans
Secretaries	M. Segers
M. Arnavon	M. Orts
Capt. de St. Quentin	M. de Bassompierre
M. de Bearn	M. Hostie
Italy	Holland
M. G. de Martino	M. de Karnebecke
Secretaries	

M. Bertele
M. A. Ricci-Busatti
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN	M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

Revision of Treaties of 1839 M. PICHON said that the Commission on Belgian Affairs entrusted by the Supreme Council at its meeting on 26th February, 1919,[1] with the study of the question of the revision of the Treaties of Treaties of 1839, had arrived at the following conclusions.

1. In law, the three Treaties and all their Clauses together constitute a single entity.

The Treaty between Belgium and Holland is not separable from the other two.

Without examining the argument that the three agreements may be said to have been terminated by the fact of their violation, the Commission holds that since three of the signatories consider revision necessary, such revision is called for.

2. In fact, the three Treaties which were directed against Belgium and imposed upon her and upon Holland by the Great Powers have not afforded Belgium any of the guarantees which these Treaties promised to her, and by their clauses relative to her territory and her

rivers, have seriously impaired her capacity for defence, and are thus in great measure responsible for the injuries she has received. As far as concerns Germany, Austria, and Russia, it is now in fact impossible to get to Belgium the guarantee of the five Great Powers to which she is entitled by the Treaties. On this ground, also, the revision of the Treaties in their entirety is called for.

3. In principle, the basis accepted for the Peace Conference contemplates the abandonment of the neutralisation of Belgium which constitutes a limitation upon her full sovereignty. The revision of the Treaties is thus a matter of general interest. This neutralisation is at present guaranteed to Holland by Great Britain and by France under the Treaty between the five Powers and Holland. The participation of Holland in the revision of the Treaties is thus called for.

The conclusion suggested accordingly, is as follows:—

(*a*) The Treaties of 1839 should be revised in the entirety of their clauses at the joint request of the Powers which deemed their revision necessary.
(*b*) Holland should take part in this revision.
(*c*) Those of the Guarantor Great Powers which have fulfilled their obligations should also take part therein.
(*d*) Similarly the Great Powers at the Peace Conference whose interests are general should take part therein.
(*e*) The general object of this revision is, in accordance with the aim of the League of Nations, to free Belgium from that limitation upon her sovereignty which was imposed on her by the Treaties of 1839 and, in the interest both of Belgium and of general peace, to remove the dangers and disadvantages arising from the said Treaties.

These conclusions were duly accepted by the Supreme War Council at a meeting held on Saturday, March 8th, 1919.[2]

M. Pichon, continuing, said that if the Conference agreed, he would call on M. Hymans to state the case of Belgium.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that he wished to make a reservation in regard to the question of procedure, since he had only just that moment heard for the first time the document read by M. Pichon.

M. HYMANS said that he would be obliged to repeat the statement made by him three months ago, giving the reasons which had prompted the Belgian Government to ask for a revision of the Treaties of 1839. He thought it necessary to do this, in order to make M. de Karnebecke fully acquainted with the views held by Belgium. (For statement made by M. Hymans, see I. C. 138, Minutes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.)[3]

M. HYMANS, continuing, said that in 1918, the German army, in full retreat, had been allowed to pass freely across Dutch Limburg without the consent of the Allies. No doubt the German troops had apparently been disarmed, nevertheless, an army of 80,000 men with all its transport and spoil had been allowed to cross the territory in question. When M. de Karnebecke had explained this very serious incident, which had led to a formal protest by the French, British and Belgian Governments, he had confessed that Holland had not been in a position to prevent the passage of the German troops, as she did not possess sufficient forces to ensure the defence of that territory.

MR. LANSING, intervening, enquired what connection existed between the passage of the Germans across Dutch Limburg and the territorial question under consideration. In his opinion, had the whole of Limburg been Belgian territory, the Germans would have crossed it just as quickly.

M. HYMANS explained that he had merely intended to quote the incident in support of his statement that Holland had found it impossible successfully to defend the territory in question. As a matter of fact, in 1914, Holland had not attempted to defend Dutch Limburg, because the Germans had guaranteed the territorial integrity of Holland.

M. DE KARNEBECKE protested against the statement that Holland had received any guarantees from Germany that it would respect her territorial integrity.

M. HYMANS, continuing, said that at the time that Holland was allowing German troops to cross Dutch Limburg, thus enabling them to escape capture, the Belgian Government had asked the Netherlands Government to liberate the Belgian interned prisoners, many of whom had been interned for over 18 months. The Netherlands Government had replied that she could not comply with that request, because the Armistice had not put an end to the war and, therefore, German consent would be necessary. Apparently, therefore, the consent of Germany was required to release Belgian prisoners of war, but the consent of the Allies was not required in order to permit the passage of 80,000 Germans across Dutch territory. It was evident, however, that in Eastern Belgium, a breach existed which, in the event of any future war between the Western Powers and the Central Powers, would constitute a grave menace to Belgium. Consequently, the Belgian Delegates would fail in their duty should they not attempt to close the breach and remove all possibility of danger.

MR. LANSING, intervening, said that in his opinion this question also had nothing to do with the territorial claims under consideration.

MR. BALFOUR interpreted M. Hymans' argument to be that Holland had not been able to maintain her neutrality. She had allowed German troops to pass across her territory, whilst refusing to liberate Belgian interned prisoners.

MR. LANSING thought that the difference in the treatment allotted to Belgium and Germany lay in the fact that the latter was big and powerful, whereas the former was small and weak. Germany had been allowed to invade Holland because she possessed the power, and the reason why Belgium's request for the liberation of her prisoners of war had not been complied with was that Belgium did not possess the power to enforce her demands.

M. HYMANS, in conclusion, said that he had repeated with perfect freedom before the distinguished representative of the Netherlands Government the statement which he had made to the Supreme Council on the 8th March last. He had endeavoured to show Belgium's weak points, which he desired to see strengthened. Those

points of weakness had been fully recognised by the Supreme War Council, who had agreed that the Treaties of 1839 should be revised in the entirety of their clauses, at the request of the Powers which deemed their revision necessary. That was the work which the Conference was now called upon to accomplish. As far as he, personally, was concerned, he was ready to co-operate in every way and to bring all his goodwill to bear on it. He would now leave the matter in the hands of the Dutch representatives.

M. PICHON enquired whether Mr. Karnebecke was prepared to reply at once to M. Hymans' statement.

MR. LANSING thought that Mr. Karnebecke should be given time to consider his reply.

MR. KARNEBECKE said that he would, with the permission of the Council, make a few observations, reserving to himself the right of making a more careful reply later on, should this be considered necessary. He had not been supplied with a copy of the text of M. Hymans' speech. It would therefore, be easier for him to reply at once whilst the statements made by M. Hymans were still fresh in his memory.

From certain official communications, which had reached the Netherlands Government, the latter had learned that the Belgian Government had referred the question of the revision of the Treaty of 1839 to the Peace Conference in Paris. On the 13th March, the Netherlands Government had received a letter from the President of the Peace Conference in Paris, stating that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had passed certain resolutions in regard to the revision of the Treaties of 1839, and the Netherlands Government was invited to attend in order to express its views on the matter. The Netherlands Government had replied that it would be glad to discuss the question of the revision of the Belgium Treaties of 1839, but that it could only deal with the Great Powers. It could not discuss the question with the Peace Conference, since the Netherlands Government did not form part of that Conference. Since then, the Netherlands Government had received a letter from M. Pichon, dated Paris, 9th May, 1919, stating that the Supreme Council of the

Allied and Associated Great Powers had decided that a conference including the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these Powers, together with a representative of the Netherlands and of Belgium would meet as soon as possible at Paris in order to examine the Treaties of 1839. A few days later, a letter had been received intimating that a meeting would be held on the 19th May, the Netherlands Government being invited to send one representative. He mentioned that fact in order to explain the reason why he had appeared alone at that meeting. He (M. Karnebecke) had followed with great interest the statement made by M. Hymans. He had learnt from M. Hymans that the subject under consideration had already been examined by a Commission, which had submitted a report. But no copy of that report had so far been communicated to the Netherlands Government. M. Hymans had stated that the statement which he had just made was merely a summary of the statement which he had already made to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Great Powers. In the first place, he would say quite frankly that he did not feel called upon to oppose a Dutch plea to the plea which had been put forward by the Belgian representative. He (M. Karnebecke) had come to that meeting for the purpose of helping the Governments to reach a decision, and with that object in view he would at once state to the Conference that the Netherlands Government was fully prepared to consider the question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839 by mutual agreement, as asked by Belgium. He had no intention of criticising the arguments put forward by M. Hymans in support of his contentions. Indeed, that would not be necessary since he had agreed to the revision of the Treaties. But he wished at the very commencement to state most emphatically that he did not think any useful purpose would be served by debating the whole question. In his opinion, it would be far better for the Belgian and Dutch Governments, the two countries chiefly concerned, to endeavour to reach an agreement. On the other hand, though the Netherlands Government were quite prepared to co-operate in the revision of the Treaty itself, he wished to state quite clearly that his Government would do so only on one condition, namely, that the territorial *status quo* would not be disturbed. The Netherlands Government could, under no possible circumstances, contemplate any territorial concessions. On the other hand, in so far

as the neutrality of Belgium was involved, the Netherlands Government would, in no way, oppose the wishes of Belgium.

In regard to the desiderata put forward by M. Hymans, the latter had apparently reached no definite conclusions. He had described the situation in a general way, but he had left the Conference to draw its own conclusions. Consequently, it would not be possible for him to express any definite opinions on the various questions raised by M. Hymans. He thought, however, that M. Hymans' desiderata should be formulated and communicated to the Dutch Government. The Netherlands Government had, in February last, requested the Belgian Government to communicate to it the substance of the statement which had been made in Paris, and the Belgian Government had replied that this would be done in due course and at the opportune moment. Today, he, (M. Karnebecke) had come to that meeting without knowing the extent and bearing of the Belgian demands, and he had only learned them from the statement which had just been made by M. Hymans. Under those conditions, he thought he was justified in asking that the Belgian desiderata should be put forward in such a way that they could be examined by the Netherlands Government. He would guarantee that the examination in question would be carried out in a spirit of honesty and perfect good-will, especially since he agreed with M. Hymans that a good understanding between Belgium and Holland would be in the interest both of those two countries and of the European Powers. He would promise, therefore, that the wishes of Belgium would be carefully and concientiously examined; but he must insist that sufficient time should be given for the careful consideration of the whole question, since a number of technical points required careful consideration. In his opinion, the best plan would be to give the Netherlands Government sufficient time to study the whole question, and he suggested that direct negotiations should then be entered into with Belgium in order to see what conclusions could be reached. Next, he would refer to certain remarks made by M. Hymans in regard to the question of facts. He could not agree that this was either the time or the place to enter into a series of disputations, but he did not wish to leave the Conference labouring under a false impression. In justifying his desiderata, M. Hymans had spoken of the Scheldt and he had stated that the policy of the Netherlands

Government had always been to dominate the Scheldt. That statement was undoubtedly true in regard to the past. That had undoubtedly been the policy of Holland a hundred years ago; but it was no longer the policy of Holland to attempt to dominate or to kill Antwerp. M. Hymans had expressed the hope that Holland would henceforth abandon that policy. It would be quite unnecessary for Holland to make any promise of that kind, since the policy in question had been abandoned over a hundred years ago. Perhaps M, Hymans would be glad to have his attention directed to a report of the French Minister at the Hague, written in 1838, that is to say, only a short time after the change of policy referred to. In that report the French Minister drew attention to the excellent results which had been obtained by the abandonment of the policy of domination, which M. Hymans had complained of.

In regard to Southern Flanders (Zeeland Flanders), M. Hymans had stated that Holland possessed no interests in that region. That was a complete mistake. The mere fact that only one large town existed in that region did not justify the statement that Holland possessed no interests. Holland possessed great interests in that part, and the sentiment of the people had been clearly expressed recently to the Queen of the Netherlands and to the Dutch Government, thus leaving no doubts in the matter. In the next place, M. Hymans had spoken of the question of the regime of the Scheldt, as laid down at the beginning of the war. He, (M. Karnebecke) was not certain whether he had correctly understood M. Hymans' contention: he had apparently wished to imply that the regime imposed by Holland in 1914 was such that Belgium had the right to complain.

M. Hymans interposing said that he had referred to the regime established by the Treaty.

M. Karnebecke, continuing, said that in that connection he would invite attention to a letter written in 1914 by the Belgian Foreign Minister to Baron Fallon[4] for communication to the Dutch Government. In that letter Baron Fallon had certified that this question had been dealt with in perfect friendliness. No protest or complaint had ever been made by the Belgian Government. He had mentioned this fact in order to avoid any misunderstandings. He

repeated that no complaints had ever been made by the Belgian Government in regard to the military aspect of the case.

Further, M. Hymans had wished to emphasise the fact that the canals of Terneuzen and the Scheldt remaining under Dutch sovereignty was prejudicial to Belgium, and the latter could not obtain the satisfaction to which she was entitled. He did not know exactly to what incidents M. Hymans had wished to refer. But before coming to the Conference, he (M. Karnebecke) had caused a careful enquiry to be made in regard to all the demands formulated by Belgium during the last 15 years. His enquiries went to show that the Dutch Government had always done all it could to give satisfaction to the desires expressed by Belgium. He did not wish to enter into details. All he wished to say was that no evidence could be found in support of the statement that the Dutch sovereignty had in any way been prejudicial to the interests of Belgium, as contended by M. Hymans.

M. Hymans had also stated that though a Joint Commission of management existed, the Treaty gave no rights to Belgium to improve the channel. He agreed that the statement was correct. On the other hand, he did not think Belgium had ever put forward any demands for the improvement of the channel and it seemed to him that if Belgium desired any works of improvement to be carried out, she should put forward her demands to Holland.

In regard to the Canal of Terneuzen, M. Hymans had brought out the fact that the Canal did not meet existing requirements. That was possible; but he wished to point out that the Canal had in its last stages been constructed, after the Treaties of 1895[5] and 1902,[6] in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian Government, and against the suggestions and recommendations of the Dutch experts who had foreseen that the Canal, as designed, would not be able to meet the requirements of Belgium. The latter had, however, insisted that the Canal should be constructed in accordance with its own designs. Nevertheless, that did not mean that Holland would not now, or at any time, be ready as she was 100 years ago to consider any changes which might be required to improve the traffic of Ghent and the Scheldt.

In regard to Limburg, M. Hymans had made certain observations of a historical character, which he (M. Karnebecke) could not accept. When an exchange of territories had occurred in 1839, Belgium had received certain areas, namely, Liege, two-thirds of Luxembourg and certain French Cantons, whilst Holland had in exchange obtained a small piece of territory at Ruremonde. This being the case, he did not think it would be possible to accept the historical interpretation favoured by M. Hymans.

M. Hymans had also spoken of the necessity for the construction of new railway lines in order to improve the lines of communication between the Meuse and the Rhine and between the Scheldt and the Rhine. He, (M. Karnebecke) was fully conscious of the importance of this question to Belgium. He also fully realised that in the Treaty of 1839 certain clauses dealt with that very question. Clause 12, in fact, decreed the construction of the Gladbach railway line. As stated by M. Haymans, the construction of the line in question finally fulfilled the conditions of the Treaty. But that did not mean that if Belgium required to build a second railway line, Holland would not be prepared to consider the question. M. Hymans' statement implied that since 1872 Holland had resisted the construction of further railway lines, whereas, as a matter of fact, no request to that effect had ever been received from the Belgian Government.

In regard to the Maastricht Canal, M. Hymans had stated that in Dutch territory the Canal was extremely narrow and this caused such a congestion of traffic that this part of the trip took from three days to one month. Furthermore, Belgium was unable to widen this Canal in Dutch territory and, therefore, could not improve it in their own territory. In this connection, he wished to point out that as soon as Belgium would express a desire to widen the Canal in Belgian territory, Holland would be prepared to do the same in her own territory. This was a question which could easily be settled by direct negotiation between the Dutch and Belgian Governments; but so far no demand had been received from the Belgian Government.

In the next place, M. Hymans had referred to a clause in the Treaty of 1839 on the subject of the construction of a Canal between the Meuse and the Rhine. He understood that a passage had been

reserved for the construction of this canal and that the whole question merely required to be studied and considered by the Belgian and Dutch Governments, acting in concert. He thought, therefore, that this question presented no difficulties.

Lastly, reference had been made to the military importance of Limburg. He did not wish to discuss that question in any detail. He only wished to refer to two conclusions reached by M. Hymans. M. Hymans had apparently wished to prove that Dutch Limburg was a constant menace to Belgium, since Holland would not and could not protect that territory. In support of his contention M. Hymans had referred to the passage of certain German troops through that territory, and that the Dutch Government had been unable to prevent it. That statement contained a very serious error. He regretted that M. Hymans had put the question in that way. The Germans had passed through Dutch Limburg not because Holland could not stop them, but for reasons quite different, with which M. Hymans was fully acquainted, and Belgium certainly had no reason for complaint. M. Hymans had also spoken about the release of interned prisoners. He, personally, could not see what bearing that question had on the question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839. He need only point out that M. Hymans was fully acquainted with the correspondence which had taken place on that subject, including the conversations which he (M. Karnebecke) had had with Baron Fallon. M. Hymans would recollect that he (M. Karnebecke) had agreed to do his utmost to obtain the consent of the belligerent parties to the release of the Belgian interned prisoners in Holland. The incident in question had, however, occurred before the signing of the Armistice. He would invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that he would have been fully justified to have given a point blank refusal to the demands of the Belgian Government. But, as a matter of fact, he had endeavoured to do his best to meet its wishes.

MR. LANSING, intervening, said that he failed to see that this question of the interned prisoners of war had anything to do with the question under consideration.

M. DE KARNEBECKE, continuing, said that in dealing with the historical aspect of the case, M. Hymans had stated that the reason

why Holland had failed to defend Limburg was that she had received certain guarantees from Germany. That statement was quite incorrect, and in his opinion, M. Hymans had not been justified in making it.

In conclusion, he would repeat his assurance in regard to the cardinal question, namely, the revision of the Treaty of 1839, that the Dutch Government would be ready to discuss the whole question and to cooperate with the Belgian Government in endeavouring to reach a satisfactory solution.

(The Meeting then adjourned to Tuesday afternoon, May 20th, 1919, at 3 o'clock.)

PARIS, 19th May, 1919.

[1] See BC–40, p. 141 [*Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 8*].
[2] See BC–47 (SWC–14), p. 270 [*Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 15*].
[3] BC–28, vol. III, p. 957.
[4] Baron A. Fallon, Netherlands Minister at Brussels.
[5] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 403.
[6] *Ibid.*, vol. XCVI, p. 809.

May 20, 3 p.m. (FM–18)

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[48] Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/18

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/18

FM–18

[Document 48]

Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 20, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Arnavon.
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn.

ITALY
M. Sonnino.
Secretary
M. Bertele.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Haskins.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Brig. General H. O. Mance.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller.
Colonel Twiss.

FRANCE
M. Laroche.

BELGIUM
M. Hymans.
M. Segers.
M. Orts.
M. de Bassompierre.
M. Hostie.

HOLLAND
M. de Karnebecke.
M. Van Swinderen.
M. Van Heeckeren.

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. Pichon suggested that the discussion concerning the Revision of the Treaties of 1839 should be resumed.

Revision of the Treaties of 1839 M. Hymans said he would like to touch on a few of the points mentioned on the previous day, in order to elucidate them more fully. On the previous day, his Dutch colleague had not known the views of the Powers. M. Pichon had given him information on that subject. He, himself, had also informed his Dutch colleague of the substance of the statement he had made three months ago before the Conference. As a result of this statement, a Commission had been set up and had made a report, and this report had been adopted by the Conference. M. de Karnebecke was now aware of all that had passed.

The Belgian Delegation asked for a revision of the treaties of 1839 for political and economic reasons, and also with a view to ensuring the security and "national defence of Belgian territory. The guarantee of neutrality had been destroyed by the war. The settlement made in 1839 had so disposed all land and river frontiers as to make the national defence of Belgium practically impossible and also in such a manner as to hamper the economic development of the country. The whole prosperity of the country depended on Antwerp. Antwerp's communication with the sea and with the hinterland, by which he meant not only the Belgian hinterland but the whole hinterland of Central Europe, was entirely held by Holland. The development of the port, therefore, depended on Dutch goodwill. Connection with

the sea passed through Dutch territory and connection with Europe to the East passed through Dutch Limburg, a province taken in 1839 against the will of the inhabitants and against the economic interests of the country, whose natural outlet was Antwerp. From the point of view of security and national defence, the system set up in 1839 made Belgium dependent on the sovereign and unhampered decisions of Holland in respect to the Lower Scheldt and the frontiers of Limburg. As the basis of Belgium's safety had now been destroyed, new adjustments were required. The whole system of neutrality was in contradiction with modern thought: each country should be master of its own economic and military fate. For these reasons, the Belgian Delegation asked for a complete revision of the treaties of 1839. M. de Karnebecke, on the previous day, had said that the Dutch Government did not object to the removal of all limitations on the sovereignty of Belgium. His statement that the Dutch Government was ready to collaborate in the revision in a spirit of goodwill was thankfully noted, but he had appeared to say that the revision ought to be carried out privately between Belgium and Holland. To this treatment of the problem, as an isolated matter only concerning the two countries, the Belgian Delegation could not agree. The treaties of 1839 had made a settlement purporting to be of general European interest. Belgium and Holland were not the sole signatories. This point of view had been fully recognised at the Conference, since not only the Powers with special interests but Powers with general interests had taken part in the Commission set up to examine the question of revision. M. de Karnebecke had also, he thought, assigned a limit to the extent of the revision of the treaties of 1839. He had declined to touch the territorial settlements made at that period. In the view of the Belgian Delegation, no arbitrary limitation could be made: the Conference had made none. It had considered the territorial and fluvial settlements made in 1839 as prejudicial to Belgium, and had taken the view that revision of the treaties should remove all impediments to Belgian sovereignty. The war had proved the inadequacy of Belgium's defences and he felt sure that M. de Karnebecke would sympathise with the Belgian desire to avoid a repetition of the sufferings lately endured. As M. de Karnebecke had said he was not able to deal with questions of national defence, he would suggest the nomination of a Commission on which the Great Powers should be represented, to elaborate a

plan for the adequate defence of Belgium. The main idea in the terms of reference to this Commission should be that Belgium's frontiers should be made safe not only for the sake of Belgium but for the sake of European security. He suggested that the following questions should be put to the Commission:—

1. Can the line of the Meuse, which is the first defensive line of Belgium, be adequately held and defended according to the territorial status laid down by the treaties of 1839, which, in particular, delivered to Holland the town of Maastricht ("Mosae trajectum") through which throughout the centuries German invasions have passed into Western Europe?
2. Can the line of the Scheldt, which is the principal defensive line of Belgium and of great natural strength, be effectually held unless Belgium can establish its position on the whole length of the stream?

He had already mentioned that, economically, the fate of Belgium was in Dutch hands. The replies given on the previous day by his Dutch colleague had exhibited the truth of this very clearly. To the Belgian complaint that the deepening and widening of canals, part of whose course lay in Dutch territory, had been made impossible, M. de Karnebecke had replied that any request from the Belgian Government would be favourably considered by Holland. This applied to the improvement of the Scheldt, to the Canal between Ghent and Terneuzen, and to the communications between Belgium and the Rhine. It followed from M. de Karnebecke's answer that the ultimate decision in all cases remained with Holland. He wished to make it clear that he was not attacking the Dutch Government. His brief was against the Treaty which had established rights in favour of Holland, and he did not blame the Dutch Government for exercising its rights under the Treaty. These Treaties were, no doubt, the last vestige of the traditional Dutch policy of dominating the Scheldt, a policy which he was glad to be assured by M. de Karnebecke had now been abandoned. Accordingly, M. de Karnebecke would not object to a revision of the Treaty in this respect. As, however, the details of any revision of the Treaties regarding these matters of navigation and river control would be very intricate, he would suggest that a Commission be set up, on which the Five Great Powers, Holland and

Belgium, should be represented, to deal with the whole question. The assumption would be that, in principle, the alteration of the provisions of the Treaties had been unanimously adopted. To be quite frank, the Belgian Government declared that the revision of the treaty should give Belgium certain guarantees, the principal of which he proposed to read:—

"Belgium demands in substance:—

I. As regards the Western Scheldt and problems connected with it:—
   (*a*) Free disposal of access to the sea through the Scheldt, that is to say, the attributes of sovereignty over the whole course of the Western Scheldt from the main dykes to open sea, and also over all the dependencies of the Western Scheldt, and over the Canal and railway from Ghent to Terneuzen, and over the Mouth of the Canal in the Western Scheldt.
   (*b*) Recognition by the Netherlands of the necessity for Belgium of basing its system of defence on the whole course of the Lower Scheldt, and of the right of using the system in full liberty, and at all times for defensive purposes. This would involve a renunciation by the Netherlands of all military measures which might hamper the exercise of this right by Belgium.
   (*c*) The management by Belgium of the locks regulating the flow of water from Flanders.
   (*d*) Satisfaction of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen of Bouchaute.

II. As regards waterways intermediate between the Western Scheldt and the Rhine:—

The creation at common expense, in place of the means provided by the Treaties of 1839 of a broad section Canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk.

III. As regards Dutch Limburg:—
   (*a*) The establishment in Southern Limburg of a regime which will guarantee Belgium against the danger resulting from the configuration of this territory, and

safeguarding Belgian economic interests compromised by the territorial and fluvial clauses of the Treaties of 1839.

(*b*) A large section waterway Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt.

IV. As regards Baerle-Duc:—

An arrangement putting an end to the difficulties resulting from the present dovetailing of the Belgian and Dutch territories".

M. HYMANS, continuing, said that he had now proposed two Commissions. It might be sufficient to establish one with two sub-Commissions. In conclusion, he would say a few words regarding Belgian policy. The Belgian Government had never desired territorial aggrandisement. In 1916, Baron Beyens[1] had given Holland an assurance in this respect. There had been at that time an agitation in the Belgian Press for the restitution of Limburg. But the Belgian Government thought that the wishes to which it had given expression should now be realised, in order to ensure the future of Belgium. The study by Commission which he had suggested would show whether the end desired by Belgium could be obtained only by territorial re-adjustments, or by some other method.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that he would willingly make a statement, though he had hesitated to do so as he did not wish to continue the discussion. As, however, his Belgian colleague had raised certain points, he felt bound, in his turn, to make certain comments. He would not begin over again the discussion on the desirability of revising the treaties of 1839. He had already replied on the previous day and wished to avoid any repetition.

M. HYMANS had re-stated what he had stated on the previous day, that the development of Belgium was entirely dependent on Holland. If this were really the case, he would ask whether Belgium had any grounds for complaint. He thought not, seeing that the prosperity of Belgium had been considerable under the old regime. Nor could he see in what manner Belgium was at the mercy of Holland merely by reason of an international river. Such a situation existed in other parts of the world and it could not be asserted that one of the riverain States was responsible for this state of things. M. Hymans had also mentioned territories taken from Belgium in 1839. He doubted

whether this was an accurate description, as these regions, with the exception of Ruremonde, had only been temporarily occupied by Belgium. Had the treaty of 15th November, 1831,[2] by which Belgium accepted the 24 Articles, been signed at once by the King of Holland, the occupation would only have lasted a few months, instead of 8 years. Historically, therefore, he did not think that the argument was well founded. M. Hymans had added that, as Belgian neutrality was about to disappear, other elements of security were required for Belgium. In saying this, the Belgian representative seemed to imply a connection between the question of neutrality and the territorial question. No doubt, in 1831, Belgium had laid claim to Dutch Flanders and Limburg, but the Great Powers had not granted Belgium these territories, thinking that an agreement should be formed on the basis of 1790 without any element of conquest or increase of territory. A study of the protocols of that period exhibited the principle quite clearly. He begged leave to quote the following example,[3] of which there were many equivalents in the text:—

> "The Conference should discuss and concert new arrangements of such a kind as to combine the future independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the Treaties, with the interests and security of other Powers and with the preservation of European equilibrium. This independence must, therefore, be in harmony with three essential principles which form a group and the observation of which could alone guarantee the peace of Europe and the rights of third Powers. The *Note Verbale* of the 3rd January[4] tends to establish a right of aggrandisement and conquest in favour of Belgium. The Powers cannot recognise to any State a right which they deny to themselves. It is on such a mutual renunciation of all idea of conquest that the European system at the present time rests."

No connection between the question of neutrality and the territorial question seemed to have been made during the discussions which took place in 1830 and 1831. In proof of this, he would refer the meeting to an authoritative book on Belgian Neutrality by M. Descamps. M. Descamps says:—

> "It was not neutrality which was the stumbling block in the discussions. The principle seems to have been accepted at the very start of the negotiations. During the discussions, it remained rather in the background, while territorial, financial and commercial questions arising from the separation of the two countries were noisily discussed round the green table."[5]

If, at that time, it was not necessary to connect the two ideas, why was it necessary today? If Belgian neutrality was to disappear, and Holland would raise no obstacles to this; he thought, in accordance with the letter sent by M. Pichon on the 13th March last, that the League of Nations should take the place of the neutrality in order to guarantee the security of Belgium. The question now raised was whether Belgium should receive compensations for the removal of its neutrality. The history of the Treaty of London[6] showed that this neutrality had been conceived just as much in the interests of Holland, the idea was due to the Russian Delegate, who thought that this solution would facilitate the settlement of all questions which might arise between the two countries. If Belgium wished to abandon her neutrality, Holland made no objection, but saw no reason to offer compensations. As far as he was concerned, he could not admit the connection between the territorial and the neutrality questions. As regards the territorial problem, he must maintain what he had said on the previous day. He had expressed himself somewhat categorically, but he could not do otherwise. M. Hymans had drawn the conclusion from what had been said on the previous day that the Dutch Delegation recognised and confirmed the allegation that the development of Belgium was dependent on Dutch goodwill, simply because he (M. de Karnebecke) had declared that the Dutch Government was ready to take note, in a spirit of goodwill, of any proposals Belgium might suggest for the improvement of communications. This situation, he would point out, was due to geographical conditions alone. There was, for instance, a point which he would not have raised but which he felt it was right to mention, namely, the question of the Meuse. It had been alleged in Holland for several years, whether rightly or wrongly, that works made in Belgian territory along the Meuse considerably hampered the prosperity of Holland. This, therefore, was an analogous case to that of the Scheldt referred to by M. Hymans. M. Hymans had further declared that the

Dutch representative appeared to recommend a private and isolated discussion between Holland and Belgium. He would not deny that he had made this proposal on the previous day. He had done it deliberately and for the following reason. The revision of the treaties was not the only question pending between Belgium and Holland. There was also the question of the relations between the two countries. These relations had been influenced by the crisis and he thought it was his duty, first of all, to re-establish mutual confidence between the two countries. For himself, this was the bigger question and he was inclined to give it precedence over that of the revision. He had, therefore, thought that, should the preliminary work be entrusted to the two countries, a useful result would be obtained not only in regard to the treaties but also in regard to the interests of the two countries. He did not wish to emphasise this any further, but he thought it right to mention the matter as a subject for consideration.

As regards M. Hymans' proposals, he wished to state at once that he had no desire to produce delay or to adjourn the discussion, but the proposals just made were of such a scope that it was impossible for him to make an immediate declaration. Belgium's desiderata were now, for the first time, placed before Holland. He would ask M. Hymans to hand him the text of his proposals which would be subjected to the most impartial examination, with a view to discovering whether the method of procedure suggested by M. Hymans could be accepted. He would, therefore, examine the proposals as soon as M. Hymans had handed him the text. It might be necessary for him to consult his colleagues in Holland, but he again repeated he had no desire to introduce avoidable delays. It was a question of deciding on the best method and of following it. It might also be desirable for him to consult M. Hymans on certain questions of detail and they might require to consider together what executive consequences should result from the proposals, in particular what programme of work should be submitted to the Commission. He thought it would be easy for them, by remaining in close touch, to hasten the solution of the question.

M. HYMANS said that he very willingly accepted this proposal.

M. PICHON said that, as M. Hymans and M. de Karnebecke appeared to agree, he would ask the Council to endorse the suggestion.

M. HYMANS said he would like to say a few words regarding an historical point connected with Limburg. During the common regime, the deputies were divided into two groups, those of the Northern Netherlands and those of the Southern, that is to say, the Dutch and the Belgian. The deputies of Limburg were Belgian. In 1830, when the revolution broke out, the Limburg deputies had voluntarily fought on the Belgian side. With the Belgians, they had voted the constitution and had remained with them until 1839. Many traces of Belgian sympathies still existed in Limburg. In 1839, Limburg had been given to the House of Nassau. It was attached to the German Confederation, which it only left in 1867. Article 3 of the Treaty of 19th April, 1839, showed under what conditions Limburg had been given to the House of Nassau:—

> "Article 3. In return for the cessions made in the preceding Article, there shall be assigned to His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, a Territorial Indemnity in the Province of Limburg."

He would point out that it would not be usual to offer as an indemnity anything which previously belonged to the recipient.

He wished to endorse heartily all that his Dutch colleague had said regarding the close and cordial relations that ought to exist between the two countries. He understood full well that conversations between them would be useful, but he thought they could well be made to concur with the negotiations he had suggested. In this respect, his proposal for the nomination of one or two Commissions appeared to him to be of advantage. Delegates working together in a Commission acquired intimate and cordial relations. After hearing M. de Karnebecke, he concluded that he was not opposed in principle to the study of the question by a Commission of Experts. He would, therefore, wait until the Dutch Representative had made his declaration.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that he must again state that he would not be able to make any definite undertaking on that day.

M. HYMANS said that he understood this, but he would point out that there were a number of technical questions requiring study. He would, himself, not be competent to discuss them. The discussion would, moreover, be long and tiresome to the Council of Foreign Ministers before whom they appeared. His proposal amounted to putting the various experts of the Delegations in touch with one another. By this means, public opinion would not acquire the false impression that an assault at arms was going on between the Dutch and Belgian Foreign Ministers. He thought it would be enough for each Power to nominate two delegates, while Holland and Belgium should be permitted to call in all experts they might wish to produce to take part in the discussion.

M. PICHON said that he felt the Council would not refuse M. de Karnebecke the delay he asked for. The Council would ask him to give notice as soon as he had completed his study of the questions and another meeting would then be called.

MR. LANSING said that this procedure did not entirely meet his views. The Conference could not last for ever, and he thought some limit should be assigned to the delay.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that it would be equally difficult for him to remain long in Paris. He wished to act quickly, but it was impossible for him to fix a date immediately, before he had even seen the text of the Belgian claims. As soon as he had this text in his hands, he would study it and give a reply in the shortest possible time.

MR. LANSING asked whether, after he had received and considered the text, M. de Karnebecke could then decide on a date for another meeting.

M. DE KARNEBECKE replied that it might, as he had already said, be necessary for him to consult his colleagues in Holland. He thought that a fortnight might be necessary.

M. HYMANS said that he would at once hand the text of the Belgian proposals to M. de Karnebecke.

M. PICHON said that he took note of M. de Karnebecke's undertaking to reply in the shortest possible time.

MR. LANSING asked whether a delay of one week could not be fixed. If, at the end of a week, M. de Karnebecke was not ready to make a reply, a meeting might be held to grant him a further delay.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that he would accept this proposal. He could not, at the present time, undertake more.

M. HYMANS asked whether the principle of a Commission could not be accepted at once and whether its members could be nominated.

M. DE KARNEBECKE said that it was impossible for him to accept this. He had not yet had time to examine the Belgian proposals which had been read to him very rapidly and of which he had not been able to take any notes.

M. PICHON said that it was agreed that M. Hymans should, without delay, deliver to M. de Karnebecke the text of the Belgian proposals. The Dutch Minister would examine them and inform the Council in a week, either through the Secretary-General or directly to the Chairman should he prefer it, whether he was ready for a discussion or whether he required more time.

(This was accepted, and the meeting adjourned.)

PARIS, 21st May 1919.

[1] Baron Eugène Beyens, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 19, 1916, to August 4, 1917.
[2] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XVIII, p. 645.
[3] From annex B of Protocol No. 10 of the conferences held in London relative to the affairs of Belgium, 1830–1831. For French text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XVIII, p. 757.

[4] For French text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XVIII, p. 758.

[5] Edouard E. F. Descamps, *La Neutralité de la Belgique au point de vue historique, diplomatique, juridique et politique* (Brussels & Paris, 1902), p. 163.

[6] Treaty of November 15, 1831.

May 23, 3 p.m. (FM–19)

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[49] Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 23rd May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 23, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/19

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/19

FM–19

[Document 49]

Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 23rd May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 23, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Arnavon
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn

ITALY

Baron Sonnino
Secretary
M. Bertele

Mr. Herbert Hoover
Colonel J. A. Logan
Dr. C. Seymour
Dr. C. Day
Mr. Morison
Major. D. W. Johnson

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Esme Howard
Hon. H. Nicolson
Mr. A. [W.] A. Leeper
General W. Thwaites
Major Temperley
General Sir H. H. Wilson
Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope
Capt. C. T. M. Fuller
} For Item 4.
Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch
Lt. Col. J. H. Morgan, For Item 5.

JAPAN	FRANCE
H. E. Viscount Chinda	M. Tardieu
Secretaries	ITALY
M. Saburi	Marquis della Torretta
M. Kawai	Count Vannutelli-Rey

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Lieut. C. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham
FANCE	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Frontier of Roumania in Bukovina M. PICHON asked M. Tardieu to make a statement on this subject.

M. TARDIEU said he had nothing to add to the Report.[1] The Committee had been unanimous and its award was shown by the blue line on the map attached to the report. He was ready, however, to answer any question that might be put to him.

MR. BALFOUR said that in the previous discussion regarding frontiers, the principle had been adopted that whenever the Committee had been unanimous, it was unnecessary for the Council to go over the ground again. He thought this was a good principle and that it should be adhered to. At the risk of breaking his own rule, however, he would enquire whether the Council was asked to consider the space between the red and blue lines.

M. TARDIEU said that the red line indicated the claims of the Roumanians, the blue the limits adopted by the committee. The Committee, therefore, had no concern with the space between the red and blue lines.

M. SONNINO said that it would seem that the space between these two lines had been attributed to no one.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether according to a previous decision, such areas should not be formally assigned to the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. LAROCHE said that in discussing the Treaty with Austria, a formula had been accepted whereby all territories not immediately assigned to any new State were to be ceded by Austria to the Allied and Associated Powers for final disposal later on. At that time, the Roumanian frontiers had not been fixed. The territory alluded to by Mr. Balfour would seem automatically to fall under the principle and to be assignable to the Allied and Associated Powers. (See I. C. 186 (6).)[2]

(No objection having been raised to the frontier proposed by the Committee, the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina was adopted.)

2. MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposed frontier had been unanimously adopted.

Frontier Between Roumania and jugo-Slavia in the Banat M. TARDIEU said that it had been reached unanimously.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Committee had discussed the question of the Dobrudja. He understood that a connection had been established between the concessions Roumania would make in the Dobrudja and the satisfaction of her claims in the Banat.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the question of the Dobrudja had been adjourned in the hope that Bulgaria and Roumania might come to terms.

M. TARDIEU recalled the discussion that had taken place on May 16th (I. C. 187, 1. *b*.).[3] He saw no advantage in linking the discussion of the frontier in the Banat with that of the cession by Roumania of territory in the Dobrudja, seeing that Roumanian aspirations in the Banat had not been satisfied.

M. SONNINO suggested that the question of the Dobrudja be allowed to remain in abeyance for a while.

MR. LANSING suggested that the question of Banat should also be allowed to remain in abeyance.

M. SONNINO said that he had understood that the Roumanians would be ready to yield something in the Dobrudja if they received satisfaction in the Banat.

M. TARDIEU said that this was not quite the case. The Roumanians had said unofficially that they might make some concessions in the Dobrudja if Bulgaria gave up Vidin and the Timok to Serbia and thus induced Serbia to forego her claims in the Banat. Meanwhile, the Serbian-Bulgarian frontier had been settled and no such bargain was now possible.

M. PICHON said he entirely agreed with M. Tardieu. Roumania certainly was going to protest against the partition of the Banat proposed by the Committee. M. Bratiano had said that he would not sign the treaty unless the Banat were given to Roumania. It was therefore impossible to say to Roumania "as you now get the Banat, you should give up part of the Dobrudja".

MR. LANSING said that presumably it was the object of the Conference to make a durable peace. He thought few people would approve of the way in which Roumania had got possession of the Dobrudja. Should this situation be maintained, it would produce in the Balkans a situation analogous to that of Alsace-Lorraine before the war. There were in the area in question 66,000 Bulgarians, 60,000 Turks and only 867 Roumanians.

M. TARDIEU said that if it had been possible to compose Roumania only of Roumanians he would have been delighted; but this had proved impossible. It was not only Bulgarians who were being made subject to the Roumanian State.

MR. LANSING said that as the United States had not been at war with Bulgaria, he would have no other means of intervening in the

discussion of the fate of the Dobrudja unless it were dealt with in connection with that of the Banat.

M. SONNINO suggested that the question of the Dobrudja like that of Bessarabia, which was also undecided, should be allowed to remain in abeyance. He did not think Mr. Lansing would be precluded from expressing his opinion when the subject came up for discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said that he sympathised with the views of Mr. Lansing. He thought that the frontier in the Dobrudja was manifestly out of relation with the equilibrium of the population. He did not defend the means whereby Roumania had acquired the country, but the Council was not really concerned with the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania any more than it was concerned with the frontier of France and Spain. He would regard it as a dangerous practice to reserve decision on all frontiers of Roumania until Roumania had conceded something in the Dobrudja.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Conference had made a precedent for this. Belgium had made certain suggestions for readjustments between herself and Holland. According to the proposal, the latter was to be compensated at the expense of Germany. The Conference had refused to pronounce in this case because a neutral country was affected. What the Conference was unwilling to do to the detriment of a neutral, could it do to the detriment of an Ally?

M. PICHON said that he was in complete agreement with M. Tardieu and Mr. Balfour. He reminded the Council that the principle of accepting unanimous recommendations of Committees had been adopted. He therefore proposed that the frontier of Roumania in the Banat as recommended by the Committee be adopted and that the question of the Dobrudja be reserved.

MR. LANSING said that he would accept the proposal but not the rule.

(It was therefore decided to accept the recommendations of the Committee regarding the frontier of Roumania in the Banat. The question of the Dobrudja was adjourned.)

3. M. PICHON asked whether the conclusions in the Report (see Annexure A) were acceptable to the Meeting.

Autonomy for the Ruthenians MR. LANSING said that he wished to ask one or two questions. He referred to Article 5 providing for the nomination of functionaries. He suggested that the wish be expressed that these functionaries wherever possible be chosen from the Ruthenian population. The curse of these regions had been that their officials had hitherto all been Hungarians and the people had therefore never acquired the habit of self government.

M. PICHON suggested that Mr. Lansing's comment together with the Report itself should be forwarded to the Commission on New States.

M. SONNINO said that Mr. Lansing, if he understood him aright, did not suggest that this proviso be applied to the Governor.

MR. LANSING said that what he had in his mind was that police and other minor officials should, wherever possible, be chosen from the local population.

M. LAROCHE said that the words "as far as possible", should be given prominence as the Ruthenians were an illiterate people and it might not be possible to find among them all the officials necessary.

MR. LANSING said that he had another question to ask. As the Ruthenians were to have a form of autonomy and nevertheless to be subject to a State, the majority of whose population would be alien to them, would it not be well to introduce a stipulation enabling them to appeal to the League of Nations in any case in which the sovereignty of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was exercised in a manner regarded by them as in conflict with their rights?

M. SONNINO said that he saw no objection to the principle but thought it might be dangerous to state it too openly. He thought it might be better for the League of Nations to intervene whenever necessary on its own initiative.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that the status of the Ruthenians was going to be settled by a Treaty between the Powers and the Czecho-Slovak

Republic. The Treaty would give the former the right to intervene. Such a clause as that suggested by Mr. Lansing if put into the Treaty, might encourage immediate trouble in Ruthenia. There were already Ukrainians in Paris who laid claim to the territory of the Hungarian Ruthenians.

MR. LANSING said that this territory was to be put in a situation analogous to that of territory subject to a mandate.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought he might assist or even perhaps terminate the discussion by calling attention to the work of the Commission on New States. This Commission had suggested a draft article with the object of safeguarding the wishes of minorities in Poland. Mr. Balfour then quoted Article I of Chapter II of the second Report of the Commission. He would therefore suggest that the question be deferred until the final Report of the Commission.

M. PICHON said that as the proposals were in any case to be referred to this Commission, it would be the simplest procedure to refer them together with the record of the discussion.

(This was agreed to.)

4. Situation in the Baltic Province MR. HOOVER said that the Committee set up by the resolution of May 9th,[4] had met and considered the Baltic question from the point of view of the supply of food. The Committee concluded that military help was required. It recognised, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers could not be called upon to garrison these countries. The alternative was to encourage the native troops and to supply them with military equipment and expert guidance. The situation was complicated by the German occupation of Latvia and Lithuania. The Committee suggested that a military Commission be sent to Esthonia and that it should have credits allotted to it, to be spent both in cash and in kind. The activities of this Commission might, as occasion served, spread to the neighbouring countries. Since the report of the Committee, (Appendix C) news had been received that the Germans had occupied Riga. Mr. Hoover communicated to the Meeting the following telegram:—

> "Communication by courier from Chief of Staff, Russian Detached Corps Northern Army Reval, states that Russians and Esthonians now eighty kilometres beyond Narva towards Petrograd. Asks definite assurance whether we will furnish food for troops and inhabitants of country districts and Petrograd. Bolshevik forces on Narva front completely routed, eight to ten regiments annihilated. Between Army and Petrograd only small and unreliable bodies of Bolsheviks; decision must be made at Omsk depending on our aid whether to advance and take Petrograd or halt. Two thousand tons landed at Reval will supply troops twenty days. Two thousand tons landed at Kotka or Wiborg in Finland supply Petrograd ten days. Asks cost and states payment can be obtained in Tsar or Kerensky roubles. Of extreme importance if food will be sent to know date of arrival at ports of Finland. Will take three weeks for Bolsheviki to concentrate troops for opposition which will be impossible down? (if?) present advance is continued. Later than that chance will be lost. Acknowledge.
>
> Heath"[5]

He summarised the decisions required from the Meeting under the following four heads:—

(1) Should Esthonia be supported with arms, munitions and money?
(2) What action should be taken regarding the German occupation of Riga?
(3) How was the German support of the Baltic boundaries in Latvia and Lithuania to be dealt with?
(4) Were the Allied and Associated Powers directly or indirectly to support the attack on Petrograd?

M. PICHON said that Mr. Hoover's news and proposals corresponded with the despatches received from the French Commander of the Naval Division at Libau (see Appendix B.)

Mr. HOOVER said that if he were allowed he would make a suggestion that was perhaps a little out of his province. He thought that the key

of the situation lay in Esthonia. The people there had shown powers of organisation and had set up a form of orderly Government. If helped, they might by degrees solve the German problem in the Baltic Provinces. At the present time it was difficult to remove the Germans merely to let the Bolsheviks into their place. The Germans at present were not in a temper to obey the Allies. It seemed best, therefore, to support Esthonia in every way and thus to enable the Esthonians to spread their authority westwards and in time to enable the Allies to dispense with German occupation. This should be taken into consideration in deciding whether the Esthonians should be encouraged to march on Petrograd.

Mr. LANSING asked whether Mr. Hoover's proposals excluded similar assistance to the Letts and Lithuanians.

Mr. HOOVER replied that under the nose of the Germans it would be difficult to set up a Lithuanian or a Lett army.

Mr. BALFOUR said that he agreed with the broad lines of the policy proposed by Mr. Hoover. He was not sure, however, that he and his colleagues had authority to consent to a loan of ten million sterling. With this reservation he was in agreement with Mr. Hoover. He particularly wished to ask the Military Authorities to give their opinion on the most recent aspects of the situation in the Baltic Provinces. He understood that in Esthonia there was an effective National Force advancing on Petrograd. This Force claimed a great victory.

MR. LANSING interjected that the Force was largely composed of Russians.

MR. BALFOUR said he would then call this Force a Russo-Esthonian Force. The Meeting was to decide what line was to be taken in regard to its operations. Were the operations to be checked by the refusal of help or were the Allied and Associated Powers to promise to revictual this army and the population of Petrograd, should it fall? He would like the military Experts to say whether the moment was expedient, from the Allied point of view, and what the probable consequences of either action would be. He particularly would like to know what

effect it would produce on the Archangel and North Russian fronts, as well as in Latvia and Lithuania. Mr. Hoover said that if the Germans left these countries the Bolsheviks would take their place as the Allies could not fill the void. It was possible that the action of this Russo-Esthonian army might have such an effect on the Bolsheviks as to relieve Latvia and Lithuania automatically. Esthonian influence might thus, as Mr. Hoover had said, spread downwards and save the Letts and Lithuanians from the strange combination of German and Bolshevik oppression. He hoped that Mr. Pichon would ask the military authorities to state their views on the various questions he had formulated.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour, but must himself make the same reservation as Mr. Balfour regarding a credit of ten million sterling. He agreed to ask the military advisors to furnish the Council with a report as quickly as possible. He pointed out that they were already in touch with this question.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Meeting should hear Sir Henry Wilson at once.

GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON said that the military situation was obscure because information as to the proceedings of the Bolsheviks was lacking. But according to all the knowledge he possessed the telegram quoted by Mr. Hoover must be incorrect. There were not enough troops in Esthonia and Finland, to exterminate 8 to 10 Bolshevik regiments. The Bolshevik troops, might, for some unknown reason have gone away, and it might be possible to drive into Petrograd in a ear, but it was not possible that a Bolshevik force of that magnitude should have been crushed in a pitched battle. If it were possible to take Petrograd without causing annoyance to Admiral Koltchak, this would be a military event of great importance. The possession of the junction at Svanka would cut the communications of the Bolshevik forces opposed to us on the Murmansk front. Later on, the possession of this junction would establish a liaison between the North Russian forces and the Siberian forces, and, as an ultimate result, should war in Russia continue, the fall of Moscow might be expected. As a soldier therefore, he would favour the occupation of Petrograd, provided Admiral Koltchak were

favourably disposed. In the meantime, he thought that a Military Mission should be formed immediately at Libau or Riga, and asked to report without delay on the Military situation of the Baltic peoples. He thought it was essential to act quickly before the summer was far advanced. The head of the Mission should be an English General. There was one already on the spot, and the Mission could be set up within a fortnight. He understood that the proposals of the Committee, with the exception of the credit of 10 millions, had been accepted in principle. Even without the credit, he thought the Mission would be useful, and would therefore recommend that it be proceeded with at once.

M. SONNINO said he agreed.

M. PICHON said that he also agreed, but he could not give formal agreement at once, by reason of the financial responsibilities involved. He was willing, however, to submit the whole proposal to the Council of Heads of States, with a favourable comment.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that resolutions to the following effect were required:—

> "That the Esthonian Army be supplied with food. That Petrograd, if captured, be supplied with food. That all possible munitions and equipment should be sent, and, lastly, that a communication be sent to Admiral Koltchak, in order to avoid any false impression on his side."

MR. LANSING said that he was willing to adopt the first three paragraphs of the Committee's report (see Annexure "C"). The fourth should be referred to the Council of Heads of States; the fifth and sixth he would accept, and he would propose a seventh to the following effect:—

> "That the Director General of Relief should continue to extend *ravitaillement* in all non Bolshevik areas of the Baltic region without respect to political control".

Mr. BALFOUR said that he did not wish to use food for the purpose of propaganda, but, on the other hand, he did not wish the food to fall into the hands of people who would use it for adverse propaganda. For instance, he did not wish it to fall into the hands of the Germans in Lithuania. He was therefore, not sure that he could accept so wide a formula as that suggested by Mr. Lansing.

MR. HOOVER said there was some difference of opinion between the British and American Delegates on the subject of the supply of food. The British Delegates wish to suppress the supply of food to Latvia and Lithuania because the local Governments of these countries had been upset by the Germans. The American view was that food could be supplied through American Committees, in such a way as to benefit the population, and not to benefit the Governments, except in so far as any Government might benefit by the order produced by the supply of food. He did not propose to send food to Bolshevik Governments, but with this reservation, he thought food should be distributed all over the area as far as possible.

SIR ESME HOWARD said that the position was, he believed, as follows. Some of the British representatives had thought it better to stop food, in order to force the Germans to relax their hold on the Governments of Latvia and Lithuania. The British Delegation, as a whole, however, felt that food should be sent, provided its distribution was so controlled that it did not get into the hands of the Germans.

MR. HOOVER said that possibly 25,000 Germans might get a fraction of the food distributed, but in any case, these Germans were bound to live on the country, by reason of the terms of the Armistice itself. It made little difference, from what source they obtained their food. According to the seventh paragraph suggested by Mr. Hoover, the Allied Food Agents would be able to follow up the Esthonian Army and feed any population, not subject to a Bolshevik Government.

MR. BALFOUR said he would agree, provided some caution were added that the food did not fall into German hands and that it should not be used for a political purpose.

MR. HOOVER said that the American officers in charge of the distribution of food had received instructions to this effect.

MR. BALFOUR said that as it was the Allied policy, it would be well to state it.

M. PICHON said that the whole proposal should therefore be sent to the Council of the Heads of State. All but the question of the advance on Petrograd and that of the credits could be accepted by the Council.

MR. LANSING said he preferred not to refer the question of the advance on Petrograd until he had seen a definite formula.

MR. BALFOUR suggested the following terms of reference:—

> "According to a telegram received by Mr. Hoover indicating that there is an immediate possibility of the occupation of Petrograd by a Russo-Esthonian force, a decision is required as to what directions should be given to that army, regarding this operation, and whether any communication should be made on this subject to Admiral Koltchak."

MR. LANSING said that he wished it to be recorded that Article 7, proposed by himself rendered this course unnecessary. He was not disposed to back this proposal and desired his reservation to be entered in the record of the meeting.

(The Articles 1 to 3, 5 to 6 of the Committee's report were accepted.

Paragraph 4 and the question formulated by Mr. Balfour regarding the advance on Petrograd, together with the 7th Article proposed by Mr. Lansing were referred to the Council of Heads of Governments. Mr. Lansing made a reservation to the effect that Article 7 as proposed by him would fulfil all necessary purposes, and render Mr. Balfour's suggestion unnecessary.)

5. M. PICHON referred to a letter from Marshal Foch, suggesting that collective action by the Powers should be resorted to as the only means of giving Belgium the satisfaction she required. (Appendix D.)

Belgian Protest Against Retention and Publication by Germans of Belgian Documents He asked in what manner the Allied and Associated Powers could act.

MR. LANSING said that all that it was possible to do was to register a protest.

M. PICHON observed that this had already been done.

He pointed out further that there were Articles in the Treaty covering the point.

(After some discussion it was decided that no action need be taken.)

6. (It was decided that no action should be taken. See Appendix E.)

MR. PICHON drew attention to a letter from Marshal Foch. (Appendix F.)

Proceedings of Germans in Poland: (a) Requisition and Removal of Railway Material in Polish Silesia (b) Proposal To Send Allied Stationnaires to Königsberg and Memel (It was decided to send the proposal contained in it to the Naval Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

7. M. PICHON read the following letter from M. Jules Cambon:—

"Paris, May 19th, 1919.

> Question of Hearing Ukrainian Representatives by the Commission on Polish Affairs The Committee on Polish Affairs, before presenting its report on the question of Galicia, would consider it just and necessary to hear the Polish and Ukrainian representatives. It hesitates to decide on account of the resolution of the Supreme Council of March 19th, which runs as follows:—
>
> > 'The hearing of the Polish and Ukrainian representatives relative to their rival claims is, it should

be noted, subject to the formal condition of an immediate suspension of hostilities.'

The attempts to bring about an Armistice having failed, the Committee asks whether the Supreme Council maintains its decision to forbid the hearing of the Polish and Ukrainian representatives."

(After a short discussion it was decided that there was no objection to the course proposed by M. Cambon, should the Commission desire to hear the Ukrainian representatives.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS , 23 May 1919.**Appendix A to IC–190 [FM–19]**

Report of the Tchecho-Slovak Committee on the Degree of Autonomy To Be Accorded to the Ruthenes of Hungary

At their meeting on the 8th of May, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to invite the Territorial Committee on Tchecho-Slovak claims to submit recommendations as to the degree and form of autonomy to be granted by the Tchecho-Slovak Republic to the populations inhabiting the Ruthenian territory south of the Carpathians.

In pursuance of these instructions the Tchecho-Slovak Committee met on Thursday, the 15th of May, and invited Dr. Benes to lay before them the views and intentions of the Tchecho-Slovak Government regarding this question.

Dr. Benes explained that it was the general policy of the Tchecho-Slovak Government to encourage throughout the Republic a process of evolution towards some form of federal organisation. This evolution, however, could only be gradual, and it would be premature to introduce a complete scheme of decentralisation until the various provinces had attained to a greater degree of national consciousness and had reached a level of common cultural and economic development. This principle applied with especial force to

the Ruthenes populating the districts south of the Carpathians: the country was poor and the population were backward: much money would be needed for the improvement of agriculture, communications and education: this money would be provided by the Central Tchecho-Slovak Government and would have to a great extent to be applied and administered by officials of the Central Government, since the Ruthenes themselves would not for many years be sufficiently developed adequately to cope with these problems.

Subject to the above reservations Dr. Benes declared that his Government were anxious to give the Ruthenians all possible local autonomy.

The Committee, having taken note of Dr. Benes' arguments and having agreed with him as to the desirability, within the limits he had indicated, of granting to the Ruthenian populations a special status within the Republic, asked that they might be furnished by Dr. Benes with a written memorandum embodying the form of autonomy which the Tchecho-Slovak Government would themselves suggest.

The scheme accordingly furnished by Dr. Benes, which is given in the Annex to this report, was examined by the Committee at their meeting of the 17th May and was considered by them to be both adequate to the present needs of the population themselves and in harmony with the general principles which the Committee had themselves foreshadowed.

Conclusions

(1) The Committee are unanimous in recommending to the Council of Five that the scheme proposed by Dr. Benes should be adopted as the basis governing the future relations between the Ruthenians and the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.
(2) They consider, therefore, that their report, if approved by the Council of Five, should be referred by them to the Special Committee on New States, who should be asked to embody Dr. Benes' proposals in such a form as may be in harmony with the general procedure adopted by them in other similar cases.

PARIS, May 20th, 1919.

ANNEX TO REPORT OF TCHECHO-SLOVAK COMMITTEE

Memorandum by Dr. Benes on the Status of the Ruthenes to the South of the Carpathians Whose Territory Forms Part of the Tchecho-Slovak State

(Translation)

In order to give a special juridical status to the territory of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians and to manifest the desire of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic to establish a just Government in that territory, the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, although possessing a common central legislature and administration, desire to accord to the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians a wide measure of autonomy. In order to provide guarantees of this autonomy the Tchecho-Slovak Republic might conclude a special Treaty with the Great Powers in this matter.

The following clauses represent the basis of this autonomy.

(1) The territory of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians, within the whole region comprised by the frontiers delimitated by the Great Powers, shall bear a special name to be determined on by agreement between the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and the Diet of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians.
(2) The country of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall enjoy legislative power in all linguistic, scholastic and ecclesiastical questions as well as in all other questions which the laws of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic may attribute to it in accordance with particular needs. The laws passed by this Diet shall be approved by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and countersigned by the Governor of the country of the Ruthenes, who shall be responsible to the Diet.
(3) As regards all other matters, the country of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians shall share in the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the constitution of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will

however not have the right of voting upon such legislative questions as will be attributed to the Diet of the country of the Ruthenes.

(4) At the head of the administration of the country shall be placed a Governor nominated by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. This Governor shall represent the final authority, on the one hand in all linguistic, scholastic and ecclesiastical questions and on the other hand in matters affecting internal administration (political matters). For all other questions, the Ministers of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic shall be the supreme authority. In these Ministries special Ruthenian sections shall be established. The tribunals established in the territory of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians shall be a part of the judicial organisation of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic. When, however, appeal is made to a higher court situated outside Ruthenian territory, the matter will be brought before a special Ruthenian Court.

(5) Government officials shall be appointed by the Governor up to the seventh class. Superior officials shall be appointed by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic on the recommendation of the Governor or the Tchecho-Slovak Council of Ministers.

(6) The Euthenes south of the Carpathians shall be represented upon the Council of Ministers of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic by a Minister without portfolio, who shall be a native of the Ruthenian territory and shall be chosen by the President of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.

In order to demonstrate the extent of this autonomy it is necessary to give a general outline of the organisation which the Tchecho-Slovak Government proposes to establish in the other territories of the Republic.

The State is to be divided into Departments.

At the head of the departmental administration there will be a Prefect who in all administrative questions will be subordinate only to the Central authority.

In principle for each department any appeal shall be brought before a competent Ministry. The body (Departmental Council) which shall

be constituted to assist the Prefect shall only enjoy administrative powers and the right of supervision. This body will in no case enjoy legislative power which shall be exclusively reserved for the Central Legislative Assembly.

17. 5. 19.

Appendix B to IC–190 [FM–19][6]

[*Information Received From the French Commander of the Naval Division at Libau*]

The Germans (are profiting) by the antagonism between the Baits and the Letts in order to dominate (Libau and Lettonia). The pastor Nedra, Germanophile agent of the Baits, has assumed again the power which the National Council had summoned him to lay aside.

The Germans are seeking to establish themselves definitively in the country, and already they push their insolence to the point of threats against the Allies. At Keyne, the French military mission was obliged to make preparations for defense in its hotel in view of the excitement among the German troops over news of the conditions of peace. At Libau, the commander of the German troops declared that he declined all responsibility for breaches of discipline in which the German soldiers might indulge when confronted by Allied soldiers in uniform; but the German soldiers at Libau are well disciplined, and the acts which it was pretended to wish to prevent would not have occurred except by order of those in command.

The conclusions of the commander of the French naval division incline toward “sending as promptly as possible into the neighborhood the necessary means in material and personnel to form a fairly strong Lettish national army”. The form of this national army would afford means to secure order in the country, and to exact ultimately the evacuation of the German troops, whose presence tends to place the Baltic provinces under the hegemony of our enemies.

CONTY

Appendix C to IC–190 [FM-19]

[*Report of the Committee to Consider the Baltic Question*]

ENCLOSURE II

In the course of a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held on May 9th, 1919, it was decided:

> "That a Committee including all the United States, British, French and Italian economic, naval and military representatives should meet to make a report on the best means of establishing and maintaining order in the Baltic Provinces and of revictualling the population."

This Committee met on the 14th May at the Ministry of Commerce.

It was of opinion:

(*a*) That the maintenance of order is a necessary condition of the distribution of food in the Baltic Provinces.
(*b*) That the present situation in Lithuania and Lettland, which leaves the maintenance of order entirely in the hands of the German army, is most regrettable and should in no case long continue.
(*c*) That, as there can be no question of sending Allied troops to the Baltic Provinces, the only alternative is to organise all that can be obtained in the way of native forces and volunteers from outside.

It was therefore decided, after an exhaustive discussion of the whole question in its different aspects, to submit to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the following recommendations:

1. In conformity with Article 12 of the Armistice, the Germans shall be required to withdraw from Lettland and Lithuania as soon as it is possible to replace them there by organised local forces, but they should remain where they are till further orders. The organisation of local forces should be proceeded with as soon as possible.
2. A competent Military Mission, under British Command, shall be organised under the orders of a Lieutenant or Major General. Its

headquarters shall be at Libau or Reval and its object shall be to advise the Governments of Esthonia, Lettland, and Lithuania on all questions concerning the organisation, equipment and training of the local forces and of the volunteers whom it may be possible to raise outside those Countries. This Mission shall also have the duty of advising the above-mentioned Governments on the best means of defending themselves against the Bolsheviks and of keeping the Germans out of their territory.

3. The volunteers mentioned in Paragraph 2 shall be raised by voluntary recruitment in the Scandinavian States including Finland.
4. A credit of ten million pounds sterling shall be placed at the disposal of the Baltic States by the Allied and Associated Governments. It shall be used as required and in the manner decided by the Political and Military Missions.
5. Food, equipment, clothing, arms, munitions, etc. shall be provided by the Allied and Associated Powers, the expense being met out of the credit mentioned in Article 4.
6. The Political and Economic Missions shall have the duty of enquiring what collateral guarantees can be obtained from the three Baltic States to cover in whole or in part the credit mentioned in Article 4.

Appendix D to IC–190 [FM–19]

SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES, GENERAL STAFF, ALLIED G. H. Q., 12th May 1919.

From:—Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,

To:—The Chairman of the Peace Conference (Secretariat-General.)

In your letter of 11th May you informed me that the Supreme Allied Council (Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs) wished to know whether the proceedings complained of by the Belgian Government did not amount to a violation of Article XIX of the Armistice, and whether in that case I did not possess the necessary power, in virtue of the Armistice itself to put a stop to those proceedings.

General Delobbe's[7] letter, which I forwarded to you, showed that the General had already dispatched a protest to the German Armistice Commission on 10th April last, and that the protest had been ineffectual.

A repetition of this protest at the present time would probably have no more effect. Moreover, the Belgian Government complains not merely of the retention by the Germans of papers belonging to the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but also of the publication of those documents. Even if Article XIX of the Armistice prohibits the retention of papers, it makes no mention of their publication.

Under these conditions it seems to me that the Armistice Commission would be unable to obtain the satisfaction demanded by the Belgian Government, and that such satisfaction, as General Delobbe points out, must be obtained by collective action on the part of the Allied Powers.

(Sgd) **WEYGAND**, *Major General*
by order

Appendix E to IC–190 [FM–19]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, May 15th, 1919.

Letter From Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau

(Translation)

I enclose herein copy of a telegram from General Henrys reporting to General Nudant that the Germans are making abusive requisitions in Silesia and are taking away from that region rolling stock from the railways.

Those proceedings having been clearly provoked by the communication of the peace conditions with Germany, the Armistice Commission at Spa is not qualified to intervene on the subject with the German Government and it is for the Supreme Council of the

Allies to decide what measures shall be taken to safeguard the interests of Silesia.

I have the honour therefore to submit the question to you.

For Marshal Foch
(Signed) **DESTICKER**

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, May 14th, 1919.

Telegram

General Dupont to Marshal Foch, Paris, and General Nudant, Spa.

No. 964. General Henrys telegraphs on the 12th May:—

> "I learn that in Polish Silesia the Germans are in violation of the conditions of peace requisitioning supplies of all kinds, viz. corn, cattle, flour, etc., and are hastily sending back to Germany rolling stock of railways. Great discontent and agitation of the population have been caused thereby. Rising to be feared. I ask whether Germans are justified or not in removing rolling stock from districts to be evacuated and thus depriving entire province of material indispensable to economic life. If not, I request steps may be taken to stop these proceedings".

(Signed) **GENERAL DUPONT**

Appendix F to IC–190 [FM–19]

CHIEF COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, May 17th, 1919.

The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies.

To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the telegram which I have received from General Dupont, from which it appears: —

(*a*) That the Germans are preparing again to take up arms in particular against Russia (*sic*).
(*b*) That they have obtained the help of Soviet Russia, and are ready to send there Non-Commissioned Officers as instructors.

I beg leave to draw your attention to General Dupont's suggestion for the despatch of Allied *stationnaires* to Königsberg and Memel, and I request you to be so good as to submit it to the Peace Conference for decision.

Enclosure

SPA, May 16th, 1919.

General Nudant, Interallied Armistice Commission.

To Marshal Foch, Paris.

General Dupont has communicated to me a telegram addressed on May 15th by General Spire* to Colonel Reboul.

In a secret document of April 22nd the German Government says that it will not sign a Peace of violence and that it is preparing a new war especially against the Poles.

It adds that negotiations have been carried on with the Soviet and that their result is satisfactory.

Many German Non-Commissioned Officers who have volunteered to serve in Russia will be collected at Königsberg whence they will start in service dress without arms. General Henrys asks Colonel Rebour to watch the movements of German military cadres towards the Bolshevik army and to report to him.

General Dupont suggests the despatch of Allied *stationnaires* to watch these movements, especially at Konigsberg and Memel. He asks that Spire's information may be forwarded to the British *stationnaires* at Libau.

[1] Report No. 1 (April 6, 1919) of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs).

[2] FM–15, p. 711 [*Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 45*].

[3] FM–16, p. 717 [*Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 46*].

[4] See FM–13, p. 687 [*Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 43*].

[5] Maj. F. K. Heath, chief of the food commission sent to Finland by the American Relief Administration.

[6] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[7] Gen. Hector Delobbe, Belgian representative on the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.

[*] of General Henrys' Mission at Warsaw. [Footnote in the original.]

May 24, 3 p.m. (FM–20)

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[50] Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 24th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/20

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/20

FM–20

[Document 50]

Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 24th May, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, May 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	General Tasker H. Bliss
Secretary	Mr. Hoover
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Morison
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Secretary	Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G.
Mr. E. Phipps	Major Gen. W. Thwaites, C. B.
France	Sir Esme Howard, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
M. Pichon	I. Malcolm, Esq., M. P.
Secretaries	Lt. Col. S. Peel
Capt. de St. Quentin	Mr. O. T. Falk
M. de Bearn	Hon. A. Akers-Douglas
Italy	France
H. E. Baron Sonnino	Admiral Ronarch
Secretary	Capt. Levavasseur
M. Bertele	Colonel Georges
Japan	Italy
M. Matsui	Marquis della Torretta

Secretary	Count Vinci
M. Kawai	Capt. Guidoni
	Capt. Jung

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia
France	Capt. A. Portier M. Fould
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. Pichon said that the first question on the Agenda Paper related to the withdrawal of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces and Russian Polish Front. The question had been raised by Marshal Foch in a letter dated 13th May 1919 which had been circulated on the 17th May 1919 (See W. C. P. 805). He would call on Colonel Georges to state the facts of the case. Withdrawal of German Troops From Baltic Provinces and Russian Polish Front

Colonel Georges said that in a letter dated the 9th May 1919, General von Hammerstein, the President of the German Armistice Commission, had informed the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission that the German Government would, within a short time, withdraw all the fighting forces from Lettland and Lithuania. General von Hammerstein's letter went on to state that the German Government had already taken preparatory measures with a view to bringing about a suspension of arms with a consequential Armistice with the troops opposed to them: that the withdrawal of the troops would take place within a period sufficient to assure the security of the property of the German Empire in Lettland and Lithuania; and that the responsibility for the consequences following upon the evacuation of Lettland and Lithuania would fall upon the Allied and Associated Powers.

At the same time, the Polish National Committee had requested the Allied and Associated Governments to intervene with Marshal Foch in order that he might summon the German troops to evacuate the territories of Grodno and Suvalki and to retire within the territories of Germany.

Both these demands had reference to the interpretation to be given to Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, namely:—

> "All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1st, 1914, and all German troops at present in the territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of those territories."

It appeared, therefore, that on the one hand the Germans threatened to withdraw their troops from the territories in question; whilst on the other hand, the Polish Government on the strength of Article 12 of the Armistice, called for the evacuation of the zone at the back of the Polish forces.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the zone of Vilna was at present occupied by the Poles.

COLONEL GEORGES replied that Vilna itself was at present occupied by the Poles; at the back of Vilna existed a zone which was traversed by railway lines, which were necessary for the despatch of supplies from Poland to the Polish forces on the Vilna front. It was an interesting fact, calling for serious consideration, that the Germans had remained in occupation of those railway lines, and that they had lately concentrated considerable forces in that quarter.

MR. LANSING enquired whether Colonel Georges referred to the railway line between Vilna and Grodno?

COLONEL GEORGES replied that he would enter into that question in greater detail when dealing with the suggestion for fixing a line of demarcation between the Polish and German zones of occupation.

Colonel Georges, continuing, said that the object Marshal Foch had kept in mind in referring General von Hammerstein's Note of the 9th May to the Council, had been to obtain a ruling in regard to the conditions which should govern the application of Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November in regard to the Polish-German-Lithuanian front. These conditions were three in number, namely:—

Firstly—the immediate evacuation by the German troops of the zone at the back of the Polish Army operating in the Vilna region;
Secondly—to draw the attention of the Germans that it is their duty to maintain their forces on Lithuania and Lettish fronts until the Entente should authorise them to withdraw the same;
Thirdly—to organise with as little delay as possible under an interallied control, the local forces in Lithuania and Latvia in order to enable these to take the place of the Germans on their respective fronts.

On the 23rd May, an agreement had been reached in regard to questions 2 and 3 above.

MR. LANSING enquired by whom this agreement had been reached.

COLONEL GEORGES replied that the decision had been reached by the Foreign Ministers themselves at the meeting held yesterday.

MR. LANSING maintained that at yesterday's meeting no mention had been made of Poland. The Ministers had only dealt with Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia.

COLONEL GEORGES agreed. He explained, however, that Poland was in no way involved. He had considered the question as a whole and had divided the same into two parts: the one, dealing with Latvia and Lithuania, which had been discussed and disposed of at Yesterday's meeting; the other, relating to the Polish zone of occupation in the

region of Vilna, which it was proposed should be settled at that meeting.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the question which Colonel Georges raised had anything to do with the dispute between the Letts and the Poles, who were at the present moment furiously fighting with one another.

COLONEL GEORGES replied that the question under consideration was merely a Germano-Polish one.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the only problem to be brought before the Council on that date related to the withdrawal of the Germans from the territory now occupied by them at the back of the Polish lines.

COLONEL GEORGES replied in the affirmative, since the rest of the problem had been settled on the previous day.

Colonel Georges, resuming, said that the Polish front under consideration began south of the Lettish town of Vilkomir, then ran in a south-easterly direction, passing 40 miles to the East of the town of Vilna, whence it passed through Soli and proceeded in the direction of Baranovichi. The northern portion of this zone, the region of Vilna, was crossed by two railway lines—the Byelostok-Grodno-Vilna line, and the Suvalki-Olita line, which joined the previous one at Roani [*Orany*]. These railway lines constituted the only means of communication between Poland proper and the Polish front in the region of Vilna. It was therefore, absolutely necessary that the Poles should have the full control and the free use of these railway lines. With that object in view, General Henrys had proposed that the Germans should be compelled to withdraw their troops from the territory in question, a line of demarcation, separating the Polish zone of occupation from the German zone of occupation, being laid down to the north, to pass through Lyudvinof, Balverjishki, Dersunishki, Jigmori, Chakiski, and south of Vilkomir. It was hoped that this would definitely put a stop to the concentration of German troops which continued to take place at Suvalki, and at Augustovo in the railway zone.

MR. LANSING said that he had been supplied with a map giving the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. That line had been referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs by whom it had been rejected. Consequently, he thought, much time would be saved if the proposed line of demarcation between Lithuania and Poland were not discussed further.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the line of demarcation now under discussion constituted a military or a political line. In other words, was it a line which was to form the actual future political boundary between the States of Lithuania and Poland? Or, was it merely a temporary line which was to be laid down in order to ease the existing military situation? If the line was intended to represent the future political boundary line, he agreed with Mr. Lansing that the Council was not competent at present to discuss the question. But, if the line were a purely military one, then, he thought, Mr. Lansing need feel no anxiety in arriving at a decision.

MR. LANSING held that if the proposal were to lay down a temporary military line, the question should be referred for decision to the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments. His information went to show that the Lithuanians were actually in arms, ready to resist further Polish advances. Consequently, the Council should be very careful in dealing with this question.

COLONEL GEORGES explained that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys was based solely on military considerations. The Polish front at present extended to the East of Vilna and it was impossible to leave all the lines of communication in possession of the Germans, as it would enable them at any moment to interrupt the flow of supplies to Vilna. Furthermore, in the event of an attack by the Germans, the possession of the lines of communication would at once constitute a serious menace to the Polish troops around Vilna. From a military point of view, the question required immediate attention; but the solution of the military problem did not in any way imply a solution of the purely territorial question. The German troops occupying Lithuania to the north of the line of demarcation had no reason for occupying the railway to the south serving the Polish front, especially as the region in question was not

German. Under these circumstances, Marshal Foch had recommended that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys should be accepted, thus separating the Polish and German zones of occupation. Marshal Foch had, at the same time, proposed certain slight improvements in General Henrys' line of demarcation, so as to follow more closely the administrative boundaries, especially in the district of Vilkomir. It was extremely urgent, however, that some line of demarcation should be adopted, and that constituted the problem which the Council had been asked to solve.

Mr. LANSING said that he quite understood the position and, in a general way, he accepted the proposals made. Nevertheless, it should be provided that the area around Suvalki and Augustovo, which was Lithuanian, should be occupied only by Lithuanian troops and not by Polish troops. In this [*his?*] opinion, the Poles should be prevented from occupying Lithuanian territory just as much as the Germans.

COLONEL GEORGES said that two obstacles could be opposed to Mr. Lansing's proposals. In the first place, the Lithuanians had no troops which could be spared to garrison the territory in question. The Lithuanian forces at the present moment consisted of 4,000 men guarding the Eastern front and 3,000 men at depots in the interior. In the second place, it had been proposed to organise Lithuanian forces in order to defend the Eastern front. Should those troops be employed, as suggested, to garrison the vast territory to be evacuated by the German troops, no troops would be left with which to defend the Lithuanian frontiers against the advance of Bolshevik forces.

Mr. LANSING maintained that guarantees should be given that the Poles would not occupy the territory in question after the withdrawal of the Germans.

COLONEL GEORGES explained that the zone to be evacuated by the Germans, including Suvalki, Augustovo and Seini, had been attributed to Poland by the Polish Territorial Commission. On the other hand, the Vilna zone was already occupied by Polish forces, and it was merely proposed that measures should be taken to prevent the Germans from going there. It had been suggested, in order to re-assure the Lithuanian Government, that the Allied and Associated

Governments should inform it that the occupation of these territories by Polish forces was purely a temporary measure necessitated by the existing military situation and that it would in no way prejudge the final settlement of the territorial question.

MR. LANSING thought that the Council could accede to the demands made by the Polish Government: but General Henrys' proposals went a long way beyond the demands put forward by the Polish Government.

COLONEL GEORGES explained that there were two questions to be considered. Firstly, the request of the Polish Government, aiming at the occupation and acquisition of the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone. Secondly, the military question which called for the temporary occupation by the Poles of the areas at present occupied by German troops, situated at the back of the Vilna front, where the Polish forces set up a strong defensive line against Bolshevism. No reason existed why the zone at the back of that defensive line should be occupied by Germans, and the Allied and Associated Governments were, in accordance with the terms of Article 12 of the Armistice, justified in demanding the withdrawal of the German troops therefrom.

MR. LANSING said he agreed to the withdrawal of the Germans from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone: but the area so evacuated should, in his opinion, be occupied by the Lithuanians, to whom the territory in question belonged, and not by the Poles.

M. PICHON invited attention to the decision reached by the Baltic Commission on this question, which read as follows:— (See W. C. P. 847).

> "The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the districts (Powyats) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Czernahanja (Marycha), districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

> "As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops."

He thought that the recommendations therein contained had an important bearing on the objections raised by Mr. Lansing.

MR. LANSING said he would accept the proposals made by the Baltic Commission.

M. SONNINO thought that the proposals just read likewise gave effect to the wishes of Colonel Georges, who had asked that the Germans should withdraw from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone; the object in view being attained by laying down the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. He wished, however, to enquire from Colonel Georges whether the line of demarcation was intended to ensure free communication with the Lithuanian troops, or with the Polish troops in the Vilna region.

COLONEL GEORGES replied that the line of demarcation was intended to protect the Polish troops on the Vilna front, since the Lithuanians had no troops there. The demarcation line, however, was essential to prevent the Germans from spreading from Vilkomir into the Vilna region, in the same way as they had spread into the Augustovo and Suvalki zone. The acceptance of the recommendations of the Baltic Commission disposed of one part of the question under reference. He would have preferred that a settlement should have been reached in regard to the whole problem. Under the circumstances, however, he asked that a telegram should be sent to General Nudant at Spa to communicate to him the decision taken in regard to the Augustovo-Suvalki region, a copy of the same being sent to General Henrys, in order that immediate effect might be given to the decision taken.

MR. LANSING said that he, personally, would be prepared to go even beyond the recommendations of the Baltic Commission. He thought

the Germans should be instructed to withdraw from the whole of the disputed area between General Henrys' line of demarcation and the ethnic boundary line, on the understanding that the Poles should not occupy the territories so evacuated.

COLONEL GEORGES understood this to mean that no German should be permitted to occupy territory to the south of the line of demarcation proposed.

MR. LANSING agreed, but he added that his proposal also implied that no Pole should be allowed to advance north of the ethnic line. The intervening region between the line of demarcation and the ethnic line would, under these conditions, be occupied by the Lithuanians.

COLONEL GEORGES remarked that no Lithuanian troops would be available to occupy that area.

MR. LANSING said that, under those circumstances, the Germans should not be withdrawn. The only solution, therefore, would be to adhere strictly to the recommendations made by the Baltic Commission.

(It was agreed:—

1. To accept the resolutions of May 19th by the Commission on Baltic Affairs with regard to the proposals in Marshal Foch's letter of May 13th concerning the German forces in Latvia (W. C. P. 847).
2. To forward a copy of the following resolution to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Armistice Commission at Spa, and to General Henrys, Head of the French Military Mission in Poland, for necessary action:—

> "The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the districts (Powyats) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Czernahanja (Marycha), districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops").

2. M. PICHON said that a memorandum prepared by the British Delegation had been circulated that afternoon in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia (W. C. P. 844). The Delegates had had no time to consult their experts. He asked, therefore, that the question should be adjourned to the next Meeting. Restrictions to be Imposed on Commercial Navigation With Northern Russia

MR. LANSING agreed that the question should be adjourned. He wished to enquire, however, whether the proposals contained in the memorandum, submitted by the British Delegation, applied only to Murmansk and Archangel.

ADMIRAL HOPE replied that the proposals related only to the control of sailings to the White Sea ports.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the American, Italian and Japanese Delegations had no objections to offer to the proposals put forward by the British Delegation. Should the French authorities, after carefully studying the memorandum likewise have no objections to offer, he thought the recommendations therein contained should forthwith be given effect to, without further reference to the Council.

Mr. LANSING agreed to accept Mr. Balfour's proposal on the understanding that it would not form a precedent.

(It was agreed that the recommendations contained in the memorandum (W. C. P. 844) submitted by the British Delegation in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia (White Sea ports) should be adopted, subject to the approval of the French authorities,

which would be communicated direct to the British Naval authorities.)

3. M. PICHON invited attention to a letter dated 16th May 1919, addressed by Dr. Benes to M. Clemenceau, containing a request from the Czecho-Slovak Delegation for the insertion of financial clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary. (See W. C. P. 851.) The proposals of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation had reference to four subjects, namely:—(1) the pre-war debt; (2) the war debt; (3) the question of State property of liberated Czecho-Slovak territory; and (4) the question of Austro-Hungarian bank notes. Financial Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Austria-Hungary

MR. LANSING proposed that questions (1) and (2) should be referred to the Financial Commission and questions (3) and (4) to the Commission on Reparations.

(In regard to the note received from the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, it was agreed to refer the draft dealing with (1) the pre-war debt and (2) the war debt to the Financial Commission, and the draft clauses dealing with (3) the question of State property of liberated Czecho-Slovak territory and (4) the question of Austro-Hungarian Bank Notes to the Reparation Commission.)

4. M. PICHON said that in a letter dated 13th May 1919, M. Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium had transmitted a demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of objects of interest now in Austria, (Appendix A). He proposed that the whole question should be referred to the Commission on Reparations for report. Demand of the Belgian Government for the Restoration of Objects of Interest Now in Austria

MR. LANSING thought that the request for the return of a picture by Rubens, known as "The Tryplique [*Triptyque*] de St. Ildephonse", required some consideration. The work of art in question had apparently been sold to the Vienna Gallery for 40,000 Florins. He failed to see why that picture should now be restored to Belgium. In his opinion objects of value which had been stolen by Austria or taken for safe custody to Vienna should be restored, but he did not

think that ruling should apply to objects of Art that had been sold, even under pressure.

MR. BALFOUR in this connection invited attention to the claim put forward by Belgium for the return of the treasure known as the "Fleece of Gold". This treasure originally belonged to the ancient Dukes of Burgundy. In the course of centuries part of the Duchy of Burgundy became attached to the Crown of Austria, and accordingly orders were given by the Monarchy of Austria for the removal of certain treasures from the Duchy to Vienna. It did not appear quite clear on what ground Belgium claimed to inherit property, which had belonged to the Duchy of Burgundy.

BARON SONNINO invited attention to the fact that the question of the delivery of the "Fleece of Gold" to Belgium had already been considered by the Commission on Reparations and the following draft Article had received approval:—

> "Article XVI. In carrying out the provisions of Article VIII, Austria undertakes to surrender to each of the Allied and Associated Powers respectively, all records, documents, objects of antiquity and of Art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded territory whether they belonged to the State or to provinciali, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical administrations or other public or private Institutions.
>
> Annexe II. Objects and documents removed for safety from Belgium to Austria in 1794:—
>
> (*a*) Arms, Armour and other objects from the Old Arsenal of Brussels.
> (*b*) The treasure of the "Toison d'or" preserved in previous times in the "Chapelle de la Cour" in Brussels.
> (*c*) Coinage, stamps, medals, and counters by Theodore van Berckel which were an essential feature in the Archives of the "Chambre des Comptes" at Brussels.
> (*d*) The documents relating to the map "carte chorographique" of the Austrian Low Countries drawn up by Lieut. Gen.

Comte Jas de Ferraris."

Under these circumstances he thought there was no necessity for the Council to consider the demand of the Belgian Government, which had already been admitted by the Commission on Reparations.

(It was agreed that no action was required in regard to the demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of certain objects of interest now in Austria, in view of the fact that a Clause had already been inserted in the Draft Reparation Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.)

5. (The Council decided to adjourn this question without discussion.) Addition as an Annex to the Treaty of Peace With Germany of the French Note Relative to Zones

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, May 24th, 1919.

Appendix A to IC–191 [FM–20][1]

BELGIAN DELEGATION.
PARIS, May 13, 1919.

[*The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs* (*Hymans*) *to the President of the Supreme Council* (*Clemenceau*)]

No. of order 614.

1 Annex.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: I have the honor to call the attention of the Interallied Supreme Council to the fact that a certain number of objects from Belgium, of the greatest historic interest, as well as works of art of great value coming from the old Belgian provinces, are being detained without any right at Vienna, and that it would be fair to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Austria a provision requiring the restitution of these things to Belgium.

These objects can be arranged in five categories, as follows:

A. Arms, armour, and other objects produced in the old arsenal at Brussels;
B. The Treasure of the Golden Fleece, composed of an ecclesiastical ornament, called “chapelle”, and of various other objects and relics heretofore kept in the Court Chapel in Brussels.
C. Dies for coins, medals, and counters, executed by Theodore Van Berckel, and forming part of the archives of the Court of Accounts in Brussels.
D. Manorial titles and records of the Austrian Netherlands, and especially the documents relating to the “Carte chorographique des Pays-Bas autrichiens”, which were drawn up between 1770 and 1777 by the lieutenant general, Count de Ferraris.
E. The triptych of St. Ildephonso by Rubens, coming from the Abbey of St. Jacques sur Coudenberg, bought on the budget of the Belgian provinces in 1777 and unlawfully transferred to Vienna by the Empress Maria Theresa; so also a schedule of other paintings obtained from the convents suppressed in 1773 and 1783 in the Netherlands, and unlawfully carried off to Austria where they are preserved in public collections.

The objects mentioned in the first three categories (A, B, C) were removed to Vienna in 1794, for safety on the approach of the French armies, and they have remained there.

The titles and records, among them the map of Ferraris (category D) were also carried away in 1794, and ought to have been restored, under the terms of Article 13 of the Treaty of Campo Formio of October 17, 1797.[2] This restitution has never taken place, and negotiations on the subject, which were begun by the Belgian Government in 1853 and 1858, were without result.

In short, the paintings were taken to Vienna only by a plain abuse of power.

I add as an annex, enclosed herewith,[3] a Note giving the most ample details on the origin of the various objects which are mentioned

above, and for which I think myself well justified in claiming restitution in the name of Belgium.

In conclusion I have the honour to ask that there be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, in Section II of Part Right (Reparations —Special Provisions) an article worded as follows:

> "Within the six months which follow the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Austrian Government shall deliver to the Belgian Government through the Reparation Commission:
>
> A. Arms, armour, and other objects from the old Arsenal of Brussels, and transferred to Vienna in 1794;
> B. The objects known under the name of "The Treasure of the Golden Fleece," and including particularly an ecclesiastical ornament called "Chapelle," the whole coming from the old Court at Brussels and carried to Vienna in 1794;
> C. The dies for coins, medals, and counters executed by Theodore Berckel, which used to form a part of the archives of the Court of Accounts at Brussels and which were transferred to Vienna in 1794;
> D. The manorial titles and records of the Austrian Lowlands, and especially all documents relating to the 'Carte chorographique des Pays-Bas autrichiens' drawn up between 1770 and 1777 by the lieutenant general, Count Ferraris;
> E. The triptych of St. Ildephonso by Rubens, from the Abbey of St. Jacques sur Coudenberg, as well as the paintings from the convents suppressed in 1773 and 1783 in the Netherlands, which are in public collections in Austria."

Persuaded that the Interallied Supreme Council will appreciate the incontrovertible grounds for the Belgian Government's request, and will not hesitate to give it favorable issue, I beg you, Mr. President, to accept [etc.]

Signed: **HYMANS**

[1] Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[2] G. F. Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trève*, seconde édition, vol. 6, p. 420.
[3] Not included with the minutes.

June 3, 3 p.m. (FM–21)

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[51] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, June 3rd, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/21

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/21

FM–21

[Document 51]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, June 3rd, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 3, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. C. H. Haskins
Secretary	British Empire
Mr. L. Harrison	Sir Eyre Crowe
British Empire	Brig. General H. O. Mance
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	Colonel Twiss
Secretary	Captain C. T. M. Fuller
Mr. H. Norman	Hon. A. Akers-Douglas
France	France
M. Stephen Pichon	M. Andre Tardieu
Secretaries	M. Laroche
Capt. de St. Quentin	Italy
M. de Bearn	M. Ricci-Busatti
Italy	Belgium
H. E. Baron Sonnino	M. Bassompierre
Secretary	M. Orts
M. Bertele	M. Hostie
Japan	Holland
H. E. Baron Makino	M. Swinderen
Belgium	M. Struycken
M. Hymans	M. London

HOLLAND	M. Leder
M. de Karnebeck	M. de Heeckeren

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. E. Abraham
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN	M. Kawai

M. PICHON said that the meeting had been called to resume the examination of the revision of the Treaties of 1839. At the end of the previous meeting the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared that he would be in a position to throw further light on the intentions of his Government regarding this question. The best thing therefore, was to ask M. Van Karnebeek to speak.

M. VAN KARNEBEEK said that the meeting would remember that he had asked his Belgian colleague at the end of the last meeting to communicate to him the requests of the Belgian Government. He had since become cognisant of the statements made by M. Hymans in the two previous meetings, and he had been able to form an opinion of the ideas inspiring the proposals of the Belgian Government. He did not intend to enter into the details of the question or repeat what he had said on a previous occasion. From one point of view, however, he felt that he ought to reiterate the declaration already made regarding the question of the territorial *status quo* of Holland. As would be remembered he had declared that the Government of the Netherlands could not allow any modification of this status, and could engage in no negotiations regarding territorial modification. It followed that he was obliged to exclude from discussion some of the Belgian proposals tending, either upon grounds of defence or, for economic reasons, to withdraw certain territories from Dutch sovereignty in order to transfer them to Belgian sovereignty. He would not press this matter any further, but

he had thought it necessary in a few words, to recall the views of the Dutch Government on the question.

His Belgian colleague would allow him to call attention to point "C" relating to the management by Belgium of the Locks regulating the flow of water in Flanders. This matter was regulated according to the Treaty of 1843,[1] but as the system was not fully satisfactory, a Commission had been instituted to deal with the question. The labours of this Commission had been interrupted in 1914 by the war. If Belgium had any further requests to make on this subject, he was glad to state that the Netherlands Government would willingly take cognisance of them, and examine them with the utmost goodwill.

The second question was that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen at Bouchante. This problem, if it might be called a problem, resulted from the damming of the waters of Dragmund. The Dutch Government had begun the construction of a new Port and of a new canal, both of which would shortly be completed, and as a result, the fishermen would receive satisfaction and would be better off than before. If other difficulties arose, the Belgian Government need only communicate them to the Dutch Government, and the latter would immediately examine them with the wish to find a satisfactory solution.

Thirdly, his Belgian colleague had mentioned the canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk. The Meeting would know that there was a line of communication between Moerdijk and Antwerp, which was reputed to be better than in former days. The Belgian Delegation had now put forward the idea that another line of communication ought to be made. The Dutch Government had not as yet received the reasons which might militate in favour of this change, but he was prepared to renew the same declaration, and to assure the Belgian Government that any communications made by them to the Dutch Government would be studied by the latter very willingly with the object of finding a common settlement of the question.

There was also the question of the Dam of Baerle-duc. This was a very simple question, and was in process of settlement.

Finally, there was the question of communication between the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt. He would again make the declaration made on a previous occasion, namely, that the Netherlands Government was disposed to enter into conversations with the Belgian Government regarding the latter's desiderata. He would like to pause for a moment over the question of the Scheldt. It had been discussed on the previous occasion. His Belgian colleague had had certain grievances against the existing system. He, himself, had endeavoured to show from his point of view that the application of the existing regulation should not give rise to any complaint on the part of the Belgian Government. He thought it was fair to say that the system established by the Powers had not hampered the prosperity of Belgium. Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation he would ask M. Hymans the following question:—"could not Belgium and Holland come to an agreement on the question of extending the already existing system of co-operation from the matters to which it applied to other matters"? This might be a means of satisfying Belgium. The system of co-operation he referred to applied to the management of buoys, piloting and preservation of channels, all of which were regulated by a mixed Commission. He thought perhaps this system of co-operation might be extended to yet other interests even administratively in such a way as to afford Belgium the satisfaction she desired regarding guarantees of the navigability of the stream. He wished to submit this idea to his Belgian colleague.

Such, in a few words, was the declaration he wished to make regarding the desires formulated by the Belgian Government. M. Hymans would not fail to observe that he was animated by the same spirit as at the first and second Meetings of the Council. He had previously said that he had not come to make matters more difficult, but to make them easier, and to see whether and to what extent Belgian desires could be met. He was glad to believe he had been able to open to his Belgian colleague an avenue of progress, and he thought that there was now a basis for conversations between Belgium and Holland. If he recollected aright, during the last discussion he and his Belgian colleague had not been in agreement regarding the method to be followed in dealing with this question. He would like to add a few words on this subject. He had said on the previous day that the choice of the method should be governed by the

consideration of bringing about the utmost mutual confidence between the two countries. It was clear that if Belgium and Holland wished to achieve new arrangements, these arrangements should be based on reciprocal good will. He need hardly remind M. Hymans that the Netherlands were under no obligation in this respect, and that no change could be imposed on Holland. Nevertheless, the country wished to reach agreement with Belgium in a spirit of cordiality which would itself contain guarantees for the future of both countries.

His impression was, that Belgium in this manner, would find a welcoming attitude, if she wished to consult with the Dutch Government. He wished to speak frankly. His impression was, that the questions to be raised, would present themselves in a different form, if, first of all, the two Powers concerned were called upon to examine them in concert. Belgium desired certain changes. These changes, in a large measure, depended on the good-will of Holland. He would ask his Belgian colleague to consider what conditions would incline Holland to be most yielding. Did he not think that it would be by adopting the method he recommended, namely, that Holland and Belgium should meet, face to face, and realise together the necessity for both to go forward harmoniously in the future.

He had a few more observations to make regarding the question of method. He would like to remind M. Hymans of all the questions, which, since 1839, had been directly transacted between Holland and Belgium. There were a considerable number of Treaties to which he might allude. Some of these agreements related to questions dealt with in the Treaty of 1839, others had a more extended scope. This showed that many of the Belgian desiderata could be transacted directly between the Government at Brussels and the Government of the Netherlands. He would indicate in a few words the principal Treaties in question.

Treaty of November 5th, 1842,[2] supplementary to and explanatory of Treaty of April 19th, 1839.
Treaty of May 20th, 1843, laying down several regulations regarding navigation and fisheries.[3]
Delimitation Treaty of August 8th, 1843.[4]

Treaty of July 12th, 1845 regarding the creation of a lattoral [*lateral*] canal to the Meuse between the towns of Liege and Maestricht.[5]
Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regarding the redemption of the toll on the Scheldt.[6]
Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regulating the right of taking water from the Meuse.[7]
Treaty of September 19th, 1863, relating to pilotage on the Scheldt.[8]
Treaty of March 31st, 1866, providing for the establishment of a series of new lights on the Scheldt, and at its mouth, as well as further Treaties relating to pilotage, lighting and buoying of the Scheldt.[9]
Treaty of January 11th, 1873,[10] modifying Treaty of 12th May, 1863, above mentioned.
Treaty of January 13th, 1873, providing for the passage of a line of railway across Limburg.[11]
Treaty of May 24th, 1873 [*1872*], regarding the damming of the Zwin.[12]
Treaty of October 31st, 1879, regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.[13]
Treaty of April 7th, 1886, regulating the conditions of construction and upkeep of bridge on the Meuse at Maeseyk.[14]
Treaty of June 29th, 1895, regarding improvements in Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.[15]
Treaty of March 8th, 1892 [*1902*], modifying Treaty regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.[16]

He had recalled these Treaties to show that the subjects with which the meeting was concerned, relating to Canals, means of communication and lights, had been settled in the past by direct agreements between Belgium and Holland, and not by international regulations. He wished to draw the attention of the meeting to this, because if Holland and Belgium had, in a cordial spirit, found the solution to all these problems, he could not see why such questions as, the outflow of water from Flanders, as that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen, of communication between Limbourg and the Rhine, of the Canal from Moerdijk to the Meuse, why all these questions should be regarded as of an international character.

His impression was, that all these Treaties should serve to indicate the method that should be followed, and that if the same method was adopted, it would lead to the discovery of the means whereby the Netherlands could satisfy Belgium on all these questions.

His Belgian colleague, however, had suggested that these subjects should be submitted to a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied Powers and of Belgium and Holland. On his side, he would like to insist on the idea elaborated above, namely, that the Belgian and Dutch Governments be asked to begin the examination of these questions directly. These two Governments might nominate a mixed Commission of Dutch and Belgian representatives, who would study the problems and make a report. If, after their examination, any points remained outstanding, he thought that the new international organ lately created could take cognisance of the matter and find a suitable solution. He referred to the League of Nations. He pressed strongly for another method than that suggested by M. Hymans, because he had the impression that the question was of great importance. Holland had come to meet Belgium as Belgium had asked for certain changes. Holland said to Belgium, “Tell us what you wish, we are ready to concert with you and see what can be done.” In order to obtain success and a happy result, he thought the procedure indicated by him should be followed, and he begged to urge his Belgian colleague to adopt it. Present conditions must not be lost sight of. It was not a question only of finding means to arrange certain difficulties between Holland and Belgium, but of harmonising the whole relations of the two countries.

His Belgian colleague, the other day, recalled the trials through which Belgium had passed. As representative of the Netherlands, he wished to say that his country had proved to the Belgians that it had not been indifferent to their trouble. At the beginning of the War, the Dutch had opened their frontiers and their doors to the Belgians. They had been happy to do so, and the Belgians had been their guests.

Subsequently to this, to speak frankly, as he thought he should before a meeting which was to settle questions between Belgium and Holland, a certain ill-will had been shown in Belgium against the

Dutch people, which had been more or less affected thereby. It seemed to him therefore, that the most important work to be accomplished was to dissipate this feeling, which might estrange and had estranged the Belgian from the Dutch people. He would, therefore, repeat with emphasis that the best means of obtaining this result, was to put the representatives of the two peoples face to face, in order that they should seek means of agreement on these various questions.

M. HYMANS said that the statement made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs had been most friendly and courteous in tone; but he could not conceal that it had disappointed him very deeply. No doubt M. Van Karnebeek had declared himself ready to give benevolent attention to certain grievances, which though important were in the whole problem insignificant. There was for instance the affair of the fishermen, and that of the locks for the Flanders streams. M. Van Karnebeek had also suggested certain proposals relating to an extension of the system of co-operation. The formula was vague, and it was difficult without further study to see how far it would reach. He was not, therefore, able to express an opinion regarding this proposal, which in any case would have to be submitted to the examination of technical experts. His Dutch colleague had produced on him the impression that he had excluded from the revision of the Treaty all territorial and military questions. In effect he maintained the regime of the 1839 treaties, of which the Belgian Delegation required the revision. Now the great Powers, after an impartial examination of the problem, had come to the conclusion that revision was necessary, and that it affected all of the clauses of the 1839 Treaty, inasmuch as the system brought about by that Treaty had diminished Belgium's capacity for defence, and that it was necessary to amend the system in order to shelter Belgium and general peace from the risks of the future. This conclusion had in view the interest of Europe. This was a point he wished to make clear. It was the system as a whole that was attacked, because it placed Belgium in a state of dependence in regard to Holland, and hampered her capacity for defence. As he had previously observed, Holland was mistress of Belgium's communications towards the sea and towards the East, and the defence of Belgium depended on decisions taken by the Dutch. M. Van Karnebee'k had not said a word

on this question. It did not appear to have struck him, but he must realise that this was the question which in the mind of Belgium took precedence of all others. The state of Europe would be more or less unstable for a long time. Measures no doubt were being taken to ensure a prolonged peace. President Wilson had said that France's frontiers were the frontiers of freedom. The Belgian frontier was a prolongation of this frontier. Belgium had been the field of battle of Europe for centuries. It was through Belgium that the coast was reached, and it was through Belgium that France could be attacked. He recently had received an address from a Belgian town which said that it had been destroyed six times in the course of last century. It now requested that it be sheltered from a recurrence of such calamities. Belgium had taken military precautions, established a strongly trenched Camp round Antwerp and fortified the Meuse, believing that the town would not be taken or could at least resist for several months. This had been a mistake. As to the future, according to Belgian Military authorities, the line of the Scheldt could not be defended unless the defence rested on the whole course of the stream. Further the salient of Limburg must be blocked. This was a question of life or death for Belgium. Had Liege held out much longer, the Germans would have passed through Limburg. He was, therefore, right in saying that these two questions passed before all others, and that their solution was the solution of the whole problem. It was for this reason that in previous meetings he had formulated the following questions.

1. "Can the line of the Meuse, which is the first defensive line of Belgium, be adequately held and defended according to the territorial status established by the Treaties of 1839 which, in particular, delivered to Holland the town of Maastricht ("Mosae trajectum") through which, throughout the centuries German invasions have passed into Western Europe?
2. "Can the line of the Scheldt, which is the principal defensive line of Belgium and is of great natural strength, be effectually held unless Belgium can establish her position on the whole length of the stream?"

He had asked that these questions be submitted for examination to the military experts. These questions concerned Europe. This had been the view of the Supreme Council, seeing that in the text of its declaration, this had been explicitly recognised. If in the interest of Europe, it was also in the interest of Holland.

M. Van Karnebeek had shown that there were close ties between the two nations. Like everyone, he had realised in the last war that the security of Holland depended on the security of Belgium. If Belgium had perished, Holland would have perished too. When, therefore, he spoke for the security of Belgium and for the security of Europe, he also spoke for the security of Holland. When he spoke of the interest of Europe, it followed he spoke of the interest of Holland also.

He had just observed that the Powers who examined the question of the revision of the Treaty of 1839, had considered that this revision should be made in the interest of general peace. He had laid stress on this as he had heard M. Van Karnebeek say that Holland was under no obligation to take part in the revision. He thought there was a moral obligation for Holland to take a share in promoting general European peace. This was an obligation to which all countries were liable, especially in relation to a neighbour.

The question was whether the problem he had drawn attention to should be settled directly between the two Powers, or according to his proposal submitted to a Commission, on which will be represented all the Powers who took part in this discussion. It seemed to him impossible to adopt a system of negotiations between the two only for it concerned a Treaty signed and guaranteed by several Powers, especially by France and England.

These Treaties determine questions which are of interest to the whole of Europe and the Council has considered that it is a question of European interest.

These Treaties were the collective work of Europe in 1839. Their revision must also be the collective work of the Powers and not only the work of Holland and Belgium. The latter course would not be logical and he asked what advantage there could be in depriving

themselves of the assistance of competent men who had studied the question. How, further, could such a course assist in the establishment of closer relations between Holland and Belgium which were just as much desired by him as by M. Van Karnebeek?

He was therefore anxious that this question should be looked into by representatives of all countries interested in the revision of the Treaties of 1839. He did not see anything that could in the slightest degree upset his Dutch Colleague or could arouse the susceptibilities of the Dutch Government. They would not be a Court of Judges who would decide the question, but representatives of the Powers who would give their opinion. M. Van Karnebeek's opinion, in which he (the speaker) agreed, was that the chief question was to re-establish a feeling of confidence between the two countries. It appeared to him that nothing could do more to obtain such a result than a meeting in an Inter-Allied Commission. What could it matter that in such Commissions there were Representatives of other nations? It was just by the exchange of views between members that the Commission would clear the matter up.

Two questions concerning the security and defence of Belgium had been raised and it was on the opinion that was come to about these questions that the solution would depend. He himself did not put forward a solution because he did not wish to impose one and because the solution of the questions should depend on the answer which would be made to the two questions of security and national defence which he had suggested.

This was the point on which he wished to close. He thought that the field of revision could never be limited and he shared that belief with the Allied and Associated Powers, for on this point he did no more than follow the conclusions that the Supreme Council had adopted. The Council had said that the 3 Treaties of 1839 in all their Clauses formed an indivisible whole and that the Belgian-Dutch Treaty could not be separated from the other two. It had further said that these Treaties ought to be revised; it had decided moreover that the territorial and riverine clauses had been a cause of real prejudice to Belgium and had as a conclusion said that these Treaties should be revised.

He asked therefore that the problem should be investigated as a whole, that nothing should be excluded, nothing prejudged and that in good faith a solution should be sought which might ensure the safety of Belgium, and he considered that this investigation should be made by the Representatives of all the Powers.

He did not think that there was anything that could upset Holland or that could hinder her from negotiations with Belgium. That in his opinion was the most certain and most rapid method to be followed, and he earnestly begged his colleague that Holland should agree to such a course.

M. VAN KARNEBEEK asked leave to make a few remarks. He said that M. Hymans had remarked that Holland did not feel bound to assist in the revision of the Treaties of 1839 which Belgium had asked for. This however was not quite the case.

M. HYMANS said that he had only replied to an expression that M. Van Karnebeek had used. M. Van Karnebeek had said that Holland had no obligation, and he had remarked that there was a moral obligation.

M. VAN KARNEBEEK said that he offered no criticism on this point; he had come to the Meeting full of the desire to find out how far an agreement with Belgium could be arrived at, but he felt that there was one thing that separated him and M. Hymans. That was, the interpretation to be given to the expression "Revision of the Treaties of 1839". M. Hymans had spoken as if it was a question of entirely refashioning the separation between Holland and Belgium.

It was hardly necessary for him to point out that the Low Countries could never accept such a point of view. The Dutch Government could never entertain the idea of the disposal of the rights of Holland in order to make a new arrangement. At their first two meetings and even to-day he abstained from entering into details of history or into details of a juridical kind; but he wished to recall a few facts so that there might be no mistakes as to the conception of the revision of these Treaties.

In 1839 Europe did not in any way whatever dispose of the rights or the goods of the Low Countries. By the Treaties of 1839 the work of 1814 and 1815 was undone; that work had been the union of the Austrian Low Countries to Holland. It was not a durable work and it needed to be undone, but there was never any intention in 1839, nor even in 1814 and 1815, to touch the secular rights of Holland. Anybody who had studied the protocols of 1830 and 1831 and of 1839 must be convinced that there could be no doubt about this point; but what M. Hymans asked for was an entire reconstruction of the Treaties of 1839. In such a way he would refashion the separation between Belgium and Holland in an entirely different way to that done by the Treaties of 1839. M. Hymans, however, must be aware that in 1839 they had adhered to the *status quo* of 1790, and that the idea of territorial modifications or of any disposal of the goods and rights of Holland was expressly rejected by the Conference of London. Could it be that any such action should be held of no value and that Holland might find herself in 1919 in a worse situation than that in which she was in 1830 or in 1839?

He had come to the Meeting as he had already said to assist in all necessary modifications in the Treaty of 1839. If it were necessary to modify these Treaties, Holland was ready to look into the question and she was ready to see what could be done in order to satisfy Belgium, but to ask that such arrangements should be made at Holland's expense was quite another question. That was the point of view and the situation which as a member of the Netherlands Government he could never accept.

M. Hymans in his speech had drawn attention to the importance of distinguishing between military and economic questions. He himself had thought that the proposal he had made was such as to be worthy of the attention of his Belgian colleague. The latter, however, had said that this proposal had seemed to him somewhat vague, and that he could express no opinion about it, but he had nevertheless expatiated on military questions. He had said that it was the military question which dominated the whole discussion. He himself wished to remark that, as far as questions of national defence were concerned, there might well be differences of opinion and that there would no doubt be found some military authorities who would not

share the views which M. Hymans had expressed on the question of Limbourg. He did not, however, insist upon that point.

The question, however, which concerned them was what method was to be adopted for the revision of the Treaties of 1839. If Belgium wished to enter into explanations with Holland on military questions that was a matter which might be entertained, but he wished to ask M. Hymans, seeing that such questions concerned the defence of Holland, whether he could imagine or even expect, that Holland would submit her system of defence to an international Commission.

M. HYMANS said that he had only spoken of the question of Belgian defence.

M. VAN KARNEBEEK maintained that it would be very difficult to separate entirely the Belgian plans of defence from those of Holland, if the question was put in the form in which M. Hymans put it. There could not be any doubt that in such a case the Low Countries would be forced to expose their system of defence before the international Commission. If Belgium wished to arrive at an explanation with Holland, there would be no difficulty, but it was quite impossible to submit such questions to an international Commission; that alone was an argument against the method suggested by M. Hymans. His Belgian colleague had also said that the Treaties of 1839 were one collective Treaty, and that they concerned not only Belgium and Holland, but several Powers as well, and for that reason their revision could not be entrusted to Belgium and Holland alone. That was an interpretation which might be discussed from the juridical point of view, but he refrained from doing so. He was content to ask why all these questions which from 1839 up to the present day had been the subject of exchanges of views and negotiations between Belgium and Holland, should not still be settled directly between the two Governments.

M. HYMANS said that such negotiations had been carried out under the regime whose revision they were now demanding.

M. VAN KARNEBEEK said that many questions which were brought forward to-day by the Belgian Government had already been the

subject of an exchange of views before the war with the Dutch Government. For instance, that had been the case with the question of communications between the Meuse and the Rhine, which had been reserved in the Treaty of Peace. There had even been a declaration made on this subject which had certainly not been unfavourable to Belgium. No one had ever thought that this question should be decided only by an international Commission. The same had also been the case with the question of a lateral canal from Maestrick to the Meuse; no one could imagine that that was a question of an international character, and it was so also with many other demands of the Belgian Government which had already been the subject of negotiations between the Cabinets of Brussels and the Hague.

Now it was claimed that because it was a question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839 all these questions must have an international character. There seems to him no foundation for such an argument. The result would be to create such a situation that in the future every demand put forward by Belgium might become an international question. He saw no reason for such a point of view.

He would speak frankly. He did not wish anyone to gather the impression that Holland wished to keep away the other Powers; that was not the case. The fact that he was there was sufficient to prove that they were not animated by such a feeling. It was very necessary that such a result should be arrived at, but in order that such a result should be arrived at, it was necessary, he spoke frankly, to avoid in his country any appearance of international influence. He thought that if the procedure suggested by M. Hymans was adopted, Holland would be very much on her guard and would not be as much disposed as she had been to meet the wishes of Belgium.

If, however, it was agreed that Belgium and Holland should settle the matter between them, there would be much less hesitation, if indeed there were any; that was the psychological point on which he felt bound to insist. It was important that the path they followed should lead to an improvement of Belgian-Dutch relations, and to the end which he had suggested.

He wished to ask his Belgian colleague whether he thought his country could obtain more by his own methods or by the one which he, the speaker, had suggested. His own proposal was a logical one. Holland was holding out her hand towards Belgium—would Belgium refuse that hand?, would his Belgian colleague take the responsibility of so doing? He hoped that was not the case. He hoped, indeed, M. Hymans would put his hand into the one which he, as a member of the Dutch Government, offered. That was the way in which business could be done, and in which the two Governments could walk in perfect harmony. It was not for technical reasons that he did not share the opinion of his Belgian colleague, but for the serious reasons which he had expounded.

He wished he could agree with M. Hymans. He was convinced that the path which the latter had pointed out would not lead them in the direction in which they wished to go. He asked M. Hymans once more to reflect, for he was aware of his conciliatory attitude. In the name of Holland he offered him his hand, a hand which must not be refused. His own was a logical proceeding. Had anyone ever seen questions which concerned the two States dealt with outside both States by an international commission?

Had M. Hymans taken into consideration the unfortunate impression which had been produced in February last by the answer given by the Belgian Government to the request of the Dutch Government? It was known that Belgium had put before the Peace Conference certain questions which might be of interest to Holland and that the Dutch had asked the Belgian Government to enlighten them on the subject of these demands. The answer of the Brussels Cabinet had been that they would learn later on. The impression produced by this answer in Holland had been deplorable.

He now pointed out to his Belgian colleague the path which they could follow, and he hoped that they might arrive at an agreement and walk in harmony.

M. PICHON said they had before them two contradictory proposals. On the one hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of the Low Countries for the setting up of direct negotiations between Belgium

and the Low Countries on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839, and on the other hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, asking that the Allied and Associated Powers should entrust to an International Commission the study of the conditions under which such a revision should take place. He asked whether the representatives of the Powers who had declared that they considered the revision of the Treaties of 1839 necessary thought that these two proposals should be discussed? If such was the opinion of the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers he asked Mr. Van Karnebeek to allow them to examine these two contradictory proposals, as they had been put before them; they would then inform him of the steps which they thought it right to take after they had carefully studied the two proposals.

MR. LANSING took the same view.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection.

BARON SONNINO accepted the proposal.

M. PICHON said that they would then look into the question and give an expression of their opinion on the two proposals put before them.

(The Meeting adjourned at 5.0 p.m.)

PARIS, June 3rd, 1919.

[1] *British and Foreign State Pavers*, vol. XXXV, p. 1202.
[2] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXXI, p. 815.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. XXXVII, p. 1248.
[4] *Ibid.*, vol. XXXV, p. 1202.
[5] *Recueil des traités et conventions concernant le Royaume de Belgique*, vol. I, p. 424.
[6] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 299.
[7] *Recueil des trails et conventions concernant le Royaume de Belgique*, vol. V, p. 343.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

[9] *Ibid.*, vol. VI, p. 336.
[10] *Ibid.*, vol. IX, p. 163.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 170.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[13] *Ibid.*, vol. XI, p. 232.
[14] *Ibid.*, vol. XIII, p. 564.
[15] *Ibid.*, vol. XVI, p. 376.
[16] *Ibid.*, vol. XVIII, p. 183.

June 4, 3 p.m. (FM–22)

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[52] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 4th June, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 4, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/22

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/22

FM–22

[Document 52]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 4th June, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 4, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary
Mr. E. Phipps
FRANCE
M. Stephen Pichon
Secretaries
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretary
M. Bertele
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
Secretary
M. Kawai

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. C. H. Haskins
BRITISH EMPIRE
Brig. General H. O. Mance
Sir Eyre Crowe
Colonel Twiss
Captain C. T. M. Fuller
Hon. A. Akers-Douglas
FRANCE
M. André Tardieu
M. Laroche
ITALY
M. Ricci-Busatti

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham
France	Capt. A. Portier
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi

1. M. Pichon said that M. Tardieu had prepared a proposal, which he wished to lay before the Council, regarding the procedure to be followed for the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

Revision of the Treaties of 1839 M. Tardieu said that the Council had to deal with two questions, one of method, and one of substance. The question of method was whether negotiations should be carried on directly between the Dutch and the Belgians, or in an international Commission, on which the Great Powers and those two countries should be represented. The question of substance was how far the revision of the Treaties should extend. He thought he was in a position to give the views of the Commission on Belgian Affairs.

As regards the first question, it seemed difficult for the Powers which had declared revision necessary, especially for such of them as were signatories to the Treaty, not to take part in the discussion. On this point, therefore, the contention of the Belgians should be accepted.

As to the second point, it seemed that, as the Conference had decided that no territorial compensation to Holland at the expense of Germany could be enforced, all territorial questions arising out of the revision of the Treaties must be excluded. A further argument was that no Commission had considered the question of territorial readjustments in Flanders or Limbourg. The solution he proposed, therefore, was one that could be adopted speedily and which offered the advantage of a middle course between the Belgian and Dutch points of view. In regard to territory, Belgium would be refused her demand, but in regard to the method of conducting negotiations, her requests would be satisfied.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was inclined to agree with the policy proposed by M. Tardieu. He felt sure that it was useless to try and negotiate territorial changes in view of the categorical refusal of Holland. Anyone in the position of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs would have adopted the same attitude. The Powers could not compel, nor could they induce Holland to give up any territory. He also agreed with M. Tardieu in his general view regarding procedure. It was difficult for any of the Great Powers who were signatory to the Treaties of 1839 to disinterest themselves from the negotiations. He was not sure, however, that it would not be better for the Great Powers to remain in the background while Belgium and Holland conducted the negotiations as far as possible, directly. This, he thought, was not necessarily in contradiction with what M. Tardieu had proposed. M. Hymans wished all the Delegations concerned to discuss questions of railways, canals, the Scheldt etc. as it were, in Plenary Conference. These questions were no doubt important, but hardly justified such a procedure. It would be better, he thought, that Belgium and Holland should try to obtain agreement, and come to the Conference should they fail to obtain it. The Great Powers would, of course, be party in any case to the final settlement. The smaller the number of people discussing such questions as related to waterways, the better, and the solution would be all the speedier. Moreover, if Belgium and Holland really wished to come to an agreement, they would be better alone. He did not know whether this would suit M. Hymans, but M. Van Karnebeek had shown a conciliatory spirit towards the Belgian demands, and this suggestion might lead to a friendly arrangement. He said this in the interest of Belgium. He wished Belgium to obtain all the privileges she asked for, and he thought she would get them more readily by a friendly talk with Holland than by what might appear to the Dutch as coercion by the Great Powers.

M. TARDIEU said that he concurred with what Mr. Balfour had said. It was obviously desirable to obtain a friendly arrangement between the Dutch and the Belgians, but according to the plan suggested, the Great Powers would be placed in the position of arbiter. An arbiter was generally a person foreign to the dispute. The fact could not be neglected, however, that several of the Great Powers were signatories of the Treaties under revision. He would therefore propose a solution

very similar to Mr. Balfour's, namely, that the Great Powers, together with Belgium and Holland, should constitute a Commission. This Commission would immediately ask the Dutch and Belgian Members to form a sub-Commission, in order to clear the ground. This sub-Commission would be able, it was hoped, to find solutions for all the more domestic problems concerning the two countries. There were some subjects, however, notably the military problem M. Hymans had alluded to, the fortification of the Scheldt, the Port of Flushing, and similar questions, in which the Great Powers were interested. Their advice might be of use in finding a solution to these questions.

MR. BALFOUR said that he accepted this proposal.

MR. LANSING said that he was not able to say that he would accept it. Whatever the origin of the divisions of territory and reciprocal rights arranged in 1839, the matter had now become essentially one concerning Belgium and Holland. The military question, in his view, was of small importance. The principal question was economic and the Great Powers were not properly interested in this question. He therefore proposed that a joint Dutch and Belgian Committee be appointed to consider the whole problem. In case of disagreement, or in case of undue delay, the Great Powers, or the League of Nations, or Holland and Belgium, might appoint a single individual to arbitrate.

BARON SONNINO said that this could only be given in the form of a recommendation. Of the two proposals, he thought perhaps Mr. Lansing's was the more conciliatory.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether, in Baron Sonnino's opinion, Belgium would prefer it.

M. PICHON said that he thought Holland might, but that Belgium would not.

BARON SONNINO said that both sides could not be satisfied.

MR. LANSING said it must be borne in mind that one party stood to gain something, and the other could only expect to lose.

BARON SONNINO said that if the stipulation that territorial questions were excluded was clearly made, Holland might be satisfied.

M. PICHON expressed the view that Holland would be satisfied with this. In his opinion, in view of the decision previously adopted, it was impossible for the Great Powers to avoid intervening in the discussion. By the 1839 arrangement, Belgium had been made neutral, her sovereignty had been limited, but her security had been guaranteed. It had now been decided that her sovereignty must be restored, and the limitations removed; if so, her security must be established on a new basis. The Powers which had established the previous regime, could not evade the duty of participating in the creation of the new. The Dutch said, however, and they seemed genuinely disposed to display good-will, that the desired result could be better obtained by discussion between Holland and Belgium than by a debate before an areopagus of the big Powers. He thought, therefore, that Mr. Balfour's proposal met the case. The terms of reference to the Commission should be clearly defined, territorial questions should be strictly excluded, the question of the new regime to be substituted for the old should be examined, and the remaining questions should be referred to the Belgians and Dutch to solve by common agreement. Should they fail to do so, Mr. Lansing's proposal might be resorted to.

MR. LANSING said that he was not in favour of a Commission of the Great Powers. In the first place, the United States of America had not been party to the Treaties of 1839. The Council was no doubt within its rights in passing a resolution in favour of revision. Any body, of citizens, might do that. It did not follow that the authors of the resolution should make the revision. Matters, he thought, all over the world, were better settled without foreign interference. If the 1839 Treaties were annulled, Belgium would be relieved of limitations to her sovereignty. Instead of paying for this advantage, she asked that more might be given to her at Dutch expense. An International Commission to deal with this matter was unlikely to produce an acceptable solution, and more likely to aggravate bad feeling. He therefore adhered to his view, that the two countries concerned should try and find a solution by themselves, and if they failed, submit the dispute to an arbitrator.

M. PICHON pointed out that Clause D of the conclusions suggested by the Commission[1] and adopted by the Council,[2] stipulated "that the Great Powers at the Peace Conference whose interests are general should take part therein (the revision)."

MR. LANSING pointed out that at that time, the Council had in mind the delivery to Holland of certain territories to be taken from Germany.

M. LAROCHE asked if he might be allowed to state the view of the Commission. In 1839, a perpetual limitation of Belgian sovereignty had been instituted. This had been done by the Powers. If this were abrogated, the situation preceding that settlement was restored. It followed that the same Powers should provide the alternative. Had the Powers not taken part in the Treaties of 1839, the settlement would certainly have been very different. It was the duty of the Powers to settle the fate of Belgium now, otherwise, Belgium would be at a disadvantage in relation to Holland. She remained hampered by the limitations imposed in 1839, whereas Holland was free from these impediments.

M. PICHON quoted from the Annex to the Report of the Commission[3] the following passage:—

> "4. In any case the revision of the three treaties is called for.
>
> Several of the signatory Powers have in fact given definite expression to their views as to the situation set forth above.
>
> (*a*) Belgium as early as 26 July, 1917, made the following declaration: 'The international statute established 1831–39 in order to guarantee the security of Belgium has become void by reason of the violation of the joint treaty by two of its signatories. It must be revised.' She has since renewed this demand before the Peace Conference.
> (*b*) France and Great Britain, signatories and guarantors, have adhered to the Belgian demand for revision.
> (*c*) The United States, not a signatory, has declared that Belgium must be 'restored, without any attempt to limit the

> sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.'
>
> It is a logical consequence of this unanimity and of the considerations set forth above, that the three treaties should be revised, the revision being undertaken in agreement with Holland, not only by Belgium, but by the Great Powers which are signatories and guarantors thereof.
>
> This revision is fully justified in law and cannot be refused."

He said that he made this quotation not in order to place Mr. Lansing in the position of contradicting the declared policy of the United States, but merely in order to make the question as clear as possible. He wished to reconcile Belgium and Holland, but he also wished the interests of the Great Powers not to be overlooked. These interests were limited to the question of neutrality and sovereignty, the rest could be left to the Belgians and the Dutch to settle among themselves.

MR. LANSING said that there were two questions, one was the limitation of the sovereignty of Belgium, and the other the limitation of the sovereignty of Holland. He was entirely in favour of relieving Belgium from all limitations to her sovereignty. In regard to anything which might impose limitations on Dutch sovereignty, he favoured direct negotiations between Belgium and Holland.

BARON SONNINO said he thought there was general agreement. The question was to find a formula. He suggested that the Powers should nominate a Commission to examine from the general point of view the consequences of the revision of the 1839 Treaties, with the object of relieving Belgium of all limitations to her sovereignty, without reference to any territorial readjustments, and only in so far as the questions in dispute could not be settled between the two countries directly concerned. He pointed out that the question of the Congo, which was also neutralised, would be likely to arise. This question concerned all the Powers, and could not be dealt with only between Belgium and Holland.

MR. LANSING said that he was in favour of a Commission to examine the limitations or restrictions imposed on Belgian Sovereignty and the best means of removing them. In regard to any similar burdens to be imposed on Holland, he thought Belgium and Holland should settle the matter together.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the neutrality of any country affected the sovereignty of all others. Not only Holland was concerned. For instance, Germany in 1914 had not the sovereign right of attacking Belgium; she had done so and that was why the rest of Europe had fallen on her. The consequences of the neutrality of any country were therefore general.

MR. LANSING said that his reservation related to limitations that might be placed on Dutch sovereignty, for instance the servitude Belgium wished to impose on the Dutch part of the Scheldt.

MR. TARDIEU said that if this view were taken he could not see what Belgium could possibly gain. Whether neutrality were considered an advantage or a burden, it was to be abolished. No territorial re-arrangement was to be made. All that could be done was to give Belgium waterway facilities, notably in the course of the Scheldt. He pointed out that the Peace Conference had imposed an international régime on many rivers, for instance the Rhine which passed through neutral countries. He did not think Dutch sovereignty would be damaged by a similar arrangement in regard to the Scheldt. President Wilson in replying to M. Bratiano in the last Plenary Conference, had said that as the Great Powers were accepting the responsibility of safeguarding the Peace of the world, they had a right to establish such conditions as they felt they would be justified in maintaining.

MR. LANSING said that he was unable to perceive the cogency of the argument. Belgium was being relieved of a burden, and alleged that she must be compensated therefor.

MR. TARDIEU said that Belgium must be in a position to defend herself.

MR. BALFOUR said that there was surely a substantial difference between interference with Dutch Sovereignty and saying that the Scheldt was really an international river. In 1839, Holland had been given control of the stream. As a result, Belgium was unable to ask her Allies to come to her help. Now that Belgium was to be made sovereign, she must be in a position to summon her friends to assist in her defence. In this war, neither the French nor the British Navy had been able to go up the Scheldt in order to help Belgium. Holland had a right to say to the British and French Governments that as she was maintaining her neutrality vis à vis Germany, Belgium's Allies would not be allowed to help in the defence of Antwerp. It was surely not an attack on Dutch sovereignty to ask that Belgium be enabled to summon her Allies to her assistance.

MR. LANSING observed that had Great Britain been the enemy of Belgium, the arrangement would have worked the other way.

MR. BALFOUR said he wished to point out that the British Admiralty as such did not desire any change in the status of the Scheldt, it was the Belgians that desired it, not the British. The Belgians desired henceforth to throw in their lot with the French, British and Americans and to resist with them all danger coming from the East. They now said "we cannot call our friends to help us."

MR. LANSING asked whether Mr. Balfour would advocate that the Rhine be so internationalised as to allow Germany to call in her friends if attacked.

M. TARDIEU said that he would like to add a few minor arguments to those of Mr. Balfour. Mr. Balfour had spoken of the danger to Belgium in time of war. He wished to speak of the difficulties of Belgium in time of Peace. The régime established in 1839 had as a result that Belgium was deprived of the most natural rights in the stream which was her outlet to the sea. This stream was as extensive as an arm of the sea and the only Port on it was the Commercial Capital of Belgium. All the Great Powers could do was to say that they were agreed that an alteration of the system was desirable. No other pressure could be put on Holland. He thought it was exaggerated to say that any change in the régime was an attack on

Dutch sovereignty. Should the Conference which was trying to rebuild the world in the interests of Peace and Justice, shirk a matter of this sort for such a reason?

MR. BALFOUR agreed that the Conference was trying to rebuild the world. One of the methods was to open all natural international waterways to the world. No better example of such a waterway existed than the Scheldt. The Powers should be able to go to Holland and say "Will you not allow this great international stream to be governed internationally like the Rhine and the Danube?" This was not a territorial question, nor one of local transportation. It should be treated apart from such questions and submitted, like the case of other big streams in other parts of the world, to a special Commission.

MR. LANSING said that he was surprised at Mr. Balfour's argument. In the case of the St. Lawrence, would Canada or the United States agree to the control of this river by an international Commission? Yet to reach certain American cities, American vessels had to pass through the Canadian reaches of the river. He could understand rule by an international Commission whenever a river passed through many States especially States which had been engaged in hostilities, but when the river in question only concerned two friendly countries, he could see no reason why they should not settle the problem together, only calling in a third party in case of disagreement. Belgium and Holland had made a whole series of treaties together, regarding the Scheldt. They had been mentioned by Mr. van Karnebeek on the previous day. It was a general rule that the nation situated upstream should also desire sovereignty over the whole course. This was human nature, and inevitably led to the imposition of servitudes on the country downstream. Why should the Powers take on their shoulders Holland's burden? It was certain that an international Commission would never satisfy the parties.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought his proposal answered the case. The Commission he proposed would not deal with territorial questions, but only with the revision of the general political status. This should be done under the auspices of the Powers. All strictly local relations would be settled between Belgium and Holland.

MR. LANSING said he would agree, provided it was clearly understood that territorial sovereignty included servitudes such as those imposed in favour of transit on rivers.

M. TARDIEU said that the operation as a whole would not consist in imposing new servitudes on Holland, but primarily in liberating Belgium from servitudes. To take a concrete instance, would Mr. Lansing regard it as a limitation of Dutch sovereignty if, instead of the system by which Belgium had to ask Holland to perform all works necessary for navigation, each country were empowered to do the needful on a basis of equality?

M. SONNINO said that it was undesirable to define too closely what the Powers could or could not do. Holland was ready to do much to avoid interference by the Powers. It would be a pity to give her a pretext for resisting.

M. PICHON restated the proposal that a Commission should study the revision of the 1839 treaties with the object of establishing Belgian sovereignty, leaving aside all territorial questions. Holland and Belgium should be invited to solve all the subsidiary problems they could solve together. The Powers would not intervene if any agreement were reached.

MR. LANSING suggested that the investigation be made only by the Powers signatory to the Treaties of 1839. The Commission could then report to the Council.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his view President Wilson would not wish America to be left out of the investigation. He would like to make an informal suggestion. If this were a private transaction, he thought it would be best if M. Pichon asked M. van Karnebeek to come to see him informally, and ask him to state exactly what Holland's position was;

(*a*) regarding territorial matters;
(*b*) regarding local questions;
(*c*) regarding the Scheldt.

M. Pichon might tell him that the matter had been discussed in the Council and no resolution had been made. He might ask him whether, if all territorial matters were excluded, a good arrangement regarding the Scheldt could not be secured. It might be indicated to M. Van Karnebeek that if such a settlement were not arrived at, there was always a chance that the River might be declared international. It was often easier to get useful results in this way than by a more formal method. Holland might be more yielding than if face to face with a formal document.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed and the result of this conversation might furnish a guide for a resolution later on.

M. SONNINO thought that the Dutch might be more frank with the Belgians, especially as they seemed very anxious about their public opinion.

MR. BALFOUR added that it might be better to leave M. Pichon a completely free hand and avoid stating at the outset that the Powers had no thought of taking territory from Holland. In fact, they had no such intention and could not carry it out if they had, but it might be inexpedient to say so categorically.

M. PICHON replied that he had already had a talk with M. Van Karnebeek, who had told him that Holland could not take part in any negotiations touching her sovereignty, or her territory. He could not even submit to his Government any question of this sort, as this would cause an explosion of public feeling. As to bringing about better relations between Holland and Belgium, lie expected good results from direct negotiation. He thought that a solution could be found to all the questions relating to Canals, to connection between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the Scheldt, in fact, to all the questions pending between the two countries. He felt sure that he would be able to satisfy the Belgian Government. That was the ground on which he stood and he would not change it. It was for this reason that M. Pichon thought the proposal for a Commission was a good one. It gave satisfaction to the Dutch Government and might result in satisfaction to Belgium.

MR. LANSING said that he would agree, still with the proviso that 'territory' included rivers just as it included three miles of sea from the coast of any country.

M. SONNINO said that the main object was to allow the two countries to decide all they could with every appearance of freedom. Too close a definition of functions was therefore undesirable.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that 63 kilometres of the navigable course of the Scheldt were in French territory, and the French fluvial ports of Condé and Valenciennes were situated on this course. The Scheldt was therefore an international river.

(After some further discussion, the following formula was adopted:—

> "Having recognised the necessity of revising the Treaties of 1839, the Powers entrust to a Commission comprising a representative of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Holland, the task of studying the measures which must result from this revision and of submitting to them proposals implying neither transfer of territorial sovereignty nor creation of international servitudes.
>
> The Commission will ask Belgium and Holland to present agreed suggestions regarding navigable streams in the spirit of the general principles adopted by the Peace Conference.")

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, June 5th, 1919.

[1] See FM–17, p. 730 [*Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 47*].
[2] On March 8, 1919; see BC–47 (SWC–14), p. 270 [*Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 15*].
[3] Commission on Belgian Affairs: Report to the Supreme Council of the Allies on the Revision of the Treaty of 1839.

June 11, 10 a.m. (FM–23)

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[53] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 11th June, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, June 11, 1919, 10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/23

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FM–23

[Document 53]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 11th June, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, June 11, 1919, 10 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison
BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman
FRANCE
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
Capt. de St. Quentin
M. de Bearn
ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
Secretaries
M. Saburi
M. Kawai

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. C. Day
Dr. C. Seymour
Mr. Johnson
BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Mr. H. Nicolson
Colonel Twiss
Major Temperley
Mr. A. Leeper
Colonel A. M. Henniker
FRANCE
M. J. Cambon
M. A. Tardieu
M. Laroche
M. Aubert
M. Hermitte
ITALY
M. A. Stranieri
Count Vannutelli-Rey
ROUMANIA

ROUMANIA	Dr. Vaida-Voevod
M. Bratiano	M. C. Dimitresco
TCHECHO-SLOVAKIA	M. Constantin Bratiano
M. Kramarcz	TCHECHO-SLOVAKIA
	M. Benes

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia, C. B., M. V. O.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

Boundaries of Hungary: (a) With Roumania 1. M. PICHON said that the reason for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers that morning was fully set forth in the following letter, addressed by the Secretary of the Supreme Council to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference:—

> "In confirmation of my telephone message this evening, I am directed to inform Your Excellency that at a meeting of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers this afternoon, the Military situation on the Roumanian and Czecho-Slovakia borders of Hungary was under consideration. M. Bratiano and M. Misu were present to represent Roumania and M. Kramarcz and Dr. Benes represented Czecho-Slovakia.
>
> A radio telegram from the Government of Bela Kun intimating the readiness of his Government to enter into some arrangement for the cessation of fighting and for the early commencement of Peace negotiations, was also read.
>
> It was agreed that instead of drawing an Armistice line and making temporary arrangements, which are apt to prove unsatisfactory, the best plan would be, as a preliminary step to the cessation of the fighting at the earliest possible moment,

to fix the permanent boundaries between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia and between Hungary and Roumania. As soon as these boundaries have been agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers, it is proposed to notify them to the Hungarian Government and to arrange for the withdrawal behind these frontiers of all the contending forces. Any subsequent violation of these lines will bring about an immediate cessation of the Peace negotiations.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will arrange for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to take place tomorrow morning, Wednesday, June 11th. The object of this meeting is for the Council of Foreign Ministers to communicate to the Delegations of Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia the boundaries they have recommended between Hungary and Roumania and Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. M. Kramarcz and Dr. Benes for Czecho-Slovakia and M. Bratiano and M. Misu for Roumania should be invited to attend this meeting.

I am further to request that a report of the meeting and in particular of the frontiers agreed to may be furnished to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers before 4 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, June 11th."

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the representatives of the Jugo-Slavs had been invited to attend.

M. PICHON replied in the negative. The terms of reference did not relate to Jugo-Slavia. He would call on M. Tardieu to explain to the Roumanian Delegates the decisions reached in regard to the boundaries of Hungary with Roumania.

M. TARDIEU thought that it would be a loss of time to describe in detail the boundaries of Hungary with Roumania as agreed upon by the Council of Four on the recommendation of the Foreign Ministers, and of the Commissions who had studied the question. A draft giving the boundaries in detail had been circulated, (Annex A), and he would also ask the Roumanian Delegates to refer to the map accompanying the report.[1]

M. BRATIANO[2] said that he was not in a position to make any remarks in regard to the boundaries of Roumania, as described in the report, which he had only just seen for the first time. The boundaries, as therein described, differed so materially from those accepted by the Treaty of 1916[3] that it would be impossible for him to take the responsibility of expressing any opinion without first consulting the Roumanian Government and the Roumanian General Staff. His remarks applied more particularly to the Northern and Southern portions of the boundary between Hungary and Roumania, which differed entirely from the frontiers claimed by Roumania. Consequently, he could not take upon himself the responsibility of discussing the question. He wished to lay stress upon the fact that the study of the problem had been carried out by a Commission representing the Principal Allied and Associated Powers[4] without the assistance of Roumanian representatives. As a result, the Roumanian Delegation and the Roumanian Government had been kept in entire ignorance as to the reasons which had guided the Commission in reaching a decision. Under the circumstances, he would press that the minutes of the meetings of the Commission should be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation in order to enable the latter to study the question in conjunction with the Ministers of the Government of Roumania, who would alone be able to accept the responsibility of abandoning the just territorial claims of Roumania.

(At this stage Dr. Kramarcz and Dr. Benes entered the chamber.)

M. TARDIEU expressed the view that the Council of Foreign Ministers would have to decide in regard to the request made by M. Bratiano that he should be supplied with a copy of the proceedings of the Commission on Roumanian Affairs. He, himself, would be prepared to answer any questions on that subject, which M. Bratiano would care to put to him; but he thought M. Bratiano, in making his statement, intended to ask for an adjournment of the meeting.

M. BRATIANO replied that he had not exactly intended to ask for an adjournment: but, in his opinion, it was imperative that he should be supplied with copies of the reports and of the arguments, (as contained in the procès-verbaux), which had caused the Allied and

Associated Powers to take decisions so materially differing from the claims advanced by the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR noted with pleasure that M. Bratiano had no desire that the debate should be adjourned. In arriving at that decision, he, (M. Bratiano), was acting in the public interest. Should the discussion be deferred, great inconvenience would occur, both locally, in connection with military operations, and here in Paris, in connection with the Peace negotiations. Every effort should, therefore, be made to arrive at an agreement with the least possible delay.

He (Mr. Balfour) ventured to think that M. Bratiano could be made sufficiently acquainted with the work done by the Commissions, who had studied the boundaries, to enable him to co-operate in the work now to be concluded.

M. BRATIANO said he was fully convinced of the necessity of avoiding all possible delay in arriving at a decision. The question which had been put to him did not, however, relate to matters of detail, but it involved the relinquishment by Roumania of her just territorial claims. In regard to matters of detail, he would have been perfectly ready to discuss and examine these, and to give a decision. But he could not agree to abandon the claims of Roumania without again putting forward arguments which the Commission had already heard. To avoid a repetition of those arguments, he had been led to ask that he should be supplied with the reasons which had led the Commission to give a verdict against Roumania. In any case, it would be impossible for him to give a decision on questions of such great importance, without first referring the matter to the Government who represented the people of Roumania.

He wished to emphasise the fact that the results of the deliberations of the Commission had only been communicated to him for the first time on that day at 10 o'clock. The Roumanian Delegation could not, therefore, be blamed if a delay occurred in arriving at a decision. Nevertheless, he would be quite prepared to help in every way in endeavouring to clear up the situation; but he could not, under any circumstances, bind his Government on such an important question

as the final acceptance of a frontier, which in no way expressed the aspirations or sentiments of the people concerned. With a desire to facilitate matters, however, on the lines suggested by Mr. Balfour, he would propose that the delimitation of the boundary line between Csap and Nagykaryoli should be left in suspense, a temporary line being laid down, subject to a reconsideration of the whole question at a later date.

MR. LANSING enquired whether, as a matter of fact, M. Bratiano had not had unofficial knowledge of the decisions reached by the Principal Allied and Associated Governments in regard to the question under reference. He quite realised that, rightly or wrongly, the decision had not been officially communicated to him, but he understood that he had seen the Report and the maps relating thereto.

M. BRATIANO replied that he had only received very conflicting reports, which had not enabled him to form any opinion or to reach a decision.

MR. LANSING enquired what kind of conflicting reports had been received by M. Bratiano.

M. BRATIANO said that all sorts of boundary lines had been suggested, some went further, some fell far short of the lines claimed by Roumania. For instance, one report received by him indicated that the boundary of Roumania with Hungary would be situated beyond the Maros. As a matter of fact, the boundary now proposed was the one he had least expected.

He felt compelled, with all due respect, to point out that considering the length of time taken by the Supreme Council to study this question in all its details, extending over a period of some months, it would hardly be consistent to expect the Roumanians, who were the most interested parties, to give a decision off-hand, in the absence of any information regarding the arguments and reasons which had led to the decisions reached. For that reason, he had asked that the reports and the procès-verbal of the Commission should be supplied to him.

DR. KRAMARCZ asked permission to support the proposal made by M. Bratiano in regard to the boundary line between Csap and Nagykaryoli. He too, would ask that, the final delimitation of that portion of the boundary should, for the present, be left in abeyance. He would point out that the future economic prosperity of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania depended on the decision taken in regard to the inclusion or exclusion of railway lines.

M. PICHON thought that M. Bratiano had raised a question of principle, which had already been decided by the Supreme Council. In the first place, M. Bratiano had asked to be given certain explanations. He thought M. Bratiano's request should be complied with, and the President of the Commission would be prepared to give all necessary information. M. Bratiano had, however, also asked to be supplied with the procès-verbal of the Commission in question. Such documents had never been supplied to anyone, for they had always been regarded as strictly confidential. He thought that M. Bratiano could only claim to be supplied with the reasons which had led to the decisions given, but he could not expect to have copies of all the remarks which might have been made.

M. BRATIANO said that he only wanted copies of the reasons which had led to the decisions taken.

M. PICHON, continuing, said that he wished also to draw attention to the urgent necessity for taking immediate action, owing to the fact that hostilities were actually taking place in Hungary. In this connection, he would invite attention to the following telegram which had just been received from General Pellé[5] at Buda-Pesth:—

> "1. I have received by telegram the text of Bela Kuhn's reply to the ultimatum of the Great Powers.
> 2. In my telegrams Nos. 258 and 259 of this date I communicated to you the position of the fronts.
> 3. It appears that at all points, except in Ruthenian territory, the Magyar troops are north of the line fixed on 13th November.[6]
> 4. In view of the impossibility of separating the adversaries' lines, the present situation cannot continue even for a short

period of time. As a result, serious incidents would be sure to occur, followed by the renewal of hostilities. It is therefore imperative to insist on the immediate withdrawal of the Magyars from the contested territory, in order to prevent acts of violence and reprisals against the non-Magyar population, and the spread of Bolshevik propaganda. Finally, it is necessary to prevent the Magyars from utilising the period set aside for negotiations, in order to prepare to renew their offensive against Komorn or Presbourg, regarding which, reports have already been submitted.

5. I urge therefore, to ensure military security, that the Hungarian troops be ordered to withdraw to a line to run to the south of the following places:—Tiszaiuez, Miskolcz and Waitzen, then parallel to the Danube at a distance of 25 kilometres to the south of the river, as far as the Austrian frontier."

In view of General Pellé's statement, he thought that a decision should be taken at once, and that an adjournment would not be permissible.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that M. Bratiano's request for an opportunity to examine the report, which had only been supplied to him that morning, could hardly be ignored. M. Bratiano's demands appeared to him to be absolutely justified. At the same time, M. Bratiano must realise the urgent necessity for speed in finally determining the boundaries between Hungary and Roumania, because the only thing which would stop the continual hostilities and unrest in those regions would be the definite fixation of the frontier lines. He wished to enquire how long M. Bratiano would require in order to place himself in a position to fix the boundaries of Roumania with Hungary.

M. BRATIANO replied that it would be necessary for him to be given sufficient time to allow a messenger to proceed to Bucharest, where he would get into touch with the Roumanian Government, who would require two or three days to examine the question. The messenger would then return to Paris. Should this suggestion be

accepted, he would at once warn the Roumanian Government at Bucharest in order that a decision might be taken within three days after the arrival of the messenger.

He wished to return, however, to his original proposal, namely, that a temporary boundary should be fixed in the northern and southern sectors of the frontier between Hungary and Roumania, that is to say, between Csap and Nagykaryoli, and between Nagyvarad and Szeged. The fixing of a temporary line of demarcation would, *ipso facto*, put a stop to hostilities.

In conclusion, he would be pleased to give his views in regard to the question of relations with the present Hungarian Government; but he thought such political questions lay outside the present reference.

MR. LANSING thought that M. Bratiano should realise that the Supreme Council had already examined the question of the boundaries of Hungary with Roumania, and that a final decision had been reached. Should Roumania therefore wish to have the question re-opened, it would be for her to convince the Heads of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments as to the necessity for doing so.

M. BRATIANO replied that he would be quite ready to state his case. He would never refuse to give reasons to show why the line proposed by the Supreme Council ran counter to the interests of Roumania.

MR. BALFOUR said he wished to put a question to the Chairman on a point of order. He took blame to himself for not having carefully read the official letter conveying the views of the Supreme Council. He would, however, call attention to the following paragraph:—

> "I am directed to request that Your Excellency will arrange for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to take place tomorrow morning, Wednesday, June 11th. The object of this meeting is for the Council of Foreign Ministers to communicate to the Delegations of Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia the boundaries they have recommended between Hungary and Roumania and Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. M. Kramarcz and Dr. Benes for

> Czecho-Slovakia, and M. Bratiano and Mr. Misu for Roumania should be invited to attend this meeting."

There was nothing said in that paragraph which would justify a discussion in regard to the boundaries between Roumania and Hungary. The instructions issued to the Foreign Ministers were to the effect that they should communicate to the Delegations of Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia the boundaries between Hungary and Roumania, and Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, which had been agreed to first, by the Commissions, secondly by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and thirdly by the Supreme Council. If he correctly interpreted the wishes of the Supreme Council, as set forth in the excerpt which he had just read, he thought the Foreign Ministers were not required to go over ground which had already been traversed, or to subject to revision the decisions already taken by the Supreme Council.

MR. LANSING invited attention to the concluding paragraph of the letter of the Supreme Council just quoted, which read as follows:

> "I am therefore to request that a report of the Meeting, and in particular, of the frontiers agreed to, may be furnished to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers before 4 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, June 11th."

He thought that the sentence might be interpreted to mean that the Foreign Ministers should also report in regard to the frontiers not agreed to. In other words, a report should be submitted to the Supreme Council, showing what portions of frontiers were accepted and what portions of frontiers were rejected by Roumania.

M. BRATIANO said that he would be quite prepared to make a full statement setting forth the Roumanian frontier claims, but he would refuse either to accept definitely or to reject definitely the boundary lines proposed.

M. PICHON thought that the statement made by Mr. Balfour complemented by Mr. Lansing's remarks, set forth the case with great accuracy. In other words, he thought the Foreign Ministers

should ask the Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak Delegates, there present, whether they accepted the proposed boundaries of Hungary with Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia, or not. The replies of the Delegates would then be transmitted to the Supreme Council for information. On the other hand, he felt that it was not part of the duty of the Foreign Ministers to enter into a discussion as to the reasons for the decisions given.

MR. LANSING interpreted M. Pichon's statement to mean that should M. Bratiano be unable to agree to accept the boundaries proposed, a report to that effect would be submitted to the Supreme Council.

M. BRATIANO said that under those circumstances he could only refer the Council of Foreign Ministers to the remarks which he had made at the commencement of the meeting.

M. PICHON enquired whether M. Bratiano's remarks applied to the whole of the boundaries of Roumania with Hungary, or whether he would be prepared to accept certain portions of the boundaries in question.

M. BRATIANO replied that he was desirous of uniting with his colleagues in arriving at a settlement, but he failed to see how any decision could be reached without a reconsideration of certain of the boundaries proposed. In this connection he wished to invite particular attention to the stretch of railway line running from Nagykaroly to Nagyvarad and onwards. This railway line constituted the great artery of communication with all the northern countries, with the Adriatic, and with the mountain regions of Transylvania. The railway line was, therefore, of the greatest importance to Roumania from an economic point of view; but the question which he wished to raise was not only one of principle, but also one of security, since the railway line in question lay in an open country within rifle-shot distance of the proposed frontier.

M. PICHON thought that the statement made by M. Bratiano again raised the question of frontiers, which it had been decided lay outside the scope of their instructions. M. Bratiano had asked for

time to consult his Government. He thought that was the only reply which could be given to the Supreme Council.

M. BRATIANO thought that if his proposal to lay down two temporary lines of demarcation, in the north between Csap and Nagykaroly, and in the south between Nagyvarad and Szeged, were adopted, a speedy solution of the difficulty would be reached. On the other hand, if his proposal could not find acceptance, he would feel compelled to reserve his decision in regard to the whole of the frontier.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the points made by M. Bratiano had all been presented to the Commission, which had reached a unanimous decision. Under these conditions, he thought no useful purpose would be served by hearing those arguments repeated.

M. PICHON thought that under the circumstances the best plan would be to submit to the Supreme Council a report to the effect that the Foreign Ministers had communicated to the Roumanian Delegation the proposed boundaries between Hungary and Roumania and that M. Bratiano had replied that a delay of some days would be required in order to enable him to consult his Government in Budapest.

M. BRATIANO said that a period of ten to twelve days would be required in order to enable him to communicate with his Government.

M. PICHON thought that so long a delay might lead to serious inconveniences.

MR. LANSING enquired whether M. Bratiano, himself, as head of the Roumanian Government, intended to proceed to Bucharest.

M. BRATIANO replied that he would either go himself or send one of his colleagues, who was fully acquainted with the facts of the case.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the course to be followed was quite clear. The Council of Foreign Ministers should report to the Supreme Council that the boundaries recommended between Hungary and Roumania had been communicated to the Roumanian Delegation. M. Bratiano had expressed his inability to accept the frontiers

proposed or to discuss the same without first consulting his Government, for which purpose a period of ten to twelve days would be required. In his opinion nothing more was required; the report would show the communication made to M. Bratiano and his reply.

(b) Hungary With Czecho-Slovakia M. KRAMARCZ said that in principle, the Czecho-Slovak Government accepted the proposed boundaries of Hungary with Czecho-Slovakia (Annex B). There were, however, two slight concessions which he would ask the Council to make. The first request was in itself intrinsically small, but it involved questions of the utmost importance to the future economic welfare and development of a State, since it was proposed to exclude a vital line of communication from the territory to be allotted to Czecho-Slovakia. He alluded to the railway line running between Losoncz and Csata, through the railway junction of Ipolyska. It would be seen that the two extremities of this railway line, namely Losoncz to Kalonda and Csata to a point west of Kalonda, were situated within Czecho-Slovakia, but the remainder of the line would, if the proposals of the Supreme Council were accepted, run immediately south, (within two or three kilometres), of the proposed boundary line. It was true that the Commission on Ports, Railways and Waterways had recommended the free use of this railway line by Czecho-Slovakia, subject to agreement with Hungary; but a rather precarious situation would thereby be created. On the other hand, slight alterations in the frontier, which from a national point of view would not in any way be prejudicial to the Magyars, would forthwith remedy the inconveniences and disabilities complained of. In this connection he wished particularly to invite attention to the fact that Ipolyska, the railway junction between the line in question and the Korpona line, which served the whole of the country to the north, would remain in the hands of the Magyars. It would be seen that the question was one of capital importance to Czecho-Slovakia, whilst the Magyars possessed other good alternative lines of communication. He trusted, therefore, that the Council of Foreign Ministers would make a favourable recommendation in regard to this bit of frontier line to the Supreme Council.

A second minor point, though one of great local importance to the Czecho-Slovaks, related to a small strip of territory situated on the

Southern bank of the Danube over against Pressburg, known as Edor. The land itself was actually owned by the town of Pressburg; but its occupation by the Magyars had enabled some of the more turbulent elements of that race to fire across Czecho-Slovak territory, and so to cause Government House to be evacuated. He begged, therefore, that this small strip of territory, a question of a few acres, might be included within the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. LANSING thought the case put forward by Dr. Kramarcz was similar to that which had been submitted by the Roumanian delegates.

DR. KRAMARCZ explained that at the Plenary Conference held on the 31st May, 1919, the Czecho-Slovak delegation had asked for certain slight modifications to be made in the boundaries proposed, in order to include the railway station of Gmünd in Czecho-Slovakia. The matter had been referred to the Committee on Czecho-Slovakian affairs who had acceded to the Czecho-Slovak request.

M. PICHON thought that the Council of Foreign Ministers should transmit to the Supreme Council the views expressed by Dr. Kramarcz.

DR. BENES wished to emphasise the fact that the loss of the railway junction of Ipolyska, deprived the Czecho-Slovaks of the use of an important means of communication with a large tract of otherwise inaccessible country. He trusted the Foreign Ministers would favourably recommend the request just made by the Czecho-Slovak delegation.

(The Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak delegations then withdrew.)

M. PICHON drew attention to the fifth paragraph of General Pellé's telegram recommending that a temporary line of demarcation passing south of Tiszalucz, Miskolcz and Waitzen should be laid down.

MR. LANSING said that, in view of the fact that the Czecho-Slovaks had practically accepted the line proposed by the Supreme Council,

his personal view was that a permanent frontier line should be accepted in preference to the line suggested by General Pellé. He thought the demarcation of a temporary line would only irritate the Hungarians; it would justify the occupation of a large section of Hungarian territory by the Czecho-Slovaks; and thus create future difficulties.

MR. BALFOUR said that by way of supplementing Mr. Lansing's remarks, he would enquire whether it was not the deliberate policy of the Supreme Council to take the permanent boundary line and not the temporary Armistice line.

MR. LANSING thought that in submitting the question to the Supreme Council, the Foreign Ministers should definitely state that they recommended the immediate acceptance of the permanent boundary line.

MR. BALFOUR felt confident that was the correct thing to do from a political point of view. He knew nothing, however, in regard to the military aspect of the case.

M. SONNINO agreed. He thought that military considerations must have been given full weight when the permanent line was fixed. In any case he felt that the acceptance of the permanent line had the advantage that it removed the impression that anything would later on be taken away.

M. TARDIEU said that General Pellé at the time of sending his telegram, had not been informed of the decision of the Supreme Council that the definite boundary line should be accepted. In his opinion, it would be inadvisable at the present moment to lay down anything but the permanent line, which was the one which had that day been communicated to the Czecho-Slovak Delegation.

(It was agreed to send the following report to the Supreme Council, and to ask M. Cambon and M. Tardieu to hold themselves in readiness to attend the meeting of the Council in order to give supplementary explanations if so required:—

In accordance with instructions given by the Council of the Heads of Governments, the Council of Foreign Ministers have called before them the representatives of Roumania and of the Czecho-Slovak State on June 11th, at 10 a.m.

1. The Council have communicated to Mr. Bratiano and Mr. Vaida-Voevod the boundaries between Roumania and Hungary which have been agreed on by the Supreme Council of the Allies.

Mr. Bratiano remarked that the line was for the first time brought to his notice. He declared that under those conditions he could not assume the responsibility of stating his opinion without consulting the Royal Government. He asked that he might be allowed to postpone his final answer for ten or twelve days, this delay being necessary for a messenger to go to Bucharest and return.

2. The Council communicated to Mr. Kramarcz and Mr. Benes the boundaries between the Czecho-Slovak State and Hungary which had been agreed on by the Supreme Council of the Allies.

Mr. Kramarcz declared that the Czecho-Slovak delegation accepted on the whole those decisions, but he requested that the kind attention of the Supreme Council might be called to two alterations, which in his opinion both involved but a slight change in the frontier; the first of which being of primary importance for the Czecho-Slovak State.

A—The present frontier assigns to the Czecho-Slovak State both ends, and to Hungary the Central portion of the railroad Czata-Kalonda-Losoncz, which ensures direct communication from west to east to southern Slovakia.

Thus the frontier leaves in Hungarian territory the junction of this line with the Korpona branch-line which is almost entirely included in the Czecho-Slovak territory.

The Czecho-Slovak delegation pointed out that in spite of the international guarantees which might be given with regard to the working of the said line, the vital economic interests of southern Slovakia and more especially of the Korpona district might be subject to suffer from the unamicable feelings of the Hungarian authorities.

Therefore they requested that the frontier might be shifted a few kilometers to the south so as to include in the Czecho-Slovak territory the whole of the Csata-Kalonda-Losoncz railroad.

B—The Czecho-Slovak delegation requested that a portion of territory on the southern bank of the Danube opposite Pressburg might be assigned to the Czecho-Slovak State, so as to remedy the inconvenience which would result from the close proximity of the town to the frontier line.

3. The Council of the Foreign Ministers have examined the telegram sent to the Ministère de la Guerre by General Pellé, suggesting that the Hungarian troops should be withdrawn to a line to be subsequently determined south of the localities of Tisza-Lucz, Miskolcz, Vacz, thence to the West of this latter town and as far as the Austrian frontier, to a line running 25 kilometers south of the Danube.

The Council of the Foreign Ministers agreed that it would be undesirable from a political standpoint to fix a military line of demarcation divergent from the frontier laid down by the Supreme Council and accepted by the Czecho-Slovak delegation.

They were of opinion that the Supreme Council only was in a position to decide on the military considerations which might support the solution suggested by General Pellé.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, June 11th, 1919.

Appendix A to IC–194 [FM–23]

Boundaries of Hungary

With Roumania:—

From the point common to the three boundaries of Hungary, Roumania and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, east-north-eastwards to a point to be selected on the Maros about 3½ kilometres upstream from the railway bridge between Mako and Szeged:—

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence south-eastwards, and then north-eastwards to a point to be selected about 1 kilometre south of Nagylak station:—

the course of the river Maros upstream;

thence north-eastwards to the salient of the administrative boundary between the *comitats* of Csanad and Arad north-north-west of Nemet-Pereg:—

a line to be fixed on the ground passing between Nagylak and the railway station;

thence east-north-eastwards to a point to be selected on the ground between Battonya and Tornya:—

this administrative boundary, passing north of Nemet-Pereg and Kis-Pereg;

thence to point 123 (about 1.2 kilometres east of Magosliget), the point common to the three boundaries of Hungary, Roumania and the Czecho-Slovak State (Ruthenian territory):—

a line to be fixed on the ground passing west of Nagy-Varjas, Kis-Varjas and Forray-N-Iratos, east of Dombegyhaza, Kevermes and Elek, west of Ottlaka, Nagy-Pel, Gyula-Varsaud, Ant and Illye, east of Gyula-Vari and Kotegyan, cutting the Nagy-Szalonta-Gyula railway about 12 kilometres from Nagy-Szalonta and between the two

bifurcations formed by the crossing of this line and the Szeghalom-Erdogyarak railway; passing east of Mehkerek west of Nagy-Szalonta and Marczihaza east of Geszt west of Atyas, Olah-Szt-Mikles and Rojt, east of Ugra and Harsany, east of Körösszeg and Körös-Tarjan, east of Szakal and Berek-Böszormeny, west of Bors, east of Artand, west of Nagy-Szanto, east of Nagy-Kereki, west of Pelbarthida and Bihar-Dioszeg, east of Kis-Marja, west of Csokaly, east of Nagy-Leta and Almosd, west of Er-Selind, east of Bagamer, west of Er-Kenez and Er-Mihalyfalva, east of Szt-Gyorgy-Abrany and Peneszlek, west of Szaniszlo, Bere-Csomaköz, Feny, Csanalos, Borvely and Domahida east of Valla j, west of Csenger-Bagos and Ovary, east of Csenger-Ujfalu, west of Dara, east of Csenger and Komlod-Totfalu, west of Pete, east of Nagy-Gecz, west of Szaraz-Berek, east of Mehtelek, Garbolcz and Nagy-Hodos, west of Fertos-Almas, east of Kis-Hodos, west of Nagy-Palad, east of Kis-Palad and Magosliget.

Appendix B to IC–194 [FM–23]

Boundaries of Hungary

With Czecho-Slovakia:—

From point 123 described above north-westwards to the Batar about ½ kilometre east of Magosliget:—

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the course of this river downstream, thence the Tisza downstream to a point to be fixed on it below Badalo and near this village;

thence north-north-westwards to a point to be fixed on the ground immediately north-east of Darocz:—

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving in Ruthenian territory Badalo, Csoma, Macsola, Asztely and Deda, and in Hungarian territory Bereg-Surany and Darocz;

thence north-Westwards to the confluence of the Fekete-Viz and the Cszaronda:—

a line to be fixed on the ground passing by point 179, leaving in Ruthenian territory Darui Tn., Mezö Kaszony, Lonyay Tn., Degenfeld Tn., Hetyen, Horvathi Tn., Komjathy Tn., and in Hungarian territory Kerek Gorond Tn., Berki Tn., and Barabas;

thence the Csaronda downstream to a point to be fixed in its course above the administrative boundary between the *Comitats* of Szabolcs and Bereg;

from this point westwards to the Tisza where it is cut by the above mentioned boundary coming from the right bank:—

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the Tisza downstream to the point, about 2 kilometres east-south-east of Csap, where it is cut by the administrative boundary between the *Comitats* of Ung and Szabolcs;

thence the Tisza downstream to a point to be fixed on the ground east-south-east of Tarkany;

thence approximately westwards to a point in the Ronyva about 3.7 kilometres north of the bridge between the town and the station of Satoralja-Ujhely:—

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving to Czecho-Slovakia, Tarkany, Perbenyik, Orös, Kis-Kövesd, Bodrog-Szerdahely, Bodrog-Szog, and Borsi, and to Hungary Damoc, Laca, Rozvagy, Pacin, Karos, Felsö-Berecki, crossing the Bodrog and cutting the railway triangle south-east of Satoralja-Ujhely, passing east of this town so as to leave the Kassa-Csap railway entirely in Czecho-Slovak territory;

thence upstream to point 125 about ½ kilometres south of Alsomihalyi:—

the course of the Ronyva;

thence north-westwards to a point on the Hernad opposite point 167 on the right bank south-west of Abaujnadasd:—

a line to be fixed on the ground following approximately the watershed between the Ronyva on the east and the Bozsva on the west, but passing about 2 kilometres east of Pusztafalu, turning south-westwards at point 896, cutting at point 424 the Kassa-Satoralja road and passing south of Abaujnadasd;

thence downstream to a point to be fixed on the ground about 1½ kilometres south-west of Abaujvar:—

the course of the Hernad;

thence westwards to point 330 about 1½ kilometres south-south-west of Pereny:—

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving to Czecho-Slovakia the villages of Miglecznemeti and Pereny and to Hungary the village of Tornyosnemeti;

thence westwards to point 291 about 3£ kilometres south-east of Janok:—

the watershed between the Bodva on the north and the Rakacza on the south, leaving in Hungarian territory, however, the road on the crest south-east of Buzita;

thence west-north-westwards to point 431 about 3 kilometres southwest of Torna:—

a line to be fixed on the ground leaving to Czecho-Slovakia Janok, Tornahorvati and Bodvavedegi; and to Hungary, Tornaszenuakab and Hidvegardo;

thence south-westwards to point 365 about 12 kilometres south-south-east of Pelsöcz:—

a line to be fixed on the ground passing by points 601, 381 (on the Rozsnyo-Edeleny road), 557 and 502;

thence south-south-westwards to point 305 about 7 kilometres north-west of Putnok:—

The watershed between the Sajo on the west and the Szuha and Kelemeri on the east;

thence south-south-westwards to point 278 south of the confluent of the Sajo and Rima:—

a line to be fixed on the ground, leaving Banreve station to Hungary while permitting, if required the construction in Czecho-Slovak territory of a connection between the Pelsöcz and Losoncz railway lines;

thence south-westwards to point 485 about 10 kilometres east-north-east of Salgo-Tarjan:—

a line to be fixed in the ground following approximately the watershed of the Rima to the north and the Hangony and Tarna rivers to the south;

thence west-north-westwards to point 727:—

a line to be fixed in the ground leaving to Hungary the villages and mines of Salgo and Zagyva-Rona, and passing immediately south of Somos-Ujfalu station;

thence north-westwards to point 391 about 7 kilometres east of Litke:—

a line following approximately the crest bounding on the north-east the basin of the Dobroda and passing through point 446;

thence to a point to be fixed on the Eipel about 1½ kilometres north-east of Tarnocz:—

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through point 312 and between Tarnocz and Kalonda;

thence downstream to its confluence with the Danube:—

the course of the Eipel:

thence upstream to a point to be chosen about 4 kilometres west of Pressburg, which is the point common to the three frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Austria:—

the principal channel of navigation of the Danube.

[1] Map not filed with the minutes.

[2] An alternate version of the proceedings from this point on, differing in some respects from that given here, is to be found filed with the minutes and is printed *post*, p. 818 [*Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 54*].

[3] Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

[4] The Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs.

[5] French general appointed February 17, 1919, as chief of the general staff of the Czecho-Slovak forces.

[6] See the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade November 13, 1918, vol. II, p. 183.

June 11, 10 a.m. (American version) [FM–23]

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[54] Secretary's Notes on Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Office at Quai d'Orsay at 10 a.m., June 11th, 1919

Paris, June 11, 1919, 10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/23

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/23

[FM–23]

[Document 54]

Secretary's Notes on Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Office at Quai d'Orsay at 10 a.m., June 11th, 1919[1]

Paris, June 11, 1919, 10 a.m.

I

BOUNDARIES OF HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA (MAP, INCLOSURE 1,[2] AND DESCRIPTION OF THE BOUNDARY, INCLOSURE 2,[3] RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AFFAIRS, WERE DISTRIBUTED)

MR. BRATIANO stated that he was unable to report the attitude of the Roumanian Government in regard to the frontier shown on the map, since it had only just been communicated to him at 10 a.m. and departed so far from the frontier claimed by Roumania and approved in the Treaty of 1916 and since these departures involved questions of vital importance to Roumania and required consideration by the Roumanian military experts as well as by the Roumanian Government. (During the discussion it was developed that the reference to the Roumanian Government would require time necessary for Mr. Bratiano or some other member of the Roumanian Delegation to go to Bucharest, discuss the matter there with the members of the Government, and return. This period Mr. Bratiano estimated at not less than ten to twelve days). He drew special attention to the fact that Roumania had been deprived in the north of the territory including the railroad from Csap to Nagykaroly and in the south of the territory including the railroad from Szeged to Bekescaba, and, finally, to the fact that, while the frontier was so placed as to include in Roumania the railroad from Nagykaroly to

Nagyvarad, it was so close to the said railroad as to leave it within artillery fire of the enemy, in open level country.

The Foreign Ministers after a short discussion decided that a reopening of the question of the proper frontier between Roumania and Hungary was not included within the terms of reference and that, having informed the Roumanian Delegation of the frontier proposed and approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers they could only report back the reply made by the Roumanian Delegation. Mr. Lansing inquired of Mr. Bratiano whether, although not officially informed of the boundary recommended by the Commission, he had not actually been cognizant for some time of what it was likely to be. Mr. Bratiano said that he had received information informally as to various lines which might be recommended, but that the reports were conflicting and that the line actually adopted was one which had seemed most unlikely to him. He said that he was not prepared, on his own responsibility, to express the attitude of the Roumanian Government on this subject, all-important to his country.

II

BOUNDARY OF HUNGARY AND CZECHO-SLOVAKIA (MAP, INCLOSURE 1,[4] AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FRONTIER RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION ON CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, INCLOSURE 3,[5] WERE DISTRIBUTED)

MR. KRAMARCZ stated that the frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia was acceptable in principle as proposed. However, he wished to call attention to the necessity, in order to preserve the economic life of the province of Slovakia, that the IPO railroad line should remain in the new state of Czecho-Slovakia throughout its entire length. One-third of this line, including the two extremities, was now left within Czecho-Slovakia; while two-thirds were left in Hungary. Mr. BENES invited attention to the fact that by depriving Czecho-Slovakia of the central portion the connection with the railroad to Korpona was left in enemy territory which would deprive a large territory inaccessible from the rear on account of the mountains, from any railroad communication. Mr. KRAMARCZ continued to the effect that only a small strip of territory of five or

ten kilometers width, inhabited by a few thousand Magyars, was involved. It was not desired to include any more Magyars than was absolutely necessary in the Czecho-Slovak State but the free possession of this railroad was a matter of incalculable importance to the economic life of the new state. There was another slight change desired at Presbourg (Pozsony) giving to Czecho-Slovakia a "tete-de-pont" on the right (south) bank of the Danube. With the boundary as proposed, Hungarian riflemen could shoot into the city and they had actually amused themselves doing this so that it was necessary for one of the Ministers to move out of the building in which he was working and into the court-yard and carry on his business there, in order to be out of rifle range. He called attention to the fact that these were slight changes in the nature of the one requested in regard to the frontier with Austria, which had been considered by the Commission and approved at the last moment and finally had received the approval of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The Foreign Ministers decided that here, as in the case of Roumania, it was not for them to reopen the question of the proper boundary but merely to report the attitude of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation.

III

LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN HUNGARY AND CZECHO-SLOVAKIA RECOMMENDED BY GEN. PELLÉ

M. Pichon read a telegram from General Pellé referred to him that morning, containing a recommendation that, in order to interrupt the aggressive action taken by the Hungarians against the Czecho-Slovaks, they be required to stop at, or withdraw to, a line running from Tisza-Lucz through Miskolcz and thence in a westerly direction to the Danube and along the south bank of the latter.

MR. LANSING suggested that as the boundary line proposed between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary was acceptable in principle to the Czecho-Slovak Delegation and would probably be the permanent line, he was opposed to the establishment at the present time of another temporary line which would justify the Czecho-Slovaks in

invading a large portion of Hungarian territory and would be likely to become a source of further trouble in Hungary. MR. BALFOUR supported this opinion with the remark that if permanent lines could be established they should be made the basis of action as soon as possible and that he had no doubt that the course of action proposed by Mr. Lansing was the proper one from the political standpoint; whether there were any military objections to it, he was not informed.

Mr. Lansing's opinion was concurred in by the other two Foreign Ministers.

[1] This alternate version of the minutes printed on p. 804 [*Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 53*] was apparently made by the American member of the Joint Secretariat, Col. U. S. Grant.

[2] Map not filed with the minutes.

[3] For description, see appendix A attached to the first version of the minutes, p. 814 [*Pg. 814 is part of Doc. 53*].

[4] Map not filed with the minutes.

[5] For description, see appendix B attached to first version of the minutes, p. 815 [*Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 53*].

June 12, 10 a.m. (FM–24)

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[55] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 12th June, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, June 12, 1919, 10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/24

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/24

FM–24

[Document 55]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 12th June, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, June 12, 1919, 10 a.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. C. Day
Secretary	Dr. C. Seymour
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. A. W. Dulles
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K. G.	Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary	Hon. H. Nicolson
Mr. H. Norman	Colonel Twiss
France	Mr. A. Leeper
M. Pichon	Major Temperley
Secretaries	Colonel A. M. Henniker
Capt. de St. Quentin	France
M. de Bearn	M. J. Cambon
Italy	M. A. Tardieu
H. E. Baron Sonnino	M. Laroche
Secretary	M. Hermitte
M. Bertele	M. Aubert
Japan	Italy
M. Matsui	M. A. Stranieri

Secretary Count Vannutelli-Rey
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Col. U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

Boundaries of Hungary With Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia: (a) Communication of Boundaries to the Representatives of Roumania M. Pichon said that in a letter dated 11th June, 1919, the Supreme Council had referred certain definite questions to the Foreign Ministers, having reference to the meeting held yesterday. (I. C. 194).[1] The first question was drawn up in the following terms:—

> "First, they think that some enquiry should be made as to why the frontiers between Roumania and Hungary, which were approved at a Meeting of the Council of Ten on May 12th, were never communicated to the representatives of Roumania, or presumably the other States concerned."

M. Pichon, continuing, said the answer to that question would be that the precedent applicable to all similar cases had been followed in regard to Roumania. For instance, the boundaries of Austria had been communicated to the parties concerned only on the day preceding the presentation of the Peace Treaty to Austria. The Council of Foreign Ministers had, therefore, been justified in supposing that the same procedure would, under normal conditions, have been followed in the case of Hungary.

Mr. Lansing thought that the Foreign Ministers should go further and point out that even in the case of Germany, the frontiers fixed

had not been communicated in advance to any of the parties concerned, except Belgium. Furthermore, the communication to the Belgian Government had been made by the Council of Four and not by the Foreign Ministers. It would appear, therefore, that the practice had become well established that the frontiers approved by the Supreme Council should not be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under instructions from the Council of Four.

M. TARDIEU asked the Council to consider what procedure would have been followed, in the ordinary course of events, in regard to the communication of the boundaries of Hungary, had not the present military operations occurred, which had made it desirable as an exceptional measure for some definite boundaries to be fixed. It was evident that the Hungarian Delegation would have been summoned to Paris, and the day before their arrival, the territorial clauses of the Treaty would have been communicated to the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers at a Plenary secret meeting. Consequently, the question of principle had not in any way been altered, and it was only for special reasons that the Foreign Ministers had been instructed on this occasion to communicate the boundaries of Hungary with Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania to the Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian Delegates.

(At this stage, Lord Hardinge entered, and M. Pichon gave a summary of the statements recorded above.)

M. SONNINO said that in the reply to the Supreme Council, a rider should be added to the effect that in future, as soon as definite decisions were reached in regard to frontiers, these should forthwith be communicated to the parties concerned.

LORD HARDINGE doubted whether it would always be advisable forthwith to communicate the decisions taken in regard to frontiers—for instance, in certain cases only one part of the frontiers might have been fixed whilst other parts still remained undetermined. He had in mind the case of Roumania, where the boundaries of Bessarabia and Dobruja still remained unsettled. The same remark would probably also apply to Greece, when those frontiers came under discussion.

MR. LANSING accepted M. Sonnino's recommendation that agreed frontiers should be communicated to the parties concerned with as little delay as possible. He thought, however, that the Council of Four should be responsible for determining the opportune moment for communicating the same to the interested parties, thus avoiding the danger of producing complications such as Lord Hardinge had contemplated.

LORD HARDINGE expressed the view that Mr. Lansing's suggestions would cover the cases quoted by him.

(It was agreed to inform the Supreme Council that the established practice, heretofore approved by that Council, had been followed in the case of Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia, namely, that the boundaries of States should not, as a rule, be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under special instructions from the Supreme Council.

The Foreign Ministers also expressed the opinion that, in future, the boundaries of States should be communicated to the parties concerned, as soon as possible after a decision had been reached, on instructions to be issued by the Supreme Council.)

M. PICHON said that the second question read as follows:—

> (b) Frontiers with Roumania: Views of M. Bratiano "The Council would also like to be informed as to whether M. Bratiano gave any indication as to whether the proposed frontiers were acceptable or not, and whether of he offered any criticism on the subject."

M. Pichon, continuing, said that M. Bratiano had raised certain objections. In the first place, he had definitely stated his inability to accept two portions of the proposed boundary line, namely, the portion between Csap and Nagykaroli and the portion between Nagyvarad and Szeged.

M. TARDIEU said that M. Bratiano had asked that the two bits of railway line in question should be included in Roumania. In addition

to that, however, he had also invoked strategic reasons in support of his contention that the whole of the boundary line between Nagykaroli and Nagyvarad and onwards would be unacceptable, as it ran within two or three kilometres of an important railway line, As a result, he understood M. Bratiano to dispute the whole of the boundary line. M. Bratiano, on behalf of the Roumanian Government, had not definitely rejected the boundaries proposed, but he had asked to refer the whole question to Bucharest for examination and report.

MR. LANSING accepted the statement made by M. Tardieu. He thought, however, that the Foreign Ministers should, in addition, express an opinion to the effect that the boundaries proposed should be accepted without alteration.

(It was agreed to inform the Supreme Council, in regard to the boundaries of Hungary with Roumania, that M. Bratiano had expressed his inability to accept the frontiers proposed, or to discuss the same without first consulting his Government, for which purpose a period of 10 to 12 days would be required.

Further, the Foreign Ministers expressed the opinion that the boundaries, as approved by the Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should be adhered to without alteration.)

(c) Frontiers With Czecho-Slovakia: Alterations Proposed by Dr. Kramarcz M. PICHON said that the third question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Council of Four had reference to the alterations in the frontiers of Hungary with Czecho-Slovakia, namely:—

> "The Council would be glad to receive, as early as possible, the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers as to the alterations in the frontier asked for by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation."

M. CAMBON said that the Czecho-Slovaks had, in principle accepted the proposed boundaries of Hungary with Czecho-Slovakia. Dr.

Kramarcz had, however, asked for two slight modifications to be made.

The first modification related to a small strip of territory situated on the southern bank of the Danube, over against Pressbourg. The area in question, known as Edor, constituted a suburb of Pressbourg and the Magyars had been firing from there across the Danube into Pressbourg. The Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs were, however, unanimously agreed that the Danube formed an excellent boundary and that no reasons existed for any alterations to be made to the boundary proposed.

(It was agreed that no alterations should be made in the proposed boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia in the region of Pressbourg.)

M. CAMBON continuing said that the second request made by the Czecho-Slovakia Delegation related to the railway line running between Kalonda and Komoron, which, in accordance with the decision reached by the Commission would remain in the hands of the Hungarians including the railway junction Ipolysk. Should the demands of the Czecho-Slovak Delegates be accorded, a large number of Magyars would have to be included in Czecho-Slovakia. On the other hand the railway line running from Ipolysk to Korpona served an important stretch of Czecho-Slovak territory which was practically inaccessible except from the South, and the fact that the Junction of this railway line (Ipolysk) had been allotted to Hungary, would undoubtedly cause very grave inconveniences to the Czecho-Slovaks.

Under these conditions he would, as President of the Commission, strongly recommend that the proposed boundary line in the immediate vicinity of Ipolysk be slightly altered in order to place the railway junction inside the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia.

BARON SONNINO understood that the boundary line accepted by the Commission had been the result of a compromise.

M. CAMBON agreed. He said that for that very reason the Commission had recommended that the boundary between Kalonda and Csad as a

whole should not be altered. He had merely suggested that a very slight modification should be made at the Railway junction, such a modification being really essential in order to obtain full use of the Korpona railway line which merely served Czecho-Slovak territory. No material alteration in the agreed boundary line was intended.

BARON SONNINO understood M. Cambon's proposals to be that a small corner of territory round the railway junction of Ipolysk should be transferred to Czecho-Slovakia. In this connection he invited attention to the following recommendation of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak affairs:—

> "The railway which follows the valley of the Eipel (Ipoly) between Losoncz and Csata, as well as the junctions of this line with the lines situated to the north and south, shall be administered under the ultimate supervision of the Allied and Associated Governments in such a manner as to assure to the neighbouring interested States the free use of these lines during the period required for the construction in Tchecho-Slovak territory of the sections linking up a continuous line of railway on the right bank of the Eipel.
>
> The conditions of this supervision and the period during which the free use of the line shall be guaranteed equally to the nations interested shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments."

He wished to enquire whether that recommendation still held good?

M. CAMBON replied that the stipulation in question would still remain.

(It was agreed that the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia in the vicinity of the railway junction of Ipolysk should be so altered as to include the railway junction itself in Czecho-Slovak territory.

The Committee on Czecho-Slovak questions were asked to meet without delay and to submit definite proposals to this effect.)

(d) Boundaries With Czecho-Slovakia: General Pellé's Proposals M. PICHON said that the last of the four questions, referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Supreme Council, read as follows:—

> "Finally, they would also like to receive the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the proposals of General Pellé. The Council of Foreign Ministers are, of course, at liberty to obtain any Military or other expert advice they desire."

At the meeting held yesterday, the Council of Foreign Ministers had expressed the view that it would be undesirable from a political standpoint, to fix a military line of demarcation divergent from the frontier laid down by the Supreme Council, and accepted by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation. At the same time the Foreign Ministers had admitted that military reasons might exist which would necessitate the delimitation of a temporary line as suggested by General Pellé. He, personally, did not think that it would be necessary to take military advice, especially as the matter under reference appeared to be extremely urgent. He thought the Foreign Ministers could forthwith agree to the opinion expressed yesterday, namely, that the Hungarians should be asked to withdraw their troops forthwith to the permanent boundary line.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the Hungarians had crossed the permanent boundary line.

M. PICHON replied that the Hungarian forces were now a long way, about 40 miles, north of the permanent boundary line, and their advance continued. He added that General Pellé's line would be situated further in Hungarian territory than the proposed permanent line.

M. TARDIEU added that the line proposed by General Pellé possessed the further inconvenience that it coincided with the boundary originally claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks. He thought that fact made it imperative to avoid accepting General Pellé's proposal.

BARON SONNINO agreed. He understood that the boundary to be laid down would apply to both parties concerned. That is to say, the Hungarian forces would be ordered to retire to the permanent boundary line, and the Czecho-Slovaks would be similarly prevented from crossing that line.

(It was agreed to recommend that the permanent boundaries of Hungary with Czecho-Slovakia, as approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should forthwith be laid down, and that the Hungarian forces should be required forthwith to withdraw their troops within their own territory, as thus defined.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 12th June, 1919.

[1] FM–23, p. 802 [*Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 53*].

June 18, 3 p.m. (FM–25)

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[56] Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 18, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 18, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/25

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/25

FM–25

[Document 56]

Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 18, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 18, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. Lord
Secretary	Colonel Embick
Mr. L. Harrison	Dr. Coolidge
British Empire	Dr. Day
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	Dr. Seymour
Secretary	British Empire
Mr. E. Phipps	Sir Esme Howard
France	Sir Eyre Crowe
M. Pichon	Colonel F. H. Kisch
Secretaries	Major Temperley
M. Arnavon	Mr. A. Leeper
M. de Bearn	Rear Admiral Sir G. Hope
M. de St. Quentin	Mr. H. J. Paton
M. de Percin	France
Italy	M. Tardieu
H. E. Baron Sonnino	M. J. Cambon M. Hermitte M. Degrand } For cells 1 & 2.
Secretary	General Le Rond, for Items 1–2

M. Bertele	M. Laroche, for Items 1 & 3
JAPAN	M. Aubert, for Item 3
H. E. Baron Makino	Marquis della Torretta
Secretary	M. Brambilla
M. Kawai	M. Vannutelli-Rey
	Colonel Pariani
	Commandant Pergolani
	JAPAN
	M. Otehiai, for Items 1 & 2

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Final Settlement of Frontiers Between the Poles and the Ukrainians M. PICHON said that the Council of Foreign Ministers had been asked by the Council of Four to find a definite settlement of the frontier between the Polish and the Ukrainian territories, in order that the forces of the two countries be ordered to withdraw behind them. He would ask M. Jules Cambon, as President of the Committee dealing with the subject,[1] to explain what conclusions had been reached.

MR. LANSING observed that he had read the report of the Committee.

M. PICHON then asked if any member wished to address any questions on the subject to M. Cambon.

MR. BALFOUR said the Committee had been ordered to make suggestions, but to give no advice. The result was that the settlement

of the question was left to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had read the report and had talked to his military advisers regarding the situation in Galicia. He concluded that as a basis for discussion it would be preferable to put forward concrete proposals. He had therefore written a memorandum, a copy of which had been furnished to each of the Ministers members of the Council. (See Annexure "A".) His justification for writing it was that M. Cambon's Committee did not deal with the military question, which was of vital importance at the moment. The Bolshevists were attacking Galicia and gaining successes, and the Allies, on the other hand, were hampering the action of the Poles. This led to an unfavourable situation. If a solution favourable to the military action of the Poles were adopted, means must be found of safeguarding the future political status of the country. His memorandum, therefore, aimed at meeting the pressing necessity of keeping the Bolshevists out, and of providing an opportunity in the future for the self-determination of the Ruthenian population, which might choose to form part of Poland, or Russia, or federation with one or other, or even independence. He therefore suggested that his memorandum be taken as the basis for discussion.

M. SONNINO said that the Committee had formulated a number of projects. Among them was one suggesting autonomy for Galicia, under Polish sovereignty. This had the advantage of supplying a definite solution. A plebiscite would lead to agitation and intrigue by all parties with ambitions connected with the final verdict. If, therefore, the Ruthenians could be guaranteed such rights as they required under Polish suzerainty, all these disadvantages would be avoided. But it must not be forgotten that many parties were interested in the decision; for instance, the Poles and Roumanians wished to have a common frontier. Russia, which, he hoped, would ere long be restored, would doubtless wish to induce the Ruthenians to become Russian subjects. This would clash with the ambitions of the Roumanians, Czecho-Slovaks and Poles; and the Hungarians also might wish to have a common frontier with Russia. If, therefore, the whole question could be settled once for all, peace in that part of Europe would be greatly benefited.

MR. LANSING said that his view of the question was based largely on the condition of the Ruthenian population. It must be recognised that this population was 60% illiterate, and therefore unfits for self-government. A period of education was necessary before it could be ripe for autonomy. Its natural connection by blood was with the Ukrainians, but it would seem that its disposition was rather towards the Poles, by reason of the relative stability of the Government in Poland, as compared with the Ukraine. He was therefore in general accord with Mr. Balfour's memorandum, which was that a High Commissioner be nominated by the League of Nations, or pending the constitution of the League of Nations, by the Great Powers, in general control. At the same time, Polish troops would be authorised to extend their operations up to the River Zbruck. It would be notified through the High Commissioner that the occupation by Polish troops was only temporary, until such time as the Great Powers might consider a plebiscite appropriate. Until then, the country would be under Polish military authority, subject to supervision by the Commissioner.

The Ukrainians were commonly called Bolshevik, but he was not sure that this was correct. In some places they appeared to be fighting the Bolshevik. He had received reports from the country, including one from Lieutenant Foster, from Tarnopol, dated 8th June; Lieutenant Foster observed among other things that the great majority of the population was overjoyed by the arrival of Polish troops. Secondly, that the Ukrainian régime had been one of force, and brutality, entirely destructive and not constructive in its character. This report also went to support Mr. Balfour's solution. He understood that it would have been easy for the Poles to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia, but for the veto of the Great Powers. The Ukrainians were now extremely aggressive, and the Poles could not stop their operations. All the Military Representatives at Warsaw appeared to take this view.

M. SONNINO said that all the reasons alleged by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing appeared to enforce the desirability of a definite solution, namely, that the country be governed under Polish sovereignty, with guarantees for the Ruthenians. If the population was as ignorant as Mr. Lansing believed, it would be a long time before an intelligent

plebiscite could be obtained from them. They would meantime be wooed by Roumanian, Polish, Czecho-Slovak, Hungarian and Russian agitators. Hence, for the very reasons advanced by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing, he advocated a definite solution. It would be easy to guarantee the linguistic and educational rights of the Ruthenians under Polish Government. If this were not done, there would be continual unrest and strife, fomented by neighbouring countries with rival interests.

M. CAMBON said that he gathered from the observations of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Mr. Balfour that there was a considerable measure of agreement between them. The Ukrainian question as such could not be solved, as we did not know what the Ukraine was, nor what its future would be. Further, there appeared to be no ground for trusting any Ukrainian Government, as Ukrainian Governments hitherto had behaved atrociously. Among the neighbours of Eastern Galicia, the only one with a high civilization was Poland. The towns in Galicia were Polish and the best classes throughout the country were Polish. The solution proposed by Mr. Balfour, therefore, appeared to him to be excellent. Polish control would be exercised under the Great Powers, represented by a High Commissioner. Thus, a mandate would be conferred on Poland for the government of the country. He would point out that this was among the solutions proposed by the Committee. He referred to Solution "B" in Report No. III of the Committee. If the Conference left the question open, Galicia would become the arena of every form of intrigue. He thought, therefore, that Galicia, with local autonomy secured, and governed in a liberal spirit by Poland, was the solution. This solution had another advantage. One of the most troublesome questions was the Western delimitation of Eastern Galicia. Two frontiers had been proposed, and both were very questionable. If M. Sonnino's solution were adopted, it would be unnecessary to trouble any further about the frontier question. Frontier "A" could be adopted, and the whole of Eastern Galicia could be placed under the same régime.

M. PICHON asked whether M. Sonnino's proposal was complementary to Mr. Balfour's.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the two solutions were different. He proposed to secure Ruthenian autonomy at once, to give sovereignty to Poland. This dispensed with the High Commissioner and with the plebiscite. In addition, the frontier question was also solved at once, and the struggle concerning Lemberg was equally dispensed with.

M. PICHON pointed out that this would place Lemberg outside Poland.

M. SONNINO said that it would nevertheless include Lemberg in territory attached to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were two inconsistent policies before the Council. M. Sonnino's suggestion was different to his own. He thought there was much truth in M. Sonnino's observation that if the question of the future sovereignty of the country were left undecided, the result would be years of intrigue and unrest. At the same time, he thought M. Sonnino a little exaggerated the advantages of his plan. M. Cambon had gone so far as to say the Conference need trouble no more about the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. M. Sonnino said that frontier "A" could be adopted, among other reasons, because the Poles, who objected to handing over Lemberg to an independent Galicia, could not object to including it in a dependent Galicia. He thought this was not quite correct. He was informed that the majority in Eastern Galicia, though doubtless ill-educated, was vigorously anti-Polish, and unwilling to be absorbed. He would like to know exactly what the autonomy offered by M. Sonnino meant.

M. SONNINO said he meant administrative self-government. There were various degrees of self-government and regulations had been proposed in other cases.

Mr. Balfour doubtless knew what he meant when he spoke of Irish Home Rule.

MR. BALFOUR said that personally he attributed no meaning to Irish Home Rule. He, however, pointed out that M. Sonnino appeared to confuse self-government with linguistic and educational privileges. If

his policy meant nothing more than minority guarantees, he thought it would not satisfy the Ruthenians.

M. SONNINO said that a representative body could be added, as there were many degrees of self-government up to federation.

MR. BALFOUR said he ventured to suggest that the matter the Council had to deal with was the Bolshevist threat to Galicia. The Ruthenians would not be satisfied with the safeguarding of their language and schools. He thought, therefore, that the method he had suggested would have to be adopted.

M. SONNINO said that they might be satisfied with the kind of autonomy granted to Finland under Russian sovereignty. Mr. Balfour's method did not offer the Ruthenians self determination, and practically told them that they must wait for another generation before exercising it.

M. CAMBON said that if the presence of Polish troops in Eastern Galicia were held to endanger the rights of the Ruthenians, it was nevertheless difficult to find any other allied troops to police the country. The Poles were the troops nearest at hand and it was for the Conference to determine the limits of Polish control and to safeguard the rights of the Ruthenians. The objection, he thought, would come not from the Ruthenians but from the Ukraine. It was clear that Galicia must not be ceded to the Ukrainians.

M. PICHON asked M. Cambon to give his opinion as regards Mr. Balfour's scheme.

M. CAMBON said that as he had not consulted his Committee he could only give a personal opinion. He agreed with Mr. Balfour's first point that the country should be occupied by Polish troops. As to the second point that control should be exercised by the Great Powers through a High Commissioner, he personally preferred M. Sonnino's plan. He thought that anything that would give the impression to the undecided populations of those areas, an indication that the Peace Conference was expressing its final will, would put a stop to unrest and disorder.

MR. LANSING said that he had listened with interest to the views expressed. He was impressed by some of the points made by M. Sonnino. He saw the difficulty of administering the country through a High Commissioner under whose authority customs and a judicial department would have to be set up. It would be extremely difficult to organise in detail out of nothing a complicated administrative machine. He therefore agreed with M. Cambon that it would be more satisfactory to give a mandate to Poland to hold the country under such conditions as might be fixed by the League of Nations or the Great Powers, until such time as these might decide that a plebiscite should take place. His conclusion, therefore, was that Eastern Galicia within frontiers to be determined by the Committee be administered by Poland as mandatory under conditions likewise to be determined by the Committee, until such time as a plebiscite could be taken regarding the ultimate sovereignty of the country. He therefore suggested that matter be referred to the Polish Committee which would be asked to submit a draft covering all the details required to carry out this policy.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Lansing's plan was open to the objections raised by M. Sonnino, namely, that until a plebiscite had finally settled the sovereignty of the country, there would be an open field for every sort of intrigue. Nor had the plan, he feared, the advantage of his own suggestion which, he admitted, was based on the hostility of the Ruthenian majority to the Polish minority. If his opinion on this subject were open to doubt, he would be prepared to revise his proposal.

MR. LANSING asked from what source Mr. Balfour obtained his information.

MR. BALFOUR said all the information received tended to produce in his mind the impression that in Western Galicia the majority was Polish or pro-Polish while exactly the reverse prevailed in Eastern Galicia. He was quite ready to refer this matter to the Committee if there were any doubt about it.

MR. LANSING said his information was totally different. He therefore thought it would be well to refer the matter to the Committee.

MR. BALFOUR said that his conviction was that the Ruthenians did not wish to be ruled by the Polish minority. It would therefore be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate.

MR. LANSING said that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion based on a totally different hypothesis. There were three possible hypotheses

(1) that the Ruthenians were hostile to the Poles
(2) that they were friendly to the Poles
(3) that the Council did not know what their feelings were

His own proposal was based on the theory that the Ruthenians were friendly to the Poles, but with a qualification that he was not quite certain of. It was for this reason that he had proposed that after a certain interval of time, the Ruthenians should have a chance of option. Meanwhile, to avoid difficulties of administration under a High Commissioner, he would give a mandate to the Poles. He was quite ready to refer back to the Committee the question whether the Ruthenians were friendly or hostile to the Poles.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection. He would like to add that the Committee might, with advantage, examine the Constitution which had been proposed for the part of Ruthenia to be attached to the Czecho-Slovak State and discuss whether the adoption of a similar plan could fit the case of Eastern Galicia.

M. CAMBON pointed out that this solution was one of those suggested by the Committee.

MR. BALFOUR requested that it be put on record that Polish troops should have full liberty to advance up to the River Zbruck without prejudice to the future status of the country.

(It was decided that M. Pichon should communicate this decision in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments officially to the Polish Government and unofficially to the Ukrainian Delegation in Paris.

It was further decided that the Committee on Polish Affairs be asked to report regarding the sentiments of the population of Eastern Galicia and also on the suitability of a scheme of autonomy similar to that devised for the Ruthenians to be attached to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.)

2. Arrangements To Be Made for the Preservation of Order at Dantzig M. PICHON said that in accordance with a minute put forward by the British Delegation (Annexure B) it would be necessary to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission with a Naval and a Military representative from each of the Powers.

This was agreed to and the following members were nominated:—

For the United States of America:
General Bliss.
Admiral Knapp.
For Great Britain:
General Sackville-West.
Admiral Hope.
For France:
General Belin,
and a Naval expert to be nominated later.
For Italy:
General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.

M. MAKINO said that he would inform the Secretary-General whether Japan wished to take part or not.

3. M. PICHON said that action was required of the Council as a consequence of the following letter:—

17th June 1919.

Evacuation of Klagenfurt Basin "My dear Colleague,

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, this afternoon, considered the situation which has arisen in regard to the armistice in Carinthia.

The Council were informed that the forces of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in disregard of the demands of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, have pressed forward and occupied Klagenfurt and have forced the Austrian[s] to accept armistice conditions which include the abandonment by them of Klagenfurt.

In these circumstances, the Council decided that a demand should be made for the evacuation of the entire district of Klagenfurt by the forces both of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrians.

It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to approve and send a telegraphic despatch to the Governments of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrian Republic demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by the forces of both contending parties. The boundaries behind which they were to withdraw will have to be defined in this despatch. A copy of this despatch should be sent to the Military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers who are watching the armistice.

Since the meeting, I have learned that the Commission which has been considering the question of Klagenfurt is holding a meeting tomorrow and I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Monsieur Tardieu, the Chairman of the Commission, with the suggestion that the Commission should be asked to prepare the boundaries for the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will confirm this action to M. Tardieu and will bring the matter before the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

At M. Sonnino's request, I am sending copies of this letter to the five Foreign Ministers.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

M. P. A. Hankey."

His Excellency
Monsieur Dutasta.

M. TARDIEU said that the Committee on Jugo-Slav Affairs had received a copy of this letter on the previous day. The Committee had discussed the subject and three different opinions had been expressed. (See Annexure C.)

M. SONNINO said that in M. Orlando's absence he brought forward the question in the Council of Four. The following was the history of the matter. On May 31st the Council of Four had decided to send to Vienna and Belgrade an intimation to both parties to withdraw from the Basin of Klagenfurt. The Austrians were to withdraw beyond the northern limit and the Slavs beyond the southern limit. The telegram to Belgrade, it would seem, had been delayed in transmission, whereas that to Vienna had arrived in time. On June 5th, Jugo-Slav troops had advanced on Klagenfurt and had forced the Austrian troops on June 6th to accept an Armistice. When the Allied Generals on the spot had informed the Jugo-Slav Commanders of the orders of the Council, the latter said that they had received no such orders and would stand by the Armistice. The Allied Officers had not felt competent to order the troops to retire and asked for instructions from the Conference. He had therefore brought up the question in the Council of Four. The Council, on the previous day, had decided that a telegram be dispatched by the Council of Foreign Ministers requiring the evacuation of the Basin of Klagenfurt by both parties.

In his letter Sir Maurice Hankey added a further suggestion that the Commission on Jugo-Slav affairs should determine the frontiers behind which the opposing Forces should retire. Now these frontiers had been already settled on May 31st when the previous order had been given. The Council of Four had also decided that notice of the decision should be given to the military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, in order that they should watch the execution of the order and make any necessary proposals. As the result of Sir

Maurice Hankey's intervention, the Commission now proposed something quite different from the intentions of the Council of Four, namely two zones for a plebiscite, the limits of which should be the lines for the withdrawal of the opposing Armies. This was quite a new feature. M. Tardieu's view was that military lines should as far as possible be the ultimate political frontiers but the limits in this case were not frontiers of this character but only the limits of plebiscite areas. He submitted that it was necessary to stand by the decision of the Council of Four, namely that both Armies must withdraw from the whole basin of Klagenfurt. M. Tardieu further suggested that the void created by evacuation must be occupied, presumably in the interests of order. He would suggest that a Police Force should be evolved locally. In any case, this was not the business of the Council. All the Council was asked to do was to renew the order of May 31st, and adapt it to the new circumstances. There was no other Mandate binding on the Council and the suggestion made by the paragraph of Sir Maurice Hankey's letter beginning with the words "Since the Meeting I have learned" had no binding force.

M. TARDIEU said that if Baron Sonnino was right, the Commission had been called upon to deliberate under a misunderstanding.

M. PICHON, reading the letter, said that there was evidently a contradiction. In the first part the instruction was that the whole basin was to be evacuated, in the second it was indicated that boundaries should be fixed.

M. SONNINO said that in the despatch of May 31st, no exact definition of the Klagenfurt area had been given. The Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to define the frontier but not to establish new ones. The Council was to repeat the previous order adapted to the present circumstances.

MR. LANSING said that he could find no authorisation by the Council of Four to Sir Maurice Hankey for submitting the question to the Commission. It would seem that the Council of Four had only directed the despatch to be sent.

M. PICHON said that all the Council itself had to do was to fix the outer limits of the Klagenfurt basin. This had been done.

M. TARDIEU said that in his opinion this had not been done. A few days ago the Council of Four had asked the Commission to report on some communications made by the Jugo-Slav Delegation involving this very question. The Commission had not yet reported, but it might be inferred from this that the exact limits of the Klagenfurt basin had not yet been fixed by the Council of Four.

M. PICHON asked whether M. Tardieu could furnish his report to the Council of Five instead of the Council of Four.

M. TARDIEU replied that the report was ready but had not yet been sent in.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not understand Sir Maurice Hankey's letter. Did it mean that the Council of Foreign Ministers was to "approve" without discussion what was suggested? He himself disapproved of leaving the Klagenfurt basin unoccupied. He would require a great deal of convincing argument before he approved of any such thing. Further, the Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to draft a telegram and in his view this was not their business.

M. SONNINO restated the case as previously explained by himself.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if the Council of Four only intended that their previous telegram should be repeated they would not have asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet to do it for them. They could presumably do this themselves.

M. SONNINO pointed out that the order would not be repeated in the same terms, as in the interval an Armistice had taken place and some notice of this fact was required.

M. TARDIEU said that he entirely agreed with Mr. Balfour. If the question was merely one of repeating the previous telegram no discussion was required. If on the other hand a new definition of the Klagenfurt basin was under consideration, he would point out that two considerable modifications had been suggested. One by the

Jugo-Slav Delegation, namely the addition to the Plebiscite zone of the Valley of Miesthal; the other by the Italian Delegation, namely, the exclusion of the triangle of Assling.

M. SONNINO said that it was clear that the Council of Five must take some action as the Heads of the Governments were away and the military situation was urgent.

MR. LANSING suggested that the question be adjourned until the Commission had furnished material for a delimitation of the Klagenfurt basin.

(At this stage Mr. Balfour withdrew.)

M. TARDIEU pointed out that nothing would be gained by delay as the findings of the Commission were not unanimous. He could only present on the following day the same divergences of opinion that he had already explained.

M. SONNINO further observed that the findings of the Commission, even if unanimous, could not assign final frontiers to the Klagenfurt basin until these had been accepted by the Council of the Heads of Governments.

(Mr. Lansing at this point withdrew.)

(The Meeting then dispersed.)

PARIS, 19th June, 1919.

Annexure A to IC–197 [FM–25]

Note by Mr. Balfour

The question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the "Four", on the subject of Eastern Galicia, differs in some very important respects from other problems connected with the frontier arrangements in Eastern Europe.

We have got, if possible, to find a plan which will:—

1. Satisfy the immediate Military necessity of resisting the Bolshevist invasion of Galicia; and
2. Avoid compromising the future interests of the Ruthenian majority who now inhabit Eastern Galicia.

These two objects seem at first sight inconsistent, for the only troops which we have at our disposal for resisting the Bolshevists in this region are the Poles; and if the Poles are given complete Military freedom—as from a Military point of view they certainly ought to be—their occupation of the country may compromise the political future of this district. The Ruthenian majority is backward, illiterate, and at present quite incapable of standing alone. The urban and educated classes are largely Polish, and when not Polish are Jewish. The whole country is utterly disorganized. There is, or was, (for some slight improvement seems to have taken place), a most embittered feeling between the Poles and the Ruthenians, and it is manifestly impossible at the moment to determine the character of public opinion by a plebiscite, or other similar methods. If the Polish Military occupation be permanent, it is hard to see how this state of things will find a remedy.

The best suggestion I can make is the following:—Appoint as soon as may be a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations, as proposed in plan II.*a*. of the Report of the Polish Commission. He must be instructed, while the Bolshevist peril lasts, to work in harmony with the Poles, and to facilitate the use of Polish troops as Military necessity may require.

The Poles, on the other hand, must be informed that their Military occupation of Eastern Galicia is a temporary one, and can only be allowed to last as long as the needs of common defence against the invading Bolshevism renders this proceeding necessary, and that of this the High Commissioner must be the judge. The Ruthenians must be told that, though the Poles are temporarily in occupation of their country, they are acting under the directions of the League of Nations, and that the Ruthenians will be given a full opportunity of determining by plebiscite, within limits to be fixed by the League of Nations, what their future status is to be.

This opportunity will be given them as soon as tranquillity is restored, and there is some chance of a fair vote being taken.

I do not know whether the Poles would accept this plan, though I think they might be induced to do so. Its advantages are that:—

1. It provides for the defence of Galicia against the Bolshevists, which seems all important, both in the interests of the Ruthenians themselves, and of the security of Eastern Europe.
2. It combines with this a policy of self-determination, to be exercised as soon as circumstances permit.

No other plan that I have been able to think of combines those two advantages, both of which seem essential to any satisfactory policy for dealing with this embarrassing problem.

(Intd). **A. J. B[ALFOUR]**

PARIS, June 18th, 1919.

Annexure B to IC–197 [FM–25]

WCP–1005

ARRANGEMENTS FOR OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF DANZIG FOLLOWING ITS CESSION BY THE GERMANS

(*Copy of Minute by the Military Section, British Delegation*)

1. It appears desirable that the Supreme Council or Council of Foreign Ministers should form a decision at an early date regarding the detailed arrangements in connection with the cession of Dantzig by the Germans to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with Section XI of the Conditions of Peace.
2. According to Articles 101, 102 and 103 of Section XI, a Commission, appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, is to be constituted within fifteen days of the coming into force of the Treaty for the purpose of delimiting the frontier, etc., of the territory in question; the city of Dantzig and described territory are to be placed under the League of Nations; a High

Commissioner, resident at Dantzig, is to draw up a Constitution for the Free City and deal with differences arising between Poland and that city.

3. The Articles in question, however, make no mention of the power upon which the authority of the High Commissioner is to be based, nor do they deal with the question of the presence of German or Polish forces in the area in question.
4. It is considered most undesirable that Polish troops, at all events for the present, should be allowed to enter the Dantzig area; for their presence would inevitably lead to a collision with the German troops.
5. At the same time, if the presence of Polish troops in the area in question is forbidden, it would be only fair to demand the withdrawal of the existing German garrisons. The Poles, in fact, would have the right to demand such a withdrawal.
6. In the absence of both German and Polish forces, the presence of some Allied force in the area in question would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining order and safeguarding the authority of the High Commissioner. It is assumed that such a force would only be in temporary occupation; for presumably it would eventually be found possible, when conditions are more stable, to raise a permanent force, recruited locally, or possibly of a mixed nature, comprising Poles and Germans.
7. The questions for decision, therefore, are
   (i) Whether Polish forces should be prohibited from entering the territory of the Free City of Dantzig;
   (ii) Whether it should be demanded that the German forces withdraw from that territory.
   (iii) In the event of (i) and (ii) being agreed upon, what force should be provided to garrison that territory.
8. At the same time, the question of the taking over of Memel (*vide* Section X, Conditions of Peace) by the principal Allied and Associated Powers is also for consideration. In this case it only appears to be a question of the replacement of the German garrison by a small Allied force pending decision as to final occupation.

(Signed) **W. Thwaites**
Major-General

MILITARY SECTION, 30. 5. 19.

Appendix "C" to IC–197 [FM–25]

JUNE 18TH, 1919.

Note Drafted by the Yugo-Slav Commission

The Commission has examined the question raised by Sir Maurice Hankey's letter to M. Dutasta, dated June 17th.[2]

The following opinions have been expressed:

1. The American Delegation recommends that the boundaries should be drawn as indicated in the Commission's Report, in answer to Sir Maurice Hankey's note dated June 11th, but expresses no opinion as regards the military measures to be taken.

2. The British and French Delegations

recalling the fact that the Supreme Council has agreed, concerning Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Hungary, that it would be advisable not to assign to military occupation limits that would differ from the definitive boundaries,

recommend that the same solution should be adopted concerning the Klagenfurt Basin, i. e. to determine as quickly as possible the political boundaries in accordance with the above mentioned report, the Yugo-Slavs being authorised to occupy Zone "A" and the Austrians Zone "B".

3. The Italian Delegation,

considering on the one hand that Sir Maurice Hankey's letter, dated June 17th, deals with the complete evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both the Yugo-Slavs and the Austrians,

considering on the other hand that the lines proposed by the American, British and French Delegations as boundary lines, are,

according to the Italian Delegation, only limits for the zones of plebiscite, which ought not to be considered as political boundaries,

is of opinion that the zone which ought to be evacuated by both the Austrians and the Yugo-Slays, ought to include the whole basin (Zones “A” and “B”) as previously defined by the Supreme Council.

[1] The Commission on Polish Affairs.
[2] *Ante*, p. 834 [*Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 56*].

June 19, 3 p.m. (FM–26)

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[57] Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, June 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Cont 180.03201/26

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FM–26

[Document 57]

Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, June 19, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 19, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Mr. Johnson
Secretary	Dr. Seymour
Mr. L. Harrison	British Empire
British Empire	Sir Eyre Crowe
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	Mr. A. Leeper
France	Major Temperley
M. Pichon	France
Secretaries	M. Tardieu
M. de Bearn	M. Laroche
M. de St. Quentin	M. Aubert
Italy	General Le Rond
H. E. Baron Sonnino	Italy
Secretary	Count Vannutelli-Rey
M. Bertele	Colonel Pariani
Japan	Japan
H. E. Baron Makino	M. Otchiai

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. C. Burden.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	M. Fould.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. Evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin M. Pichon said that he thought it would be best to ask M. Tardieu to inform the Council of the conclusions of his Committee regarding the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt for the purpose of the telegram which the Council was requested to send (see previous Minutes I. C. 197, Minute 3).[1]

M. Tardieu said that the answer to this question was to be found in Minute 5 of a note addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission for Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs. (See Annexure A). The consequence was that no change was made in Zone A and none proposed in Zone B, and that the boundaries shown on what was known as President Wilson's map were maintained by the unanimous assent of the Committee.

M. Pichon said that if the Council approved the proposal sent to them from the Council of Four, it would follow that a telegram should be sent demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both sides, the frontiers being those shown on President Wilson's map excluding the Miesthal region.

M. Sonnino said that as no alteration was proposed in the frontier, no specification need be made in the message. The telegram of May 31st should be repeated.

Mr. Balfour said he could not quite understand what it was proposed the Council should do. Was it to order that a large tract of country should be left with no troops in it either Austrian or Jugo-Slav?

M. TARDIEU observed that the Commission had no remarks to make on this policy as the question had not been submitted to it.

M. SONNINO said that the Council of Heads of Governments wished the Military Representatives on the spot to be informed of the order given for the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin. These Officers would then make proposals in accordance with events for maintaining order in the evacuated area. This was the resolution adopted in the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING said that he did not quite follow M. Sonnino. He read the letter written by Sir Maurice Hankey on June 17th (see I. C. 197, Minute 3) to mean that entire evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was to be ordered. At the same time the Council of Foreign Ministers were asked to determine certain limits. M. Sonnino said these limits had already been laid down. If the outline of the Klagenfurt Basin had already been determined, the letter must mean lines behind which the occupying troops should retire.

M. SONNINO maintained that this was not the meaning of the resolution of the Council of Four. Seeing that the Commission proposed no change in the outer limits of the Klagenfurt Basin, all that remained to be done was to re-affirm the orders of May 31st.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to "approve"; for his part he did not.

MR. BALFOUR also said that he did not approve.

M. SONNINO said that he had himself raised the question in the Council of Four and asked what was to happen

(*a*) if evacuation took place
(*b*) if it did not take place.

He asked whether the Council would authorise the military Representatives on the spot to take action. The Council had decided that these Officers should not take action but should make proposals to the Council.

M. PICHON observed that this matter was not within the terms of reference.

M. SONNINO said that if his Colleagues did not approve the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin in spite of the fact that it had been decided on by the Council of Heads of Governments, he could do no more. In his view the proper thing to do was to send a telegram and ask the military authorities on the spot to make proposals for dealing with the consequences.

M. PICHON said that as Mr. Balfour could not approve of the telegram, it clearly could not be sent. The Council was, therefore, at the very start precluded from doing what M. Sonnino suggested.

MR. LANSING proposed that a reply be sent on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the effect that having been asked to approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin, the Council returned the reply that it did not approve of this policy. It would, however, approve of the withdrawal of the opposing troops behind the line proposed by the Jugo-Slav Commission.

M. SONNINO said he could not agree to this. It appeared to him quite contrary to the decision of the Council of the Heads of Governments as understood by him.

M. PICHON said there was another proposal formulated by Mr. Lansing and supported by Mr. Balfour. He also concurred with it. All he could do was to put this to the vote. He thought it would be a wise decision as supplementary information just received reported disturbances in the Klagenfurt area. He quoted a telegram from the French General on the spot saying that Allied troops were urgently required to keep order.

MR. LANSING said that he thought there must be some mistake in the account given of the matter by M. Sonnino. The more natural course would have been to consult the military men on the spot before asking the Foreign Ministers for their approval.

(At this stage Mr. Balfour withdrew.)

M. SONNINO said that the news quoted by M. Pichon showed the necessity of doing something. He referred again to the history of the telegram sent on May 31st and to the subsequent events.

M. PICHON said that, to sum up, as Mr. Balfour and he himself supported Mr. Lansing's views, all he could do was to report to the Council of Four that with the exception of M. Sonnino, all supported a withdrawal of the contending armies north and south of the line shown on the map known as "President Wilson's Map".

M. SONNINO said that his view was that a telegram should be sent renewing the order of May 31st for the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin and that the Military authorities should be asked to make proposals for dealing with the consequences. The following resolution was then adopted:—

> "The Council of the Foreign Ministers decided to reply to the Council of the Heads of Governments that their interpretation of the letter addressed by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference on June 17th, 1919, regarding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was that they were asked to approve the action suggested in paragraph 3.
>
> With the exception of Baron Sonnino, this interpretation was unanimous and, with the same exception, the answer was that the Council of Foreign Ministers could not approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin.
>
> It was further proposed by Mr. Lansing, and approved by the other Foreign Ministers, excepting Baron Sonnino, that the troops of the contending forces be ordered to withdraw north and south respectively of the purple line drawn on the map known as President Wilson's Map.
>
> Baron Sonnino maintained that the duty of the Council was to send a telegram ordering the total evacuation of the Basin and to ask the 4 Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the spot what proposals they had to make to deal with the consequences of the evacuation."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, June 19, 1919.

Annexure "A" IC–198 [FM–26]

JUNE 18th, 1919.

Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission for Rumanian and Yugo-Slaw Affairs

The Commission were requested by a letter from Sir Maurice Hankey to submit their recommendations concerning two letters dated June 17th [*7th?*] from Monsieur Vesnitch.

The Commission were unable to meet earlier than June 18th, several of its members being on the Committee for revising the reply to the German Delegation.

The opinion of the Commission is as follows:—

1. The two letters dated June 7th from M. Vesnitch completed by a third one dated June 9th suggest methods referring to a solution of principles which was set forth in a letter of June 3rd, and drafted as follows:—

> "Assignment of Zone "A" to the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene State; but the inhabitants are recognised the right to express by a plebiscite to be held within a period of three months or six months at the most, their wish to see this territory placed under Austrian sovereignty.
>
> "Assignment of Zone "B" to Austria, but reciprocally the same right is allowed to the inhabitants of the territory in favour of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom."

The Commission agree to this suggestion in its general line, it being understood that both zones will be placed under the control of the International Commission.

2. Regarding paragraph 1 of the letter of June 7th, the Commission unanimously recommend that the delay provided in paragraph A should start from January 1st, 1919, instead of from "the coming into force of the present Treaty". The American, British and French Delegations recommend the approval of Monsieur Vesnitch's proposals as contained in paragraphs B and C. The Italian Delegation agree to paragraph B: they request that in paragraph C the words "from August 1st 1919" should be substituted for "on a date previous to January 1st 1905".

3. Regarding paragraph 2 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter the Commission recommend an International Commission consisting of seven members, namely: five appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene State, and one by the Republic of Austria.

4. Regarding paragraph 3 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter, the American, British and French Delegations recommend that the plebiscite should be held in zone "A" three months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Italian Delegation ask that it be six months at the earliest or eighteen months at the latest, as for Upper Silesia.

As regards the date when the plebiscite shall be held in zone "A", Monsieur Vesnitch's proposals are unanimously agreed to.

5. Regarding paragraph 4 of Monsieur Vesnitch's letter, the Commission unanimously recommend that the boundaries of zone "A" such as shown on "President Wilson's map" should be maintained, which means the exclusion of the Miesthal region.

[1] FM–25, p. 834 [*Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 56*].

June 25, 3 p.m. (FM–27)

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[58] Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 25, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/27

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/27

FM–27

[Document 58]

Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, June 25, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Dr. R. H. Lord
Secretary	Mr. G. L. Beer
Mr. L. Harrison	Dr. M. O. Hudson
British Empire	British Empire
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P. (for part of meeting)	Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O.
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. M. G., K. C. B.	Sir E. Howard, K. C. M. G., K. C. B.
France	Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
M. Pichon	Sir H. J. Read, K. C. M. G.
Secretaries	Mr. Bourdillon
M. de Bearn	France
Capt. de St. Quentin	M. J. Cambon
Lieut. de Percin	General Le Bond
Italy	M. Degrand
Marquis Imperiali	M. Hermitte
Secretary	Italy

M. Bertele	Marquis P. della Torretta
JAPAN	Count Marazzi
H. E. Viscount Chinda	JAPAN
Secretary	M. Otchiai
M. Kawai	M. S. Tachi
	Colonel Sato

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE	Major A. M. Caccia. C. B.
FRANCE	Capt. A. Portier M. Fould
ITALY	Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

1. M. PICHON said that he had received a note from Mr. Balfour, stating that he would be delayed owing to other engagements and that Sir Eyre Crowe would replace him.

Political Status of Eastern Galicia The first question the Agenda Paper related to the political status of Eastern Galicia. He would call on M. Cambon, the President of the Commission on Polish Affairs to whom the question had been referred on the 18th June last (I. C. 197),[1] to make a verbal statement.

M. CAMBON said that a copy of the supplementary report on Eastern Galicia had been circulated to all the members of the Conference. (Appendix A). That report discussed two possible solutions for the status of Eastern Galicia, namely:—

(*a*) A provisional administration under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, with a temporary Polish Military occupation, and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

(*b*) A provisional administration under the Polish Government, with full local autonomy and military occupation as for (*a*), and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

It would be seen that both proposals contemplated a temporary Polish military occupation, and provided for an ultimate plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes and national aspirations of the people. The two propositions merely differed in regard to the character of the Chief of the State. In the first case, the provisional administration would be under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations. In the second case, the provisional administration would be under a representative of the Polish Government. Before proceeding further, he thought the Council of Foreign Ministers might wish to give a decision on that point.

M. PICHON agreed. The question for the Council to decide was whether the provisional administration should be placed under a High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League of Nations or under the Polish Government.

MR. LANSING enquired what was meant by a "provisional administration"?

M. CAMBON explained that the administration would necessarily be "provisional", since it was agreed that sooner or later a plebiscite would be held, in order to decide the ultimate form of government desired by the inhabitants.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that, before a decision in regard to the character of the administration were given, it would be advisable to decide whether there should or should not be a plebiscite. The Report, submitted by the Commission on Polish Affairs, laid considerable stress on the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and on the fact that a plebiscite might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. The Commission had thought it its duty to make the following observation:—

> "A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit".

In these circumstances, he thought it would be impossible to separate the two questions, namely, the form of government to be established in Eastern Galicia and the expediency, or otherwise, of holding a plebiscite.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Commission on Polish Affairs had made any definite proposal on that question?

M. CAMBON replied that the Commission had always been guided by the spirit which had animated the Council of Foreign Ministers when referring questions to it. The Commission had always been told to study the questions referred to it without taking a definite decision. Nevertheless, the arguments for or against the holding of a plebiscite after a short delay or after a long delay have been clearly summed up in the Report submitted by the Commission in the following terms:—

> "In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a short delay, that the value of such a solution would be seriously impaired by the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a long delay, that such a solution succeeding a prolonged provisional regime would obviate the disadvantages alluded to above."

On the other hand:—

> "A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit."

In the circumstances, he, personally, recommended that the people of Eastern Galicia should be told that a plebiscite would be taken either by the League of Nations or by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at a date to be selected later without, however, fixing any definite date.

M. PICHON thought that the Council should be asked to decide the two following questions:—

1. Should a plebiscite be held?
2. If so, at what date should a plebiscite be taken?

MR. LANSING said he had read the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs with considerable interest, since it entirely conformed with his views. The Commission had unanimously agreed that there should be a temporary Polish military occupation, at all events up to the River Zbrucz. Bearing these proposals in mind, he had thought it wise to prepare the following resolution to form the basis of discussion:—

> "It was agreed:
>
> 1. That the Polish Government be authorized to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz.
> 2. That the Polish Government be authorised to utilize any of its military forces including General Haller's army in such occupation.
> 3. That the Polish Government be authorised to establish a civil Government in Eastern Galicia under a mandate from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants.
> 4. That the mandate shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their Political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.

5. That the drafting of the mandate be referred to the Polish Commission subject to revision by the Drafting Committee.
6. That the Polish Government be forthwith advised of the foregoing decisions and of the propriety of acting immediately upon Articles 1 and 2.
7. That the military representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Poland be advised of these Articles of agreement."

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he was prepared in principle to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal, which possessed the great advantage that a definite Government would be set up in the territory in question. On the other hand, the great advantage thereby gained would be somewhat nullified by the proposals contained in Article 4, namely, that the continuance of the Government so constituted should depend upon "the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance." That condition would necessarily have the effect of giving the administration a provisional character, and so leave an open field for every sort of intrigue, and give rise to the serious political consequences referred to by M. Cambon.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Marquis Imperiali dissented from Mr. Lansing's proposal.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI replied in the negative. In his opinion, Mr. Lansing's proposals were excellent. He merely thought that the proposals would be improved by omitting the Articles which prescribed the holding of a plebiscite.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Mr. Lansing's draft resolution should be considered Article by Article.

(This was agreed to.)

Article 1. (Article 1 was accepted without amendment.)

Article 2. SIR EYRE CROWE enquired whether any military objection existed to the proposal that the Polish Government should be

authorized to utilize General Haller's army for the occupation of Eastern Galicia.

GENERAL LE ROND explained that it would be the duty of the Polish Command to decide how the troops placed under its orders could best be employed. The Article in question merely gave the Polish authorities the power to utilise their military forces in Galicia. In that connection he would invite attention to the fact that up to the present the Council of Four had objected to the employment of Haller's troops in Galicia. It was now proposed to withdraw that veto.

MR. LANSING said that he had consulted his military advisers, who were entirely in favour of the proposals contained in the Article under discussion. Furthermore, the American Minister to Warsaw, who had just arrived in Paris, had informed him that all the local Military Authorities were in favour of using Haller's army in Galicia, since it constituted the only really trained force available.

(Article 2 was accepted without amendment.)

Article 3. SIR EYRE CROWE called attention to the situation which had arisen at the Meeting of the Council held on the 18th June, 1919.[2] Mr. Balfour had then suggested the appointment of a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations, basing his proposal on the fact that a most embittered feeling existed between the Poles and the Ruthenians, and that it would, in consequence, be manifestly impossible at the moment to determine the character of public opinion by a plebiscite or other similar methods. Mr. Balfour had, moreover, expressed his conviction that the Ruthenians did not wish to be ruled by the Polish Minority and that it would be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate. Nevertheless, Mr. Lansing had now proposed, in accordance with the terms of the clause under consideration, to give the mandate to the Polish Government under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, even though the Commission on Polish Affairs had, in its supplementary report, clearly borne out Mr. Balfour's contention that the feelings of animosity against Poland indisputably existed among an important part of the Ruthenian population. Consequently, speaking for Mr. Balfour, he felt

compelled to urge the Council to give due weight to Mr. Balfour's original proposition, recommending the constitution of a provisional Administration for Eastern Galicia, under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING drew attention to the fact that while the Commission had, as stated by Sir Eyre Crowe, expressed the opinion that "feelings of animosity against the Poles indisputably existed among an important part of the Ruthenian population", it had qualified that statement by adding the following remarks, namely:

> "Without entering into a discussion as to the origin of this state of feeling, the Commission considers it necessary that its existence should be taken into account in devising any system by which the province would be even provisionally placed under Polish authority. It believes, however, that such a system carefully organised so as to respect the special and local rights of the Ruthenian population might prove acceptable to the latter as a provisional arrangement."

Furthermore, he wished to complete the statement made by Sir Eyre Crowe in regard to what had occurred at the last meeting. Mr. Balfour had proposed the appointment of a High Commissioner under the mandate of the League of Nations; M. Sonnino had proposed the unconditional surrender of Eastern Galicia to Poland; whilst his own proposal had been a compromise between the two.

M. CAMBON said that, speaking in his own name, he wished to urge the necessity of placing the provisional administration under a Polish High Commissioner. The Council had decided that the country should be occupied by Polish Military forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces would obviously be a great personage, and it would facilitate his relations with the High Commissioner, should the latter also be a Pole. Consequently, in the interests of ensuring a good understanding between the High Commissioner and the Polish Commander-in-Chief, it would in his opinion, be expedient that both should be Poles. In the second place, it followed as a consequence of Mr. Lansing's proposals that the administration of Eastern Galicia under a Polish High Commissioner would be controlled and

supervised by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Would it be wise for the Allied and Associated Powers to abandon this control and to mix themselves up in local politics by themselves taking over the administration of the country? In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments would exercise their control more easily and more authoritatively on a Polish official than on a Commissioner appointed by themselves.

(Mr. Balfour here entered, and received a short summary of the above discussion.)

MR. BALFOUR said that his own views could be easily expressed. Should the feelings of the native Eastern Galician population allow them to be joined to Poland without local disturbances, that would undoubtedly be the best plan to follow. But he feared that the feeling of the local population was averse to any such proposal, and in that case it might be difficult to join them to Poland. In his opinion, the appointment of a Polish High Commissioner was tantamount to the assertion that Eastern Galicia would permanently be joined to Poland. He personally wished that to happen, but he hesitated to give more trouble to Poland by adding to it a country consisting largely of Little Russians, who did not wish to join her. In his opinion, the whole question turned on a correct estimate of Ruthenian public opinion, regarding which he, personally, could give no positive indication.

M. PICHON said that the information received by the French Foreign Office from Galicia positively indicated that no feelings of hostility existed between the Ruthenians and the Poles. On the contrary, a good understanding appeared to exist between them. Further, the views expressed by the American Ambassador, Mr. Gibson, appeared to bear out those reports.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that his information fully confirmed that received by M. Pichon. The largest part of the population was indifferent and all signs of disturbance were undoubtedly due to external causes. On the other hand, religious sentiment turned towards Poland rather than towards the Ukraine, the latter territory being fully Orthodox.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in the circumstances, he would withdraw his objections.

(Mr. Balfour then withdrew.)

SIR EYRE CROWE enquired whether it would not be well to avoid the use of the word "mandate", which had been given a particular meaning in connection with the League of Nations. He suggested that in the Treaty with Poland certain stipulations should be embodied, dealing with the question of Eastern Galicia.

MR. LANSING suggested that the word "agreement" should be substituted for the word "mandate" throughout the resolution.

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 3, as amended, was accepted.)

Article 4. THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he would like, in connection with this clause, once more to raise the question of the necessity for holding a plebiscite. As previously stated by him, he felt that the establishment of a provisional Government would merely lead to continual intrigues and disturbances.

MR. LANSING explained that the question of holding a plebiscite had been fully discussed at the last Meeting. The proposals he had now submitted were intended as a compromise between the radically different views then expressed. He felt certain Mr. Balfour would refuse to accept any plan which did not leave the door open for an expression of the wishes of the people.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, under the circumstances, he would not press the matter further.

(Article 4 was accepted.)

Article 5.
Article 6.
Article 7. (Articles 5, 6, and 7 were accepted without amendment.)

MR. LANSING proposed that a copy of the resolution should be transmitted to the Ukrainian representatives in Paris with a request that they should inform their Government in order that measures might be taken for the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from Eastern Galicia.

SIR E. CROWE pointed out that the Ukrainian representatives in Paris had no means of communicating with their Government. He thought a copy of the resolution should be forwarded to the Allied Military Commission in Poland, who would arrange to transmit the same to the Ukrainian authorities. A copy of the resolution might also be sent to the French Military Representative at Lemberg for transmission to the Ukrainian Government.

MR. LANSING proposed that M. Pichon should be authorised to notify the parties concerned using all possible means to achieve that object.

(This was agreed to).

SIR E. CROWE said that the Commission on Polish Affairs had attached to their report on Eastern Galicia, a proposed status of Eastern Galicia on the hypothesis of its receiving the largest measure of local autonomy within the Polish State. The Commission had taken as the basis of its studies the draft treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and the Czecho-Slovak state on the other. He suggested that in drafting the final articles, the Commission should be instructed to lay stress on the provisional character of the administration to be given to Eastern Galicia, in order that nothing should be included which might in any way interfere with the possibility of holding a plebiscite.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the Council had decided "that the drafting of the agreement be referred to the Polish Commission, subject to revision by the Drafting Committee".

MR. LANSING proposed that the Polish Commission should have full power to confer with Polish, Ukrainian and Ruthenian representatives, if so desired.

(It was agreed:—

(1) to accept the following resolution:—
   1. That the Polish Government be authorised to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz.
   2. That the Polish Government be authorised to utilise any of its military forces including General Haller's army in such occupation.
   3. That the Polish Government be authorised to establish a civil government in Eastern Galicia under an agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants.
   4. That the agreement shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.
   5. That the drafting of the agreement be referred to the Polish Commission subject to revision by the Drafting Committee.
   6. That the Polish Government be forthwith advised of the foregoing decisions and of the propriety of acting immediately upon Articles 1 and 2.
   7. That the military representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Poland be advised of these articles of agreement.

(2) to authorise M. Pichon to forward a copy of the above resolution to all parties concerned, including the Ukrainian Government, by whatever means might seem best to him.

(3) to authorise the Commission on Polish Affairs to confer with Polish, Ukrainian and Ruthenian representatives, if so desired.)

2. Extension of Power of Commission on Polish Affairs M. PICHON said that the second question on the Agenda paper related to the extension of the powers of the Commission on Polish affairs in accordance with a proposal submitted by the British Delegation. (See Annex B.)

M. CAMBON invited attention to the terms of the letter submitted by the British Delegation (Annex [B].) The third paragraph of the letter in question read as follows:—"I would venture to suggest that the Polish Commission should be authorised by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, to deal with all questions that may arise concerning Poland". He wished to enquire what interpretation should be given to the words "all questions that may arise concerning Poland". In what sense should that sentence be interpreted? He thought a mandate of that nature rendered the Commission liable to be accused either of being indifferent or of committing indiscretions by interfering in questions which did not concern it.

MR. LANSING said that he well understood M. Cambon's feelings. In his opinion, should the size of the Commission be increased in the nature proposed, it would become so large as materially to interfere with the possibility of doing business promptly. He proposed that the constitution and size of the Commission be left as at present, but that it be authorised to appoint technical advisers or additional delegates for duty on sub-committees when needed.

M. PICHON fully agreed with the proposal made by Mr. Lansing. He thought that the fewer the number of members on a Commission, the better the work. The wishes of the British Delegation could be met by authorising the Commission to appoint experts when required.

SIR E. CROWE explained that an extension of the scope of the powers of the Commission on Polish affairs had become necessary for the following reasons. The British Delegation constantly received communications, either from the Polish Delegation in Paris, or from the British Delegates in Poland, in regard to which no definite action could under present conditions be taken. As examples of the kind of questions which might have to be dealt with by the Polish Commission, should the proposals now before the Council be accepted, he would mention the following:—

> (1) Question of release of hostages and protection of Germans and Poles; (2) Complaints by Poles and Germans respecting measures of Armistice Agreement of Spa of 16th. February, 1919;[3] (3) Complaints of Lithuanians; Eastern Galicians and

Jews reaction of Polish troops and alleged pogroms; (4) Advisability of bringing about an Entente between Poles and Lithuanians so that there should be a combined front against Russian Bolsheviks.

Questions of the kind continuously cropped up, but at present no machinery existed for dealing with them.

(It was agreed that the existing Commission on Polish Affairs should be authorised to deal with all questions that may be referred to it concerning Poland. The Commission would be authorised to appoint Experts to assist or to act on Sub-Committees when so required.)

3. Arms Traffic M. PICHON said that the next question on the Agenda paper related to the formation of a Committee to examine the draft Conventions intended to take the place of the General Acts of Berlin[4] and Brussels.[5] The following minute would explain how matters stood:—

> "Delegates of the British and French Governments had arrived at an agreement in regard to the alterations to be made to the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels, dated respectively, 26th February 1885 and 2nd July, 1890. Two Draft Conventions, intended to replace the two General Acts had been prepared by the British and French Delegates, and forwarded to the American, Italian, Belgian, Japanese and Portuguese Governments, with a request that they should appoint Delegates to examine these Drafts in conjunction with the British and French Delegates.
>
> The British and American Delegates, having expressed the view that the Council of Foreign Ministers should formally approve the creation of a Special Commission, consisting of Delegates appointed by each of the interested Powers to examine these Drafts, it is suggested that M. Pichon should place the matter before the Council of Foreign Ministers, who have already individually expressed their approval, at their next meeting.

It is suggested that the Commission should also be charged with the duty of examining a third project, which had been prepared in the same manner, dealing with other questions included in the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels."

(The proposals above contained were approved.)

M. PICHON said that a list of the names of the representatives appointed to serve on the Commission had been prepared by the Secretariat-General, and had been circulated.

(It was agreed that the Commission to examine the draft conventions intended to take the place of the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels should meet on 26th June, 1919, at 15 o'clock at the Ministry of the Colonies. The following members have been appointed to represent the seven governments concerned:—

United States of America	Mr. G. L. Beer
British Empire	Sir Herbert Read
	Mr. C. Strachey
France	M. Duchene
	M. Merlin
	M. de Peretti de la Rocca
Italy	Count Girolamo Marazzi
	M. di Nobili Massuero (Secretary)
Japan	M. T. Yamakawa
	Colonel Y. Sato
	M. R. Sawada (Secretary)
Belgium	Commander Maury
	Mr. O. Louwers
	Mr. Galopin

	Portugal	Colonel Norton de Mattos M. Tomaz Fernandes

It was understood that the United States of America and Italy would nominate an additional member.)

4. Revision of Treaties of 1839: Reply of Belgium and Holland M. PICHON said that at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers held on Wednesday, June 4th, 1919, the following resolution had been passed:—[6]

> "Having recognised the necessity of revising the treaties of 1839, the Powers entrust to a Commission comprising a representative each of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Holland the task of studying the measures which must result from this revision and of submitting to them proposals implying neither transfer of territorial sovereignty nor the creation of international servitudes.
>
> The Commission will ask Belgium and Holland to present agreed suggestions regarding navigable streams in the spirit of the general principles adopted by the Peace Conference."

The following reply dated 19 June 1919 had now been received from M. Karnebeek, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs:—

> "I have the honour to say that the Netherlands Government is ready to accept the proposals contained in the above-quoted resolution. The Netherlands Government notes that the resolution embodies without reservations, the views expressed by the Government of the Queen, to the effect that the revision of the Treaties of 1839 implies neither transfer of territorial sovereignty, nor the creation of international servitudes. It is understood that the resolution cannot be interpreted to mean that decisions may be taken on questions in regard to which Belgium and the Netherlands have not reached an agreement".

M. PICHON continuing said that he did not think the Council could accept the statement contained in the last sentence of M. Karnebeck's letter, should the interpretation be that the Commission could not discuss any questions upon which an agreement had not already been reached by the Belgian and Netherlands representatives. He thought that when replying to Holland, asking her to send Delegates, that question should be cleared up.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON enquired what date should be fixed for convening the Commission.

MR. LANSING thought that the Dutch and Belgian Governments should, in the first place, be consulted on the matter on the understanding that the Commission should meet as soon as possible.

(This was agreed to.)

M. PICHON stated that the various countries concerned should be asked to nominate their representatives. He thought that each country should be entitled to appoint two representatives; the Commission would thus consist of 14 members.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI pointed out that a Commission on Belgian Affairs already existed. He suggested that the American, British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives on that Commission should form part of the Commission now under consideration, together with additional representatives for Belgium and Holland.

SIR E. CROWE said that owing to the nature of the questions referred to the Commission now to be created, it would be necessary in many cases to appoint different representatives who would possess the necessary special qualifications. He proposed that Brig-General Mance and the Hon. A. Akers-Douglas should be the British representatives.

(It was agreed:—

1. To authorise M. Pichon to acknowledge the receipt of M. Karnebeck's letter of 19th June above quoted, and to intimate with reference to the last paragraph that the Commission would be prepared to discuss questions upon which agreement had not already been reached by the Belgian and Netherlands representatives.
2. To authorise M. Pichon to invite the Dutch and Belgian Government[s] to send representatives to Paris at an early date to be fixed in consultation with these two Governments.
3. To request the American, French, Italian, and Japanese Delegations to communicate to the Secretary-General the names of their representatives with as little delay as possible. It was notified that the British Delegates would be Brig. General Mance and the Hon. A. Akers-Douglas).

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 26th June, 1919.

[Appendix A to FM–27]

Report No. 4 of the Commission on Polish Affairs

EASTERN GALICIA

(Supplementary Report)

At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the 18th June several possible solutions for the status of Eastern Galicia, including the following, were discussed:—

(*a*) Provisional administration under a High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League of Nations, with a temporary Polish military occupation so long as this may be necessitated by the Bolshevik menace, and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.
(*b*) Provisional administration under the Polish Government with full local autonomy and military occupation as for (*a*), and an

ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

From the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers already referred to it appears to the Commission that the choice between these two solutions, or any others which may also be considered, will to some extent be dependent on a correct appreciation of the sentiments existing between the Polish and Ruthenian inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. The Commission has accordingly considered this question, and their conclusion is as follows:—

> The Commission is of opinion that feelings of animosity against the Poles indisputably exist amongst an important part of the Ruthenian population.
>
> Without entering into a discussion as to the origin of this state of feeling, the Commission considers it necessary that its existence should be taken into account in devising any system by which the province would be even provisionally placed under Polish authority. It believes, however, that such a system carefully organised so as to respect the special and local rights of the Ruthenian population might prove acceptable to the latter as a provisional arrangement.

The Commission on Polish Affairs has also been charged by the Council of Foreign Ministers to suggest the general clauses which it would be advisable to adopt, on the hypothesis of Eastern Galicia receiving a large measure of autonomy within the Polish State, under conditions analogous to the connection with the Czecho-Slovak State of the Ruthenian territory to the South of the Carpathians. (See Annex.)

The question of holding a plebiscite to determine the aspirations of the population having been referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs, the Commission formulates the following conclusions:—

It is unanimously agreed that a consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants, before fixing the definitive status of the country, would be just and equitable.

On the question of practical convenience and political expediency, the Commission considers:—

(*a*) In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a short delay, that the value of such a solution would be seriously impaired by the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants;
(*b*) In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a long delay, that such a solution, succeeding a prolonged provisional régime, would obviate the disadvantages alluded to above.

The Commission, nevertheless, thinks it its duty to make the following observation:—

> The decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences: it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit.

Jules Cambon.
R. H. Lord.
Eyre Crowe.
Della Torretta.
K. Otchiai.

June 20, 1919.

ANNEX

Proposed Status of Eastern Galicia on the Hypothesis of Its Receiving the Largest Measure of Local Autonomy Within the Polish State

The Commission has taken as the basis of its studies the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and the Czecho-Slovak State on the other, in regard to the territory of the Ruthenians. (Heading II.) This draft Treaty, drawn up by the

Commission on New States, takes into account the memorandum on this question which was submitted to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak State.

The Commission on Polish Affairs considers that the stipulations of this draft Treaty apply in a general manner to the case of Eastern Galicia under discussion, but that it is nevertheless desirable to complete and to define them so as to take into account the facts, firstly, that the population of Eastern Galicia is mixed instead of being homogeneous, and secondly, that it is immeasurably more competent than the Ruthenian territory to furnish the officials necessary for its own administration.

The Commission submits, as an indication of its views, the following draft articles. If the general line of this scheme should be approved, it would be necessary to define the details of its application after a more careful study of the previous status within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of Galicia and the other provinces of that Monarchy, and after hearing the views of the Polish Delegation and of representatives of the Ruthenian population.

Subject	*Text Proposed*
ARTICLE 1	ARTICLE 1
Recognition of the autonomy of Eastern Galicia within the Polish State.	Poland consents to recognise Eastern Galicia, as defined by the frontiers fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in the form of an autonomous unit within the Polish State, enjoying all the liberties compatible with the unity of the Polish State.
ARTICLE 2	
Functions of the Diet and of the Governor of Eastern Galicia.	
The general provisions of Article 2 of Heading II of the draft Treaty with the Czecho-Slovak State are satisfactory, but must	

be more precisely defined if adopted in principle.

ARTICLE 3

Representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet of the Polish State.

The general provisions of Article 4 of Heading II of the draft Treaty with the Czecho-Slovak State offer a satisfactory basis, but the details of their application should not be settled until the views of the Polish Delegation have been heard.

ARTICLE 4 *Representation of Eastern Galicia in the Council of Ministers of the Polish State.*	ARTICLE 4 Eastern Galicia shall be represented in the Council of Ministers of the Polish State by a Minister without portfolio, nominated by the Head of the Polish State from among the representatives of Eastern Galicia either in the Diet of the Polish State or in the Diet of Eastern Galicia.
ARTICLE 5 *Selection of Officials.*	ARTICLE 5 Poland consents to the officials of Eastern Galicia being selected in principle from among the inhabitants of that province. The officials shall be nominated by the Governor, exception being made when necessary in the case of certain officials to be nominated by the Government of the Polish State.

ARTICLE 6 *Creation of a special section of affairs of Eastern Galicia in certain Ministries of the Polish State.* It is further advisable that the Polish Government should be able at any moment to obtain information on Ruthenian affairs through a special Adviser, to be nominated by the Head of the State.	ARTICLE 6 In each Ministry of the Polish State which deals with the affairs of Eastern Galicia a special section of those affairs shall be organised.

[Annex B to FM–27]

7

[*The Secretary of the British Delegation* (*Hankey*) *to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference* (*Dutasta*)]

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, 19th June, 1919.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: Members of this Delegation who are interested in the affairs of Poland have pointed out that there is in existence no Inter-Allied body competent to deal with the numerous questions relating to the affairs of that State which are brought to the notice of the Peace Conference.

As Your Excellency is aware, the existing Commission on Polish Affairs was originally appointed to receive and consider the reports of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw, which has now been dissolved, and was subsequently also entrusted with the consideration of questions connected with the frontiers of Poland. It has, however, never been authorized to consider current questions connected with that State.

I would accordingly venture to suggest, that in order that such questions may receive due consideration in the future, the Polish Commission should be authorized by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to deal with all questions that may arise concerning Poland. The number and importance of these questions is such that the Commission as at present constituted would scarcely be capable of dealing with them adequately and I would accordingly suggest the desirability of increasing its numbers by the addition of two further representatives of each of the Five Allied and Associated Powers, in order that it may be possible, if necessary, to facilitate its work by the appointment of Sub-Commissions.

I trust that Your Excellency will see your way to bring this proposal to the notice of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(Sd) **H. Norman**
for **M. P. A. Hankey**
British Secretary

His Excellency, M. P. Dutasta.

[1] FM–25, p. 828 [*Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 56*].
[2] See FM–25, p. 827 [*Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 56*].
[3] See vol. II, p. 15.
[4] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 4.
[5] *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXII, p. 55.
[6] FM–22, p. 801 [*Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 52*].
[7] Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.2132/15.

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[1] This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed in vol. III, pp. 1–153.