

PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES

1919
VOLUME II

THE
PARIS PEACE
CONFERENCE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

**Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1919,**

Volume II

**The Paris Peace Conference,
1919**

United States Government Printing Office
Washington

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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**Office of the Historian
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U.S. Department of State
May 2018**

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GERMANY

THE GERMAN ARMISTICE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 11	<i>Terms of the Armistice With Germany</i> With two annexes (1) regulating the evacuation of the invaded countries, and (2) establishing conditions regarding communications.	1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]
Dec. 13	<i>Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany</i> Extension of the duration of the convention signed November 11, 1918, for one month, i. e., until January 17, 1919.	11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 1]
1919 Jan. 16	<i>Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany</i> Extension of the armistice agreement until February 17, 1919; additional clauses providing for changes in the Spa protocol of December 17, 1918, and additions to the armistice agreement of November 11, 1918.	11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 1]
Feb. 16	<i>Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany</i> Agreement providing that the Germans shall cease hostilities against the Poles at once and that the armistice with Germany shall be prolonged for a short period, the Allied and Associated Powers reserving to themselves the right to terminate the period at three days' notice.	15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 1]
1918 Nov. 12	<i>Manifesto of the Government of the Bavarian Republic (tel.)</i> Appeal to President Wilson and Governments of France, England, and Italy that the new Bavarian	16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of

	people's state not be crushed by harsh armistice terms.	Doc. 1 and Doc. 2
Nov. 13 (105)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Suggestion that it might be wise to intimate to German authorities that their communications should be addressed to Allied Powers rather than to United States alone.	17 [Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4]
Nov. 15 (290)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Communication for the German Foreign Minister (text printed) acknowledging radio messages sent to the President and suggesting that in the future such messages be sent to the Allied and Associated Powers.	17 [Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4]
Nov. 16 (38)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> To be laid before the Supreme War Council: Messages from Dr. Solf (texts printed) appealing to the President for mitigation of the armistice conditions. Transmittal of reply which is printed <i>supra</i> .	18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5]
Nov. 19	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication transmitted at the request of the German Government (text printed) containing an exchange of telegrams between the French and German Army High Commands (texts printed) in regard to violences committed by German soldiers which the German High Command states are unavoidable in view of the harshness of the armistice terms; German Government's appeal to the President to intervene for easier terms.	20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]
Nov. 19	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Text of a communication from the Government of Bavaria addressing an appeal to the Allies and calling attention to the fears of the population of	21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]

	the Palatinate that they will be interned or deported to perform forced labor.	
Nov. 19 (5285)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State</i> Letter from the Bavarian Minister of Finance to Dr. George D. Herron, November 18 (text printed), stressing the need for modification of the armistice terms and an early publication of the conditions of peace.	21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]
Nov. 20 (5872)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Two notes from the German Foreign Office (texts printed): (1) asking for an extension of the period for evacuating the left Rhine district, and including a note to that effect which was presented to the Allied delegates on the Armistice Commission by the German delegate on November 17 (text printed); (2) asking for an alleviation of the conditions regarding the transfer of locomotives and cars; note to this effect presented to the Allied delegates by the German delegate on November 16, and Marshal Foch's reply that no change could be made (texts printed).	22 [Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9]
Nov. 20 (5330)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum calling attention of American and Allied Governments to certain violations of the armistice conditions by the German army of occupation in Lithuania (text printed). (Footnote: Information that source of memorandum is not indicated.)	24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]
Nov. 20	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)</i> Information, in reply to the Ambassador's inquiry, that the United States is not disposed in the circumstances to raise objection at present to	25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 10]

	the action of the Netherlands Government in permitting German troops to cross Dutch territory.	and Doc. 11]
Nov. 21	<i>The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Information that Italian Government has received communication from German Government asking where its representatives may meet Allied plenipotentiaries to discuss modification of armistice; request for opinion of U. S. Government.	26 [Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13]
Nov. 21 (134)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Telegram from Clemenceau to Foch (text printed) requesting that the German plenipotentiaries be informed that they will be notified of the conditions under which supplies will be furnished to Germany as soon as the U. S. Government representative, Mr. Hoover, arrives in Europe.	26 [Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13]
Nov. 22	<i>The Swedish Legation to the Department of State</i> Information that German Government has made appeal through Swedish Government regarding modification of armistice conditions; regret of the Swedish Government that it does not have sufficient supplies to offer perceptible relief to German people.	27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14]
Nov. 22 (6381)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Foreign Office that U. S. Government has received through the Swiss Legation a request from the Bavarian Government to be allowed to determine damages in Belgium and Northern France. (Footnote: The same, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , on same date to Minister in Belgium.)	28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16]
[Nov. 23] (3182)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Account of a conversation with two Germans not	28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of

	in sympathy with the revolution; opinion of the two Germans that the most potent counter measures against Spartacist influence would be: (a) a more definite statement by President Wilson that relief measures will be undertaken but will be extended only to orderly communities, and (b) a definite pronouncement by the President that no peace can be negotiated or signed with any government not representing the whole people.	Doc. 15 and Doc. 16]
Nov. 24 (3190)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Abrahamson, the British Red Cross delegate to Berlin, had an interview with Erzberger, who begged that the delivery of railway cars and locomotives be postponed until January, offering immediate delivery of 250 million in gold as a guarantee of good faith.	30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18]
Nov. 26 (6014)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by M. Pichon that until the terms of the armistice had been complied with the French Government could not consider the request of the Bavarian Government to be allowed to determine damages in Belgium and Northern France.	30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18]
Nov. 26 (3204)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Description of interviews which Abrahamson had with Solf, Eckhardt, Schlesinger, and Erzberger; Erzberger's opinion as to what steps would have to be taken in order to avoid anarchy in Germany; Abrahamson's suggestion as to what Germany might do to dissipate the distrust on the part of the Allies. Indications that interviews were sought by the Germans.	31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 19]
Nov. 26 (3207)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that French Minister is indignant at activities of British Red Cross delegate,	32 [Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 19

	maintaining that all negotiations concerning armistice conditions should be carried on through Marshal Foch.	and Doc. 20]
Nov. 26	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Protest of German Government, November 21, against extension of evacuation to Rhenish territory (text printed).	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23]
Nov. 26	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that German Government has noted U. S. Government's request that communications be addressed to all the Allied and Associated Powers and suggests that a central diplomatic agency be designated to receive such communications.	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23]
Nov. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)</i> Statement, in reply to Ambassador's letter of November 21, that U. S. Government has referred all letters concerning the armistice to the Supreme War Council at Versailles.	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23]
Nov. 26	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Urgent request from the German Government that experts in economics and railroad technicalities be delegated as soon as possible to the Armistice Commission at Spa (text printed).	34 [Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25]
Nov. 26	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication from the German Government to the American, English, French, and Italian Governments (text printed) setting forth the conditions which it considers necessary in order	34 [Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 ,

	to avoid a Bolshevistic state in Germany and requesting that a place be set where German representatives may meet Allied representatives to discuss the question.	and Doc. 25]
Nov. 27	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication from the German Government (text printed) requesting a modification of the measures which have been taken by the Allies whereby all communications between Alsace-Lorraine and other parts of Germany are interrupted.	36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26]
Nov. 30	<i>The British Embassy to the Department of State</i> Request for the views of the U. S. Government in regard to issuing a statement to allay the fears which the populations of Bavaria and the Palatinate have of being interned or deported for compulsory labor.	37 [Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27]
Dec. 1 (1336)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Inquiry as to U. S. views concerning the custody of Russian and Roumanian gold which Germany is bound to turn over to the Allies. (Footnote: Notation on document as to the Secretary's opinion that France should hold gold in trust for creditor nations until disposed of by the Peace Conference.)	38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29]
Dec. 3 (6020)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Communication received from Swiss Political Department on behalf of German Legation (text printed) explaining the situation of Mackensen's army in Hungary and stating that Germany expects to be allowed to present its standpoint again in a conference with the Armistice Commission.	38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29]
Dec. 3 (5361)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State</i>	39 [Pg. 39 includes

	Note from the German Minister in Switzerland to the President of the Swiss Federal Council, November 21 (text printed), requesting that there be transmitted to the British, French, and U. S. Governments the statement which the German military representative transmitted to the Armistice Delegation at Spa, November 18 (text printed), setting forth the alleviations in armistice conditions necessary to prevent anarchy in Germany.	portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30]
Dec. 4	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> German Government's protest to the U. S. Government against the harshness of the terms of the armistice (text printed).	43 [Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31]
Dec. 6 (3462)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) (tel.)</i> Statement that telegram No. 6020, of December 3, cannot be considered unless it is communicated simultaneously to Associated Governments.	44 [Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]
Dec. 6 (295)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Request that Swiss Government be informed that United States would prefer not to receive from German Government any communications which concern all of the Associated Governments unless they are sent also to the other governments concerned.	45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]
Dec. 7	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Statement that the Supreme War Council at Versailles is a central agency which can receive and consider the wishes of the German Government.	45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]
Dec. 11 (13)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	46 [Pg. 46 is part of

	Copy of a note from the Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland, December 7 (text printed), enclosing four documents and requesting that they be transmitted to U. S. Government (texts printed): (1) request from German Government for additional facilities for repatriating Russian and Roumanian prisoners of war, (2) German Government's suggestion, November 28, that questions concerning resumption of telegraphic communication be considered, (3) suggestion, November 22, of Austro-German Government for revictualing Austro-German provinces, (4) German Government's request that Mr. Hoover be empowered to organize the import of foodstuffs into Germany.	Doc. 35]
Dec. 11	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Information that the question of issuing a statement to reassure the population of Bavaria and the Palatinate has been referred to the representatives of the Associated Governments at Paris.	48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36]
Dec. 11 (11)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Protest by the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office (text printed) against the decision of Marshal Foch whereby all traffic is stopped between the evacuated territories and the other parts of Germany.	49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 37]
Dec. 12	<i>The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Rathbone) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Letter from the Deputy French High Commissioner, December 11 (text printed), advising of the receipt by the Bank of France of 91,000 kilograms of gold representing gold payments made by Russia to Germany under terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.	50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38]

Dec. 13 (25)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from McCormick: Report of a movement to abolish all censorship in the United States; belief that such action would have unfortunate effect; request for President's views.	51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39]
Undated [Rec'd Dec. 19]	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: The President's agreement with views of McCormick that censorship should be maintained insofar as it is part of the blockade.	52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]
1919 Jan. 1 (59)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opinion that blockade in the Baltic should be either entirely abandoned or strictly enforced.	53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]
Jan. 4 (5578)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Note from the German Minister in Switzerland, December 24, 1918, transmitted through the Swiss Political Department (text printed), requesting that the U. S. Government be informed that all notes addressed to it by the German Government have also been addressed to all Allied Governments since the date when the United States requested that such action be taken.	53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]
Jan. 5 (69)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from the German Legation, December 28, 1918, transmitted through the Swiss Political Department, asking for Swiss intervention to the end that German troops and civilians be returned from Turkey through the Mediterranean rather than by way of the Ukraine (text printed).	54 [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43]

Jan. 6 (5617)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement issued by Foreign Office, January 5, to the effect that under certain conditions the British Government may transport troops and stocks via the Scheldt River (text printed).	56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , and Doc. 45]
Jan. 7 (80)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Definite evidence that the British Navy is making no attempt to enforce the Baltic blockade.	56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , and Doc. 45]
Jan. 7	<i>The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> For General Churchill and Mr. Grew: General Pershing's opinion that it is now virtually impossible for Germany to resume hostilities and that it is unnecessary to retain so large an Allied force as the 120 or 140 divisions recommended by Marshal Foch.	57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46]
Jan. 7	<i>The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> For General Churchill and Mr. Grew: Total number of American Expeditionary Forces in various areas on December 31, 1918.	58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49]
Jan. 8 (181)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Rejection by Belgian Government of Bavarian Government's request to be allowed to establish the amount of damage done by German troops in Belgium.	58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 ,

		and Doc. 49]
Jan. 8 (27)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Opinion of the British commander in chief in the Mediterranean that it is necessary to evacuate the German troops from Turkey through the Mediterranean because of the growing difficulties in the Ukraine.	58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49]
Jan. 10 (89)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Fear that British bunkers are being used to break the Baltic blockade; doubt that blockade is necessary but belief that present administration is detrimental to American interests.	59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50]
Jan. 10 (84)	<i>The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from the German Government, transmitted through the Swiss Political Department, asking for authority to send vessels from Hamburg to repatriate German troops on the Black Sea (text printed).	60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]
Jan. 11 (87)	<i>The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Memorandum from the German Government, transmitted through the Swiss Political Department, protesting against measures taken by the French authorities in Alsace-Lorraine (text printed).	61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]
Jan. 13 (79)	<i>The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Memorandum from the German Government, transmitted by the Swiss Political Department, in regard to the evacuation of territories of the former Russian Empire by German troops (text printed).	64 [Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]

Jan. 15 (44)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Proposal by British High Commissioner at Constantinople that German troops be transported home in four German vessels now at Constantinople; British Government's concurrence in proposal.	66 [Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]
Jan. 23 (67)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Letter from Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss to the British Admiralty, attaching a report of the Allied Naval Mission appointed to ensure the execution of article 28 of the armistice (texts printed).	66 [Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]

GERMAN PEACE PROPOSALS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 26	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that German Government would be grateful for an early reply to its communication regarding negotiations for a preliminary peace. (For German note, see abstract of telegram No. 29, December 14, page XII. [Pg. XII is part of List of Papers])	71 [Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
Dec. 2	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Proposal by the German Government that a neutral commission be organized to probe the responsibilities for the war (text printed).	71 [Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
Dec. 11 (6132)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request from Swiss Political Department that, if possible, U. S. Government put it in a position to reply to repeated questions of German Minister	72 [Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , and Doc. 59]

	in regard to date and place of the peace negotiations.	
Dec. 14 (29)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Note from Swiss Legation transmitting communication from German Government expressing anxiety for peace negotiations to begin immediately (texts printed); statement that Department is replying to Swiss Legation that matter has been referred to Commission to Negotiate Peace.	72 [Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , and Doc. 59]
1919 Jan. 6 (119)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Note from British Chargé (text printed) stating that German Government has proposed to British and French Governments that a neutral commission be appointed to probe the responsibilities for the war; setting forth British and French opinion that no reply is necessary since Germany's responsibility is already established; and inquiring as to attitude of U. S. Government. Inclination of Department to adopt course followed by British and French Governments.	73 [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61]
Jan. 8 (71)	<i>The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Information that Swiss Political Department has requested an answer to its note concerning the desire of the German Government to be informed as to the date on which peace negotiations will commence.	73 [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61]
Jan. 10 (229)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Agreement with suggestion that Department follow lines adopted by British and French Governments in regard to German proposal of a commission to fix war responsibility.	74 [Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64]

Feb. 1	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Statement that U. S. Government considers that German proposal does not require an answer since Germany's responsibility for the war has already been established.	74 [Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64]
Feb. 1	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Information that U. S. Government has taken action similar to that of British and French Governments in regard to German proposal.	74 [Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64]

STATUS OF THE FORMER GERMAN EMPEROR

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 29 (2183)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram from the Foreign Minister to the Minister in the United States, November 21 (text printed), giving a résumé of the Premier's statement regarding the ex-Kaiser's status in Holland as a private person.	76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 65]
Nov. 30 (5322)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Text of abdication document signed by Emperor Wilhelm at Amerongen, November 28.	77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]
Dec. 6	<i>The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> President Wilson's unwillingness to commit himself as yet in the matter of ex-Kaiser's punishment.	78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
Dec. 7 (5420)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Text of document by which ex-Crown Prince	78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of

	gives up rights to crown, signed at Wieringen, December 1.	Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
Dec. 10 (5446)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by Foreign Minister that Dutch Government has not been informed by German Government that it would not oppose demand for appearance of ex-Kaiser and ex-Crown Prince before international court; indication, however, that Dutch Government would welcome such a solution.	78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
Dec. 12 (5463)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of German efforts to convince Allies of ex-Kaiser's harmlessness.	79 [Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70]
Dec. 12 (5464)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Memorandum signed by German Minister in the Netherlands attesting to the ex-Kaiser's lack of political relations with Germany (text printed).	80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]
Dec. 31 (2318)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on situation in the Netherlands; Queen's interest in possible visit by President Wilson; evidences of growing irritation at presence of ex-Kaiser.	80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]
1919 Jan. 8 (80)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement made by Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice on the subject of the Government's attitude toward the ex-Kaiser (text printed)	84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]
Jan. 10 (5640)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report on the attempt of Colonel Luke Lea and	85 [Pg. 85 includes portions of

his party to see the ex-Emperor; suggestion that affair be called to the attention of War Department and commander in chief of A. E. F.	Doc. 73 and Doc. 74

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN GERMANY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 11	<i>Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State</i> Résumé of reports which have reached Department in regard to political conditions in Germany: dominance of Social Democrats made up of (1) Independent Socialists (radicals) and (2) Majority Socialists, who favor democratic election of constituent assembly. Suggestion that Majority Socialists would be strengthened by a statement from President Wilson that a German Republic would be welcomed and would be assisted with food supplies.	88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 75]
Nov. 19 (5270)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State</i> Description of the socialist revolution in Germany with names of officials now in power; aim of present government to call a constituent assembly.	89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 76]
Nov. 20 (1301)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Request from German Foreign Minister, Solf, that, in view of threat to present government by radical element, the Entente Powers let it be known that Bolshevism will not be tolerated. Request for observations of U. S. Government.	94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]
Nov. 21 (5873)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Zurich, November 19: Statements by	95 [Pg. 95 includes portions of

	reliable informant that present German Government is controlled by three Majority Socialists, who stand for order, and three Independent Socialists, who have Bolshevik tendencies; that only food can save Germany from Bolshevism; and that President Wilson should make it clear that unless order is maintained, the United States will not help with food.	Doc. 77 and Doc. 78
Nov. 21 (3168)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Opinion that only continued reiteration that an undemocratic Germany cannot expect food from the western democracies will counteract Bolshevik influence.	96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]
Nov. 22 (5897)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Zurich, November 21: Communication from reliable source in Berlin (text printed) describing rise of Spartacus group, left wing of Independent Socialists, and advising ultimatum from Entente Powers.	97 [Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]
Nov. 24 (3187)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that a group of Germans, upon their return to Berlin, intend to propose an appeal to the Associated Governments that a commission be sent to Germany to investigate conditions.	98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]
Nov. 25	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Report by Mr. William C. Bullitt (text printed) showing trend toward Bolshevism in Germany and suggesting steps that should be taken to support moderate democratic socialists (Ebert government).	98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]
Nov. 25	<i>Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State</i>	101 [Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc.

	Fear that Bolshevism in North Germany is inevitable unless action is taken at once.	83 , and Doc. 84]
Nov. 25	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Suggestion that Mr. Hoover might proceed to Berlin in order to study and report on situation there.	101 [Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84]
Nov. 25 (64)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Request that Allied Powers be asked if they would join the President in notifying the Germans that there could be no peace negotiations with them until a constituent assembly had been elected and a definite form of government set up.	102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86]
Nov. 26	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State</i> Opinion of Mr. Rickard that Dr. Taylor and Mr. Kellogg should go to Berlin instead of Mr. Hoover, since they could do so with less publicity.	102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86]
Nov. 26 (3205)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report by a newspaper correspondent in Berlin (text printed) that Scheidemann had said that opposition to constituent assembly would cease if President Wilson should state that only through it could peace be made.	103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]
Nov. 26 (77)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Request that Mr. Hoover be consulted concerning suggestion that Dr. Taylor and Mr. Kellogg proceed to Berlin.	103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]
Nov. 27	<i>The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Statement that, since the President and Secretary of State will soon be in Paris, it seems best to	104 [Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 88 , Doc.

	determine there what measures should be taken in regard to the Bolshevik menace in Germany.	89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91
Nov. 28 (196)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that in hurried conversation Hoover did not seem to think it wise to send men to Berlin at present.	104 [Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91]
Nov. 28 (197)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Memorandum written by Mr. Hoover (text printed) stating that the British have objected to any action on food situation in Germany without their participation and expressing opinion that for amity's sake the British Foreign Office might simply be informed that inquiry agents, Dr. Taylor and Mr. Kellogg, are being sent to Germany.	104 [Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91]
Nov. 30 (5324)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report on the political situation in Germany, with a list of the political parties and their leaders.	105 [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]
Nov. 30 (206)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Note from the French Foreign Minister (text printed) stating objections to sending joint notification to the Germans as proposed in telegram No. 64, November 25.	106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]
Dec. 1	<i>The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Additional reason why French Foreign Minister thinks it unwise to notify Germans that no peace negotiations can take place until a constituent assembly is established in Germany.	107 [Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95]
Dec. 2 (109)	<i>The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Communication from the German Government,	107 [Pg. 107 includes portions of

	transmitted through the Swiss Legation, proposing that the U. S. and Allied Governments send a delegation to Berlin to establish facts in the food situation (text printed).	Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95]
Dec. 3 (6026)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report on political conditions in Germany by Dr. Wilhelm Muehlton, former director of Krupps, now living in Switzerland.	108 [Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96]
Dec. 5 (5404)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that German extremists are rapidly accumulating arms and ammunition; fear that serious conflicts may take place.	110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98]
Dec. 7 (3270)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Indications in German press that some progress has been made in past week toward consolidation of political situation.	110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98]
Dec. 8 (5421)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that fixing of February 16 as date for general elections seems to have strengthened position of the temporary central government at Berlin; other political developments in Germany.	111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]
Dec. 10 (1950)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum by a clerk in the American Legation (text printed) of a conversation with the Deputy Minister of Justice in Prussia, in which the Deputy Minister, a leader of the Independent Socialist Party, explained the origin of the revolutionary movement in Germany.	113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 100]
Dec. 16 (3309)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	121 [Pg. 121 includes portions of

	Report of improved political situation in Germany.	Doc. 100 and Doc. 101
Dec. 21 (5549)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement that the dominance of the Majority Socialist Party seems to be due to support of troops returned from the front.	122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102]
Dec. 21 (3338)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Suggestion that recommendation be made to Allied authorities that prisoners of war be removed from Germany and Denmark as quickly as possible because of Bolshevik influence in those countries.	123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104]
Dec. 29 (5589)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary</i> Information that disorders in Berlin in past week seem to make political changes inevitable; discussion of possibilities.	123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104]
1919 Jan. 6 (76)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum on the prospects of order and ordered government in Berlin prepared in the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, December 21, 1918 (text printed).	125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 105]
Jan. 6 (6859)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> Instructions to obtain views of Foreign Office regarding statement in telegram from U. S. Minister in Switzerland (text printed) that Bavarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed desire to hold elections in Palatinate for National Assembly on January 12 (Similar telegram on same date to Great Britain.)	129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107]
Jan. 11 (6717)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Marshal Foch will permit	129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 105 ,

	elections in that part of Palatinate occupied by France on certain conditions.	Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107]

THE DRESEL MISSION

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 31	<i>Telegram Sent by the Chief of the Special Mission in Germany (Dresel)</i> Report on political conditions in Bavaria. (Footnote: Document bears a notation: "Telegram sent from Berlin Jan. 1st.")	130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 108]
1919 Jan. 10	<i>The Chief of the Special Mission in Germany (Dresel) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Detailed report of trip to Germany December 27, 1918–January 5, 1919; memorandum of interviews with various German leaders and memorandum furnished by Bavarian Minister of Transportation concerning effect of armistice conditions on German railway system (texts printed).	132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109]

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

NEGOTIATIONS WITH, AND CONDITIONS IN, AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 3	<i>Terms of the Armistice With Austria-Hungary</i> With supplement giving details and executive clauses of certain points of the armistice.	175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 110]
Nov. 13	<i>Military Convention Between the Allies and Hungary, Signed at Belgrade</i> Regulating conditions under which the armistice	183 [Pg. 183 is part

	between the Allies and Austria-Hungary is to be applied in Hungary.	of Doc. 110]
Nov. 12 (5512)	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State</i> Cablegram from Swedish Foreign Office (text printed) conveying request of Austro-Hungarian Government that U. S. Government be informed concerning protest made to German Government against entrance of German troops into Austro-Hungarian territory.	185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112]
Nov. 14 (2346)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of renewed discussion of possible territorial expansion of Switzerland.	185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112]
Nov. 15 (2356)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Belief of Swiss Minister in Italy that his Government would be willing to take in Vorarlberg, if the population desired it, but would not go beyond this.	186 [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114]
Nov. 16 (2366)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Receipt of memorandum from Swiss Minister in Italy expressing in writing his attitude as explained in telegram No. 2356, November 15.	186 [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114]
Nov. 16	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication from Government of German Austria begging U. S. Government to obtain	187 [Pg. 187 includes portions of

	consent of Entente Governments for certain German missions to continue in German Austria.	Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]
Nov. 16 (40)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Two communications received through the Swedish Minister (texts printed): (1) from the representatives of neutral powers in Vienna to the Associated Governments advising the occupation of Vienna by Allied forces in order to prevent revolution, (2) from the Austrian Government requesting that Austrian and Hungarian ships be allowed to sail and to bring in food. Two communications received through the Swiss Minister (texts printed): (1) request of commander of forces in the Tyrol that Entente Powers occupy and revictual the Tyrol at once, (2) suggestions of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office for revictualling Austria-Hungary.	188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 116]
Nov. 16 (5582)	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State</i> Message addressed to the President by the Austrian Government asking for his support of the resolution of the Provisional National Assembly that German Austria, as a democratic republic, should be part of the great German republic (text printed).	189 [Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117]
Nov. 18 (46)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Note transmitted by the Swiss Minister setting forth the recommendation of the representatives of neutral countries at Vienna that the Entente occupy Vienna in order to prevent revolution (text printed).	190 [Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118]
Nov. 18 (1060)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum from Swiss Minister in Italy, November 15 (text printed), stating Minister's	191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of

	attitude toward territorial expansion of Switzerland.	Doc. 118 and Doc. 119]
Nov. 19 (5844)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Message addressed by a Viennese organization to President Wilson entreating him to use his influence to the end that no nation should lose its right of self-determination for reasons of retaliation (text printed).	192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]
Nov. 19 (5849)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Message addressed by the Hungarian Foreign Minister to President Wilson appealing to him, and through him to the world, to come to the aid of the young Hungarian democracy (text printed).	193 [Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]
Nov. 26 (5861)	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State</i> Appeal by the President of the National Council of the Ukrainian State of Halycz to President Wilson asking his intervention to prevent the occupation of all of Galicia by Poland and all of Bukowina by Roumania (text printed).	195 [Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]
Nov. 29 (292)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Regret that Minister's note dated November 16 was not received until after November 17, the date set for the evacuation of German troops from Austria.	196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124]
Nov. 30	<i>President Wilson to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Instructions to acknowledge receipt of note No. 5582, dated November 16, from the Swedish Minister and to state that in the conferences at Paris the President will take under serious	196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 ,

	consideration the question of the formation of a Republic of German Austria.	and Doc. 124]
Nov. 30 (5945)	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State</i> Note from the Foreign Office of German Austria, November 26 (text printed), drawing attention of neutral diplomats to encroachments of Czechoslovak troops and requesting that this note be forwarded to the President of the United States and the Entente Governments.	197 [Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125]
Dec. 4	<i>The Italian Chargé (Miniscalchi-Erizzo) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Proposal of a central commission at Vienna to control Austro-Hungarian demobilization; suggestion that United States participate in commission. (Footnote: Transmitted to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 147, December 7, not printed.)	198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126]
Dec. 7 (6000)	<i>The Swedish Legation to the Department of State</i> Protest of German Austria against Yugoslav occupation of Klagenfurt, with request that area be neutralized and occupied by U. S. troops (text printed).	199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128]
Dec. 7	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Ekengren)</i> Request that Swedish Government suggest to Austrian Government that all communications in regard to terms of the armistice should be addressed to all the Associated Governments and not to the United States alone.	199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128]
Dec. 9 (246)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Reasons why French Foreign Office believes that it	200 [Pg. 200 includes

	would be unwise to establish central commission at Vienna; inclination to agree with Foreign Office.	portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]
Dec. 10 (163)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Communication from the Austro-German Government, transmitted by the Swedish Legation, suggesting the occupation of Klagenfurt and Villach by American or English troops as the only way to avoid conflict between Germans and Jugoslavs (text printed).	201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131]
Dec. 11 (1377)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Request for expression of views of U. S. Government concerning request of Austrian Government that U. S. troops be quartered at Klagenfurt and Villach and that territory in question be neutralized; opinion that French and Italian Governments should be consulted before final decision is made.	201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131]
Dec. 12 (3320)	<i>The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Letter from King's Chamberlain (text printed) expressing King's desire that there be brought to the attention of U. S. Government, with a view to consideration by the Peace Conference, a telegram imploring King's protection for Protestant churches of Hungary (text printed).	202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133]
Dec. 13	<i>The Swedish Legation to the Department of State</i> Communication which the Austro-German Government desires to have transmitted to President Wilson (text printed) concerning a proposal that Austro-German Republic and Jugoslav and Czechoslovak states submit frontier disputes to arbitration.	202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133]

Dec. 18	<i>The Department of State to the Swedish Legation</i> Statement that U. S. Government prefers not to receive further communications such as that transmitted in Legation's memorandum of December 13, unless it is clear that they are being sent to all governments concerned.	203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]
Dec. 18	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Chargé (Miniscalchi-Erizzo)</i> Acknowledgment of note of December 4, proposing central commission at Vienna to facilitate Austro-Hungarian demobilization; advice that decision has been made to handle matter through representatives in Paris.	204 [Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]
Dec. 19 (6277)	<i>The Swedish Legation to the Department of State</i> Request of the Hungarian Government that there be transmitted to U. S. Government a communication already sent to Allied Governments (text printed) setting forth desire of Hungarian Government to renew direct relations with said governments. (Footnote: Transmitted to Commission to Negotiate Peace as Department's telegram No. 299, January 18, 1919, with statement that Department has replied that question has been brought to attention of the Mission.)	204 [Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]
Dec. 19 (33)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from Swiss Political Department, December 17 (text printed), quoting communication from Austro-Hungarian Legation at Berne in regard to critical situation of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia and Turkestan.	205 [Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137]
Dec. 21 (96)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Note from French Embassy, November 23 (text printed), stating that Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has expressed wish that Allied	206 [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137]

	diplomatic missions at Berne be authorized to handle all economic questions directly with Austro-Hungarian Legation, and setting forth French Government's opinion that such direct relations must await final peace. Note from Swiss Legation, November 29, enclosing Similar request from Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to U. S. Government (texts printed). Department's inclination to make reply to French Embassy and Swiss Legation giving opinion similar to that of French Government.	and Doc. 138]
Dec. 23 (64)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Approval of proposed replies to French Embassy and Swiss Legation.	207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]
Dec. 29 (53)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from Swiss Political Department, December 27 (text printed), communicating German-Austrian Government's proposal of a mixed commission to discuss the international position of the new German-Austrian State.	208 [Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140]
1919 Jan. 2 (64)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Undated telegram from Hungarian Government proposing to Allied Governments that Hungarian prisoners of war be allowed to communicate with their families and that they be repatriated as soon as possible (text printed).	209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141]
Jan. 8	<i>The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Decision of British, French, and Italian Governments that the French and Italian commanders in chief shall decide the line of demarcation between their zones of action in	210 [Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 141

	Austria, any differences of opinion to be submitted to Marshal Foch to be placed before the interested Governments; three notes implementing decision: (1) from Italian commander in chief, December 10, 1918, (2) from French commander in chief, December 12, 1918, and (3) from Marshal Foch, December 22, 1918 (texts printed).	and Doc. 142]
Jan. 13 (8o)	<i>The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Letter from Count Sigray, informal representative in Switzerland of the Karolyi government in Hungary, concerning the possibility of elections in Hungary, and requesting that matter be referred to U. S. and Allied Governments (text printed).	217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 143]

THE COOLIDGE MISSION

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)</i> Instructions to enter into negotiations with Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary in order that observers of political conditions being sent out by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace may be afforded the necessary assistance by those Governments.	218 [Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146]
Dec. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Assignment to the Commission to Negotiate Peace for the purpose of proceeding to Austria to observe political conditions there and in neighboring countries.	218 [Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146]
Dec. 26	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Professor A. C. Coolidge</i> Directions to establish headquarters in Austria and send out observers to cover former Austro-	218 [Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 144 , Doc.

	Hungarian Empire and adjacent regions, particularly Poland, reporting to the Commission all matters of interest.	145 , and Doc. 146]
Dec. 27	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Intention to leave for Berne immediately for the purpose of proceeding to Austria-Hungary; names of others in group.	219 [Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]
Dec. 31 (3)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of interviews with three Austrian leaders in Berne December 30.	220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 148]
Dec. 31 (4)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Account of an interview, December 30, with Count Sigray, who declared that a statement by the Allies that the settlement in Hungary would be made on the basis of justice and not present military occupation would help situation in Hungary.	221 [Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]
1919 Jan. 1	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor Clive Day, of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Account of two interviews concerning Bulgaria and especially Macedonia, one with Gueshov, former Prime Minister of Bulgaria, and the second with a professor in the University of Sofia.	221 [Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]
Jan. 2 (5)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Recommendation by Count Sigray that an American or British regiment be stationed at Budapest to combat growing Bolshevik peril.	224 [Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153]
Jan. 5 (1)	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Request for recommendations in regard to Count Sigray's suggestion of a joint statement	224 [Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 151 , Doc.

	by the Allies concerning the settlement in Hungary.	152 , and Doc. 153]
Jan. 6	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Attitude that there seems to be no objection to such a joint statement and that it might help to ease Italo-Jugoslav tension also.	224 [Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153]
Jan. 8 [10?]	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of State</i> Request for authorization to use the American consulate in Vienna for working accommodations.	225 [Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]
Jan. 9 (11)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Report of visits by several representatives of the German part of Southern Tyrol to protest against annexation to Italy.	225 [Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]
Jan. 9 (12)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Impressions concerning the situation in Poland.	227 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 156]
Jan. 10 (13)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> First impressions of the situation in Vienna; Government's anxiety to know when, if at all, they will be allowed to send representatives to the Peace Conference.	228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157]
Jan. 11 (14)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Letter from Lieutenant Foster in Warsaw, January 9, describing conditions in Poland (excerpt printed).	229 [Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]
Jan. 12 (15)	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Arguments advanced by German Austrians against the inclusion in the Czechoslovak state	233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

	of large blocks of German population in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.	
Jan. 13	<i>Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor W. E. Lunt, of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Difficulties in discovering present national tendencies of the Ladins; report of a conversation with one representative of the Ladin district.	236 [Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160]
Jan. 16 (37)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Approval of Professor Coolidge's request for use of consular quarters in Vienna.	237 [Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161]

BULGARIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Sept. 29	<i>The Bulgarian Armistice Convention</i> With military covenant regulating conditions of suspension of hostilities.	241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 162]
Nov. 14	<i>The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Intention of Serbian Government to create international commission to investigate violations of the Hague Conventions by the Austrians, Germans, and Bulgarians, and request to United States to appoint a member.	242 [Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163]
Nov. 21 (610)	<i>The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Sofia, November 20: Order from chief of Entente military mission, at direction of French Government, that Bulgaria must evacuate Dobrudja; information that order violates armistice and that Cabinet has resigned; inquiry whether United States can intervene to have order revoked.	243 [Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165]

Nov. 22 (612)	<i>The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Sofia, November 21: Note from Prime Minister to Chief of the Entente mission stating that, since evacuation of Dobrudja would violate armistice, Cabinet is resigning (text printed); belief that prompt action is needed to prevent overthrow of government by French intrigues.	243 [Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165]
Nov. 25	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) (tel.)</i> Attitude of U. S. Government that it cannot properly appoint a member to international commission to investigate Bulgarian atrocities, since U. S. forces did not participate in Balkan campaign.	244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167]
Nov. 29 (190)	<i>The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Roumanian troops have crossed Danube; request from Prime Minister that United States intervene to assure strict adherence to armistice terms. (Footnote: Forwarded to Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 132, December 6.)	244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167]
Nov. 30 (192)	<i>The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that situation in Dobrudja has improved; that Roumanian troops have withdrawn.	245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170]
Dec. 3 (193)	<i>The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement that situation is worse; Bulgaria's desire that English and French troops occupy Dobrudja.	245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170]
Dec. 10 (33 [3?])	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	245 [Pg. 245 includes

	Reports from Red Cross sources that Bulgarian officials are rendering repatriation of Greeks as difficult as possible and subject them to great hardships.	portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170]
Dec. 10 (2)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Report of conversations with Prime Minister and Minister of War, in which appeals were made for American intervention in several situations in Bulgaria.	246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 171]
Dec. 12 (250)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by General Bliss that he sees no remedy for situations such as crossing of Danube by Roumanian troops; that if conditions are serious they will be considered at Peace Conference.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173]
Dec. 12	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Explanation of pro-Bulgarian sympathies of American missionaries in Bulgaria.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173]
Dec. 12 (6)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Bulgaria seems to have no interest in Thrace but is most interested in return of Dobrudja and acquisition of part of Macedonia.	249 [Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]
Dec. 16 (6)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Prime Minister's request that prominent Bulgarians be allowed to lay Bulgarian cause before U. S. delegation at Paris; information that similar request has been made to British and French Governments.	250 [Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]
Dec. 16	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)</i>	251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc.

	Article from <i>L'Echo de Bulgarie</i> , December 13 (text printed), containing important declarations by the Prime Minister, in reply to an interpellation in the Chamber, concerning the situation in Dobrudja.	176]
Dec. 19 (6)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report, based on conclusions drawn from numerous conversations with Bulgarians and others, concerning attitude of Bulgaria toward Allied countries, toward her Balkan neighbors, and toward question of the Dobrudja.	254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177]
Dec. 21 (6414)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Saloniki from Sofia, December 15: Conversation of the Chargé in Bulgaria with the King concerning Bulgaria's situation; King's statement that Bulgaria places her whole reliance upon United States.	257 [Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]
Dec. 21 (8)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Article from <i>L'Echo de Bulgarie</i> , December 18 (text printed), containing extracts from speech of Prime Minister concerning Bulgarian territorial aspirations which it is hoped the Peace Conference will consider favorably.	258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]
Dec. 24	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For American Mission: Entry of Roumanians into Dobrudja; understanding that action is due to orders from Paris; fear that situation may endanger government of Bulgaria.	261 [Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]
Dec. 27 (3)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Consul General at Saloniki (Horton) (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform U. S. Chargé in Bulgaria that Prime Minister's request that Bulgarian representatives be allowed to lay their cause before U. S. delegation in Paris must await	262 [Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]

	French Government's action on similar request addressed to it.	
Dec. 28	<i>Professor Clive Day to Mr. William C. Bullitt</i> Opinion that President Wilson could do much to stabilize conditions in the Balkans if he would give warning that U. S. Commissioners would not recognize changes effected by violence or acts contravening the armistice.	262 [Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]
Dec. 30 (5)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Desire for reply to Bulgarian request for permission to send delegates to Paris.	263 [Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184]
1919 Jan. 1 (8)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Prime Minister's announcement in Parliament of receipt of a telegram from Mr. Hoover indicating possibility of Bulgaria's securing flour from United States; Parliament's vote of thanks to U. S. Government.	263 [Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184]
Jan. 9 (23)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on conditions in Dobrudja; belief that a failure by the U. S. Government to urge observance of armistice will reflect on United States.	264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 185]
Jan. 10 (24)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> <i>Mémoire</i> from the Mayor of Silistra to the officer commanding the British forces in Silistra (text printed) setting forth situation in Dobrudja and begging for a guarantee of Bulgarian rights.	266 [Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186]
Jan. 14 (6738)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy, January 10 (text printed), setting forth Roumanian view of Dobrudja situation.	268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187]

TURKEY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 13 (2337)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Visit from the Armenian Committee to Italy, who called to present the situation and the hopes of Armenia.	271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 188]
Nov. 16	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram from Italian Minister of State, November 8 (text printed), describing meeting held by representatives of Armenia and attended by prominent Italians, at which resolution was passed to apply to President Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando for recognition of the Armenian national delegation headed by Nubar as a government. President Wilson's expression of sympathy for Armenians, and instructions to reply to the telegram that everything possible will be done.	272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 189]
Nov. 19	<i>The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)</i> Memorandum from the Italian Embassy (text printed) in regard to alleged violations of the armistice by Turkey in Tripoli.	273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 190]
Nov. 25 (226)	<i>The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Cairo (Gary) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint declaration by British and French Governments (text printed) that their aim in the East is to emancipate all peoples oppressed by the Turks and to establish national governments which derive their authority from the will of the people.	274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191]
Dec. 4 (623)	<i>The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of many petitions from Greeks for	275 [Pg. 275 includes portions of

	redemption of their fellow countrymen from foreign governments.	Doc. 191 and Doc. 192]
Dec. 6 (4181–4182)	<i>The Greek Legation to the Department of State</i> Description of the serious situation of Christians in Turkey; request that United States begin action necessary to save them.	276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 193]
Dec. 16	<i>The British Embassy to the Department of State</i> Telegram from Foreign Office to British Ambassador in Italy, December 13 (text printed), instructing him to inform Italian Government that there are no grounds for occupation of Constantinople and Anatolia by Italy, but that British Government sees no objection to Italian troops proceeding to Turkey and Thrace.	277 [Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]
Dec. 21	<i>The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Proposals of Allied representatives at Constantinople for removing Germans and Austrians from Turkey; readiness of French Government to accede to propositions; request for attitude of U. S. Government.	278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195]
Dec. 29 (M–5/G)	<i>Admiral W. S. Benson to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Information that State Department does not believe it necessary to send an Admiral as High Commissioner at Constantinople but that Rear Admiral M. L. Bristol has been directed to proceed to Salonica and to hoist his flag on the U. S. S. <i>Nahma</i> .	279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197]
1919 Jan. 2 (351)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Request that German Government be informed that U. S. Government is not in position to intervene in favor of German civilians being permitted to remain in Turkey inasmuch as the United States was not a signatory of the armistice with Turkey.	279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197]

Jan. 4 (1)	<i>The American Commissioner at Constantinople (Heck) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Report on political and economic conditions in Turkey.	280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198]
Jan. 7	<i>Professor W. L. Westermann to Mr. William C. Bullitt</i> Information that letter has been received from delegate of Georgian Government concerning claims of that Government.	283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]
Jan. 22	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Chargé (Valentino)</i> Statement that inasmuch as the United States is not a party to the armistice with Turkey, U. S. Government is unable to take up with British Government the situation created in Tripoli by Turkish violations of armistice.	284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201]
Feb. 6	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the French Chargé (Chambrun)</i> Statement that U. S. Government is not immediately concerned in proposals for removing Austrians and Germans from Turkey, since the United States was not a party to the armistice with Turkey.	284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201]

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS AND RELATIONS WITH NEW STATES

JUGOSLAVIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 11 (89)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Advice that if it is decided to recognize National Council of Zagreb as	287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of

	representative of Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation it might be well to assure Yugoslavs guardedly that their territorial aspirations are a matter for the Peace Conference to settle.	Doc. 202 and Doc. 203
Nov. 12 (128)	<i>The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the formation of the new Yugoslav Government (National Council at Zagreb), the negotiations between it and the Serbian Government for some form of union, and the movements of the Italian forces, which are a source of alarm to both Serbia and the National Council.	287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203]
Nov. 13 (5751)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that communication from the President of the National Council of Zagreb has been received, enclosing protest of National Council to Allies and United States in regard to manner in which terms of armistice are being executed.	291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]
Nov. 13 (2342)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that a delegate from city of Fiume has addressed himself to Allies through Italian Prime Minister, stating that the city has resolved to annex itself to Italy and asks Italian protection during transition.	292 [Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]
Nov. 14 (2349)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that the French are being charged by the British and Italians with being at bottom of present Yugoslav movement along Austrian and Dalmatian coast.	292 [Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]
Nov. 14 (2351)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that naval attaché has referred to Rear Admiral Bullard a communication from	293 [Pg. 293 includes portions of

	the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy requesting a joint occupation of Spalato by Americans, British, French, and Italians.	Doc. 207 and Doc. 208]
Nov. 14 (2355)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of growing tension over Dalmatian question.	293 [Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208]
Nov. 14	<i>The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Irritation felt by Serbian Cabinet members because of Italian attitude in Austrian fleet question and because Italy has occupied alone Fiume and several ports of Dalmatia and Montenegro. (Footnote: Transmitted to Ambassador in France in Department's telegram No. 6312, November 16, with instruction to confer with Colonel House and report how Yugoslav-Italian situation is regarded in Paris.)	294 [Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]
Nov. 16 (2363)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Augmentation of Italian feeling against Yugoslavs by latter's attempts to forestall Italian possession of ports on Adriatic; statement that Italian public now boldly claims Fiume as Italian city.	294 [Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]
Nov. 16 (2368)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that a detachment of troops has occupied Fiume but that doubt exists as to whether they are Italian or international.	295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212]
Nov. 16 (2370)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Summary of general trend of present Italian opinion on Adriatic and Yugoslav questions.	295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc.

		211 , and Doc. 212]
Nov. 18 (2378)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that French have taken over bay near Fiume and that Italians seem to question their reason for doing so.	296 [Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214]
Nov. 18 (2376)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Occupation of Fiume by Italians, November 9; report of serious conditions in Fiume.	296 [Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214]
Nov. 18 (120)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Request from President of Yugoslav Provisional Government that U. S. troops occupy strategic points where it is feared conflicts may occur between Yugoslav and occupying Italian troops; statement that similar request was received recently from Orlando.	297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]
Nov. 18 (5267)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication dated November 11, and enclosure, November 9 (texts printed) to which reference is made in telegram No. 5751, November 13.	298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]
Nov. 19 (50)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> From President Wilson: Instructions to urge Supreme Command to acquiesce in request of President of Yugoslav Provisional Government that U. S. troops occupy strategic points.	301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218]
Nov. 20 (5924)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of discussions with Serbian Minister,	301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of

	with head of Yugoslav movement, and with French Foreign Minister concerning Yugoslav-Italian situation.	Doc. 217 and Doc. 218
Nov. 20	<i>The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Substance of telegram from Serbian Minister of War to Foreign Office reporting that Italian and U. S. forces have landed at Fiume.	303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219]
Nov. 20 (2384)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Inflamed state of Italian public opinion in regard to Adriatic and Yugoslav questions; increasing feeling against the French, who are believed to be stirring up Yugoslav hostility.	304 [Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220]
Nov. 20 (2385)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Expression by King of Italy of pleasure that Allied contingents are going into ports along Eastern Adriatic.	305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]
Nov. 20 (129)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Telegram from the Italian Prime Minister to the Italian Ambassador in France (text printed) setting forth requests made by the French Ambassador in Italy concerning occupation of territory by Italian forces, and Prime Minister's reply as to why it had been necessary for Italy to occupy Fiume.	305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]
Nov. 20 (1306)	<i>The British Embassy to the Department of State</i> Report from British Minister at Nish that Yugoslavs and Serbians have not yet succeeded in arriving at an agreement; Minister's opinion that recognition should not be given Yugoslavs until an accord has been reached.	306 [Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223]
Nov. 21 (2386)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	307 [Pg. 307 includes

	Indignation caused in Italy by transfer of Austro-Hungarian fleet to Jugoslavs; fear of disastrous clash.	portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224]
Nov. 21 (2390)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's expression of apprehension over situation along Eastern Adriatic and his desire that U. S. observers be sent to that region.	308 [Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]
Nov. 22	<i>The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Expression by French naval commander in chief of anxiety at attitude of Italian Government in regard to Eastern Adriatic region.	308 [Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]
Nov. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Discussion with Italian Ambassador of disturbing reports from abroad concerning Italian-Yugoslav relations.	309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227]
Nov. 22 (6379)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Information that the Department has expressed to the Italian Ambassador its concern over Italian-Yugoslav friction in the Adriatic and its hope that Italy will take no step to increase such friction until matters can be discussed at the Peace Conference.	310 [Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229]
Nov. 22 (145)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Communication from British Ambassador to France (text printed) indicating that British Government would favor occupation of strategic points in former empire of Austria-Hungary by U. S. forces; intention to take matter up with Supreme Command as soon as French reply is received.	310 [Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229]

Nov. 24 (163)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by French Foreign Office (text printed) that French Government would favor occupation of strategic points by U. S. troops.	311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231]
Nov. 25 (2406)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of peculiar situation caused by sudden change of Austro-Hungarian officers to Yugoslav officers.	311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231]
Nov. 26 (1072)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State</i> Letter from the Syndic of the Free City of Fiume and the delegate of the National Council of Fiume (text printed) dealing with the history and present status of Fiume.	312 [Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232]
Nov. 26 (2407)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request from Foreign Office that U. S. troops not be withdrawn from Fiume and Cattaro.	314 [Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234]
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Italian Ambassador's belief that it would be dangerous for President Wilson to enter Peace Conference with idea that Pact of London need not be considered, inasmuch as whole of Italy is enthusiastic for it.	314 [Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234]
Nov. 26 (2405)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that situation in Eastern Adriatic is somewhat improved; information that French attitude has changed and that French Admiral has been instructed to act sympathetically with Italians.	315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]

Nov. 27 (2417)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's concern over reported order to withdraw U. S. regiment from Italy; belief that its presence will do much to prevent clashes.	316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237]
Nov. 29 (2426)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of facts brought out at a naval conference concerning the Eastern Adriatic.	316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237]
Nov. 30	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Reasons why the Council at Zagreb has voted for a junction with the kingdom of Serbia.	317 [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]
Dec. 2 (2433)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that friction between Italians and French continues in parts of Eastern Adriatic coast.	318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239]
Dec. 2 (221)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: General Pershing's opinion that U. S. troops already in Italy might be used in occupying disputed areas; telegram from the War Department to General Pershing, November 28 (text printed), directing that U. S. troops be withdrawn from Italy; suggestion that matter be taken up with Secretary of War.	319 [Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]
Dec. 3 (2438)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information concerning the program of certain "Adriatic Deputies" who are ready to go to London or Paris to see President Wilson.	320 [Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242]

Dec. 4 (2445)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report by military attaché of conditions along the Dalmatian coast.	320 [Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242]
Dec. 5	<i>The Serbian Legation to the Department of State</i> Request that U. S. Government use its influence to curb friction between Italy and the National Council in Zagreb.	321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243]
Dec. 6 (1087)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Letter from a deputy to the Dalmatian Diet to the U. S. Ambassador in Italy, November 30 (text printed), setting forth conditions at Spalato and the necessity for its occupation by Allied troops.	322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 244]
Dec. 7	<i>The President of the Italian National Council of Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Expression of confidence that the Peace Conference will recognize Fiume's desire for union with Italy.	323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246]
Dec. 11	<i>The Serbian Legation to the Department of State</i> Note addressed to the Serbian Government by the National Council of Ljubljana (text printed) imploring that U. S. Government be requested to persuade Italians to retire from all Yugoslav territory which they now occupy.	323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246]
Dec. 13	<i>The Serbian Legation to the Department of State</i> Protest to the United States against measures adopted by Italian administration in Yugoslav territory; request that U. S. Government employ most energetic means to influence	325 [Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247]

	Italian Government to change the orders to its troops.	
Dec. 14	<i>The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by Assistant Foreign Minister that, while Serbia will do everything to restrain her troops and the population of Dalmatia, Italy seems bent upon provoking an incident in that region in order to alienate Serbia from her Allies.	326 [Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249]
Dec. 15	<i>Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)</i> Information, transmitted at the request of Colonel House, concerning the probable attitude of President Wilson with regard to the dispute between the Yugoslavs and Italy.	326 [Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249]
Dec. 15	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson</i> Report of activities in the Eastern Adriatic; appointment by Admiral Sims as U. S. representative on a commission to make an inquiry and report to the Allied Governments on the existing situation; belief that there is no necessity for troops in Fiume.	327 [Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250]
Dec. 16	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson</i> Report of events in the Eastern Adriatic; description of Fiume as completely occupied and dominated by Italians.	332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 251]
Dec. 17 (40)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from the Italian Embassy, December 11, concerning the Yugoslav-Italian situation (text printed).	333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252]

Dec. 18 (243)	<i>The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Serbian Government's claim that Italian Army is occupying places in Kranjska in disregard of the demarcation line included in the armistice; anticipation that U. S. Government will endeavor to persuade Italian Government to instruct its Army to keep within limits prescribed in the armistice.	335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]
Dec. 19	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i> Receipt of a memorandum from the National Yugoslav Council of Fiume-Susak setting forth their grievances against the Italians; reasons why they protest against Italian occupation, and remedies which they request.	335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]
Dec. 21 (314)	<i>The President of the Italian National Council of Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Protest against seizure of part of the harbor of Fiume by the French Government as a base for supplying the Eastern Army.	336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255]
Dec. 23	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to President Wilson</i> Belief of the American Peace Commission that President Wilson might find it desirable to authorize the Commission to draw up general rules to govern the use of the U. S. regiment in the Eastern Adriatic region, since it appears that this regiment is being used to further political aims.	337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256]
Dec. 23	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i> Report of unpleasant incident at Spalato between Italian destroyer and Slav population.	338 [Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]
Dec. 25	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean</i>	339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc.

	<i>(Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i> Explanations of conditions at Fiume given to the commission of inquiry by the French General and the Italian Lieutenant General.	258]
Undated	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i> Statement of English General Gordon before naval committee, December 24 (text printed), including assertion that there were no disorders in Fiume before Italians landed. Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Everson (text printed) to the effect that Fiume appears to be occupied by Italians and not by Allies.	340 [Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259]
Dec. 26 (6889)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Communication addressed by the Yugoslav Assembly to the Allied Powers, November 13, protesting against the occupation by the Italian naval forces of certain territory claimed by the Yugoslav nation (text printed).	341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260]
Dec. 26	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i> Information that naval committee has reconvened but that inquiry is delayed in order to permit Italian Admiral to consult his Government.	342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261]
Dec. 27 (33)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> From chief of American military mission at Padua: Report on inquiries into situation in territory occupied by Italians.	343 [Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263]
Dec. 29	<i>The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson (tel.)</i>	343 [Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc.

	Testimony given to naval authorities by inhabitants of outlying districts.	262 , and Doc. 263]
Dec. 31	<i>The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State and the Department: Report of alleged acts of intrigue and aggression by Italy against Serbia and her interests.	344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]
1919 Jan. 6	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Request for expression of views concerning matters reported by the Chargé in Serbia in his telegram <i>supra</i> .	345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267]
Jan. 9	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Difficulty in dealing with matters reported by the Chargé in Serbia; suggestion that they might be called to the attention of Baron Sonnino, since he is in Paris.	345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267]
Jan. 9	<i>The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that a single government has been set up representing Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene countries of former Austria-Hungary; willingness of France to recognize the new state if U. S., British, and Italian Governments desire to do so; inquiry as to U. S. intentions.	345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267]
Jan. 10	<i>The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Statement that British and Italian Governments prefer that question of recognition of the new state be settled by the Peace Conference; suggested reply (text printed) to Serbian note on the subject.	346 [Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268]

MONTENEGRO

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 21 (5958)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Receipt of a letter from the President of the Montenegrin Committee for National Union, violently attacking King Nicholas.	347 [Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271]
Nov. 22 (5970)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Receipt of a note from Montenegrin Government complaining against actions of Serbia and stating that Serbia plans to absorb Montenegro against the wishes of the Montenegrin people.	347 [Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271]
Nov. 27	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that a note dated November 25 has been received from the Montenegrin Government complaining of Serbian penetration.	347 [Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271]
Dec. 4 (124)	<i>The Montenegrin Minister (Gvosdenovitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Despatch from the Acting Foreign Minister (text printed) denying report that National Assembly has met, deposed the King, and voted for union with Serbia.	348 [Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272]
Dec. 4 (3447)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) (tel.)</i> Instructions to investigate press reports indicating that the King of Montenegro has been deposed.	349 [Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274]
Dec. 7 (149)	<i>Manifesto of the National Executive Committee of Montenegro Directed to the Government of the United States</i> Resolutions passed by the Great Servian National Assembly of Montenegro at Podgoritza	349 [Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274]

	deposing King Nicholas and proclaiming the union of Serbia and Montenegro.	
Dec. 7	<i>The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Copy of a telegram officially forwarded to the Chargé (text printed) concerning the union of Montenegro and Serbia.	350 [Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]
Dec. 7	<i>The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Communication from the Serbian Prime Minister containing declaration, December 1, by representatives of the Yugoslav National Council of Zagreb to the Prince Regent of Serbia and the Prince Regent's reply proclaiming the union of the two states in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (texts printed).	351 [Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]
Dec. 9 (4)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Confirmation by pro-Serbsians that Montenegro is discontented.	354 [Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]
Dec. 12 (6139)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information, in reply to telegram No. 3447, of December 4, concerning the meeting at Podgoritza of representatives of the Montenegrin National Committee.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279]
Dec. 13 (6159)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Receipt of a note from the Montenegrin Committee for National Union announcing the action of the National Assembly at Podgoritza; receipt also of a note from the Montenegrin Government stating that the action was illegal since the National Assembly is nonexistent.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279]
Dec. 18 (135)	<i>The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report of information obtained from various	356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 280]

	sources concerning the action of the National Assembly at Podgoritza.	
Dec. 24 (145)	<i>The Secretary of the Montenegrin Legation (Matanovitch) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Telegram from the Acting Foreign Minister, December 23, denying report that National Assembly has voted for annexation to Serbia (text printed).	358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282]
Dec. 28	<i>The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)</i> Statement that Montenegro is formally blockaded by Serbian authorities; appeal to Allies that blockade be removed, that Allied troops be sent to Montenegro, and that the Serbian troops and authorities be sent away.	358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282]
1919 Jan. 4	<i>The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Letter addressed by the Montenegrin Acting Foreign Minister to the American Chargé, December 29, 1918 (text printed), protesting against the actions of the Serbian Government, and enclosing a note from the Serbian Chargé near the Montenegrin Government, December 28, 1918 (text printed), stating that his function has come to an end because of the union of Montenegro and Serbia.	359 [Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283]
Jan. 4 (20)	<i>The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)</i> Statement bringing to the attention of the Allies the proceedings of Serbia against Montenegro.	361 [Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285]
Jan. 4 (17)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Intention of British Government to protest to Serbian Government against their action in creating a <i>fait accompli</i> in Montenegro, thus attempting to prejudice the decisions of the	361 [Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285]

	Peace Conference; desire that Associated Governments take similar action.	
Jan. 7	<i>King Nicholas I of Montenegro to President Wilson</i> Appeal to President Wilson; hope that United States and Allies will compel Serbia to right the wrong she has done.	362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]
Jan. 7 (54)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement by the Montenegrin Peace Conference delegate that the Montenegrin peasant party staged a revolution January 3 and have demanded an Allied occupation of Montenegro.	365 [Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287]
Jan. 8 (60)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Three telegrams from Cattaro, January 6 and 7, concerning the French-Serbian penetration to put down Montenegrin revolution (texts printed).	366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]
Jan. 9 (61)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram to the Italian Minister of Marine from Cattaro, January 8, setting forth appeal from the insurgents (text printed).	367 [Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290]
Jan. 9	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestion that the Secretary point out to the Serbian representative at the Peace Conference the serious view which the United States takes of Serbia's actions in Montenegro.	367 [Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290]
Jan. 9	<i>President Wilson to King Nicholas I of Montenegro</i> Promise that interests of Montenegro will be given sympathetic consideration.	368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , and Doc. 292]

Jan. 10	<i>Manifesto of Certain Montenegrins Resident in France Directed to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)</i> Protest against Serbia's actions; appeal that principle of free disposition of peoples be applied in all Yugoslav countries.	368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , and Doc. 292]
Jan. 11	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Request for advice as to the wisdom of giving King Nicholas an audience.	370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Jan. 13	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Belief that it would be unwise at the present time to have an interview with King Nicholas.	370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Jan. 13 (208)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Inquiry as to whether there are persons in Paris who could be sent to Montenegro to investigate and report on situation there.	370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295]
Jan. 14 (2538)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report concerning situation in Montenegro; fear that it may soon become irremediable.	371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]
Jan. 24 (425)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that the military attaché at Rome has been directed to send Captain James Bruce to observe conditions in Montenegro.	372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

ALBANIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 16 (315)	<i>The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Statement, in reply to British inquiry, that the U. S. Government is not contemplating any action regarding Albania pending the Peace Conference.	373 [Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299]
Nov. 19 (1292)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that the British Government has stated to the Italian Government that it has no objections to the Albanians expressing their views on the future organization of Albania but that it trusts no action will be taken on these proposals pending the decision of the Peace Conference.	373 [Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299]
Dec. 20 (72)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from the Italian Embassy enclosing a letter concerning the future of Albania addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Albanian residents in Switzerland (texts printed).	374 [Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300]
1919 Jan. 9	<i>The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from the Italian Embassy in France, December 30, 1918 (text printed), stating that an assembly of Albanians has voted the constitution of a provisional government and that the Italian Government has advised them that there is no reason to take action prior to the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the political situation of Albania.	375 [Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 18 (10241)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State</i> Note from the British Foreign Minister, November 13, together with a memorandum, November 4, setting forth some of the difficulties involved in the consideration of the future boundaries of the Czechoslovak state (texts printed).	376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 302]
Nov. 21 (5652)	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State</i> Communication to the President of the United States from the National Representation of German Bohemia, transmitted through the Swedish Government, proclaiming the right of German Bohemia to be a part of the German Republic and protesting against oppression by Czech forces (text printed).	377 [Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303]
Dec. 2 (3236)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Activities of Czechoslovaks in districts of Hungary and Bohemia as reported in the German and Danish press.	378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304]
Dec. 13	<i>The Swedish Legation to the Department of State</i> Communication for President Wilson from the Austro-German Government, transmitted through the Swedish Government (text printed), requesting that no decision be made as to the fate of Bohemia and Moravia except on the basis of a plebiscite.	379 [Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306]
Dec. 20	<i>The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš) to the Secretary of State</i> Objections to German-Austria's request for a plebiscite; boundaries which it is suggested that	379 [Pg. 379 includes portions of

	the Allies fix temporarily, leaving the final decision to the Peace Conference. Copy of the reply of the French Government, December 19 (text printed), to the request of the German-Austrian Government.	Doc. 305 and Doc. 306
Dec. 23	<i>The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Communication from the German-Austrian Government, transmitted by the Swedish Government, taking exception to the occupation of certain territory by the Czechoslovak forces. (Transmitted simultaneously to all the Allies.)	383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]
1919 Jan. 4	<i>The Secretary of State to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš)</i> Statement that the Foreign Minister's note of December 20, 1918, has been attentively read and forwarded to the Department of State at Washington.	384 [Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]

ROUMANIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 9 (133)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of an audience with the King, in which the latter expressed his gratitude for the Secretary's statement in favor of union of all Roumanians who live in territory adjoining Roumania, and his agreement to the Minister's suggestion that Roumania enter the war; information that mobilization of the army has been ordered. Telegram from the Queen (text printed) expressing her gratitude for the Secretary's statement.	385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 309]

Nov. 10 [134]	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Two communications, one from the Roumanian Government, and one from the King, expressing gratification in regard to the attitude of the United States (texts printed).	386 [Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310]
Nov. 12 (139)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of an audience with the Queen in which she expressed thanks to Americans and inquired concerning foodstuffs to be sent by American Red Cross.	387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312]
Nov. 13 (142)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Memorandum from the Roumanian Government setting forth reasons why Roumania is entitled to a realization of her claims (text printed).	387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312]
Nov. 17 (1102)	<i>The Roumanian Chargé (Lahovary) to the Secretary of State</i> Cablegram dated November 10 from the President of the Council (text printed) giving information that German commander has been notified that Roumania will use force if Germans fail to comply with the order to evacuate Roumanian territory within 24 hours.	388 [Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]
Nov. 20 (5923)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 10 (text printed), concerning Roumania's re-entry into the war.	389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314]
Nov. 22 (5975)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 17 (text printed), conveying request of Roumanian Government that action be taken to stop German seizures of railway rolling stock.	390 [Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316]

Nov. 24	<i>Queen Marie of Roumania to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Statement of gratitude for the help being given to Roumanians by the American Red Cross.	390 [Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 314, Doc. 315, and Doc. 316]
Nov. 25 (6003)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 21 (text printed), stating that the national committee of Dobrudja has requested that action be taken to hasten the departure of Bulgarian troops from Dobrudja.	391 [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 317, Doc. 318, and Doc. 319]
Nov. 26 (6023)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 20 (text printed), stating that the delegates of the National Council of Transylvania have declared their intention to unite with Roumania.	391 [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 317, Doc. 318, and Doc. 319]
Nov. 27 (6029)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 23 (text printed), conveying request of the Roumanian Government that a mixed commission of Allied and Roumanian officers oversee the retreat of the German troops in Transylvania in order to prevent depredations.	391 [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 317, Doc. 318, and Doc. 319]
Nov. 27 (6036)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 23, transmitting note of Roumanian Government concerning Dobrudja (text printed), which states that Roumanian troops have been ordered to cooperate with Allied troops in carrying out armistice provisions relating to territory evacuated by the enemy.	392 [Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320]

Nov. 28 (3222)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Advice that the Danish press reports that Roumania has delivered an ultimatum to Hungary.	393 [Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322]
Nov. 30	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of removal of the Roumanian Government to Bucharest.	393 [Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322]
Dec. 2 (6)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Description of the celebration of the Roumanian Government's return to Bucharest.	394 [Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324]
Dec. 4 (6123)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 24 (text printed), stating the attitude of the Roumanian Government that Dobrudja is not debatable territory and that Roumanian authorities should be reinstalled at once.	394 [Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324]
Dec. 6	<i>President Wilson to Queen Marie of Roumania (tel.)</i> Assurances that Americans will always consider it a privilege to be of assistance to the people of Roumania.	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326]
Dec. 7	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House</i> <i>Aide-mémoire</i> from the Roumanian Legation in Switzerland (text printed) giving information concerning the proclamation of union with	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 ,

	Roumania made by the delegates of the Roumanian provinces of Hungary and Transylvania in a meeting at Alba Julia on December 1.	and Doc. 326]
Dec. 9 (6579)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Instructions to ascertain whether the new Roumanian Government has declared war on Germany and how the French Government views the matter.	396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327]
Dec. 11 (6234)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, November 12 (text printed), explaining that all movements of Roumanian forces ceased when so ordered by Marshal Foch, but that it is necessary that they be used to maintain order in places where anarchy threatens.	397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329]
Dec. 12 (6244)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that M. Pichon states that the present Government of Roumania cannot declare war on Germany and that the new Government will not go into power until January, but that he regards Roumania as an ally to all intents and purposes.	397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329]
Dec. 12 (6258)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Conversations with the Roumanian Ministers to France and to the United States, in which both declared that unless the Allies desired her to do so, Roumania would not declare war on Germany.	398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331]
Dec. 14 (26)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from Roumanian National Council, Vienna, December 9 (text printed), charging that the Serbs have prevented the	398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 330

	return of the Roumanians of the Banat who attended the meeting at Alba Julia December 1, and requesting that another Entente army replace the Serbian army of occupation.	and Doc. 331]
Dec. 16 (6303)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, December 12 (text printed), conveying the Foreign Minister's request that the Governments send delegates to the European Commission of the Danube at Galatz.	399 [Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334]
Dec. 19 (6395)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Roumania has not declared war on Germany.	399 [Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334]
Dec. 19 (58)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Opinion that the division of the Banat will have to be left to the Peace Conference in order to avoid trouble between the Roumanians and the Yugoslavs.	399 [Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334]
Dec. 23 (6447)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Embassy has sent to the American Mission copies of all joint telegrams from the Allied Ministers at Jassy and any other communications thought to be of interest to the Mission.	400 [Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336]
Dec.[27] (32)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that conflict between Roumanians and Serbians on account of Banat has already commenced.	400 [Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 ,

		and Doc. 336]
Dec. 27 (34)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Telegram regarding the claims of Roumania sent by the French, British, and Italian Ministers to their Governments (text printed).	402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338]
Dec. 28 (35)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that the committee of Transylvanians who brought the documents of their union with Roumania have asked that their thanks be extended to President Wilson and the United States for freeing them from Hungary.	402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338]
Dec. 30 (6572)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, December 27 (text printed), expressing opinion that in order to avoid conflict all of Banat must be occupied temporarily by Allied troops.	403 [Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339]
1919 Jan. 4	<i>The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestion that U. S. and Allied Governments inform the Roumanian Government that the Peace Conference alone can decide the fate of Banat and Transylvania.	404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341]
Jan. 7	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that the Prime Minister called a meeting of the U. S. and Entente Ministers, at which he expressed his dissatisfaction with treatment he is receiving from the Entente.	404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341]
Jan. 10	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State</i> Conversations with Roumanian and Serbian representatives concerning the problem of Banat.	405 [Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 ,

		and Doc. 343]
Jan. 10 (10)	<i>The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For the Secretary and the Department: Assurances given by the Serbian Chief of Staff concerning internment of Roumanians in Banat.	405 [Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343]
Jan. 11 (6707)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Identical telegram from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, January 6 (text printed), transmitting declaration by the President of the Council that Roumania would not object to the designation of arbiters by the Allies to examine the populations of Banat (text printed).	406 [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344]
Jan. 13	<i>The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand)</i> Statement that the American Embassy in France has been instructed to take appropriate action in regard to the suggestion set forth in the French Ambassador's letter of January 4.	407 [Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345]

POLAND

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 14 (5775)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that the Regency has requested Pilsudski to form a government for all of Poland including Silesia.	408 [Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347]
Nov. 15 (1278)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Statement that the representative in London of the Polish National Council has been informed that the British Government	408 [Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347]

	would view with displeasure any act by the Polish Government intended to prejudge the decisions of the Peace Conference.	
Nov. 16 (5208)	<i>The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Reasons given by the unofficial representative in Holland of the Polish Government why it is necessary that the government being formed in Poland be recognized by the Allies and the United States.	409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 348]
Nov. 18	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Telegram from General Pilsudski to President Wilson, November 17, requesting that Polish military formations now under U. S. flag be sent to Poland (text printed).	410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350]
Nov. 18 (6791)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum from the Polish National Committee, November 13, protesting against Ukrainian occupation of Lwow and Przemyśl and against German attempts to prevent union of Galicia and Poland (text printed).	410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350]
Nov. 26	<i>The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Desire to know whether the U. S. Government is ready to agree to recognition by the Allies of the Polish National Committee as a <i>de facto</i> government.	412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351]
Nov. 28	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Answers to queries concerning matters affecting the Polish situation.	413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353]
Nov. 29 (102)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Instructions that any Americans sent to	413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of

	Poland should investigate alleged mistreatment of Jews by Poles and report matter to the Department.	Doc. 352 and Doc. 353
Dec. 5 (2447)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Anxiety of Polish Committee in Italy regarding exaggerated reports of pogroms in Galicia; Committee's desire that U. S. troops be sent to Poland.	414 [Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355]
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by Major Julian L. Coolidge</i> Reasons why Polish troops now in France should be sent to Poland, and some of the difficulties involved.	414 [Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355]
Dec. 12 (2)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Statement by the Lithuanian Bureau of Information at Lausanne with regard to the Polish occupation of Lithuanian territories (text printed).	416 [Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358]
Dec. 21 (6704)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Instructions to investigate and report on relations between Polish National Committee in Paris and Polish officers in charge of affairs in Poland.	416 [Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358]
Dec. 27	<i>The President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski) to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram, December 16, from the Poles of the former German Empire to President Wilson on his arrival on the Continent (text printed); resolutions of the Local Parliament at Posen in regard to the aims of Poland (texts printed).	416 [Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358]
Undated [Rec'd Dec. 29]	<i>The President of the National Council of the Western Ukrainian Republic (Petrouchevitch) to the Acting Secretary of</i>	420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 359]

	<i>State (tel.)</i> Protest against the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia and the Roumanian occupation of the Ukrainian parts of Bukowina.	
1919 Undated [Rec'd Jan. 1] (64)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from a member of the Polish Mission describing conditions in Lithuania and requesting that Germans be compelled to allow passage of Polish troops to Vilna (text printed).	421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 360]
Jan. 3 (1995)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum dated January 1 (text printed) giving a description of M. Paderewski's visit to Posen as set forth in a despatch by the British military attaché in Copenhagen.	422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 361]
Jan. 3 (81)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Opinion of Secretary of War that enlistment of Polish troops in the United States should stop, since Poles are apparently beginning hostilities against friendly nations. (Footnote: Reference to Department's telegram No. 236, January 15, for correction.)	424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363]
Jan. 4 (70)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Colonel House from Paderewski: Plea for U. S., British, and French troops and materials in order to save Polish territory from Bolshevists.	424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363]
Jan. 6 (174)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Request for text of reply	425 [Pg. 425 includes portions of

	which the Department made to the French Ambassador's note of November 26, 1918, concerning the recognition of the Polish National Committee.	Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365]
Jan. 6	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Inquiry as to answer to be made to Secretary of War concerning enlistment of Polish troops in the United States.	425 [Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365]
Jan. 8 (6655)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report on relations between the Polish National Committee at Pan's and the Pilsudski government in Poland.	426 [Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366]
Jan. 9	<i>Colonel William R. Grove to General Marlborough Churchill</i> Report on conditions in Poland.	427 [Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367]
Jan. 9 (212)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request for full details in regard to report in Department's telegram No. 81 of January 3 that Poles are beginning hostilities against friendly nations.	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , and Doc. 370]
Jan. 9	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Statement that it is out of the question to allow Poles to be enlisted in the United States to fight against friendly nations; opinion that Polish representatives should be so informed before official action is taken.	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , and Doc. 370]
Jan. 13	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)</i> Request that Chargé get in touch with Polish	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 368 , Doc.

	representatives in Paris as suggested by President Wilson.	369 , and Doc. 370]
Jan. 15 (236)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that Department's telegram No. 81, January 3, reads: "Poles are apparently beginning hostilities against Germans."	431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372]
Jan. 17	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Statement by the President of the National Polish Committee at Paris that it was his impression that orders had been given to discontinue recruiting in the United States for the Polish Army.	431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372]
Jan. 18 (297)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that the Department has not answered the French Ambassador's note of November 26, 1918, because of uncertainty as to relations between Polish National Committee and other Polish factions.	432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374]
Jan. 23	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Decision by the National Polish Committee to order discontinuance of further recruitment in the United States.	432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374]
Jan. 25 (436)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that Chargé in France has been assured that recruiting for the Polish Army in the United States is being discontinued.	433 [Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , and Doc. 376]
Jan. 27	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i>	433 [Pg. 433 includes portions of

	Communication from the Polish National Committee, January 25 (text printed), confirming that on January 23 the necessary orders were given to end recruiting in the United States for the Polish Army.	Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , and Doc. 376]

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 7 (636)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock), Temporarily at Le Havre, France, to the Secretary of State</i> Explanation of peculiar situation of the territory of Moresnet; Belgian hope that it will be annexed to Belgium at the Peace Conference.	435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 377]
Nov. 11	<i>Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide of Luxemburg to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Plea for the President's intervention against the passage of German troops through Luxemburg, and for his protection of the rights and interests of Luxemburg at the peace negotiations.	436 [Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379]
Nov. 13	<i>The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum setting forth the Belgian Government's attitude toward Luxemburg (text printed).	436 [Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379]
Nov. 15	<i>The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State</i> Hope that the U. S. Government will take into account certain facts which indicate the desire of the people of Luxemburg for a closer union with Belgium.	440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380]
Nov. 16	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Instruction to inform Grand Duchess Marie that her request concerning the passage of	441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc.

	troops has been transmitted to the Supreme War Council.	380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382
Nov. 21	<i>The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State</i> Information in regard to the political situation in Luxemburg.	441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382]
Nov. 28 (158)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by a deputy from Luxemburg that enlightened opinion there favors an arrangement looking to possible reunion with Belgium.	442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384]
Dec. 7 (162)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Evidences that the French Government desires to annex Luxemburg.	442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384]
Dec. 9	<i>The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Hope that the U. S. Government will support the Belgian Government in its views in regard to restoring normal traffic on the lower Scheldt.	443 [Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386]
Dec. 15 (164)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For Mr. Lansing: Refusal of Marshal Foch to allow Belgian troops to participate in the occupation of Luxemburg; Belgian Government's desire for General Pershing's assistance in the matter.	443 [Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386]
1919 Jan. 4 (69)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram from the Foreign Minister of Luxemburg (text printed) stating that his Government has cancelled its conventions with Germany and desires to begin	444 [Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387]

	negotiations for an economic understanding with the Entente countries.	
Jan. 9 (83)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that a note has been received from the Foreign Minister of Luxemburg giving the dates of the cancelled conventions.	445 [Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389]
Jan. 11 (Lux. 12)	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Note from the Foreign Minister of Luxemburg, December 31, 1918 (text printed), announcing the cancellation of the conventions with Germany of November 11, 1902, as well as the treaty of October 25, 1865.	445 [Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389]

AALAND ISLANDS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 12 (1486)	<i>The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that the Executive Committee of the Provincial Assembly of the Aaland Islands has addressed a message to President Wilson expressing the wish of the inhabitants that those Islands be joined to Sweden.	447 [Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391]
Nov. 25 (3213)	<i>The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Conversation with the King of Sweden, in which the King expressed his hope that President Wilson will help in settling the question of the Aaland Islands in such a way that they may become a part of Sweden.	447 [Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391]

SCHLESWIG

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 21 (55)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> From Copenhagen: Report that a letter from Solf was read at a meeting at Aabenraa to the effect that the North Schleswig question would be settled on the basis of self-determination.	450 [Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394]
Nov. 30 (101)	<i>The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> From Copenhagen: Report that a statement has been sent to Danish Government wherein the Danish population of North Schleswig ask Denmark to accept Danish part of that province and also to bring up North Schleswig question at the Peace Conference.	450 [Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394]
Dec. 5 (1930)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Request by the Danish Foreign Minister that the Associated Governments inform him as to what further measures his Government should take to obtain a solution of the Schleswig question.	450 [Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394]
Dec. 5 (1356)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Proposal of the British Government to reply to the Danish Foreign Minister that his Government should place before the Allies an official request that the Schleswig question be considered by the Peace Conference; request for views of the U. S. Government.	451 [Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395]
Dec. 13 (2415)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)</i> For the information of Colonel House: Three despatches from the Legation in Denmark in regard to the cession of North Schleswig (texts	452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 396]

	printed): (1) November 8, regarding political situation in Denmark, (2) November 8, enclosing a memorandum by the Danish Minister for Defense setting forth Denmark's desire to regain only that part of Schleswig inhabited by Danes (text printed), (3) November 12, concerning German attitude in the matter.	
Dec. 13 (3298)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Formal request by Danish Foreign Minister that the Peace Conference take under consideration the North Schleswig question.	456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397]
Dec. 14	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Statement that the U. S. Government is in accord with the British Government in regard to the action to be taken by the Danish Government.	457 [Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399]
Dec. 14 (1962)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Note from the Danish Foreign Minister, December 12, making formal request to the U. S. Government that the North Schleswig question be brought before the Peace Conference (text printed).	457 [Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399]
Dec. 21 (91)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of action taken in regard to Danish Foreign Minister's request for information.	458 [Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , and Doc. 401]
1919 Jan. 3 (85)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that Department has been informed that Danish Government has requested British Government to raise the Schleswig question at the Peace Conference.	458 [Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 ,

		and Doc. 401]
Jan. 4 (2005)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Resolution by the leaders of the Electoral Association of North Schleswig, December 30, 1918 (text printed), reiterating their desire for a solution based on self-determination, and protesting German attempts at obstruction.	459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402]
Jan. 7	<i>The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that the French Government is willing that the Schleswig question should be submitted to the Peace Conference; exchange of letters on the subject, December 10 and December 12, 1918, between the French Minister in Denmark and the Danish Foreign Minister (texts printed).	460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403]
Jan. 9	<i>The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand)</i> Expression of gratitude at receiving information contained in the exchange of letters.	461 [Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404]

RUSSIAN AFFAIRS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 2 (1403)	<i>The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Suggestion that the Associated Governments obtain access to the archives of the former German Government in order to secure information concerning the Bolshevik movement.	465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406]
Dec. 2 (115)	<i>The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i>	465 [Pg. 465 includes

	Information in regard to the situation in various parts of Russia.	portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406]
Dec. 2 (10300)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State</i> Letter from the diplomatic representative of Esthonia in London, November 26, protesting against acts of violence by the German Army in Esthonia (text printed).	467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407]
Dec. 4 (3247)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information concerning the political situation in Finland, the Baltic provinces, and Lithuania.	468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408]
Dec. 4 (227)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Expression of appreciation for Department's telegram No. 115, December 2, concerning the situation in Russia.	469 [Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409]
Dec. 6 (134)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Opinion that Associated Governments might well consider suggestion of Minister in Norway concerning the archives of the former German Government.	470 [Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412]
Dec. 8 (241)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Recommendation that the United States lend assistance in facilitating the return of Roumanian prisoners from Russia.	470 [Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412]
Dec. 9 (154)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Inquiry as to action taken or contemplated by the Supreme War Council in regard to critical condition of Russian officers now prisoners in Germany.	470 [Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412]
Dec. 10	<i>Memorandum by Lieutenant A. A. Berle, Jr.</i> Report on the background and results of	471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc.

	American economic intervention in Russia.	413]
Dec. 11 (248)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement that the situation of the Russian officers now prisoners in Germany has not been considered by the Supreme War Council.	476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415]
Dec. 13 (Misc. 11)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement of the peace terms regarding Russia which the Russian Ambassador wishes to present to the Peace Conference (text printed).	476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415]
Dec. 18 (183)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Department's opinion that the Peace Conference should consider the question of relief for the Russian officers in prison in Germany.	477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , and Doc. 417]
Dec. 24 (6752)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Department's opinion that the Associated Governments should adopt a policy and plan in regard to (1) Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria and (2) German and Austrian prisoners in Russia.	477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , and Doc. 417]
Dec. 25 (43)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Belief that the relief of Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria is a proper work for the American Red Cross.	478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419]
Dec. [27] (11)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Secretary Lansing: Opinion that Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States should agree on a joint expression of opinion in regard to Japanese activities in Siberia.	478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419]
Dec. 27 (13)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	479 [Pg. 479 includes

	For Secretary Lansing: Information regarding Siberia; opinion that the United States cannot consent to Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.	portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420]
Dec. 30 (36)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Letter from the representative of the provisional government of Latvia protesting! against violations of the armistice by German troops.	480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421]
Dec. 30	<i>Memorandum by Mr. A. W. Dulles</i> Description of situation in Lithuania and Poland, and assertion that the moment seems propitious for cooperation between these two countries, with Allied assistance, to combat Bolshevism.	481 [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422]
Dec. 31 (57)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State from Polk: Inquiry as to whether the President objects to the Acting Secretary's appearing before an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to answer questions on the Government's Russian policy.	483 [Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423]
1919 Jan. 2 (131)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Hope of being able to take up the Siberian railway situation with President Wilson on his return from London.	484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425]
Jan. 2 (61)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information that Red Cross War Council at Washington is of opinion that supplying Russian prisoners is beyond their scope; belief that matter requires concerted action of Associated Governments.	484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425]
Jan. 6 (3408)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	485 [Pg. 485 includes

	Desire of Lithuanians for U. S. troops and money to help stem Bolshevik tide.	portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427]
Jan. 11 (250)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Statement that the President sees no objection to the Acting Secretary's appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.	485 [Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427]

THE FAR EAST

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 14	<i>The Chargé in Siam (White) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that Siamese Government has not formulated a program to present to the Peace Conference; indications of a hope that Allies will abrogate their extraterritorial rights in Siam.	489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 428]
Nov. 23 (2342)	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on China's aims at the Peace Conference; principles of action on which it is believed necessary that the Great Powers agree; memorandum by the Adviser to the Chinese Government and a letter from the Legal Adviser to the Chinese Government, November 18, both on the subject of China's position at the Peace Conference (texts printed).	491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429]
Nov. 24	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Conversation with the Foreign Minister in regard to the proposals which the Chinese delegates will probably make to the Peace Conference; opinion as to the considerations	507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430]

	essential to a permanent settlement of Far Eastern problems.	
Nov. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)</i> Conversation with the Chinese Minister concerning China's program for the Peace Conference: (1) territorial integrity, (2) political sovereignty, and, (3) physical and economic independence.	509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431]
Dec. 14	<i>The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison)</i> Memorandum on the disposition of the ex-German islands of the Pacific Ocean now in the possession of Great Britain and Japan (text printed).	511 [Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432]
Dec. 16 (6648)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Secretary Lansing: Information that the Japanese are trying to conclude an agreement with the Chinese in regard to the Shantung Railway.	515 [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433]
Dec. 16	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request for instructions in regard to the desire of the Chinese Postal Administration to acquire the German post office in the Legation Quarter.	516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435]
Dec. 21	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) (tel.)</i> Opinion that Chinese should not take possession of the German post office without consent of the protocol powers.	516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435]
Dec. 21 (92)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i>	517 [Pg. 517 is part of

	For the Secretary of State: Suggestion that the visit of President Wilson and Secretary Lansing to London might offer an opportunity for reaching a broad understanding with the British on the question of the Far East.	Doc. 436
Dec. 24 (123)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that U. S. Minister in China has been instructed that such matters as the internment of Germans and Austrians in China should await the results of the Peace Conference.	518 [Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438]
Dec. 24	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Arrangements for the abolition of German-Austro-Hungarian privileges in China which the Allied representatives have recommended to their Governments should be adopted at the Peace Conference.	518 [Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438]
1919 Undated [Rec'd Jan. 5] (97)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that it appears that the Japanese are promising to support Chinese desires at the Peace Conference in return for a favorable settlement of the Shantung question.	519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439]
Jan. 6	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) (tel.)</i> Instructions not to participate in recommendations set forth in Minister's telegram of December 24, 1918.	520 [Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441]
Jan. 6	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> To be transmitted to President Wilson: Report of Japanese manipulations in China which make it imperative that the Peace Conference work out a permanent settlement of the China question.	520 [Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441]

Undated	<i>Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Opinion that the report of the Minister in China, telegraphed to the Department on January 6, is worthy of careful consideration by the Peace Commissioners.	525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442]
Jan. 10	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> British memorandum (text printed) indicating desire of Allies to repatriate enemy aliens in China, and pointing out the unhappy results of Department's decision that question must await the consideration of the Peace Conference; instructions to take appropriate action to cooperate with the Allies in this matter.	526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443]
Jan. 11 (257)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Suggestion that Legation at Peking be instructed to say to Foreign Office that U. S. Commissioners will be unable to help China at the Peace Conference if Japan presents a <i>fait accompli</i> in Shantung.	528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444]
Jan. 13 (214)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that Legation at Peking is being instructed as suggested.	529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446]
Jan. 15 (293)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Instructions as to action to be taken in regard to enemy aliens in China.	529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446]

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

Date and number	Subject	Page

1918 Nov. 13 (5830)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For McAdoo from Crosby: Opinion that the United States should retain freedom of action in the disposal of its resources after the war; belief that if private assets in Allied countries are used to a maximum they will suffice as a basis of credit for private needs.	533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 447]
Nov. 22 (2976)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Crosby from McAdoo: Views in regard to U. S. financial policies; belief that negotiations and decisions should be concentrated in Washington rather than in Inter-Allied bodies.	535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448]
Dec. 7 (3330)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Crosby from McAdoo: Statement that questions concerning U. S. loans to Allies should not be decided at the Peace Conference, since Congress has expressly delegated authority in such matters to the Secretary of the Treasury.	537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449]
Dec. 11 (166)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Colonel House from McAdoo: Instructions given to Treasury representatives in Europe in view of indications that Allies may attempt to bring questions concerning U. S. loans into the Peace Conference.	538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450]
Dec. 13 (6272)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For McAdoo from Crosby: Conversation with French Minister of Finance from which it seems that he has in mind some plan for cancellation or of connecting maturity of French obligations with payment of indemnities.	540 [Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451]
Dec. 13	<i>Financial Protocol Signed at Trèves</i> Provision for conservation of German securities	541 [Pg. 541 includes

	pledged to the French Government to serve as a guarantee for the collection of the common debt.	portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452]
Dec. 18	<i>The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Information concerning the financial protocol signed at Trèves, December 13.	542 [Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453]
Dec. 19 (6674)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Crosby from Rathbone: Statement that Treasury is not disposed to press France to discuss at this time questions relating to conversion of demand loans into long-time obligations.	544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455]
Dec. 19 (65)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Views in regard to certain aspects of the foreign loan situation.	544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455]
Dec. 26 (82)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Glass from House: Recommendation that Mr. Norman Davis be appointed as a Commissioner in connection with the armistice discussions at Spa.	546 [Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456]
Dec. 31 (6808)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Davis from Glass: Offer of appointment as suggested by House; instructions, so far as time is not occupied by special mission, to furnish President Wilson with financial advice on matters not touching foreign loans.	547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458]
1919 Jan. 2 (66)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Request for advice in regard to Crosby's resignation as	547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of

	Special Finance Commissioner; reluctance to send an Assistant Secretary to Paris to head an organization to deal with financial questions which may arise in connection with the Peace Conference.	Doc. 457 and Doc. 458
Jan. 2	<i>The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Inquiry as to whether the U. S. Government intends to designate a Commissioner to serve with the French representative in handling matters relating to Germany's financial situation. (Footnote: Acting Secretary's reply on January 27 that Mr. Norman Davis had been appointed.)	549 [Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459]
Jan. 2	<i>The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State</i> Request for an interview in view of indications that Jugoslavs intend to ask for greatly increased loans.	550 [Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461]
Jan. 3 (6614)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from Crosby: Points to be considered in regard to desire of Jugoslavs for increased loans.	550 [Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461]
Jan. 3 (137)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from the Commissioners Plenipotentiary: Inquiry as to whether Secretary would approve of appointment of Mr. Albert Strauss as financial adviser to the American Commission.	552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463]
Jan. 3 (138)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Glass from Davis: Acceptance of appointment as Commissioner in connection with armistice discussions at Spa. Information that the President has also appointed him to Inter-Allied board to coordinate relief work.	552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463]

Jan. 6 (112)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Fear that there may be confusion in regard to Treasury representatives in Europe; suggestion that a Treasury Commission in Europe be created with Strauss as chairman, and including Davis, Lamont, and Crosby.	553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464]
Jan. 7 (186)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Glass: Request for approval of Davis to act as Treasury representative on a council to coordinate the work of different departments in determining U. S. policies to be pursued in the peace negotiations.	555 [Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465]
Jan. 8 (206)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Two letters from the President to Davis, January 6 (texts printed), to serve as Davis' credentials to act as U. S. Finance Commissioner in the armistice discussions until his commission is issued by the Secretary of State.	556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466]
Jan. 9	<i>Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House</i> Arrangements concerning representation at Spa and Mayence conferences and assistance to Relief Council and Peace Commission.	557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 466 and Doc. 467]
Jan. 9 (163)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For House from Glass: Statement that if President Wilson approves suggestion of a Treasury Commission in Europe with Mr. Strauss as chairman, Mr. Strauss should also be Treasury representative on the council to coordinate activities of the different Departments.	558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468]

Jan. 10	<i>Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House</i> Conditions which the French Government proposes to insert when renewing the armistice with Germany.	559 [Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469]
Jan. 10 (173)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from the Alien Property Custodian in regard to property of subjects of the former Austrian Empire (text printed).	560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 469 and Doc. 470]
Jan. 10 (233)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Rathbone from Davis: Arrangements concerning representation at Spa and Mayence conferences and assistance to Relief Council and Peace Commission.	561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471]
Jan. 11 (9)	<i>The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to the Department (text printed) asking for instructions in regard to a warning issued by the French Legation in respect to the financial protocol signed by the Allies and Germany at Trèves, December 13, 1918.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473]
Jan. 11 (3448)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request for instructions in regard to warnings given by French Minister to the Danish Foreign Office in respect to the financial protocol signed at Trèves, December 13, 1918.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473]
Jan. 11 (252)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President: Suggestion that Crosby's resignation as Special Finance Commissioner be accepted; belief that it is not necessary to create a Treasury Commission in Europe at present; approval of sending Strauss to advise with	563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474]

	American Mission; fear, however, that he will not be able to remain long.	
Jan. 11	<i>The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State</i> Extract from a telegram sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, January 9, in regard to U. S. funds to support a proposed increase in the Belgian Army.	564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475]
Jan. 13	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Opinion that the United States should not finance any increase in any military establishment in Europe and that present aid should be gradually reduced.	565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476]
Jan. 13 (6721)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from Crosby: Report from Harris on economic situation in Italy (text printed), recommending that U. S. food credits should taper off and end completely about September.	566 [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477]
Jan. 14	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Decision to follow General Bliss' advice in answering Mr. Crosby concerning the proposed increase in the Belgian Army.	567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478]
Jan. 14 (278)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Secretary Glass from Colonel House: Opinion of the Commissioners that it would not be wise at present to appoint a Treasury Commission in Europe.	568 [Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480]
Jan. 14 (102)	<i>The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Department, January 14 (text printed), reporting on results of French Minister's warning to Danish Foreign Office.	568 [Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480]

Jan. 15 (6746)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from Crosby: Indications that Venizelos intends to appeal for further credits to maintain Greek Army on preceding year's level.	569 [Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483]
Jan. 15 (242)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing from Glass: Information that Strauss is being sent to Europe for a short stay.	569 [Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483]
Jan. 15 (244)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Information that action is being taken in accordance with telegram No. 252, January 11.	569 [Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483]
Jan. 15 (246)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Davis from Glass: Approval of appointment as Treasury representative on the council described in telegram No. 186 of January 7.	570 [Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484]
Jan. 17	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Approval of decision to follow General Bliss' advice in answering Mr. Crosby concerning Belgian Army.	571 [Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486]
Jan. 21	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby)</i> Statement that the United States should not finance any increase in any military establishment in Europe.	571 [Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486]

REPARATIONS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 10 (11)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Recommendation, in view of enormous claims which France and Belgium will make on Germany, that U. S. engineers make an approximate estimate for U. S. Government's guidance.	575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489]
Nov. 17 (17)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Inquiry whether to proceed with estimate.	575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489]
Nov. 22	<i>The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State</i> Observation that peace treaty should exempt property owned by Allied citizens in enemy countries from taxes for payment of war indemnities or should provide special indemnity for reimbursement of such taxes; desire to be informed of U. S. attitude. (Footnote: Information to the Italian Chargé, December 24, that the question would receive attentive consideration.)	575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489]
Nov. 23 (151)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Request to General Pershing, upon receipt of President's authorization to proceed, for detail of officer to undertake estimate; assignment of Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry.	576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491]
Nov. 24	<i>Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Special Representative (House)</i> Recommendations regarding procedure to be	576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of

	followed in estimating damage to industries in the invaded parts of Belgium and France; preference for verification of Belgian and French estimates rather than independent investigation.	Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491]
Nov. 30 (4162)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Rathbone from Goodhue: Request for estimates of valuation of German Government and private property in the United States and U. S. Government and private property in Germany, total cost of war to the U. S. Government, and annual pre-war increase in U. S. national income.	580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492]
Dec. 4	<i>Colonel E. M. House to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry</i> Instructions to proceed with estimate, consulting with French and Belgian officials as occasions require.	581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493]
Dec. 4	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Uncertainty of final attitude of British as to indemnities; desirability of asking British, French, and Italians for definite formulation of attitude on this and financial questions generally.	582 [Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496]
Dec. 6	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Views of Keynes regarding question of indemnities.	582 [Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496]
Dec. 6	<i>The Diplomatic Liaison Officer With the Supreme War Council (Frasier) to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry</i> Letter from the French Foreign Minister to	582 [Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 493 ,

	Colonel House, December 5 (text printed), advising that General McKinstry may communicate with the two French Ministers who are in charge of evaluation of damages in invaded portions of France, and stating that French investigation continues to show that losses are greater than previously supposed.	Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496]
Dec. 12 (3406)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Crosby from Rathbone: Reply to Goodhue's inquiries transmitted in telegram No. 4162 of November 30.	583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497]
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Advisory Counsel of the American Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance (Cravath)</i> Presentation of some of the principal problems to be considered in the forthcoming discussions on indemnities, including a tentative program respecting indemnity to be paid by Germany, and preliminary conclusion that wisest course would be for Allies to err on the side of leniency and avoid subjecting Germany to an army of occupation for several years and to a crushing burden of external debt for a generation or more.	584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 498]
Dec. 21 (40)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Request for estimate of property of citizens of the old Austrian Empire and the present German-Austria <i>de facto</i> Government now held by the Alien Property Custodian; desire for information as to procedure for disposing of such property.	605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499]
Dec. 22	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry</i> Inability to furnish information, in reply to an inquiry from General McKinstry, as to who is going to make an estimate of what Germany can	606 [Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 ,

	afford to pay; suggestion that matter be discussed with Colonel House.	and Doc. 501]
Dec. 28	<i>Memorandum by Dr. A. A. Young</i> Suggestion that U. S. policy with respect to indemnities be based on the principle that actual personal compensation is the purpose as well as the measure of the indemnity.	606 [Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501]
Dec. 30	<i>Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Chief of Engineers, American Expeditionary Forces (Langfitt)</i> Report on the nature and status of the work in connection with evaluation of war damages to France and Belgium.	608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 502]
1919 Jan. 1	<i>Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Presentation of certain questions discussed with Colonel House, and in general all questions relating to verification of French and Belgian war damages, to the Commission for determination.	611 [Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503]
Jan. 5	<i>Memorandum by General Tasker H. Bliss for the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Recommendation that after certain groups of claims are formulated, American experts select a few claims for independent investigation and judge the approximate accuracy of the entire claim by the results.	616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 504]
Jan. 6	<i>The Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces (McAndrews), to the Chief of Engineers, A. E. F. (Langfitt)</i> Impossibility of furnishing the organization, equipment, and authority for expenditure of A. E. F. funds called for in General McKinstry's report of December 30, 1918; willingness, however, to permit use of existing facilities.	618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505]

Jan. 9 (211)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Desire of the Commission for a statement of the claims of American citizens against Germany.	619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507]
Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles</i> Observations on the memorandum by Mr. Cravath, December 12, 1918.	619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507]
Jan. 11 (186)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Brazilian Government has instructed its Minister at Paris to present itemized claim for indemnities from Germany.	622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509]
Jan. 21 (344)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram from the Alien Property Custodian (text printed) to be sent in reply to Commission's telegram No. 40 of December 21, 1918, stating that the settlement of enemy debts in the United States as authorized by Congress is being continued, and outlining general principles for disposing of entire question of enemy debts and enemy property. From Polk for the Secretary of State: Department's belief that in general the Alien Property Custodian's plan is a fair one.	622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509]

FOOD RELIEF

Date and number	Subject	Page

1918 Nov. 7	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Desire that Colonel House be informed of Mr. Hoover's telegram to Mr. J. P. Cotton, Food Administration representative in London, and be advised that no arrangements for food relief for liberated populations should be undertaken until after Mr. Hoover's arrival in Paris.	627 [Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511]
Nov. 8	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Instructions to carry out Mr. Hoover's request.	627 [Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511]
Nov. 8 (66)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Suggestion that as soon as the armistice is signed the President propose immediate formation of an international relief organization, to be headed by Mr. Hoover and composed of two representatives each from the United States, England, France, Italy, and Germany, and that Germany be asked to place her merchant marine at the disposal of this organization until the final peace treaty is signed.	628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 512]
Nov. 12	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram from German Government asking whether U. S. Government will send food without delay if public order is maintained in Germany and equitable distribution of food is guaranteed (text printed).	629 [Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514]
Nov. 12	<i>The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Communication for German Government stating that President Wilson is ready to	629 [Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 ,

	consider favorably the supplying of food to Germany (text printed).	and Doc. 514]
Nov. 14	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Need of appropriation to provide working capital for food relief to liberated peoples and neutrals; belief that German food problem could be handled through such agencies as the Army and the Grain Corporation, with possibly the Presidential fund.	630 [Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]
Nov. 14	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Telegraphic instructions to Mr. Cotton (text printed), in accord with President Wilson's suggestion, to convey to Food Administration officials, Colonel House, and Mr. Cravath, statement of U. S. policy regarding food relief for other than Allied nations. Information for British Minister of Blockade that organization for distributing U. S. food to liberated parts of Europe must await Mr. Hoover's arrival.	631 [Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516]
Nov. 18 (45)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Telegraphic request from Austrian Government that Allied Powers and United States intervene in order that shipments of coal be sent forward from Bohemia and Moravia to avert imminent coal famine in Vienna (text printed). (Similar message to the Ambassador in France on November 20, with instructions to confer with Colonel House and take such steps with Czechoslovak National Council as might seem desirable.)	632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517]
Nov. 21	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Telegraphic plea from German-Austrian Government that U. S. and Allied Governments intervene with Czechoslovak National Council to	633 [Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 517

	obtain permission for export and transportation of coal into German Austria (text printed).	and Doc. 518]
Nov. 21	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Telegram from German Government asking President Wilson's support of German request to the Y. M. C. A. for relief of German prisoners of war and interned civilians (text printed).	634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]
Nov. 22	<i>The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State</i> Desire to learn U. S. opinion on appeals from Austrian-Hungarian Government that Allies and United States (1) remove restrictions on neutral commerce and permit export of clothing and medical supplies from Switzerland to Austria-Hungary, and (2) authorize their diplomatic missions at Berne to establish direct relations with Austrian-Hungarian Legation there for purpose of handling questions pertaining to the provisioning of Austria. (Transmitted by the Department to the Commission to Negotiate Peace on December 19.)	635 [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]
Nov. 23 (150)	<i>The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Inquiry if part of wheat shipment reportedly on the way to Europe could be sent to Roumania, where it is absolutely necessary.	635 [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]
Nov. 27 (6450)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Assumption that Ambassador and Colonel House will bring all pertinent correspondence to Mr. Hoover's attention; information that representations by Serbians and Montenegrins for food supplies have become pressing.	636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523]
Nov. 27 (188)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	636 [Pg. 636 includes

	For the President: Information that Mr. Hoover has arrived and that his plans are, with some alterations, in general as stated in telegram No. 66 of November 8; desire to present to Supreme War Council meeting at London on December 1 a written communication (text printed) setting forth plan for administration of relief under an American Director General.	portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523]
Nov. 27 (189)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Preliminary expressions by British and French financial and food officials with respect to proposed international relief plan.	639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524]
Nov. 28	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Communications from German Government (text printed) appealing for discussions between American and German plenipotentiaries at The Hague regarding food relief for Germany and asking that a German mission be permitted to come to the United States to present statement of food conditions in Germany.	640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525]
Nov. 28	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Desire that Colonel House be authorized to propose his plan, on the understanding that Mr. Hoover agrees.	641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526]
Nov. 28 (2)	<i>The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Objections to shipping features of relief plan on ground that they amount to surrender of control of American shipping to foreign bodies.	642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 527]
Nov. 29 (90)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i>	643 [Pg. 643 includes portions of

	Authorization of the President, assuming Mr. Hoover agrees, to propose relief plan.	Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530]
Nov. 29 (99)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> For Colonel House and Hoover: Note from the Italian Ambassador (text printed) requesting U. S. opinion on suggestion that food supplies for Austria-Hungary be decided upon at Zurich, for Germany at Paris, and for Turkey and Bulgaria at London; information that Department has replied that Mr. Hoover is authorized to take charge of all such matters on behalf of the U. S. Government.	643 [Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530]
Dec. 1	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Concurrence in Mr. Hurley's views regarding American shipping; instructions to advise him to this effect, asking that he explain to Colonel House that this was an aspect of the arrangement which the President had not taken in.	643 [Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530]
Dec. 1 (6482)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Hurley: President's agreement with Mr. Hurley's position; request that conference be held with Colonel House. For the Ambassador: Instructions to advise Colonel House of the foregoing.	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532]
Dec. 1 (210)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Hoover to the Food Administration: Instructions to ask Secretary of War to order nearby steamers to Trieste in order that A. E. F. may receive and hold food stocks until Inter-Allied matters are settled.	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532]
Dec. 1 (213)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	645 [Pg. 645 includes

	For the President: Information that mistake had been made in respect to proposed disposition of enemy passenger ships, that this error has been corrected, and that Mr. Hurley now gives his approval of plan; intention to propose plan in formal communication to Mr. Balfour, M. Pichon, and Baron Sonnino rather than to Supreme War Council.	portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534]
Dec. 1 (214)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President from Hoover: Inquiry whether immediate working capital of \$5,000,000 for relief might be appropriated from Presidential fund. Request that copy be given to Food Administration, with Hoover's instructions that message be followed up.	645 [Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534]
Dec. 1	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)</i> Memorandum containing the President's views on food relief and proposing the creation of an American Director General of Relief (text printed); desire for British views. (Footnote: Similar communications apparently sent on the same date to M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino.)	646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 535]
Dec. 4	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Understanding that at previous day's meeting of Premiers, President's note regarding relief was referred to a committee; observation that this means postponement of question until President's arrival.	648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537]
Dec. 5 (127)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> From President Wilson: Instructions to inform Mr. Hoover that the terms of the appropriation for national security and defense would not	648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 ,

	justify making the allotment referred to in telegram No. 214 of December 1.	and Doc. 537]
Dec. 6	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> Understanding that Lord Reading agrees in principle to administration of relief by Mr. Hoover but thinks that policies should be determined by a committee of the four Powers and not by the War Council.	649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540]
Dec. 10 (10)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> German-Austrian Government's plea that U. S. and British Legations intervene with Czechoslovak Government to allow coal to be forwarded to Vienna.	649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540]
Undated	<i>Memorandum of a Conference on European Relief, Held in London, December 10, 1918</i> Decision of Allied representatives to submit a memorandum to the War Council expressing agreement in principle with the President's plan for food relief, embodying the exception that the only question is the method of approaching the Germans on the shipping problem.	649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540]
Undated	<i>Statement Furnished by Messrs. Hoover and Davis to the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers To Consider Relief Matters, London, December 10, 1918</i> Difficulties in the relation of the United States to the relief problem; views as to internal organization of the Directorate General of Relief.	651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541]
Dec. 11 (15)	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Swiss communication (substance printed) stating decision of neutral diplomatic missions	654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 542

	at Vienna to call Associated Governments' attention to the disastrous situation in Vienna regarding coal supply and to ask that they intervene with Czechoslovak Government.	and Doc. 543]
Dec. 12	<i>Report of the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers To Consider Victualling and Supply of Allied, Neutral, and Enemy Countries</i> Recommendation that the present U. S. Food Administrator act as a mandatory of the Allied and U. S. Governments in the actual administration of relief in accordance with directions of a council to be composed of two representatives of each Government.	654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543]
Undated	<i>Memorandum by Messrs. Hoover, Davis, and Cotton</i> Analysis and comparison of the plans of President Wilson and the plans of the Premiers' representatives; recommendation that, rather than attempt immediate solution of the points of entire difference in fundamental principle, the President propose that U. S. Government take action to remedy the critical situations in Vienna, German-Austria, Serbia, and elsewhere by furnishing such supplies as may be available, suggesting that Allies cooperate and take similar action.	658 [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544]
Dec. 12	<i>The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to President Wilson</i> Conviction that any commercial concessions or assurances in connection with relief plan should come directly from the President, so that his larger task in connection with a League of Nations may be made easier.	661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545]
Dec. 13	<i>The British Ambassador to the United States (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)</i> Desire to be informed whether Mr. Hoover will accept terms of the report of the Allied	664 [Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 545 .

	Premiers' committee or in what respects he disagrees.	and Doc. 546]
Dec. 15	<i>The Secretary of the American Embassy in France (Gibson) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of dossier of memoranda and correspondence in regard to proposed relief plan, with information that Mr. Hoover will submit them to the President the same evening.	665 [Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548]
Dec. 16 (6321)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Hoover to Rickard: Instructions for conduct of Food Administration while settlement of relief matters is pending in Europe.	665 [Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548]
Dec. 16 (6317)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Hoover for Rickard: Report that little progress has been made after 2 weeks of negotiations; that because Yugoslav, Serbian, and South European situations have become acute, the President has instructed food officials to undertake emergency relief independent of Allied cooperation, at the same time inviting Allies to join the United States.	666 [Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549]
Dec. 16	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Arrangements for Serbian, Yugoslav, and South Austrian relief; letter from Norman H. Davis, Special Representative of the Treasury, to President Wilson (text printed), seeking President's approval of cable to Treasury with respect to advances to Serbian Government for relief purposes.	667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550]
Dec. 16 (255)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President: Instructions to pay immediately to Food Administration, Grain Corporation,	670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 ,

	\$5,000,000 from fund for national security and defense.	Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
Dec. 16 (256)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of War from the President: Instructions to continue to forward foodstuffs to such ports as Mr. Hoover may direct.	670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
Dec. 16	<i>The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury: Recommendation that credit of \$35,000,000 be established in favor of Serbian Government; approval of the President expressed in communication to the Secretary of the Treasury (text printed).	670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
Dec. 16	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)</i> Decision of the President, pending further discussions of the entire relief problem, to instruct Food Administration to furnish food supplies to critical areas and to establish an organization to this end in certain places outside of Germany; invitation to send representatives to these points. (Footnote: Similar communications apparently sent on the same date to M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino.)	672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555]
Dec. 16	<i>The British Ambassador in France (Derby) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Note to the French Government, dated December 15, relative to control of German merchant shipping (text printed); expression of hope that U. S. representative on Naval	672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555]

	Armistice Committee will be instructed to press Germany to place her merchant shipping immediately at the disposal of the Allies for use in carrying food and supplies.	
Dec. 17	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)</i> Willingness of the President to instruct U. S. representatives to join Allied colleagues in a demand that German tonnage be handed over unconditionally; his opinion, however, that if the tonnage is secured it should be used pursuant to the suggestions contained in his relief proposal of December 1. (Communication of copy to M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino.)	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556]
Dec. 17 (39)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from Swedish Legation, dated December 13 (text printed), stating that neutral diplomatic missions in Vienna have asked that Entente Powers request Government of Bohemia to permit coal shipments to Vienna.	676 [Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557]
Dec. 18	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Secretary of State</i> Recommendation that mission be sent to Poland to investigate food situation.	677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 557 and Doc. 558]
Dec. 19	<i>The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Opinion that no differences exist as to necessity for appointment of a Council of the four Governments to deal with relief; suggestion that Council be created at once, leaving to the representatives the matter of meeting and dealing with all questions.	678 [Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559]
Dec. 19 (31)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	679 [Pg. 679 includes

	Instructions to urge Treasury to accede to recommendations for loan to Serbian Government.	portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562]
Dec. 19 (59)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Opposition of War Trade Board to shipments suggested in Italian Ambassador's note of November 22 until necessary relief measures by Mr. Hoover are determined.	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562]
Dec. 20 (6698)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Crosby from Rathbone: Willingness to establish credit in favor of Serbian Government in amount of \$15,000,000, with further credits if necessary and on request from Serbian Government.	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562]
Dec. 20	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Suggestion that Associated Governments issue immediate warning that they cannot accomplish food relief in Germany except through hands of a stable and experienced government and cannot anticipate furnishing it through hands of Bolshevik elements.	680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563]
Dec. 21 (22)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Food Administrator (Rickard) (tel.)</i> From Hoover: Press reports in the United States of serious differences between Hoover and the Allies; instructions, if subject is being discussed, to hint at Hoover's attitude of inability to accept domination of American resources by an Allied food council.	682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565]
Dec. 21 (2)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) (tel.)</i> Request that Serbian Government be urged to	682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of

	take immediate action in Washington toward financial arrangements so that release of foodstuffs may be begun.	Doc. 564 and Doc. 565]
Dec. 21 (48)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Hoover: Postponement of decision with regard to appeals from Vienna until Allies will agree to joint action with the United States.	683 [Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566]
Dec. 23	<i>The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Acceptance of President's proposal that U. S. Government manage the administration of food relief; belief that questions can be settled by a competent organization as the general plan is gradually put into execution; suggestion that special council of two representatives of each of the four Powers be named. Information that representative has been sent to Berne to cooperate in connection with aid to Vienna and others have been instructed to assist in any enterprise for aid of Serbia and Jugoslavia. (Footnote: Identical communication from Italian Foreign Minister.)	684 [Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567]
Dec. 23	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson</i> Desire of Grain Corporation directors for approval of the President, as the sole stockholder, to extension of their operations outside U. S. territory.	686 [Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 568]
Dec. 27 (9)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram from Legation at Bucharest, dated December 20, pleading for immediate food relief to Roumania (text printed); request that telegram be transmitted to Hoover.	687 [Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]
Dec. 30	<i>The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i>	687 [Pg. 687 includes

	Note from Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, dated December 21 (text printed), observing incorrectness of Vienna Government's claim that Czechs were opposed to revictualling of Vienna, as evidenced in telegram of Czechoslovak Council of December 17 (text printed).	portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]
Dec. 31 (10)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> For Italian Food Minister: Concern over withdrawal by Italian representatives at London of January order for pork products; impossibility of withdrawing shipments; hope that instructions will be issued to reestablish the order. Information that Italian representatives are awaiting instructions regarding participation in 100,000,000-bushel grain purchase.	688 [Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571]
1919 Jan. 1	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)</i> Information that the President accepts M. Pichon's suggestion of December 23 for a special council of two members from each of the four Governments, suggests that at first meeting the representatives state what participation and resources they can and will contribute, has appointed Mr. Hoover and Mr. Davis as American members, and has asked Mr. Hoover, as Director General of Relief, to call a meeting as soon as possible.	689 [Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]
Jan. 1 (47)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> Letter from Colonel House to Mr. Balfour, handed to Lord Derby (text printed), containing copy of the letter to M. Pichon; instructions to hand Foreign Office a memorandum containing these letters.	690 [Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574]

Jan. 1 (13)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> Letter from Colonel House to Baron Sonnino, handed to Italian Ambassador in France (text printed), enclosing copy of the letter to M. Pichon; instructions to hand Foreign Minister a memorandum containing these letters.	690 [Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574]
Jan. 1	<i>Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)</i> For Colonel House: Information that M. Pichon's letter of December 23 embodies British views, and if President Wilson concurs therein and so informs British Government, the respective Governments should proceed to nominate their representatives.	691 [Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576]
Jan. 1	<i>The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Transmittal of a proposed cable to Rathbone regarding relief situation.	691 [Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576]
Jan. 1 (127)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President: Necessity of providing food and supplies to countries destitute of resources or credit; request that Congress make immediate appropriation of \$100,000,000 available to the President for this purpose.	692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 577]
Jan. 2 (132)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Rathbone from Davis: Advisability of immediate action to prevent starvation and anarchy in Roumania; Hoover's proposal for an advance of \$5,000,000 to Roumania for	693 [Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578]

	expenditure through Food Administration or Grain Corporation to cover cost of supplies en route to Mediterranean which could be diverted to Roumania. Hoover's decision to send 10,000 tons of flour into Vienna, in view of desperate situation there, paying for same out of Presidential fund.	
[Jan. 2] (48)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Instructions to inform Secretary of the Treasury that immediate relief for Roumania is imperative; opinion that Roumania's present state of hostilities entitles her to come within provisions of the law relating to Treasury advances.	695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580]
Jan. 2	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Request that Colonel House forward to Foreign Ministries copy of letter from Mr. Hoover to the three Food Ministers (text printed) recommending that certain foodstuffs of which a surplus exists in the United States be exempted from restrictions with regard to neutral and enemy trading.	695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580]
Jan. 3 (142)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury: Extreme urgency of the action proposed by the President in telegram No. 127 of January 1.	698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582]
Jan. 4 (98)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information from Representative Swagar Sherley, Chairman of House Appropriations Committee, that it will be difficult to get the proposed relief appropriation without facts as to how the work will be done,	698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582]

	what security, if any, will be given, and whether the other Powers will contribute their share.	
Jan. 4 (154)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Glass from Davis: Assumption that position that all questions with reference to U. S. foreign loans should be discussed and disposed of in Washington does not exclude consideration and recommendations in respect to applications for loans for relief.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584]
Jan. 4	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)</i> Request that British Government be informed, with respect to a telegram from Lord Reading stating that council should be appointed to decide questions of general policy and Mr. Hoover as mandatory should be entrusted with actual administration of the relief, that U. S. proposals have never contemplated that President's appointee act as the mandatory of an Allied council.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584]
Jan. 4 (103)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Inability of Treasury Department to make proposed loan to Roumania unless (1) Roumania may be regarded as a belligerent within meaning of act of Congress, (2) Roumanian representative in Washington has authority to sign obligations, and (3) loan is to be used for the purpose contemplated by the act of Congress; or unless President directs Treasury to make loan as a matter of policy.	700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585]
Jan. 4	<i>The French Minister of Commerce (Clémentel) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)</i> Information that a communiqué has been given to press (text printed) for the purpose of dispelling impression created by American	701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 585]

	communiqué that the United States has undertaken relief of the liberated areas of France and Alsace-Lorraine.	and Doc. 586]
Jan. 4 (Food 167)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard) (tel.)</i> Letter to British Food Ministry, January 2 (text printed), stating that the problem of surplus production in the United States has become acute, and with reduction of British orders an extremely critical situation has arisen which must be solved.	703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 587]
Jan. 4 (11)	<i>The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Urgent need of Bulgaria for flour. (Request to repeat to Department.)	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589]
Jan. 5 (Food 173)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard) (tel.)</i> Information with respect to relief now being furnished by the other Allied Governments to Serbia, Syria, South Austria, and Belgium; urgency of action by Congress on proposed relief appropriation.	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589]
Jan. 6 (51)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Hoover from Crespi: Dispatch of instructions to accept 20,000 tons of pork for January and to accept Italian share of grain purchase.	705 [Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591]
Jan. 6 (177)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Summary of present relief plans to be administered by Hoover with aid of Allied council; other information in support of proposed relief appropriation.	705 [Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591]

Jan. 6 (107)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Urgency of some expression from Secretary before appropriation question comes up in House; message from Chairmen of Senate and House appropriations committees reporting existence of considerable opposition and inquiring how much money England, France, and Italy will provide (text printed).	707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593]
Jan. 6 (120)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Hoover: Letter from French Chargé, dated December 21, 1918 (text printed), suggesting that Allies, in their humane feelings toward Austria and sympathy for plight of Vienna as to coal, not forget that Czechoslovak State is still laboring under Austrian intrigues which are even now being carried on.	707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593]
Jan. 7 (6879)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> From Rathbone for Davis: Readiness of Treasury to advance \$5,000,000 against Roumanian obligations to pay for American foodstuffs when Department of State has advised that legal difficulties are cleared.	708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594]
Jan. 7 (6881)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For Davis from Rathbone: Instructions to receive and study all applications for relief loans.	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597]
Jan. 7 (131)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Transmittal to Congress of the President's request for	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 594 ,

	\$100,000,000 relief appropriation; optimistic attitude.	Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597]
Jan. 7 (138)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Fear of Chairman Sherley that difficulties will arise; his desire for all available information.	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597]
Jan. 8 (Food 192)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Rickard) (tel.)</i> Instructions to announce that President has signed license cancellations list No. 1, effective January 10; summary of economic factors to be taken into consideration with respect to commodity regulations still outstanding.	710 [Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]
Jan. 8 (203)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Senator Lodge from Mr. Henry White: Arguments for immediate granting of President's request for \$100,000,000 relief appropriation.	711 [Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 598 and Doc. 599]
Jan. 9 (163)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information from Chairman Sherley that Rules Committee refused special ruling for relief appropriation bill, and that without further information he is powerless.	712 [Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , and Doc. 601]
Jan. 9 (215)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President: Existence of extremely dangerous situation in Roumania; strong approval of the \$5,000,000 advance to Roumania so as to allow	712 [Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 ,

	shipment of urgently needed food pending relief appropriation now in Congress.	and Doc. 601]
Jan. 9 (216)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of War from the President: Letter from Hoover reporting British withdrawal of customary monthly orders on behalf of Allied Governments and predicting debacle in American market unless situation is remedied (text printed), and his memorandum for presentation to Allied Premiers (text printed). President's query whether, if Hoover's plan does not succeed, War Department should not make the necessary purchases and ship the material to Europe for distribution under its direction as a military measure.	713 [Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 602]
Jan. 9 (169)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From the Secretary of State for Polk for Sherley: Information that American mission of investigation to Czechoslovakia has recommended immediate dispatch of additional supplies.	715 [Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603]
Jan. 9 (170)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk for Sherley: Message from Hoover's representative in Serbia and neighborhood territories (text printed), stating urgent need for two or three cargoes of mixed provisions. (Instructions to give copy to Food Administration.)	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605]
Jan. 9 (172)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk for Sherley: Telegram from Polish Government, dated January 3 (text printed), appealing for food, clothing, and transportation facilities for relief cargoes.	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605]

Jan. 9 (173)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel)</i> For Polk for Sherley from Lansing: Message from Allied mission at Vienna (text printed) stating authorization to ship Austria 30,000 tons without regard to immediate financial arrangement, and advising that condition is very urgent.	717 [Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607]
Jan. 11 (239)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Information as to Allied willingness to contribute relief; instructions to furnish Chairman Sherley with all appeals for assistance; strong recommendation for passage of bill.	717 [Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607]
Undated [Rec'd Jan. 12] (198)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Auchincloss: Intention of Chairman Sherley to bring up food appropriation bill; his desire to learn names and appointment dates of representatives of the other Governments on Hoover's Inter-Allied Relief Commission.	718 [Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609]
Jan. 12 (260)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Auchincloss: Names of British and French representatives on the Inter-Allied Relief Commission; understanding that Italian delegates are en route. (Footnote: Information that first meeting of this body, known as the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, was held at Paris on January 11; that on February 25 the name was changed to the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.)	718 [Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609]
Jan. 12 (68)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Hoover from Crespi: Information that Attolico will represent Italy at first meeting of	719 [Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 610]

	Relief Commission, and that the two permanent delegates will be appointed soon.	and Doc. 611]
Jan. 13	<i>The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to President Wilson</i> Understanding that Mr. Hoover is preparing statement of Roumanian need for food and that Department of State is clearing up legal aspects of the proposed credit of \$5,000,000; transmittal, for the President's signature, of letter to the Secretary of Treasury.	719 [Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611]
Jan. 13 (6947)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For Davis from Rathbone: Information that President's message contained in telegram No. 215 of January 9 is regarded as sufficient to authorize use of credits in favor of Roumania and that necessary advices from the Department of State are being awaited.	720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613]
Jan. 15 (245)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Glass: Readiness to make advance to Roumania when essential requirements imposed by loan statutes are met; statement of Treasury's attitude toward artificial maintenance of commodity prices.	720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613]
Jan. 16 (305)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Military information leading to opinion that Roumania should be regarded as belligerent within meaning of act of Congress; instructions to advise Secretary of the Treasury and to cable whether Roumanian representative has received authority to sign obligations.	721 [Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614]
Jan. 18 (303)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Roumanian representatives are still without authority to sign obligations; inquiry whether authority might be forwarded	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 614 .

	by Premier Bratiano in Paris; telegram to Legation at Bucharest (text printed) instructing that Roumanian Government be advised of necessity to confer full powers upon representative in the United States.	and Doc. 615]
Jan. 20 (356)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Receipt and approval of Roumanian Premier's authorization to Chargé in Washington to execute obligations; suggestion that, with this and other information already supplied, Department furnish Treasury Department with the information requested.	723 [Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617]
Jan. 23 (397)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Rathbone from Davis: Assumption that letter from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury approving extension of credits to Roumania (text printed) is no longer needed, in view of telegram No. 6947 of January 13; request to be advised when funds are made available.	723 [Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617]
Jan. 25 (414)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Davis from Rathbone: Information that everything is in order to establish \$5,000,000 credit to Roumania and to make advances therefrom, as well as additional advance of \$1,000,000 to Czechoslovak Government from credit previously established, as soon as requests therefor are received.	724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618]

THE BLOCKADE AND REGULATION OF TRADE

Date and number	Subject	Page

1918 Nov. 9 (5779)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from McFadden: Recommendations regarding post-armistice policy. (Copy to Auchincloss.)	729 [Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 619]
Nov. 14 (2813)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Desire for opinion of Allied Blockade Committee regarding changes to simplify procedure respecting Northern Neutrals. (Instructions to repeat to Christiania, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.)	731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620]
Nov. 15 (3756)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For McCormick, War Trade Board, from Sheldon: Recommendation for immediate decision on question of continuation of Allied control of raw materials, shipping, and trade.	732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621]
Nov. 15 (3765)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Tentative proposals of A. B. C. for relaxation of blockade.	733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622]
Nov. 16	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Expectation that foreign organization will be maintained; request for suggestions as to any change of blockade policy during armistice period. (Footnote: Sent also to other diplomatic missions for War Trade Board representatives.)	734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623]
Nov. 16 (2854)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board, for Frothingham: Continuance of strict censorship	735 [Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 623 ,

	except with respect to press; continuance of enemy trade restrictions.	Doc. 624 , and Doc. 625]
Nov. 16 (2855)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Intention to advise promptly of any relaxation of U. S. export or import restrictions; desire for frank interchange with British Government on the subject. (Instructions to inform Stevens, Rublee, and Tower, and to repeat to McFadden.)	735 [Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , and Doc. 625]
Nov. 18 (1843)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> For Stewart from War Trade Board: Importance of maintaining close and sympathetic relations with representatives of Associated Governments.	736 [Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , and Doc. 627]
Nov. 19 (2904)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions to discuss with British authorities U. S. proposal for mutual arrangement to give advance notification of proposed relaxations of import restrictions.	736 [Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , and Doc. 627]
Nov. 19 (6338)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board: Approval of recommendations regarding post-armistice policy; views on blockade and Inter-Allied blockade organizations. (Repeated to the Chargé in Great Britain, for Sheldon, on November 21.)	737 [Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]
Nov. 21	<i>The Secretary of State to All American Missions and Consulates (cir. tel.)</i> From War Trade Board: Instructions to give publicity to press notice for release on November	738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 628

	22 (text printed), which states that although there will be considerable relaxation in exportation of commodities heretofore conserved for war purposes, tonnage will continue to be the controlling factor.	and Doc. 629]
Nov. 21	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions to give publicity to press release to be published November 22 (text printed), regarding relaxation of export regulations, restriction resulting from scarcity of tonnage, and continuance in full effect of the Trading with the Enemy Act. (Sent also to Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, France (for McFadden), and Japan.)	739 [Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 630]
Nov. 22 (3944)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Formal draft of blockade and trading with enemy policy formulated by A. B. C. and British Government for submission to Washington, Paris, and Rome for approval (text printed).	740 [Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 631]
Nov. 23 (3966)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Inability of Rationing and Statistical Subcommittee to agree to suggested restricted list of imports to Northern Neutrals because of delay involved; their recommendation to A. B. C. for temporary free list. Desire to be informed of acceptability of procedure and of the free list transmitted in this telegram.	741 [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632]
Nov. 25 (3037)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions to ascertain attitude toward U. S. proposal to establish blanket license for export to France, Great Britain, Italy, and colonies, of all	742 [Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 ,

	commodities except certain foodstuffs and possibly a few other articles. Establishment of blanket license for export of cotton to France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, effective December 2. (Sent also, on November 23, to the Ambassador in Italy, for Stewart, and to the Ambassador in France, for McFadden.)	and Doc. 634]
Nov. 26 (3072)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board, for Frothingham: Comments on tentative A. B. C. proposals for blockade relaxation. (Instructions to advise Paris and Rome of substance of this cable.)	742 [Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 632, Doc. 633, and Doc. 634]
Nov. 26 (4078)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Frothingham: Request for views on proposed reduction of statutory list and General Black List A; report of A. B. C. discussions.	743 [Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635]
Nov. 27 (3098)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Information that Embassy's telegram No. 3944 of November 22 has now been received and that Board's views as set forth in Department's telegram No. 3072 of November 26 need not be modified.	744 [Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 635, Doc. 636, and Doc. 637]
Nov. 29 (4158)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: British view that proposed blanket license for U. S. exports should not be established until British import restrictions have been removed to a greater extent; their suggestion for general permission to export to Great Britain only articles for which British have issued a general license to import.	744 [Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 635, Doc. 636, and Doc. 637]

Nov. 30 (4185)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon, for Woolley and Gay from Peterson: Arrangement for reciprocal exchange of information with Board of Trade concerning relaxation of import restrictions.	745 [Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , and Doc. 639]
Dec. 4 (3224)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Information that Board agrees to list proposed in Embassy's telegram No. 3966 of November 23 but believes it to be entirely inadequate; proposal to grant licenses for export to Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland, reporting same to London after granting, of manufactured articles generally, and referring to London before granting licenses for major foodstuffs and raw materials; desire for opinion of A. B. C; instructions to supply interpretation of the term "free list."	745 [Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , and Doc. 639]
Dec. 5 (4330)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Letter from Board of Trade (text printed), notifying of removal of certain import restrictions.	746 [Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640]
Dec. 6 (4385)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Information that articles on free list will be released from restrictions for Northern Neutral destinations, that as export licenses for free list goods will be required only at discretion of exporting country, it will be possible for the goods to go to firms on confidential list but not to a statutory list consignee; plan to announce list on December 10, to be effective on December 15; consideration by	747 [Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641]

	A. B. C. of U. S. suggestions to add to scope of list.	
Dec. 7 (3334)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Intention to release announcement that after December 16 no individual licenses will be required for shipments to Great Britain except for a limited list; public announcement (text printed) of suspension by British of import restrictions on certain commodities and of procedure for exporting under special export license rather than individual export licenses.	748 [Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642]
Dec. 10 (3354)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions to urge A. B. C. to increase rations of all commodities to neutral countries of Europe, or at least to increase cotton rations to the Northern Neutrals; suggested modification of general procedure regarding Northern Neutrals (summary printed).	750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 643]
Dec. 10 (3358)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board, for Frothingham: Opinion, in agreement with British, French, and Italian representatives, that it is undesirable at present to undertake any important revision of statutory or confidential lists or changes in enemy trade restrictions.	752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646]
Dec. 10 (3367)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Inquiry as to what, if any, proposals have been formulated by the A. B. C. regarding shipments to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey, including Syria.	752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646]

Dec. 11 (4513)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Frothingham: Inquiry whether opinion expressed in Department's telegram No. 3358 of December 10 applies in respect of neutral Europe or specifically to Latin American countries.	752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646]
Dec. 12 (4549)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Information that A. B. C. has given conditional approval to resumption of trade with Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, Trentino, Syria, and Palestine, and is considering question of Luxemburg, Roumania, and Serbia; no resumption of trade with Bulgaria and Turkey under consideration.	753 [Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647]
Dec. 13	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Notification to representatives of European neutrals that purchases may now be made in the United States without restriction as to obtaining of a license before purchase is made. (Sent also to diplomatic missions in Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland for War Trade Board representatives.)	754 [Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649]
Dec. 13 (4599)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Information that A. B. C. agrees in principle to increase of Northern Neutral cotton ration.	754 [Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649]
Dec. 13 (3527)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions	755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of

	to keep Board fully informed as to any proposed resumption of trade with enemy territory now under Allied occupation, especially Alsace-Lorraine.	Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652]
Dec. 13 (4600)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Concurrence by A. B. C. in discontinuance of reference to London of export license applications, provided Board is protected by receipt of import certificate numbers from all Northern Neutrals.	755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652]
Dec. 14	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Proposed issuance, December 16, of general license R. A. C. 63, permitting exportation, without the issuance of individual licenses, of all commodities not on conservation list to United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, including colonies. (Sent also to Embassies in France, Italy, and Japan, for War Trade Board representatives.)	755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652]
Dec. 14 (4613)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Suggestions by A. B. C. for safeguards in connection with discontinuance of reference to London of export license applications.	756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653]
Dec. 14 (3549)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Information to Danish and Swedish commercial representatives that ration increase will be recommended for practically all articles. (Instructions to repeat to Denmark and Sweden.)	757 [Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655]
Dec. 14 (6629)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board: Understanding that contingents will be fixed by	757 [Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 653 ,

	military authorities and Inter-Allied bureaus in Montenegro, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Roumania; inquiry whether U. S. military authorities will be represented and whether export applications will be referred to a central or local bureau. (Instructions to advise Sheldon.)	Doc. 654, and Doc. 655]
Dec. 14 (3420)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Increasing impracticability of continuing to control shipping through restriction of imports; intention to remove greater part of import restrictions by February 1; observation that this freedom will apply only to the limited number of vessels freed from time to time from War Department control; desire for British views. (Instructions to repeat to McFadden.)	758 [Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656]
Dec. 15 (6292)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: French preliminary plan for economic supervision of occupied German territory as far as west bank of the Rhine and bridgeheads (text printed); recommendation that Board approve plan and designate delegates to sit on proposed Inter-Allied committees at Paris and in occupied territory.	759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 656 and Doc. 657]
Dec. 17 (3470)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Concern over precipitous nature of London announcement of December 10; observation that abolition of confidential list is contrary to Board's view; inquiry whether free list can be withdrawn by British; decision to publish on December 20, effective December 23, a so-called nonration list	761 [Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658]

	covering manufactured articles generally which will require individual licenses.	
Dec. 17 (6336)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Taylor: Suggestion that U. S. rules be modified to agree with Allied laws permitting trade with enemy subjects in occupied areas; information that Alsace-Lorraine is as open as any French territory.	762 [Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661]
Dec. 17 (6340)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Taylor: Advice that no agreement has been made that consignments to Adriatic ports should depend on import authorization from Inter-Allied bureau, and that no such organization exists at present.	762 [Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661]
Dec. 18 (4701)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Resumption of trade with Mesopotamia, effective January 1, 1919.	762 [Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661]
Dec. 18 (4720)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: A. B. C. decision to increase Scandinavian cotton rations; consideration of increase of Dutch cotton rations.	763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663]
Dec. 20 (6385)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: Note from French Ministry of Blockade, dated December 18 (text printed), requesting designation of U. S. delegate to Inter-Allied committee to regulate	763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663]

	economic matters in occupied territory on left bank of the Rhine.	
Dec. 20 (3572)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Understanding that in connection with free list for Northern Neutrals, the British propose to refuse licenses only to consignees on statutory list. Importance of unity of U. S. and British action.	764 [Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664]
Dec. 20 (3580)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Willingness to allow unlimited ration of manufactured cotton to neutral countries; desired that matter of ration increase for all commodities to neutral Europe be taken up with A. B. C. without delay.	765 [Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , and Doc. 666]
Dec. 20 (4772)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Request of British, French, and Italian representatives on A. B. C. that action proposed in Department's telegram No. 3470 of December 17 be withheld until receipt of statement of their position.	765 [Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , and Doc. 666]
Dec. 20 (4781)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Statement of British, French, and Italian representatives on A. B. C. (text printed), explaining that War Trade Board's publication on December 20 of its unrationed list has placed the other Governments in an awkward dilemma, and proposal that, if notice cannot be revoked, its effect be nullified by confining actual issuance of licenses within the limits of the agreed rations as extended from time to time by A. B. C.	766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667]
Dec. 20 (6701)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel)</i>	767 [Pg. 767 includes

	For McFadden from War Trade Board: Inquiry as to what organization is being set up to control trade to countries under military occupation and control other than Alsace-Lorraine; need for central bureau to keep Allied countries informed of permissions to trade.	portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668]
Dec. 20 (4789)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Feeling of British and French representatives on A. B. C. that their earnest desire to cooperate is not wholly appreciated; instances of their cooperation.	768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670]
Dec. 21 (3595)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Message to be repeated to Athens, for Weddell (text printed), advising intention to make public announcement on December 26 that, effective January 1, 1919, licenses will be issued freely for shipments to Greece without prior reference to Athens.	768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670]
Dec. 21 (3596)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Approval of procedure suggested in Embassy's telegram No. 4613 of December 14; intention to make announcements on December 26 to become effective immediately.	769 [Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671]
Dec. 21 (4817)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Correctness of understandings as to free list; intention to propose to A. B. C. modification of previous decision in order to prevent consignment of free list goods to individuals on confidential list; British views on measures to be adopted for further relaxations.	770 [Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672]

Dec. 21 (6713)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board, for Taylor from McCormick: Instructions to act as U. S. representative on Paris committee to formulate policies for Rhine area.	771 [Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 672 and Doc. 673]
Dec. 21 (6717)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board, for Taylor: Desire for specific information with respect to shipments to Trieste, other Adriatic ports, and Alsace-Lorraine.	772 [Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676]
Dec. 23	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Missions and Consulates (cir. tel.)</i> From War Trade Board: Information that nearly all commodities are freely licensed for export; list of commodities under limited restriction for conservation reasons on December 21. (Sent to all missions except those in Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.)	772 [Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676]
Dec. 23 (4831)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: A. B. C. modification of free list to prohibit consignment of free list goods from United Kingdom and France to firms on confidential list.	772 [Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676]
Dec. 23 (4838)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Belief of A. B. C. that such reexport of free list articles as might occur would not be seriously objectionable, but that guarantees against reexport to the Central Powers, Russia, or Finland should be obtained insofar as practicable.	773 [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677]
Dec. 23 (6439)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i>	774 [Pg. 774 includes

	War Trade Board from Taylor: Opinion that restriction in foodstuff and manufactured goods to neutral nations is becoming disadvantageous, and that protection against seizure of world markets by neutral nations can be maintained by control of raw materials.	portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679]
Dec. 24 (40)	<i>The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Rickard) (tel.)</i> Statement for release to press from Washington office (text printed), advising that Mr. Hoover has proposed that normal trade be allowed to proceed for the present in shipments of pork products and condensed milk to all European neutrals, and announcing readiness of U. S. Shipping Board to assist neutrals having insufficient shipping of their own.	774 [Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679]
Dec. 24 (4839)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Information that proclamation is soon to be issued providing trade resumption, effective January 1, 1919, with Alsace-Lorraine and the new Italian territories, omitting specific reference to Trieste and Trentino.	775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , and Doc. 681]
Dec. 24 (4841)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Supplementing information contained in Embassy's telegram No. 4817 of December 21.	775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , and Doc. 681]
Dec. 24 (4855)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Addition by A. B. C. of pork, pork products, iron and steel and manufactures thereof except high speed steel, to free list, subject to Italian approval; request that Food Administration be notified.	777 [Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683]

Dec. 24 (3662)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Auchincloss from McCormick: Hope that no change in the censorship will be made; importance of maintaining enemy trading list and enemy trade restrictions.	777 [Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683]
Dec. 24 (6474)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: Advice from French Ministry of Blockade that Italian Government has permitted trade with Trentino since November 29; that the French consider it necessary that a committee be established in Paris to make simultaneous announcements to Allied countries regarding relaxation of restrictions. Intention to endeavor informally to secure cooperation of British and Italians so that information may be secured as to any changes they may make in lessening trade restrictions.	778 [Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685]
Dec. 25 (6490)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: Proposal by French Ministry of Blockade that Inter-Allied committees in occupied territory grant derogations or licenses to trade and that Paris committee determine policies under which licenses will be granted.	778 [Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685]
Dec. 25 (6489)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: Advice that the French intend to keep committee informal and uncomplicated.	779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687]
Dec. 28 (4910)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Opinion that it should be made clear to neutrals that they may	779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 685 ,

	import pork and other free-list articles, and that there will be no objection to reexport in any direction.	Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687]
Dec. 30 (6793)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board, for Taylor: Decision that, subject to Taylor's approval, it will be proper for Stetson to represent Board on Inter-Allied committee at Paris.	780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689]
Dec. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of the War Trade Board (Hale)</i> Extract from Board minutes of December 30 (text printed) containing decision to advise Hoover that restrictions upon exportation of foodstuffs from Northern Neutrals to Germany should be maintained, and that U. S. food shipments to Germany should be made directly, with payments to be made in a manner approved by the Peace Conference.	780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689]
1919 Jan. 1 (10)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Italian approval of A. B. C. action in placing pork on free list; development of British opposition which will probably be withdrawn; A. B. C. modification of action regarding iron and steel and manufactures thereof.	781 [Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690]
Jan. 3 (2)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Hoover from Sheldon: War Trade Board telegram of January 2 (text printed) communicating decision that commodities, including pork, should not be permitted to sift into enemy countries via neutrals, and that any foodstuffs should be shipped direct to enemy countries. Suggestion that pork be placed on	782 [Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 691]

	unrationed list in order that importers will be required to give guarantees against reexport.	
Jan. 3 (45)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Minute adopted by A. B. C. (text printed), modifying interpretation of free list and providing for three principal lists: (1) free, (2) nonrationed, and (3) rationed.	783 [Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692]
Jan. 3 (3772)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Telegram for transmission to Legation at Stockholm (text printed) communicating opinion that present control of imports into Sweden should not be immediately and wholly abandoned.	784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693]
Jan. 3 (3774)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Instructions to explain to British, French, and Italian representatives that list originally intended for publication on December 20 has never been published. Memorandum summarizing position with reference to exports to Northern Neutrals (text printed); instructions to submit to A. B. C. for consideration, and to repeat to Hoover and Taylor.	785 [Pg. 785 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694]
Jan. 4 (Food 172)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Food Administration (tel.)</i> From Hoover: Report on status of food shipments.	789 [Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 694 and Doc. 695]
Jan. 4 (6615)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Stetson: Telegram from Stewart, at Rome, December 30 (text printed),	790 [Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 695]

	advising that Italian Government will soon issue decree regarding trade with Trentino.	and Doc. 696]
Jan. 4 (3797)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board, for Frothingham: Opinion that British must cooperate with U. S. missions in Latin America and Spain in the continuance of policy regarding detection of suspicious consignees; instructions to furnish information.	791 [Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697]
Jan. 6 (6870)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board: Approval of issuance by local Inter-Allied committees of licenses to trade in occupied territory, provided they are issued in accordance with policies formulated by Paris committee.	792 [Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698]
Jan. 7 (6884)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board, for McCormick from White: Increase in complaints regarding embargo on foodstuffs; opinion that, as surplus exists, there is no justification for withholding licenses; advice that action is delayed only in order that Hoover may be made acquainted with this position.	793 [Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700]
Jan. 7 (154)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> War Trade Board from Sheldon: Suggestion that certain commodities be placed on nonrationed rather than free list if control is desired, as free list is now a no-guarantee list.	793 [Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700]
Jan. 8 (6900)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For McFadden from War Trade Board, for McCormick: Objection to forcing pork shipments to uphold price in United States; opinion that any shipments of pork or other commodities which A.	794 [Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 ,

	B. C. consider necessary for Central Powers to receive should be permitted openly.	and Doc. 702]
Jan. 9 (3973)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Public announcement of procedure for trading with Alsace-Lorraine (text printed).	794 [Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702]
Jan. 10	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Removal from export licenses to Northern Neutrals of the condition that shipment must be made in vessels flying flag of country of destination. (Sent also to diplomatic missions in France, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, for War Trade Board representatives.)	795 [Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704]
Jan. 13	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> For Sheldon from War Trade Board: Information that applications for export licenses to Allied countries are no longer being referred to Allied missions in Washington. (Sent also to Embassies in France and Italy, for War Trade Board representatives.)	795 [Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704]

Germany:

Contents

The German armistice¹

¹ For correspondence concerning the German armistice negotiations, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 337–498*](#) passim.

[**\[1\] Terms of the Armistice With Germany, Signed November 11, 1918**](#)

The present armistice was signed on the 11th day of November, 1918,
at 5 o'clock a.m. (French time).

[**\[2\] Manifesto of the Government of the Bavarian Republic**](#)

Nauen, Germany , November 12, 1918. [Received via Naval Radio at
Belmar, N. J., November 12 (?), 3:41 p.m.]

763.72119/2772: Telegram

[**\[3\] The Special Representative \(House \) to the Secretary of State**](#)

Paris , November 13, 1918—9 p.m. [Received November 13—6:15
p.m.]

763.72119/9132: Telegram

[**\[4\] The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister \(Sulzer \)**](#)

Washington , November 15, 1918.

763.72119/2800a

[5] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 16, 1918—noon.

763.72119/9126a: Telegram

[6] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 19, 1918.

763.72119/2711

[7] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 19, 1918.

763.72119/2715

[8] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne , November 19, 1918. [Received December 4.]

763.72119/2866

[9] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne , November 20, 1918. [Received November 21—3:12 p.m.]

763.72119/2742: Telegram

[10] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne , November 20, 1918. [Received December 14.]

763.72119/3000

[11] The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)

Washington , November 20, 1918.

763.72/12937b

[12] The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

Washington , November 21, 1918.

763.72119/3085

[13] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 21, 1918—10 p.m. [Received November 21—8:22 p.m.]

862.48/118: Telegram

[14] The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

Washington , November 22, 1918.

763.72119/2754

[15] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , November 22, 1918—6 p.m.

763.72116/608a: Telegram

[16] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen [November 23, 1918—8 p.m.] [Received November 24—
11:40 a.m.]

862.00/344: Telegram

[17] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 24, 1918—11 p.m. [Received November 25—
12:40 a.m.]

763.72119/2767: Telegram

[18] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 26, 1918—12 m. [Received 12:30 p.m.]

763.72116/609: Telegram

[19] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 26, 1918—5 p.m. [Received November 27—
6:08 a.m.]

763.72119/2807: Telegram

[20] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 26, 1918—8 p.m. [Received 10:30 p.m.]

763.72119/2793: Telegram

[21] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/2812

[22] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/2801

[23] The Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/3085

[24] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/2803

[25] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/2811

[26] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 27, 1918.

763.72119/2825

[27] The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington , November 30, 1918.

763.72119/3052

[28] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

Washington , December 1, 1918.

763.72119/2917

[29] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Pontarlier (Berne), December 3, 1918—1 p.m. [Received December 4
—9:35 p.m.]

763.72119/2882: Telegram

[30] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne , December 3, 1918. [Received December 23.]

763.72119/3138

[31] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 4, 1918.

763.72119/2941

[32] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)

Washington , December 6, 1918—3 p.m.

763.72119/2882: Telegram

[33] The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

Washington , December 6, 1918.

763.72119/2881a

[34] The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

Washington , December 7, 1918.

763.72119/2801

[35] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 11, 1918. [Received December 17.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/4

[36] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

Washington , December 11, 1918.

763.72119/3052

[37] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 11, 1918. [Received December 18.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/11

**[38] The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Rathbone)
to the Acting Secretary of State**

Washington , December 12, 1918.

763.72119/2994

**[39] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace**

Washington , December 13, 1918—7 p.m.

811.711/854a: Telegram

**[40] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State**

Paris [undated]. [Received December 19, 1918—12:37 p.m.]

033.1140/46: Telegram

**[41] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace**

Copenhagen , January 1, 1919—3 p.m. [Received January 2—8:45
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/6: Telegram

[42] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State

Berne , January 4, 1919. [Received February 7.]

763.72119/3666

[43] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/20

[44] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , January 6, 1919. [Received January 7—2:41 a.m.]

763.72/12642: Telegram

[45] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen , January 7, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 8—1:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/10: Telegram

[46] The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris , January 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/23¹/₂

[47] The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris , January 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/23¹/₂

[48] The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State

Brussels , January 8, 1919—6 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.]

763.72116/629: Telegram

[49] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , January 8, 1919.

763.72119/3340

[50] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen , January 10, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 11—12:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/12: Telegram

[51] The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 10, 1919. [Received January 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/25

[52] The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 11, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 850e.00/2

[53] The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 13, 1919. [Received January 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/27

[54] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , January 15, 1919.

763.72119/3415

[55] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , January 23, 1919.

763.72119/3484

Terms of the Armistice With Germany, Signed November 11, 1918 2

Between Marshal Foch, commander in chief of the allied armies, acting in the name of the allied and associated powers, with Admiral Wemyss, first sea lord, on the one hand, and Herr Erzberger, secretary of state, president of the German delegation, Count von Oberndorff, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Maj. Gen. von Winterfeldt, Capt. Vanselow (German navy), duly empowered and acting with the concurrence of the German chancellor, on the other hand.

An armistice has been concluded on the following conditions:

CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH GERMANY

(A) CLAUSES RELATING TO THE WESTERN FRONT

I. Cessation of hostilities by land and in the air six hours after the signing of the armistice.

II. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine—so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the armistice.

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed shall be made prisoners of war.

Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly shall keep pace with the evacuation in these areas.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated in accordance with a note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

III. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or condemned).

IV. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 1,700 aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly all D. 7's and night-bombing machines).

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

V. Evacuation by the German armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation.

The occupation of these territories by allied and United States troops shall be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer (about 19 miles) radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the area.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine, between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometers (6¼ miles) distant from them, between the Dutch frontier and the Swiss frontier.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (right and left banks) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated according to the note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

VI. In all territories evacuated by the enemy, evacuation of the inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to

the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the armistice.

No destruction of any kind to be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores, food, munitions, and equipment, which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general character shall be taken, and no official order shall be given which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

VII. Roads and means of communications of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons, in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in Annexe No. 2 (not exceeding 31 days in all).

Five thousand motor lorries are also to be delivered in good condition within 36 days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days, together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system.

Further, the necessary working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals, and repair shops, shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany, so far as the working of the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine is concerned.

All lighters taken from the Allies shall be restored to them.

The note attached as Annexe 2 defines the details of these measures.

VIII. The German command shall be responsible for revealing within 48 hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delay-action fuzes disposed on territories evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.

The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of wells, springs, etc.).

Breaches of these clauses will involve reprisals.

IX. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, save for settlement of accounts with authorized persons.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

X. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war, including those under trial and condemned. The allied powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they think fit. This condition annuls all other conventions regarding prisoners of war, including that of July, 1918, now being ratified. However, the return of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the peace preliminaries.

XI. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who shall be left on the spot with the material required.

(B) CLAUSES RELATING TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

XII. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

XIII. Evacuation of German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners and agents, civilians as well as military, now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as defined on Aug. 1, 1914), to be recalled.

XIV. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measures with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as defined on Aug. 1, 1914).

XV. Annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties. [2a](#)

XVI. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

(C) CLAUSE RELATING TO EAST AFRICA

XVII. Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period specified by the Allies.

(D) GENERAL CLAUSES

XVIII. Repatriation without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians, including hostages and persons under trial and condemned, who may be subjects of allied or associated States other than those mentioned in Clause III.

FINANCIAL CLAUSES

XIX. With the reservation that any subsequent concessions and claims by the Allies and United States remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are imposed:

Reparation for damage done.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies to cover reparation for war losses.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power.

This gold is to be delivered in trust to the Allies until peace is concluded.

(E) NAVAL CONDITIONS

XX. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the position and movements of all German ships.

Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the navies and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

XXI. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

XXII. To surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and mine layers), with armament and equipment complete. Those that can not put to sea shall be deprived of armament and equipment and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of a wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the armistice.

XXIII. The following German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only care and maintenance parties being left on board, namely:

6 battle cruisers.

10 battleships.

8 light cruisers (including 2 mine layers).

50 destroyers of the most modern type.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet are to be disarmed. All vessels specified for internment shall be ready to leave German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

XXIV. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and destroy all obstructions laid by

Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

XXV. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the navies and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers. This to be secured by the occupation of all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defense works of all kinds in all the routes from the Cattegat into the Baltic and by the sweeping up and destruction of all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any questions of neutrality being raised by Germany, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated, and the plans relating thereto are to be supplied.

XXVI. The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the armistice as shall be found necessary.

XXVII. All aerial forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

XXVIII. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and intact the port material and material for inland waterways, also all merchant ships, tugs and lighters, all naval aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

XXIX. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized in the Black Sea are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned, and German materials as specified in Clause XXVIII are to be abandoned.

XXX. All merchant ships at present in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored to ports specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

XXXI. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

XXXII. The German Government shall formally notify all the neutral Governments, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately canceled.

XXXIII. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

(F) DURATION OF ARMISTICE

XXXIV. The duration of the armistice is to be 36 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be repudiated by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that failure to execute Articles III and XVIII completely in the periods specified is not to give reason for a repudiation of the armistice, save where such failure is due to malice aforethought.

To insure the execution of the present convention under the most favorable conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is recognized. This commission shall act under the supreme authority of the high command, military and naval, of the allied armies.

The present armistice was signed on the 11th day of November, 1918,
at 5 o'clock a.m. (French time).

FOCH
R. E. WEMYSS

**ERZBERGER
OBERNDORFF
WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW**

NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

The representatives of the Allies declare that, in view of fresh events, it appears necessary to them that the following condition shall be added to the clauses of the armistice:

In case the German ships are not handed over within the periods specified, the Governments of the Allies and of the United States shall have the right to occupy Heligoland to insure their delivery.

**F. FOCH
R. E. WEMYSS**
Admiral

The German delegates declare that they will forward this declaration to the German chancellor, with the recommendation that it be accepted, accompanying it with the reasons by which the Allies have been actuated in making this demand.

**ERZBERGER
OBERNDORFF
WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW**

ANNEX NO. 1

I. The evacuation of the invaded territories, Belgium, France, and Luxemburg, and also of Alsace-Lorraine, shall be carried out in three successive stages according to the following conditions:

First stage.—Evacuation of the territories situated between the existing front and line No. 1 on the inclosed map, ^{2b} to be completed within 5 days after the signature of the armistice.

Second stage.—Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 1 and line No. 2, to be carried out within 4 further days (9 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

Third stage.—Evacuation of the territories situated between line No. 2 and line No. 3, to be completed within 6 further days (15 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

Allied and United States troops shall enter these various territories on the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each.

In consequence, the allied troops will cross the present German front as from the 6th day following the signing of the armistice, line No. 1 as from the 10th day, and line No. 2 as from the 16th day.

II. *Evacuation of the Rhine district.*—This evacuation shall also be carried out in several successive stages:

- (1) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 2 and 3 and line 4, to be completed within 4 further days (19 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
- (2) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 4 and 5 to be completed within 4 further days (23 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
- (3) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 5 and 6 (line of the Rhine) to be completed within 4 further days (27 days in all after the signing of the armistice).
- (4) Evacuation of the bridgeheads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine to be completed within 4 further days (31 days in all after the signing of the armistice).

The allied and United States army of occupation shall enter these various territories after the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each; consequently the army will cross line No. 3, 20 days after the signing of the armistice. It will cross line No. 4 as from the twenty-fourth day after the signing of the armistice; line No. 5 as from the twenty-eighth day; line No. 6 (Rhine) the thirty-second day, in order to occupy the bridgeheads.

III. Surrender by the German armies of war material specified by the armistice.—This war material shall be surrendered according to the following conditions: The first half before the tenth day, the second half before the twentieth day. This material shall be handed over to each of the allied and United States armies by each larger tactical group of the German armies in the proportions which may be fixed by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

ANNEX NO. 2

Conditions regarding communications, railways, waterways, roads, river and sea ports, and telegraphic and telephonic communications:

I. All communications as far as the Rhine, inclusive, or comprised, on the right bank of this river, within the bridgeheads occupied by the allied armies shall be placed under the supreme and absolute authority of the commander in chief of the allied armies, who shall have the right to take any measure he may think necessary to assure their occupation and use. All documents relative to communications shall be held ready for transmission to him.

II. All the material and all the civil and military personnel at present employed in the maintenance and working of all lines of communication are to be maintained in their entirety upon these lines in all territories evacuated by the German troops.

All supplementary material necessary for the upkeep of these lines of communication in the districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be supplied by the German Government throughout the duration of the armistice.

III. Personnel.—The French and Belgian personnel belonging to the services of the lines of communication, whether interned or not, are to be returned to the French and Belgian armies during the 15 days following the signing of the armistice. The personnel belonging to the organization of the Alsace-Lorraine railway system is to be maintained or reinstated in such a way as to insure the working of the system.

The commander in chief of the allied armies shall have the right to make all changes and substitutions that he may desire in the personnel of the lines of communication.

IV. *Material—(a) Rolling stock.*—The rolling stock handed over to the allied armies in the zone comprised between the present front and line No. 3, not including Alsace-Lorraine, shall amount at least to 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. This surrender shall be carried out within the period fixed by clause 7 of the armistice, and under conditions the details of which shall be fixed by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this material is to be in good condition and in working order, with all the ordinary spare parts and fittings. It may be employed together with the regular personnel, or with any other, upon any part of the railway system of the allied armies.

The material necessary for the working of the Alsace-Lorraine railway system is to be maintained or replaced for the use of the French army.

The material to be left *in situ* in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as that on the inner side of the bridgeheads, must permit of the normal working of the railways in these districts.

(b) Permanent way, signals, and workshops.—The material for signals, machine tools, and tool outfits, taken from the workshops and depots of the French and Belgian lines, are to be replaced under conditions the details of which are to be arranged by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

The allied armies are to be supplied with railroad material, rails, incidental fittings, plant, bridge-building material, and timber necessary for the repair of the lines destroyed beyond the present front.

(c) Fuel and maintenance material.—The German Government shall be responsible throughout the duration of the armistice for the release of fuel and maintenance material, to the depots normally

allotted to the railways in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

V. Telegraphic and telephonic communications.—All telegraphs, telephones, and fixed W/T stations are to be handed over to the allied armies, with all the civil and military personnel and all their material, including all stores on the left bank of the Rhine.

Supplementary stores necessary for the upkeep of the system are to be supplied throughout the duration of the armistice by the German Government according to requirements.

The commander in chief of the allied armies shall place this system under military supervision and shall insure its control, and shall make all changes and substitutions in personnel which he may think necessary.

He will send back to the German Army all the military personnel who are not in his judgment necessary for the working and upkeep of the railway.

All plans of the German telegraphic and telephonic systems shall be handed over to the commander in chief of the allied armies.

Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany, Signed December 13, 1918

CONVENTION

The undersigned, in virtue of the powers with which they were endowed for the signing of the armistice of the 11th November, 1918, have concluded the following additional agreement:

1. The duration of the armistice signed on the 11th November, 1918, has been prolonged for a month, i. e., till 5 a.m. on the 17th January, 1919.

The one month's extension will be further extended until the conclusion of peace preliminaries, provided this arrangement meets with the approbation of the allied Governments.

2. The clauses of the convention (11th November) which have been incompletely fulfilled will be carried out during the period of extension, according to the conditions laid down by the Permanent International Armistice Commission following the orders given by the allied generalissimo.

3. The following clause is added to the convention of the 11th November, 1918:

From now onwards the generalissimo reserves to himself the right of occupying (when he deems it advisable), as an additional guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank or the Rhine, north of the bridgehead of Cologne, and as far as the Dutch frontier.

Six days' notice will be given by the generalissimo before the occupation comes into effect.

TRÈVES, December 13, 1918.

F. FOCH
WEMYSS
Admiral
ERZBERGER
A. OBERNDORFF
WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW

Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany, Signed January 16, 1919

CONVENTION

The undersigned plenipotentiaries (Admiral Browning taking the place of Admiral Wemyss), vested with the powers in virtue of which the armistice agreement of 11th November, 1918, was signed, have concluded the following supplementary agreement:

1. The armistice of the 11th November, 1918, which was prolonged until the 17th January, 1919, by the agreement of the 13th December,

1918, shall be again prolonged for one month, that is to say, until the 17th February, 1919, at 5 a.m.

This prolongation of one month shall be extended until the conclusion of the peace preliminaries, subject to the approval of the allied Governments.

2. The execution of those clauses of the agreement of the 11th November which have not been entirely carried out shall be proceeded with and completed during the prolongation of the armistice, in accordance with the detailed conditions fixed by the Permanent International Armistice Commission on the instructions of the allied high command.

3. In substitution of the supplementary railway material specified by Tables 1 and 2 of the Spa protocol of 17th December, i. e., 500 locomotives and 19,000 wagons, the German Government shall supply the following agricultural machinery and instruments:

400 two-engined steam-plow outfits, complete, with suitable plows.

6,500 drills.

6,500 manure distributors.

6,500 plows.

6,500 Brabant plows.

12,500 harrows.

6,500 scarifiers.

2,500 steel rollers.

2,500 Croskill rollers.

2,500 mowing machines.

2,500 hay-making machines.

3,000 reapers and binders.

or equivalent implements, according to the scale of interchangeability of various kinds of implements considered permissible by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. All this material, which shall be either new or in very good condition, shall be delivered together with all accessories belonging to each implement and with the spare parts required for 18 months' use.

The German Armistice Commission shall, between the present date and the 23d January, supply the Allied Armistice Commission with a list of the material that can be delivered by the 1st March, which must, in principle, constitute not less than one-third of the total quantity. The International Armistice Commission shall, between now and the 23d January, fix the latest dates of delivery, which shall, in principle, not extend beyond the 1st June.

4. The officers in Germany delegated by the allied and associated powers to organize the evacuation of the prisoners of war belonging to the armies of the entente, together with representatives of the relief associations of the United States, France, Great Britain, and; Italy shall form a commission charged with the care of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

This commission, the headquarters of which shall be in Berlin, shall be empowered to deal with the German Government direct, upon instructions from the allied Governments, regarding all questions relating to Russian prisoners of war.

The German Government shall accord the commission all traveling facilities necessary for the purpose of investigating the housing conditions and food supply of such prisoners.

The allied Governments reserve the right to arrange for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war to any region which they may consider most suitable.

5. *Naval clauses.*—Article XXII, of the armistice agreement of the 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows:

In order to insure the execution of such clause, the German authorities shall be bound to carry out the following conditions:

All submarines capable of putting to sea, or of being towed, shall be handed over immediately and shall make for allied ports. Such vessels shall include submarine cruisers, mine layers, relief ships, and submarine docks. All submarines

which can not be surrendered shall be completely destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the allied commissioners.

Submarine construction shall cease immediately, and all submarines in course of construction shall be destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the allied commissioners.

Article XXIII of the armistice agreement of the 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows:

In order to insure the execution of such clause, the German commission shall furnish the interallied naval armistice commission with a complete list of all surface vessels constructed or in course of construction (launched or on the stocks), specifying probable dates of completion.

Article XXX of the armistice agreement of 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows:

In order to insure the execution of such clause, the allied high command informs the German high command that all possible measures must be taken immediately for delivery, in allied ports, of all allied, merchantmen still detained in German ports.

6. Restitution of material carried off from Belgian and French territories.—As restitution of material carried off from French and Belgian territory is indispensable for setting factories once more into working order, the following measures shall be carried out, viz:

(a) All machinery, machinery parts, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of all kinds and, generally, all industrial or agricultural articles carried off by German military or civilian authorities or individuals, under any pretext whatever, from territories formerly occupied by the German armies on the western front, shall be placed at the disposal of the Allies for the purpose of being returned to their places of origin, should the French and Belgian Governments so desire.

These articles shall be returned without further alteration and undamaged.

(b) In view of such restitution, the German Government shall immediately furnish the armistice commission with all official or private accounts, agreements for sale or hire, or correspondence relating to such articles, together with all necessary declarations or information regarding their existence, origin, adaptation, present condition and locality.

(c) The delegates of the French or Belgian Government shall cause inventories or examinations of such articles to be made on the spot in Germany, should they think fit.

(d) The return of such articles shall be effected in accordance with special instructions to be given as required by the French or Belgian authorities.

(e) With a view to immediate restitution, declarations shall more particularly be made of all stocks of driving belts, electric motors and parts thereof, or plant removed from France or Belgium and existing in depot parks, railways, ships, and factories.

(f) The furnishing of the particulars referred to in articles 3 and 6 hereof shall commence within eight clear days from the 20th January, 1919, and shall be completed in principle before the 1st April, 1919.

7. As a further guarantee, the supreme allied command reserves to itself the right to occupy, whenever it shall consider this desirable, the sector of the fortress of Strassburg formed by the fortifications on the right bank of the Rhine, with a strip of territory extending from 5 to 10 kilometers in front of such fortifications, within the boundaries defined on the map appended hereto.^{[2c](#)}

The supreme allied command shall give six days' notice prior to such occupation, which shall not be preceded by any destruction of material or of buildings.

The limits of the neutral zone will, therefore, be advanced by 10 kilometers.

8. In order to secure the provisioning of Germany and of the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet, for the duration of the armistice, under the control and the flags of the allied powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.

This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews so replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.

Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.

All questions of details, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessel, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately.

TRÈVES, January 16, 1919.

**FOCH
BROWNING
ERZBERGER
OBERNDORFF
VON WINTERFELDT
VANSELOW**

Convention Prolonging the Armistice With Germany, Signed February 16, 1919

CONVENTION

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, possessed of the powers in virtue of which the armistice agreement of November 11, 1918, was signed, have concluded the following additional agreement:

Admiral Wemyss being replaced by Admiral Browning, Gen. von Winterfeldt by Gen. von Hammerstein, and the minister plenipotentiary, Count von Oberndorff, by the minister plenipotentiary, von Haniel.

- I. The Germans are to cease all hostilities against the Poles at once, whether in the district of Posen or any other district. With this end in view, they are forbidden to allow their troops to cross the following line: The old frontier between East and West Prussia and Russia as far as Louisenfelde, from thence the line west of Louisenfelde, west of Gr. Neudorff, south of Brzoza, north of Schubin, north of Exin, south of Samotschin, south of Chodziesen, north of Czarnikau, west of Miala, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawitsch, south of Krotoschin, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Doruchow, to the Silesian frontier.
- II. The armistice of November 11, prolonged by the agreements of December 13, 1918, and January 16, 1919, until February 17, 1919, is further prolonged for a short period, the date of expiry not being given, the allied powers and those associated with them reserving to themselves the right to terminate the period at three days' notice.
- III. The carrying out of those clauses of the agreement of November 11, 1918, and of the additional agreements of December 13, 1918, and January 16, 1919, the terms of which have not yet been fully carried into effect, will be continued and completed during the prolongation of the armistice, according to detailed arrangements made by the permanent armistice commission, acting on instructions issued by the supreme allied command.

TRÈVES, February 16, 1919.

**FOCH
BROWNING
ERZBERGER
FREIHERR V. HAMMERSTEIN
VON HANIEL
VANSELOW**

² Reprinted from Senate Document No. 147, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3; the three conventions *infra* are also reprinted from S. Doc. 147. Copies of the French text of the Armistice with Germany and its subsequent extensions certified as authentic by M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, may be found under file No. 763.72119/6664.

^{2a} For treaty of Bucharest, see [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771](#); for treaty of Brest-Litovsk and supplementary treaties, see [ibid., 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 442–475](#).

^{2b} No map accompanies file copy of this document.

^{2c} No map appended to file copy of this document.

763.72119/2772: Telegram

[Document 2]

Manifesto of the Government of the Bavarian Republic

NAUEN, GERMANY , November 12, 1918.
[Received via Naval Radio at Belmar, N. J.,
November 12 (?), 3:41 p.m.]

The just founded Bavarian Republic directs following manifesto to Swiss Federal Council with request to send it to Wilson, to Governments of France, England, and Italy and to spread it abroad among Swiss people:

“To Governments and people of America, France, England, and Italy, to proletarians of all countries! Bavarian people were first in Germany, who under guidance of men who since beginning of war have carried on an urgent struggle against frivolous policy of German Governments and princes, to set aside in a stormy revolutionary uprising crowned by definitive success all and everything which was guilty or contributed to guilt of great war. Bavaria has proclaimed itself a people's state. Whole people welcome with joy its liberation. The other states of Germany have followed by a not to be resisted impulse our example and by this founded for first time an actual internal unity of Germany. At this moment bursts upon the young Bavaria publication of armistice conditions of the Allied Powers.

All hopes which we cherished by success of revolution can by these be destroyed. New Republic will, if these terrible terms should remain unchanged, in a short time be a waste and chaos. We understand indeed the feelings which have occasioned Allied Powers to make such conditions if they by this would strike at the guilty. German autocrats and

militarists deserve no pity. Now however people has freed itself and conditions which are now laid upon it mean its destruction. If the demands are maintained we come into a condition which no human imagination can represent. An anarchistic dissolution of all relations, which Bavarian revolution by creation of a people's state complete in itself wishes to prevent, would be the necessary consequence and the rulership of an army of millions of disbanded soldiers without discipline would introduce a moral brutalisation and a political, social diabolical possession which would pass over and have a destructive effect also in the territory of the conquerors. That must not take place! Democratic people must not allow that revolutionary creation of German democratic state be destroyed by the unpityingness of the victors. The hour has now come when by an act of farseeing magnanimity reconciliation of the nations can be brought about. Forget in the creation of the new world the hate which has been produced in the old. League of Nations, which has become common ideal of humanity, can never come into existence if it begins with rooting out of youngest member of democratic culture. We conjure you, the governments as well as people, to undertake in a sublime conquest of self the settlement which is fateful for all of the great war in common work of conqueror and conquered. This difficult work would be the first action of new League of Nations and would be its beginning work. Allied democrats must not forget how many sacrifices have been silently borne by innumerable nameless Germans who have been brought since beginning of war into clear recognition of the guilt, and governments of Allied Powers must not assume responsibility before the proletarian masses of again destroying the international at the moment when it has been inwardly brought together. Fate of mankind lies in hands of men who are [now] responsible for bringing it peace and new organization of the destructed [*sic*] nations.

763.72119/9132: Telegram

[Document 3]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 13, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received November 13—6:15 p.m.]

105. Secret for the President. Clemenceau informs me that the Allies feel, now that the armistice is signed, that the German authorities should address their official communications to them rather than to the United States exclusively. It is a small matter, but under the circumstances I believe it would be wise for you to give the German authorities an intimation that better feeling could more easily be brought about if they would do this. I would suggest that you inform the Allied Ambassadors as to any action you take so that they may inform their Governments.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2800a

[Document 4]

The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

No. 290

WASHINGTON , November 15, 1918.

SIR: I should be gratified if you would be good enough to convey the following communication to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the German Government:

“The Government of the United States has received the radio messages addressed to the President of the United States by the German Government, relative to relief from certain requirements imposed in the armistice with the Ottoman Government and the armistice with the German Government.^{[3](#)}”

“The communications which have been received will be forthwith communicated to the other Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated and also to the Supreme War Council in Paris.

“The Government of the United States takes this opportunity to suggest to the German Government that communications of this nature, which pertain to the terms of the armistice or to matters in which all the Associated Governments are interested, should be sent to all the Governments and not addressed alone to the President or Government of the United States.

“The Government of the United States also desires to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that these communications should be presented through established

diplomatic channels rather than by direct radio communication”.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

³ Several German radio communications on these subjects are quoted in the document *infra*.

763.72119/9126a: Telegram

[Document 5]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918—noon.

38. For Colonel House to be laid before the Supreme War Council.

The following messages have been received by wireless from Doctor Solf, addressed to the Secretary of State:

November 15. “The German Government and the German people have thankfully heard that the President of the United States is disposed to take into favorable consideration the question of shipping food products to Germany. But quick action is most imperative. The acceptance of the hard terms of the armistice, and in particular the necessity of providing for the food of the returning army out of our scanty stores, the stagnation of ocean traffic in the North and Baltic Seas through the continuation of the blockade, the danger to our supplies from the unsettled conditions in the East, all this makes our situation daily more unbearable. The danger of anarchy can only be averted by the speediest grant of relief. I, therefore, believe that my appeal to the President’s humane sentiments will not be in vain, if I lay before him an entreaty to save the German people from destruction by starvation and anarchy in sending as soon as possible to The Hague or any other place plenipotentiaries who would there discuss with plenipotentiaries of the German people the details of the plan for the timely saving of our Fatherland through the magnanimous help of America. The matter might perhaps be put in the tried hands of Mr. Hoover who has rendered grand service in Belgium.”

November 15. “According to the nineteenth article of the Anglo-Turkish armistice⁴ all civilians of German nationality should leave the Ottoman Empire immediately. The literal fulfillment of this clause which would cause severe hardship especially to the poor people, must appear unreasonable after conclusion of a universal armistice. The German hospitals and asylums for the blind and orphans, the latter of which principally take care of Armenian children, would be compelled to close, thereby causing new sufferings to the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire. The German Government requests that the President should intervene in favour of these German civilians being permitted to remain in Turkey.”

November 11. “The armistice being now concluded the German Government requests the President of the United States to arrange for the opening of peace negotiations. For the purpose of their acceleration the German Government proposes first of all to take in view the conclusion of a preliminary peace and asks for a communication at which place and what time negotiations might begin. As there is pressing danger of a famine the German Government is particularly anxious for negotiations to begin immediately.”

November 10. “Mr. Secretary, Convinced of the common aims and ideals of democracy the German Government has addressed itself to the President of the United States with the request to reestablish peace.

This peace was meant to correspond with the principles which the President has always maintained. Its aim was to be a just solution of all questions in dispute followed by a permanent reconciliation of all nations.

Furthermore the President has declared that he did not wish to make war on the German people and that he did not wish to impede with its peaceful development.

The German Government has received the conditions of the armistice.

After a blockade of fifty months these conditions, especially the surrender of the means of transport and the sustenance of the troops of occupation would make it impossible to provide Germany with food and would cause the starvation of millions of men, women and children, all the more as the blockade is to continue.

We had to accept the conditions.

But we feel it our duty to draw President Wilson's attention most solemnly and with all earnestness to the fact that the enforcement of these conditions must produce amongst the German people feelings contrary to those upon which alone the reconstruction of the community of Nations can rest, guaranteeing a just and durable peace.

The German people therefore, in this fateful hour, address themselves again to the President with the request to use his influence with the Allied Powers in order to mitigate those fearful conditions."

I have today transmitted the following note to the Swiss Minister, copies of which have been officially transmitted to the French and Italian Ambassadors and the British Chargé d'Affaires:

[Here follows the text of the note of November 15, 1918, to the Swiss Minister, printed *supra*.]

LANSING

⁴ For provisions of the Anglo-Turkish armistice, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441*](#)⁴.

763.72119/2711

[Document 6]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to transmit to your Excellency, upon the request of the German Government, the following communication:⁵

“The following telegrams have been exchanged between Marshal Foch and the German Army High Command:

‘The French Army High Command to the German Army High Command, November 14, 1918, 4:15 p.m. From information which has reached the high command of the Allied forces, it appears that at various places, particularly in Belgium, and especially in the country lying around Brussels, the German troops have committed violences against the people and destruction and plundering have occurred—acts which are entirely contrary to the terms of the armistice. The High Command of the Allied Armies relies upon the High Command of the German Army to take without delay all measures tending to prevent a violation of the contents of the signed agreement. If those proceedings do not stop in a very short time the high command of the Allied forces will find itself under the obligation to issue orders with a view to bring these to an end.

(Signed) FOCH’

‘To MARSHAL FOCH: The German plenipotentiaries during the negotiations have always insisted in writing

and orally in the most emphatic manner that the carrying out of the unheard of and technically unfeasible terms will be attended with unavoidable transgressions. The blame for these transgressions lies now and in future exclusively on the High Command of the Allies. The German High Command protests against the reproaches wrongfully made and again insists that further adherence to the methods employed up to now by the Allied High Command render impossible their measures for the protection of their own as well as the enemy people, and also the protection and care of their troops. It again urges that the armistice, yearned for by all peoples, be carried out in a spirit that does not exclude the observance of humaneness towards friend and foe. As to the fact itself, the German High Command wishes to remark that according to the information that it has gathered it is mostly a case of the populace committing excesses against the well-to-do classes and also against the German soldiers.

GERMAN HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMY'

"The German Government begs leave to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the President of the United States, and begs him to intervene towards giving a hearing to the dictates of humaneness.

Solf"

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

⁵ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised. A translation was forwarded to the Embassy in Paris for Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 6406, Nov. 25, 1918, 3 p.m. Another copy

of this message was received direct from the German Secretary of State in the Foreign Office by wireless dated Nauen, Nov. 17.

763.72119/2715

[Document 7]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the original text of a communication of the Government of the Republic of Bavaria.

A translation of this communication is also enclosed.

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

[Enclosure]

TRANSLATION OF A COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF BAVARIA

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the Government of the Republic of Bavaria is arranging for the removal, from the Palatinate, of the supplies of alcohol and other commodities stored there. In the interest of the maintenance of its very distressing economic situation, the Government of the Republic of Bavaria begs to earnestly solicit that the supplies, which cannot be removed within the time specified, be kept intact until the conclusion of peace.

Furthermore, the Military Authorities are not in a position to arrange for the repatriation of the numerous Russian prisoners of war, interned in the Palatinate. They recommend these prisoners to the protection of the Allies.

In conclusion, the Government of the Republic of Bavaria desires to call the attention of the Allies to the panic which has seized the population of the Palatinate for fear of being interned or deported to perform forced labor. The Government of the Republic of Bavaria is confident that the Allies will reassure the population of the Palatinate in this respect.

763.72119/2866

[Document 8]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 5285

BERNE , November 19, 1918.
[Received December 4.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a communication addressed by Dr. Edgar Jaffe, Minister of Finance of the Bavarian Government, to Dr. George D. Herron of Geneva.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure]

The Bavarian Minister of Finance (Jaffe) to Dr. George D. Herron

MÜNCHEN , 18 November, 1918.

Many thanks for your telegram of the 14th whose contents I have communicated immediately to the president of ministry. We know well what a great difference there is between the conditions of armistice that have been communicated to us and the conditions of peace which we do not know yet. But on the other hand we must refer most energetically to the fact that just the immense heaviness of the original conditions of the armistice contains in itself the great danger to cause just the thing which the Allies as well as ourselves must consider the greatest evil, that is, the dissolution of all ordered state of things and their change into complete anarchy. The alleviations of the conditions of armistice that have been communicated have already dispelled part of the danger, but further

consideration, especially with regard to the demanded consignment of locomotives, railway-cars and automobiles would be necessary, because otherwise our whole system of transportation would be disorganized and therefore the demobilization of the army as well as the food and coal supply in the interior could not be done in an orderly way. All obstruction of this kind may cause the breaking down of the whole traffic. An early publication of the conditions of peace would be the best means of giving back quiet and confidence to our people. You can be assured that the old powers of militarism have been destroyed so thoroughly here that there is no danger of their returning. The new democratic governments in the realm (Reich) as well as in the confederate states have the power firmly in their hands, and the danger of a reaction either from the right or from the left seems to me completely overcome. We shall go on our way firmly and steadfastly. The new Germany will cooperate in all those great tasks that have been put to civilized humanity, and she hopes to begin this work hand in hand with the other great world-democracies. I can assure you that the position which the President of the United States has taken until now in the question of armistice and the conditions of peace has already created a complete change in the whole of public opinion in Germany. I beg you most heartily to do all you can that the President continues to go on this way.

In old friendship and with fraternal greetings,

Yours,

Dr. EDGAR JAFFE

763.72119/2742: Telegram

[Document 9]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

BERNE , November 20, 1918.
[Received November 21—3:12 p.m.]

5872. Swiss Foreign Office hands me two notes from German Foreign Office with request for transmission. Notes follow in translation:

First note. “The German delegate at the Armistice Commission in Spa gave the following note to the delegates of the enemy on November 17th:

‘I have been instructed by the German Government to call your attention to the following: On the left side of the Rhine especially in the Luxembourg, Lorraine and in the Saar districts extraordinary disturbances of economic life will occur as a result of the discontinuance of imports of fuel from lower Rhine. The Luxembourg and Lorraine iron industry will have to stop work if unable to obtain these imports. As more than half of the population of these districts is employed in the iron industry or dependent thereupon catastrophal consequences will arise through lack of employment and tumults of every nature. The overhasty evacuation forced upon us has already caused a reduction in the traffic facilities for the works of the Ruhr district by one half and for the blast furnace and iron industry by one third. The small number of cars makes it impossible to undertake shipments to the left Rhine district. If an economic catastrophe in Luxembourg and in the iron district is to be avoided

then the number of cars for use must be increased by at least 2,500 daily in order to supply the Luxembourg, Lorraine iron industry with the absolutely essential quantity of fuel. If however, if work is to be kept up in the whole left Rhine district then the number of cars must be increased by at least 4,000 daily.

The Allied Governments and America face the question as to whether they desire to further insist upon the period set for evacuation which is too short to admit of an execution of the demands and thus call forth catastrophic conditions especially in the Luxembourg, Lorraine iron districts or whether they desire to grant a reasonable extension of the evacuation.

Should the Allied Governments and America decide in the interest of humanity and in order to protect the interests of the districts placed under their protection to grant a reasonable extension they would thereby make it possible for iron ore from the Luxembourg, Lorraine districts to be exported to the lower Rhine industrial district. The Luxembourg, Lorraine iron mines would be able to keep their works going in full force. At the same time the necessary import of iron ore would prevent unemployment and grave industrial interruptions on the lower Rhine especially on the right bank of the Rhine. Should however disturbances occur in the right Rhine district the close economic connection between the two districts would make a spreading of these disturbances to the left Rhine district unavoidable. The occupying powers should prevent this under all circumstances both in the interest of all and especially in their own interest, and for this purpose should grant immediately a 15-day extension of the evacuation period.' Signed VON HANIEL, Minister, Spa, November 17th, 1918.

The German Government begs earnestly for a reasonable extension of the evacuation period as otherwise serious disturbances and grave economic damages will be unavoidable. (Signed) Solf, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”

Second note. “The German delegate at the Armistice Commission in Spa gave the following note to the delegates of the enemy on November 16th:

‘Under instructions of the German Government I beg to point out most emphatically the following: When evacuating the territories now occupied the locomotives which are in use there will be surrendered. There are 3,000 of such locomotives. The delivery of the remaining 2,000 locomotives would mean the collapse of the German railway service and a resulting grave danger for Germany’s economic life. Hunger revolts with their unavoidable consequences could then be expected and furthermore the paralysis of the railway traffic would make the execution of certain armistice conditions, as for instance the transportation of prisoners, impossible. About 100,000 cars will probably be left in the occupied territory. The transfer of the remaining cars from Germany will be faced under present circumstances by overwhelming difficulties the removal of which cannot be foreseen.’
Signed BARON VON LERSNER, Counsellor of Legation, Spa, November 16th, 1918.

Marshal Foch replied to the above by wireless as follows:

‘The question is not clear. Article 7 of the convention provided for a period of 31 days for the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. This period cannot be changed. It is suggested that you propose to me the scale of delivery which will have to be made in order that the entire delivery be obtained in the time fixed.’

The German Government points again to the unforeseeable consequences which the strict execution of the conditions of article 7 of the armistice convention threatens and begs emphatically for an alleviation of these conditions. (Signed) Solf, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”

STOVALL

763.72119/3000

[Document 10]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 5330

BERNE , November 20, 1918.
[Received December 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith for the Department's information a copy of a memorandum calling to the attention of the American and Allied Governments certain violations of the conditions of the recently established armistice by the German Army of occupation at present preparing to evacuate Lithuanian territory.

I have the honor to add that a copy of the enclosed memorandum has been forwarded to the American Embassy at Paris.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM 6

The attention of the American and the Allied Governments is earnestly invited to the flagrant violations of the conditions of the recently established armistice which have been and are being committed by the German army of occupation now preparing to evacuate Lithuanian territory. These troops are now somewhat disorganized and in a state of semi-revolt, their discipline being weakened. Instead, however, of checking their excesses, both the military and civil authorities tolerate and even encourage them. The pillage which, under the name of requisitions, has devastated the

entire land and reduced the inhabitants to the direst poverty everywhere and, in places, to absolute famine, visibly increase against the day of evacuation now imminent. Not only are all foodstuffs unlawfully seized but also the rolling stock of the railways; the very rails are torn up and all telegraph and telephone materials are taken. The horses and cattle actually in German possession, which were seized forcibly from the peasants and proprietors and should be left in the country, are also being got ready for transport into Prussia. Munitions and stores from the forts are taken and, in the case of the greatest fortress in the land, Kowno, built by the Russians, some twenty-five kilometres of triple rows of iron fencing are being dismantled to be removed. This fortress, left practically intact by the Russians, when they retreated in 1915, is being, as far as possible, dismantled.

The ruinous destruction of the forests, one of the country's chief sources of wealth, goes forward, unhindered by the conditions of the armistice and the protests of the people. All the steamboats and other craft on the Niemen, the property of companies and individuals, is likewise being taken into Prussia, and thus is the country deprived of all means of transport.

If this robbery and destruction is not promptly stopped, the few poor remnants of the country's resources overlooked by the organized plundering of the last three years, will disappear.

General Pershing has been appealed to, for a force of ten thousand Lithuano-American soldiers. The way is open for transporting such a force to Libau. Arms, ammunition and military stores sufficient for a local militia force of twenty thousand men have also been solicited from General Pershing.

The mere knowledge that such aid was at hand would encourage and reinforce the law-abiding people and subdue the seditiously inclined. These troops would restore tranquillity, maintain order and discourage lawlessness, until such time as the Lithuanian Government should be able to organize and to assume these tasks. Meantime the German authorities should be required to observe in good faith the terms of the armistice they have signed.

⁶ Source of memorandum not indicated.

763.72/12937b

[Document 11]

***The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the
French Ambassador (Jusserand)***

WASHINGTON , November 20, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In reply to your inquiry as to what steps this Government would take on the action of The Netherlands Government in permitting German troops to cross Dutch territory, I beg to inform you that the Secretary of State has cabled to the American Chargé d’Affaires at The Hague⁷ to advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs that while in the opinion of the United States a violation of neutrality has occurred, the United States is not disposed in the circumstances to raise objection thereto at the present time on the understanding that this attitude of the United States is not to be regarded as a precedent, or as an admission of the rightfulness of the action of The Netherlands Government.

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

⁷ Telegram not printed.

763.72119/3085

[Document 12]

The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: My Government informs me that it has received a communication from the German Government asking for a modification and interpretation of the armistice, especially in regard to the economic intercourse between the left bank of the Rhine and the rest of Germany, the exploitation of mines, the navigation of the Rhine, the requisitioning of goods, etc., etc.

The German Government wishes to know also at what place its representatives may meet the Allied plenipotentiaries to discuss all these questions.

Baron Sonnino, assuming that the United States Government has also received such a communication,⁸ informs me that he would appreciate knowing the opinion of the United States Government on this matter, with a view to giving an answer to the German Government in agreement with those of the Allied Governments.

I have recourse to your courtesy and will very much appreciate it if you will let me know.

Believe me [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

⁸ See telegram No. 5872, Nov. 20, 1918, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 22 [Pg. 22 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#) and [Doc. 9](#)]; also note of

Nov. 26, 1918, from the Swiss Minister, p. 34 [*Pg. 34 includes portions of [Doc. 23](#), [Doc. 24](#), and [Doc. 25](#)*] (file No. 763.72119/2811).

862.48/118: Telegram

[Document 13]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 21, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received November 21—8:22 p.m.]

134. I have just been advised that the following telegram has been sent by Clemenceau to Marshal Foch:

“Be good enough to communicate to the German plenipotentiaries that as to that which concerns the supplying of Germany, the German people have only to refer to the text of the armistice, which makes known our intention to furnish it [with?] supplies to such an extent as we shall deem necessary. The Allied Governments are studying at this time means of realizing this intention. The Allied Council of Supply will make known to the German Government the conditions under which this supply can be operated as soon as the representative sent by the United States Government has arrived in Europe, Mr. Hoover being expected at the end of the following week.

The carrying out of the concessions to the demands of the German people cannot but be hastened if they hold ready the detailed information relative to these demands such as all information as to production, stock et cetera, and its system of dividing it.”

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2754

[Document 14]

The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The German Minister at Stockholm has pointed out to the Swedish Government, that if the stringent conditions of the armistice imposed upon Germany by the Allies cannot, to some extent, be modified, a grave danger of increased Bolshevistic activities would threaten Germany as well as neighboring countries. To avert such a calamity the Germans are very anxious to obtain a modification in these conditions especially for the purpose of raising the blockade of the Baltic and the North Sea, of mitigating the stipulations governing the surrendering of railroad-material, of preventing the exportation of raw material from the parts of Germany which are occupied by the Allies and of the maintenance of the free economic exchange within those regions as well as from them to other parts of Germany and abroad.

The German Minister further directed an appeal to the Swedish Government, to, if possible, obtain for the neutrals a release of the restrictions stipulated as to their free exportation to Germany, and finally, it has especially been pointed out the great importance of having the blockade raised in such a manner as to release the German fishing in the North Sea.

As to the possibility of an export of foodstuffs and other necessities to Germany from Sweden, the available supply is in the latter country, for the present, so scant—according to what has been stated by the Swedish Government—that all exportation to an extent which would render perceptible relief to the German people is excluded. And, besides, the tonnage and rolling stock presently at the disposal of Sweden are so limited that although the Swedish Government is strongly convinced of the great importance of a speedy and effective victualizing of Germany as a means of checking the Bolshevistic

movement, it regrets its inability to furnish, under present conditions, transportation facilities which would be required for the shipping: of a somewhat adequate amount of provisions to Germany.

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918.

763.72116/608a: Telegram

[Document 15]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)⁹

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918—6 p.m.

6381. Inform the French Foreign Office that this Government has received the following communication through the Swiss Legation from the Government of Bavaria:

“The Government of the Republic of Bavaria begs to request that a Bavarian mission be permitted to establish the destructions in Belgium and Northern France occasioned through the occupation of these regions by German troops.”

In delivering this note, the Swiss Minister stated that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that Bavaria was anxious to send a mission of prominent Bavarians into Belgium and France to make a careful report of the damage done to those countries, which report could be used in connection with the elections in Germany to the constituent assembly.

POLK

⁹ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date to the Minister in Belgium as Department's No. 326.

862.00/344: Telegram

[Document 16]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State*** 10

COPENHAGEN [November 23, 1918—8 p.m.]
[Received November 24—11:40 a.m.]

3182. Last night a very prominent member of the at present all-powerful executive committee of the Berlin Workmens and Soldiers Council together with another German not in sympathy with the revolution arrived from Berlin in company with a neutral diplomat *en poste* in Berlin. A two hours' conversation with them left the following impression:

1. That the application of the armistice terms in conjunction with the temper of the troops absolutely precluded any German military action whatsoever. Difficulty is even being experienced in defending the eastern boundary against the Poles.
2. The soldiers councils thus far are the strongest forces for order as opposed to Bolshevism.
3. This applies equally to such councils at the front; but conditions in the "Etappen" are chaotic, demonetization being in the [omission] and it is here the Spartacus agents, who are omnipresent and very active begin their work.
4. Housing facilities, food and clothing are lacking for many soldiers. They are accordingly also easy victims for the Bolshevik agents.
5. Thus if the soldiers return faster than arrangements can be made for their demobilization, anarchy is certain to supervene.
6. Therefore the time limits for withdrawal beyond the Rhine should be extended if it was not our intention to bring about the conditions described.
7. The immediate loss of such a large number of motorcars, locomotive and railway cars would make a proper demobilization almost impossible, especially in view of the desperate state of all

transport material which had reached a degree of general dilapidation little dreamed of by us.

8. Food is immediately needed to support the partisans of order and should be withheld from such districts as might embrace Bolshevism. The immediate relaxation of the embargo on fish from Scandinavia resulting from the loss of naval control of the Baltic would have an excellent effect as tangible proof of the willingness of the Allies to help relieve the food situation.
9. The Spartacus leaders are referring to reports of possible food relief from the Associated Governments as chimerical; thus Muller of the executive committee recently stated to the workmen's council of greater Berlin that such reports were "lies invented by the bourgeois press to aid the capitalistic forces."
10. By such statements and by making the best use of the present chaos the Spartacus group hope to create general anarchy. It is nothing [*sic*] that the Spartacus are the only party which have not protested publicly against the terms of the armistice, privately they express hopes of an Entente occupation of Germany boasting that they can then most easily infect the Entente troops.
11. Aside from an extension of the time for evacuation and retirement, the most potent counter measures against the Spartacus influence would be: (*a*) A more definite statement by President Wilson that relief measures will be undertaken but will be extended only to orderly communities, (*b*) An equally definite pronouncement by the President that no peace can be negotiated or signed with a government other than one representing the whole people; in such a pronouncement care should be taken against its being interpreted as excluding a socialistic republic democratically based.
12. They declared with much emphasis that no statement made by a German would carry any weight nor would that of any Entente statesman. The only pronouncements which now carried weight with the German masses and which were sure to reach and impress them were those of President Wilson. I called attention to the President's last speech¹¹ and to various other statements regarding the intention to institute relief measures. They replied that none had been sufficiently definitely or formal.

The contentions of the two Germans who are agreed on the necessity of helping the democratic elements of the revolution to gain the ascendancy were supported by the neutral diplomat. I was impressed with the sincerity of my informants. Their account of the great and immediate danger of the Spartacus group gaining control and creating anarchy convinced me of the accuracy of the views expressed in my 3108, November 11, 3 p.m.¹² Today Bouton of the Associated Press reports that the Spartacus group have obtained full control in Kiel and in the whole Düsseldorf district while the Danish press reports that Liebknecht has held three enthusiastic meetings in Berlin. If anarchy in Germany is to be avoided some recognition of the efforts of the democratic elements in the present government would seem imperatively necessary, while on the other hand it should be made still more clear that a Germany ruled by Spartacus Bolsheviki elements will be given neither assistance nor peace. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

¹⁰ Repeated to Colonel House as Department's No. 78, Nov. 26, 1918, 8 p.m.

¹¹ Delivered at a joint session of the two houses of Congress, Nov. 11, 1918; text in *Congressional Record*, vol. 56, pt. 11, p. 11541.

¹² Not printed.

763.72119/2767: Telegram

[Document 17]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 24, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 25—12:40 a.m.]

3190. The British Chargé d’Affaires informs me that the British Red Cross delegate who returned from Berlin on Friday had an interview with Erzberger who begged that the delivering of the railway cars and locomotives be postponed until January for reasons as stated in my 3182, November 23, 8 p.m. As a guarantee of good faith he offered the immediate delivery of 250 million in gold. Copenhagen to London.

GRANT-SMITH

763.72116/609: Telegram

[Document 18]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 26, 1918—12 m.
[Received 12:30 p.m.]

6014. Department's 6381, November 22, 6 p.m. Mr. Pichon manifested considerable surprise in my talk with him today, that the Government of Bavaria should make such a request. He said that under the circumstances it could not be entertained by the French Government, as the armistice was chosen [*still?*] in force against the Central Powers, of which Bavaria was a part, and that in effect the armistice itself [*superseded?*] all other relations that might exist between the French Government and the Central Powers, and until its terms had been fully complied with no such request from Bavaria could be considered.

SHARP

763.72119/2807: Telegram

[Document 19]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 26, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 27—6:08 a.m.]

3204. Supplementary to my 3190, November 24, 11 p.m. Abrahamson, British Red Cross delegate, also had interviews with Solf, Eckhardt and Schlesinger, the latter representative of Workmens and Soldiers Council. Solf and Schlesinger spoke of demobilization problem as reported in my 3182, November 23, 8 p.m. The latter stated that there were 120,000 Russian prisoners to be removed from the left bank of the Rhine which is especially interesting in view of the reports communicated to you in my 2872, October 7, 11 a.m.,¹³ of the German intention to fortify the frontier for a last stand on which work they were presumably engaged.

Erzberger speaking to Abrahamson as plenipotentiary of the Armistice Commission said there was no intention to avoid the fulfillment of the armistice conditions. He claims to have full authority to carry them out being entirely independent of other authorities and Workmens and Soldiers Councils. He said that it was possible for the conditions to be fulfilled but that the cost would be terrible, probably anarchy. He begged for postponement of the date of delivery the rolling stock until after the full demobilization of the troops in order to avoid massing them in the cities. The troops would be beyond the Rhine bridgeheads on December 12th and the neutral zone December 25th. If the concession asked for were made he said it would be possible to distribute the soldiers over the country and to deliver the rolling stock before January. As an earnestness of good faith he offered the immediate delivery of the 250 million in gold proposing Warnemünde as the place for the transfer. He was ready to give figures to prove that the amount of rolling stock seized in

Belgium and France was less than that demanded in the armistice conditions. He asked what more Germany could do to dissipate the distrust on the part of the Entente from which the severity of the armistice conditions arose. Abrahamson suggested that Germany herself immediately institute an inquiry relative to the treatment of prisoners which had caused such indignation in England and that Allied or neutral delegates should be invited to participate. Erzberger accepted unconditionally saying that he would endeavor at once to put such a plan into effect. He asked no reciprocity but stated that the principle of full justice which the new German Government had adopted would be followed.

He expressed the opinion that the solution of the transport question would lessen the danger of anarchy but not eliminate it. In order to avoid it entirely the Entente should declare itself ready to conclude a preliminary peace with Germany, to supply provisions and to raise the blockade. Elected national assembly should be called within three weeks and that the above-mentioned measures should not go into effect until such assembly had accepted the terms of peace. In such a preliminary peace the most important questions should be immediately and finally settled, the others might go over to a commission which would settle them on fixed principles. Abrahamson inquired whether a commission consisting of the military attachés of the Allied Powers in Copenhagen would be permitted to enter Germany and pursue their investigations unhindered should they so desire in order to gain a first-hand impression of the conditions of transport and similar questions. Erzberger declared his full agreement and gave assurances that he would do everything possible towards the introduction of such a commission and its work. On his return here Abrahamson submitted his notes to the German Red Cross representative who had them telegraphed through the German Legation to Berlin. The reply was received that they were correct and that Erzberger's interview could be considered as binding on the German Government. I understand Abrahamson has no instructions to occupy himself with anything but succor and repatriation of women and children. Interviews appear to have been sought by the Germans mentioned.

Copy to London.

¹³ Not printed.

763.72119/2793: Telegram

[Document 20]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 26, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received 10:30 p.m.]

3207. I learn that the French Minister is indignant at the activities of the British Red Cross delegate as reported in my 3190, November 24, 11 p.m., and 3204, November 26, 7 [5?] p.m., maintaining that negotiations relative to the armistice conditions should be carried on through Marshal Foch alone and has so telegraphed his Government.

Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

763.72119/2812

[Document 21]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to transmit to your Excellency, upon the special request of the German Government, the following protest:¹⁴

“According to annex 1 to the armistice agreement, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine are to be evacuated within 15 days in three stages. The third stage reaches over into Rhenish (Rhineland) territory, on the map, west of Prüm and between Merzig and Saargemünd, including Saarlouis and Saarbrücken.

It appears possible that this was done in order to attempt to add these regions to Alsace-Lorraine or to Luxemburg. The protest of the members of the German Commission was not heeded. The German Government most solemnly protests against any attempt to tear away these territories.

(Signed) Solf,
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

Berlin, November 21, 1918.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

¹⁴ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised.

763.72119/2801

[Document 22]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to inform your Excellency that the German Government has taken due note of your Excellency's communication of November 15, 1918. In consequence, the German Government begs to suggest that, in order to simplify matters, a central diplomatic agency be designated to receive and consider, on behalf of the United States and Allied Governments, the wishes of the German Government which, according to the present procedure, are to be submitted to all the governments concerned.

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

763.72119/3085

[Document 23]

The Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant in which you inquire regarding the views of this Government in connection with the request of the German Government for a modification and interpretation of the armistice, especially in regard to the economic intercourse between the left bank of the Rhine and the remaining portions of Germany, the exploitation of mines, the navigation of the Rhine, the requisitioning of goods, etc.

In reply I beg to state that all communications which have been received by this Government concerning the armistice have been referred to the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/2803

[Document 24]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the following communication from the German Government:^{[15](#)}

“Unless economic considerations are heeded, every additional day of the overhurried evacuation imposed by the armistice threatens disastrous effects not only for Germany (and particularly her territories on the left side of the Rhine), but above all for Luxemburg.

The German Government therefore urgently requests that experts in economics and in railroad technicalities be delegated as soon as possible to the Armistice Commission at Spa, as otherwise economic injuries might occur which could not subsequently be repaired.

(Signed) Solf,
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

^{[15](#)} The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister.

763.72119/2811

[Document 25]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency, upon instructions of my Government, the following communication from the German Government:^{[16](#)}

“To the American, English, French, and Italian Governments:

The conditions of the armistice most seriously threaten the economic conditions of the left bank of the Rhine and the relations of said left bank to the part of Germany situated on the right bank of the Rhine. Unless it is possible, by means of interpretation and supplementation, to make the most extensive clarification of a mitigating character, it will be impossible for us to continue to exist in view of the close economic connection between the left bank of the Rhine and the rest of Germany, and it is almost certain that the calm development which is beginning to proceed here will be immediately upset again. We shall then head toward incalculable and more or less Bolshevistic conditions, which may even become dangerous to the neighboring nations.

In order to prevent this, we deem a mitigation of the conditions and the determination of the practical execution thereof on the following points to be urgently necessary:

1. A general understanding to the effect that the normal economic intercourse on the left bank of the Rhine and all the normal connections of an economic nature between the left bank of the Rhine, the rest of Germany, and foreign

countries shall not be disturbed even during the military occupation.

2. Separate stipulations in regard to the following most important points:
 - (a) Permission of the German owners to operate the coal, potash, and ore mines on the left bank of the Rhine within the old imperial territory in the manner hitherto in vogue.
 - (b) Permission to transport the mined coal, ores, and potash up and down the Rhine and across the Rhine into the part of Germany situated on the right bank of the Rhine.
 - (c) General free utilization of the Rhine for transportation within the old German imperial boundaries.
 - (d) Permission of free navigation via Rotterdam and along the coast for the purpose of supplying Germany via the coast of the North Sea and the Baltic with coal, potash, foodstuffs, etc.
 - (e) Continuation of the industrial enterprises on the left bank of the Rhine for the benefit of the rest of Germany.
 - (f) Free railroad traffic in the occupied territory.
 - (g) Furnishing of electric energy from the left to the right bank of the Rhine.
 - (h) Discharged military recruits on the left bank of the Rhine shall not be taken as prisoners of war even if they still wear uniform.
 - (i) The civil and military offices of every kind on the left bank of the Rhine shall be permitted to continue to operate.
 - (k) Merchandise of any kind shall be requisitioned within the occupied territory only to the extent absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the garrisoning troops.
 - (l) Telephonic, telegraphic, and postal communications of the occupied territory with the right bank of the Rhine as well as with foreign neutral countries shall be free.
 - (m) Permission to convey food and forage of any kind from the left to the right bank of the Rhine.

The customs frontier shall be understood as being the old imperial boundary including Luxemburg, which belongs to

the German Customs Union, as stipulations of a legal character will be made only in the treaty of peace. The duties shall therefore be collected on the old imperial boundary by German customs officials on account of the Empire.

Furthermore, the German export, transit, and import embargoes shall be handled on this frontier by German officials according to German regulations.

Furthermore we must emphatically point out that the surrender of 500 [5,000?] locomotives and 150,000 cars in the present condition of our rolling stock will make it impossible for us to supply the cities with food, coal, etc., even within modest limits. We should be unable to guarantee the supply even for one week, and inasmuch as conditions are alike in the east, west, north, and south, we must expect hunger riots to occur simultaneously in all parts of the Empire owing to difficulties of transportation, and the consequences thereof would be incalculable.

Finally, the result of a continuance of the blockade, especially in the Baltic Sea, would be that not only the transportation from the North, which is so necessary to our industry, but also the transportation of German coal and iron to the North, which is so indispensable to Scandinavia, would no longer be possible, and the German and Scandinavian industry dependent thereon would have to reduce operations if not entirely stop. But what seems still more serious is the complete paralysis of the North Sea and Baltic Sea fisheries which would occur if the blockade were continued. We have instructed our representatives at Spa to discuss the foregoing urgent wishes with the representatives of the Allied Governments, though they have no full powers to negotiate in this regard.

In view of the serious danger which threatens us as a result of the oppressive armistice conditions, we beg you to indicate to us, by return mail if possible, a place where our representatives may meet with duly empowered

representatives of the Allied Governments in order to discuss the above questions. As the transportation question on both land and water is becoming graver every day and the returning troops threaten to dissolve all organization, we beg that no time be lost to the end that we may be in a position to continue to maintain order as hitherto.

(Signed) Solf,
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

¹⁶ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised. The substance of this message was transmitted to Colonel House in telegram No. 123, Dec. 4, 1918, 4 p.m. A translation of part of this note was also received by radio on Nov. 18, 1918 (file No. 763.72119/2624^{1/2}a).

763.72119/2825

[Document 26]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 27, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the original text of a communication from the German Government, received by this Legation this morning.

A translation of this communication is likewise enclosed.

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

[Enclosure—Translation]

A Communication From the German Government to the Government of the United States

According to information received in Berlin from the Postmaster General at Karlsruhe, Strassburg and Frankfurt, the Allied Governments have taken measures, whereby, since November 21, all communications by mail, telegraph and telephone between Alsace-Lorraine and the other parts of Germany are completely interrupted. These measures inflict great hardships on the population concerned.

The Postmaster General at Karlsruhe, for instance, reports that there are thousands of parcels, destined for the Alsace, at the Parcel-post Transfer Office at Mannheim and at the Post Office Karlsruhe 2. In Karlsruhe more than 200 registered and insured parcels from Switzerland for the Alsace are held up. The parcels contain mostly foodstuffs.

Furthermore, since November 21, noon, all [passenger] traffic has been stopped between Alsace-Lorraine and the other parts of Germany. This measure seriously affects the manifold economic relations, especially a great number of workmen and employes.

The German Government begs to draw the attention of the United States and Allied Governments to the unjustified harshness of these measures, which are not in line with the terms of the armistice. In the name of the population of Alsace-Lorraine and of the other parts of Germany it begs to solicit an early modification mitigating the aforementioned conditions.

SOLF
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office

763.72119/3052

[Document 27]

The British Embassy to the Department of State ¹⁷

MEMORANDUM

The Swiss Government has recently received from the Bavarian Government a communication stating that the population of the Palatinate and of Bavaria fear that they may be either interned or deported from their homes for compulsory labour and that they are flying in panic from their homes. The Bavarian representative in Switzerland has made the suggestion that a proclamation of a pacifying nature should be addressed by the Allies to the population of these districts. He suggests that such a step would be very reassuring and would fortify the authority of the ideas of the Entente among the Germans and act as a deterrent to Bolshevism.

The British Government think it advisable that a statement should be issued by the associated Governments to the effect that there are no grounds for the fear felt by the population, that the associated Powers do not intend to follow the example of the German imperial authorities in France and Belgium, but mean to carry out the conditions of the armistice both in the letter and the spirit.

The British Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the views of the United States Government as to the desirability of issuing a statement on the lines indicated.

WASHINGTON , November 30, 1918.

¹⁷ Text transmitted to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 156, Dec. 9, 1918, 6 p.m.

763.72119/2917

[Document 28]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State [18](#)

No. 1336

MEMORANDUM

The British Chargé d’Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty’s Government, has the honour to point out that no indication is given in Article 19 of the Armistice with Germany, or in the note of arrangements annexed to the Armistice conditions, as to how the Russian and Roumanian gold which Germany is bound to deliver to the Allies is to be checked or to whose custody it is to be handed over.

The matter is an urgent one and His Majesty’s Government are anxious that an understanding on the points indicated should be reached without delay. The British Chargé d’Affaires has accordingly been instructed to enquire the views of the United States Government on the matter, and would be much obliged if a reply could be given to this enquiry as soon as possible. A similar enquiry is being addressed to the French and Italian Governments.

WASHINGTON , December 1, 1918.

[18](#) This document bears the following manuscript notations: “Handed to Secty by Mr Barclay. Secretary told Barclay he thought France should hold in trust for all creditor nations until Peace Conference can determine ultimate disposal. I told Mr. Barclay I concurred as Secy suggested he see me. B[asil] M[iles] 12/2.”

763.72119/2882: Telegram

[Document 29]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), December 3, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received December 4—9:35 p.m.]

6020. The following is a translation of communication received from Swiss Political Department on behalf of German Legation, Berne. Political Department requests answer as soon as possible:

“The army of Mackensen had already begun its withdrawal from Roumania via Hungary when the armistice was signed on November 11th. Other retreating German troops who had previously fought in Siberia were also on Hungarian soil at this time. According to article 12 of armistice of November 11th the German troops were to immediately withdraw behind the German borders of August 1st, 1914 but no period for the execution of this withdrawal was fixed. In execution of this article the German troops from Roumania and other troops mentioned above which joined them in Hungary have continued to march home with the greatest possible speed. The Hungarian Government announced that in accordance with the request of the Supreme Command of the French Orient army, the special armistice which it concluded with the Entente on November 4th called for the evacuation of Hungarian territory by German troops within the fixed period of 14 days. After negotiations with the army [of] Mackensen, in accordance with the general armistice of November 11th, the Hungarian Government then silently allowed the retreat of German troops up to November 25th. On November 27th General Berthelot who had apparently meanwhile assumed supreme command of the Entente troops in Hungary informed Field Marshal Mackensen that Marshal Foch

‘rejected a change in the armistice conditions of November 11th for the German [omission?] front and demands the disarming and internment of Mackensen’s army.’ According to the German attitude the measures thus far taken by the army [of] Mackensen are not contradictory to the armistice conditions of November 11th and consequently Marshal Foch’s hypotheses for the rejection of change of these conditions is unraised [*sic*]. In a legal sense the armistice of November 11th also annuls the agreement of November 4th, concluded between Hungary and the Entente army regarding the withdrawal of German troops from Roumania and Hungary. The German Government was never notified of this agreement of November 4th. The present situation forces Germany to fulfill the new French demands. The German Government must however expressly characterize these as measures of force and expects that it will be given opportunity through its German representatives at Spa, who have been instructed in this regard today, to present its standpoint again in a conference with the Armistice Commission. Its standpoint in this matter is as follows: In the armistice treaty of November 11th which annuls all former agreements regarding the withdrawal of German troops from Roumania and Hungary and is alone authoritative, a period for the German withdrawal was not fixed and there was no question of internment. As the German troops are actually withdrawing with the greatest possible speed behind the German borders of August 1st, 1914, their internment would be contrary to law and which will represent a measure of force in no wise justified.”

STOVALL

763.72119/3138

[Document 30]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 5361

BERNE , December 3, 1918.
[Received December 23.]

SIR: Supplementing my telegram No. 5929 of November 25th last,^{[19](#)} I have the honor to transmit herewith copies, in German and translation, of the note of the German Legation of November 21st, transmitted to this Legation by the Political Department of Switzerland.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]^{[20](#)}

***The German Minister in Switzerland (Romberg) to the President of the Swiss
Federal Council (Calonder)***

A. I. 19355

BERNE , November 21, 1918.

The undersigned German Minister has the honor to bring the following note to the attention of the Federal Government, with the request that it be communicated to the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States of America:

“The German Military representative detailed to the Armistice-Delegation at Spa, transmitted on November 18, the following statement to the enemy representatives:

‘After the events that have occurred lately, Germany is evidently not in a position nor willing to resume hostilities once more. For this reason, several terms of the agreement regarding the armistice have become superfluous; terms which, under other conditions, were deemed necessary as a military guarantee to the Entente. If these should be maintained, notwithstanding, all efforts of Germany to oppose anarchy, effect an orderly demobilization, and insure the feeding of the population will prove unavailing. If, owing to the arbitrary (inconsiderate) enforcement of the present hard conditions, general disorder and a cessation in the feeding of the people and the extraction of coal should arise in Germany, the very near future will bring forth conditions which will find their reaction in the adjoining countries of the Entente and neutral countries.

I have therefore the honor to suggest the following alleviations in the execution of the armistice agreement:

Regarding Article II and Annex 1:

a) In lieu of Annex 1, I:

The evacuation of Belgium, France, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine (territory between the front when the armistice agreement was signed and lines 2 and 3 respectively) may be delayed upon a local agreement of the armies facing each other, if technical difficulties with regard to the march and the victualing of the troops make the observance of the dates prescribed impossible, and if by rushing, danger for the orderly evacuation should arise. The maximum of the delay shall not however, exceed ten days, so that, therefore, the German troops shall have passed line 2 on the 19th day (Nov. 30) at the latest, and line 3 on the 25th day (Dec. 6) at the latest.

b) In lieu of Annex 1, II:

The evacuation of the left Rhine bank shall be effected in such a way that the German troops leave line 2 and 3 respectively on the 29th day (instead of the 16th day); line 4 on the 35th day (instead of the 20th day), line 5 on the 39th day (instead of the 24th day); line 6 shall have been passed by the last German troops on the 43rd day (instead of the 28th day). The whole evacuation would therefore take 43 days instead of 28 days. The occupation would take place in 43 days instead of 32 days. Following the withdrawal of the German troops, the troops of the Allies and the United States shall enter the evacuated territories. Their movements will be regulated in such a way as to maintain at all times a zone of security of 10 km. between the opposing forces.

The commanders of the opposing armies shall directly come to an understanding, in order that they may regulate their movements in such a way as to fulfil these conditions and avoid any misunderstanding.

Regarding Article V:

The establishment of bridgeheads and the neutral zone east of the Rhine, no longer being necessary from the military point of view, shall in the interest of maintaining order and economic life, be waived. Special attention is drawn to the fact that the establishment of a neutral zone without military protection would, under the circumstances prevailing at the present time in Germany, lead to complete anarchy in the nearest future. The Rhine is looked upon everywhere as a neutral zone. The occupation will in a way be a hindrance to the economic traffic between the territories on either side of the Rhine.

Regarding Article VII:

Concerning paragraph 2 it is noted that as soon as the German troops have left French and Belgian territory, German employees cannot continue in service there.

Concerning paragraph 3 and Annex 2, IV (a):

At least 3,000 locomotives and 100,000 railway cars are to be left to the Allies in the occupied territories of France and Belgium. This delivery must be made within at least 31 days.

Reason: there is at present such a scarcity of locomotives and railway cars on the German railroads that economic life and provisioning is most seriously endangered, which paves the way for the spread of Bolshevism. The number of locomotives capable of service has been steadily decreasing in spite of new construction, owing to great difficulties of all sorts with regard to their being kept in good order. Hence the capacity of traffic of the railways is reduced in a corresponding manner.

Should Germany be forced to deliver more rolling stock out of Germany, besides that part already in the hands of the Entente, and another part which is in French and Belgian occupied territories, then a complete breakdown of the German system of transport will take place and through it famine and Bolshevism is to be expected.

The execution of the conditions of the armistice (i. e. restitution of prisoners of war), would be impossible if 3.000 locomotives and 100,000 railway cars had to be delivered, the importance of such material exceeding considerably that of the material which was previously requisitioned by Germany in Belgium and in the north of France.

A further delivery would only mean superabundance in Belgium and in the north of France, whilst in Germany it would lead to an economic break-down on account of the deficiency of transport material.

Concerning paragraph 4:

Those automobiles which are still in the evacuated territory and which may be placed in proper condition shall be computed among the 5,000 automobile trucks which are to be handed over. It will be decided about the delivery of the remainder at the Peace Conference.

Reason therefor: The German Army possesses considerably fewer automobile trucks than the armies of the Entente. The hasty evacuation has already resulted in the leaving behind of innumerable automobiles due to the lack of benzine, or an insignificant damage to the automobile, or to road obstructions. The remainder are indispensable to the provisioning of the Army, the carrying out of the demobilization and economic requirements.

Regarding Article X, paragraph 3:

In the interest of humanity it would be welcomed that German prisoners of war should be restored to their families by Christmas.

Suggest modifying conditions with regard to the Navy (naval clauses) regarding Article XXIII:

Safe return trip shall be assured for ship and crew of all auxiliary warships from the ports in which they are at present stationed to the port where they are to be dismantled.

Regarding Article XXIV:

The right will be recognized to Germany to participate with her own mine-searching ships to search and remove all mines in the North and Baltic Seas, even outside Germany's territorial waters. These ships shall be allowed to keep on board the armament required for the destruction of mines, that is: one light gun, one machine gun and several rifles with the necessary ammunition.

The above-mentioned right will be granted to Germany in the following territories:

- a) North Sea in the region of the German Bay (Deutschen Bucht) declared by England as "blockade territory".
- b) In the whole of the Baltic Sea.

Embargo ships fallen during the war into German hands have been transformed to the purpose of searching and removing mines. Germany will be allowed, until further advice, to charter such ships, as without them the work of removing the mines would be greatly prejudiced.

Regarding Article XXVI, paragraph 1:

With the exception of transports of arms, ammunition and manufactured war materials, German and neutral merchant ships loaded with foods should be allowed to travel safely to and from Germany:

- a) Between Germany, Scandinavia, Finland and the Baltic.
- b) Between Dutch and German ports.
- c) Between Scandinavia and Dutch ports.
- d) German merchant ships should be permitted to travel between German ports and between the German Islands of the North Sea and German ports.

Regarding paragraph 2:

- a)* Germany shall be allowed to engage in seafishing in the North and Baltic Seas unhindered;
- b)* German merchant ships shall be allowed to take part in the supplying of Germany with foodstuffs from overseas.'

The German Government urgently requests that these proposals be examined immediately. (Signed) Solf, Secretary of State in the Foreign Office."

We, the undersigned, avail ourselves of the opportunity to renew to His Excellency the President of the Swiss Confederation the expression of our highest consideration.

ROMBERG

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ File translation revised.

763.72119/2941

[Document 31]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , December 4, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit you the original text of a communication from the German Government to the Government of the United States:[21](#)

“Relying on the principles of a just peace announced by the President of the United States, the German people turned to President Wilson to procure an armistice. Instead of an armistice inspired, as expected, by principles of right, good will and a desire to promote the future reconciliation of the peoples we have an armistice of oppression and annihilation.

The terms of that armistice mean, in their execution, not a bridge leading to peace but the prosecution of the war by other means. The requirements of the armistice will not bring to the world the peace it longs for. They make it impossible to restore peaceful rest in Germany and to proceed with an orderly demobilization. They deliver up our sorely tried country to anarchy and chaos.

Our solemn protest against such treatment in defiance of humaneness fell on deaf ears. If the terms of the armistice were prompted by the necessity of depriving the German Empire of the means of resuming hostilities, our enemies must have clearly seen since that there is no longer any such ground. For the German people will not and cannot resume hostilities. The German Government sees in the maintenance of the harsh terms a criminal attempt on the principles of civilization and is forced to the conclusion that the

Governments of the allied countries care for nothing but the oppression and annihilation of the German people.

After the negotiations for the armistice were concluded the German Government again applied to the President of the United States with a request to bring about the earliest possible negotiations for a preliminary peace. The German Government has not yet been told when the Governments of the allied countries will take up the work of peace. The German people are beginning to doubt whether the enemy is not using this deferment of the peace as a cloak for a design to put the driven and exhausted German troops in the wrong for nonexecution of armistice terms that cannot be executed and so afford the Allies a ground upon which to prosecute the war.

If peace is to be concluded as a just peace, the decisions of the Peace Conference on points debatable in law are not to be forestalled. The German Government must declare in the face of the principle laid down by the President that the measures taken by the French Government in Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the conduct of the Poles in the Eastern borderland of Germany and the several measures taken by the non-German constituent parts of the late Austria-Hungary against the Germans, are nothing but attempts to forestall by force the decisions of the Peace Conference.

Against those attempts, as against the delay in concluding peace, the German Government most sharply protests. The animus betokened by such proceedings cannot give birth to a lasting peace. The German nation (*Volk*) may be temporarily borne down. It will not cease to live and to demand its rights.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

²¹ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised. A translation was

transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in telegram No. 38, Dec. 17, 1918, 6 p.m.

763.72119/2882: Telegram

[Document 32]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in
Switzerland (Stovall)***

WASHINGTON , December 6, 1918—3 p.m.

3462. Your 6020^{[22](#)} cannot be considered unless it is simultaneously communicated to Governments associated with the United States in the War. This applies to all future communications of similar nature.

If you receive assurance that it has been communicated to Associated Governments, you may repeat directly to Paris for information of Col. House.

POLK

^{[22](#)} *Ante*, p. 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 27](#), [Doc. 28](#), and [Doc. 29](#)].

763.72119/2881a

[Document 33]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

No. 295

WASHINGTON , December 6, 1918.

SIR: In a note addressed to you, dated November 15th, the Secretary of State suggested to the German Government that communications which pertain to the terms of the armistice or to matters in which all the Associated Governments are interested should be sent to all the Governments and not addressed alone to the President or Government of the United States.

In this connection I beg now to call your attention to the fact that the German Government, nevertheless, continues to address to this Government, through your good offices, various communications which apparently have not been communicated to the Governments associated with the United States in the war. In these circumstances I should be grateful if you would kindly inform your Government that the Government of the United States would prefer not to receive further communications of the above nature from the German Government unless it is clear that they are being simultaneously communicated to the other Governments concerned.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

763.72119/2801

[Document 34]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

WASHINGTON , December 7, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 26, 1918, in which you inform this Government that the German Government begs to suggest that, in order to simplify matters, a central diplomatic agency be designated to receive and consider, on behalf of the United States and Allied Governments, the wishes of the German Government which, according to the present procedure, are to be submitted to all the governments concerned.

In reply, I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme War Council at Versailles is an agency corresponding to the one the German Government asks to have designated.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/4

[Document 35]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 13

BERNE , December 11, 1918.
[Received December 17.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a note from the Swiss Political Department dated December 7, 1918, enclosing four communications intended to be delivered to the Government of the United States but which apparently did not reach their destination for some reason which I am unable to ascertain. In connection with the enclosed documents I should be glad to learn whether the American Mission to Negotiate Peace desires that documents of a similar nature be forwarded to Paris [by?] telegram or be forwarded by mail by the first available courier. I should also be glad to learn whether the American Mission desires that translations be made in the Legation or be left to the translators of the Mission itself.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

D. A. 58/1

The Swiss Political Department has the honor to enclose herewith to the Legation of the United States of America at Berne, four copies of different communications which it had communicated, to the Swiss

Legation at Washington to be transmitted to the Government of the United States, in cables which did not reach their destination.

The Political Department will be extremely obliged to the Legation of the United States if it would forward these different documents to their destination.

The Department seizes this opportunity to renew to the Legation of the United States of America, the assurances of its high consideration.

[Subenclosure 1—Telegram—Translation]

BERNE, December 7, 1918.

The Swiss Political Department to the Swiss Legation at Washington

D. A. 58/1. At the request of the German Government will you transmit the following communication to the Government of the United States:

“On account of the condition of transport the repatriation of Russian and Rumanian prisoners of war is almost entirely necessitated by sea routes and a longer stay of these prisoners-of-war in Germany would mean the breaking down of the feeding system and with that every order in the State. German Government begs in the interest of these 700,000 prisoners-of-war and civil prisoners who are still in Germany that ships from the German North Sea and Baltic harbors as well as with Holland’s consent from Rotterdam be permitted under a special flag to have free passage through the North and Baltic Seas to the Baltic or North Russian harbors and through the Atlantic and Mediterranean to South Russian and Rumanian harbors to effect the repatriation of Russian and Rumanian prisoners-of-war.”

[Subenclosure 2—Translation]

The German Legation in Switzerland to the Swiss Political Department

[BERNE ,] 28 November, 1918.

1. The German Government offers for consideration whether it would not be in the interest of all countries concerned that during the Armistice all telegraphic communication between Germany enemy countries and the neutral countries across enemy countries be resumed.
2. In order to assure the speedy early reopening of the German cable service destroyed on the enemy's side in the course of the war it is to be desired that the repairing of the cable by German cable ships be begun during the Armistice.
3. The German Government requests the American Government especially that wireless service between Nauene and Eilwese on the one hand and the American stations of Sayville and Tuckerton on the other hand be resumed forthwith.

[Subenclosure 3—Telegram—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the Swiss Legation at Washington

O. F. 40. At the urgent request of the Austro-German Government would you hand the Government of the United States the following communication:

Entente troops have occupied the Bacska South Hungary where there are important grain supplies. Besides the Czechoslovak troops have occupied a part of Upper Hungary where there are large quantities of potatoes. The quickest aid which Entente can give the German-Austrian provinces (which) lacking in food stuffs would consist in, sending in advance grain and potatoes from these provinces to Vienna.

[BERNE,] November 22, 1918.

[Subenclosure 4—Translation]

The German Minister in Switzerland (Romberg) to the President of the Swiss Federal Council (Calonder)

A. I. 19576

The undersigned German Minister in conformity to instructions received has the honor to respectfully request the Swiss Government to communicate the following telegraphically to the Government of the United States of America:

According to telegraphic news Mr. Hoover is on his way to Europe. The German Government requests the American Government to empower Mr. Hoover with the organizing of the import of food stuffs into Germany. German experts would be placed at his service for his information at the Hague.

The undersigned takes this opportunity to renew to His Excellency the President of the Republic the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

ROMBERG

763.72119/3052

[Document 36]

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

WASHINGTON , December 11, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum of November 30, 1918, from your Embassy containing the information that the Swiss Government recently received from the Bavarian Government a communication stating that the population of the Palatinate and of Bavaria fear that they may be either interned or deported from their homes for compulsory labor and that they are departing in panic from their homes, and that the Bavarian representative in Switzerland has made a suggestion that a proclamation of a pacifying nature should be addressed by the Allies to the population of these districts. It appears that the Bavarian representative further suggests that such a step would be very reassuring and would fortify the authority of the ideas of the Entente among the Germans and act as a deterrent to Bolshevism.

In reply to your request that the views of this Government regarding the desirability of issuing a statement on the lines indicated be made known to you, I beg to state that inasmuch as this appears to be a question in connection with the carrying out of the conditions of the armistice, it is being referred to Paris for consideration by the representatives of the Associated Powers.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/11

[Document 37]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 11

BERNE , December 11, 1918.
[Received December 18.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your consideration copies of a translation of a protest addressed to the associated Governments by Dr. Solf, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Office, objecting to certain measures which Marshal Foch is alleged to have taken in regard to evacuating certain occupied territories on the left bank of the Rhine. I beg to add that the enclosed documents were transmitted to the Legation under cover of a note from the Swiss Political Department dated December 10, 1918.^{[23](#)}

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure]

***Translation of a Statement by the German Secretary of State in the Foreign
Office (Solf)***

On December sixth General Foch forwarded a decision to the Armistice Commission, according to which the traffic of food stuffs and all traffic between the evacuated country of the left bank of the Rhine, with the neutral Zone and thereby with the remaining parts of Germany, would be stopped, for the reason that the maintenance of the Blockade during the Armistice had been provided for.

The German Government is in duty bound to raise the sharpest protest against such an arrangement for this one-sided decision is in absolute contradiction to the clear text of the Armistice agreement. The measure proclaimed and which has already been carried out in part, gives to the existing Blockade an expansion of blockade measures on land which are in contradiction to the nature of the Blockade and foreign to all peoples since the times of the British Continental Blockade against France. The above quoted condition of the Armistice agreement relative to the Blockade is therefore also properly found in the section "Clauses Navales" and requires the maintenance of the Blockade only "to the present extent". The above decision means a very important increase in severity and extension of the Blockade, under which German women and children of the country of the right bank of the Rhine suffer greatly; they are dependent on the importation of milk and other perishable food stuffs from the evacuated territories, the more so as the German people have not yet received a revictualling whatsoever through the Allies as promised in the afore-mentioned Blockade agreement of the Armistice.

This determination further nullifies the terms of the last paragraph of the VI Article of the agreement, according to which "no general or state measures are to be adopted which would have as their consequence a depreciation of the industrial plants or a diminution of its personnel". Through this stoppage of traffic, the absolutely necessities of material importation of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods for the maintenance of the industrial situation is made impossible, whereby their depreciation must result. The inability for production necessitates "diminution of the Personnel". Lack of work and new misery in the arbitrarily cut off territories which are absolutely German are unavoidable consequences of this. The German Government therefore proposes that these questions be regulated during the negotiations relative to the prolongation of the Armistice to the effect that without prejudice to the right of supervision of the Allies complete liberty of traffic between the evacuated territories and other parts of Germany be guaranteed.

SOLF

23 Not printed.

763.72119/2994

[Document 38]

The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Rathbone) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , December 12, 1918.

DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to enclose to you herewith the copy of a letter which I have this day received from Mr. de Billy, Deputy French High Commissioner, advising of the receipt of the Bank of France of 91,000 kilograms of gold representing all or part of the gold payments made by Russia to the German Government under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.^{[24](#)}

I am [etc.]

ARTHUR RATHBONE

[Enclosure]

The Deputy French High Commissioner to the United States (de Billy) to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Rathbone)

WASHINGTON , December 11, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. RATHBONE: I beg to inform you that I received today a telegram from the French Minister of Finances advising me that in accordance with the conditions imposed by the International Armistice Commission at Spa, the German representatives have delivered to the Bank of France, the Russian gold in their possession.

They declared to the representatives of the French Government that they had received only the first two installments of the gold payments to be made by Russia under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk

Treaty, in all 91,000 kilograms of gold. These declarations were accepted with full reserve.

These 91,000 kilograms of gold arrived yesterday morning in Paris and will be held by the Bank of France as a deposit for the common account of the Allies. They will not figure in the Bank's statement.

I am [etc.]

DE BILLY

²⁴ For text of treaty, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442*](#)²⁴.

811.711/854a: Telegram

[Document 39]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918—7 p.m.

25. For the President from McCormick. A serious movement is on foot here to abolish forthwith all censorship insofar as the United States is concerned. While fully appreciating that there should be a material and progressive relaxation in censorship administration, I am equally clear that, prior to the abolition of censorship as a war measure, this whole problem should be made the subject of interallied discussion, presumably at Paris. The censorship has been one of the effective weapons for weakening Germany economically. Without censorship it would have been and would now be impracticable to prevent the strong commercial and financial groups in Germany from undertaking active and profitable operations through their branches in neutral countries at the expense of Allies and weaker neutral nations. With the abolition of censorship, we would remove a most potent influence for paralyzing German efforts at economic rehabilitation through financial and commercial operations abroad before the conclusion of peace. The censorship is thus one of the recognized blockade measures which all of the associated governments have been administering and which still constitutes a most important influence, particularly on the wealthier classes in Germany, the foreign connections of which are extensive and still maintained in large part. The elimination of censorship might appreciably lessen the importance particularly to this class in Germany of the speedy conclusion of a definitive peace. The terms of the armistice provide that blockade conditions shall remain unchanged, and it was certainly not contemplated that any one of the associated governments should during the period of the armistice abruptly and by independent action totally abandon an important blockade measure such as censorship. Were we to do so, it would in

my opinion place us in an unfavorable light before our associates and we would lay ourselves open to the charge of hastening to secure a trade advantage through permitting the revival of enemy trade in our interest, and we would further be charged with desiring to shift to our associates the odium of maintaining an unpopular measure. If you concur in the view that the abolition of censorship should first be made the subject of interallied discussion in order that a common understanding may, if possible, be arrived at, I should appreciate your cabling me to this effect, as there is considerable doubt here as to your views, and I should like an expression thereof to show, if it seems necessary, to congressmen and other officials who would welcome an expression of your opinion.

Mr. Polk fully concurs with the foregoing view as to the unfortunate effect which independent action on our part at this time would have on our international relations.

While in my judgment the most important aspect of our proposed abolition of censorship is the effect which it would have on our international relations, it may be noted from a domestic standpoint that the Trading with the Enemy Act, which remains law, cannot be enforced without the aid of censorship and that the Alien Property Custodian is almost daily obtaining through censorship important information as to enemy-owned property not heretofore reported to him.

POLK

033.1140/46: Telegram

[Document 40]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS [undated].

[Received December 19, 1918—12:37 p.m.]

26. Priority for Polk from Auchincloss.

2.²⁵ Your number 25, December 13, 7 p.m., from McCormick for the President. The President directs me to say that he is quite in accord with Mr. McCormick in the judgment that the censorship should be carefully maintained so far as it constitutes an added blockade against the Central Empires and their areas. This is what the President understood would be done and he takes it for granted that McCormick will find the authorities in Washington ready to acquiesce in this judgment.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

²⁵ Mr. Auchincloss's cables to the Acting Secretary were identified by a serial number distinct from that given to the same cable by the Commission (undated telegram received Dec. 19, 5:18 p.m. (033.1140/45)).

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/6: Telegram

[Document 41]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN , January 1, 1919—3 p.m.
[Received January 2—8:45 a.m.]

59. Inter-Allied Committee received telegram November 25th from Allied Blockade Committee stating that relaxation of the blockade of Baltic established by the armistice terms was to be carried out by granting licenses to neutral ships sailing for German ports with specified cargoes, any ship not carrying such to be liable to seizure. Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed of this telegram by identic notes from legations of Associated Powers. Pending negotiations to arrange procedure and conditions under which sailing permits will be granted by the Inter-Allied Committee, none have been issued and theoretically blockade has remained intact. It appears certain, however, that both Danish and German ships have sailed between Denmark and Germany in addition to the base of Nemunde [*Gjedser-Warnemünde?*] ferry (owned by the Danish Government) which is known to run regularly once or twice each day. In spite of presence in the Baltic of considerable British naval forces, only one seizure (of a German ship) has been reported although the conditions described are certainly not unknown to the British authorities. Consequently the general onus of theoretically maintaining the blockade falls upon the American, British authorities, French and Italian Governments alike, while any advantages resulting from actual relaxations accrue to the one power now in a position to effectively enforce the blockade. From the point of view of American interests it seems desirable that the blockade in the Baltic either should be entirely abandoned or strictly enforced. Am investigating further in the matter.

OSBORNE

763.72119/3666

[Document 42]

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 5578

BERNE , January 4, 1919.
[Received February 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, copy and translation of a note together with its enclosure, received from the Swiss Political Department, dated December 28, 1918, relative to communications from the German Government, addressed to the Allied Governments.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. D. Int. 540/I

Referring to its note Allg. Int. D. 540/I of December seventeenth last,²⁶ the Swiss Political Department has the honor to transmit herewith, in copy, to the Legation of the United States of America, a Note from the German Legation concerning the communications addressed by the German Government to the Allied Governments.

In requesting the Legation of the United States of America to take the action on the Note in question which it seems to require the Political Department takes this occasion to renew to it the assurances of high consideration.

BERNE, December 28, 1918.

[Subenclosure—Translation]

The German Minister in Switzerland (Romberg) to the President of the Swiss Federal Council (Calonder)

A. I. 20808

BERNE , December 24, 1918.

Complying with the instructions he has received, the undersigned German Minister has the honor, quite respectfully, to request the Federal Government to bring the following to the knowledge of the Government of the United States of America.

According to a statement contained in a press telegram from Washington, the Government of the United States would have received lately a Note from the German Government addressed to it exclusively, and not to all the Governments of the Allies.

The German Government attaches some importance to state against this assertion that, since the Government of the United States of America has expressed the wish that all communications of the German Government should not only be sent to it, but as well to all Governments of the Allies, from that time accordingly, the German Government has sent all Notes also to the Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.

The undersigned avails himself [etc.]

ROMBERG

²⁶ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/20

[Document 43]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 69

BERNE , January 5, 1919.

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for such action as you may consider advisable a copy and translation of a note from the German Legation transmitted to this Legation through the Swiss Political Department, regarding the transport of German soldiers and civilians captured in Palestine and Mesopotamia.

I beg to add that copies of the enclosed note are being forwarded to the Department of State.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. 540/I

At the request of the German Legation, the Swiss Political Department has the honor to transmit to the Legation of the United States of America, to be communicated to its Government, copy of a note in regard to the transport of the German soldiers and civilians who were made prisoners in Palestine and Mesopotamia.

The Political Department takes this occasion to reiterate the assurances of its high consideration to the Legation of the United States of America.

BERNE, January 2, 1919.

[Subenclosure—Translation]^{[27](#)}

The German Legation in Switzerland to the Swiss Political Department

In Haidar Pasha at Constantinople, there are about 10,000 men, German troops who have been brought together from Palestine and the Mesopotamian Front in order to be transported in accordance with the conditions of the armistice. As it is understood, the Allied Powers have just recently sent part of these troops by way of the Black Sea and the Ukraine and plan further transport via this route. For German troops who are no longer used to the northern climate and whose clothing is planned for a warm climate, this transport through wintry Russia would be accompanied by the greatest suffering and dangers. The length of the journey could not be determined, and the provisioning would be exceedingly difficult. The heating of freight cars necessary for transportation is not possible. To this must be added the threatening danger of bandits. If this is true with regard to military transport, then the traveling of civilians in this manner is absolutely impossible. Women, children, weak persons or old men would not survive this trip. The Swiss Political Department will place the German Legation under great obligation of thanks, if it would intervene with the Allied Powers to the end that further transport of German troops or civilians from Turkey or Georgia should not be sent by way of the Ukraine but through the Mediterranean and that the transports already under way to the Ukraine ports should be returned to Constantinople insofar as is possible.

BERNE, December 28, 1918.

^{[27](#)} File translation revised.

763.72/12642: Telegram

[Document 44]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , January 6, 1919.
[Received January 7—2:41 a.m.]

5617. Following official communication issued by Foreign Office, 5th:

“In connection with its request to be allowed convey stocks destined for troops of occupation in Germany via Scheldt the British Government has also given notice of its desire to make use said river for conveyance of troops to be demobilized returning to their homes.

To this, Government has replied that it will be pleased to grant permission for conveyance for this purpose on condition that taking into account the special circumstances no precedent shall be created by this, that such conveyances shall be made under the mercantile flag, and that no munition is carried, that only officers shall be allowed to carry arms, and that in advance notice shall be given to Dutch authorities of every transport.”

Paris informed.

GARRETT

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/10: Telegram

[Document 45]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN , January 7, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 8—1:10 p.m.]

80. 2822 [3422], January 7th, 7 p.m.²⁸ Legation's 3381, January 1st, 2 p.m.²⁹ I have definitely ascertained that the one German ship seized in the course of blockade of Baltic was released by the British naval authorities after being permitted to unload her cargo of coal in Copenhagen. I am further informed that ship in question received 30 tons of British bunkers for the return to Germany. It has further been definitely established that British bunkers have been given to Danish vessels sailing to Germany at least until recently; whether this practice is being continued I am unable to ascertain definitely but it seems probable because further reports of continued shipping between Denmark and Germany have been received. One captain of a Danish ship reported that a British destroyer encountered during his return from Germany returned his salute. The British admiral just arrived from England informed the British Legation that he has been instructed to disregard the "blockade". In the meantime negotiations between Inter-Allied Committee and Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to relaxations of the blockade have been reported. These negotiations are based upon notifications to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Danish ships sailing to Denmark are liable to seizure. The position of the Inter-Allied Committee is therefore somewhat anomalous and weak in view of the Danish Government's knowledge that the blockade is not being enforced. How the irregularities mentioned above in regard to the blockade might conduce to the commercial and other advantages of the powers permitting them is evident. Repeated to American Mission, Paris. Copy to London.

²⁸ To the Department of State.

²⁹ To the Department of State; transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace by the Chargé in Denmark in his No. 59, Jan. 1, 1919, 3 p.m., p. 53 [*Pg. 53 includes portions of [Doc. 41](#) and [Doc. 42](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/23^{1/2}

[Document 46]

***The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes)
to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate
Peace (Grew)***

PARIS , January 7, 1919.

For General Churchill and Mr. Grew:

Marshal Foch has transmitted identical communications to the American, British and French governments, preparatory to an agreement concerning forces to be maintained during the armistice and thereafter.

The Marshal fears the result of the present independent diminishing of the forces of the allied nations. He estimates the German divisions remaining under arms at from 50 to 60, urges that the allies should be prepared to meet 60 to 70 German divisions, and recommends that 120 to 140 divisions be retained for this purpose, made up of 60 to 65 French divisions, 35 to 40 British divisions, 22 to 25 American divisions, and 6 Belgian divisions.

The note of Marshal Foch states that the allies must occupy the Rhenish provinces as a guarantee after the signature of peace, and until the reparation exacted has been made. For this post-bellum occupation, he proposes the use of 13 to 15 British divisions, 15 to 20 French divisions, 6 American divisions, and 2 to 4 Belgian divisions.

The attention of Marshal Foch has been called to the fact that the problem of transportation before demobilization is so much, more serious for the American forces than for the French and English, that the return of our troops must take place at almost a fixed rate; and that it is proposed to have here about 20 American combat divisions on March 1st, about 15 on April 1st, and about 10 on May 1st.

It is the belief of the Commander in Chief of the A. E. F. that the elimination of the German navy, the surrender of a large part of German war material, the crippling of German transportation facilities, the shortage of food, the political upheaval within Germany, the reduction of the German army to not more than 50 divisions, and the dispatching of this personnel to their home garrisons, makes it virtually impossible for her to resume hostilities, and makes unnecessary the retention of so large a force as 120 or 140 allied divisions.

R[ALPH] A. H[AYES]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/23^{1/2}

[Document 47]

***The Liaison Officer for General Pershing (Hayes)
to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate
Peace (Grew)***

PARIS , January 7, 1919.

For General Churchill and Mr. Grew:

On the last day of 1918, the American Expeditionary Force in the American areas of the front totaled 1,846,733; in the British area 4,319; in England 6,049; in Italy 5,473; in Russia 4,720—a total of 1,867,294.

R[ALPH] A. H[AYES]

763.72116/629: Telegram

[Document 48]

The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State

BRUSSELS , January 8, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received 10:10 p.m.]

181. Your 326, November 22, 6 p.m.^{[30](#)} I have today received a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Belgian Government is not disposed to comply with the request of the Bavarian Government to send a mission of prominent Bavarians to Belgium to establish the amount of destruction committed by German troops during the war.

WHITLOCK

^{[30](#)} See footnote 9, p. 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of [Doc. 15](#) and [Doc. 16](#)].

763.72119/3340

[Document 49]

***The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting
Secretary of State [31](#)***

No. 27

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Government, that the British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean has reported that the German Vice-Admiral and a Staff Officer came to Constantinople on December 28th in order to beg him to impress again on the Admiralty the increasing difficulty of evacuating German troops by land through Ukraine, representing that the troops are now altogether out of hand and will not obey either officers or their own Committee; further, that the railways in Ukraine are now controlled by Bolsheviks and Petlura bands who deprive the troops of clothing, food and arms. The troops apparently refuse to fight even to keep the railways clear for their own passengers, endeavouring to secure this by, negotiating with local Revolutionary leaders, or else in some cases joining the revolutionary band.

The German Vice-Admiral stated that eighteen trains are at present held up at Snamenka, and some have even been sent Eastwards. Eight thousand troops are at present at Nicolaieff, and it is obviously inadvisable in the present circumstances to increase that number. The British Commander in Chief has accordingly stopped sending German troops from Constantinople to Nicolaieff at the German Vice-Admiral's request.

It is confirmed by a report received from a British man of war that evacuation from Nicolaieff has not been possible since December

25th. The British Commander in Chief, therefore, considers the transport of German troops by the sea route necessary, in order to prevent the influx of recruits, arms and ammunition to the Bolsheviks.

As the British Commander-in-Chief requested an early decision, and as it otherwise would have been necessary to continue to retain the German troops in Constantinople area, the Commander-in-Chief has been authorized to instruct the German Vice-Admiral to hand over all German tonnage for use under his direction, in order to meet the emergency which has arisen.

WASHINGTON , January 8, 1919.

³¹ Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 232, Jan. 14, 1919, 8 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/12: Telegram

[Document 50]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN , January 10, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 11—12:30 p.m.]

89. Following message sent to the Department:

“3443, January 10, 7 p.m. [According] to communication from British Legation to Inter-Allied Committee, former telegraphed British Foreign Office ‘Inquiring whether the restrictions hitherto placed on reliable importers of British coal using their cranes for discharging German coal should be relaxed as importers argued that if Danish shipowners are allowed to use British bunkers to fetch German coal importers of British coal should receive equal concessions’. On basis of this British delegate in I. A. C. was asked whether British bunkers had been in the past and were still being given to Danish ships sailing between Denmark and Germany. He replied in the affirmative. When it was pointed out that British bunkers were thereby being employed to break the Baltic blockade he promised to secure further information. The next day he contradicted his previous admission and stated that the above-mentioned telegram to the British Foreign Office concerned only a future arrangement in case the proposed relaxations of the blockade went into effect. Reliable private information received by Legation gives rise to the fear that it is his original admission which accords with the facts. In any case shipping between this country and Germany is continuing and the Danish Government is in position at any time to declare blockade illegal since it is ineffective.

To remedy this, large blockading squadron would be quite unnecessary; the bona fide seizure of few ships breaking the blockade would probably suffice to prevent further sailings. Whether the Baltic blockade is necessary to make Germany accept the Associated Governments' peace terms seems doubtful to the Legation, as all reports indicate that Germany will be compelled to accept any peace terms offered her. But if blockade is to be continued it is evident that it is certainly potentially and probably actually detrimental to American interests that it should be conducted in a manner which will make unofficial relaxations possible".

Repeated to American Mission, Paris.

OSBORNE

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/25

[Document 51]

***The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 84

BERNE , January 10, 1919.
[Received January 16.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information copy and translation of a note from the Swiss Political Department, dated January 9, 1919, enclosing a communication from the German Legation regarding the repatriation of German troops from the Black Sea.

I beg to add that copies of the enclosed note are being sent to the Department of State.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. D. Int. 540 I

The Swiss Political Department has the honor to enclose herewith to the Legation of the United States of America, copy of a note which the German Legation in Berne has submitted to it, asking the Legation of the United States to be so good as to bring it to the attention of its Government.

In this communication the German Government asks authority to send from Hamburg a certain number of vessels for the repatriation

of German troops on the Black Sea.

The Department avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Legation of the United States of America the assurances of its high consideration.

[Subenclosure—Translation]^{[32](#)}

BERNE, January 9, 1919.

Memorandum From the German Government

Since shipment of the repatriated German fighting units from the Black Sea is not possible by land routes, because the railways are in the hands of the revolutionary soldiers and strong Bolshevik bands, part of the transports which have left were completely sacked and were left to their fate in the Russian winter. The one salvation for the troops from Nikolaiev, Constantinople and the Caucasus, in all about 25,000 men and 40 nurses, is therefore the transport by sea to Hamburg. As ships available in the Black Sea are absolutely unusable for the long trip, the necessary vessels must be forwarded from Germany. Provisioning and money for the German troops are lacking. Greatest haste is therefore necessary to avert a catastrophe. The German Government requests the Entente Governments to grant immediate permission to send the necessary number of German transports to Nikolaiev.

^{[32](#)} File translation revised.

Paris Peace Conf. 850e.00/2

[Document 52]

***The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 87

BERNE , January 11, 1919.

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information a copy and translation of a note from the Swiss Political Department, dated January ninth 1919, enclosing a communication from the German Legation regarding the measures which are said to have been taken by the French Authorities in regard to Alsace Lorraine.

I beg to add that copies of the enclosed note are being sent to the Department of State.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. D. Int. 540 I

The Swiss Political Department has the honor to transmit herewith to the Legation of the United States of America, to be forwarded to its Government, a copy of a note from the German Legation at Berne.

By this communication the German Government protests against the measures which are said to have been taken by the French authority in regard to Alsace-Lorraine.

The Department avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Legation of the United States of America the assurance of its high consideration.

[Subenclosure—Translation]^{[33](#)}

BERNE, January 9, 1919.

Memorandum From the German Government

In conformity to the Armistice Agreement of November 11th, 1918, the French armies have occupied parts of the Prussian Rhine Province Hessen, the Palatinate and Alsace-Lorraine, after their evacuation by the German troops within the agreed extension of time. From the first day of the occupation, the French Government has carried on quite a peculiar policy with regard to Alsace-Lorraine. Not only did it content itself with the right devolved upon it to occupy the evacuated territories militarily and to take such measures in those places as were required by military necessity and in the interest of the occupying troops, but it has started a struggle of political extermination in the entire Rhineland territory against whoever is German, thinks or feels German. Though not empowered in any way by the Armistice Agreement to do so, the French Government has dismissed from their offices all the judicial and administrative officials of the country and has kept on duty only such German functionaries whom they cannot get along without. It has furthermore proceeded to the expulsion of a considerable number of inhabitants of the region and looked on inactively in the presence of shameful scenes which took place upon the departure of those expelled from Strassburg, Colmar, Mulhouse and other places. The fact that it is a question of systematic expulsions is shown by the fact that in one town on the Baden frontier (Kehl), in the course of the past fortnight over 800, and in a single day 119, expelled persons passed. The French Government has also arrested a certain number of Alsace-Lorraine citizens and this under the admitted pretext of "war acts" which took place previous to the signature of the Armistice. By these actions, against which the German Government has at different times protested, but in vain, the French Government has violated the clear text of Article 6 of the Armistice Agreement as

well as the assurances given by the wireless message of the Minister President Clemenceau of November 17th.

Moreover reliable information makes it clear that the French Government has also started a campaign against all that is German in the schools of Alsace-Lorraine. The professors of the Strassburg University have been discharged; in the lower schools, even in purely German-speaking territory the exclusive teaching in French has been obligatorily introduced and this on a very large scale.

The French Government did not further hesitate either in interfering in private ecclesiastical business of the people of Alsace-Lorraine, and therefore expelled and escorted to the frontier in the most inconsiderate manner the President of the Consistory of the Church of Augsburgischer Confession in Strassburg. Quite recently according to trustworthy statements which lie before us the French Government also tried to turn out in the big industrial concerns of the country every element which was not French, by compelling the people to accept French administrators and removing the German managers. It is even rumored that the French Government is on the point of carrying out a compulsory liquidation of the German factories. Finally, the French Government seeks to extend the frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine, by the fact that from the beginning of the occupation it has instituted at the northern border of the country new and arbitrary regulations, which must create the impression that this part of the Rhine Province, particularly the "Saarbecken" belongs to Alsace-Lorraine. These lands have never been a part of Alsace-Lorraine. The solemn protest against this frontier arrangement which the German Government made November 21st, 1918, has up to the present been entirely ignored. On the eastern frontier of the country, the French Government seems to be desirous of wiping out the clear old border delimitation recognized by the Agreement, while it has pushed its troops of occupation forward at the Rhine bridgeheads not only to the valley of the river but up to the east bank of the Rhine. All these measures taken are not upheld in the Armistice Agreement, nor are they to be justified through military necessity in a defenseless country which is but desirous of concluding peace. They are explained only if the French Government intends to force the German population of Alsace-Lorraine to

become French as soon and as radically as possible and to enlarge the desired territory by the annexing of valuable frontier districts which do not belong thereto. The French Government seems even to have taken the stand that the severing of Alsace-Lorraine from the German Empire is an accomplished fact. This is apparent from the note of the Adjutant General, in which according to instructions from Marshal Foch and the Minister President (No. 156g of December 26)³⁴ an alleviation of the present postal blockade between Alsace-Lorraine and the rest of Germany is denied with the statement: *La correspondance entre France et Allemagne est absolument interdite*. Besides, this misinterpretation finds expression in the official refusal of the French Government to consent to the holding of the election for the German National Assembly in Alsace-Lorraine (note of General Nudant No. 148 of December 24).³⁴ It is incompatible with the Armistice Agreement, that the French Government shall hinder the people of an occupied country, without any military necessity, from the practice of their political rights. The German Government emphatically emphasizes that the regulation of the Alsace-Lorraine question is to take place at the ensuing peace sittings and enters a solemn protest against the French method of procedure.

³³ File translation revised.

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/27

[Document 53]

***The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 79

BERNE , January 13, 1919.
[Received January 16.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information a copy and translation of a note from the Swiss Political Department, dated January 9, 1919, enclosing a communication from the German Legation in this city regarding the evacuation of the territories of the former Russian Empire by German troops in accordance with articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Agreement.

I beg to add that copies of the enclosed note are being forwarded to the Department of State.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. D. Int. 532

The Political Department has the honor to transmit herewith to the Legation of the United States of America, with the request that it be brought to the attention of the Government, copy of a note which the German Legation has addressed to it. This communication concerns the evacuation of certain territories of former Russia by German troops in accordance with articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice.

The Department avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Legation of the United States of America the assurances of its high consideration.

[Subenclosure—Translation]^{[35](#)}

BERNE, January 9, 1919.

Memorandum From the German Government

Articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Agreement stipulated at first the withdrawal of German troops from the territories which, before the war, belonged to Russia. At Germany's instigation the wording of Article 12 was altered. This alteration did not, however, make it an obligation for Germany to care for the maintenance of order in those territories, but simply conferred on it the right to evacuate the same gradually. The Allies have evidently admitted this interpretation; and besides they would have raised a protest when Germany announced the evacuation of Crimea and asked for the free passage of the sea between Sebastopol and Odessa in order to accelerate this evacuation. The task which Germany had voluntarily undertaken to maintain order in the Ukraine was fulfilled as long as it was possible. The retreat had, however, to be ordered as the German troops appeared to be too weakened and unfortunately also too unreliable for the purpose. First of all it would have been necessary, if the German troops had had to fight in Ukrainia, that they should have weapons, ammunition and provisions. These things should not have been taken away from them, as they were for the most part in the case at Odessa.

The German Government desires particularly to indicate that any degrading treatment of German troops increases most seriously the danger of spreading Bolshevism, and it expresses the hope that under the circumstances explained, the Allies will not deny the right for the German troops still remaining in Ukrainia to return home honorably, and without being disarmed.

^{[35](#)} File translation revised.

763.72119/3415

[Document 54]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 44

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and, with reference to the memorandum from this Embassy of the 8th January, has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Majesty's Government, that the British High Commissioner at Constantinople has reported that owing to the congestion on the railways in Turkey and the impracticability of transporting German troops by that means, he has proposed that the German troops in the Black Sea basin and Turkestan, the position of whom is rapidly becoming impossible, should be transported by four German steamers now at Constantinople to a North Sea German port.

His Majesty's Government have concurred in Admiral Calthorpe's proposals, and have telegraphed to him that they are informing the Associated Governments.

In communicating the above to the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to explain that this action is complementary to that of which he had the honour to inform the Acting Secretary of State in the above-mentioned memorandum.

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919.

763.72119/3484

[Document 55]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 67

WASHINGTON , January 23, 1919.

SIR: I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, by direction of my Government, a letter signed by Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, together with a report of the Allied Naval Mission appointed to ensure the execution of Article 28 of the conditions of Armistice with Germany.

I have [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

[Enclosure]

Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss to the British Admiralty

DECEMBER 22, 1918.

I have the honour to attach herewith a Report of the Allied Naval Commission appointed by the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States to ensure the execution of Article XXVIII of the Conditions of Armistice.

2.—Since the receipt of this report two British Officers have made a tour of the Belgian Waterways for the purpose of enquiring into the movements of river craft from Belgium into Holland (or Germany) subsequent to the signing of the Armistice.

3.—As the result of this further enquiry it is clear that the Germans made no organised attempt to remove Belgian river craft after the Armistice came into force.

4.—It is possible that a few barges passed through Loosen into Holland, and others may have gone from Liege to Maastricht, but the evidence is quite insufficient on which to base a claim that there has been an infraction of Article XXVIII of the Armistice Conditions.

5.—There is, however, definite evidence that the French sailing vessel *Vercingetorix* was removed from Antwerp after the signing of the Armistice.

The case of the *Vercingetorix* has been brought to the notice of the French Government.

6.—With the exception of this case, and that of two empty barges from Antwerp, names or numbers of which could not be ascertained, the evidence indicates that the terms of Article XXVIII have been carried out.

R. E. WEMYSS

[Subenclosure]

Report of the Allied and United States of America Commission Entrusted With the Carrying Out of Clause XXVIII of the Armistice

President:

Vice Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes, KCB., CMG., CVO., D. S. O.,
Representing Great Britain.

Members:

Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, Representing the United States of America.

Capitaine de Vaisseau de Boisanger, Representing France.

Commander Giuseppe Viganoni, Representing Italy.

Colonel Cornellis, the Belgian Member of the Commission was unable to attend, but Commander Hennebique, who is in charge of the Belgian Canal System, was kindly placed at the disposal of the Commission by General de Rubbel. He undertook to furnish the Commission with all the information he was collecting regarding the Belgian Waterways.

Other British Officers accompanied the Commission to assist in the examination of Aircraft Aerodromes, etc., and for secretarial duties.

2. The Commission arrived at Antwerp on the 19th November, 1918.

An examination was made of the Port of Antwerp. From this examination and from information received from the local Belgian Authorities, the enemy, in withdrawing from Antwerp, appear to have left the harbour, tugs, cranes, goods sheds, etc., in working order, and do not appear to have carried out any destruction of allied or enemy property.

The following three enemy war vessels were found in the Port:—

Torpedo	Boat	A.	4.
“	“	A.	12.
“	“	A.	14.

These boats have been partially disarmed and their engines disabled, but from enquiries it appears that this disablement was carried out prior to the signing of the Armistice.

The Belgian Captain of the Port provided the Commission with a list of enemy ships which had sailed from Antwerp for Holland. (This list is attached as Enclosure No. 1).³⁶ From this list it will be seen that twenty-nine German and two Austrian Merchant Ships proceeded to Holland between the 13th October and 4th of November 1918.

Five sailing vessels were also taken to Holland between the 2nd and 13th of November; of these vessels, two were British and one French, i. e.:

British <i>Thames</i>	renamed <i>Moritz</i>	by the Germans.
“ <i>Vindex</i>	“ <i>Max</i>	“
French <i>Vercingetorix</i>	renamed <i>Bremen</i>	“

The latter vessel sailed for Holland on the 13th November and her removal on that date therefore constitutes a violation of Articles XXVIII and XXX of the Armistice.

This was brought to the notice of the French Authorities.

Enclosure No. 1. shows that eleven German Torpedo Boats, Class A, sailed for Holland on the 9th of November.

3. The German Aerodrome on the plain of Wilryck was visited; a number of enemy aeroplanes were found here; many of these were not in working order, but it is impossible to say that the damage was caused by the enemy after the 11th November, as local inhabitants had been allowed into the aerodrome and much reckless looting had taken place.

A larger number of aeroplanes were found in trucks in good condition.

It was impracticable to decide which of the aeroplanes were meant for Naval and which for Military Service, and it was therefore arranged that the Belgian Authorities, who were making an inventory of all aircraft and their stores, assisted by German Officers, should provide the Commission with a complete list, noting which were earmarked for Naval Service.

This list has not yet been received and will be forwarded separately.

A list, compiled by Belgian Officers, of aircraft in Antwerp, is attached as Enclosure No. II.^{[37](#)}

The two German Officers mentioned in paragraph 4 had no knowledge of the aircraft situation. They stated that Captain Shultz, late Chief of Staff, Antwerp, possessed this information. Attempts

were made to get in touch with Captain Shultz, but he could not be found.

4. The German Officers detailed to confer with the Commission arrived on the afternoon of the 20th November. They were—

Kapitain Lieutenant Bartling—an officer of Reserve, and Engineer Captain Ilgenstein, of the German Army—employed on the Belgian Inland Waterways Control during the war.

Kapitain Lieutenant Bartling had no knowledge of affairs at Antwerp or in the canals, and had apparently been employed at Berlin; therefore, except to act as interpreter (he spoke excellent English), he was of no assistance to the Commission.

The Officer originally detailed for this duty—Lieutenant Commander Kiep—did not appear, and the substitution of Kapitain Lieutenant Bartling did not assist matters.

Engineer Captain Ilgenstein furnished the following information:—

(1) Between Bruges and Ghent, four German torpedo boat destroyers had been sunk about a month ago.

This was verified and the boats located—two about six miles north of Ghent and two more about two miles farther north. They have been blown up and sunk across the canal so as to block it; only the masts and tops of the bridges and funnels are out of water. The boats appear to be larger than the “A” class torpedo boats.

(2) He stated that no damage had been done to any canals behind the fighting line of the 11th November, and that all these canals—including the Charleroi–Brussels Canal—were in good working order.

Subsequent enquiries and inspection tend to confirm this statement.

(3) He stated that there were about 1,000 barges at Antwerp, of which fourteen were privately owned, the remainder having been requisitioned by the Germans. He also stated that much of the canal traffic to the Eastward of Antwerp was carried in Dutch barges—of these he had no information.

(4) He stated the Germans employed about sixty motor boats (he could not give the exact figures) about half of which were private craft hired by the Germans. The remainder had left Antwerp prior to the 11th November for Holland; this latter statement tallies with information obtained from Belgian Officials.

(5) He furnished a German plan of the Belgian Canal System, which is attached as Enclosure No. III.^{[38](#)}

(6) Commander Hennebique had an interview with Engineer Captain Ilgenstein in which he obtained information of value, regarding the waterways and facilities for conducting repairs, etc.

5. The German Representatives asked what would be done with German property in Antwerp. They referred to some thirty-five tugs hired from the Dutch.

They had apparently received orders to arrange for the return of these tugs.

They based their claims on their interpretation of the word “abandon” in Clause XXVIII, which they maintained did not include the seizing of such vessels by the Allies. They were informed that this question was outside the province of the Commission and they agreed to furnish a list of the tugs involved.

This list will be forwarded as soon as received.

To prevent the return of any of these tugs to Holland before the Allied Authorities had decided as to their disposal, General de Rubbel, Military Governor of Antwerp was requested to issue orders that none of them were to be permitted to leave Antwerp for the present. Orders to this effect have been issued, and no tugs are

authorised to return from Antwerp to Holland, except those placed at the disposal of the Relief Committee.

6. The German Representatives could furnish no information as to the stores, etc., which they had abandoned at Antwerp.

They therefore agreed to supply a complete list of stores, etc, left by them in Antwerp. This list will be forwarded directly it is received.

7. The Commission proceeded to Brussels on the 21st November to inspect the aerodrome there and the canal System between that City and Antwerp.

The Canals all appear to be in working order. The aerodrome was visited on the 22nd November and was found intact.

It contained one Zeppelin shed and some seventy-eight German aeroplanes, the majority of which appeared in serviceable condition.

8. The Commission spent a few hours at Bruges and Ghent, where extensive damage has been done to the canals, but as both these towns were in Allied possession before the signing of the Armistice, it appeared unnecessary to enquire closely into the German depredations.

9. The Commission returned to Dover on the evening of the 23rd November.

**V. DE BOISANGER
G. VIGANONI
ROGER KEYES
MARK L. BRISTOL**

³⁶ Not attached to copy of report in Department files.

³⁷ Not attached to copy of report in Department files.

³⁸ Not attached to copy of report in Department files.

German peace proposals

[\[56\] The Swiss Minister \(Sulzer \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 26, 1918.

763.72119/2804

[\[57\] The Swiss Minister \(Sulzer \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , December 2, 1918.

763.72/12485

[\[58\] The Minister in Switzerland \(Stovall \) to the Acting Secretary of State](#)

Pontarlier (Berne), December 11, 1918—11 a.m. [Received December
12—7:34 p.m.]

763.72119/2966: Telegram

[\[59\] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Washington , December 14, 1918—5 p.m.

763.72119/2966: Telegram

[60] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 6, 1919—9 p.m. [Received January 7—5:14 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/9: Telegram

[61] The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 8, 1919. [Received January 13.]

Paris Peace Conf. 182/29

[62] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 10, 1919—6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/9: Telegram

[63] The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

Washington , February 1, 1919.

763.72/12650

[64] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

Washington , February 1, 1919.

763.72/12650

763.72119/2804

[Document 56]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: I am directed by my Government to inform your Excellency that the German Government would be grateful to receive an early reply from the United States and Allied Governments to its communication regarding negotiations for a preliminary peace, which communication I had the honor to transmit to your Excellency with my note of November 13, 1918.^{[1](#)}

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

^{[1](#)} For text of the note of Nov. 13, see telegram No. 29, Dec. 14, 5 p.m., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 72 [*Pg. 72 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#), [Doc. 58](#), and [Doc. 59](#)*].

763.72/12485

[Document 57]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , December 2, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the following communication from the German Government to the Government of the United States:[2](#)

“For the purpose of bringing about universal peace, of insuring lasting guarantees against future wars and of restoring the peoples’ confidence in one another, it seems imperatively necessary to throw light on the events which brought on the war, in all the belligerent States and in all their particulars. A complete truthful account of the world conditions and of the negotiations among the powers in July 1914 and of the steps taken at that time by the several Governments could and would go far toward demolishing the walls of hatred and misconstruction erected by the long war to separate the peoples. In a correct appreciation of the course taken by friend and foe lies the augury for the future reconciliation of the peoples, the one possible foundation for lasting peace and a league of peoples.

The German Government therefore proposes that a neutral Commission be organized to probe the responsibilities for the war, which should be composed of men whose character and political experience will guarantee a true verdict. The Governments of all the belligerent powers should declare their readiness to place at the disposal of such a Commission all of their records. The Commission should have the power to examine every person who at the outbreak of the war presided over the destinies of the several countries and also all

witnesses whose deposition could be of consequence in establishing the proof.

(Signed) Solf.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

² The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister. A translation of the message was repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for Colonel House, as Department's telegram No. 172, Dec. 11, 6 p.m.

763.72119/2966: Telegram

[Document 58]

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State

PONTARLIER (BERNE), December 11, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received December 12—7:34 p.m.]

6132. Have received communication from Swiss Political Department stating that on behalf of German Government that Department instructed Swiss Legation in Washington on the 12th and again on the 24th November 1918,^{[3](#)} to enquire from the Government of the United States the place and date of the peace negotiations and expressing the desire that in view of the menace of famine in Germany these discussions take place at the earliest possible moment.

Swiss Political Department requests that inasmuch as no reply has been received and that German Government has repeated its questions the Government of the United States place it in a position to reply to German Minister if possible.

STOVALL

^{[3](#)} See the Swiss Minister's note of Nov. 26, p. 71 [*Pg. 71 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)*].

763.72119/2966: Telegram

[Document 59]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918—5 p.m.

29. Following is text of note in translation from Swiss Legation Washington dated November 13th but which was not received at Department and copy only just received

“I have the honor to transmit herewith upon instructions of my Government the original text of a communication from the German Government received by this Legation this afternoon

‘The armistice now being concluded the German Government requests the President of the United States to arrange for the opening of peace negotiations. For the purpose of their acceleration, the German Government proposes first of all to take in view the conclusion of a preliminary peace and asks for a communication at which place and what time negotiations might begin. As there is pressing danger of a famine the German Government is particularly anxious for negotiations to begin immediately. Solf’

Accept Sir etc.”

German Government is pressing for reply through Swiss Political Department. Department replying to Swiss Legation that matter referred to you.⁴

POLK

4 Department's reply to Swiss Legation not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/9: Telegram

[Document 60]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—9 p.m.
[Received January 7—5:14 p.m.]

119. Following memorandum dated December 23rd, 1918, received from British Embassy, Washington:

“His Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that His Majesty’s Government have received through the Swiss Legation a German proposal that a neutral commission should be appointed to inquire into the responsibilities for the war. A similar communication was made to the French Government. His Majesty’s Government and the French Government are informing the Swiss Ministers in London and Paris respectively that they do not consider that the German proposal requires any reply as the responsibility of Germany for the war has been long ago incontestably proved. His Majesty’s Government would be grateful if they might be informed whether the United States Government today received a similar communication and what answer they propose to return.”

German proposal regarding neutral commission transmitted to Mission in Department’s 172 of December 11, 1918.⁵ Department is inclined to make reply along lines adopted by British and French Governments. Do you agree?

POLK

⁵ See footnote 2, p. 71 [*Pg. 71 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 182/29

[Document 61]

***The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 71

BERNE , January 8, 1919.
[Received January 13.]

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for such action as you may consider advisable, copy of a note from the Swiss Political Department dated January 6, 1919,⁶ requesting a reply to its previous note of the 7th of December in which it brought to the attention of this Legation the desire of the German Government to be informed of the date on which the preliminary discussions for peace would commence.

For your information, I have the honor to add that the substance of the previous note of December 7th referred to was telegraphed to the Secretary of State⁷ from whom a reply was received⁸ to the effect that this matter had been referred to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ See the Minister's telegram No. 6132, Dec. 11, 1918, 11 a.m., p. 72 [Pg. 72 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#), [Doc. 58](#), and [Doc. 59](#)].

⁸ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72/9: Telegram

[Document 62]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 10, 1919—6 p.m.

229. Your 119, January 6th, 9 p.m. Commission agrees with the suggestion that Department make reply to the German proposal along lines adopted by British and French Governments.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

763.72/12650

[Document 63]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

WASHINGTON , February 1, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 2, 1918, in which, by direction of your Government, you transmitted a communication from the German Government proposing that a neutral commission be appointed to probe the responsibility for the War.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States does not consider that the German note requires a reply as the responsibility of Germany for the war has already been established.

Accept [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

763.72/12650

[Document 64]

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

MEMORANDUM

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the latter’s memorandum of December 23, 1918,⁹ stating that the British Government has received through the Swiss Legation a German proposal that a neutral commission be appointed to inquire into the responsibility for the war, and that a similar communication has been made to the French Government.

Mr. Barclay added that the British and French Governments had informed the Swiss Legations at London and Paris, respectively, that they did not consider that the German note required any reply as the responsibility for the war had long ago been incontestably proved.

Mr. Barclay further expressed the desire of the British Government to be informed whether the United States Government had received a similar communication and what reply it proposed to return.

In reply Mr. Polk begs to inform Mr. Barclay that a similar communication has been received from the Swiss Minister and that the Department of State has informed the Swiss Minister in return¹⁰ that the Government of the United States does not consider that the German note requires a reply, as the responsibility of Germany for the war has already been established.

WASHINGTON , February 1, 1919.

⁹ See telegram No. 119, Jan. 6, 1919, 9 p.m., from the Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 73 [Pg. 73

includes portions of [Doc. 59](#), [Doc. 60](#), and [Doc. 61](#)].

[10](#) *Supra*.

Status of the former German Emperor¹

¹ For correspondence previously printed regarding the asylum of the former German Kaiser in the Netherlands, see [*Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, pp. 652](#) ff.

[\[65\] The Minister in the Netherlands \(Garrett \) to the Secretary of State](#)

The Hague , November 29, 1918. [Received December 26.]

763.72/12603

[\[66\] The Minister in the Netherlands \(Garrett \) to the Secretary of State](#)

The Hague , November 30, 1918. [Received November 30—8:15 p.m.]

662.00/365: Telegram

[\[67\] The Counselor for the Department of State \(Polk \) to the Assistant Secretary of State \(Phillips \).](#)

[Washington ,] December 6, 1918.

862.001 W 64/46

[68] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 7, 1918. [Received December 8—3:42 a.m.]

862.00/383: Telegram

[69] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 10, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 11—
2:08 p.m.]

862.001 W 64/45: Telegram

[70] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 12, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 13—
3:38 a.m.]

862.001 W 64/47: Telegram

[71] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 12, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 13—
12:05 p.m.]

862.00/396: Telegram

[72] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 31, 1918. [Received February 19, 1919.]

763.72/12807

**[73] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace**

The Hague , January 8, 1919—noon. [Received January 9—10:30
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 862.001/14: Telegram

**[74] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State**

The Hague , January 10, 1919—4 p.m. [Received January 11—1:10
p.m.]

811.221/54: Telegram

763.72/12603

[Document 65]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

No. 2183

THE HAGUE , November 29, 1918.
[Received December 26.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 5255 of November 20th,² regarding the status in Holland of the former German Emperor, I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a telegram sent on November 21st last by the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Minister in Washington, together with a translation thereof.

I have [etc.]

J. W. GARRETT

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]³

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Karnebeek) to the Netherlands Minister in the United States (Cremer)

[THE HAGUE , November 21, 1918.]

The following résumé of the declaration made on Wednesday to the States-General by the Premier will enable you to explain in official circles the character of the sojourn of the former German Emperor:

“It is only natural that the sojourn in Holland of the former German Emperor has attracted widespread attention throughout the country, and has even aroused some alarm. The facts of the case are that the ex-Emperor came to Holland after his abdication as a private person and considers himself

as such. At the express request of the Dutch Government, Count Bentinck tendered the Castle of Amerongen, which is situated in an isolated region, as a place to receive him. The character of the asylum offered the ex-Emperor differs in no way from that enjoyed by refugees for centuries. The offering of asylum is a trait deeply rooted in the spirit of liberty and tolerance of the Dutch people, and in the course of our history refugees of humble and of high position, as well as princes, have benefited by it. During this war hundreds of thousands of foreigners have found refuge and repose in the Netherlands. Because of his former position there was no reason to make in advance any exception against this man who, as a foreigner, came to our frontier and requested admission. This does not mean that the Government must not be on its guard lest any abuses occur and lest its offer of hospitality become harmful to the interests of the country. National interests might demand that the exigencies of the case should outweigh humanitarian considerations and historical traditions. The Dutch Government, however, has reason to expect that the ex-sovereign and his suite will be fully alive to the fact that it is to their interest as well to conform to the requirements of the situation and to avoid any false appearance of their sojourn in the Netherlands serving as a basis for any political action whatever. The Dutch Government has no reason to suppose that the foreign states whose citizens, without distinction of rank, have so often found asylum in Holland, will refuse to respect our traditions and forget the instances in which they themselves have given hospitality to fallen sovereigns.”

In view of the wild rumors circulating in the foreign press, I think it advisable to inform you that a fixed place of residence has been assigned to the ex-Emperor, who has not once left the grounds of the Castle. I beg you to contradict these rumors whenever it is possible.

KARNEBEEK

² [*Ibid.*, p. 652](#) .

³ File translation revised.

662.00/365: Telegram

[Document 66]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

THE HAGUE , November 30, 1918.
[Received November 30—8:15 p.m.]

5322. Wolff,⁴ Berlin, telegram:

“In order to put an end to misunderstandings which have arisen concerning abdication, Emperor William has now formally in constitutionally unimpeachable document resigned rights to Prussian and German imperial crowns. Text as follows.

‘Hereby for all time I resign the rights to the crown of Prussia and rights to the German Imperial crown connected with this. At the same time I release all officials of the German Empire and Prussia as well as all officers now commissioned officers and men of the navy and Prussian army and the federal contingents from the oath of allegiance which they have made to me as their kaiser, king and commander-in-chief. I expect of them they will assist those who are now possessed of actual power until the new institution of the German empire and protecting the German people against the threatened danger of anarchy, famine and foreign domination. In witness whereof this document under our own signature and accompanied by the Imperial seal given at Amerongen the 28th day of November, 1918. Signed Wilhelm.’”

GARRETT

⁴ Theodor Wolff, chief editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

862.001 W 64/46

[Document 67]

***The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)***

[WASHINGTON ,] December 6, 1918.

MR. PHILLIPS: I spoke to the President about this matter,⁵ and he said under no circumstances was he prepared to commit himself at this time. The question of the punishment of the German Kaiser could be taken up when he reached France.

F[RANK] L[YON] P[OLK]

⁵ See memorandum from the British Embassy, [*Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, p. 653](#) .

862.00/383: Telegram

[Document 68]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 7, 1918.
[Received December 8—3:42 a.m.]

5420. Dutch press Wolff telegram Berlin 6th:

[“] Document by which ex-Crown Prince gives up rights to crown of Prussia and imperial throne has been received Berlin. Reads as follows:

‘I do hereby expressly resign now and for all time all claims to [the] crown of Prussia and [the] imperial crown which might fall to me either through abdication of His Majesty the Emperor and King or through any other right Given under our own hand and signature at Wieringen on December 1st, 1918. Wilhelm.’[”]

Paris informed.

GARRETT

862.001 W 64/45: Telegram

[Document 69]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 10, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 11—2:08 p.m.]

5446. In reference to a telegram published in the press yesterday purporting to be a radio from Lyons to the effect that the German Government would not oppose a possible demand from the Entente for the appearance of the Kaiser and the ex-Crown Prince before an international court, and that the German Government had already so informed the Dutch Government the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that no such information has reached the Dutch Government from the German Government.

In the course of a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it became evident that he wished me to understand that Holland would welcome the solution of its difficulties caused by the presence of the ex-Emperor. He seemed to realize the danger that his presence in the country might be to Holland, but it was evident that he feared that a demand might be made by the United States and the Allies calling for such action or couched in such terms as to threaten the honor of Holland and make it difficult to concede the demand, however much the Dutch might be inclined to meet it favorably.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs once more told the story of how the ex-Kaiser had come across the border unannounced; his coming not even being known in advance to the Dutch Government which was presented with a *fait accompli*. He reiterated his statement that the Dutch Minister in Berlin was told by Doctor Solf that the ex-Emperor had abdicated about the time of his flight into Holland, and he suggested that the act of abdication of November 28th was only a confirmation demanded by the German Government in order to

overcome any ambiguity or equivocation that might be thought to exists.

In regard to the renunciation of the Crown Prince it may be of interest to note that his abdication is dated December 1st the same day on which he stated to the correspondent of the Associated Press that he had neither signed any document nor renounced any rights.

GARRETT

862.001 W 64/47: Telegram

[Document 70]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 12, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 13—3:38 a.m.]

5463. Strong German efforts are apparently being made to convince Entente that German Emperor is now harmless and sufficiently punished by present situation, also to arouse sympathy by widely spread stories of desperate state of health of Empress which so far lack confirmation. In this connection, through indirect sources, I have received a memorandum under date of December 11th bearing no address, but signed by Rosen, German Minister here who has been mentioned in press as possible successor to Solf, the text of which follows in my next telegram. It is reliably reported that the Emperor's entourage now consists of Lieut. General Gontarb, Colonel Estorf and Herr Ilseman, all of whom are declared to be politically innocuous. Paris informed.

GARRETT

862.00/396: Telegram

[Document 71]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 12, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 13—12:05 p.m.]

5464. My 6463 [5463] today. The text reads as follows:⁶

“I am in a position to [make] the following statement of facts about the veracity and exactness of which I do not entertain the slightest doubt. The former German Emperor has no political relations whatever with Germany. Indeed he possesses hardly any means of communication with Germany at all. The only correspondence that takes place consists in very short family news forwarded to his children through the German Foreign Office, and even these are few and far between. On his arrival in Holland—and twice since—the former Emperor has expressed to me his very clear opinion that there are no chances whatever of his regaining the throne of Prussia or of Germany. He does not in any way entertain such a desire. His religious conviction leads him to believe firmly that what has occurred to him is a decree of Providence, the ultimate object of which he cannot understand, but which it is his duty to submit to in Christian humility. He has daily expressed similar views to the gentlemen of his entourage. Among the gentlemen who accompanied the former Emperor to Holland there were three whose influence might be considered as doubtful. [These were:] General Oberst von Plessen, Oberst Leutnant von Moltke and Admiral Graf Platen. These gentlemen have some time ago been removed from the Emperor’s suite and have gone back to Germany. Those remaining with the Emperor at Amerongen have no

tendency whatever to lend themselves to any political intrigue”.

Paris informed.

GARRETT

⁶ The text has been corrected on the basis of a photographic copy forwarded with the Minister's despatch No. 2279 of Dec. 28, 1918; received Jan. 24, 1919 (763.72/12683).

763.72/12807

[Document 72]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. 2318

THE HAGUE , December 31, 1918.
[Received February 19, 1919.]

SIR: The Queen's invitation to President Wilson to visit Holland on his trip through Europe has been in general most favorably commented on, and the President's postponement of a definite reply has aroused the hope that he may yet find his way to spend a few days in the Netherlands. The Queen herself is deeply interested in the project, and on December 26th summoned me in special audience to make sure that she was not mistaken in awaiting a further reply from the President before taking any new action or sending another telegram. She had determined to regard in a favorable light his indefinite message, and was seriously considering the form his visit should assume. She declared that in her democratic country she was wont to consult the wishes of her subjects, and would do so on this occasion too, as they joined with her in wishing to welcome President Wilson.

Two days later Mr. J. B. Kan, the Secretary General in General Service, and right hand man of the Premier, called at the Legation, and read to me, for my information, a tentative program of the visit, though he was unwilling to leave a copy. He stated that it had been drawn up by Her Majesty in person, and consisted of the arrival at Amsterdam, which is the capital of the country in distinction to The Hague which is merely the Queens Residence and Seat of Government, a drive through the city, the reception of delegates either inside the Palace or outside, a gala dinner; the following day a visit to the University of Leiden, the oldest of Dutch universities, then a trip to The Hague, a reception by the two houses of the States

General in the Binnenhof, closing with a possible visit to the Peace Palace.

In connection with the possibility of the President's visit two extremely interesting articles appeared on December 27th and 28th in the *Handelsblad*, the powerful organ of the commercial world, raising the point of whether Holland had violated her neutrality in inviting to her territory in time of war the head of a belligerent nation who was constitutionally vested with the supreme command of land and sea forces. In view of this invitation, the paper reached the conclusion that, discounting the political aspect of the case, the admission of the former German Emperor sank to a position of secondary significance. It declared unjustified the reproaches from the Entente press to the effect that Dutch hospitality to the Kaiser was inspired by a spirit of friendliness toward Germany, and pointed out what it termed the glaring contrast between the attitude of the Government toward the Kaiser and that toward the President.

This comparison, however, was expressed so negatively as to convey the impression that should the President accept the Queen's invitation, America would thereby lose her moral right to protest at the Kaiser's presence in Holland. Aside from these two articles, this aspect of the case has been studiously avoided in the press.

.....

The question of whether or no the Kaiser was invited directly or indirectly by the Dutch Government to seek refuge on Netherlands soil is still unsettled, and the statements of the Ministers in reply to questions on the point have been most equivocal. A new element in the case was brought up on the 28th by Professor van Hamel, a warm friend and admirer of the Entente, in *de Amsterdammer*; according to his article, the Dutch sergeant who was guarding the frontier at the point where the Kaiser crossed, made the following statement:

“When on the morning of the 10th of November the 8 or 9 motor cars stopped at the frontier, a Captain or a Lieutenant-Colonel stepped out of the first car and said, when I refused to

allow the Kaiser and his suite to pass, 'You can safely do this, your Government is fully acquainted.'

"When I continued to oppose yet further objections, still other German officers stepped out of their cars, among them a very tall thin man, the only one who wore a broad silver band on his cap. This officer also said to me, 'The Dutch Government knows everything about this,' or at any rate words to this effect. The Kaiser himself, I believe, did not put in an appearance. Whether or no they told the same story to the officer who had in the meantime been called from Maastricht, I do not know."

Thereupon the editorial continues:

"Probably light can be thrown upon this from Amerongen! If those accompanying the ex-Kaiser did not hesitate, in their haste to flee to Dutch territory, to lie to Dutch soldiers and to compromise the Dutch Government, then such action is surely worthy of an apology. If they were able to obtain admission with their Princely burden by means of cunning pretexts, then the matter is still worse and the presence of the ex-Kaiser here would have been forced upon the country by deceitful means."

In the States General, too, there has been some attempt to criticise the action of the Government. In particular Mr. van Emden put the following series of questions to the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs:

- "1. Are the Ministers conscious that the stay in this country of the former Emperor of Germany, which commenced on November 10th last, is a source of continued irritation to the feelings of almost all the world toward this nation, and is thus causing inestimable moral injury to the Netherlands?
- "2. Have the Ministers yet received the report of the commission appointed to define the legal position of the said ex-Kaiser?

“3. If so, in connection with question one, are the Ministers prepared to publish that report as speedily as possible and also to take a definite stand on the matter without loss of time as the present is only a provisional arrangement?”

As yet these questions remain unanswered, but in connection therewith it is of interest to call attention to the private conversation between Mr. Heemskerk, the Minister of Justice, and Mr. Stiles, correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, which was reported in my telegram number 5565 of December 24, 7 p.m.⁷ In the course of this the former declared that should the Allies demand the delivery of the Emperor he favored bringing him for examination before the tribunal at Utrecht, in whose jurisdiction Amerongen lay, after which he could make a definite decision on the matter for the Government. He added that the present Dutch Commission is only formed to advise him on the legal aspects of the situation.

It is difficult to judge just what is the precise attitude of the people at large towards the presence of the Kaiser. Whereas at first all papers united in stating that he had as much right to Dutch hospitality as the most humble French or Belgian poilu, there has of late been apparent an undertone of irritation at his presence which is seemingly gaining in extent. The rumors are persistent despite denials that it has been unofficially hinted to him that the Government would be relieved of embarrassment were he voluntarily to leave Holland. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the Government's attitude is summed up in the words of the Premier that it would have been better pleased if circumstances had led to his not having sought refuge here.

The German Legation at The Hague has openly and without reservation accepted the new order. The days following the flight of the Emperor were spent in burning papers, whose ashes fell in profusion on the porches of the Belgian Legation, a house or two away. The sign on the Chancery door “Kanzlei der Kaiserliche Gesandtschaft” was painted out, and after a few weeks a new sign was added “Kanzlei der Deutsche Gesandtschaft”. The attitude apparently adopted by the members of the Legation is one of social defiance; they appear in public places, and dine, wine and dance together quite

as if they ignored the fact that they are a defeated nation and that their country is being wracked by revolution if not by actual internecine war.

The position of the German Legation has been impaired yet further by the publication of the reported arrest of three telegraph operators accused of pilfering, in order to deliver to it, the telegrams of the Entente Legations at The Hague to their Governments. This had apparently been going on since September with a short interlude during the Dutch revolutionary outbreaks in November. The central detective office at Utrecht noticed that important parts of the vouchers leaving The Hague were cut, and after investigation discovered that these copies were carried by courier from Amsterdam to The Hague where they came into the hands of the German Legation through an intermediary. The courier was arrested and furnished all possible information at the Head Office as a result of which the three arrests were made.

In the matter of Holland's Foreign relations, the first event to be chronicled is the decision of Mr. van Karnebeek to name as successor to Jhr. Beelaerts van Blokland, the recalled Minister to Pekin, Mr. W. J. Oudendijk, former Minister to Russia. The rumors of this selection, which was confirmed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to my French colleague, have already spread abroad, and been favorably commented on. Among so many of the Dutch diplomats, who stand convicted of pro-German sentiments, Mr. Oudendijk is conspicuous as a shining exception. He is now staying in London, having but recently returned from Petrograd where as Dutch representative in Bolshevik Russia he won the confidence of the Entente powers by his courageous action on behalf of Allied citizens. As one paper expressed it, he is expected to "wipe out some of the black spots which have been made on Holland's reputation owing to the unneutral actions of many of the Ministers."

Dutch-Belgian relations have undergone a marked improvement. As much space is devoted to the questions as formerly, but the earlier acrimonious spirit is softening. The question is almost on the point of becoming academic, and the reassuring voices of the statesmen are being listened to once more. Whether this is but a lull in the

storm it is impossible to judge, but all indications would point to a concerted and successful effort of both Governments to put a stop to the unreasoning agitations of the Press.

Of the recent correspondence of the Associated Governments protesting against the passage of German troops through Limburg and demanding compensatory privileges therefor, and of the comments of the Dutch Press on President Wilson's trip to Europe, I purpose to inform the Department in separate despatches.

I have [etc.]

J. W. GARRETT

7 Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 862.001/14: Telegram

[Document 73]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

THE HAGUE , January 8, 1919—noon.
[Received January 9—10:30 a.m.]

80. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice in reply to questions put by van Emden on the subject of the Government's attitude toward the ex-Kaiser⁸ yesterday made a statement to the following effect:

The Ministers are aware that wrong judgments of the line of conduct adopted by the Government in this matter have occurred under the influence of inaccurate representations abroad, and refer to the Premier's statement of December 10 wherein he stated:

First: That the Government would have been better pleased had the Kaiser not sought a refuge in Holland.

Second: That he had already abdicated and that he entered Dutch territory as a private individual.

Third: That he had confronted the Government with a *fait accompli* as there had been no warning of his coming, of any nature.

Fourth: That there could be no question of internment after the abdication but that the choice of residence could not be left to the Kaiser.

Fifth: That the Government could assume no other point of view in its future course of action than that dictated by the laws of hospitality and in the event of extradition being demanded the reply would depend upon the law and circumstances, and,

Sixth: That the present arrangements were provisional.

The two Ministers further declared that commission to define the legal position of the ex-Kaiser had not been instituted, but that joint advice had been received on the subject from several lawyers at the request of the Minister of Justice which the Government must regard as confidential.

GARRETT

⁸ *Ante*, p. 82 [*Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 72](#)*].

811.221/54: Telegram

[Document 74]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , January 10, 1919—4 p.m.
[Received January 11—1:10 p.m.]

5640. The evening newspapers of the sixth published a story from Amerongen to the effect that the previous evening two motorcars containing two [*twelve*] persons appeared at the castle there demanding to see the German ex-Emperor; that one car contained rifles; and that the occupants gave out that they were sent by the American Minister at The Hague to speak with the ex-Emperor. I called up the Foreign Minister by telephone and told him that this report had been called to my attention; that it was of course quite unnecessary for me to tell him that I knew nothing at all about the occurrences at Amerongen but that I could say that no one who might have taken part in them had any connection with the American Legation at The Hague or with me. Karnebeek said that of course he understood that and that he knew nothing about the matter except for a short telegram which he had received which said in substance that some people had arrived at Amerongen late of night for the purpose of seeing the ex-Kaiser; that they had of course not been able to see him; and that it had been found out their passports were in order. He said nothing about the nationality of these people.

The papers next day stated among other things that the cars were American Army cars and that the occupants were American officers and soldiers in uniform. I consulted Colonel Davis, Military Attaché to the Legation, who promised to take measures at once to ascertain everything he could in regard to the story.

One of Colonel Davis' aides proceeded Tuesday to Brussels and informed Mr. Brand Whitlock of the rumors and I received a telegram the next day from Mr. Whitlock informing me that the

“only Americans recently going to Holland from here comprised the party of United States Senator Luke Lea from Tennessee, Colonel of the 114th Field Artillery. He came to the Legation last Tuesday saying that he was on leave for the purpose of visiting Belgium and Holland. I told him that he could not enter Holland in uniform. He said that they would send for their civilian clothes and on Saturday he applied for emergency passports. The Dutch Legation here gave Senator Lea a pass to enter Holland and I now learn that the Dutch Minister here indorsed the pass with permission for them to go in uniform”.

I have received a note from Mr. Whitlock confirming his telegram and stating in addition that emergency passports had been [given] by him to Senator Lea and to three officers, Messrs. Elsworth Brown, Leland S. MacPhail and Thomas P. Henderson; and to two military chauffeurs, Egbert O'Hail and Owen Johnston. Mr. Whitlock added:

“In the future, before visaing any passports for Holland, I shall telegraph you and ask if you desire the bearers to enter the country and I should be obliged if you will do the same in the case of Americans who wish to visit Belgium.”

I shall, of course, comply with Mr. Whitlock's excellent suggestion.

In view of the newspaper reports that the party had been sent by the American Minister at The Hague to speak with the ex-Emperor I sent a member of the Legation to Amerongen to accompany two of his assistant officers who were being sent there by Colonel Davis. It appears from the report submitted to me by my representative that the statement which he went to investigate was apparently not made by any of the American party but originated in the mind of the local editor of the *Amerongen Courant* who represents at Amerongen most of the Dutch newspapers and newspaper agencies.

The younger Count Bentinck who had received Colonel Luke Lea said to my representative that he asked Colonel Lea by whose authority they came and whether they came on an official mission; that Colonel Lea in response took out a *laissez passer* issued and signed by the Netherlands Chargé d’Affaires at Brussels and addressed to the Dutch customs authorities and as he handed it to Count Bentinck said “This will explain”. This *laissez passer* stated that Colonel Luke Lea and his party of five were proceeding to Holland under a special mandate of the American Government. Count Bentinck said that he told the ex-Emperor that a party of American officers had come on an official mission to see him for no good purpose; that the ex-Emperor said he would not be able to see them without knowing the exact authority with which they came. He went and repeated this to Colonel Luke Lea inquiring by whose authority they had come, as for instance, whether they came from General Pershing or not. Think that he also told them that he could not let them go into the castle to see the ex-Emperor without the permission of the governor of the province of Utrecht. He offered to call the governor of the province, but Colonel Lea said not to do so. About this time the burgomaster of Amerongen arrived in company with the chief of police. He examined the passports and after some conversation the men got into their automobiles and went away. It is reported but not confirmed that both cars have crossed the Dutch frontier into occupied Germany.

It is evident from the way the newspapers have been handled since Wednesday that Dutch officials desire to keep this affair from going any further, and it is to [be] hoped that they will not take any further steps about it. There is, as yet, no other intimation of what the[y] intend to do, but that may be gathered from the newspapers. There is a great desire, not only in government circles, but in every part of the population to permit nothing at the moment that may interfere with the longed-for visit of President Wilson to Holland and, moreover, our recent action in regard to ration and blockade is having a very good effect upon Dutch feeling towards America.

I am sending a full report by mail of the Amerongen escapade⁹ and the military attaché is also forwarding a report to headquarters in France.

I earnestly urge that this affair be called to the attention of the War Department as well as of the Commander-in-Chief [of] the American expeditionary force in order that they may have the opportunity of taking whatever steps may be necessary to prevent a recurrence of such a disgraceful episode.

GARRETT

9 Not printed.

Political and economic conditions in Germany

[\[75\] Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 11, 1918.

862.00/328¹/₂

[\[76\] The Minister in Switzerland \(Stovall \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Berne , November 19, 1918. [Received December 5.]

862.00/370

[\[77\] The British Chargé \(Barclay \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 20, 1918.

862.00/354

[\[78\] The Minister in Switzerland \(Stovall \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Pontarlier (Berne), November 21, 1918—9 a.m. [Received November 23—10:38 a.m.]

862.00/347: Telegram

[79] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 21, 1918—8 p.m. [Received (November 22)
1:31 a.m.]

862.00/336: Telegram

[80] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Pontarlier (Berne), November 22, 1918—11 a.m. [Received November
24—6:05 a.m.]

862.00/343: Telegram

[81] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 24, 1918—3 p.m. [Received November 25—
12:25 a.m.]

862.00/346: Telegram

[82] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington , November 25, 1918.

862.00/363½

[83] Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State

[Washington ,] November 25, 1918.

862.00/344

[84] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington , November 25, 1918.

862.00/788a

[85] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 25, 1918—5 p.m.

862.01/23a: Telegram

[86] The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

[Washington ,] November 26, 1918.

862.00/789

[87] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 26, 1918—7 p.m. [Received November 27—
1:28 a.m.]

862.00/350: Telegram

[88] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 26, 1918—8 p.m.

862.00/789a: Telegram

[89] The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

Washington , November 27, 1918.

862.00/354

[90] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

London , November 28, 1918—12 [noon.] [Received November 28—
10:20 a.m.]

862.00/790: Telegram

[91] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 28, 1918—3 p.m. [Received 3:03 p.m.]

862.00/802: Telegram

[92] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

The Hague , November 30, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 1—4:57 a.m.]

763.72/12396: Telegram

[93] Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 30, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 1—1:26 a.m.]

862.01/24: Telegram

[94] The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

Washington , December 1, 1918.

763.72119/2897

[95] The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

Washington , December 2, 1918—5 p.m.

862.00/369: Telegram

[96] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Pontarlier (Berne), December 3, 1918—2 p.m. [Received December 5—7:00 a.m.]

862.00/377: Telegram

[97] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 5, 1918—9 a.m. [Received December 6—7:30 a.m.]

862.00/380: Telegram

[98] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 7, 1918—4 p.m. [Received 11:47 p.m.]

862.00/387: Telegram

[99] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 8, 1918—12 noon. [Received December 9—12:20 p.m.]

862.00/390: Telegram

[100] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 10, 1918. [Received January 6, 1919.]

862.00/430

[101] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 16, 1918—7 p.m. [Received 10:36 p.m.]

862.00/403: Telegram

[102] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 21, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 22—
5:23 a.m.]

862.00/416: Telegram

[103] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 21, 1918—5 p.m. [Received 8:33 p.m.]

763.72114/4275: Telegram

[104] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , December 29, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 30—
9:22 a.m.]

862.00/425: Telegram

[105] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , January 6, 1919. [Received February 4.]

763.72/12726

[106] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Washington , January 6, 1919—3 p.m.

862.01/8: Telegram

[107] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—11 p.m. [Received January 12—1:47 a.m.]

862.01/9: Telegram

862.00/328^{1/2}

[Document 75]

Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 11, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is difficult to piece together an accurate picture of the present situation in Germany, but examination of all reports which have reached the Department up to the present moment leads to the following conclusions:

1. Social Democrats are in control of every section of the German Empire.
2. The Social Democrats of every variety agree that Germany must become a socialist Republic.
3. The Independent Socialists demand that the whole executive, legislative and judicial power shall be placed in the hands of workmen's and soldiers' councils.
4. The Majority Socialists, who at present are in control in Berlin, by virtue of the fact that Ebert is the Provisional Chancellor, oppose this demand of the Independents, asserting that it will mean a dictatorship of the proletariat, and propose that a Constituent Assembly shall be chosen at once by democratic elections, to decide on the future form of Government of the Empire.
5. The Majority Socialists have offered the Independent Socialists an equal share in the Government and have proposed to take Haase, Liebknecht and Barth into the Government.
6. It is as yet uncertain whether or not the Independents will accept this offer and will support the proposed Constitutional Convention or will attempt to seize the Government and to rule through the workmen's and soldiers' councils, which have been set up everywhere in the Empire.
7. A statement by the President that the United States will welcome a German Republic into the family of nations, and that the

Government of the United States will assist a German People's Republic to restore normal living conditions by sending supplies of food and other essential commodities, would greatly strengthen the Majority Socialists, and might be sufficient to persuade the Independent Socialists to cooperate with the Majority Socialists, instead of setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Very respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT

862.00/370

[Document 76]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 5270

BERNE , November 19, 1918.
[Received December 5.]

SIR: The complete defeat of the German armies in the West and the abandonment of all hope for a victorious peace brought to the German people the disappointment of all its expectations and opened its eyes to the policy of deception and untruth of its government. A revolution in Germany was impossible as long as the military powers were in control and were able to strengthen their position by apparent military successes. As soon as these failed and as the defensive lines in the West pronounced impregnable were broken one after the other, the German people saw that their only salvation lay in their taking the government into their own hands and entered upon a relatively bloodless but very complete revolution. There can be no doubt that the President's notes to Germany regarding the armistice prepared the ground most effectively for such a change by persuading the German people that the war was waged not against them, but against their leaders.

The general strike in Switzerland and the consequent delay in the receiving of newspapers from Germany because of the cessation of all railway traffic as well as the rapidity of events which have succeeded one another with breathless speed, make it almost impossible to give a complete account of the German revolution at this time.

The resignation of Ludendorff¹ and the growing influence of the social-democratic party in the government as well as the amnesty for political offenders, which the new government pronounced, indicated that greater changes than these might be expected. In view of the fact that the most disciplined and best organized of political

parties, the socialists, had been divided at first into two parties, the independent socialists and the majority socialists, and later into three by the defection from the independent socialists of the Spartacus group, it seemed that a radical change in government in the sense of a thoroughgoing socialist administration could not immediately be brought about. It appears, however, that the revolutionary movement, once begun, tended to bring about a unity of action between all socialist parties. These parties, through their superior organization, were able to take a controlling hand in political events.

The first signs of the revolution appeared on November 3rd at Kiel where a large crowd of sailors and civilians demanded the release of the crews of the battle fleet which for a long time had been imprisoned for mutiny. An attempt to prevent the liberation of the mutineers resulted in bloodshed and in the immediate control of the town by a council of sailors and workmen, against which, troops were powerless. Some companies of soldiers and squadrons of cavalry, which were sent to quell the uprising, were in part disarmed and in greater part went over to the people and established themselves as a socialist government. The Central Government at Berlin was powerless to cope with the situation and had to promise the fulfillment of all the demands of the mutineers, which, at this time, related rather to minor reforms than to any extensive democratic demands. A report at this time that a similar council of soldiers and workmen had been established at Stuttgart was officially denied. The troubles at Kiel had their origin probably in the demobilization of the personnel of the navy, which had not been under the necessity of the same iron discipline which obtained at the front and which because of long inaction had offered a particularly fertile field for socialist revolutionary propaganda. These troubles spread immediately to Hamburg where some excesses in bakeries appeared to have taken place on November 6th. At the same time that these events took place in the port towns, a large meeting was held on November 5th in Munich at which the liberation of political prisoners was demanded, a demand which was accorded by the Supreme Court. This action in Bavaria was the more effective because the two socialist parties of this country had for two days before the demonstration been collaborating in an effort to bring

about a union between all socialist elements which was effected under the leadership of Kurt Eisner, an independent socialist lately released from prison.

In view of the prominent rôle which Eisner played in later political events in Bavaria, it is interesting to note his history. Eisner is of Jewish race and early in life devoted himself to philosophical studies becoming a Privat Dozent and writing certain books on philosophical subjects which insured him a reputation as a brilliant critic. Later he became interested in socialism and grew to be the most prominent leader of radical socialism in Bavaria. I am informed by a person intimately acquainted with him that he is a man of strict integrity and of great ability.

While these events were going on, public opinion was still occupied largely with the abdication of the Emperor which was expected as a consequence of the demand addressed to him by the socialists who threatened to leave the government if he did not resign the crown of Prussia. The Reichstag was to have met on November 4th but it appears that this meeting was put off and that the activity of the political parties confined itself to party discussions outside of the legislative body. The government found itself in an exceedingly difficult situation as the events at Kiel and in Bavaria were symptomatic of the unrest among the people and as the government, which though liberal, contained a number of members who were compromised by former utterances, was not able to exercise any influence towards moderating the continued agitation. It appears also that cooperation between the majority socialists and the liberal members of the government was imperfect and that the socialists felt themselves strong enough to present an ultimatum to the Emperor requesting him to resign by the 7th of November and threatening an immediate severe opposition to the government if the resignation did not take place. It is incredible that the socialist party would have taken such a step without being certain that the great masses of the population were in complete accord with it and there seems little doubt that the liberal government of Prince Max of Baden knew its own weakness and the strength of the radical elements within the socialist party. These radical elements were rapidly getting the upper hand within the party body and although the majority socialists had

been faithful to the government during the four years of war, the past of such men as Scheidemann and Ebert was stronger than their action during the last four years, and forced them towards the more radical wings led by Haase and Ledebour. While political tension and anxiety were thus great at Berlin, a real revolution broke out in Bavaria. On the afternoon of November 7th, a great meeting took place in Munich in order to commemorate the Bolshevik revolution at Petrograd. Thousands of people collected and the large labor unions marched as a body to the meeting. At this meeting a resolution was voted demanding (1) the immediate abdication of the Emperor and the Crown Prince; (2) the army should take oath to the constitution; (3) Germany was to be a democratic state; (4) the administration should be democratized; (5) the armistice conditions should be accepted; (6) the idea of national defense propagated by the conservatives was to be abandoned and (7) provisions for an eight hour day, for unemployment insurance and for other social reforms. After this resolution was accepted, the body of the people, joined by many soldiers, marched to the palace and shortly afterwards formed a council of workmen and soldiers under the presidency of Kurt Eisner above mentioned. A proclamation was issued to the people stating that Bavaria desired to prepare Germany for the league of nations and stating also that no one willing to work for the welfare of the new Bavaria, which was created, would be excluded from the common labor of the soldier and workmen councils. The police, the courts and the administration immediately put themselves at the disposition of the council of soldiers and workmen and an agreement with the peasants was even brought about insuring the provisioning of Munich.

In view of the fact that this revolutionary movement was to become the model for all other revolutionary movements in Germany, it is interesting to examine certain of its features. In the first place it presented a picture of perfect order, and although the terminology of the government was borrowed from Bolshevik Russia, it presented no analogy with the anarchy of the social republic of Lenin. In Munich and in all Bavaria, no disorder occurred and the only casualties were amongst certain officers who attempted to resist the new government after having seemingly surrendered. Even this incident appears to have caused no more than 20 deaths. All

administrative officers work as formerly and with the exception of the fact that the power was in the hands of labor, it appears that Munich presents no other picture than it did under the royal government.

In Hamburg, Cologne and Bremen, similar governments to that of Bavaria were formed and with the exception of Hamburg, where in the first excitement food shops were plundered, no disorder took place. These revolutionary movements then led to the movement of the abdication of the Emperor and on November 9th, the Chancellor published a proclamation in Berlin stating that Emperor William had abdicated, that the Crown Prince had renounced all claims to the throne and that the socialist Ebert would be the new Chancellor of the Empire until a constituent assembly had been formed. Berlin itself was quiet and no revolutionary movements had taken place there.

On November 9th all of northwestern and all of central Germany were in the hands of councils of soldiers and workmen and this movement was beginning to spread into the Westphalian industrial districts. In Munich the revolution had so far progressed that a government of national concentration could be formed which had for its president Eisner and which contained the head of the Catholic peasant organization of Bavaria Heim. The former Minister of railways Frauendorfer, who is reputed a not-over intelligent conservative, became minister in this new cabinet together with the socialist Auer (Interior), the Union Secretary Finn [*Fink*] (Justice) and Professor Edgar Jaffe (Finance). The Chief of Police of the town of Munich was the independent socialist Diener. This government completely controls the situation and appeared to have the support of all classes of the population. On the next day a similar government of workmen and soldiers was formed at Frankfurt where, with the exception of the plundering of bread shops, no disorder occurred.

The lack of German newspapers and the haste of events prevent me from giving any conclusive picture of events as they took place after this. Berlin appeared to be quiet as late as November 8th. On November 9th Berlin was cut off from all telegraphic and telephonic communication with the outside. It appears that the government had

sent for a battalion of riflemen which they believed trustworthy to put down any disorder which might occur. At three o'clock on the morning of November 10th, this battalion refused to do duty upon the punishment of one of its members for having made a revolutionary remark. The soldiers thereupon sent a delegation to the social-democratic party insuring it of its support and putting the full strength of their troops including some of the Prussian guards at the disposal of the people. Red flags were hoisted on the editorial buildings of the *Vorwaerts* and military automobiles distributed revolutionary pamphlets through the streets. In a short while the whole population and all of the garrison of Berlin had joined the revolution and had formed a soldiers and workmen council, which in accordance with the national government, took over the direction of political affairs in cooperation with the government. No disorder or bloodshed took place except in isolated instances in which it seems that monarchist officers fired upon innocent passers-by. The editorial offices of several bourgeois papers were occupied by socialists, thus the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* was taken over by the Spartacus group. Liebknecht hoisted a red flag on the parliament building. Further detailed accounts of occurrences have not yet reached Berne.

During the following week the King of Saxony abdicated, the King of Bavaria was declared to have forfeited his crown and all other German princes either abdicated or declared that they would not exercise their functions until a national constituent assembly had decided upon the future government of Germany. The German Government at present constituted is presided over by a cabinet composed as follows: Interior and War, Ebert; Foreign Affairs and Colonies, Haase; Finance, Scheidemann; Demobilization and public health, Dittmann; Press, Landsberg; Social Policy, Barth. This cabinet calls itself the Council of People's Deputies and on November 15th it announced that the administration of the Empire would be in the hands of the following officers: Foreign Affairs, Dr. Solf; Finance, Schiffer; Public Economy, Dr. Mueller; Economic Demobilization, Dr. Koeth; War Food Office, Wurm; Labor, Bauer; War, Scheüch; Navy, von Mann; Justice, Krause; Post, Ruedlin. To these ministers, the following Under-Secretaries of State are attached: Foreign Affairs, Dr. David; War Food Office, Robert Schmidt; Labor,

Giesbert. Furthermore a number of advisors have been appointed to assist the Secretaries of State. They are distributed as follows: Foreign Affairs, Karl Kautzki; Finance, Eduard Bernstein; Public Economy, Dr. Erdmann (Cologne); Economic Demobilization, Buchner and Schumann; Labor, Jockel; War, Goehre and Daumig; Navy, Noske and Vogtherr; Justice, Dr. Oskar Cohn.

The Prussian Ministry has also been entirely changed and is completely in the hands of independent socialists. It appears that all the members of the Prussian Lower House, which on the Prussian electoral law were very few, are now Prussian ministers.

The organization of this government is such that the socialist party leaders, who control almost all offices, will have the supreme control of all political affairs and that the former ministers will act only as technical advisors. It is the aim of this government to call a constituent assembly which is to decide the future form of the government and to introduce a large number of social and political reforms. The institution of councils of workmen and soldiers does not represent any analogy to similar bodies in Russia as they are composed not only of soldiers but in many cases of officers and high functionaries. The original purpose in the creation of these councils was to prevent disorder upon the demobilization of the troops which obey their own commanders, but who, it was feared, might mutiny against their officers. So far few officers have been molested as long as they did not interfere with the political activities of the soldiers and in the ranks the officers who have remained have still military authority which, however, does not extend to activities outside of the ranks. It is a remarkable fact that many of the officers of the Prussian guard have joined the revolutionary movement.

Whether this revolution will develop along orderly lines or whether it will lead to Bolshevik excesses, is at present beyond any possibility of estimation; the morale of the returning troops can alone determine this. So far there can be no question that the government has shown itself strong and determined to enforce order and that it has the support of the people everywhere. It is not likely that a reactionary movement will set in as all the elements which would form such a movement are wholly discredited and are unable to make themselves

felt against the overwhelming republican sentiment of the country. The great organization which made Germany such a menace as a militaristic nation is now being used to effect a peaceful change from a militaristic empire to a social republic and the next weeks will show conclusively whether this organization possesses enough inherent strength to insure a peaceful change. The severe discipline among the laboring classes of Germany, due on the one hand to their military training and on the other hand to the strict discipline enforced in the ranks of the socialists, will be an important factor in determining the peaceful course of the great German revolution.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

¹ Gen. Erich F. W. Ludendorff, First Quartermaster General of the German Army.

862.00/354

[Document 77]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 1301

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Minister at The Hague has informed the Foreign Office that a member of the German Legation there, who has just returned from Berlin, has communicated to him through a third party a message from Dr. Solf, to the effect that the situation in Berlin is not at all what the papers make it appear. The present Government's position is by no means secure and at times the ultra elements have the upper hand. Monsieur Joffe, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, was sent away by the German Government a few weeks ago, but the extremists are doing their best to secure his return. If they succeed in their endeavours the situation will become critical. The Entente powers are asked to let it be known that there will be no toleration of Bolshevism, and it is earnestly hoped that the moment there are signs that disorderly elements are getting the upper hand, they will resume hostilities. The only thing that can assure the maintenance of order is fear of an immediate military invasion. The member of the German Legation added, probably as an expression of his own opinion, that despite the fact that the danger of Bolshevism in Holland would appear to be diminished at the present moment, it would at once spread from Germany to Holland.

In communicating the above, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to request that the United States Government will be so

good as to furnish His Majesty's Government with any observations which they may have to make in the matter.

WASHINGTON , November 20, 1918.

862.00/347: Telegram

[Document 78]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), November 21, 1918—9 a.m.
[Received November 23—10:38 a.m.]

5873. McNally² sends the following:

“19th. From a reliable source just returned from Germany. Following the success of revolution at Kiel the sailors after winning over the garrisons at Hanover and Cologne proceeded to Berlin where they were arrested by the soldiers and imprisoned, but in two days converted their captors and with them rode through the streets firing indiscriminately and waving red flags. The Government is administered by six Social Democrats, three Majority representatives standing for order and three of the Minority or Independents having Bolshevik tendencies. The left wing of the Independents are terrorists. The Bolsheviks in Russia recently offered to make an offensive and defensive alliance with the Independents. Self prevented. The Soldiers' Council are for order which will be [apparent omission] if starvation, the ally of Bolshevism, does not intervene and if it does my informant declares that nothing can save Germany from the Bolshevism and all it stands for; that the limited supply of food in Germany makes the carrying out of the armistice terms impossible when the stores intended for the German army are taken by the Allies leaves foodless [*sic*]; that the President of the United States should make it clear to the German people that unless order is maintained throughout Germany, will not help with food and that this would defeat Bolshevism. He declares that if food is sent from America it must be distributed under strict military condition [s]. Many soldiers behind the front are returning in

disorder and are pillaging. At Frankfort recently a train full of sailors jeered at a train full of soldiers on the siding. The soldiers opened fire and killed or wounded almost all. The success of Bolshevism in Germany would endanger Switzerland if not all Europe. McNally.”

STOVALL

² James C. McNally, vice consul at Zurich.

862.00/336: Telegram

[Document 79]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 21, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received (November 22) 1:31 a.m.]

3168. The neutral diplomat mentioned, quoted in the Legation's 1141, Sept. 3, [1917,] 5 p.m. and 1755, Dec. 31, [1917,] 6 p.m.³ writes from Berlin November 17th as follows:

“There is one great danger and that is a Bolshevik movement if the present Cabinet remains in power and there soon comes national assembly. I hope things may still turn out all right, but if there comes disorder and famine, I do not see any end to the terror. The most important thing the Entente can do is of course to send food, because people in the cities are starving and will starve terribly in a few weeks' time when the soldiers come back. Another very important thing would be that President Wilson puts it as clearly as possible before the German nation that he wants general elections. I believe this country will do anything the President wants at present.”

The last suggestion seems of imperative importance. It is evident from all reports received that the revolutionary movement is fast falling into the hands of the German Bolsheviks and quasi-Bolshevik supporters. A demand by the President for some sort of provisional national assembly chosen on democratic lines, to be succeeded by a permanent representation elected after conditions have become settled, would probably result in precipitating crisis which appears unavoidable. The sooner this crisis comes, however, the greater is the chance that it will result favorably for the forces of real democracy, which now probably have the support of the soldiers returning from the front; this may not be the case after the latter have had time to

become discontented as the result of the shorter rations, etc., and exposure to the extremists' propaganda. Only continued reiteration that an undemocratic Germany can never expect food or raw material from the western democracies would counteract the Bolshevik poison, which is undoubtedly being incessantly injected into the German masses. In this connection a manifest from the American Federation of Labor addressed to the German working classes might be of great effect. The Bolshevik leaders recognize in democracy their most dangerous enemy. Copy to London.⁴

GRANT-SMITH

³ [*Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, pp. 189*](#), 515.

⁴ By telegram No. 1241, Nov. 30, 1 p.m., the Chargé was instructed to repeat the above telegram to Paris for Colonel House.

862.00/343: Telegram

[Document 80]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), November 22, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received November 24—6:05 a.m.]

5897. McNally sends the following:

“21st. The following has been communicated to me from most reliable source in Berlin.

‘Have put myself in communication immediately after return with all persons of influence. Situation is the following: Government of People’s Delegates seems to lose power of control more and more. The Executive Council of the Workmen and Soldiers’ Council of Berlin denies obedience to the Government since yesterday and is about to grasp the power of Government. Today the crisis is at its climax. Result cannot be foreseen at the present moment. Spartacus group, the violent and Terroristic left wing of Socialists, works purposely against convocation of national assembly and publicly propagates the domination of the proletariat with the exclusion of bourgeois elements. As soon as the desperadoes get the upper hand, which may happen any moment, a Russian condition of affairs is inevitable. Spartacus men are strengthened by armed disorderly soldiers back from the front. They will not work and they demoralize the others. Feeling amongst Government including Majority Socialists who see situation clearly very pessimistic. Using of own troops from front not possible as suspicion of counter revolution would arise and as one cannot rely any

longer on any troops. Germany is at the time being terrorized by small minority. Only effective counteraction which Government of course cannot propose itself would be immediate ultimatum of Entente demanding that doings of Spartacus group should at once take an end; that all revolutionary nonsense like red cockades, red flags, soldiers' rule over all officers independent of their political opinions, should be done away with. Further, that binding declarations for immediate convocation of national assembly should be given and preparations for general elections should be made. If not, armistice would be terminated and American troops would march in. Such a step would be received with great relief by German people as there is very general longing for real democratic Government and for the continuation of new form of Government on reasonable lines, return monarchy absolutely excluded. I beg urgently to forward this on as there is no hour to be lost and as it is most necessary to take steps before it is too late.'

McNally."

STOVALL

862.00/346: Telegram

[Document 81]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 24, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received November 25—12:25 a.m.]

3187. The persons mentioned in my 3183⁵ left today for Berlin. Last night I warned them that an impression prevailed in some quarters that Germans were giving an exaggerated impression of conditions in their country especially with regard to Bolshevism and the food conditions in the hope of obtaining better terms; that the first great difficulty any new Government in Germany would have to contend with in foreign affairs was that from years of regrettable experience the Governments of the other peoples had come to regard with suspicion every declaration emanating from the constituted authorities at Berlin. I urged them to approach every question with the utmost frankness and no half truths. They realized this, they said, and suggested that a commission proceed to Germany to make a thorough investigation of conditions. I did not think the Associated Governments would care to take the initiative but promised to advise you of their intention to propose such an appeal immediately on their return to Berlin.

Such an investigation would evidently be the most practical means of learning the truth especially if carried on by persons possessing sound judgment and a thorough knowledge of German and Germany. I would suggest that each be sent immediately upon appointment. Individual investigations with some overlapping of territory would seem to promise better than a commission traveling as such. I venture to suggest Lithgow Osborne as one of our delegates. He would be prepared to leave without delay. The military attaché is telegraphing the War Department on similar lines. He also

would be a useful member of such a commission, as would Owen.^{[6](#)}
Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

^{[5](#)} Not printed. The persons identified in this telegram were those described in the first paragraph of telegram No. 3182, Nov. 23, 1918, 8 p.m., p. 28 [*Pg. 28 includes portions of [Doc. 15](#) and [Doc. 16](#)*].

^{[6](#)} William H. Owen, War Trade Board representative at Stockholm.

862.00/363^{1/2}

[Document 82]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I do not wish to burden you with memoranda but here is another one by Mr. Bullitt upon the situation in Germany which I think you will agree is worth reading. It seems to me that it is the most critical question at present and possibly should be acted upon without delay.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Germany has moved along the road to Bolshevism with such speed during the past week that it is now doubtful that even the wisest action by the United States and the Governments with which we are associated in the war will prevent Bolshevik domination of Prussia and the seaports. If we do not act wisely, and at once, a Liebknecht-Mehring dictatorship inevitably will play the same role in Berlin that the Lenine-Trotsky dictatorship is playing in Petrograd.

The situation in Germany at present is this:

1. There is not the slightest possibility of a return to power of any Hohenzollern or any counter revolutionary leader. The old order has been rooted out, though naturally in isolated country communities and in complicated Governmental departments remnants of the old bureaucracy remain.
2. The Government of Bavaria and the Government of Prussia at the present moment are in the hands of the most decent men in Germany—the moderate Social Democrats and their intimate allies of other progressive parties.
3. These Governments are menaced by the Spartacus Group of Bolsheviki. (Note. On November 21, Liebknecht formally announced that he is a Bolshevik.)
4. At present the Bolsheviki are weak in Bavaria but strong in the Hansa towns, the northern Rhine districts and Berlin.
5. Kiel, Bremen and Düsseldorf are already in the hands of the Bolsheviki, according to press reports.
6. The Russian Bolsheviki are supplying Liebknecht and his followers with unlimited funds and materials for the dissemination of propaganda.
7. The German Bolshevik propagandists are concentrating their efforts on the supply zone behind the active zone of the army, where all discipline ceased and disorder supervened the day the armistice was signed. Their propaganda is having great success in this mass of hungry, disorderly men.
8. Liebknecht's meetings in Berlin are becoming more and more popular.
9. The so-called "Government" or "Cabinet" in Berlin has acknowledged the control of the Executive Committee of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council.
10. This Executive Committee is composed of equal numbers of Majority and Independent Socialists, and an indeterminate number of representatives of the soldiers and workmen. The Executive Committee is much more radical than the "Cabinet", and is becoming more radical every day.
11. The Executive Committee has announced its opposition to an immediate Constituent Assembly and apparently has forced the "Government" to abandon the plan to hold elections for the Assembly on January 2. The Executive Committee favors the immediate summoning of representatives of the various

Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils throughout Germany to form a Central Council and to prepare a form of Government for the former Empire.

The parallel between the course of the revolution in Germany and the course of the revolution in Russia is obvious. As the Government of Prince Lvov represented the progressive bourgeoisie of Russia, so the Government of Prince Max represented the progressive bourgeoisie of Germany. As Kerensky represented the moderate democratic socialists of Russia, so Ebert represents the moderate democratic socialists of Germany. As Lenine represents anti-democratic proletarian dictatorship in Russia, so Liebknecht represents anti-democratic proletarian dictatorship in Germany. Kerensky fell and Lenine succeeded him, partly, to be sure, because of Kerensky's own mistakes, but partly because the Allies and the United States did not take his appeals for material and spiritual aid at their face value. So today there is the gravest danger that Ebert will fall because the Allies and the United States will not take his appeals for material and spiritual aid at anything like their face value.

It is my belief that Ebert is entirely sincere and truthful when he says that unless the period for carrying out certain terms of the armistice is extended and unless the number of railroad engines and cars demanded by the Allies is diminished, such dislocation of economic life will ensue in Germany that Bolshevism will be inevitable. A hundred facts may be cited to prove this contention; it seems advisable, however, to burden this memorandum with only one example: A secret agent of Military Intelligence who was in Düsseldorf on November 18 returned to Holland on November 21 and reported: ["]The street cars were running, the railroads not. The garrison troops had returned and were making a noisy demonstration in the streets for food. Otherwise things were quiet." On November 23, the Spartacus Group gained control of Düsseldorf!

If the present German Government of moderate democratic socialists is to hold its position it must be sustained not only by economic assistance but also by political support. There is need for amelioration of certain conditions of the armistice, there is need for

immediate supervision by Mr. Hoover of food distribution, and there is also need for the right word at the right time from President Wilson. In order that the right word may be said at the right time it is necessary to establish at once the closest unofficial relations with the Ebert Government.

The gravity of the situation cannot be overemphasized. Unless we support the Ebert Government a little more strongly than the Russian Bolsheviki are supporting the Spartacus Group, Germany will become Bolshevik. Austria and Hungary will follow Germany's example. And the remainder of Europe will not long escape infection.

Very respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT

862.00/344

[Document 83]

Mr. William C. Bullitt, of the Division of Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON ,] November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Just as I concluded this memorandum,⁷ the appended telegrams were handed to me.⁸ They confirm my fears and underscore my conclusions.

I do not wish to be an alarmist but I feel that Bolshevism in North Germany is inevitable unless we act at once and very wisely.

Very respectfully yours,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT

⁷ *Supra.*

⁸ No indication on file copy as to which telegrams these were.

862.00/788a

[Document 84]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The political situations in Germany and Austria disturb me greatly, and from the reports which we are receiving it seems probable that the Spartacus group of the Bolsheviks is gaining headway. Kiel, Bremen and Düsseldorf are already in the hands of the Bolsheviks according to press reports; while other reports indicate that the Russian Bolsheviks are supplying Liebknecht and his followers with unlimited funds and materials for the dissemination of propaganda. Liebknecht's meetings in Berlin are becoming more and more popular.

From all information received the governments of Prussia and Bavaria are in the hands of good men—moderate social democrats—and there are many advantages, it seems to me, in doing what we can at the present time to strengthen these two governments. The possibility has occurred to me that we might ask Mr. Hoover, who has already completed his visit in England and is now in Paris, to proceed immediately to Berlin to get in touch there with the actual situation, both political and economic, and report to you at the earliest possible moment. I should think that Mr. Hoover could make this trip in a very brief period of time.

I should be grateful for an expression of your judgment.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

862.01/23a: Telegram

[Document 85]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918—5 p.m.

64. The President is impressed with the wisdom of a suggestion which has recently come to him from more than one quarter, namely that the German authorities be notified that there can be no official dealings with them on the part of the other powers in connection with the final settlements of the peace until a constituent assembly has been brought together and a definite form of government agreed upon and set up. Will you not be kind enough to bring this suggestion to the attention of the other great Powers and ask them if they would be willing to join the President in such a statement to the Germans? It seems to be the judgment of well informed persons that this would bring the uncertainties in Germany to a head and clear the way sooner than any other one influence.

LANSING

862.00/789

[Document 86]

The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON ,] November 26, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Last evening Mr. Rickard of the Food Administration suggested to me that possibly it would be better if Mr. Hoover himself did not proceed to Berlin. He felt that Dr. Taylor and Mr. Kellogg, both of whom are with Mr. Hoover in Paris, would be the logical men to go. Mr. Rickard said that the Food Administration is being flooded with protests from all parts of the country with regard to the plans for feeding Germany and that the departure of Hoover for Berlin would merely increase the trouble by giving great publicity to it. He thought that Taylor and Kellogg, both of whom know Germany and speak German fluently, could go in without any publicity at all and secure the information just as well as Mr. Hoover.

W. PHILLIPS

862.00/350: Telegram

[Document 87]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 26, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 27—1:28 a.m.]

3205. Uncensored and confidential message received from ...[9](#) in
Berlin reads as follows:

“Scheidemann said to me but not for publication: ‘Opposition to the Constituent Assembly would disappear if Wilson were to say that peace could be made only with the Constituent Assembly or Government supported by it.’ So far I can make the following positive statements: First. The Government must stand or fall by the Constituent Assembly. Second. The Spartacus group and other[s] of Bolshevik tendency can grow in power only if famine and rumor [of?] retreat to the Rhine throw the army into disorder. The Bolshevik centers are Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen and they can only be successfully fought with immediate food. The food situation is really desperate and inspires the Radicals to plan to prevent the Constituent Assembly to force the Allies to come to Berlin and so threaten the Allied armies with Bolshevikism. Also our move is to announce loudly that food is coming to a democratic Germany, followed quickly by at least a few shiploads and at the same time to try [to] delay the fulfillment of the armistice terms especially regarding the delivery of the railroad so that it can be used in transporting coal and food.”

Copenhagen to London.

GRANT-SMITH

9 A newspaper correspondent.

862.00/789a: Telegram

[Document 88]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918—8 p.m.

77. The reports which the Department is receiving from Germany indicate that Kiel, Bremen, and Dusseldorf are already in the hands of the Bolsheviks; and that the Spartacus group of the Bolsheviks is gaining headway in Berlin. Other reports indicate that Russian Bolsheviks are supplying Liebknecht and his followers with unlimited funds and materials for the dissemination of propaganda. The Department believes that the governments of Prussia and Bavaria are in the hands of good men—moderate social democrats—and there would seem to be advantages, therefore, in doing what we can at this time to strengthen these two governments.

It has been suggested that Mr. Hoover's representatives, possibly Dr. Taylor and Mr. Kellogg, might be able to proceed immediately to Berlin for a brief visit, there to come in touch with the actual situation, both political and economic, in order to ascertain what steps should be taken in the circumstances. Please confer with Hoover and cable your views.

LANSING

862.00/354

[Document 89]

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires of Great Britain and with reference to a memorandum 1301 dated November 20, 1918, which has been received, begs to say that the Government of the United States believes that, in view of the fact that the President and the Secretary of State will shortly proceed to Paris, it would seem best to determine there what measures may be agreed upon in regard to the Bolshevik menace in Germany.

WASHINGTON , November 27, 1918.

862.00/790: Telegram

[Document 90]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

LONDON , November 28, 1918—12 [noon.]
[Received November 28—10:20 a.m.]

196. Your number 77, November 26, 8 p.m. I took this matter up with Hoover very hurriedly as he was about to leave for Brussels. Hoover did not seem to think it would be wise to move along lines you suggested at present time. I will take it up with him later and advise you.

EDWARD HOUSE

862.00/802: Telegram

[Document 91]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 28, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received 3:03 p.m.]

197. Referring to my cable number 196. Hoover, just before he left for Brussels, handed one of his men the following written memorandum of instructions:

“Will you see Mr. Auchincloss this morning and say that with regard to Secretary Lansing message upon sending someone into Germany, the British have objected to our taking any action without their participation in it. I am not disposed to abide by this domination but do think for amity[’s] sake that Secretary Lansing had better have Laughlin inform the British Foreign Office that we are sending inquiry agents into Germany on food, to wit, Taylor and Kellogg, and do nothing else, that is, simply inform them.”

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72/12396: Telegram

[Document 92]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

THE HAGUE , November 30, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 1—4:57 a.m.]

5324. An interesting but not novel feature of the new German propaganda is the evident attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and the Allies. Practically all appeals for help from Germany have been addressed to the United States. Press articles now refer to United States and Germany as the sole champions of the freedom of the seas and intimate that the United States will be found in the minority at the Peace Conference on more than one issue. The presence of the American correspondents at Berlin is being vigorously exploited to strengthen the position of the present Government, and unofficial German agents claiming high German political connections are circulating stories of anti-American propaganda by Entente journalists in Munich, in connection with attempt to convince America that it is in her interest that a strong Government be established in Germany, for her support at the Peace Conference.

It is reliably reported that today a meeting of the party leaders is being held Frankfort, at which the question of Solf's resignation [is] to be discussed. He has strong support but his resignation is believed imminent. It is believed a part of Solf's supporters are [hoping?] to strengthen his position, attempting to create the belief in German political circles that the American Government desires his continuation in office.

On the other hand Eisner is reported to object to Solf, Erzberger, David and Taber[?] as being discredited in foreign countries because of their prominent connections with old regime. He is said to favor

awaiting the return of all soldiers to their homes and until Socialism is more firmly fixed in public mind before convening constitutional assembly. He claims that the reactionary elements are the most anxious for its early convocation, but it now seems probable that the elections to the German Constitutional Assembly will not be held as early as February second. At present there are seven parties who will appeal to the voters: The German National Party, composed of the old Conservatives and pan-Germans; the German Peoples Party composed of the main body of the National Liberals and some sympathizers from the Progressives; the Christian Peoples Party composed the old center; the new Democratic Party consisting of the Progressives and the left wing of the National Liberals; the Social Democratic Party or the Majority Socialists; the Independent Socialist Party and the Spartacus League. The respective leaders are Westarp, Stresemann, Erzberger, Richthofen, Scheidemann, Haase, and Liebknecht. Published announcements of German Empress' arrival state that wife of Rosen, German Minister at Hague, met her at Sevenaar. Some days before her arrival, a prominent German connected with the German regime was assured by Rosen that he and Legation were not in communication with German Emperor. Emperor's abdication proclamation¹⁰ urging German people to support those now possessed of actual power until institution of new German Government, strongly reflects energetic methods of German Moderates in Holland to enlist all possible support for their efforts to maintain control of German Government.

GARRETT

¹⁰ See telegram No. 5322, Nov. 30, 1918, from the Minister in the Netherlands, p. 77 [*Pg. 77 includes portions of [Doc. 65](#) and [Doc. 66](#)*].

862.01/24: Telegram

[Document 93]

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

PARIS , November 30, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received December 1—1:26 a.m.]

206. Your number 64, November 25, 9[5] p.m. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs makes following reply to the President's suggestion. French text translated:

“In thanking you for this interesting suggestion, I believe it my duty to mention the reason[s] which seem to me after reflection to make it advisable at least to adjourn such an initiative if not to renounce it altogether. In the first place it would constitute a direct intervention in the internal policy of another country and this is in itself already contrary to the practices of great democracies which profess an absolute respect for the internal life of other states. Moreover we must note, looking at the matter from a practical point of view, that the centralizing tendency which was that of Prussia and which created the dangerous situation from which the war issued, begins to be strongly menaced by the autonomous and federal tendency of other states notably of Bavaria. By exercising political pressure such as suggested, we would run the risk of arresting a movement favorable to the reorganization of a pacific Germany. Finally, such action seems precipitate; the armistice signed by Germany has not yet been completely executed and the delay allowed will not expire until the 17th of December. This armistice in spite of a certain number of violations continues nevertheless to be executed along its broad outlines. We would run the risk of coming to the aid of the enemy by intervening in his internal organization and thus contracting a sort of engagement before the essential act, destined to assure indispensable guarantees against the resumption of hostilities, shall have been terminated. For all

these reasons while appreciating the interest of your suggestion, I do not believe that it responds to the present factors of the situation.”

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2897

[Document 94]

***The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the
Secretary of State***

[Translation]

WASHINGTON , December 1, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government informs me that according to a statement made by Colonel House it occurred to the President of the United States that there might be advantage in notifying the German authorities that the Allies would not conclude peace with Germany before a constituent assembly had been made and a regular German Government had been set up.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic deemed it proper to remark, on the one hand, that intervention of this kind in German internal policy might perhaps be a delicate matter and that on the other hand we would take the risk, by bringing pressure of that kind to bear, to halt the federalist movement which is taking shape in Germany, while our interest in maintaining peace must suggest to us a hope that the centralistic tendencies which were those of Prussia may fail.

It further seems to M. Pichon that action of this character would seem premature, for there would be objection to our enemies organizing before we were afforded, by a complete carrying out of the clauses of the armistice now under way, the indispensable guarantees against any possible resumption of hostilities.

I have the honor, in compliance with my instructions, to impart to your Excellency my Government's view of the question.

Be pleased [etc.]

JUSSERAND

862.00/369: Telegram

[Document 95]

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON , December 2, 1918—5 p.m.

109. In a note dated November 29th^{[11](#)} the Swiss Minister at Washington transmitted to the Department by direction of his Government, the following translation of a communication from the German Government to the Government of the United States:^{[12](#)}

“In view of the fact that public opinion in the enemy countries still shows persistent distrust in the communications regarding the food conditions and the political situation in Germany, the German Government begs to propose that the United States and Allied Governments send an international delegation to Berlin as soon as possible to establish the facts. Solf, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs.”

LANSING

^{[11](#)} Not printed.

^{[12](#)} Original missing from Department's files.

862.00/377: Telegram

[Document 96]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), December 3, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received December 5—7:00 a.m.]

6026. Muehlon¹³ just returned from Munich which he visited at invitation of Kurt Eisner. He reports great mass of government held down by fear of terrorism. Council of Soldiers, Workmen and Peasants consists [of?] only a part [of?] soldiers and are only ruling force of government and rest entirely on possession of machine guns. These weapons have not been used, but this is merely because of Eisner's personal aversion to bloodshed. If he were assassinated and another took his place terror might commence, as there is no resistance anywhere. Local authorities have stuck to posts and work subservient to councils. Railways, street cars, general utilities still functioning but with irregularity. Food naturally extremely scarce.

In soldiers' councils Jews taking leading part partly because of ability to grasp situation with facility, partly because of oratorical ability.

Eisner is predominating figure in Munich. Galician Jew he has lived in Berlin and during war aligned himself with Independent Socialists. Is completely out of touch with all elements of people except Soldiers' Council. Believes in force alone and recognition his authority depends on machine guns. Unwilling however to shed blood unless necessary. In this respect differs from Liebknecht who is willing to sacrifice innumerable lives to establish Bolshevik regime. Eisner at heart a Bolshevik but trying to hide feelings to curry favor with Entente, since he recognizes safety of country depends on Entente. He is willing to sacrifice unity of Germany and sign anything in order to obtain special concessions for Bavaria which will enable him to remain in public office. Muehlon adds that the

[apparent omission] and Rhine province would gladly go to France while Bavaria would in immense majority like to be independent. Eisner regards dissolution of Empire as inevitable but talks vaguely of ultimate federalization of States. Men like Jaffe and Foerster are holding posts in Government merely because Eisner recognizes their value with Entente as giving intellectual cachet to his government. Eisner ignores local press but is extremely adroit with correspondents of Entente press. Eisner flatly opposed to convocation of Constituent Assembly because he fears representation of peasant and bourgeois classes even though it be minority representation. He is flatly opposed to present government in Berlin since it contains Solf, Erzberger, David and Scheidemann. His opposition to them is based first, on their previous participation in old regime; second, on their conservative tendencies and desire to preserve order at all costs. He does not believe they can obtain satisfactory peace and therefore made proposal to Muehlon that an Empire Council be established for the purpose of forming peace, to be composed of Eisner, Keimertsky, Haase, certain politicians and Muehlon, the latter, as he frankly told Muehlon, for decorative purposes and for sympathy of Entente. Muehlon refused.

From information received in Bavaria Muehlon believes similar conditions exist everywhere perhaps not as [much?] in Berlin as in Munich. He is convinced that days of present government in Berlin are numbered and that with returning troops chaos will become ever greater. He believes Independent Socialists have permitted presence of Majority Socialists in Government only because, to soldiers at front, their names stood for liberalism during the war. As soon as the soldiers become properly educated by populations at home independents will throw out Majority Socialists and the Spartacus group will have complete sway with inevitable sanguinary results.

Muehlon recommends that if food is sent Bavaria, and food is urgently necessary, it should be distributed by units of Entente armies and not delivered to Eisner's government in order not to strengthen his hand.

Muehlon believes only two possible solutions exist; (1) the appearance of some general able to retain personal loyalty of some

military unit. Muehlon hardly regards this as possible in view of the fact that there is now not even a lieutenant who has kept control of his company without being forced to sign agreement of degrading conditions; (2) the intervention of the Entente throughout Germany. Muehlon believes latter step inevitable sooner or later and urges that it come in near future in order to save Germany from intermittent stages of terrorism. If such intervention possible he urges that it be not made as punitive measure but as measure of aiding new German Republic to establish stable and democratic government. Necessity for intervention will cease when Constituent Assembly elected and military authority established under that Assembly.

Muehlon adds time for words of hate is over and that if America and Entente desire lasting influence in Germany it must avoid appearance of dictating to criminal agents receiving just deserts.

Am sending memorandum to Colonel House.

STOVALL

¹³ Dr. Wilhelm Muehlon, former director of Krupps, later resident in Switzerland, author of *Die Verheerung Europas* (Zurich, 1918), and critic of the German Government's war policies.

862.00/380: Telegram

[Document 97]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 5, 1918—9 a.m.
[Received December 6—7:30 a.m.]

5404. There is information to the effect that the power of Bolshevism in Germany is growing in spite of the fact that the majority of the people is strongly opposed to it, and irrespective [of] the food situation. This anomaly may be due to the superior organization and unscrupulous appeal to class hatred among the more radical elements, as well as open intimidation practiced upon moderates and conservatives by a display of force and threats of violence. Although returning officers and men are said to show little sympathy with and open hostility towards revolution, this has really the effect of strengthening the hands of radicals who claim that there is great danger of a counter revolutionary movement until strong measures are taken to guard against it. To this end extremists are reported to be rapidly accumulating arms and ammunition, which are easily procured, and it is feared that serious conflicts may take place.

Above to Paris.

GARRETT

862.00/387: Telegram

[Document 98]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 7, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received 11:47 p.m.]

3270. German press indicates that some progress has been made towards consolidation during the past week. Thus the meeting of the front soldiers delegates at Ems revealed a decided hostility toward Bolshevist experiments and support for the present Ebert-Haase administration. Furthermore the Bavarian Premier Eisner has been forced by public opinion to relinquish some of his more radical policies. Methodical efforts are being made to cope with the great problems of reconstruction. The bourgeois press is strong in its criticism but this is undoubtedly to a great extent due to the fear of severe measures against capital and the desire to start political agitation for the coming elections to the peace protocol. Reports of disorders are few but food conditions may at any time cause a change in this respect.

The reorganization of the political parties is progressing gradually. The "German Democratic Party" which was formed as a new party on a program favoring ["] republican form of government", very sweeping social reform from a bourgeois standpoint, comprised the majority of the former Progressive Party and affiliated elements of the National Liberal Party and soon obtained the control of the Progressive Party organization. The National Liberals organized the "Democratic Peoples Party" which as the result of negotiations has now been amalgamated with the German democratic party under the exclusion of the most conservative wing of the former national liberal party which will evidently join the new conservative organization. Although several of the former party have been excluded from active participation in the leadership of the democratic party it still seems

to contain too many nondemocratic elements ever to be a very effective organization.

The Catholics are strongly opposed to the measure of the new Prussian Minister [of] Worship and Education who is working for a quick separation of church and state as well as for school reforms abolishing certain forms of church supervision and compulsory religious instruction. This is the reason for the strong Catholic agitation for a Rhenish Westphalian Republic, where the Catholics would control the majority and could decide their own policies, as an autonomous state in German Confederation. Repeated [to] Paris for Colonel House.

[GRANT-SMITH]

862.00/390: Telegram

[Document 99]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 8, 1918—12 noon.
[Received December 9—12:20 p.m.]

5421. The tentative fixing of February 16th as date for general elections seems to have strengthened the position of the temporary Central Government at Berlin, the Independent Socialists having acquiesced, on condition that certain socialist reforms shall be enforced before that date. The date of elections will be finally fixed by the National Soviet Congress meeting on the 16th instant. The opposition of the old clerical party to the temporary Government calls for attention. It appears to have been caused principally by the announced policy of the Prussian Government to enact the separation of State and Church as soon as due preparations can be made. The great Roman Catholic party will fight tooth and nail any attempt to abridge the long-established privileges of the Church. The most striking means of agitation adopted by the clerical party is the threat to organize an independent secessionist Rhineland republic. This agitation is not countenanced by the Socialists or the middle classes, and the evident support of reactionary industrial circles in the Rhineland does not tend to improve its prospects. It is significant in this connection that the agitation of the radical socialist element has become particularly intensive in the Rhineland. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the radical element, which is in strongest opposition to the temporary government. Liebknecht himself boasts that he has the soldiers with him, controls Berlin, and will astound the country with the force of his "continuation" of the revolution. The radical agitators are openly advocating strikes and an armed uprising to overthrow the temporary government. It is asserted that Liebknecht numbers among his following 100,000 armed deserters at Berlin. On the other hand, the soldiers' councils of the troops

returning from the front uniformly announce that they support Ebert's government and will oppose Bolshevism. The regiment of the Prussian Guard likewise announce their support. Friction has occurred everywhere in Western Germany, however, between the armies coming from the front and the local Soviets, without assuming general proportions or [*and?*], to judge from the press, the idea of a Royalist counter revolution at this time can be dismissed. Prince Henry's manifesto is caustically criticized and great vigilance seems to be exercised by the temporary government to uncover any reactionary counter revolutionary plans.

The old National Liberal party has joined the democratic party, but this self-effacement of pan-Germans of the Stresemann type cannot be accepted as a change of spirit. Conjecture as to the composition of the National Assembly to be elected varies greatly. The Majority Socialists affect to believe that if the Independent Socialists make common cause with them, an absolute Socialist majority is assured and negotiations with the Independent Socialists are in progress. All parties claim the female vote. Elections are to be held in Baden January 5th, and in Württemberg, January 16th, which will enable some forecast of the general election to be made.

The Prussian Minister of Education has made the important announcement that all chauvinistical and militaristic instruction will be eradicated from the public schools.

GARRETT

862.00/430

[Document 100]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State [14](#)***

No. 1950

COPENHAGEN , December 10, 1918.
[Received January 6, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of a memorandum stating the substance of an interview with Dr. Oskar Cohn, a German Independent Socialist and formerly a member of the German Reichstag from Nordhausen. Dr. Cohn, who is now Deputy Minister of Justice in Prussia, has been one of the leaders of the Independent Socialist party since its foundation and one of the bitterest opponents of the old regime.

The enclosed memorandum was written by Mr. Charles Witzleben, a clerk in the Legation, from notes of his conversation with Dr. Cohn in company with Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Second Secretary of the Legation. Mr. Witzleben, who was formerly R. G. Dun & Company's agent in Germany, has known Dr. Cohn for many years and states that he is a lawyer of great ability.

From the enclosed memorandum it is evident that Dr. Cohn belongs to the most radical wing of the Independent Socialists. He is very intimate with the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow and speaks of Messrs. Lenin and Tchitscherin as "my good old friends." His explanation of the relations between the Independent Socialists and the Spartacus Group is of particular interest in reference to the present situation in Germany, and it is evident that he personally takes a view of affairs more in accord with that of Liebknecht than of Scheidemann.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by Mr. Charles Witzleben, Clerk in the American Legation, of a Conversation With Dr. Oskar Cohn

[COPENHAGEN ,] December 5, 1918.

Dr. Cohn agreed to explain the origin of the present revolutionary movement, which he said dated back as far as June, 1917. Owing to the impending Stockholm conference a movement was started in the navy to back it up, and many of the sailors were of the opinion that action on their part in support of the Independent Socialists would improve peace prospects. The crews of the ships were recruited chiefly from organized skilled labor and therefore possessed a good amount of political education, each man having probably formerly been a member either of some socialist organization or of a trade union. Many men in the navy had followed the independent socialist organ, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, closely, two or three copies sufficing to keep several hundred men informed. In order to carry out their program for peace the sailors started a partial mutiny, went ashore, held meetings, and passed a resolution in favor of a peace action on the part of the navy. The authorities adopted sharp measures; 2 men from one ship and altogether 5 men were shot, while from 65 to 70 others received sentences ranging from 15, 12 down to 10 years penitentiary, totalling about 600 years in all.

The movement of protest against the war was not organized so early in the army. However, the political agitation there was greatly promoted by the counter-measures the authorities adopted in suppressing the strikes of January, 1918. All instigators and leaders were immediately drafted for military service, many of them having formerly been in the army and released for important war work at home. The number drafted in this manner Dr. Cohn estimates at from 4,000 to 5,000. All of those who knew how to handle a rifle were sent to the front lines within a few days, while the others were kept in the garrison towns in a sort of preventive arrest. In February, 1918, a strong secret agitation started both in the army and at home.

The movement in the army was assisted by letters from home to the men at the front, while each one of the strikers sent to the front infected several hundred men there. Richard Müller, one of the strongest and most radical members of the "Vollzugsrat" of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council in Berlin, was one of those sent into the trenches. It is Dr. Cohn's personal opinion, for which he has no proof, that the spring offensive was partly dictated by the necessity of maintaining the morale of the troops. The morale was actually improved by the initial successes and particularly by the tremendous quantities of food captured from the British and French, with the result that the agitation decreased. This was changed again through the reverses suffered later and the negative tendencies in the army increased. There were many deserters and whole units surrendered to the enemy. At this juncture America's decisive participation in the war made itself felt and became generally known.

German public opinion had been deliberately misled by the General Staff as to the proportions of America's war effort. The President's message to Congress on Baker's report was immediately distributed broadcast by the enemy aeroplane propaganda. During the retreat food conditions were very bad and the army's spirit corresponded to it. The people at home became disquieted, and letters from home again influenced the morale. The army's confidence in its leadership was shattered, to which the social differences between the officers and the men and the bad example set by many officers through their personal enrichment in sending army supplies home, bagging the lion's share, etc., contributed. Early in August Ludendorff admitted the military collapse to Hertling, either in personal conversation or by letter and mentioned the necessity of an immediate armistice and peace. The delay in any definite action was caused by the impossibility of the military regime acknowledging its bankruptcy (thus undermining its prestige within the country) and its desire to hide behind the civil administration. At the end of September the situation was such that no further delay was possible. Ludendorff sent an officer to Berlin instead of with a flag of truce to Foch. On October 2nd a conference was called at which Payer presided, and which was attended by several ministers, as well as a leader of each political party including the independent socialists. The officer read out a formulated declaration demanding that a new government be

formed capable of taking up negotiations for an armistice and peace. The situation was clearly expressed in one sentence: "Wir haben keine Stunde zu verlieren." (We have not an hour to lose) On October 5th the German note was issued; Dr. Cohn pointed out that Prince Max in his first speech to the Reichstag did not mention the request for an armistice and expressed the opinion that Prince Max, as he stated in his later declaration, did not favor it.

THE REVOLUTION

After the peace note had been issued the agitation for a fight to the finish was started by the Pan Germans and affiliated circles. Every fleet, i. e., its officers, has its own patriotic conceptions, and the officers of the German fleet soon decided to offer the British fleet battle, facing certain and complete destruction, including a terrific loss of life. The crews got wind of this and started a new movement, holding meetings on land and committing breaches of discipline. The crews then, through the intermediary of the orderlies, informed the officers of their point of view as follows: "We are willing to defend the home country and the coasts. Should the British come, we are ready to meet them, but we refuse to make a senseless sacrifice merely for the sake of prestige." They agreed among themselves to remain at their posts and carry out all manoeuvres as far as the outer mine fields, the limit of the defensive region. On Wednesday, October 30th, the Commander of the High Seas Fleet gave the order for the fleet to go out for what is technically known as an "Evolutionsfahrt." The crews immediately perceived that this order was a mere subterfuge and that the fleet was going out to engage the British fleet in battle because the mine-sweepers and torpedo boats accompanied the other vessels, which was otherwise not the case for manoeuvres and all ships were loaded to their full capacity with coal. When the fleet reached the outer mine-fields and continued on, the fires were extinguished in several ships and other means of passive resistance were adopted. This forced the Commander to give the order to return. The fleet returned to Wilhelmshaven on October 31st and the part stationed at Kiel proceeded thither through the Kiel Canal.

After the vessels were at their station shore leaves were resumed again. The crews immediately wrote letters home to their people explaining the proceedings and these were smuggled through uncensored by those going on leave. In the Kiel fleet the opposition turned from a passive into an active one. The men struck the war flag and raised the red flag in its place. On one ship where the officers resisted, the commander and one other officer were shot. Then the crews went on land and took over the command. They immediately despatched delegations to Wilhelmshaven, Hanover, Braunschweig, Stendal, and Rathenow, one after the other, in that manner gradually drawing nearer Berlin. The movement approached the capital simultaneously from Munich.

November 5/6th. Sailors reaching Berlin on furlough were at once sent on by the Kommandantur without having come into touch with the garrisons.

November 7th or 8th. A train with 500 sailors tried to reach Berlin. This was an organized undertaking of the Kiel sailors. The military authorities stopped the train one hour's journey from Berlin by tearing up the rails, posting machine-guns, etc.

November 8th. Sailors and civilians reached Berlin by roundabout routes. The sailors' movement met a prepared movement of the workmen, instigated by the independent socialists and the Spartacus group. Ever since the failure of the January strike the workmen were determined not to go on the streets again unarmed. Arms were carefully collected and stored beforehand. The workmen now and then were able to get away with a machine-gun from the factories, rifles were obtained in a similar manner, and hand grenades smuggled back from the front by men on leave. The "Oberkommando in den Marken" had been expecting an uprising in Berlin and prepared countermeasures consisting of the occupation militarily of a number of bridges in town, each of which was patrolled by two policemen armed with carbines, bringing machine guns into position and getting in troops from the outside. A whole plan for the military occupation of Berlin by provincial troops was worked out at the end of October; this had been discovered a few days previous and published in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.

During the afternoon of the 8th, Dr. Cohn called on Geheimrat Simons, the representative of the Chancellor, to demand the release of the labor secretary Daeumig, who had been arrested. While waiting for Simons to get some information he desired on the case, Dr. Cohn asked what the military preparations meant and whether the military authorities desired bloodshed. Cohn's statements were corroborated by a journalist who came in at this time and Simons asked to be excused immediately so that he could report to the Chancellor. Prince Max demanded that Linsingen should rescind his orders, which the latter refused to do and as a result was forced to resign. Then the order not to fire on demonstrators was issued to the troops.

November 9th. A general strike of the workmen, which had been desired for the 6th, started at 9 a.m. Demonstrations and parades were started and the Berlin revolution then took the course known from the press. Only at one barracks was there some shooting, causing a few deaths, and by the afternoon the entire power was in the hands of the revolutionaries.

Asked where the independent socialists had obtained the means to finance their revolution, Dr. Cohn replied that they had not needed any and that the various expenses would be covered either by the communities or the state government. With regard to the immediate organization of sailors', soldiers', or workmen's councils, Dr. Cohn claimed that such measures had not been planned in advance, the revolution at Kiel being a spontaneous one. He attributed the organization of the first councils to the fact that such councils are a form of self-administration bound to be adopted on the part of any body of men desiring to engage in united action. If they had been patterned after the Russian revolution, that had been done more or less subconsciously. The motive power behind the revolution was: where the soldiers were concerned, bad treatment, dislike of militarism, desire of peace; for the workmen, fear that they might still be drafted for army service, political discontent, desire for a new government and socialization.

The soldiers were less posted politically, but stronger than the workmen through their discipline. The result was that the soldiers

terrorized the workmen. In the meeting at the Cirkus Busch, where the Workmen's and Soldiers' Executive Committee was elected, the soldiers demanded and received half of the delegates for themselves, while the remainder was divided in equal parts between the majority and independent socialists.

Questioned as to the connections between the independent socialists and the Liebknecht-Spartacus group, Dr. Cohn remarked that the difference was more one of methods and means than of aims. Liebknecht was still a registered member of the independent socialist party and in general the independents shaded off into Spartacans without its being possible to draw any hard and fast line between them. The Spartacans strive to copy the Russian form of revolution, which Dr. Cohn considers unsuited for Germany. He stated that the Germans need certain fixed forms of administration and have no taste for the wilfulness and lack of method that has characterized the Bolshevik administration in Russia. However, he added that Bolshevism is a socialistic theory and really has nothing in common with anarchy, as which the western powers regard it on account of the conditions it has created in Russia; these conditions, he claims, are due to the fact that the Russians were not ripe for real socialism. The practical conclusion to be drawn from the independent socialists' attitude is, he said, that they do not intend to assume the tactical forms of Bolshevism and to go into anarchy. Cohn claims that it is impossible to hinder anarchy through military measures, which Foch appears to believe possible, just as Ludendorff did before him, but that anarchy can only be prevented by America helping Germany as President Wilson stated in his message to Congress.¹⁶ That the present administration wanted to avoid Bolshevism was proved by the fact that it had permitted the great majority of old officials to remain in office in order to avoid chaos.

It is just that Germany should pay with raw materials and labor for the damage done in Belgium and northern France, but matters would assume an entirely different aspect if the military measures were overdone, with the result that Germany could not reorganize. All railroad material stolen in Belgium and northern France should be given up, but Cohn asserted that Germany should be allowed the use of it for the present, perhaps until February, 1919, or later. It is

needed more than ever for the maintenance of order. Furthermore Cohn stated that Germany could not support herself industrially without the left bank of the Rhine, which it appears to be Foch's intention to cut off from Germany. She needs that section to provide work for her population and to get export commodities with which to pay for imports of food. If the Allies want to force Germany back into the position of an agricultural state that would mean that she could not support more than 40 million people and that civil war must result until the population is reduced to that figure.

The terrifically hard armistice conditions have made the food supply much worse, which Cohn explained as follows. In times of peace Germany produces only 7/8ths of her corn requirements. The war had reduced the supply in various ways. First through the small farmers going into the army with the result that their wives could not keep up the old production even when they had help; second through the shortage of fertilizers; third through the shifting of the consumption, the soldier eating much more bread; fourth through feeding corn to cattle, as the importation of feed had stopped entirely. Germany at first had reserves to carry her over the period from July, when the old harvest was used up, until October, when the new crop was available. In May, 1917, a decree was issued offering premiums for the early threshing of the new crop. That meant that the reserves had disappeared, and that Germany had to take the new grain as soon as it was ripe. In Baden and Alsace the harvest commences in the middle of June and it ends in East Prussia the middle of August. In 1917 the new corn was used in July with the result that the crop was exhausted in May, 1918. Then the bread ration was reduced, a higher percentage of potatoes added, and with the assistance of some grain from Roumania Germany managed to get along until the middle of June, when it had to begin using its 1918 crop, resorting even to unripe grain. Normally the 1918 crop would therefore have been exhausted before April 15, 1919.

This had been entirely changed by the armistice conditions, which through the forced evacuation had compelled the Germans to leave behind tremendous stores of grain and flour in Belgium, France, and Poland. Aside from that there were naturally large stores in the

fortresses of Metz, Strassburg, etc., which could not be removed to the interior of the country.

The only way to avoid anarchy in Germany, which will result from famine, is through a supply of food from the outside, guaranteed by a unanimous expression from the Entente; this would steady conditions even now. The danger of the greater part of the potato and turnip crops remaining in the ground has become a sad reality.

Cohn said that America must not permit the military parties everywhere to gain the upper hand, which had been Germany's ruin. The people had actually not been responsible for the old government's faults, as they had been educated wrongly, lied to, and deceived in every manner.

With regard to the present government he claimed that it was firmly lodged in the people's hearts and that it would go, if the people should make that demand. While not concealing or minimizing the differences existing between the majority and independent socialists, Dr. Cohn claimed that the Ebert-Haase administration had the full support of the soldiers and would in his opinion remain in office. He asserted that the non-socialistic parties had no claim to a seat in the government, as they had done nothing to overthrow the Hohenzollerns and other rulers, or the military caste, but had remained passive onlookers during the revolution. Having carried out the revolution, the socialists were entitled to run the government until a new one is appointed by popular vote. He emphasized particularly that the independent socialists through their active policy, in contrast to the passive one of the majority socialists, had risked their lives to free their country and were therefore determined not to remain in the background and let others reap the fruits of their work.

The independent socialists are in favor of a national assembly, but regard February 15th as a premature date for its election, for the following reasons: During the demobilization it is impossible for them to travel about Germany to hold political meetings and canvass for the elections. The soldiers have been away 4½ years and required political enlightenment. Furthermore there were:

800, 000 German prisoners of war
500, 000 Germans in formerly occupied Russian territories
2, 500, 000 Germans being demobilized, who would not be home by
February 15, 1919

total 3,800,000, of [or?] 20% of the male voters. Besides the women were voting for the first time and they were uninformed. He said that the national meeting of delegates from the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils meeting December 15th would considerably improve matters. The Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils were potentially democratic organizations, and it was only right that the consolidation of the revolution should be in the hands of those who had always opposed the old regime, not in the hands of those who had actively or passively supported the old regime. The farmers, clerks, and so-called brain workers were organizing now, to which the administration had no objections, and they could elect delegates too.

One party, the Centrum or Catholic party, would have an inestimable advantage if elections were held soon, because they are not hindered in their political agitation by the lack of railroad facilities, but hold a political meeting in church every Sunday. Dr. Cohn claimed that the criticism of the bourgeois press was dictated by the desire to represent the present administration as disorderly in order to make political capital from that fact. He asserted that a tremendous amount of work had already been accomplished.

Dr. Cohn asserted that order was being maintained and that, while determined on promoting socialism, the administration would not take any rash steps. The bourgeois press were attacking the present system of things because the people behind this press were worried about their purses; they wanted the national assembly as soon as possible, before the proletariat had been sufficiently educated, in the hope of postponing or preventing the socialization of industries, etc. The present state of German industries, with their extensive development into trusts, had been brought about by a few experts without the consent of the people; why should the socialists postpone the undoing of this work until after a national assembly, particularly when they represented a majority of the people? The revolution had

been carried out partly in order to overthrow the rule of “big business” in Germany; why should the execution of the task (for which the revolutionaries had risked their lives) be delayed to the benefit of Messrs. Krupp & Thyssen, et. al.? A commission composed of experts and scientists had been appointed to investigate what lines of business were ripe for socialization at this time.

With respect to Poland, Dr. Cohn said that the pogroms against the Jews in Lemberg and many other places were an actual fact, and had been instigated by the Polish authorities themselves. They proved the correctness of the old assertion that the Poles were less tolerant of national minorities than any other civilized nation on earth. The Poles had always hated the Jews, and this dislike had been increased by the fact that the lot of the Jewish population on the whole had not been so bad as that of the Polish population during the war. The Jews were business men and go-betweens. While the business men had lost heavily, they had on the other hand also been able to make some money buying for the German authorities. The Polish farmers had lost their agricultural implements, crops, live-stock, etc. On some occasions they had concealed live-stock or grain which they should have delivered and the Jewish dealers had reported this to the Germans. The Jews made money, aside from buying for the Germans and selling to the soldiers, by handling food that was smuggled into Germany and sold there at high prices. All of this incensed the Poles against the Jews and was one of the reasons for the pogroms, which seemed to be aimed at the extermination of the Jews in Poland.

(Dr. Cohn is, as the name indicates, a Jew and a member of the Zionist Organization.)

¹⁴ This despatch and its enclosure were transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace on Jan. 9, 1919.

¹⁶ Of Nov. 11, 1918; *Congressional Record*, vol. 56, pt. 11, p. 11541.

862.00/403: Telegram

[Document 101]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 16, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received 10:36 p.m.]

3309. From a [reliable] German source it is reported that political situation in Germany has improved. The National Assembly seems now assured. It will be composed of 60 percent Socialist representatives, the Majority Socialist preponderating so that the Government will rest on a coalition of the two Socialist parties or a coalition between the Majority Socialist and the Radical bourgeois elements. The latter seems more probable in view of the growing disunity between the two Socialistic parties. Count Bernstorff¹⁷ will go as one of the German representatives to the Peace Conference. He told a friend recently that upon his arrival he would communicate with Colonel House personally and say “I have a letter from you dated shortly before I left America expressing such and such opinions about me; have you changed those opinions?” If the answer is yes, Bernstorff stated that he would be taken ill and leave for Berlin within 24 hours.

GRANT-SMITH

¹⁷ Former German Ambassador in the United States.

862.00/416: Telegram

[Document 102]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 21, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 22—5:23 a.m.]

5549. The Berlin Congress of Workmen and Soldiers' Councils has contributed to the clarification of the political atmosphere, despite the stormy nature of its debates. The executive and legislative powers of the Provincial [*Provisional?*] Government have been placed entirely in the hands of the Council of People's Delegates, while the radical parliamentary control is exercised by a committee of 27 elected by the Congress. Thus the predominant influence of the Berlin Workmen and Soldiers' Council, which was productive of so much friction has been eliminated. An important feature is the repudiation of the tactics of the Spartacus group by the Independent Socialists, seemingly under pressure of the Majority Socialists. This completely isolates the exceedingly active if not numerous following of Liebknecht. The domination of the situation by the Majority Socialist party seems due principally to the attitude of the troops returned from the front, who announce that they support Ebert's government unconditionally and will have nothing to do with Liebknecht. The demeanor of the front troops since their return is not, however, calculated to contribute to the serenity of the political atmosphere in Germany, and the radical socialist press is perhaps correct in surmising that the Ebert-Scheidemann party is led by the army instead of vice versa. It is significant at any rate that the efforts of the radical socialists to have officers excluded from all Soldiers' Councils and to have the military command and Hindenburg kept under sharper surveillance have been entirely in vain. The asseverations of the reactionary press that a counter revolution from the Right is out of the question are interesting in this connection.

The secessionist movement in the Rhineland and South Germany appears to me reduced to a negligible point. Paris informed.

GARRETT

763.72114/4275: Telegram

[Document 103]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 21, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received 8:33 p.m.]

3338. The slowness of the evacuation of the prisoners from Germany is in my opinion acting as a serious menace to orderly Government in Europe. Bolshevist propaganda is overactive not only in Germany but likewise in Denmark where returning prisoners are approached by their agents. Viewed from the broad political standpoint, it is difficult to comprehend the dilatoriness especially of the shipping authorities in rushing an adequate amount of tonnage to German and Danish ports to remove their troops with a minimum of delay. It would appear that if the authorities fully realized the dangers of situation the shipping would be promptly forthcoming even at a temporary sacrifice elsewhere. Too little importance in my opinion is attached to the Bolshevist ferment which is acting through Denmark. The Bolsheviks are now quietly establishing their principal Scandinavian headquarters in Copenhagen to operate not only on the returning prisoner of war stopping here but likewise to support the Spartacus movement in Germany. I am reliably informed that Jenson, one of the principal members of their "Legation" here left for Berlin recently bearing 1,500,000 marks and 3,000,000 rubles. The utmost possible speed in the removal of all Allied prisoners from both Germany and Denmark is, I am convinced, most necessary measure in the general interest. The discontent bred among Allied prisoners owing to delays in repatriation already evidenced by disorders at several camps makes them especially susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda and for the reasons cited above by stopping in Denmark they are exposed to its full force. I venture therefore to suggest that this matter be brought to the immediate attention of the competent Allied authorities with a recommendation that prompt

measures be taken. Repeated to American Mission Paris. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

862.00/425: Telegram

[Document 104]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

THE HAGUE , December 29, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 30—9:22 a.m.]

5589. The disorders of the past week in Berlin have so glaringly revealed the incompetency of the present Government that important changes seem inevitable. The firing on the marines by regular troops under command of General Lequis is now claimed to have been unprovoked although the first reports claimed a revolt by the marines. It has not yet developed who was responsible for the orders which General Lequis claims to have received from the government as his authority for proceeding against the marines, but the assertion of the radical element that Ebert practically gave carte blanche to the military leaders and is in effect a mere puppet in their hands gains plausibility. The ostentatious support of Ebert by the troops returning from the front may be attributed to the influence of the military officers who feel confident that they can manage Ebert or they [*it*] may, like the support of Ebert by the democratic bourgeois parties, arise from the sincere desire for law and order and the willingness to accept any man who seems to promise that order will be maintained. Ebert's personal popularity has however suffered a rude shock from the demonstration of his utter lack of the qualities of leadership. Scheidemann keeps in the background and the resignation of Ebert is now discussed as a means to relieve the situation. It is scarcely conceivable that the Majority Socialists should now yield preference to the radical element in the Provisional Government since their position in the whole country seems far stronger than that of the Independent Socialists. The peculiar conditions at Berlin appear however to necessitate great indulgence toward the Independents. Reactionary circles might naturally welcome a Liebknecht Government since that would mean a very

considerable improvement of the chances of new military dictatorship. The Independent Socialist press now openly proclaims the overthrow of the present Government as the end of a stage of the revolution which has unmasked the false leaders of the working classes. It is not known what attitude the military authorities and the great army of Government employees would take in the event of the formation of a purely radical Socialist Government. On the other hand the formation of a purely Majority Socialist Government would expose the leaders to attacks which they would not relish because coming from a quarter with which they would prefer to remain on friendly terms. The elimination of Independent Socialists from the German Government would have the merit of establishing a homogeneous Government but would set up a sharp dividing line between it and a minority so strong as to be difficult to control at least in the surcharged atmosphere of Berlin. The feeling in the provinces seems to be one of great dissatisfaction and anxiety at the turn which affairs have taken in Berlin and the suggestion meets with increasing favor that the seat of Government should be removed from Berlin to some other city. Paris informed.

GARRETT

763.72/12726

[Document 105]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. 76

LONDON , January 6, 1919.
[Received February 4.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, herewith enclosed, for the information of the Department, three (3) copies of a confidential Memorandum on the Prospects of Order and Ordered Government in Berlin, which I have just received from the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office.

It is pointed out clearly in this Report that the political situation hinges upon the economic; and that the latter is at the present very menacing. "There seems to be no prospect of improvement until a stable Government supported by the great majority of the people is formed and until the raw materials of industry are available in adequate quantities." This statement sums up best present conditions in Berlin and in Germany generally—the keys to the situation are the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and the resumption of industry. Consequently, every effort is being made by the *de facto* Government to hasten these events. It is to be noted that, while at present the final decision apparently rests with the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, the majorities in these bodies, under the influence mainly of soldiers are strongly in favor of orderly, constructive, republican constitutionalism and federalism.

Attention is drawn to the caution with which exaggerated reports of Bolshevism in the German cities should be received. In a measure, the tendentious descriptions of the prevailing anarchy, supposed to exist, which have appeared in French journals may be ascribed to the preferences of two sections of French opinion. The first of these is Chauvinist, imperialist and annexationist, without even worldly

wisdom. But the other is afraid of a successful, progressive and really democratic German Republic. These circumstances must therefore be taken into account in surveying the reports which emanate from neutral countries, regarding the internal conditions in Germany.

The Spartacus group led by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg is not of itself formidable. It is rather as a permanent point of crystallization for all discontented and disorderly elements that the group may become dangerous; and its peril will exist during the transition period between war and peace. Much depends upon the willingness with which the C. W. S. D.'s¹⁸ will yield their power to the Constituent Assembly, and the prospects in this regard seem favorable at present. In the final analysis, however, the preservation of order in Berlin will be brought about only if the Government uses a firm hand in dealing with anarchical tendencies. If the Ebert Cabinet is willing to exercise its authority in an impartial manner, the development of republican Germany can occur in a healthy and orderly manner.

I have [etc.]

JOHN W. DAVIS

[Enclosure]

Memorandum on the Prospects of Order and Ordered Government in Berlin

Germany/027

[LONDON ,] 21 December, 1918.

1. It is difficult to gather a complete or clear idea of the political situation in Germany in so far as it can be distinguished from the economic. That the economic situation is very menacing admits of no doubt; and there seems to be no prospect of improvement until a stable Government supported by the great majority of the people is formed, and until the raw materials of industry are available in adequate quantities. The way to a stable Government for the whole of Germany—a Federal Government of the United States of

Germany—lies through the Constituent Assembly. The meeting of the Congress of Delegates of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils from all Germany which opened in the Prussian Chamber on Monday, December 16, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Constituent and in the expression of an eager desire that it should be elected and should assemble sooner than the previously contemplated date, February 16. It appears that the Ebert-Haase Government will try to expedite the elections.

2. The elections for the Constituent Assemblies of the separate States are beginning. In Mecklenberg, hitherto the most reactionary of all the States and without any popular representation, a large Radical (i. e. Non socialist) majority has been returned. In Anhalt-Dessau, a partly industrial State, the majority is moderate Socialist (Ebert and Scheidemann's party).
3. Still leaving the economic situation out of account, there seems to be clear evidence that the great majorities in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, under the influence mainly of the soldiers, are strongly in favour of orderly, constructive, republican constitutionalism and federalism. The idea of a 'unitarian' republic with its seat at Berlin has hitherto found support only in Saxony, and even there it would appear to be yielding to the general federalist tendency.
4. Great caution ought to be exercised in the repetition of reports from neutral countries regarding the strength of the disintegrating, or Bolshevik, elements, in the situation. It is noticeable in particular that the Zürich telegrams to *Le Journal* (of Paris) wear a 'tendentious' aspect. Those who supply these telegrams must conceive it to be in the interest of France that Germany should lapse into a state of anarchy—for a time at any rate. There are two sections of opinion in France which incline to this desire. The first is Chauvinist, imperialist and annexationist, without even worldly wisdom. It wants as much of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine as it can get, and does not want Germany ever again to be come a great European Power. The other section is afraid of a successful, progressive and really democratic German Republic. If the Germans succeeded in organizing a Federal Republic on a really popular basis, and put into the organization of their democracy all the ability (some would add all the honesty) which used to characterize their semi-autocratic and wholly bureaucratic

Empire before the war; if they achieved as great success in organizing Labour in the interest of the masses and of renewed industrial prosperity, as they achieved in the commercial and military spheres before the war, the new German Republic would soon contrast very favourably with France, and, after due expiation, might regain the good opinion of the world. For it is too often forgotten that in the 'eighties and early 'nineties, there was almost everywhere a chorus of admiration for modern Germany, and that not least in England and America.

5. Disintegrating and destructive elements undoubtedly exist. The Spartacus group led by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg would not of itself be formidable. A man who celebrates the Revolution by establishing himself in the Berlin Royal Castle and sleeping in the Kaiser's bed, as Liebknecht is reported to have done on November 9, must be nearly as extravagant and theatrical in his methods as the Kaiser himself. That kind of conduct does not commend itself to the German working man, who is serious and argumentative, and is distrustful of extravagances and eccentricities. It is rather as a permanent point of crystallization for all discontented and disorderly elements that the Spartacus group may become dangerous. That is what happened on Friday, December 6, when a report got abroad (encouraged by the imprudent overtures of a demonstration of soldiers outside Ebert's official residence) that Ebert contemplated allowing himself to be elevated forthwith to the Presidency of the Republic. All opinion which really counts at the moment—that is to say, the opinion which has behind it the votes of the majority and the arms of the soldiers—is in favour of two things (1) the General German Constituent Assembly, (2) the retention of the ultimate authority and the provisional representation of the nation by the collectivity of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, until the Constituent is elected and a stable German Federal Government established on the basis of the Majority of the Constituents' views.
6. When it is reported that the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils will not be willing to surrender power and control after the Constituent has done its work and has superseded them by establishing a Government capable of governing, these statements are based on symptoms and inferences which are not, so far, convincing. It is quite true that certain elements in the Councils—a section of the

workmen and the more extreme Socialist leaders like Richard Müller, who signs with Brutus Molkenbuhr for the Executive Committee of the Berlin Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils—cling to power. They know or fear that the majority of the Constituent will not be even Socialist in colour, and they would fain insist that, before the Constituent assembles and establishes the Federal Republic, the present holders of power should establish the Socialist state by a series of decrees in lieu of legislation. It is also true that a number of members of the Councils cling to their present positions and the emoluments which they have voted themselves. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, formally, at least—though there are still frequent irregularities—the Berlin Councils have divested themselves of executive power, which they at first claimed and which they were sometimes exercising in a grotesque enough fashion. Perhaps the Councils, or more or less irresponsible and arbitrary members of them, are still, here and there, interfering with the administration. It is reported that General Scheuch has resigned the portfolio of War because Socialist officers refused to obey orders, and because one of his direct subordinates was arrested and kept in prison in spite of the War Minister's protests. A representative of the Potsdam Workmen's and Soldiers' Council had also objected to the War Office appointment of a Commandant for Potsdam, because he wanted the post himself.

Revolutions cannot be made with rose-water, and manifestations of this kind will continue unless, or until, the Constituent can establish a Constitutional Republic and a stable government. Ebert has declared his desire that the All-German Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils should “draw a broad line” against increasing attempts to cripple by means of brutal violence the State and Communal administrations. But the only remedy for “brutal violence” is the exercise of superior force. It does not appear that the Ebert-Haase Government is yet prepared to exercise the force which the vast majority of the troops now in and about Berlin is ready to place at their disposal. A successful provisional Government like the Haase-Ebert “People's Commission” must be at once disinterested and firm. The Ebert-Haase combination is evidently unable to overcome its traditional party repugnance to methods of force, and

fears the groundless charge, which the Spartacus Group bring against it, of wanting to establish a reactionary personal dictatorship. The force which suppressed with some bloodshed the Spartacus *émeute* of Friday, December 6, was not put in action by the Government. It consisted of troops just home from the front, and now quartered in the neighbourhood of Berlin. The question whether the preservation of order, until order is firmly re-established on a constitutional basis, can be left with any confidence to the orderly portion of the troops, undirected by the Provisional Government, can only be decided by the event. The next month or six weeks will decide the issue between order and anarchy. Much will depend upon the economic situation, regarding which and its dangers another report has been presented.

¹⁸ i. e., Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

862.01/8: Telegram

[Document 106]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)¹⁹***

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—3 p.m.

6859. Please obtain views of Foreign Office and consult with Mission concerning the following from Berne.

“Have received note from Swiss Political Department enclosing note from Bavarian Legation, Berne, of which following is substance, ‘Bavarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests that in Palatinate, elections on January 12th, 1919, for National Assembly be made possible and facilitated by Entente’. Stovall.”

POLK

¹⁹ Similar telegram sent to Great Britain, Jan. 6, 3 p.m., as Department’s No. 3804.

862.01/9: Telegram

[Document 107]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 11, 1919—11 p.m.
[Received January 12—1:47 a.m.]

6717. Your 6859, January 6th, 3 p.m. Learn informally from Foreign Office that Marshal Foch will permit the elections in that part of the Palatinate occupied by the army of France on condition that it cannot be used as a pretext for excessive increase of communications between occupied and unoccupied territory and that the elections do not provoke disorders.

BLISS

The Dresel Mission

[\[108\] Telegram Sent by the Chief of the Special Mission in Germany \(Dresel\)](#)

Berlin , December 31, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01302/1

[\[109\] The Chief of the Special Mission in Germany \(Dresel \) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew \)](#)

Paris , January 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01302/2

Telegram Sent by the Chief of the Special Mission in Germany (Dresel)^{[1](#)}

In two days visit in Munich I succeeded by means of numerous interviews in getting much information as to Bavarian situation. The tendency is less radical than in the rest of Germany and Eisner, Independent Socialist, who on account of his having been chief instigator of revolution has hitherto maintained himself, will probably be defeated at elections January 12. He is criticized on all hands as a dreamer and vain, unpractical and averse to action. The strong man is Auer, Minister of Interior, Majority Socialist, and man of the people but well balanced sincere and intelligent. He is endeavoring with aid of South German Governments to call together a constitutional convention to discuss and coordinate the different governments throughout Germany and seems destined to play a highly important part. I strongly recommend that close contact be maintained with him.

Bolshevik and Communistic group inconsiderable in number but active in propaganda and violent in its demonstrations. Several well informed persons consider serious outbreak on their part between now and elections inevitable. They have attacked newspaper offices and threatened Auer's life.

Beside two or three smaller factions important parties are as follows: (1) League of Peasants (2) Bavarian Popular Party (3) Democratic Popular Party (4) Majority Socialists (5) Minority Socialists (6) Spartacus Group comprising many different shades.

The second party led by Heim is reactionary but does not apparently contemplate a restoration of the Monarchy. Its importance lies in its ability to influence the Catholic voters especially women. One of its principal representatives perhaps however influenced by narrow party considerations told me that intervention by the Entente would

probably be necessary to restore order. This is however not the view of the moderates of the third and fourth parties who are confident that the elections will result in a strong and harmonious government and I think the prospects are good. The fourth party named the Majority Socialists appears to be the safest and most reasonable and most largely supported by the returning troops. The bourgeoisie which has principally joined the third party appears apathetic and without program and lacking in vision. They will however support a strong Majority Socialist government if duly elected. In talking with people of all shades of opinion including soldiers I have been impressed by the moderation of views expressed and great desire for orderly energetic government.

The dislike of Prussia is extremely noticeable and strong tendency exists to hold her entirely responsible for the political and military mistakes of the war. A capital other than Berlin and a complete freedom from Prussian hegemony are strongly urged. Nevertheless no distinct separatist movement is as yet visible.

Referring economic situation food will last until about April first as peasants in view of high prices and fear of possible disorder and confiscation are bringing in supplies in considerable quantities. At same time suffering of poor due to bad labor conditions and exorbitant food prices are serious and evidence of under nourishment is seen everywhere. At food kitchen meals consisting of soup and beans are served each of which costs consumer fifty pfennig and government ninety-three. Even more immediately serious is coal shortage which is ascribed partly to lack of cars due to armistice conditions and partly to occupation of Sarre district. The factories have all been closed until January first and railroad service has been reduced to an absolute minimum. Appeals have been made to me from all sides to urge immediate facilitation of coal shipments in order to prevent destruction of all industrial life and spread of anarchy. Further all persons in authority with whom I talked begged that the Entente should issue a formal statement that peace would not be negotiated unless with a stable government nor would food be provided unless stability secured. Auer requested me if no formal statement could be issued that I should at once write him a letter to that effect but this I refused to do.

These two measures namely the supply of coal and the statement described would as the moderates believe assure the immediate creation of an orderly and permanent government and I believe therefore that such action is desirable.

The fourteen points are as is stated entirely acceptable and President Wilson was everywhere spoken of with great respect.

I expect to stay here through the week, address Hotel Esplanade, and hope to arrange to leave for Paris via Coblenz on Sunday or Monday. Day returns to Berne at least temporarily. Repeat to Grew.

DRESEL

BERLIN , December 31, 1918.

¹ This document bears a notation: "Telegram sent from Berlin Jan. 1st." No indication appears as to the channel by which it was forwarded to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01302/2

[Document 109]

The Chief of the Special Mission in Germany (Dresel) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

PARIS , January 10, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of a journey to Germany, covering the period from December 27, 1918, to January 5, 1919.

I. TRAVELLING ARRANGEMENTS, DETAILS AND OBJECTS OF EXPEDITION, ETC.

In accordance with directions of the Commission, I left Paris on December 17th. I travelled by way of Switzerland, in order to make the necessary preliminary arrangements from there. I saw Professor Förster, the Bavarian Minister to Switzerland, and Count Montgelas, Counsellor of the German Legation, who gave their entire approval to my entering Germany and obtained the necessary authority from their governments. This consumed some days, and as it seemed impracticable to start immediately before Christmas, I did not leave Berne until the 27th.

My first stopping place was Munich, where I arrived the same evening. The Bavarian authorities provided a special car from Lindau to Munich, together with an escort from Lindau, and I was met at the station by a deputation, including the Burgomaster and several members of the government. This was due to a regrettable misunderstanding, but I took pains, both at that time, and afterwards, to emphasize that I had come in with no mission other than to obtain general information about the situation. To prevent any further misapprehension, I gave to the press a short and guarded statement to the effect that I had come in as an American citizen

without any official status, and that my only aim was to obtain first hand details regarding the state of the country.

I stayed at Munich until Sunday evening, December 29th, after succeeding in obtaining interviews with many of the prominent men both inside and outside the Government.

On Sunday evening, December 29th, I proceeded to Berlin by night train, and arrived there at noon of the next day. I immediately put myself into communication with the German Foreign Office, and Dr. Rödiger, and later Dr. Ahrens, were assigned to make the necessary arrangements for interviews. Both these gentlemen made every effort to meet my wishes, and the result was that during the time which elapsed up to my departure, on January 5th, I was able to come in contact with a large number of representative men of all shades of opinion.

Owing to the extremely limited time which it seemed best to devote to the trip, I made no effort to visit places other than Munich and Berlin, as these two appeared to be the most important cities from which to study the situation.

I left Berlin on the evening of the 5th by the direct train to Spa, which, on account of the Armistice Commission there sitting, still maintains sleeping cars. A gentleman attached to the Berlin Military Department (Kommandantur), Dr. Burger, was sent with me as an escort, and I arrived at Spa on the afternoon of the sixth, and reported at once to General Barnum at the Headquarters of the American Mission. An automobile and escort were furnished me to Brussels, where I spent the night, reaching Paris on the evening of January 7th.

No serious difficulties of any kind were encountered on the trip, and both at Munich and Berlin army automobiles were put at my constant disposal, with the result that much time was saved. Hotel accommodations were still satisfactory, and though trains were crowded, it was possible to make proper reservations.

By arrangement with the American Legation at Berne, I took with me Mr. Franklin Day, a Special Assistant attached to the Legation, and Hunter D. Scott, a stenographer. Both these gentlemen returned to Berne by way of Munich in accordance with my directions.

II. GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

Taken as a whole, the Germans fully realize that they have lost the war and that the situation which faces them is of extreme difficulty. The general sentiment is of utter depression, and apathy and inertia are everywhere noticeable. At the same time, the old habits of order and discipline have not been superseded, except in isolated instances, and the outward life of the people, as observed in the streets, theatres, restaurants, etc., is not changed. While crime is said to be on the increase, the mass of the people is well-behaved and orderly, and even on such occasions as New Year's eve, no evidence of riotous behavior of any kind was observed.

Among the people at large, any return to military activity is looked upon with the utmost aversion, and the returning soldiers are almost all only anxious to go back to their families and to take up civil occupations.

The places of entertainment are all crowded and there is an evident desire to forget the war and its consequences as soon as possible. The effort is, however, hardly successful, and little real gaiety is seen anywhere. The streets are alive until late at night.

III. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

The following is a rough outline of the composition of the more important parties. These are, however, changing from day to day, and any analysis, to be correct, needs constant revision.

1. *Majority Socialist Party.* This is now in control of the Government, and maintains its hold through disposing of the best party organization and by its homogeneity. The leaders, though generally without experience in administering Government affairs, are practical common sense men of moderate ideas. While they have

not abandoned their views of an ultimate social reorganization of the State, in accordance with the ideas of Karl Marx and other socialist writers, they see the necessity of postponing the full realization of these views until order has been entirely restored. They also appreciate the necessity of working together with the members of the new Democratic Party and other moderates in order to stabilize the government.

Besides the lack of governmental experience, the chief handicap of the party has hitherto been its great disinclination to extreme measures against the fanatical groups involving bloodshed. A deliberate attempt has been made to avoid a clash at any cost before the elections, but it now seems that this will have to be abandoned, and the appointment of a strong man, Noske, about a fortnight ago, to take charge of the military situation is a sign that a determined effort will be made to keep the anarchists under control.

The Cabinet now includes five Socialist members: Ebert, Scheidemann, Noske, Wissel and Landsberg.

Of these, Ebert, the head of the Government, is universally respected, and has a strong hold, both inside and outside his party. He makes an impression of great honesty and sincerity, but it may be questioned whether his ability is adequate to cope with the intensely difficult situation, and whether his forcefulness is sufficient to control the disorderly element outside of his Party. He is a self-made man, the son of a tailor, and was himself brought up to the saddlers trade. He has acquired considerable education, and expresses himself with clearness and even eloquence.

Scheidemann, also a man of humble origin, who began life as a printer's apprentice, has more brilliant gifts than Ebert, but is less free from self-effacement, and unlimited political ambitions are attributed to him.

Noske is a man of little education, but has a very strong personality, and his chances of controlling the parties of disorder are good. His success at Kiel, which led to his present appointment, is evidence of his power and willingness to use an iron fist.

Wissel is Minister of Education, but neither he nor Landsberg, the remaining Socialist member of the Government, is especially prominent at present.

To sum up the strength and weakness of the Government, it may be affirmed with some certainty that it is gaining rather than losing. The resignation of the independent socialists has given it a freer hand. Its elements of strength are:

- (a) Close touch with and control of the masses.
- (b) A constructive programme and political initiative.
- (c) Its moderation and willingness to cooperate with moderate men of other parties.

The elements of weakness are as follows:

- (a) The inexperience of the leading party members in actual government, their previous activity having been confined to party and parliamentary work.
- (b) The fact that the prominent members have now no time for public propaganda.
- (c) The disinclination of the Government to shed blood, at least before the elections, if it can be possibly avoided.
- (d) The lack of a real military organization at the present moment, and the necessity of creating a national army.

In addition, in Bavaria, the party is handicapped by an Independent Socialist, Eisner, being nominally in control as Prime Minister. Here the man best fitted to head the Government is undoubtedly Auer, a man of obscure origin, but who appears to be possessed of constructive ideas, and of energy to carry them out, and who has the respect of all moderate parties.

2. Independent or Minority Socialists. This party, at the present moment, is in a state of disorganization. While it is far more radical than the Majority Socialists in its insistence on the immediate institution of far-reaching socialist measures, it has for the most part shrunk from cooperating with the Spartacus adherents. The result is that it has been losing in influence, the right wing of the party joining

the Majority Socialists, while some of the extremists have been won over to Liebknecht. The leaders of the party are Hoffman, Barth, Dittmann, Cohn and Ledebour.

3. *Spartacus or Bolshevistic Groups*. These comprise several different factions, such as the followers of Liebknecht, the anarchists, and the communists, who may properly be considered together, as the aims of all appear the same, and as they are all closely allied to Russian Bolshevism. The movement is led by radical fanatics, who are, with few exceptions, foreigners or Jews. It is composed of:

- (a) Professional and theoretical agitators.
- (b) Laborers who have hitherto received extravagant wages for their work in war industries ("schwerarbeiter").
- (c) Young uneducated soldiers.
- (d) Fanatical women such as take part in all revolutions.

The strength of the party lies in:

- (a) The serious food and economic situation, resulting in hunger, disease and unemployment.
- (b) A nervous collapse, due in the first place to defeat, and in the second to under nutrition.
- (c) The old agitation of labor against capital, strengthened by the collapse of the capitalistic regime.
- (d) The entire freedom from scruples of any kind on the part of the leaders and their willingness to go to all extremes.
- (e) The fact that the party has obtained, in a large measure, the control of arms and munitions, including especially machine guns.
- (f) The fact that they are in control of large sums of money obtained principally from Russian sources.
- (g) The fact that the leaders are not in the Government, and therefore free to agitate on the outside.

The weakness of the party appears to be due to the following considerations:

- (a) The people whom they wish especially to control, i. e., the mass of the populace, are not particularly amenable to their influence. The

German proletariat are far better educated, much less easily led and much more attached to order and discipline than the Russians.

(b) The widespread knowledge of the true state of affairs in Russia.

(c) The fact that the party has no well-defined and constructive programme, but is in its essence destructive.

(d) The lack of distinguished leaders.

4. *German Democratic Party*. This consists of a conglomeration of the liberal elements of several parties, and includes the former Progressive Party and the left wing of the National Liberal and Centre parties. Their aim is to establish a permanent republic on democratic lines, excluding however, the social reorganization to which the Majority Socialists are committed. Their ideal is a revival of the Republic of 1848, under the black, red and gold flag. Their tendency is antimilitaristic, and they derive their strength from the middle classes and from men of moderate incomes who wish an orderly and moderate government, without marked social changes. They will be willing to join the Majority Socialists in a coalition government, should the latter not have an absolute majority. The weakness of the party lies in the fact that it is composed of heterogeneous elements and includes among its prominent men a number of professors and other theorists. Among the leaders and founders of the party are Theodor Wolff, Naumann (known as the chief exponent of the Mittel-Europa scheme), Dr. Dernburg, Professor Delbrueck, Max Warburg, Prince Max of Baden, and others.

While forecasts of the election are unreliable, it seems certain that the party will poll a large vote and will be a strong factor in framing a new constitution.

5. *German People's Party, or Christian People's Party*. This consists of the right wing of the former Centre Party and includes the Clerical Party, which is especially strong in Bavaria, and which is fighting the separation of church and state. The party is bourgeois, republican and not markedly reactionary, but is more opposed to all socialistic measures than the Democratic Party.

6. *German National Popular Party*. Comprises the former conservatives and the right wing of the national liberals. The leaders are Stresemann and Heydebrand. This party is also professedly republican, but its tendency is distinctly reactionary, and should the liberals be unable to form a stable government, it may be looked on to make an attempt to revive the monarchy in one form or another.

In some sections, especially in Bavaria, some of the old parties have maintained organizations and will put tickets into the field, but as far as can be ascertained, they will not form an important factor.

III. [*sic*] ATTITUDE OF SOCIAL CLASSES

1. The Junkers have retired entirely into the background, owing to the results of the war. The landowners, owing to their advocacy of the war to the last extremity and to their success in obtaining food supplies are the most unpopular class in the community and no serious attempts are being made by them to influence public opinion. They are under such obloquy that they will not be able to assert themselves, if at all, for a long time to come. The same thing may be said of the large manufacturers and of the war profiteers, as well as of the officers of the Ludendorff regime, who have been eager to fight to the last. Their voices are not heard, and their newspapers have had to change their tone.
2. The intellectuals, including professors and others, have to a large extent joined the Majority Socialist Party. Some are in the democratic ranks. They are not a strong influence at the present moment, due to their theoretic rather than practical views and their failure to agree on questions of policy.
3. The bankers and important merchants are extremely pessimistic and apathetic. They consider the financial condition of Germany almost beyond redemption and are afraid of losing all they have.
4. The minor officials, small employes and tradesmen are proletarianized, orderly and in favor of a liberal and stable government, but are politically quite untrained.
5. The laboring classes are mainly reasonable and inclined to support the Majority Socialists. A serious danger exists, however, that by hunger, cold and lack of employment, they will come under the control of the radical revolutionaries.

IV. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ALLIES AND THE UNITED STATES

The most conspicuous feature of all conversations which I had with all classes was the somewhat over-friendly disposition towards America and Americans. This is undoubtedly partly due to self-interest, but is also largely owing to the former close ties with America, to social, economic and financial intercourse which existed before the war, and to the large population of German extraction in the United States; also to an appreciation of the fact that America has no selfish ends to serve and to the hope that she may be induced to plead the German cause with her allies. The result is that there is a strong wish to take up relations again with the United States at the same point where they were before the war, and the hope is cherished that the events of the war will be overlooked and condoned and that by the help of America, Germany will be enabled to rehabilitate herself. It is perhaps needless to add that I was careful to give no encouragement to this desire for a policy of forgiving and forgetting.

It was suggested to me that real advantages could be obtained for America if she consented to become the friend of the German people. One of the leading German financiers went so far as to explain that the nations predestined to bring order into Russia were evidently Germany and America; that America could not accomplish the task alone, and Germany had hitherto failed because of her lack of experience in dealing with the Russian people and her preoccupation with the war in other quarters, and that America would also fail if she acted alone because she would not understand the conditions in Russia, but Germany had now gained the necessary experience and together the two governments could organize the whole country and develop its resources.

An attempt will also be made on the part of the financiers to obtain a loan for Germany.

Anxiety is expressed as to whether, after the war, there will be a market for German goods in America, and I was asked on several occasions whether a boycott would be put in force for a considerable time after the war.

As regards the peace conditions, it is hoped in Germany that America will prevent the infliction of terms so severe as to cripple the economic and commercial life of the country, which is stated to be necessary for the existence of the German people. Bitter complaints are heard on all sides on account of the alleged harshness of the terms of the armistice, and the point most frequently brought up is that the forced giving up of rolling stock has practically stopped the transport of coal to many districts and has necessitated the closing of factories and unemployment of thousands of workmen. The occupation of the Ruhr district and the possible loss of the Silesian coal mines is also an especial source of anxiety. At Munich all factories were closed down for a period of ten days, up to January 1st, owing to the coal shortage.

A further cause of complaint was the alleged embargo against allowing passage of goods from the right to the left bank of the Rhine, in other words, from the occupied to the unoccupied district, and vice-versa. It was claimed that the consequence would be to prevent the important industries, such as textile concerns, from receiving supplies which would enable them to continue business.

Great emphasis was laid, by almost all persons with whom I talked on the necessity of obtaining an immediate supply of raw materials, and it was even claimed by one or two that the supply of raw materials was more important for the rehabilitation of Germany than the food supply.

The invariable argument used by all persons with whom I came in contact was that the Bolshevik danger was real and pressing, and was constantly fed by the lack of food and by the unemployment due to stoppage of raw materials; that Bolshevism would spread all over Germany and infallibly from thence to the neighboring countries, and would ultimately affect the whole world; that it was in the power of the Entente to check the movement by energetic relief measures and by giving the German people the chance to rehabilitate themselves; that this could only be done by affording them the necessary help and by failing to demand huge indemnities and crushing conditions with which it would be impossible to comply.

From many quarters it was insistently urged that the Entente should issue a formal and specific declaration substantially to the following effect: that it would under no circumstances conclude peace except with a responsible and stable government, elected by the will of the people, and that it would not be able to furnish food and other supplies to the people of Germany unless such a government, capable of providing the required guarantees, could be established. Such a declaration would in their opinion have the greatest possible strengthening effect on the forces of law and order.

I was asked repeatedly by persons connected with the government whether Count Bernstorff² would be an acceptable person to represent Germany at the peace negotiations. While I disclaimed giving anything but a personal opinion, I intimated that it would be, in my opinion, a great mistake, as in popular estimation, Count Bernstorff was held to have been the responsible head of the whole propaganda and espionage system in America and was emphatically an object of suspicion to the people at large. It seems probable that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would be the principal delegate, if his health, which is said to be delicate, would permit. Dr. Solf was also mentioned, as was Dr. Rathenau. Mr. Warburg expects to be the financial representative of the German Government. Besides this, it is undoubtedly planned to bring over a number of experts. It is assumed that elaborate peace negotiations between Germany and the Entente will take place, in the course of which Germany will be allowed to explain her position at length, and it is hoped that her views regarding the fourteen points of the President and the League of Nations will be sustained.

V. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS. CONSTRUCTIVE PLANS

It is believed, that while in the extremely confused state of affairs an accurate forecast is difficult, the moderate element will ultimately remain in the ascendant. No doubt serious trouble with the anarchists is bound to take place, and very likely before the election at some time or other a serious clash is inevitable. It is, however, hardly possible that with the great majority of the German people opposed to them the anarchist people can do more than obtain momentary triumphs. The Government both in Prussia and Bavaria

is adopting a more resolute attitude, and it is not conceived that the elections can be prevented. With the National Assembly behind them, the present Government, with or without the support of additional members of other parties, especially the German Democrats, should succeed in organizing a permanent government upon a Republican basis.

What form of organization will eventually be established is now the subject of discussion, and in Berlin a number of competent men are working at the task of framing a constitution. Of these, the most prominent is Professor Preuss, Minister of the Interior. The scheme favored by him is a confederation of states modelled on the American system with parliaments and a president or governor in each, and a central government with a president of strictly limited powers analogous to those of the French or Swiss President, together with a ministry responsible to a central parliament. Bodies akin to our senate and congress are proposed. Prussia would have its controlling influence weakened by being divided into four or five large states, and the capital would be removed from Berlin to some more central point, such as Weimar, Erfurt or Frankfort.

The South Germans appear to be in general accord with this plan, and at the instigation of Minister Auer, it was proposed to hold a convention for the purpose, before the elections, of determining on forms of constitutions for the whole of Germany. Two or three delegates from each state were to have been sent to this convention. The scheme did not go through, owing to the opposition of Eisner and the apparent lack of interest of the Government at Berlin in the proposal.

The danger of a monarchist reaction is, according to the consensus of opinion, remote. The general sentiment against the Hohenzollern dynasty is exceedingly strong, and there is a feeling that the latter has shown itself unworthy. In especial the former Emperor is an object even of contempt, due to the fact that in popular estimation his flight has branded him as a personal coward.

Whatever action may hereafter be taken in favor of a monarchy will therefore probably confine itself to an attempt to establish a

constitutional form of government like England or Italy, under a non-Hohenzollern prince, possibly chosen from among the South Germans. Such elements as are likely to favor monarchism are, first, the agrarians, secondly, the Catholic Church. These are, however, only marking time at present. Against any such reaction is, in the first place, the growth of Socialism, which will foster closer relations with the proletariat in republican governments; second, the disorganization of the Army, which is exhausted by fighting and wishes to shed no blood in furtherance of a monarchical form of government.

It seems probable that no monarchical government will have any chance of success for many years to come, unless

- (a) An undue extent of bona fide German territory or disputed territory is occupied by the allies or by subject nationalities.
- (b) The terms of peace are so harsh as in substance to reduce the German people to a state of slavery.
- (c) A violent and arbitrary separation of church and state lends fuel to the Catholic forces, which at present are in a state of inanition. This contingency applies in especial to Bavaria.

VI. ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND FOOD SITUATION

In view of the fact that, as is understood, a commission will shortly visit Germany, including a number of specialists, in order to thoroughly investigate the economic and food situation, I made no especial effort to make a study of conditions of this nature. Some general impressions which I obtained in the course of conversation may be of use in order to furnish a rough outline.

The financial burdens which Germany will have to bear were described by bankers and others with whom I talked as well nigh hopeless. The country is practically bankrupt, and unless commerce can be restored, will be unable to meet the interest on the war loans, in addition to severe indemnities which may be imposed. The well-to-do are gloomily anticipating being shorn of all they have. By the latest tax proposals, the war profiteers are to be taxed out of 80% of their war gains. The large estates are to be divided up. The bankers

are expecting to become insolvent, as security for their loans has vanished, and merchants complain that they cannot collect debts.

War industries have come to a standstill, and owing to the lack of raw materials the factories cannot be retransformed so as to take up their pre-war activities. The seaports are centres of unrest on account of the large number of unemployed, and in Hamburg alone, it is estimated that 40,000 persons are out of work. At the same time, the rate of wages remains high and ordinary laborers are demanding and receiving 7200 marks a year, amounting at pre-war rates, to \$1800 annually, and at the present value of German currency to about \$900. In Bavaria and other places, the unemployed are being supported by the State, at a rate in some instances, of 20 marks a day.

The purchasing power of the mark has about been cut in two. As an example, the taxi-cab drivers are demanding and receiving twice the registered fare. At the same time, the salaries of petty officials, railroad employes, teachers, etc., have seldom been increased, and the result is that these classes are suffering severely.

I only had opportunity to judge of the food situation in Munich and Berlin. It is evident, however, that there is no danger of actual starvation for a number of months to come. The estimates vary from March 1 to June 15 as the period at which all stocks would be exhausted. It is probable that the last date is substantially correct. At the same time, the under-nutrition is everywhere evident. Especially in Berlin, but also in Munich, the people on the streets show marked signs of insufficient nutrition. The children have an anaemic and delicate appearance compared with two years ago, and the older people also show signs of emaciation and lack of strength.

I was informed by one of the food experts that while it had been possible during the war to furnish 1200 calories to each person, this now had to be reduced to 800 or 900. The normal allowance is, I am told, 3000. The most evident need is fats of all kinds, the butter and margarine ration being only 70 grammes per week. The bread is very poor and meat ration, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. per week, including bones, insufficient.

The potato crop, according to personal statements which were made me, was much worse than has been admitted in the papers.

The system of food distribution has almost completely broken down and the result has been that the rich are often able to obtain sufficient supplies by paying exorbitant prices and by underhand methods of all kinds, which are now employed without hesitation. In some quarters of Berlin even money cannot buy adequate rations. In the country stocks which had been successfully concealed during the war are now being brought forth and sold at high prices. The incentive to this is partly the fear that a Bolshevist government may succeed in confiscating all food supplies and also to the expectation that when stocks are exhausted there will be help from outside.

The infant mortality is said to be terrible, and in general I was told that 800 more deaths occur daily throughout Germany than was the case before the war. Deaths were not directly due to starvation, but to wasting diseases caused by malnutrition. I was informed that cases of hunger oedema have been diagnosed by competent medical men as a result of living on full rations allowed by the Government.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

I venture to make the following suggestions:

- (1) A commission of competent observers familiar with the German language should be organized and should proceed to Germany without delay, unless a condition of actual civil war arises within the next few days, in which case such a commission would probably attain no useful results. The members of this commission should be distributed throughout Germany. The points where it would seem advisable to place observers appear to be Berlin, which would naturally be the centre of the organization and where the strongest force should be maintained; Munich; Leipsic or Dresden, probably the former; Hamburg, Frankfort and Breslau. Such distribution should, however, be elastic and subject to change. The staff distributed outside of Berlin should report there by telegram or mail, and cipher communication, which will be allowed by the German Government, should be arranged from

there to Paris. Great care should of course be taken that only persons of good judgment and considerable experience shall be sent in. Persistent endeavors will be made to convert observers to German views, and objectivity and impartiality are absolute prerequisites. In this connection attention is called to the great undesirability of allowing the entry into Germany at present of American newspaper reporters, some of whom have already in several cases obtained interviews with German public men.

- (2) A further commission to study the economic and food situation should also be sent immediately. Whether this could not be advantageously combined with the political commission is a question seriously to be considered. In this connection the question suggests itself whether preliminary arrangements for consignments of fats should not be undertaken at once.
- (3) The coal situation should be made the subject of an immediate investigation, with the view of alleviating the very serious conditions which undoubtedly obtain in Bavaria and elsewhere at the present moment.
- (4) I advise that an official statement of the kind above indicated relative to non-negotiation except with a stable government elected by the will of the people and non-supply of food stuffs and other commodities except to a government capable of giving the necessary guarantees, be issued at the earliest moment possible. In view of the coming elections, the present moment seems especially indicated for such a statement.

VIII. MEMORANDUM AS TO ANNEXED DOCUMENTS

The following papers are annexed hereto as part of this report:

1. Memoranda of interviews with the following persons:
 1. Professor Brentano
 2. Lieut.-Col. v. Sonnenburg
 3. General Count Montgelas
 4. Dr. A. Mueller
 5. Prime Minister Eisner
 6. Archbishop von Faulhaber
 7. Minister Auer
 8. Minister Frauendorfer

9. Assistant Commandant of Munich Station
 10. Theodor Wolff
 11. Dr. Solf
 12. Dr. W. Rathenau
 13. Minister Preuss
 14. Minister Scheidemann
 15. Dr. Salamonsohn
 16. Dr. Solmssen
 17. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau
 18. K. Fürstenberg
 19. Minister Ebert
 20. M. Harden
 21. Prof. Wurm
 22. Max Warburg
 23. Minister Noske
2. Memorandum furnished by Mr. Von Frauendorfer, Bavarian Minister of Transportation, in regard to the delivery of railroad material to the Entente.

In conclusion, I have to mention the efficient assistance which was given me by Mr. Franklin Day of the American Legation at Berne, who accompanied me on the journey and whose notes and participation in interviews have been exceedingly helpful in furnishing the material from which the above summary has been compiled.

I have [etc.]

ELLIS LORING DRESEL

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum of Interviews in Germany

1. PROFESSOR LUJO BRENTANO, OF MUNICH

Professor Brentano stated that the first requisite of Germany was its economic rehabilitation, as the bad economic situation affected

political developments adversely. He complained of the terms of the armistice, and stated that the delivery of the number of railway carriages and, locomotives provided for in the armistice was certain completely to cripple the German railways. The Bavarian industries had been ordered not to work during the week preceding January 1st in order to save coal, as all coal supplies from the Saar and Ruhr territories and from Bohemia had been cut off. The present Bavarian Government had effected an agreement with the Bohemian Government, according to which twenty five cars of coal would be furnished each day, which, however, had not been delivered. Coal and food, in his opinion, are the great necessities for attaining stable conditions. As to the food question, it was important to note that Germany was living on its reserve stock at present and that Bavaria was eating its March and April supplies. He thought that the stocks could not last longer than February, although optimists believed they would not be exhausted until March.

The Government had the masses under control, but could control them only so long as it could feed them, and the only reason for using the reserve stocks was to keep the people contented during the critical period.

He did not believe that the present Government would last much beyond January 12, the date of the elections to the Bavarian Diet. The further outcome of these elections he considered dubious, because of the unknown factor of woman suffrage.

Of Eisner, he said that he was a brilliant man, but a comedian and that he was not made to govern people. As far as counter revolutionary movements were concerned, he believed that the clerical party, which he said probably had the numerical superiority in Bavaria, would immediately attempt to make Bavaria a monarchy, and that this would be dangerous because the minority would never acquiesce, and bloodshed would take place. He also stated that if the Bavarian "National Constituent" were called and did not contain a Socialist majority, the Socialists would probably disperse it, or at least such action would be attempted by the Radical Socialist factions. Such an attempt, he added, would be useless, for the Diet

would meet in some other town in Bavaria such as Nuremberg, take Munich by force, and then establish a firm government.

A great part of the people were anti-monarchical, and wanted order kept, although the very radical elements of the Independent Socialists were using funds copiously to corrupt the Soldiers who were returning from the front with their morals unimpaired.

As far as any separatist tendencies in Bavaria are concerned he believed that, while the Bavarian people were impatient of Prussian domination, they would be willing to form part of a federated Germany. Moreover, he pointed out that a separate Bavaria could not exist because it could not combat the economic pressure of its neighbors, as raw materials and coal came from other parts.

In conclusion Professor Brentano stated that he thought that it would be helpful if the Entente would designate some German party, and express its confidence in it by a declaration to the effect that it would conclude a peace with the government of that party. A policy of this kind would rally all elements to a moderate political program, and restore unity. Some such moral help he said was necessary to the German people who had physically and morally collapsed. He did not believe that the League of Nations would meet any obstacle from Germany and expressed his fervent hope for its creation.

Professor Brentano stated that he had been offered the Ministry of Commerce, and that for a number of days he had occupied himself with a study of the material collected at that office. He then came to the conclusion that only stringent reforms would be of any use in the reconstruction of the country's commerce, and had resigned his post because he had no confidence that the present government possessed sufficient stability to assure his being able to carry out the measures he advocated with due consistency.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

2. LEEUT.-COL. FATNER VON SONNENBURG, OF MUNICH

During the last four years, Lieut-Col. Von Sonnenburg has been the Chief of the Press Bureau of the Bavarian General Staff and thus has been the censor of the Bavarian press, an office which I am told he conducted with tact and liberality. I was informed by a number of people that, although not a party man, he was the best posted man in Munich on political affairs. In conversation he stated that he had protested against submarine war, as he had long been in America and knew the character of our people. Immediately before the order for unrestricted submarine warfare was issued, Bethmann-Holweg, then Chancellor, was ordered to report to the German Emperor on the subject. Upon his arrival at Headquarters however, he was informed that His Majesty had already made up his mind and that the matter should not be further mentioned. Bethmann-Holweg was then urged by friends, actuated perhaps by mistaken motives of patriotism, that it was his duty to remain in office unless the war became more and more ruthless, and unless further gross political errors be committed. Bethmann-Holweg therefore, instead of following the logical course of immediate resignation, remained Chancellor. Sonnenburg stated that this was a mistake, for thus the sore was only covered and was able to eat into the flesh further. He also informed us that he had argued with Ludendorff regarding submarine warfare without effect. Originally, he stated, the demolition of the Eastern French fortresses was the only demand which the Military Party was prepared to enforce upon a victorious peace. Then, the manifesto of the industrial societies appeared and the policy of conquest was adopted by the military extremists.

Brest-Litovsk was the grossest blunder of the German Government, and the expeditions to the East in 1918 were only made for the purpose of proving that the military were right. A firm civilian government which [could?] control the Ludendorff adherents was then impracticable, as a highly organized pan-German movement was everywhere.

With reference to the present situation, Germany urgently required moral and material help, food and absence of further humiliation in order that the people might become self-respecting again. He stated that the German people had passed through an awful crisis, that of

militarism, and that it was now a convalescent which needed nursing and strengthening.

He considered a monarchist reaction out of the question. That form of government was gone forever and the government of the future in Germany would certainly be Socialist. All parties would loyally lend their services to such a government as otherwise a Bolshevik supremacy over Germany would be assured. He was very firm in his conviction that there would be no pan-German or monarchist reaction in Germany, because the vast majority of the people were bitterly opposed to it.

He believed that as far as a separatist movement in Bavaria is concerned, it would only arise if things became insupportable in Berlin when Bavaria might join with the Tyrol and with Styria, and thus control large resources of electrical energy. Such a state would be able to endure. He believed, however that a federated, decentralized republic with its seat in a historic or geographic center outside of Berlin would be the outcome of a political readjustment. In conclusion he asked that America should place confidence in the German people who had been deluded and betrayed and who were anxious to follow a new road to a better political existence.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

3. GENERAL COUNT MONTGELAS, OF MUNICH

He began with a general talk on the causes of the war, claiming that it was not as the Entente believed an aggressive war, but that Germany was forced to protect herself against her neighbors, especially those on her east. He acknowledged the wrong done to Belgium, and the fatal mistake of the extreme submarine warfare, against the last of which his brother as he said had made the strongest of protests. The transformation into an aggressive war had only taken place later on, when the Ludendorff regime came in, and the extreme measures were never supported by the masses of the people. The people should not in his view be punished for what the military authorities had wrongly decided, but it now seemed that the Entente were inclined to press matters to the utmost limit. As far as

Bavaria was concerned, the coal situation was exceedingly serious, in fact even more so than the food situation at the present time. All factories have been closed until January 1st and there was no relief in sight. Whatever coal was obtained from the Ruhr was not sufficient and the transport difficulties from Silesia, even supposing that it would not be swallowed up by Poland, were extreme. The food on hand would last until March 1st. He could see no remedy except a specific declaration by the Entente that unless a stable government was formed at once no food would be furnished and no peace could be made.

Asked about the members of the present Government he did not think Eisner would last long; he considered him a visionary and an extremist. Auer was, he thought, the man most to be trusted and it was quite likely that he would come in after the coming elections. The clerical party was strong, especially among the peasants, but he was inclined to think a Majority Socialist Party, eliminating all independents, might be the solution in Bavaria.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

4. DR. A. MUELLER, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE "MUENCHENER
NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN"

Doctor Mueller is a young man and appears very energetic, sound and intelligent. In his opinion there are two dangers in the present situation. (1) Bolshevism, considered from a political point of view, and (2) disorganization of labor and lack of work which again may influence political activity in favor of the support of Bolshevism. In his opinion the elections to the Constituent Assembly will not pass without opposition on the part of the Spartacus group, which is supported in its aggressive attitude by the revolutionary internationalists and by the Communists. These are led in large part by idealists, and even by persons from the best classes of society. All desire to destroy, but fail to take into account the necessary difficulties of reconstruction. Dr. Mueller expressed considerable pessimism and did not think that a stable government could be established in Bavaria without bloodshed, any more than in any other part of Germany. Bolshevism might even for the time become

paramount. Dr. Mueller agreed with all other persons with whom interviews had been had, in stating that the most powerful factor for the stabilization of any government would lie in a statement by the Entente to the effect that no peace would be concluded, and no food furnished but to a firmly established government which expressed the popular will. It should be noted that Dr. Mueller's pessimism is perhaps due to the bad experiences he has had with the more radical elements, which attempted to censor or suppress his newspaper.

Doctor Mueller was eloquent in his statements regarding the economic situation which he considered very bad indeed among the poor and those who lived on a fixed salary. He himself with an income of twenty thousand marks was only occasionally able to eat in the better restaurants where the food was not more than fair and it was practically impossible to bring young children through the period of the blockade without serious injury to their health. He believed that Bavaria might take a leading part in reestablishing order as soon as her economic difficulties arising from the coal situation, which created a lack of work, were settled. The present reasonably sufficient food was due to the fact that reserves were being used, and he expressed his fears for the potatoless time which was sure to come in March or April.

Dr. Mueller has been informed on the best authority that before the revolution Liebknecht had requested instructions from Joffe, and that he had received a large sum of money, about four million francs in gold, which was being copiously used to corrupt soldiers and induce them to join the Spartacus group, as members of which they were paid fifteen marks a day. These methods were highly dangerous as they attracted to the Spartacus faction all kinds of immoral and criminal elements which might be used for the purpose of a destructive Bolshevistic revolution.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

5. MINISTER PRESIDENT EISNER

Last night I had the opportunity of dining with Minister President Eisner, together with Professor Jaffe, Finance Minister, and

Professor Bonn. Mr. Eisner presents the typical appearance of a radical journalist, with long hair, and although he is a Jew has few of their racial aspects. He had just arrived from Stuttgart where, he informed us, the States of Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse, had formed a coalition of the southern German States. Having returned by automobile he appeared tired and disinclined towards any serious political discussion, nor did he react to any political suggestions which were thrown out. Doctor Eisner made the impression of being both vain and flippant, and as lacking in any true realization of the bases of government. He talked "my revolution" and of his prison experiences, and showed no especial interest in the regeneration of Germany nor with its relations with the outside world.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

6. ARCHBISHOP VON FAULHABER, OF MUNICH

In conversation the Archbishop appeared very pessimistic indeed. The bourgeoisie was weak and lacked political experience, was easily terrorized and all possibility of arousing the non-governmental elements before the elections of the National Assembly was handicapped by the fact that the ordinary means of transport had broken down, and that conveyance such as motors was only in the hands of the supporters of socialistic and radical government. He seemed convinced that a further revolution was possible, and even probable, and that the bourgeoisie of the towns and the uninstructed peasants who, in spite of the non-existence of the great land holders were desirous of land, would not be able to stem the socialistic tide. He saw no strong man who could reorganize Bavaria, and eventually Germany. In his opinion the next ten days were vital in order to carry out an orderly electoral campaign, but he feared that obstacles would be put into the way of a real expression of the popular will. A certain harmony existed between Protestant and Catholic members of the new Bavarian Peoples' Party, which was formerly the Center Party but which had abandoned its cut and dried attitude and was now a party of order as opposed to the parties of revolution.

The impression which the conversation left was that anything was possible today even in Munich, where the population was by nature less accessible to emotional political propaganda, but where the apathy of the bourgeoisie and its desire to let things go by the board rather than to allow their inertia to be disturbed might seriously cripple any agitation against what he considered the wholly destructive force of radical socialism. It is to be noted, however, that the Archbishop spoke in the highest terms of Auer, who, he said, possessed the confidence of many of the bourgeoisie.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

7. MINISTER OF INTERIOR E. AUER

Erhard Auer is a Majority Socialist who has consistently opposed militarism and Prussian influence, as can be seen from a speech of his before the revolution which he gave me. He is a self-made man in the widest interpretation of the word, having risen from obscurity and a farm laborer's job to the post of Minister of Interior in the Republican Bavarian Government. He gives an impression of strength, honesty, directness and intelligence and courageously continues to fight against revolutionary radicalism in spite of the fact that his life has been threatened. He appeared both willing and able to carry his program to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the quiet but determined obstruction of the visionary Eisner. He also informed me of a recent meeting of delegates from the Southern German States, including Hesse, at Stuttgart, where a permanent committee of these States would sit there to keep in touch with German affairs. Like all other members of the Government and politicians with whom I have spoken he emphatically urged a statement by the Entente that no peace would be made except with a stable government, a statement which, he said, would be of the greatest value in suppressing the radical revolutionary ardor due to the hysteria. He was optimistic and confident that the elections would go smoothly, by which I took him to mean that he and his party would win. It was his belief that the elements of order would get control in Berlin, and that Ebert would be able to hold his position and create a stable and non-radical government which by

gradual socialization of appropriate industries would prepare the work of transition to a really Socialistic regime.

He also discussed the economic situation and strongly emphasized the danger arising from the unemployment, due to the lack of coal and raw materials, of the industrial population, thus causing disorder and endangering the morale of the proletariat. The above mentioned statement of the Entente he considered of particular importance and desired very much to obtain it officially in order to be enabled to pave the way to a constitutional and republican form of Government.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

8. FRAUENDORFER, MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION

Herr von Frauendorfer expressed his belief in Auer as the man best able to carry a democratic, socialistic policy. He also agreed that the statement which has been mentioned in a former memorandum made by the Entente relative to order in Germany was highly necessary. He further enlarged upon the transport difficulties, a memorandum regarding which he gave me.^{[3](#)}

Munich, December 29, 1918.

9. MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION WITH A NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (VIZE-FELDWEBEL) AND ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE RAILWAY STATION IN MUNICH

This man, who accompanied us as far as Hof, was originally an employee in a large department store, and had gone in 1914 to the front, where he was made a vice first sergeant. He had fought in France, Rumania, and Russia, as well as a short time in Italy. He appeared to be an intelligent man of sober judgment and to represent the better type of the revolutionary masses. He expressed himself strongly in favor of order and discipline and told us of the measures which he and his comrades had taken to prevent Bolshevist agitations coming into Bavaria from Berlin.

He told us that the morale of the German Army began to break when America had entered the war, for they knew then that they could not win. Neither Ludendorff, nor Tirpitz would have dared to show themselves at the front, even as early as 1916, for none of the soldiers believed in the success of extreme submarine warfare.

The war had lasted too long and a revolution was bound to follow, although nothing would have happened had the war stopped two years earlier. He expressed himself as glad that the war had ended in the defeat of Germany, as, though they had lost the war they had won their liberty. He was in favor of a government headed by Auer, but was not ready to break up a Constituent Assembly, should it have a Catholic majority. He expressed himself as apprehensive as regards the results of granting woman suffrage, because women were not yet accustomed to exercising political rights. I was much impressed with his sobriety, as well as by the spirit of discipline which men like he might be able to enforce. He did not think that the Spartacus people would be able to wield any permanent influence or exercise real terrorism, and expressed his contempt because they all ran away when he ordered his men on one occasion to fire on them.

The spirit of men of his stamp is shown by the fact that he is on duty twenty-four hours successively every other day, and when asked whether he did not find this very hard he said that this was a time when every one must do his best to restore the country to order. He expressed great personal hatred of the Prussians, who, he said, had robbed Bavaria, a statement which was repeated by a comrade of his at a further railway station with whom we discussed the political situation, and who was entirely on the side of my informant. Bavaria, in the opinion of the first man, should have entered the war of 1870 on the French side. He did not believe that Bavaria could stand alone, but he was for the exclusion of Prussia from a federation of South German States.

Berlin, December 30, 1918.

10. THEODOR WOLFF, CHIEF EDITOR OF THE "BERLINER TAGEBLATT"

Herr Wolff began by explaining the position of the German Democratic Party, which he had founded. This party, he said, was created to form a bourgeois organization with which the Social Democrats could cooperate, although it did not pursue as radical economic aims as the Socialists. He stated that no one was admitted to the Democratic Party who had either (A) supported the U-Boat war, (B) who had favored a policy of annexations and indemnities (C) who had opposed electoral reform in Prussia. The purpose of this restriction, he stated, was to keep the Party's hands clean. This Party, carrying black, red and yellow flags, last Sunday demonstrated in favor of a stable government, this being the first instance of a bourgeois street parade, and one hundred thousand people took part. At the same time the Majority Socialists demonstrated with a similar aim and mustered four hundred thousand representatives. The Spartacus Group also had a parade of about thirty thousand men only.

The German Popular Party, of which Stresemann is the head, is reactionary and represents a blend of moderate conservatives and of the right wing of the National Liberals.

Of the Spartacus Group, he said that it was small in number but determined and well armed, possessing many machine guns, and including especially laborers from the steel industries. It is largely composed of young soldiers, many sailors and visionaries, and of criminal elements. He stated that the first care of the new government, which has no doubt been strengthened by the fact that the Independent Socialists had left it, must be to create a new army.

With reference to the events in Poland, he said that the German people would not now suffer the Poles to occupy German territory, although if the Peace Conference based on Wilson's principles decides that this territory should belong to Poland this view will be accepted. Under no conditions, however, will the German people suffer the Poles to rob them of the eastern provinces. Germany is not dead and sooner or later the German people will awaken if the Entente insists on a policy of force. The great dangers to Germany arising from the political situation are (1) Bolshevism, which may follow impoverishment and (2) a nationalism which, although it may

not be monarchical, may lead the nation again into militarism through the channel of a republican national uprising. It is, therefore, unwise to humble Germany too much or to ruin her completely. As far as Bolshevism is concerned he stated that the labor unions had lost in power, and that thus an element of discipline was lost to the State. Of Walther Rathenau, he said that he had lost his influence and his credit. First he issued a manifesto calling for a defense to the last ditch after the armistice negotiations had begun, and then he said that he would not outlive the ruin of his country, which no one believes.

With reference to the National Assembly he said that the Majority Socialists would poll a huge vote, that the Independent Socialists would fail to gain many seats, and that the Centre Party would regain much of its lost influence on the voters because of the untimely separation between Church and State which had irritated the Catholic masses.

Wolff was thoroughly optimistic, and thought that, even should Germany pass through a period of Bolshevism, she would be able to overcome it and would be able to renew her strength.

In conclusion he said that Radek's presence was a great danger, as he was unscrupulous and immoral. He was no better than a thief, and had been expelled from both Polish and German Party organizations.

Berlin, December 31, 1918.

11. DR. W. SOLF, FORMER COLONIAL MINISTER

Dr. Solf explained that he had left the Foreign Office because of the telegram which Joffe sent to the effect that Haase, then a member of the Government, had accepted Bolshevik money for the purpose of a social revolution. Upon the publication of this, Dr. Solf refused to shake hands with Haase and ensuing difficulties led to his resignation.

With reference to the present situation Solf was very pessimistic, and could not see that the Government would be able to hold itself

against the onslaught of the Spartacus group. He estimated the strength of the armed men at the disposal of the Spartacus people at thirty thousand, and stated that the Government had no such number of loyal troops to oppose them. He said that the sailors who had originally come to preserve order as well as the soldiers had to a large extent gone over to the Spartacus faction. Another great danger lay in the fact that the Police President of Berlin was one of Germany's most prominent Bolsheviks, and not only prevented the collection of arms from the Spartacus party, but in fact furnished them. He believed that the present government would have to attempt to disarm the Bolshevik elements but he would not be surprised if in another week the Spartacus people would one fine day go and simply imprison the Government. It was his belief that the whole Bolshevik movement, as well as the apathy of the bourgeois classes was in a large measure due to the under-feeding which had made brain cells abnormal. Bolshevism, once it were rampant in Germany, would affect all Europe and might even infect England and America.

The present government, suffered not only from its weakness in not having troops, but also from the fact that it was opposed to the use of force in principle and was, therefore, at the mercy of its radical and active opponents. Its members were honest men from the lower middle classes who were good party politicians, but who entirely lacked courage, or the character necessary to rule. Noske he thought the most energetic man, and he believed that he might be able to re-organize the army. Solf himself had hoped that a coalition government of democrats and socialists would obtain power, but he thought this impossible at present.

He agreed with all other informants that a monarchical reaction was impossible, and that no one was willing to reinstate the Emperor. The Emperor, he said, had behaved very badly and had utterly misunderstood the true situation, for when Solf had asked him to abdicate, the Emperor claimed to have the people and the army behind him, and could not be persuaded that this was not the fact. The Emperor's greatest mistake, Solf said, was his flight to Headquarters, as it gave circulation to rumors that he would continue to fight with his army in spite of the armistice and that he

would cause the navy to attack England. He said that he himself had been convinced that Germany would break down in the spring, but he never believed that such Russian conditions as existed in Berlin today would come about. It was his belief that there would be bloody fighting before the elections to the National Assembly were carried out. Finally he repeated what, as he said he had impressed on all Americans who had spoken to him, that the greater the food supply, the less danger of Bolshevism, and the less food, the more danger.

Solf also considered the presence of Radek in Berlin as most dangerous.

Solf made a most depressed impression. He did not think that the present Government could solve the problems before it. Ebert and Scheidemann were both estimable in his opinion, Scheidemann the more able man, but they could not see that forcible measures were necessary to save Germany. At any time the Spartacus Group could seize the reins of power. They had already at times prevented his entering his own office, and one day he found three sailors at his door who barred the entrance. The real leaders of men were only to be found among extremists, the Junker class among them, but these latter had, of course, made themselves impossible.

Of the Spartacus Group, Rosa Luxemburg was the most dangerous and plausible. Liebknecht has been said to be mentally unbalanced, but when it was attempted to send him to a sanatorium instead of a prison he defended himself with such cleverness that a medical certificate of mental trouble was impossible.

Ludendorff had been the evil genius of Germany. He had had matters all his own way and had been able to prevent Kuhlmann from making a decent peace at Brest-Litovsk. Ludendorff had no political sense, but tremendous will power, and his entourage was also most pernicious.

Solf warmly favored a declaration by the Entente that no peace would be concluded unless with a stable government. If the parties of disorder got into power sooner or later the Entente would have, in his opinion, to intervene.

Berlin, January 1, 1919.

12. DR. WALTHER RATHENAU

Dr. Rathenau stated that when he last saw Colonel House he had arranged to let him know when the moment was ripe for American intervention with a view to concluding peace. He said that the time had not come up to autumn of 1917, but he then wrote two identical letters to Colonel House, one over Holland and one over Spain, which he forwarded through the Foreign Office and the Legation and Embassy. He had not had an answer, and supposed they had never reached [*sic*]. Asked how it could have been expected that America at that moment would enter on discussions for a separate peace, he said that was not contemplated, but that she should take action with her allies.

Passing to general conversation, he stated that at the time of the majority resolution in July 1917, he had done all he could to make peace possible. He had even gone so far as to approach Ludendorff, though unwillingly. He reproached Ludendorff for having surrounded himself with Pan-Germans, but this was denied by Ludendorff, who said that he had only one or two, and these only temporarily. However, Rathenau said that he convicted him by naming several to him. One, the most virulent, was Colonel Bauer, who was a liaison with great producers ("Schwerindustrie"). Ludendorff had told Rathenau after a long conversation that he agreed with his views in all respects except that the submarine war could not be stopped. Ludendorff said that it was a matter of instinct with him to continue it. Rathenau pointed out the technical reasons why the continuation was ruinous and quite ineffective, but was unable to convince Ludendorff.

Dr. Rathenau then made a plea for moderation in the peace negotiations, stating that the country was already three-fourths ruined, and that cold-blooded discussions at the Council Table would lead only to the destruction of all that was left in Germany. Poland was the only land in history which had been divided by negotiations between the dominant powers, and even in that case the results had

been that the Poles were assured of good treatment under stable governments.

In answer to a question, he said that he considered that the chances of ultimately establishing an orderly, strong government were very good. The German nation were naturally orderly and docile and he did not question but that the proper spirit would assert itself. It was quite to be expected that the Bolshevists would be able to gain power for a time, but this would be merely temporary, and could last from only three to six weeks at the most. Everything would be in order before the Entente would have time to step in. Their views would be so divergent that it would be long before they could come to an agreement between themselves.

In Dr. Rathenau's opinion the American influence with the Entente was decreasing rapidly. Now that their army was no longer necessary, the French would make every effort to push matters to extremes, and America's prestige has been injured by coming to Europe to negotiate.

In diplomacy American methods were direct, but Europe has to rely on machinations and intrigues, and with the best will in the world America could not use direct methods. He feared that the President would be drawn into the net; that his broad lines of policy would be ignored and evaded, and that the peace would eventually be made by France, not even by England. No doubt the President had a hold on the people at large in the different countries, but it would take a long time for such forces to get into play, and in the mean time peace will have been concluded on narrow, selfish lines.

The only thing to do was for America to assert itself strongly, and bang on the table, and insist that Germany should not be utterly destroyed.

Going into details, he stated that the whole national wealth of France was about 250 billions. 8 per cent of French territory had been occupied, and possibly a fourth of the wealth in this was destroyed. This would amount to 5 billion francs, but even if the loss is put at 15 billions, this is small compared with the 65 billions demanded. This

last figure can only be accounted for by France figuring in the expenses of the war.

He feared that there would be no real negotiation of peace, but mere dictation analogous to that of the Armistice. He thought that the Germans should never have proposed an armistice, but should have directly started negotiations of peace with America. Asked how this would have stopped the fighting, he said that it would have been simple, after negotiations had once begun, to conclude a temporary peace in two or three weeks.

He feared that the German delegates to the Peace Conference would be badly treated. Erzberger would undoubtedly be one of the delegates. Perhaps Bernstorff would be another delegate, but he himself favored Solf, and had told him so.

Rathenau expressed his astonishment that the French and British should have allowed the present mission to come through without interference, but he exceedingly welcomed the opportunity to state his views and trusted that further occasions would be given. It was in the interest of America that there should be a strong Central Europe whose economic basis was satisfactory and, therefore, it was entirely in the interest of America to furnish raw materials and facilitate trade in every way. He said he believed in the future Germany was the only country on whose friendship America could rely. England would undoubtedly remain a friend for a time, but amicable relations with France would certainly not be permanent.

The greatest difficulty with the present situation was that old-fashioned diplomatic methods would hold the stage for a "short run", as he expressed it, but permanent ideas founded on justice and liberality could only establish themselves in the long run. The only way to avoid this tendency was to have America strongly assert itself at the present moment.

Dr. Rathenau touched on the food situation and said there was enough food to last until about March 1st. The infant mortality was terrible.

He insisted that the German people were at heart perfectly sound. They understood nothing about politics, but they have been taught to obey from their earliest youth. Atrocities of all kinds were abominable to them, but nothing could go above the direct orders of their military superiors. The people who had really done harm to Germany were infinitesimal in number, but they have been able to swing the masses of the people who trusted and believed them implicitly. Asked how it was then that there had been such a distinctly unfriendly feeling among the whole German people towards America before we came into the war, he stated that the people had been deceived by lies, and taught that America was throwing her influence on the side of the Entente by deliveries of munitions and encouragement of the blockade. He himself had tried to controvert this but had not been listened to. Rathenau described himself as very pessimistic about the home situation, but it was evident that his fear was on account of the rigorous conditions which he thought would be imposed, rather than because of the internal situation. He made the impression of being very nervous, and not entirely well-balanced. He was inclined to talk a good deal about what he had done and written.

Berlin, January 1, 1919.

13. PROF. G. F. PREUSS, MINISTER OF INTERIOR

Preuss was formerly a professor, and was considered the most radical member of the bourgeois parties. He was respected but obscure, and had no preferment until the new popular administration entered upon office. He was then offered the position of Minister of the Interior in the Government, following an article entitled: "Obrigkeitsstaat und Volksstaat" ("Government by bureaucrats versus popular government"). When he entered the cabinet he informed the present Government of his exact attitude in political matters, and was told that he was chosen because he was an independent thinker and because of his technical knowledge, although he was not a Socialist.

Of the bourgeois parties, he said that they were torpid and that politically they were not of very much use. The revolution so far, he

said, had been political rather than social, and the Independent Socialists complained of this. He stated that the more the revolution could be kept political the less likelihood of disturbances, but it was difficult at the present time to create purely political revolutions as social questions in an industrial country like Germany were of overwhelming importance. The danger for the present Government for the time being is from the Left, but he thinks that the demoralization of the army may be overcome. As far as the Spartacus Group and Liebknecht are concerned, he said that Liebknecht was not bloodthirsty, and that Rosa Luxemburg was the cleverest woman as far as politics were concerned in Germany today. To him the greater danger appeared to be from the Right, not for the present but in the long run, for he believed the reaction which was not showing its head now would emerge sooner or later and would emphasize any lack of success in any field. If conditions of misery exist, they will be pointed [to?] in order to persuade the people that the revolution had not brought what [had] been expected, and that the old regime had safeguarded property and [life].

The people were so used to the Hohenzollerns and to militarism that it would at best be a difficult matter to destroy the sentiment entirely. In this respect Dr. Preuss expressed a different opinion from other informants. Like very one else Dr. Preuss emphasized the danger of the coal and food situation, of which he said that they were ready instruments to bring about Bolshevism, which has no political standing but whose determined adherents, only a few hundreds in number, used the economic situation for their own purposes. Liebknecht, he said, had attended his courses, and had been an intelligent pupil.

In discussing the new German constitution which he was drafting, he stated that it had always been his opinion that the American Constitution should in a large sense be used as a model in organizing any possible German confederation of states, and that his present draft was being made with this in view. He proposes that the executive power of the government should be in the hands of a president with extended powers, but that unlike our system a cabinet of ministers responsible to parliament should be constituted. He also proposes that the chief legislative body of the new federated

Germany should have a House of Representatives and a body akin to our Senate, with the exception that the representatives to the Upper House would not in numbers be equal for each state, but would be proportional to the inhabitants. For this purpose he stated Germany would have to be broken into federated states between numbers of the population, of which there was so great discrepancy. The scheme which [would be?] adopted for the suppression of Prussian hegemony, would require the breaking up of Prussia, and granting to the smaller states a limitrophe province of former Prussia. The difficulty, he said, with political development in Germany was that Germany had never had a revolution and that therefore it lacked the leaven necessary for active political development. The present revolution, he also said, was too bloodless and had not been energetic enough, nor had it affected a sufficient number of the people.

Dr. Preuss gave the impression of a sincere man of exceptional intellect and acquirements. He is of Jewish origin.

Berlin, January 2, 1919.

14. MINISTER PHILLIP SCHEIDEMANN

Scheidemann stated that the numbers of Spartacus Group were small, but that they were determined and energetic. The Government, he stated, appreciated the necessity of taking a firm stand against them, but was naturally unwilling to bring on a struggle before the elections as this would enable opponents to say that the blood of fellow workmen had been shed. He was very confident that a strong government could be formed which would have permanence, and he expressed his willingness to cooperate in any moderate government which was established by the will of the people. The National Assembly would determine the constitution, and the present Government considers itself purely provisional and would acquiesce in the wishes of the people, as expressed by a freely elected parliament.

He also stated that the constitution would be modeled on that of America, and that Germany would have a President and a number of

federated States.

He discussed the food situation, and stated that it was worse than the Government dared to admit, and that the coal situation was dangerous. These two economic difficulties, once having been overcome, he was certain that a stable government could be created, and that the political situation could be controlled from within. The early frosts had ruined the potato crop, and in the north and east of Berlin conditions were exceedingly bad. He thought that there would be no Bolshevism unless the food situation became desperate, but in that case the masses would free themselves from the control of the government.

Berlin, January 2, 1919.

15. DR. SALAMONSOHN, HEAD OF THE DEUTSCHE KREDITANSTALT

Dr. Salamonsohn stated that the situation today was as bad as it could be, and that Germany was on the road to ruin. The Government was not strong enough to enforce order, and he feared that Bolshevism would become rampant if the food and coal situation were not remedied. At present the workmen were demanding such high wages that any profitable working of industries was out of the question, because no margin of profit was left, and because the workmen who received higher pay did less work. Hard work which was of a disagreeable nature, such as stoking, was not done by anyone, and other labor was too inadequate to be usefully employed either in production or in reconstruction. He said it was a fact that wealth produced high wages and that high wages produced high prices. The reduction of prices to precede a reduction of wages was impossible, as wages had to be reduced first to lower prices. When this process begins to set in he feared difficulties, and he believes that the present Government would not be able to quell them.

Once the National Assembly were called he said a coalition government or even a Majority Socialist government could be formed which would have the support of all classes which loved order. He feared, however, that this Assembly would never sit, as the

Independent Socialists and the Spartacus people together might do their best to prevent it, since their aim was to establish their own regime during the interregnum, and to ruin the country.

The people were demoralized, and the army, the workmen, and the bourgeoisie all had lost their energy and their sense of responsibility. If food and coal could be provided the chances of the re-establishment of order would improve, otherwise he saw nothing but Bolshevism.

The financial situation, he said, was bad, and the amount of gold to cover the note issue was about thirteen percent. The currency which had been issued by certain municipalities was only temporary, due to wearing out of the machinery for printing bank notes, and therefore printed city notes were put in circulation. The coupons of the war loan also had been used as currency, but they had now been redeemed and the municipal currency would also soon be called in. This measure, therefore, did not appreciably affect the financial situation. This latter depended largely on an orderly government, and an orderly government could be brought about by economic assistance from outside. Germany, he believed, would soon have to adopt the American trust system in order that production could be concentrated where it was cheapest, and that wasteful distribution could be done away with.

With reference to guaranteeing payment for food to be sent in, he stated that this could only be done by a dollar loan which could be secured by a pledge of German railway mining securities which are yet free from liens.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

16. DR. SOLMSEN

Dr. Solmssen has just come from Cologne, and gave the following information relative to the economic situation on the left bank of the Rhine. The country on the left of the Rhine was industrially entirely interlocked with that on the right bank, many industries have their furnaces on one side and their coal mines and ore deposits on the

other. Railway statistics of 1913, which could not have been made with any ulterior purpose, show that the railway traffic on each side was equal. The left bank was as industrially important as the right bank, for materials were worked into semi-finished goods, especially textiles, which were later sent off for completion. For this reason, he said, the present restrictions on intercourse were ruinous to the economic situation, not only on the left bank of the Rhine but also in other parts of Germany which depended on goods half finished on the left bank. Once industries came to a stop, he feared the worst and believed that a sudden uprising would take place which even the Entente could not suppress. He was pessimistic and requested information as to what central authority he could address himself in order to explain the situation, naturally not appreciated by the military authorities.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

17. COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

Count Rantzau began the conversation by stating his aims. He said that his policy would be to sign any peace on the basis of the fourteen points of President Wilson, but that he would not accept conditions which made Germany the slave of the Entente. He said that he had accepted his office with reluctance. The German people could not be destroyed, and he would not let it be destroyed, nor would he sign any peace whatever but a peace which would grant Germany the possibility of continuing a decent existence.

He stated that he had always stood for President Wilson, and that at the time the offer for an armistice went to the President it was he who had particularly urged it, and he had thus taken upon himself a great responsibility before the people. He said that he had great faith in the President's honesty, and had great admiration for him. He said he appreciated the difficulties under which the President worked in Paris, and that he could understand the French and Belgian attitude. He said that he would not whine or beg, but that the coal situation and the situation relative to food was exceedingly serious, so serious indeed that it might result in Bolshevism. Once this Bolshevism

became rampant in Germany he knew that it would immediately spread to Scandinavia and that it would [not?] fail to affect France and Italy. Germany and America, he believed, has [*had*] similar interests and were akin to one another, and could for the future of the world cooperate profitably.

In discussing the Peace Conference, he mentioned the question of Bernstorff being sent there, and expressed his doubts whether he would be acceptable.

Count Rantzau stated that he was optimistic for Germany, because he had not lost his faith in the German people, which had been deceived and misled, and which had followed a phantom to the edge of an abyss. Optimism, he believed, was the only possible basis for a constructive program, and he intended to draw a sharp line at the foot of the happenings of the war and to proceed to reconstruct.

Count Rantzau stated emphatically that a reaction was out of the question.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

18. HERR K. FURSTENBERG, PRESIDENT OF THE BERLIN HANDELS
GESELLSCHAFT

Furstenberg is a prominent private banker and discussed the financial situation. Germany, he said, could not pay the war debt as a lump sum, but could pay the interest on it, if it were given help in the form of an international loan. Such an international loan, he said, could be secured by German stocks which represented the German industrial assets. He had, as a patriot, hoped for victory, but had run his bank in the expectation of defeat, and consequently it was still sound. He had never been consulted, and considered the Government experts incapable and ignorant. He was very optimistic, and was sure that Germany, after a hundred years of paying off her debts would again be financially reestablished. Herr Furstenberg is a man of original and interesting ideas, and appears to be universally respected.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

19. MINISTER F. EBERT

Herr Ebert received us at the Chancellor's palace, which he is occupying. The son of a tailor, he became a saddler's apprentice, and in the Social Democratic movement rose to the second place in the party. He is everywhere spoken of as the logical President for the new German Republic. Ebert stated that the Bolshevist danger was serious only because of the food and coal situation, and that a stringent shortage of food or coal would make it difficult to control the masses, because they would fall into utter despair. The armistice conditions were such as to be very burdensome to Germany, but he had given orders that everything should be done to comply with them, although traffic would thereby be seriously hampered. He was confident that a firm government would soon be established, and he expected no serious difficulties from the Spartacus Group. This could be suppressed by force of arms, but he was not willing to use force until the opponents had first employed it. He said that Noske was very energetic, and was working out a plan for a national army which would soon be created. He gave the impression of an honest and simple man with the best of intentions to build up the nation.

In discussing the question of the German constitution, Ebert said that it would be modelled largely on the American Constitution, with slight modifications. Ebert said that he considered a reaction out of the question.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

20. M. HARDEN

M. Harden stated that he was not pessimistic in regard to the situation but that the Bolshevist danger was very real. The present Government meant well, but had not the force necessary to solve the difficult problems which confronted it. A strong coalition government was, in his opinion, necessary, and might well be established after the elections. The new Constitution should follow that of the United States. He thought there could be a nominal head

of each state, but the chief power should be in the hands of a prime minister. A strong central executive was necessary. Prussia would have to be divided into several states.

The whole German people were relying on President Wilson to see that justice was done, and that such indemnities should not be demanded as would absolutely cripple Germany.

He strongly favored an official statement by the Entente to the effect that peace would only be negotiated with a strong, stable government which had eradicated Bolshevism, and that no food supplies or raw materials would be forthcoming unless such a stable government was formed.

He thought that there was no possible danger of a reaction for a long time to come. The Hohenzollerns have made themselves utterly impossible, and the former Emperor was universally condemned because of his flight to Holland. He had always been a coward. Bismarck once told Harden that everybody should feel relieved that the Emperor was, in fact, a coward because if mobilization was ever discussed he would not be able to make up his mind to order it. At the beginning of the present war they had arranged to mobilize without the Emperor taking any part in the decision.

Harden is an interesting talker, but had no original constructive ideas of value to impart.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

21. PROF. WURM, FORMER FOOD CONTROLLER

The mortality is terrible. The figures have been hitherto strictly kept secret. Every day eight hundred more people die than was the case before the war. Since the armistice was concluded, and leaving out the grippe cases, 36,000 more people have died than in the corresponding period before the war. The mortality has been especially great among older people and children. The under-nourishment of mothers has had a disastrous influence on babies.

The normal amount of calories is 3000, and in America it has been the custom to consider 4000 the proper ration. The ration in Germany during the war has generally been about 1200, which is quite insufficient, but now the amount is only 800 to 900 calories.

The present supplies of cereals will last up to the 15th of June at the very latest; after that everything will be empty unless new supplies come in. The under-nourishment, however, is so terrible that help is needed at once.

There is a marked hunger psychosis which is firstly of a purely nervous nature, causing all kinds of nervous disturbances; secondly, a state of mind is induced bordering on desperation, a conviction that it is impossible to endure hardships longer. The combination of these two is having a disastrous effect on the political situation in Germany.

During the war Prof. Wurm had occasion to see well defined cases of hunger oedema caused among persons who had had the full war rations.

Prof. Wurm gave me two photographs [*graphs?*] indicating the mortality in Berlin from 1915 to 1918 and the consumption of the most necessary foodstuffs for the years 1912 to 1913 and 1917 to 1918.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

22. M. WARBURG, A BANKER OF HAMBURG

The German people, he stated, were suffering more from the demoralization of the war than from having lost it. People are indifferent as to whether they die or not, and thus are not able to gather the necessary strength to fight dangerous revolutionary movements. Not only had militarism been overcome, but discipline has been lost. If some strength is left her, Germany will find her way through the woods, though she will never again be a great power. To help her on the right path is in the interest of the Entente, as Germany can keep order in Europe, and as she must not become a source of infection for all the world. In order that she may become

sane again, she must be enabled to live her economic life. She must not lose northern Silesia, nor the opportunities to obtain iron ore from Lorraine. The Silesian coal production was 30 million tons per year, of which Poland received 1, Austria 9, and Germany the remainder. This is indicative of the importance of these coal mines to the existence of Germany. But as much as she needs economic help, she needs moral help so as not to lose confidence in herself as a self-respecting nation. For this reason Alsace-Lorraine should not be returned to France except on the basis of a plebiscite. The German people can console themselves for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but only if taken legally on a fair basis, such as the fourteen points. It is especially necessary also to remove the blockade, which has particularly affected the Baltic. Today 900,000 tons of shipping are lying idle in Baltic harbors and in all German harbors ships of the total capacity of 1,900,000 tons would be ready to go out but for the continuation of the right of seizure. The result of this is that the most unruly elements, the sailors, are out of work, and that 38,000 men in Hamburg alone are unemployed. The menace of this to order and quiet is obvious.

Mr. Warburg stated that peace should not be signed in Paris, although he thought that the preliminary peace might be signed there in order to give France the triumph she desired. He considered that France was an unsuitable place for the final peace conference because of the pressure public opinion might exercise there on the negotiations, and that from there the German members of the peace commission would be cut off from their home Foreign Office and their people. Therefore, a neutral country should be chosen for the final negotiations.

The fact that the German prisoners had not yet been returned is not understood in Germany, and is causing considerable indignation. Never, he said, would Germany consent to the use of these men as slaves to rebuild France, although Germany would be willing to enter upon contracts to furnish labor and pay it for the rebuilding of the destroyed territories of France and Belgium.

A war indemnity such as has been talked of was impossible. Figures are now being collected which can be verified, showing the state of

the German national finance and what Germany can pay, but it cannot collect the enormous sums demanded. Moreover, he said, if territories like Alsace-Lorraine and Poland are sundered from Germany, such districts would have to take over proportionally the burden of the pre-war loans made for their development and would also have to continue to bear their share in the war loans.

In regard to the colonies, he said that Germany must not be left without them, because the people must be left the hope and possibility of expansion and must not be deprived of every chance of recovering their economical strength, else, he said, Bolshevism or general disintegration might take place and Germany would, to the harm of the world, vanish as a nation. Reconstruction he believed to be possible if help from the outside were given.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

23. MINISTER NOSKE

Herr Noske stated that he believed that the German people would get through this crisis, and that the Government was becoming firmer. The Bolshevik movement in Germany was no such great menace and that the workmen as a whole were orderly, and very desirous of keeping order. The danger in the situation, in his opinion, lay in the fact that in the industrial sections raw materials were lacking and that workmen were therefore out of employment and demoralized. The first necessity for Germany was to receive raw materials so that industries could be revived. The Government was now preparing everything so that it could strike a blow when necessary, but he was not willing to try experiments which he was not sure of bringing to a successful conclusion.

He said that it was of importance to the Entente to prevent the demoralization of Germany as this might easily spread to other European countries. A reaction, he stated, was out of the question, and there was not a soul who favored it. This had been his experience when he was Military Governor in Kiel. Once the borders were open and raw materials were allowed to come in, Germany would soon recover and become again orderly. He complained that the French

were not complying with the Armistice conditions, and were abusing them to crush Germany. Noske was energetic and plainspoken, and it seems that he has sufficient strength to be able to suppress rioting or trouble which may occur, and which he fully expects. Should this come, he said that the Government would show itself firm and would be able to carry out its policy, as it had received information from soldiers in all parts of Germany that they would loyally support it.

[Enclosure 2]

Berlin, January 5, 1919.

Memorandum Furnished by the Bavarian Minister of Transportation (Von Frauendorfer)

The fulfilment of the armistice treaty and the manner in which the Entente is interpreting and executing it exposes the economical and industrial existence of Germany to the greatest danger.

What do the conditions of the armistice mean to the German railway system?

We are to deliver up 5000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. It is true the German state railways possess about 32,000 locomotives and about 820,000 passenger carriages, luggage vans and goods-trucks. At the first glance the delivering up of the sixth part of our locomotives and something more than a fifth part of our wagons as wagons demanded from us may appear heavy but not impossible. Unfortunately conditions are much more unfavorable, for

1. We were obliged to leave the whole of the rolling stock of the Alsace-Lorraine railway-net in that country and we must, according to the conditions imposed anew by the Interallied Commission conditions, which are daily becoming more complicated, considerably increase this rolling material, having to deliver 700 wagons besides to Strassburg daily, altogether about 15000 wagons.
2. The whole rolling-stock necessary for the maintenance of the railway traffic in the German railway districts on the left bank of the Rhine had to be left there.

We do not know in Bavaria how great the number of the conveyances is which have to remain in Alsace-Lorraine and in the other districts on the left side of the Rhine. But we assume that it is a matter of altogether more than 3000 locomotives; the number of the wagons we cannot even approximately estimate here in Munich.

Moreover only a very small part of the enormous quantity of rolling-stock, which Germany has had to supply for the traffic in the occupied districts in the East as far as Bagdad has been returned till now. We reckon here that there are probably more than 3000 locomotives in the East; but the exact figures are not at hand here at Munich.

Today only 60%, that is, about 15000 of these 26000 locomotives which remain to us in the most favourable case are in a fit condition, because unfortunately the number of the repairs cannot be decreased more than 40% for a long time on account of want of material; so, supposing we have to deliver up 5000 locomotives we should have to give up a third of our whole serviceable locomotive material.

Besides there is to be taken into consideration that the conditions of the armistice are interpreted by the Interallied Commission that, practically only locomotives of the heaviest construction will be accepted. For the Bavarian States Railway which possesses only few heavy locomotives, this means, according to the present standing of the negotiations, that we must give up far more than 200 heavy locomotives.

Therefore Bavaria would have to deliver up two-thirds of its total sum of the serviceable heavy goods-trains engines to the Entente.

Besides these deliveries must be executed hurriedly by the 16th of January, that means exactly at the time when tremendous demands are being made on our railways by the demobilization of the front troops and the transporting home of the prisoners of war.

The condition of the German and especially of the Bavarian railway was already nearly hopeless till now.

Our present passenger-trains time-table only amounts to about 40% of the time-table in time of peace, resulting in the dangerous overcrowding of the trains so that the passengers who want to alight at an intermediate station very often have to be lifted out of the windows.

For weeks the goods-service has only been able to be maintained in quite an insufficient manner. Traffic prohibitions exclude all goods not absolutely necessary for the nourishment of the people and the supplying of fuel to the population. By the want of locomotives more and more wagons, which cannot be forwarded any further, accumulate in the railway-stations and obstruct them. Double lines must be obstructed to a great extent with wagons so that the management of the traffic is made extremely difficult. By this the circulation of the wagons is stagnating, the empty coal-trucks do not return to the coal-mines to be reloaded. Added to this the railway lines on the Rhine are occupied by the enemy and the lines, still at our disposal for the transport of coal are entirely overburdened, because the railway-lines on the left bank of the Rhine are completely cut off.

Bavaria on the right side of the Rhine in time of peace has imported 17000 t. of coal on an average, daily. We reckon that, maintaining our present economy we can just manage with an importation of 10,000 t. Practically we have received nearly 8000 t. in November, 7000 in the first half of December, but in the second half of December only 1100–2000 t. daily. Now already important industries in Bavaria have come to a standstill, others have been obliged to greatly reduce their activity. The demobilization commissioner has ordered a ten days closing down of all industrial works employing more than 10 workers; beginning on December the 23rd, on account of want of coal. The consumption of gas and light has already been reduced to the utmost. Further severe encroachments are to be expected. The want of coal must, if not entirely, so still for a great part, be traced to the difficulties of transport.

The outlook in the future is however still more gloomy.

It may be that at least the masses of the Western Armies will be transported back to their home garrisons by the end of January.

If even then for months a considerable amount of military transport will remain to the Railway-Direction for the distribution of the soldiers, to be discharged from their garrison regiments, home or to their new place of employment; for the bringing back of the Eastern-Army and for the distribution of the army stores, yet the reduction of military traffic will effectively relieve the railways. But opposed to this relief there is the huge lessening of our capability, caused by the delivering up of rolling material.

The situation of the Bavarian Railways is made worse by the fact that the 65 locomotives, hired from the Swiss Confederal Railways, must be returned from the middle of January.

Nevertheless we shall make every effort to fulfil the conditions of the armistice. Unbounded difficulties will still have to be overcome in order to take out from the running-stock the necessary engines and wagons—fit for acceptance—and we are looking forward with great anxiety to the moment when we shall have accomplished it.

We shall then be placed before the possibility of a breakdown of our economical existence.

If the imminent danger of anarchy and bolshevism is to be prevented, it is absolutely necessary to take care that the masses of returning soldiers find work and positions to earn money. This will only be possible if coal, raw-material and food can be distributed all over the country. Instead of this by that time many factories will have used up their very last reserves and numerous industries and perhaps even gas and electricity works and flour-mills will have to close down; the passenger traffic will have to be so greatly reduced that even the economical requirements will not be able to be carried out.

Moreover the Entente themselves do not only not keep to the conditions of the armistice, but render the fulfillment of them more difficult for us in every possible manner.

Contrary to the spirit of the armistice-treaty, the communication between the left and the right bank of the Rhine has been completely cut off, although our industries—especially the locomotive industry and the repairing of locomotives entirely depend on the supply of material from the West and our gas-works are specially fitted up for the use of coal from the Saar-mines.

Recently they have even closed the shunting stations on the bridgeheads to the right of the Rhine, so that now even the coal for the Bavarian railway service (unloading-station Gustavsburg) has not arrived from the Ruhr mines for ten days.

But the Entente for their part, demand a daily delivery of Ruhr coal and coke for the country on the left bank of the Rhine; they even require our supplying coal for a stretch of 200 km with every locomotive delivered up.

The sharper blockade at sea—contradictory to the conditions of the armistice and the stopping of the whole of the Baltic shipping not only increases our need of raw material and food but also overburdens the railways because large transports, which till now have been forwarded by water, are now thrown upon the railway.

Quite exaggerated demands are made by the French Commission at the taking over of the rolling-stock. No consideration is taken of Germany having had to makeshift with substitute materials to a great extent for the construction and the maintenance of rolling stock during the war, (manufacture of the fire-boxes of the locomotives out of iron instead of copper, the using of inferior material for the bearings, of inferior train oil, etc.) and that therefore the number of serviceable rolling-stock has sunk extraordinarily. Now the Receiving Commission also refuses a great number of the serviceable engines and wagons on account of very small faults (e. g. passenger carriages with broken window panes, locomotives with small defects in the bearings, etc.)

Moreover all goods trucks that have not been examined for three years, are refused without further ado. The time for the examination of goods trucks having been fixed at five years during the war in

Germany; this new demand of the Entente will exclude from the very beginning two-fifths of the whole of our rolling stock from acceptance.

Germany has [*had*] at one time captured numerous Belgian and French locomotives and wagons. This rolling material must be returned, but is to be credited to the number of wagons we are obliged to deliver up. The Receiving Commission makes the greatest difficulties at the acceptance of this material. They object if German substitute parts (German buffers and German pistons) have been used for the repairs; on the other hand we have nothing but German material for restoring these wagons.

The delivery of the locomotives and wagons and the returning of the rolling stock refused in great number by the Receiving Commission is complicated by the fact that important crossings and lines of communication over the Rhine are blocked by the Entente besides many other unnecessary annoyances in the service being made.

So there is the danger that the Entente themselves make it impossible for us to meet the conditions of the armistice treaty properly.

² Former German Ambassador in the United States.

³ Enclosure 2, *infra*.

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[139] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

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Paris , January 8, 1919.

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[143] The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 13, 1919. [Received January 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 864.00/36

***Terms of the Armistice With Austria-Hungary,
Signed November 3, 1918 1***

(A) MILITARY CLAUSES

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities by land and sea and air.
2. Total demobilization of Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian forces operating on front from North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory limited as in clause 3, below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a maximum of 20 divisions reduced to prewar effectives.

Half the divisional corps and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in territories to be evacuated by Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commander in chief of allied forces on each front, of Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to north of Stelvio it will follow crest of Rhetian. Alps to sources of the Adige and Eisach, passing thence by the Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Ziller.

The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach as far as present frontier of Carnic Alps. It follows this line as far as Mount Tarvis, thence to watershed of Julian Alps by Col de Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou) and watershed Podberdo, Podlaniscan, and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save River and its tributaries; from Schneeberg it descends the coast in such, a

way as to include Castua, Mattuglia, and Volosca in evacuated territories.

It will follow the administrative limits of present Province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tribania and to the south, territory limited by a line from the shore of Cape Planka to the summits of watershed eastward so as to include in evacuated area all the valleys and watercourses flowing toward Sebenico, such as Cicola, Karka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago, and Puntadura Islands, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzolä, Cazza, and Lagosta as well as neighboring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of great and small Zirona, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by allied and American troops.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left *in situ*, and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by commander in chief of forces of associated powers on different fronts.

No new destruction, pillage, or requisition by enemy troops in territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by associated powers.

4. Allied armies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and water ways in Austro-Hungarian territory which shall be necessary.

Armies of associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for troops of associated powers wherever they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days not only from Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary before that date.

6. Administration of evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will provisionally be intrusted to local authorities under control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

7. Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war and interned allied subjects and of civilian populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by commanders in chief of forces of allied powers on various fronts.

8. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with medical material required.

(B) NAVAL CONDITIONS

1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that free navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

2. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between years 1910 and 1918 and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under supervision of the Allies.

3. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers,

9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

All other surface war ships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off, completely disarmed, and placed under supervision of Allies and United States of America.

4. Free navigation to all war ships and merchant ships of allied and associated powers to be given in Adriatic, in territorial waters, and up River Danube and its tributaries, and Austro-Hungarian territory.

Allies and associated powers shall have right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions, and positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure free navigation on the Danube, Allies and United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

5. Existing blockade conditions set up by allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture with the exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by Allies and United States.

6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by Allies and United States of America.

7. Evacuation of all the Italian coast, and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment, and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

8. Occupation by Allies and United States of America of land and sea fortifications and islands which form defenses, and of dockyards and arsenals at Pola.

9. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to Allies and associated powers to be returned.

10. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

11. All naval and mercantile prisoners of war of allied and associated powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, signify their approval of above conditions:

November 3, 1918.

Representatives of Austro-Hungarian supreme command

VICTOR WEBER, EDLER VON
WEBENAU

KARL SCHNELLER

Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN

J. V. NYÉKHEGYI

ZWIERKOWSKI

VICTOR FREIHERR VON SEILLER

KAMILLO RUGGERA

Representatives of Italian supreme command

Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO

Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE
SCIPIONI

Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI

Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA

Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA

Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI

Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO
ACCINNI

SUPPLEMENT TO PROTOCOL

Contains details and executive clauses of certain points of the armistice between the allied and associated powers and Austria-Hungary.

(I) MILITARY CLAUSES

1. Hostilities on land, sea, and air, will cease on all Austro-Hungarian fronts 24 hours after the signing of the armistice, i. e., at 3 o'clock on November 4 (Central European time).

From that hour the Italian and allied troops will not advance beyond the line then reached.

The Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must retire to a distance of at least 3 kilometers (as the crow flies) from the line reached by the Italian troops or by troops of allied countries. Inhabitants of the 3-kilometer zone included between the two lines (above-mentioned) will be able to obtain necessary supplies from their own army or those of the Allies.

All Austro-Hungarian troops who may be at the rear of the fighting lines reached by the Italian troops, on the cessation of hostilities must be regarded as prisoners of war.

2. Regarding the clauses included in articles 2 and 3 concerning artillery equipment and war material to be either collected in places indicated or left in territories which are to be evacuated, the Italian plenipotentiaries representing all the allied and associated powers, give to the said clauses the following interpretation, which will be carried into execution:

(a) Any material or part thereof which may be used for the purpose of war must be given up to the allied and associated powers. The Austro-Hungarian army and the German troops are only authorized to take personal arms and equipment belonging to troops evacuating the territories mentioned in article 3, besides officers' chargers, the transport train, and horses specially allotted to each unit for transport of food supplies, kitchens, officers' luggage, and medical material. This clause applies to the whole army and to all the services.

(b) Concerning artillery, it has been arranged that the Austro-Hungarian army and German troops shall abandon all artillery material and equipment in the territory to be evacuated.

The calculations necessary for obtaining a complete and exact total of the artillery divisions and army corps at the disposal of Austro-Hungary on the cessation of hostilities (half of which must be given up to the associated powers) will be made later, in order to arrange,

if necessary, for the delivery of other Austro-Hungarian artillery material and for the possible eventual return of material to the Austro-Hungarian army by the allied and associated armies.

All artillery which does not actually form part of the divisional artillery and army corps must be given up, without exception. It will not, however, be necessary to calculate the amount.

(c) On the Italian front the delivery of divisional and army corps artillery will be effected at the following places: Trento, Bolzano, Pieve di Cadore, Stazione per la Carnia, Tolmino, Gorizia, and Trieste.

3. Special commissions will be selected by the commanders in chief of allied and associated armies on the various Austro-Hungarian fronts, which will immediately proceed, accompanied by the necessary escorts, to the places they regard as the most suitable from which to control the execution of the provisions established above.

4. It has been determined that the designations M. Toblach and M. Tarvis indicate the groups of mountains dominating the ridge of Toblach Mountains and the Valley of Tarvis.

5. The retirement of Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies beyond the lines indicated in article 3 of the protocol of armistice conditions, will take place within 15 days of the cessation of hostilities, as far as the Italian front is concerned.

On the Italian front, Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must have retired beyond the line Tonale–Noce–Lavis–Avisio–Pordoi–Lavinallongo–Falzarego–Pieve di Cadore–Colle Mauria–Alto Tagliamento–Fella–Raccolana–Selle Nevea–Isonzo by the fifth day; they must also have evacuated the Dalmatian territory indicated above.

Austro-Hungarian troops on land and sea, or those of her allies, not having evacuated the territories indicated within the period of 15 days will be regarded as prisoners of war.

6. The payment of any requisitions made by the armies of the allied and associated armies on Austro-Hungarian territory will be carried out according to paragraph 1 of page 227 of “Servizio in Guerra—Part II, Edizione 1915,” actually in force in the Italian army.

7. As regards railways and the exercise of the rights confirmed upon the associated powers by article 4 of the armistice agreement between the allied powers and Austria-Hungary it has been determined that the transport of troops, war material, and supplies for allied and associated powers on the Austro-Hungarian railway system, outside territory evacuated in accordance with the terms of the armistice, and the direction and working of the railways shall be effected by the employees of the Austro-Hungarian railway administration, under the supervision of special commissioners selected by the allied powers, and the military Italian headquarters which it will be considered necessary to establish, the Austro-Hungarian authorities will give priority to allied military trains and will guarantee their safety.

8. On territory to be evacuated at the cessation of hostilities all mines on roads or railway tracts, all mine fields and other devices for interrupting communications by road or rail must be rendered inactive and harmless.

9. Within a period of eight days from the cessation of hostilities, prisoners and Italian subjects interned in Austria-Hungary must cease all work, except in the case of prisoners and interned who have been employed in agricultural pursuits previous to the day on which the armistice was signed. In any case they must be ready to leave at once on request of the commander in chief of the Italian Army.

10. Austria-Hungary must provide for the protection, safety, and supplies (expenses of these to be repaid) of the various commissions selected by the allied governments to take over war material and to exercise general control, whether in the territory to be evacuated or in any other part of Austria-Hungary.

(II) NAVAL CLAUSES

1. The hour for the cessation of hostilities by sea will be the same as that of the cessation of hostilities by land and air.

Before that time the Austro-Hungarian Government must have furnished the Italian Government, and those of the associated powers, with the necessary information concerning the position and movements of the Austro-Hungarian ships, through the wireless station at Pola, which will transmit the information to Venice.

2. The units referred to in Articles II and III, to be surrendered to the associated powers, must return to Venice between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. on November 6; they will take a pilot on board 14 miles from the coast. An exception is made as regards the Danube monitors, which will be required to proceed to a port indicated by the commander in chief of the forces of the associated powers on the Balkan front, under such conditions as he may determine.

3. The following ships will proceed to Venice:

<i>Tegikethoff.</i>	<i>Saida.</i>
<i>Prinz Eugen.</i>	<i>Novara.</i>
<i>Ferdinand Max.</i>	<i>Helgoland.</i>

Nine destroyers of the *Tatra* type (at least 800 tons) of most recent construction.

Twelve torpedo boats (200-ton type).

Mine layer *Chamaleon*.

Fifteen submarines built between 1910 and 1918, and all German submarines which are, or may eventually be, in Austro-Hungarian waters.

Premeditated damage, or damage occurring on board the ships to be surrendered will be regarded by the Allied Governments as a grave infringement of the present armistice terms.

The Lago di Garda flotilla will be surrendered to the associated powers in the port of Riva.

All ships to be surrendered to the associated powers will be concentrated in the ports of Buccari and Spalato within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

4. As regards the right of sweeping mine fields and destroying barrages, the Austro-Hungarian Government guarantees to deliver the maps of mine fields and barrages at Pola, Cattaro, and Fiume to the commander of the port of Venice, and to the admiral of the fleet at Brindisi within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities and within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, maps of mine fields and barrages in the Mediterranean and Italian lakes and rivers, with additional notification of such mine fields or barrages laid by order of the German Government as are within their knowledge.

Within the same period of 96 hours a similar communication concerning the Danube and the Black Sea will be delivered to the commander of the associated forces on the Balkan front.

5. The restitution of merchant ships belonging to the associated powers will take place within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, in accordance with the indications determined by each associated power which will be transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The associated powers reserve to themselves the constitution of the commission referred to in Article 5, and of informing the Austro-Hungarian Government of its functions and of the place in which it will meet.

6. The naval base referred to in Article VI is Spalato.

7. The evacuation referred to in Article VII will be effected within the period fixed for the retirement of the troops beyond the armistice lines. There must be no damage to fixed, mobile, or floating material in the ports.

Evacuations may be effected via the Lagoon canals by means of Austro-Hungarian boats which may be brought in from outside.

8. The occupation referred to in Article VIII will take place within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities must guarantee the safety of vessels transporting troops for the occupation of Pola and of islands and other places as provided for in the terms of the armistice for the land Army.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will give directions that the ships belonging to associated powers proceeding to Pola should be met 14 miles out by pilots capable of showing them the safest way into port. All damage to the persons or property of the associated powers will be regarded as a grave infringement of the present armistice terms.

The undersigned duly authorized plenipotentiaries have signified their approval of the above conditions.

November 3, 1918.	<i>Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army</i>	<i>Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Italian Army</i>
	VICTOR WEBER, EDLER VON WEBENAU	Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO
	KARL SCHNELLER	Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI
	Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN	Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTIT
	J. V. NYÉKHEGYI	Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA
	ZWIERKOWSKI	Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA
	VICTOR FREIHERR VON SETTLER	Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI
	KAMILLO RUGGERA	Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI

***Military Convention Between the Allies and Hungary, Signed at Belgrade,
November 13, 1918***

MILITARY CONVENTION REGULATING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE ARMISTICE, SIGNED BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,
IS TO BE APPLIED IN HUNGARY

1. The Hungarian Government will withdraw all troops north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Bistritz, Maros-Vásárhely, the river Maros to its junction with the Theiss, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Fünfkirchen (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia.

The evacuation to be carried out in eight days, the Allies to be entitled to occupy the evacuated territory on the conditions laid down by the general commander in chief of the allied armies. Civil administration will remain in the hands of the Government.

In actual fact only the police and *gendarmérie* will be retained in the evacuated zone, being indispensable to the maintenance of order, and also such men as are required to insure the safety of the railways.

2. Demobilization of Hungarian naval and military forces. An exception will be made in the case of six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order and in the case of small sections of police mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. The Allies to have the right of occupying all places and strategic points, which may be permanently fixed by the general commander in chief of the allied armies.

The allied troops to be allowed to pass through or to remain in any part of Hungary.

The Allies to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock and shipping belonging to the State or to private individuals resident in Hungary, also of all draft animals.

4. The rolling stock and railway staff usually employed in the occupied territory will remain (see paragraph 1), and a reserve of 2,000 wagons and 100 locomotives (normal gauge), and 600 wagons

and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge), will also be handed over within the month to the general commander in chief. These will be for the use of the allied troops and to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. Some portion of this material could be levied from Austria. The figures are approximate.

5. The ships and crews, usually employed in the service of the occupied territory will remain, in addition to monitors will be surrendered to the Allies immediately at Belgrade. The rest of the Danube flotilla will be assembled in one of the Danube ports, to be appointed later by the general commander in chief, and will be disarmed there. A levy of 10 passenger vessels, 10 tugs, and 60 lighters will be made on this flotilla as soon as possible for the use of the allied troops, to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. The figures are approximate.

6. Within 15 days a detachment of 3,000 men from the railway technical troops are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief, supplied with the material necessary to repair the Serbian railways. These figures are approximate.

7. Within 15 days a detachment of sappers of the telegraph branch are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief provided with material necessary for establishing telegraphic and telephone communications with Serbia.

8. Within one month, 25,000 horses are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief, together with such transport material as he may deem necessary. These figures are approximate.

9. Arms and war material to be deposited at places appointed by the general commander in chief. A portion of this material will be levied for the purpose of supplying units to be placed under the orders of the general commander in chief.

10. Immediate liberation of all allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, who will be collected at places convenient for their dispatch by rail. They will there receive directions as to time and place of repatriation, according to the orders issued by the general

commander in chief. Hungarian prisoners of war to be provisionally retained.

11. A delay of 15 days is granted for the passage of German troops through Hungary and their quartering meanwhile, dating from the signing of the armistice by Gen. Diaz (Nov. 4, 3 p.m.). Postal and telegraphic communication with Germany will only be permitted under the military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government undertakes to allow no military telegraphic communication with Germany.

12. Hungary will facilitate the supplying of the allied troops of occupation; requisitions will be allowed on condition that they are not arbitrary and that they are paid for at current rates.

13. The situation of all Austro-Hungarian mines in the Danube and the Black Sea must be communicated immediately to the general commander in chief. Further, the Hungarian Government undertakes to stop the passage of all floating mines sown in the Danube upstream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian waters.

14. The Hungarian postal service, telegraphs, telephones, and railways will be placed under allied control.

15. An allied representative will be attached to the Hungarian ministry of supplies in order to safeguard allied interests.

16. Hungary is under an obligation to cease all relations with Germany and stringently to forbid the passage of German troops to Roumania.

17. The Allies shall not interfere with the internal administration of affairs in Hungary.

18. Hostilities between Hungary and the Allies are at an end.

Two copies made November 13, 1918, at 11.15 p.m., at Belgrade.

Signed for the Allies by the delegates of the general commander in
chief.

VOIVODE MISHITCH
GEN. HENRYS

Signed for Hungary by the delegates^{1a} of the Hungarian Government.

BÉLA LINDER

¹ Reprinted from S. Doc. 147, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16; the convention *infra* is also reprinted from S. Doc. 147. Copies of the French text of the Armistice with Austria-Hungary and the military convention certified as authentic by M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, may be found under file No. 763.72119/6664. For correspondence concerning the Austro-Hungarian armistice negotiations, see [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 341–447](#) [☞] *passim*.

^{1a} This word appears in the singular in the authentic text.

763.72/12259

[Document 111]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

No. 5512

WASHINGTON , November 12, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I received on the 10th instant the following cablegram from the Royal Swedish Foreign Office:^{[2](#)}

“On the request of the Government of Austria-Hungary, you will make to the Government of the United States the following communication:

“According to information, German military forces have occupied Salesbourg [*Salzburg?*] in Tyrol. Besides other serious objection, there is ground to feel that it will involve awkward consequences for Austria-Hungary in consideration of the armistice terms. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin has been instructed to protest against the entrance of German troops into territory of Austria-Hungary. A like protest has been lodged with the German high command.”

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

^{[2](#)} The following is a translation of the French text quoted by the Minister.

763.72119/2634: Telegram

[Document 112]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 14, 1918—12 noon.
[Received November 15—10:25 p.m.]

2346. In connection with claims allied countries at approaching peace conference, a revival has been discussed in Italian newspaper of Mazzini's idea regarding territorial expansion of Switzerland. Paper states that inhabitants of part of Alsace-Lorraine and part of Tyrol may wish to become Swiss, and in quotation from Swiss papers, it is stated that the Tyrolese Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein would prefer unite with Switzerland rather than Germany. It is not known whether such a solution of Tyrolese problem would please Italy, but some think it might as it would enlarge buffer between Italian Trentino and Germany. From what I hear of Swiss attitude towards such enlargement, Switzerland may be behind above-mentioned suggestion. I know that she is looking forward hopefully to extending her confines.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/2635: Telegram

[Document 113]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 15, 1918—noon.
[Received November 16—12:15 a.m.]

2356. My 2347 [2346?].³ In conversation with Swiss Minister, he said that he has had no instructions from his Government on the subject but Switzerland, he believes, would be willing to take in the small part of the Tyrol known as Vorarlberg, if the population there were substantially unanimous in desiring it, but would not be willing to go beyond this. To take in Tyrol would change completely the character of Switzerland.

NELSON PAGE

³ *Supra.*

763.72119/2643: Telegram

[Document 114]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 16, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received November 17—10:48 p.m.]

2366. My 2356, November 15. I received today memorandum from Swiss Minister⁴ referring to conversation I had with him, see 2345 [2356?],³ and concerning question of uniting with Switzerland Vorarlberg and Tyrol, which has been [discussed] in press. He evidently wished to put in writing his position regarding matter, stating that if Vorarlberg should ask to be united with Switzerland, the Federal Government would examine seriously question, taking inspiration from President Wilson's principles that Vorarlberg is territory more united Switzerland than to Austria and at the present moment he understands petition being circulated among population Vorarlberg in favor incorporation into Switzerland Swiss Government, however, not yet approached on matter. Swiss would not refuse to examine desires neighbor populations, though has never expressed a wish of territorial expansion. He does not think question uniting Tyrol to Switzerland will arise. This memorandum closes with reference to fact that Switzerland, the small model society of nations, is happy to be able to count on sympathy and comprehension of great American democracy, which phrase, I think, refers to apprehended possibility that hereafter Italy might ask Switzerland to return to her Italian Ticino Canton, taking Tyrol as compensation.

NELSON PAGE

⁴ *Post*, p. 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)].

3 *Supra.*

763.72119/2730

[Document 115]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that my Government has been requested by the Government of German Austria to transmit to the Government of the United States the following communication.⁵

“Under the terms of the armistice the Imperial German troops must vacate the territory of Austria-Hungary within 15 days or be disarmed and interned.

It is very hard for German Austria strictly to carry out this provision. German Austria is deeply interested in leaving in possession of their offices in Vienna, the representatives of the German chief of the military railway service, the German supervising office in Vienna and the representative of the Prussian War Office (the latter meaning a personnel of 3 officers, 1 representative of the office, and 7 non-commissioned officers and privates) as their activities in promoting the smooth working of the railway transportation and in economic questions are highly important.

As the German Government has now also concluded an armistice with the Entente, we beg you to obtain the Entente Governments' consent to the continuation of the German missions. The matter is extremely urgent, as the time limit set for the Germans expires on November 17.”

Accept [etc].

HANS SULZER

5 The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised.

863.48/125a: Telegram

[Document 116]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918—5 p.m.

40. The Swedish Minister has confidentially transmitted to me a copy and [sic] urgent appeal addressed to the Associated Governments by the representatives of neutral powers in Vienna as follows:

“From the most reliable sources I have gathered that a revolution is on the point of breaking out in Vienna upon the inspiration and the attitude of the most radical elements of the socialistic party.

According to my opinion it is of the utmost importance that it should be pointed out to the Allied Governments in the most confidential manner that the moment has come to employ the means accorded the armies of the Entente in Art. 4, par. B of the Armistice convention of the 3rd of November.

The occupation by the Allied forces of Vienna as a strategic base should immediately put a stop to the sinister movement which may menace, as in Russia, the foundation of Society.

Under the menace of developments of such grave consequences the representatives of the different neutral nations at Vienna have convened under the presidency of His Excellency the Papal Nuncio and have resolved that the above communication should, be made to their governments”.

The Swedish Minister has also transmitted the following communication from the Austrian Government:

“Famine is threatening Vienna and other parts [parts] of the country. Prompt action is necessary to remedy the situation. It is requested that the Commission referred to in the Armistice in Article 5 of the sea terms be instituted as soon as possible. We ask of that commission that it allow a number of Austrian and Hungarian ships to sail to Argentina, the United States of America and the Indies for wheat, meat, and lard. The detailed program will be submitted to the Commission. It is requested that the Commission’s headquarters be at a place where it will be easy for us to communicate with it.”

The Swiss Minister has today presented two communications on the Austrian situation as follows:⁶

“The situation in Austria is very grave. The Commander of the forces in the Tyrol was compelled to instruct the troops in the Southern Tyrol not to withdraw North on account of the shortage of food supplies. He earnestly requests the Entente Powers to occupy the Tyrol without delay, and to take steps for the revictualling of the army and the population. The Tyrolese National Council has made a similar urgent appeal, claiming this measure to be the only means of saving army and population from impending death by starvation and destruction. The papal nuncio at Vienna has called a meeting for the purpose of soliciting the intervention of the neutrals in favor of the revictualling of the city of Vienna which has only food up to and including November 14th. Switzerland would willingly do everything possible to avert this terrible catastrophe, but her stocks are very low and the pledges given to the Entente Powers render it impossible for her to take any action.”

“I have the honor to inform your Excellency that my Government has been requested to bring to the attention of the Government of the United States the following propositions, formulated by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a view to facilitate the revictualling of Austria-Hungary:

- 1) To direct to Trieste, by radio, vessels of the Entente Powers carrying foodstuffs, especially flour and fats;
- 2) To authorize the departure of Austrian and Hungarian vessels, actually lying in Spanish ports, ports of the Adriatic, and the Black Sea, for the purpose of carrying food supplies to Trieste; and to supply these vessels at Pola with the necessary bunkers from Entente stocks;
- 3) To suspend the blockade for these transports in conformity with paragraph 5 of the terms of the Armistice;
- 4) To accompany, by troops of the Entente powers, trains carrying foodstuffs from Trieste to Vienna and other parts in want of food supplies;
- 5) To utilize as much as possible also the Arlberg route for the transportation of foodstuffs and to have such trains likewise escorted by Entente troops.”

LANSING

⁶ These two communications were forwarded by the Swiss Government as intermediary only. The Swiss Minister, in his note of Nov. 15, 1918, transmitting the first of these messages, stated that it had been originally forwarded by the Swiss Government Nov. 6, but that it had failed to reach him at that time (863.48/40).

763.72119/2676

[Document 117]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

No. 5582

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to request Your Excellency to kindly transmit the following message of the Austrian Government, which I have received today through my Government, to the President of the United States:⁷

“Mr. President: The Provisional National Assembly of German Austria on November 12, 1918, unanimously resolved to constitute German Austria into a democratic Republic which is to form part of the Great German Republic. The German people of Austria, in the exercise of their right of self-determination, have thus made it known that they will not henceforth be subjected to any executive power other than that set up by themselves and that they want to restore the close political connection with Germany which, fifty-two years ago, was rent asunder by the sword. We hope, Mr. President, that you will give your support to these endeavors of the German people of Austria, in accordance with the principles so often proclaimed by you. You, Mr. President, have championed the right of the Poles, Italians and Jugo-Slavs who hitherto belonged to the Austrian State to unite with their National States outside of Austria. We are convinced that you will also concede the same right to the German people of Austria. We beg you, Mr. President, to offer us the earliest opportunity to enter upon preliminary peace negotiations. The Council of State of the German Austrian Republic is exclusively empowered to conduct those negotiations in our name; the powers of the former Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have expired. The Austro-Hungarian Missions

abroad are provisionally empowered to represent the Council of State until the German Austrian Republic organizes a representative corps of its own. We have read with special attention the warning given by you, Mr. President, to the liberated peoples of Austria to be firm and cautious.⁸ Our Government, which consists of representatives of all the parties in German Austria, has thus far fully succeeded in its efforts to maintain order and liberty in our land. These efforts however are at present hampered by the severe lack of food which prevails in our country. The continuance of the blockade threatens the German people of Austria with a danger all the more serious as the Slav National States which grew out of the soil of Austria also lock out the German Austrian Republic and refuse to deliver to the German Austrian industrials the surplus of their agricultural products. Under those circumstances a hunger catastrophe hangs over the German Austrian Republic. We therefore take note with the greatest satisfaction of your willingness, Mr. President, to come to the relief of German Austria by sending food products and beg you kindly to afford that relief with the utmost dispatch. Accept, Mr. President, the expression of our most distinguished consideration.

The Foreign Office of the German Austrian Republic. Dr. Bauer”

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

⁷ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised. A translation of this note was sent to Colonel House in Department’s telegram No. 83, Nov. 27, 1918, 4 p.m.

⁸ See telegram No. 3275, Nov. 5, 1918, 4 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 470](#) .

863.00/112: Telegram

[Document 118]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 18, 1918—9 p.m.

46. The Swiss Minister, by direction of his Government, has delivered to the Department the following strictly confidential communication:^{[8a](#)}

“In view of the revolution which threatens to break out at Vienna under the leadership of the extreme socialist party, the diplomatic representatives of the neutral countries at Vienna, under the presidency of the Papal Nuncio, decided to recommend to their Governments the immediate intervention with the powers of the Entente with a view to request the occupation, as a strategical point, of the city of Vienna by Entente forces, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the terms of the armistice. This measure alone could guarantee order.”

Advise Dept. of action contemplated.

LANSING

^{[8a](#)} This communication was forwarded by the Swiss Government as intermediary only.

763.72119/2865

[Document 119]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

No. 1060

ROME , November 18, 1918.
[Received December 3.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 2366, of November 16, 1918, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the letter which was received from the Swiss Minister in Rome.

I have [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure]

The Swiss Minister in Italy (Wagniere) to the American Ambassador in Italy (Page)

ROME , November 15, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: Referring to the conversation which I had the honour to have with you yesterday evening, I feel anxious to give you some particular details about the question concerning the relations between Switzerland, the Vorarlberg and Tyrol.

At first I should like to point out to you that I never expressed to your Excellency the desire of seeing Switzerland increased by new territories. To the question which was put to me by a member of the Embassy, if I remember well it was Mr. Richardson, I answered that if the population of the Vorarlberg should ask with overwhelming majority to be united with Switzerland, I thought that my

Government would have to examine seriously the question, taking inspiration from the principles of the right of the peoples to dispose themselves of their fate, affirmed with so much authority by the President Wilson.

The Vorarlberg is a territory which, from a point of view of geography, is really more united to Switzerland than it is to Austria. All its rivers run naturally into the Swiss part of the zone of the Rhine. In the course of history it was already once conquered [*conquered*] and made part of the Confederation for some time. The man language. But for the moment it seems that it has not manifested in a positive manner its desire to be incorporated into Switzerland. The only movement was to send a Delegation to Switzerland with the object of asking for provisions. We also know that a petition is actually circulating among the population in favour of an incorporation of the country into Switzerland. My Government has not yet had an occasion to deal with the matter and the Swiss newspapers have expressed different views on the subject.

Concerning the Tyrol, the idea of joining this country to Switzerland has had its birth in the foreign press. Neither on the Tyrolese, nor on the Swiss side, the desire of a union has been expressed and I think that this idea will not be taken up.

The whole Tyrol, as it was until now understood by Austria, had a million inhabitants and inclosed the Trentino and the Vorarlberg.

Putting the Vorarlberg apart and after the taking possession by Italy of the whole Trentino to the chain of the Alps, which latter is composed of 380,000 inhabitants of Italian language and about 100 to 200,000 inhabitants of German language, the rest of the Tyrol is formed by the about 180 kilometres long and partly narrow valley of the Inn, running from the Arlberg towards Kufstein. This remainder of the Tyrol would have about 300,000 inhabitants all of (hem of German language.

In any case, Switzerland would not refuse to examine the desires of her neighbour populations, but it has never expressed the wish of a territorial increase and in no case it could consent to enter into

discussion with the Powers on the subject of whatever modification of her own actual territory.

I beg to thank especially your Excellency for the interest which you take in my country. In the moment, in which the nationalism, put on so an exclusive ethnical scale, menaces in Europe to continue the rivalry and provoke new fights, it is precious that the small model of the Society of Nations, which is formed by Switzerland and founded on democracy and on the respect of individualities and which has resisted to the prove [*test*] of centuries, should be able to count on the sympathy and the comprehension of the great American Democracy.

I beg to remain [etc.]

WAGNIERE

763.72119/2727: Telegram

[Document 120]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), November 19, 1918.
[Received November 21—7:27 a.m.]

5844. Austro-Hungarian Legation here has received despatch transmitted by Bauer, Representative for Foreign Affairs, addressed to President Wilson by the Friedengesellschaft Bereitschaft [sic] of Vienna, message follows:

“We hail with all our hearts the coming of the final world salvation from the cruelties of war. At all times and during the whole war we unfailingly professed the idea of the Confederation of nations convinced that by it alone a lasting peace might be secured. To its creation and vitality it is however indispensable that justice should be granted to every nation and that no parts of a nation inhabiting contiguous settlements or larger districts of the same tongue should be submitted to any other nation. This ought to be the rule for the German parts of the population in Bohemia, Moravia, Tyrol and so on as for any parts of other nations. The nation itself must decide in free voting controlled by neutrals to which state they will belong. A humiliation and exploitation of a people as punishment for the crimes committed by their sovereigns would contradict the nature of the world confederation and make its realization impossible. You we entreat as the most powerful proclaimer and supporter of the idea of the world confederation to direct your influence to the fact that no nation should lose its full unlimited right of self determination for reasons of retaliation or that their free will should be sophisticated [sic] by abusing their present distress.”

STOVALL

864.00/27: Telegram

[Document 121]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), November 19, 1918.
[Received November 21—2:13 p.m.]

5849. Following is translation of telegram for the President handed to me by former member of Austro-Hungarian Legation in Berne at present special representative of Count Karolyi of Hungary.

“Mr. President: It is with profound emotion and with a heart full of gratitude that the National Hungarian Council and Hungarian Government have learned of message which Your Excellency addressed to those people who until now formed a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and which was transmitted to the people of Hungary.⁹ This message freed our souls and justified our moral consciences, since it proved peremptorily that of which we were always convinced, namely that the peoples of Hungary could count on the generosity of the western democracy from the moment in which it threw off the yoke of feudal regime and joined with all its forces the movement which wishes to regulate the internal and international life of peoples on the foundation of moral justice and integral equality. The victorious revolution of the Hungarian people has abolished the institutions which falsified and corrupted its own wishes. It has eliminated at the same time all the culpable politicians who oppress the people and who directly or indirectly declared, sustained and continued the most nefarious of wars. Finally it has intrusted the power to men [who] have for a long time been the pioneers of democracy in Hungary and who will do their best to justify this confidence. These men Mr. President, have adhered from the first moment without reserve and with

enthusiasm and gratitude to the principles which Your Excellency proclaimed to civilized humanity and which constitute the only possible and fertile foundation of international life. These fourteen articles are the only solid and just foundation of an equitable and rational political condition for the government of Hungary, the only solution of the internal problems which have existed for such a long time in our country.

Your Excellency will certain[ly] permit men who have had such a past to address themselves to you with full confidence, Mr. President, and through [your] person to the civilized world and to bring to your attention the very serious condition in which our country, our nation and our young Hungarian democracy finds itself. This war declared without any scruples and prolonged with most culpable thoughtlessness has destroyed the economic life of Hungary and is pushing its social organization towards an abyss. The victorious revolution has put an end to the war and has thanks to an exemplary discipline been able to preserve order in the greater part of the country and above all in the capital. Nevertheless the new democratic regime perceives itself exposed to imminent dangers. On one side our frontiers are seriously menaced by armed troops who making pretexts of the known pretensions of their respective states but evidently without authority are preparing to invade a certain region of Hungary and to occupy a series of boroughs and communities. The population of these regions ignorant of the circumstances and lacking besides democratic discipline are turning the entire district into a disastrous and terrible anarchy. On the other hand an economic catastrophe is likewise menacing our country. Unless we have the possibility of importing coal from the exterior our factories will stop, and our railroads which will have been deteriorated by the long war will be forced to suspend their service. It is then that famine will spread over all of Hungary. Such is our situation. We bring it to your attention Mr. President in all sincerity and we add that our only hope, our only confidence, lies in that solidarity of

civilized peoples in which we have always had faith even in the darkest days of the war.

Mr. President we appeal to your feeling and through your person to all the civilized nations of the world. Come to the assistance of the young Hungarian democracy. Supported [*Support it?*] in its efforts to restore and to rebuild the internal and external situation of Hungary on the basis of right and justice. Help us in this severe struggle against dissolution and against the menace of anarchy. If there is no other means allowed to our country a provisional peace while waiting for the final peace. We have full confidence and an absolute trust in the eternal solidarity of democracy. The only wish of the Hungarian nation is to avoid, to prevent and to render impossible the anarchy which threatens to engulf us, and at the same time to become a peaceful sincere and loyal member of the league of nations. We beg all civilized peoples and most particularly Your Excellency to listen to the appeal of the Hungarian nation which having broken the chains of tyranny is now working for its renaissance.

Accept Mr. President the expression of our very high esteem and our very sincere confidence. Signed Count Michael Karolyi, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, countersigned Bauer.”

STOVALL

⁹ See telegram No. 3275, Nov. 5, 1918, 4 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland, [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 470*](#) .

763.72119/2858

[Document 122]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

No. 5861

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: By request of the Foreign Department of the recently established Austro-German republic the following telegraphic appeal has by the Royal Foreign Office at Stockholm been forwarded to me for transmission to the President of the United States.

May I ask for Your Excellency's good offices in order that the desire of the applicants be granted.^{[10](#)}

“To the President of the United States of North America, Mr. Woodrow Wilson:

“The provisional Government of Halycz the province of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire united to an independent Ukrainian State permits itself, aware of the call issued by you, Mr. President, to the peoples now freed from the oppression of the former Monarchy, to address to you, Mr. President, the following appeal for support.

“On constituting our State at Lemberg on October 19 of this year we drew the boundary line of our State which is only provisional pending your decision, Mr. President, taking pains to avoid any usurpation even of a strip of land whose population is not Ukrainian by an overwhelming majority, in keeping with the 14 righteous principles laid down by you, Mr. President, within that line, the National Council representing the State is endeavoring to maintain order and shrinks in horror from any inhuman act and any improper forcible use of the power it holds. It finds this task all the more arduous as

the four and a half million Ukrainians heretofore oppressed in East Galicia especially by the Poles, in Hungary by the Magyars and in Bukowina by the Roumanians are, as may be easily understood, actuated in the great mass of the people by an impulse to shake off as soon as possible and without waiting for peaceable development of the changed conditions, the foreign and national administrative and economic system of oppression residing in the mastery of the Polish and Magyar nobility in former East Galicia and in Hungary. The exasperation of the masses of our Ukrainian population is further fanned by the action of a Polish adjustment Commission which has set itself up at Cracow in the name of the Polish Government at Warsaw and is striving with the manifest tacit consent of the former Austrian Emperor to bring about the annexation of all Galicia, that is to say also the Ukrainian provinces of the San and the Lemkowczyzna.

“With our own Ukrainian forces and not as has been falsely represented to you, Mr. President, by the Warsaw Government, with German or Hungarian military forces, but thanks to the unexampled selfsacrificing spirit of our Ukrainian population we are defending our historic Ukrainian land on which a free democratic entity is to thrive as intended by you, Mr. President, and now troops sent by the Polish Government are trying to subject us again to foreign domination. On the other hand Roumania will, by the power of her regular army, gain possession of the whole of Bukowina, including the North and Northwest parts exclusively inhabited by Ukrainians. In both cases the principles you, Mr. President, magnanimously set up for the heretofore oppressed peoples are ignored. These we can most scrupulously fulfill and we beseech your intervention, Mr. President, so that without resorting to violence your final verdict and that of the Peace Conference concerning the ultimate demarcation of the boundaries of the new States, to which we Ukrainians unreservedly bow, may bring to us the coveted deliverance from foreign rule and give us existence as a free democratic State. Bolshevism and Nihilism have no footing in our Nation. These were but the offspring of a

desperate mind and would make their appearance if the Ukrainian Nation were forsaken by the new triumphant democracies led by you, Mr. President, and again delivered up to its former foreign masters.

“For the provisional Government of the Ukrainian State of Halycz,

“Dr. Petruszewicz
“President of the National Council.”

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

¹⁰ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister.

763.72119/2730

[Document 123]

The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

No. 292

WASHINGTON , November 29, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated the 16th instant regarding the evacuation of the territory of Austria-Hungary by German troops within the period fixed by the terms of the armistice and to inform you that the substance of the communication from the Government of German Austria therein contained has been brought to the attention of the competent authorities of this Government. I beg to state, however, that this communication was received after the expiration of the period fixed by the terms of the armistice for the evacuation of the territory of Austria by German troops; namely, the 17th instant.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/2877

[Document 124]

***President Wilson to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Phillips)***

WASHINGTON , 30 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received the copy in translation of the note received from the Minister of Sweden, in charge of the Austro-Hungarian interests in the United States, dated November 16th, 1918, and communicating a message addressed to me from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Austrian Republic regarding the formation of a Republic of German Austria, and beg that you will acknowledge the receipt of it by me to the Swedish Minister and ask him to say that I will of course take it under the most serious consideration in the conferences to be held in Paris.^{[11](#)}

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[11](#)} Department's acknowledgment not printed.

763.72119/2900

[Document 125]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

No. 5945

WASHINGTON , November 30, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: By order of my Government I have the honor to ask Your Excellency kindly to communicate to the President of the United States the following telegram from the Swedish Minister in Vienna to the Foreign Office in Stockholm.^{[12](#)}

“Have just received the following note from the Department of Foreign Affairs of German Austria:

“Vienna, November 26, 1918.

“The Department of Foreign Affairs of German Austria has the honor to draw the attention of the diplomatic missions of the neutral states to a series of attempts committed lately by the troops of the Czecho-Slovak state on the integrity of the national territory and on the life and property of the purely German-born population.

The southern parts of Bohemia and Moravia were mainly subjected to armed raids by the Czecho-Slovaks. Without the slightest regard for the situation, precarious as it is already, of the population, sorely tried by famine, the raiders did not hesitate either to lay hand on what remained of food and the necessities of life, or to stop the shipment to Vienna of the merchandise indispensable to the needs of that capital. Public officers have been assaulted, constrained by oath to take allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak State, and threatened, if they refused, with prosecution on the charge of high treason. Many have been kidnapped, among whom was Monsieur Soukup, a

member of the legislative body; finally, the acts of violence in which the Czechoslovak troops indulged, resulted in the death of several sentries and even that of a public officer, killed while he was discharging his duties. In this way, the Czechoslovak troops are introducing the scourge of civil war in peaceable regions, spreading horror and misery and still renewing the warlike acts which henceforth are hateful to the whole civilized world. The German Austrian State, of course, did not fail to take, repeatedly, appropriate and urgent steps with the diplomatic representative of the Czechoslovak Republic at Vienna, with a view to stopping those aggressions. But notwithstanding its representations and protests repeatedly made and supported by official and detailed statements, the above-mentioned facts continue to occur day after day. Now German Austria, earnestly wishing the return of peace and asking for nothing better than to live in harmony with all its neighbors, abhors any territorial dispute between any free and sovereign nations. It fully adopts the principles of world-wide alliance of the civilized peoples and would have the end of disputed territories determined either by the peace conference or the free and independent vote of the people. It believes, nevertheless, that whatever differences of that character can be amicably settled, neighboring states should give reciprocal evidence of fairness and maintain a peaceful attitude by avoiding all acts of violence on their respective borders. As for itself German Austria, while energetically protesting against the attempts committed by the Czechoslovaks on the integrity of their territory and the vital interests of its citizens, confines itself to appeal to the intervention of all the free and civilized peoples to the end that the Czechoslovak Republic be asked to refrain from any encroachment and to respect its neighbor's inalienable rights of humanity and national sovereignty that it justly invokes for its own sake.

The Department of Foreign Affairs begs the diplomatic missions of the neutral states kindly to make the foregoing known to the Governments represented by them. The Department of Foreign Affairs takes the liberty of making,

particularly to the representatives of the powers which, during the war, kindly assumed the protection of Austro-Hungarian interests in the enemy states, the special request that they will kindly forward without delay, this communication to the President of the United States of America, and to the several Governments of the Entente.”

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

¹² The following is a translation of the French text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised.

763.72119/2910

[Document 126]

***The Italian Chargé (Miniscalchi-Erizzo) to the
Acting Secretary of State [12a](#)***

WASHINGTON , December 4, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: In order to better ensure the Austro-Hungarian demobilization, to facilitate the reimpatriation of interned subjects and war prisoners, to gather data that may be of use at the Peace Conference, and to exercise the control of railways, the Supreme Command would deem it necessary to establish at Vienna a Central Commission with Sub-Commission for its various branches. The Central Commission as well as the Sub-Commissions, should include representatives of the Allies for all questions pertaining to them.

As it appears urgent to put this plan into effect, leaving it to the superior officers indicated by the Supreme Command to determine its modalities, its constitution and its functions, I am requested by the Royal Government to call, with the least possible delay, the attention of the United States Government on this matter, and to recommend that they participate in the said Commissions.

I shall therefore be much obliged to you for a reply as early as practicable on this subject, that I would hasten to communicate to Rome.

Thanking you in advance, I am [etc.]

F. MINISCALCHI

[12a](#) Transmitted to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 147, Dec. 7, 1918, 9 p.m. (not printed).

763.72/12560

[Document 127]

The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Austro-German Government has communicated the following message to the Swedish Government:^{[13](#)}

“The Commander of the Yugoslav troops in Carinthia has just made known his intention to move his headquarters to Klagenfurt and to detail Yugoslav troops to other parts of Carinthia. In spite of every effort on the part of the Austro-German authorities these proceedings would create intense excitement among the people. Bloodshed and grave disturbances would unavoidably follow. The people earnestly pray that Klagenfurt be neutralized by means of occupation by American troops. The Austro-German Government protests to the Government of the United States against any unlawful occupation of German areas by Yugoslav troops and asks that its request be granted that the said territory be neutralized and a company of American troops be detailed to Klagenfurt and one to Villach. This would guarantee in accordance with humane considerations, quiet and order to those parts that have already been so sorely tried and at the same time would not in any way prejudice the decisions of the Peace Congress.”

WASHINGTON , December 7, 1918.No. 6000

^{[13](#)} The following is a translation of the French text quoted within the Legation's memorandum; the file translation has been revised. A translation of the message was sent to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 160, Dec. 10, 1918, 1 p.m.

763.72119/3143a

[Document 128]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Ekengren)

WASHINGTON , December 7, 1918.

SIR: During the last few weeks the Department has received from the Government of Austria through your good offices, various communications addressed to the President or Government of the United States with regard to the terms of the armistice or to matters in which the other governments associated with the United States in the war are equally concerned. The communications received do not indicate whether or not they have been communicated to the other interested governments.

I should be grateful, therefore, if you would kindly request your Government to suggest to the Government of Austria that communications of this nature which pertain to the terms of the armistice and to matters in which all the associated governments are interested, should be sent to all the governments and not addressed only to the President or Government of the United States, and to inform your Government that the Government of the United States would prefer not to receive further communications of the above nature from the Government of Austria unless it is clear that they are being simultaneously communicated to the other governments concerned.

Accept [etc.]

[FRANK L. POLK]

763.72119/2953: Telegram

[Document 129]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 9, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received 11:30 p.m.]

246. Your 147, December 7, 9 p.m.^{[14](#)} I have informally ascertained that the French Foreign Office believes that the establishment at Vienna of a central committee composed of representatives [of] the Allies would be unwise for the following reasons:

Such a commission could hardly establish itself in Vienna without armed detachment, which would create military and political complications. The railway system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is already under the command of the Allies by the terms of the armistice. As Austria now forms only a small portion of the former Empire Vienna would no longer be a central point for the demobilization of the army or for the repatriation of interned subjects and war prisoners, and finally the terms of the armistice are being fairly well carried out.

I am inclined to concur in the above view. British Embassy here knows nothing about the matter. Suggest you wire London.

EDWARD HOUSE

^{[14](#)} See footnote 12a, p. 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of [Doc. 125](#) and [Doc. 126](#)].

763.72/12517: Telegram

[Document 130]

***The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M.
House***

WASHINGTON , December 10, 1918—5 p.m.

163. The Swedish Legation at Washington in a Note dated December 7th¹⁵ has transmitted following communication to Department from Austro-German Government:

“Austro-German Government advises that the situation in Carinthia is growing more and more acute. The Jugo-Slavs are assuming a threatening attitude toward German cities and threaten to occupy Klagenfurt and Villach. As the result of conflicts with Jugo-Slav troops, the Railway and Postal employees have quit work and traffic is entirely stopped. The only way to avert bloody conflicts between Germans and Jugo-Slavs will be to have Klagenfurt and Villach occupied by an American or English half company each. Occupation by Italian troops would not be desirable and would greatly stir up the people. Klagenfurt and Villach are the only places where there is a purely local need of such occupation, and it would be neither necessary nor desirable to occupy territory beyond those two cities.”

POLK

¹⁵ Not printed.

763.72119/3247

[Document 131]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 1377

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that a note from the Austrian Government has been communicated to the Foreign Office by the Swedish Minister in London, stating that the Commandant of the Jugo-Slav troops in Carinthia has announced his intention of moving to Klagenfurt, and of quartering Jugo-Slav troops in other parts of Carinthia. In the opinion of the Austrian Government this will inevitably lead to disorders, and they have made a request for the neutralization of the territory in question, asking at the same time that American troops may be quartered at Villach and Klagenfurt. It should be stated that the area affected is of course outside the terms of the armistice with Austria.

It is understood that a similar note has also been addressed to the United States Government.^{[16](#)}

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to state that His Majesty's Government would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government on this matter, and he is also directed to indicate that His Majesty's Government entirely agree with the view of the United States Government that such questions should be addressed to all the Allies. His Majesty's Government consider that the French and Italian Governments should also be consulted before the matter is finally decided.

WASHINGTON , December 11, 1918.

¹⁶ See telegram No. 163, Dec. 10, 1918, 5 p.m., to Colonel House, *supra*.

763.72119/2979: Telegram

[Document 132]

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM , December 12, 1918—12 a.m.
[Received December 13—2:53 a.m.]

3320. I have received following letter from King's Chamberlain with an enclosure which King requests be sent to you. Letter reads:

“His Majesty the King has received telegram from Protestant churches in Hungary, of which copy is enclosed.

His Majesty, who takes the interests of all Protestant churches warmly to heart, desires me to ask whether you would be kind enough to forward telegram in question to your Government with view to having interests of any Protestant churches in Hungary brought up for consideration at forthcoming Peace Conference.”

Enclosure reads:

“Protestant churches of Republic of Hungary, numbering four millions of adherents, implore Your Majesty's protection against threatening danger of dismemberment. The eventual disruption of the country, especially the loss of southeastern Hungary with her 1,200,000 Protestants, would strike death blow to vitality of these churches, and thereby would rob newly forming democracies in this part of world of most valuable moral and spiritual forces. During four centuries these churches served and suffered as furthest bulwark of western Protestantism in east of Europe. Now it is the turn of western Christendom to rescue future efficiency of these churches for immense tasks awaiting them.”

MORRIS

763.72119/3049

[Document 133]

The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Legation has received from the Royal Swedish Foreign Office, a cablegram requesting the Legation to transmit to President Wilson the following communication from the Austro-German Government:^{[17](#)}

The Austro-German Republic has felt it its duty to propose to the neighboring states, that is to say the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and the Yugoslav State, to submit to a decision by arbitration, the disputes regarding the frontiers which have come up before the conclusion of peace, and which have unfortunately caused severe acts of violence. The Austro-German Republic appeals to the sense of justice of the Powers and asks them to kindly use their influence with a view of bringing about that the said arbitrage and treaty be accepted and thus prevent further troubles and acts of violence, which are certainly not apt to bring nearer the conclusion of a general peace so much desired. The proposed treaties between the Austro-German Republic on one side, and the Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav States on the other side, stipulate in article I, that the definite determination of the frontiers, the settlement by treaties of the economic and legal relations between the states in question, specially the regulation of questions of property which have necessarily been caused by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or Austria, shall be left to the peace negotiations.

In article II the States bind themselves to live in peace until that time, and to submit until then, all the conflicts, which cannot be settled at once through diplomatic negotiations, to an obligatory court of arbitration, in accordance with article

III, composed of five members, of which each of the parties shall elect two, only one of whom shall be a citizen of the electing state, and the other a citizen of a neutral state. The 5th is to be elected by the other four, and in case of disagreement, by two neutral powers designated by the nations in conflict.

The abovementioned stipulations shall be valid only until the peace treaty is in force.

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918.

¹⁷ Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as Department's telegram No. 47, Dec. 18, 1918, 7 p.m.

763.72110/3049

[Document 134]

The Department of State to the Swedish Legation

WASHINGTON , December 18, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State is in receipt of a memorandum of December 13, 1918, from the Swedish Legation transmitting a communication from Austria addressed to President Wilson touching a proposal that the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Yugoslav State submit frontier disputes to arbitration.

In this connection reference is again made to the Department's note of December 6 [7], 1918, in which it was stated that the United States would prefer not to receive further communications of this nature from Austria unless it is clear that they are being simultaneously communicated to the other governments concerned.

763.72119/2910

[Document 135]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Chargé (Miniscalchi-Erizzo)

WASHINGTON , December 18, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 4, 1918, in which you state that the Supreme Command in Italy, with a view to insuring to a better degree the demobilization of the army in Austria-Hungary, to facilitate the repatriation of interned subjects and war prisoners, to gather data that may be of use at the Peace Conference, and to exercise the control of the railroads, deems it necessary to establish at Vienna a Central Commission with sub-commissions for its various branches, which Commission and Sub-commissions should include representatives of the Allies for all questions pertaining to them. You add that you are instructed by your Government to bring this matter at once to the attention of the United States Government and to urge that they participate in the Commission and Sub-commissions.

In reply I beg to advise you that it has been decided that this matter will be handled in Paris through the representatives of the United States and other powers in that City.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

763.72119/3265

[Document 136]

The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Government of the Hungarian Republic has requested the Swedish Government that the following message, which has also been sent to the Governments of the Allies, be communicated to the Government of the United States:^{[18](#)}

“The Government of the Hungarian Republic applies to all the Governments of the Allied Powers and begs to be given the opportunity to renew the direct relations that were broken up by the war through the sending of special missions to the said governments. There are two reasons why the sending of such missions is, in our opinion, not only to the interests of the Republic of the Hungarian people but also, in part, to those of the Allied Powers. The Hungarian Government so far has succeeded in holding the young Republic of the people within the bounds of democratic order which was at all times proclaimed by the Allied Powers to be one of their foremost war aims. But the state of utter confusion and disorder in the districts invaded by the Czecho-Slovak troops and in those regions brought under the influence of the Roumanian national council, as well as the parts recently occupied by the Serbs, constitutes a danger to the ways of communication and an orderly distribution of food. In addition, the disastrous lack of coal which threatens an early destruction of economic life not only in Budapest but throughout the land, makes it more and more difficult for us to maintain the new democratic order. In order to ward off the peril of anarchy about to swoop upon the Republic of the Hungarian people, the urgent need is to put our Government in position directly to confer in the very near future with the Allied Governments about the means of averting or at least provisionally alleviating the impending

difficulties. In support of its request the Hungarian Government further points to the fact that the armistice concluded with the Commander of the Allied forces expires on December 4 next and that it would be desirable to confer upon certain points before that date and thus assist us in maintaining order in the Republic of the Hungarian people. Taking into account the sympathies which the members of the present Hungarian Government always bore to the Allied Powers during the war and that have grown deeper and broader since the fall of the former regime, the Government of the Republic of the Hungarian people feels justified in hoping that the Governments of the Allied Powers will assent to a very early sending of special missions.

“In the name of the Hungarian Government:
Michel Károlyi, President of the Council.”

The foregoing communication has been cabled by the Foreign Office in Stockholm to the Swedish Legation under date of November 25, 1918, but has never reached its destination. A copy of said cable has now been received by the Swedish Legation through the mail from the Foreign Office in Stockholm.

WASHINGTON , December 19, 1918.No. 6277

¹⁸ The following is a translation of the French text quoted in the Swedish memorandum; the file translation has been revised. A translation of the message was sent to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as the Department's telegram No. 299, Jan. 18, 1919, 6 p.m., with the statement that the “Department has merely acknowledged receipt of the note adding that this question has been brought to the attention of the Mission.”

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/7

[Document 137]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 33

BERNE , December 19, 1918.

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information a copy and translation of a note from the Swiss Political Department dated December 17, 1918, quoting a communication received from the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Berne relative to the critical situation in which the Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war who have been detained in Siberia and Turkestan now find themselves.

I beg to add that copies of the enclosed documents have been forwarded to the Department of State for its information and such action as it may deem advisable.

I am [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

Allg. D. O. Int. 1

The Swiss Political Department has just received from the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Berne a note concerning the critical situation in which the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war held in Siberia and Turkestan are likely to be.

The communication in question reads as follows:

“The deplorable situation of the prisoners of war in Siberia and Turkestan is made worse by the fact that for a long time, that is since the formation of the Czecho-Slovak front, they have been deprived of all communication with their families whose anguish concerning the fate of their ‘nearest and dearest’ in captivity is only increased by this condition of affairs.

The Secretary of State of German Austria appeals, therefore, to the feelings of humanity and justice of the governments of France, the United States and Great Britain with the most urgent request that these governments be so kind as to arrange that these prisoners of war be placed once more in a position to send to their families and to receive from them, telegrams and postal cards.”

In requesting the Legation of the United States of America to be so good as to convey the preceding information to its government the Political Department takes the opportunity to renew its assurance of the utmost respect, to the Legation.

BERNE, December 17, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 863.50/37: Telegram

[Document 138]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received December 22—8 p.m.]

96. Following note dated November 23rd received from French Embassy:

“My Government informs me, and Your Excellency will have no doubt received the same information, that according to a statement made by the Minister of Sweden to France, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna expresses a wish that the Allied diplomatic missions at Berne be authorized to handle directly all revictualing questions and other questions of economic character, with the Austro-Hungarian Legation.

My Government instructs me to say to Your Excellency that it believes, for its part, that those questions must be handled by the Allied representatives in Switzerland, not directly with that Legation but in accordance with the normal rules, through the Swiss Government. It would, however, be acceptable to let Austro-Hungarian delegates take an unofficial part in the conferences, looking to settlement of certain details, but all official and direct intercourse between the Austro-Hungarian Legation and the diplomatic representatives of the Allies must be formally barred until peace is finally signed. My Government intends to return an answer in that sense to the proposals it has received. I shall be very thankful to Your Excellency if you will kindly let me know whether you take the same view of the questions put before us.”

Following note dated November 29 received from the Swiss legation:

“By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the following communication of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

‘Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs begs to propose that the diplomatic missions of the Entente Powers at Berne be authorized to enter into direct communication with the Austro-Hungarian legation in that city regarding all matters pertaining to the revictualling of Austria-Hungary and to economic questions. The earliest solution of these urgent matters is of interest to [*in interest of*] the whole of Europe.’”

Department is disposed to reply to [French Embassy] that it is the opinion of this Government that official and direct intercourse between [Austro-Hungarian] Legation at Berne and the diplomatic representatives of the Allies and the United States must await the signature of peace and that the suggestion of the French Government that these questions be dealt with by the Allied representatives [in Switzerland] through intermediary of the Swiss Government would be satisfactory to this Government provided it proved agreeable to the Swiss authorities. Department proposes to reply to the Swiss Minister that it is the opinion of this Government that direct communication with the Austro-Hungarian Legation representatives in Berne and the representatives of the United States must await the signature of peace. Do you approve of these proposed replies?

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 863.50/37: Telegram

[Document 139]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State***

[PARIS ,] December 23, 1918.

64. [From Lansing.] Your number 96, December 21st, 10 p.m. I approve of the proposed replies to French Embassy and Swiss Legation. Suggest that you advise American Legation, Berne, if you have not already done so. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Parts Peace Conf. 863.00/18

[Document 140]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 53

BERNE , December 29, 1918.

SIRS: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information, copy of a note from the Swiss Political Department dated December 27, 1918, suggesting at the request of the German-Austrian Government that a mixed commission be established on neutral territory, composed of representatives of the German-Austrian Government and the Governments of the Associated Powers, to discuss German-Austria's desire for peace, the economic and ethnographic conditions of their people and the international position of the new German-Austrian State, as well as to demand support against the imperialistic tendencies which are now manifesting themselves in the territory of the ancient Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

I beg to add that the substance of the enclosed communication has been transmitted to the Department of State by cable.

I have [etc.]

P. A. STOVAUL

[Enclosure—Translation]^{[19](#)}

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland

The Government of German Austria has communicated to the Swiss Political Department, for the information of the Government of the

United States of America and the Governments of the Entente, the following proposals:

The German Austrian Government, being convinced that a just settlement of Austrian questions, so important to the general order in Europe, cannot be obtained unless an opportunity is given to all the interested peoples to state in detail their wishes and their needs, expresses the desire that a mixed commission of the German Austrian State enter into direct relations with a body representing the United States of America and the Entente, or, if more agreeable, that it meet on neutral territory with representatives of those Governments. The German Austrian commission would have the task of explaining the desire for peace in German Austria, the economic and ethnographic conditions (*Siedlungsverhältnisse*) of the people and the international position of the new German Austrian State, as well as to ask for support against the imperialistic currents which are appearing in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Political Department would be greatly obliged to the Legation of the United States of America if it would bring the foregoing to the knowledge of its Government.

The Department takes this occasion [etc.]

BERNE, December 27, 1918.

¹⁹ Translation from the French supplied by the editor.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72114/18: Telegram

[Document 141]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 2, 1919—2 p.m.
[Received January 3—8:20 a.m.]

64. Following undated telegram received direct from Budapest:

“To the governments of the Allied states, Washington. Immediately upon assuming the powers of government the Hungarian Democratic Government regarded as its foremost duty that of releasing all prisoners of war including the interned civilians of all nationalities and did all that lay in its power to send them back to their homes as speedily as possible. At this time there are only left on the territory of the Hungarian Republic those prisoners of war who of their own will are endeavoring to build up their happiness or expect on family grounds to thrive here, also invalids who on account of their grave condition and the present transportation difficulties cannot be removed. To these we are giving the best attention. The Russian Mission in Hungary is cooperating with the Hungarian Government in the relief of prisoners of war; it is endeavoring alike to ameliorate the condition and expedite as far as possible the repatriation of the Russian prisoners. The Hungarian Government proposed to the Government of the United States to send similar mission to Hungary with the duty of inquiring into the condition of their prisoners who are left here in rather trifling numbers and of assisting in their repatriation. The new Democratic Government of Hungary has declared consistently with its peaceable belief as soon as the armistice was discussed that it does not wish to carry on the war and ordered the Hungarian troops to lay down their arms. The Allied Governments need

not fear that the Hungarian prisoners of war who return to their homes will again take up arms. The Hungarian Government imbued with ideas of humaneness and mutual atonement among the nations is convinced that nothing stands in the way of repatriating the prisoners. In letting their prisoners of war join their families and resume their peacetime occupations, the Allied states also rid themselves of a burden which they need not carry. The latest events of war have broken off all relations and in particular the correspondence of prisoners of war with their relatives, with special reference to those who were taken prisoners in the last stages of the war and the prisoners in Siberia. Relatives and children, do not know whether their nearest kinsmen are still alive. The Democratic Hungarian Government is convinced that the following propositions will be acquiesced in by the Governments of the Allied states. Let all prisoners of war send with the consent of the respective governments word to their families in postal cards with a printed text. Let also the families of the prisoners of war send word in the same manner. The printed text to be worded as previously agreed; for instance, I am in good health and doing well, would dispense entirely with the long drawn work of the censor. Inas-much as the exchange of invalid prisoners of war is already going on and as the Democratic Hungarian Government has already delivered all the prisoners that could stand transportation, it appeals to the humaneness of the Allied Governments to send theirs home as soon as possible. Further, referring to the untold sufferings caused by the long war, the Hungarian Government asks the Allied states to take the earliest possible measures towards sending all the prisoners of war home taking into account the time during which they were held prisoners. Owing to the transportation difficulties it would be desirable to send them home by sea by the way of Fiume. The Hungarian Government begs the Allied Governments kindly to consent to the immediate repatriation of interned civilians and the prisoners of war less than 18 and more than 50 years old. The Government of the Hungarian Republic hopes that its people now freed forever are no longer regarded as an enemy by any one and begs the Allied

Governments kindly to alleviate the condition of all the Hungarian prisoners in a manner worthy of the greatness of the nations. Lastly and for the purpose of expediting as much as possible the imparting of information to the families of the prisoners and to themselves and also of recommending and according if need be proper treatment to the said prisoners of war, the Hungarian National Government asks the Allied Governments kindly to accredit to the states which hold prisoners of war relief committees whose field of action is sufficiently suggested by the name. The Hungarian Government is of opinion that the relief of prisoners of war in Siberia is particularly urgent under existing circumstances and since it cannot be sent over European Russia we beg the Governments of the Allies kindly to agree to the sending by sea of the above proposed mission by way of Vladivostok. The Hungarian Government is convinced that these requests which appeal to the humane sentiments of the Allies will be taken with favorable consideration by their governments and hopes it may begin at the earliest possible date to heal the wounds caused by the war. In the name of the Hungarian Democratic Government, Michel Karolyi, President of the Council.”

No reply has been made by Department.

POLK

Tasker H. Bliss Papers

[Document 142]

The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , January 8, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you are doubtless aware, an agreement had been come to in London, on Dec. 3rd ult. between the British, French and Italian Govts. concerning the military occupation of Austria, as foreseen in the Armistice. It had been decided that the Italian commander in chief, and the French one (Gnl Franchet d'Esperey) would settle together those matters, and in case their proposals differed, would submit them to Marshal Foch who would place the question before the interested Governments.

In accordance with the instructions I have received, I beg to include herewith 3 notes: one from General Diaz, one from General Franchet d'Esperey (each expressing his point of view), and one from Marshal Foch, submitting the question to the interested Governments, and giving his own opinion.

I should be much obliged to you for letting me know whether the Marshal's conclusions meet with the approval of the American Government. A prompt answer would greatly oblige my Government.^{[20](#)}

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure 1]^{[21](#)}

No. 15852 B. G. M.

ROME , December 10, 1918.

To: His Excellency, Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of The Allied Armies in France.

Subject: Military occupation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

In reply to your Excellency's note, transmitted by Colonel Mourrier, I am sending you, in the inclosed memoir, the views and proposals of the Italian High Command on the subject of the line of demarcation between the zones of action to be assigned respectively to the Italian High Command and to the Army of the Orient, in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The officer who brings you this letter is qualified to furnish oral amplification and any explanation that Your Excellency may require.

I think that I should add that on December 7, 1918, this same question of the demarcation between the zones of action was presented to His Excellency the French Ambassador at Rome, M. Barrère, and that, consequently, similar communications have been made to your government with a view to arriving at a perfect agreement on this question.

Le Général d'Armée
Chief of the Army Staff
DIAZ

[Subenclosure]

MEMOIR

Military occupation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy beyond the limits determined by the armistice.

(1) It is proposed that the zones of action assigned respectively to the Italian High Command and to the Army of the Orient be separated by the following line:

The former frontier between the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, from the boundary of the province of Galicia (Beskids Mountains) to Brod (on the Kulpa River, on the boundary between Carniola and Croatia).

Line of the Treaty of London,²³ leaving in the Italian zone of action the islands of Veglia and Arba.

(2) In each of the two zones of action the garrisons to be established in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will be formed, as a rule, by interallied contingents and will be placed under the authority of the Italian High Command or of the General commanding the Army of the Orient, according to whether they are in the zone of action assigned to the Italian Command or to the Command of the Army of the Orient.

(3) The interallied forces of occupation of the various centers will be under the orders of an Italian commander in the zone of action assigned to Italy, and under the orders of the commander belonging to an allied army in the zone of action assigned to the Army of the Orient.

The allied armies, represented each one in the different centers by a contingent belonging to it, will attach to the garrison commanders of the different centers a liaison officer of their nationality and of a rank inferior to that of the garrison commander.

(4) The Italian High Command foresees that it will be necessary on its part, and in the zone of action assigned to it, to occupy the following points:

The city of Vienna (1 division), the city of Graz (1 division), Lubiana (1 brigade), Linz and Salzburg (1 division for the two centers).

(5) To confer on the different garrisons an interallied character, it will be necessary that, in each center of occupation, the allied Commands be represented by forces such that, in each center, the sum of the allied forces shall not be superior to the force furnished by the army to which the commander of the garrison belongs.

No. 6257/3

SALONIKI , December 12, 1918.

From: General Franchet d'Esperey.

To: The Minister of War and the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

1. I propose, as the line of demarcation between the zones of action of General Diaz and my own, the following line: Fiume—Laibach—Marburg—Course of the Raab-Raab, all these cities to be included in my zone.

Fiume, which is the only base of supplies possible for troops operating in the region of Belgrade and to the north, must be placed entirely under my authority, as well as the Fiume—Agram railway.

(2) With a view to avoiding the multiplication of local commands, which complicates the exercise of authority, without always conferring sufficient authority to settle conflicts, it seems to me necessary to create, especially in the contested territories, territorial commands directly under my authority, the command and nature of which will guarantee a character of neutrality until the decisions of the Peace Congress.

These commands might be determined as follows:

(A) Territory of Fiume: from Voloczo [*Volosca?*], exclusive, to the north Dalmatian frontier, exclusive, with the islands not assigned to Italy, the eastern boundary being constituted by the watershed between the Save basin and the Adriatic; the command should be conferred preferably on an American general having at his disposition:

Tranié detachment: 1 battalion and 1 company of French Engineers, 1 Serbian battalion (already in place);

Italian detachment: 2 battalions (the rest of the Italian division at Fiume falling to the zone of Diaz);

English detachment: 1 general and 1 battalion (in place);

American detachment: If possible 2 battalions, one of which is already in place.

(B) The territories of Spalato and Ragusa would be limited on the north by the line defined by clause 3 of the Diaz armistice concerning the territories to be evacuated by the Austrians; on the south by Castelnuovo inclusive; on the west by the islands not assigned to Italy; on the east by the former boundary of Dalmatia.

Commander: English general to be appointed; seat, at Spalato; having at his disposition:

At Spalato: an Italian company, a French detachment, as well as English and American detachments to come from Italy, and a Serbian company already in place. Local commander: English general.

At Ragusa: a Serbian battalion already in place, a French Battalion.

[C] Territories of Montenegro and Cattaro:

Commander: seat, at Cattaro; General Venel, having at his disposition, as soon as he arrives:

(a) 2 Yougoslav battalions, already in the interior of Montenegro.

(b) International garrison of Cettigne: a French company to come from Cattaro and an Italian company; a Serbian company already in place. Local command: French.

(c) Garrison of Antivari: a French company, an Italian battalion in place, an American company to come from Cattaro. Local command: Italian.

(d) Garrison of Cattaro: 1 French battalion to come from Italy, a Serbian detachment, 1 Italian battalion instead of 3. 1 American battalion already in place. Local command: American.

All Italian garrisons in place, and not mentioned above, to be suppressed, especially those of Neagus [*Njeguši?*] and Virpazar.

(D) Territory of Scutari preserving its present form and composition.

(E) Yougoslav territory: bounded on the north by the Drave, on the south and south-west by the former frontier between Dalmatia and Montenegro, on the west by the line: Laybach-Marburg.

Command: Serbian. Troops already in place.

- (F) Territory of Neusatz: between the Danube and the line marked by: Baja-Theresiopel–Szegedin–the Maros–Nagylak, then parallel to the Nagylak–Temesvar–Weisskirchen railway and 10 kilometers west of this railway. 2 Serbian divisions. Command: Serbian.
- (G) Banat of Temesvar—Bounded on the north by [the] Maros, south by the Danube, west by the line Nagylak–Temesvar–Weisskirchen inclusive, east by the line Lippa–Lugos–Karansebes–Mehadija–Orsova. Command: French, seat at Temesvar, having at its disposition 1 brigade of cavalry and 1 French division, exclusive of Roumanians and Serbians, whose common claims on this territory necessitate the presence of French troops to prevent conflict.

3. As I have already reported, I consider the occupation of Buda-Pesth necessary. This occupation, to be limited to the city, would be effected by a French division. This division being in place, another French division, echeloned along the Danube from Belgrade to Neusatz, would be liberated.

4. Concerning the territory of north Buda-Pesth, it is impossible, considering the weakness of my forces, to send troops into this region.

It is indispensable, nevertheless, with a view to basing my relations with the present representatives of the power in Hungary on precise orders, which the commission of control in Buda-Pesth insists on having for the execution of your orders, to have definite information on the limits of occupation of the territory of Austria-Hungary by the Czecho-Slavs, and I beg you to send me this information.

[Enclosure 3]^{[25](#)}

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY , December 22, 1918.
No. 9690/o

NOTE

In execution of the resolution of London of the 3rd of December last, Generals Diaz and Franchet d'Esperey have, at the request of

Marshal Foch, formulated their propositions in regard to the occupation to be carried out in Austria-Hungary.

The examination of these propositions gives occasion for the following preliminary remarks:

a) Line of Demarcation.

The question of the occupation of the entire extent of the territory of the Double Monarchy is not to be thought of, therefore there would be no advantage in dividing this territory into two great regions, in which the Italian command and that of the Allied Armies of the Orient could respectively act with entire liberty.

The tracing of a line of demarcation between these two commands, from the northern frontier of Austria to the Adriatic, is not to be considered.

b) Occupation of Vienna.

By reason of the importance which this measure would have from a political point of view, it seems that this can be decided, in case of necessity, only after a special agreement among the Allied governments.

c) Occupation of Buda-Pesth.

On the other hand, the occupation of Buda-Pesth is necessary (but doubtless not sufficient), if we wish to secure for ourselves the means to make Hungary keep the terms of the armistice of November 3rd, especially insofar as concerns the Mackensen army.

It will not however be carried out until General [Franchet] d'Esperey has at his disposition the necessary means.

These points being admitted, the only questions left open by the comparison of the solutions presented by Generals Diaz and Franchet d'Esperey are those relative to the occupation of Laybach and Fiume.

Moreover, the experience of recent events demonstrates the necessity of regularizing and precisising the existing situation which results from the application of Articles III and IV of the armistice of November 3rd, as far as concerns the occupation of the Adriatic coast.

These various questions are examined as follows:

d) The occupation of Laybach can have no other object than the maintenance of order.

The present Serbian–Yougo-Slav garrison provides for this; the intervention of the Italians could only give rise to conflict. There is therefore every reason for maintaining the *status quo*.

e) Occupation of Fiume—To remove all cause of conflict, the surest solution would be to install at Fiume a regime of strict neutrality, by organizing there, for example, an interallied occupation, under the orders of an American general, who would be directly responsible to the Higher Council of War.

Such a solution would be necessary as a last resort, if it seemed to be impossible to conciliate the conflicting interests.

In the present situation, it seems preferable to try to establish harmony by the adoption of a definite scheme of action based on the following points:

- the occupation of Fiume will be Italian and will be responsible to General Diaz.
- At the same time, there will be constituted, for the needs of the Allied Armies of the Orient, an autonomous base, directly responsible to General [Franchet] d’Esperey, and the Commander of which will be a French general.
- The French general appointed shall be put into possession, by the Italian command, of the part of the port, installation and equipment necessary for the organization and functioning of the base, as well as of a zone of cantonment sufficient for the

establishment near by of a Franco-Serbian detachment assigned to this base.

Moreover, the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient will have exclusive control of the Fiume–Agram–Semlin railway and will regulate its operation.

f) The Adriatic coast—

To avoid all conflict in the future, it would be necessary to provide:

- 1 —That the occupation of the territories bounded by article III of the armistice, on the Italian border as well as upon the Adriatic, and the occupation of Albania (without Scutari) shall remain confided to the Italian command.
- 2 —That, on the other hand, concerning the territories of the Adriatic coast not included above, and exclusive of the territory of Fiume, the occupation shall depend on the General Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Orient, to whose duty it will fall definitely to fix the conditions of the occupation (composition of the interallied garrisons and the division of the local commands among the allies), in such a way as to establish with entire impartiality a regime of order and neutrality.

These are the propositions which Marshal Foch thinks should be submitted to the decision of the allied governments.

FOCH

20

The original bears the notation: “Not acknowledged. Copy and enclosures sent to Gen. Bliss Jan. 9–19.”

The enclosures filed in the papers of General Bliss bear the additional notation: “Turned over to General Bliss with Navy plan of occupation of Fiume Jan. 22, with French originals and unsent letter expressing Sect, views to Pres. Wilson.”

21 Printed from copy filed under 763.72119/3199^{1/2}.

²³ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

²⁴ Printed from copy filed under 763.72119/3200¹/₂.

²⁵ Printed from copy filed under 763.72119/3200¹/₂.

Paris Peace Conf. 864.00/36

[Document 143]

***The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

[No.] 80

BERNE , January 13, 1919.
[Received January 16.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that Count Sigray, informal representative in Switzerland of the Karolyi Government in Hungary, has written me a letter, of which a copy is enclosed, concerning the possibility of elections in Hungary. Count Sigray brought this letter in person and endeavored to obtain an expression of opinion from me on its subject matter. I was, however, careful to refrain from expressing any opinion whatever in the premises, nor did I give him any promise of an answer from either the Peace Commission or the American Government.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

[Enclosure]

The Informal Representative in Switzerland of the Government of Hungary (Sigray) to the American Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson)

BERNE , January 11, 1919.

SIR: The Hungarian Government has decided to appeal to the people of Hungary and to set an early date for the elections of a constitutional Assembly.

Considering the fact that a great part of Hungary is at present occupied by the troops of the Allies, the Government wishes me to inquire what attitude the Allies would take towards the elections in Hungary and specially elections in the territories that are lying behind the line of occupation freed by the armistice of Belgrade.

The Hungarian Government and people take the standpoint that they have the right of making elections in the whole of Hungary because:

1. in the armistice of Belgrade it was understood that the administration of the whole country would remain in the hands of the Hungarian Government;
2. the Hungarian Government and people have not given up the right to any territories claimed by neighbours.

I should be greatly obliged to you if you would refer this matter to the Government of the United States and her Allies and if you would let me know as soon as possible the answer to my inquiry.

Believe me [etc.]

COUNT SIGRAY

The Coolidge Mission

[\[144\] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland \(Stovall \)](#)

[Paris ,] 26 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/9a

[\[145\] The Secretary of State to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Paris , December 26, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/15

[\[146\] The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew \) to Professor A. C. Coolidge](#)

Paris , December 26, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/17

[\[147\] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace \(Grew \)](#)

Paris , 27 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/22

[148] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 31, 1918. [Received January 4, 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2

[149] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 31, 1918. [Received January 3, 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2¹/₂

[150] Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor Clive Day, of the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/3¹/₂

[151] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , January 2, 1919. [Received January 4.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/3

[152] The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Dr. S. E. Mezes

[Paris ,] January 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2¹/₂

[153] Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris ,] 6 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2¹/₂

[154] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of State

Vienna , January 8, 1919. [Received January 16.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/40c

[155] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna , January 9, 1919. [Received January 22.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/4¹/₂

[156] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna , January 9, 1919. [Received January 23.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/4

[157] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna , January 10, 1919. [Received January 23.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/5

[158] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna , January 11, 1919. [Received January 28 (?).]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/6

[159] Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Vienna , January 12, 1919. [Received January 19.]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/7

[160] Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor W. E. Lunt, of the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Vienna ,] January 13, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/7½

[161] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson)

Paris , January 16, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/49: Telegram

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/9a

[Document 144]

***The Secretary of State to the Minister in
Switzerland (Stovall)***

[PARIS ,] 26 December, 1918.

SIR: In order that certain observers of political conditions in the Central Empires, who are being sent out by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, be afforded the necessary assistance by the Governments of the Countries in which they will be, you are hereby authorized to enter into appropriate negotiations with the Governments of Germany and Austria Hungary.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/15

[Document 145]

The Secretary of State to Professor A. C. Coolidge

PARIS , December 26, 1918.

SIR: You are hereby assigned to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace for the purpose of proceeding to Austria for that Commission to observe political conditions in Austria-Hungary and neighboring countries.

Yours very truly,

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/17

[Document 146]

***The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Grew) to Professor A. C. Coolidge***

PARIS , December 26, 1918.

Subject: Observation in Eastern countries.

1. You are directed to proceed without undue delay to Switzerland, and as soon as the necessary preliminaries are settled then to Vienna or some other suitable point from which you can make arrangements for the forwarding of news to the Commission. You will also, as soon as is feasible, send agents for a longer or shorter time to such places as Prague, Agram, Budapest, Lemberg, and Warsaw. In view of the many uncertainties, and the changing nature of the situation, you will have to use your discretion as to where and when and how the agents under your control may best be employed at any given point, and they may be freely transferred from one place to another according to circumstances. The field of their observation will cover as much as possible the territories comprised in the former empires of Austria-Hungary and adjacent regions, particularly Poland. Though the course of events may make changes advisable, Vienna would appear the natural point you would choose for centralization and transmission of your news. It will be your headquarters from which you visit other places under the charge of your agents. Your duties and theirs, as at present instructed, will be to observe and to report frequently to the Commission matters that may be of interest.
2. You will make use of such means of communication as are available, and may authorize your agents to forward direct reports if valuable time is saved thereby.
3. The Commission will meet all proper expenses on your mission when duly supported by accounts and vouchers.

4. It is desired that you enter upon your activities with as little loss of time as possible, and to furnish the Commission with information, even if imperfect, at an early date.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/22

[Document 147]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS , 27 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. GREW: I beg to advise you that I am leaving tonight with the following men for Berne, for the purpose of proceeding to Austria Hungary as soon thereafter as possible:

Mr. Robert J. Kerner

Capt. Walter G. Davis

Lieut. F. R. King

Capt. W. A. Pashkowski

Lieut. H. G. Campagnoli

Lieut. R. C. Foster

Mr. F. E. Parker

Couriers { Capt. Leslie Snow
Capt. Leo M. Czaja
Capt. Charles H. Wetter
Lt. Beckhart

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2

[Document 148]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 3

BERNE , December 31, 1918.
[Received January 4, 1919.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I had an interview yesterday with Dr. Leopold Baron Hennet, Dr. Rudolph Ritter von Schwarzhiller, and Dr. Adler.¹ Their arguments which they set forth at considerable length mostly came down to two main points about which they were insistent.

- 1st. German Austria is not in a position to support an undue share of any war indemnity. She has been drained of her wealth and she has not benefited by war expenditures for the creation or enlargement of factories, etc. These have been established elsewhere, notably in Bohemia. The fact that Vienna was the seat of the imperial government does not render the German Austrians as such peculiarly responsible for the war.
- 2nd. The German Austria of the future (of which Vienna contains about a third of the population) is economically of small resources and incapable of standing alone. Only two courses are possible for it:—either union with Germany which is favored by the Socialists not so much for nationalistic reasons as because they believe the socialistic cause in Austria would be strengthened by it, or a Danubian confederation. This (according to the speakers) is favored by a majority of the people for sentimental, historical, economic, and other reasons. To make it possible a fair *modus vivendi* with free interchange of products must be worked out between the different members of the confederation. In view of the recent events an understanding of this sort can hardly be brought about without strong moral support and perhaps direct pressure on the part of the Allies and of the United States. The speakers

mentioned as among their own reasons for opposition to union with Germany, the fear that it would be looked upon with disfavor by the Allies, notably France. They also seemed to hold it as a threat or last resource if Austria were too severely treated at the final settlement. They expressed a desire that German Austria might have an opportunity to set forth her side of questions in Paris.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

¹ Vicktor Adler, Austrian Social Democratic leader.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2¹/₂

[Document 149]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 4

BERNE , December 31, 1918.
[Received January 3, 1919.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I had an interview yesterday with Count Sigraý who has been sent to Switzerland to get in touch as far as possible with the Americans.

His arguments were the familiar ones. Perhaps the most notable statement that he made and which he declared represented the official opinion of his government was that Hungary would be willing to submit the question of the future of the disputed territories—the Slovak region, the Banat, Transylvania,—to a plebiscite of the inhabitants provided the vote were taken under impartial supervision, that is to say American or British or perhaps American and Italian, but not French or that of any of the claimants directly interested. He said that Hungary had abandoned all claims to Croatia but needed to have a port. He is anxious that Hungary should have some chance of presenting her case in Paris. He complained that the armistice was not being carried out in Hungary in the spirit in which it had been made and declared that a statement on the part of the Allies that the settlement there would be made in accordance with justice rather than on the base of present military occupation would do much to tranquilize public opinion and maintain order in Hungary.

I have [etc.]

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Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/3^{1/2}

[Document 150]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor Clive Day, of
the Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERNE , January 1, 1919.

DEAR DAY: I have just had a long and interesting interview with Gueshov.² As Bulgaria is perhaps out of the bounds of my vague bailie-wick, I am writing to you directly instead of reporting to the Commission. Gueshov, as you know, has been out of his country for some months and finds it difficult to keep in touch with it. He has almost no direct news from Bulgaria and not much from elsewhere except what appears in the papers. His main point was that according to the eleventh of the Fourteen Articles the Balkan questions will be settled according to principles of justice and that justice is all that Bulgaria asks for. I gently suggested to him that everybody else said the same thing, but he of course has no doubt in the justice of his own claims. He regards Macedonia as incontrovertibly Bulgarian and took the line that one ought to disregard all that was said by Bulgarians and Serbians, (he naturally has no use for Cvjich³), and confine oneself to the testimony of competent neutrals who were in a position to know. He instanced the Carnegie Report,⁴ the Encyclopedia Britannica (Bourchier), and the American Missionaries in the Balkans. I hinted that some of these authorities if neutral were not exactly impartial. A thing he laid particular stress upon, as do naturally the Austrians, Magyars and others here, was the unfairness of having their fate decided upon without their being consulted. Gueshov asserted that as Bulgaria had not been at war with the United States it would be unjust to her to have her destiny settled on the base of the Eleventh Article without her voice being heard. Incidentally he made the rather amusing point that if the Serbian view was accepted that the Macedonians were Serbians, why then so were the Slavs within the Greek boundaries, in

which case the cry of a Serbia Irredenta would be soon be raised in a country much larger and more powerful than Greece.

I told Gueshov a little about the Division of Information in Paris and said that the Legation here could send to it any literature that he wished to furnish it, but advised him to spare you common or garden propaganda. He spoke bitterly of the Greek charges of Bulgarian atrocities, stating that it was just what the Greeks had done five years ago. They had cut off the Bulgarians from any communication with the outside world, and had then accused them of atrocities which were afterwards proved to be false. Here he referred to the Carnegie Report. He asked if I included anti-atrocity literature in the material it was useless to send. I said that the contradiction of any story was always worth while.

Gueshov took up the question of Bulgaria's part in the present war. He declared she had been forced into it by the king and by her geographical position against the will of the great majority of the population and that the Bulgarian soldiers had been no more willing combatants against the Allies than had the Czecho-Slovaks and the Croats. He adverted to the point that one of the three Yugo-Slav commissioners in Paris, the Slovenian Zolger, had been one of the chief aides of Seidler in Austria and contrasted this with the Bulgarian lack of representation. He said that he and the opposition had done everything they could to prevent the king from taking the fateful step, but unlike Venizelos they had had no Allied support to bring pressure, that they had asked for a landing at Saloniki, Dedeagatch or Varna, but they had been refused, that if Rumania had gone into the war when Italy did, as was expected, Ferdinand would never have dared to stir. He said that from Switzerland last summer he had implored the Malinov Ministry to prevent the king from going on his last visit to Germany, but that he supposed that Malinov had felt if he should do so, it would merely mean the recall of Radoslavov. He said that Ferdinand would never have come to Bulgaria if Alexander III had not refused to allow Prince Waldemar of Denmark to accept the crown offered to him, (in those days England was Ferdinand's chief friend and supporter), that this foreign prince has brought untold evil on his people, and that it was

most unjust that they should have to suffer for all the things he had done.

Finally he expressed the hope that if it was impossible for any Bulgarian representative to get to Paris, someone of you familiar with Balkan subjects might come to confer with him and others here.

I have also had an interview with Professor Constantine Stephanov, a professor in the University of Sofia. He is a Macedonian by birth and feeling. He declares that the Macedonians were largely responsible for the fact that Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915 because their ill-treatment at the hands of the Serbians was such and their desire for the reunion of the different parts of their territory was so great that they did much to influence Bulgarian opinion. Professor Stephanov regards Macedonia as one and indivisible and also as overwhelmingly Bulgarian, though this last was not the line of argument he pursued. He declared that the only just thing to do as had already been indicated in the usual inevitable telegram to President Wilson was to have the whole of Macedonia occupied by impartial Allied troops and then a plebiscite taken of the wishes of the inhabitants. I asked him if that plebiscite were in favor of Serbia whether he would be willing to accept it for the whole of the country including even the most eastern and Bulgarian portion of it. He wriggled a little, but in general said yes, evidently not regarding the contingency as possible. I asked him how he should feel about the same plan being tried in Thrace. He expressed a willingness to which I do not believe Gueshov would agree. He repeated that the Macedonians had a strong local sentiment of their own and that they would prove practically impossible to govern against their own consent. We skirmished a little as to just what was Macedonia. He seemed to me not very practical, but sincere and interesting as expressing the Macedonian point of view.

We are delayed here by the length of the holiday but hope to get off Friday. Happy New Year.

Very truly yours

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

² T. E. Gueshov, former Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

³ Jovan Cvjich, Serbian author, professor at the University of Belgrade.

⁴ *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1914).

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/3

[Document 151]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 5

BERNE , January 2, 1919.
[Received January 4.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that yesterday I had another interview with Count Sigray. He was evidently worried by his latest news from Budapest and declared that the Bolshevist peril was increasing in Hungary as the government had no armed forces on which it could rely. He again declared that the best thing would be an American or even a British regiment at Budapest, and said that the French there only number some two hundred men so that no one takes them seriously, though their officers issue arrogant orders.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2^{1/2}

[Document 152]

***The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Grew) to Dr. S. E. Mezes***

1. Will you kindly let me have a memorandum on the point raised in the marked portion of this report,^{[5](#)} and your recommendations for appropriate action in the matter.

[PARIS ,] January 5, 1919.

^{[5](#)} The last sentence of Professor Coolidge's report No. 4, Dec. 31, 1918, p. 221 [*Pg. 221 includes portions of [Doc. 149](#) and [Doc. 150](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/2¹/₂

[Document 153]

***Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of the Commission
to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

[PARIS ,] 6 January, 1919.

We have tried to get a copy of the Armistice mentioned, but without success.

The statement asked for is, of course, in full accord with the policy of our Government, and no doubt of our Associates. Moreover the purpose of the Armistice is military security, not territorial settlement, and the statement is not therefore strictly necessary. But I can think of no objection to securing a joint statement if the diplomatic wheels are revolving smoothly. A joint statement covering this Armistice as a whole might also ease the Italo–Jugo-Slav tension.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/40c

[Document 154]

Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Secretary of State

[No. 10 (?)]

VIENNA , January 8, 1919.
[Received January 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that I sent to you today *en clair* the following telegram: "British Embassy occupied publicly by British Military Representatives. Stop. Urge strongly for reasons of efficiency and economy that we be allowed to make use of available consular quarters". The need for me to use the consular premises is great. Work is coming on fast and I have a large staff for whom it is almost impossible to find suitable working accommodations. The city is very full and quarters of all kinds are exceedingly hard to obtain and command high prices. As I said in my telegram the British Military Agent is publicly installed in the British Embassy. The American clerk who is in charge of our interests in the Spanish Embassy has continued to use a portion of the former American Chancery. In any quarters which we might hire it would be almost impossible to obtain coal. In the American Consulate there is coal already and more might be procurable. I am going in the immediate future to lend some of my men for work for the Food Commission and such a thing may well happen again. Under these circumstances I trust that my request will be granted.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 11

VIENNA , January 9, 1919.
[Received January 22.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that in this and some later despatches I shall take up certain questions concerning Austria and especially her future frontiers which will be determined by the Peace Conference. I shall usually confine myself to a brief exposition of the Austrian point of view, expressing it as clearly as I can without comment of my own. As I have been visited today by several representatives of the German part of Southern Tyrol to protest against annexation to Italy, I shall begin with that question.

The German speaking part of the Southern Tyrol, lying south of the Brenner Pass, is inhabited and has been for the last seven or eight hundred years by a purely German population, (except in the Ladin portion). The population is German to the core and intensely so. The people are a race of mountaineers, fervently patriotic and proud of their country, to which they are devotedly attached. Their spirit and their indomitable love of freedom were well shown in the famous rising under Andreas Hofer against the French in which they took a notable part. It is inconceivable that this population should ever submit or become reconciled to Italian rule. There are few Italians among them except a certain number of day labourers who come and go, especially in the district of Botzen. This district, whose only political connection with Italy in recent centuries was when it was united for a few years with the Kingdom of Italy in Napoleonic times, was claimed by the Italians when they were asking for a reward if they should keep out of the war. They now desire not only Botzen, but the regions of Meran and Brixen and the whole territory up to the top of the Brenner. The Austrians declare that under the

principle of self-determination as proclaimed by President Wilson which has been loyally accepted by them, (to this point they continually return), they do not see how this territory can possibly be taken away from them. They say that in the Southern Tyrol the linguistic division between German and Italian agrees remarkably well with the geographical lines made by the wild mountain ranges and that the national separation between the two peoples is as good as could be desired. Even at the main gateway, the passage is a narrow one.

Economically the German district south of the Brenner would suffer severely by separation from the country to the north of it. The great influx of German tourists would be much reduced if the country were under Italian rule. The land is comparatively poor and its products which are only obtained through hard labor have now an assured outlet in Austria. If it were a part of Italy they could not compete with similar Italian products grown on a more fertile soil under cheaper conditions.

This part of the Tyrolese land has always had a peculiar sentimental value to the German race. It is their one playground of their own in southern climes. It was the home of the minnesinger in the Middle Ages. The loss of it would deeply wound national feeling in German Austria and would be regarded as an intolerable injustice.

The case of the small Ladin district is rather different. The Austrians assert that although the Ladin language is Latin, not a Germanic one, it is an independent language and the people prefer Austrian to Italian rule. The region is barren, but economically its interests lie with Austria rather than with Italy.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/4

[Document 156]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 12

VIENNA , January 9, 1919.
[Received January 23.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that since my arrival in Vienna I have been able to pick up a few impressions on the situation in Poland. They are not more than impressions, because I have been unable as yet to give much attention to the subject and have seen but few people and have not had a chance to control their reports. I have despatched one member of the party to Poland and am planning at short intervals to send off two more, so that I am hoping soon for more reliable information.

The general feeling here about Poland and among the Poles seems to be pessimistic enough. The abortive conspiracy of Prince Sapieha has probably done grave harm to the conservative cause. The government of General Pilsudski looks weak. It is said that what his army suffers most from is not lack of men but of arms and ammunition and that a supply of these would be invaluable to him. With them he might hope to check the progress of the Bolsheviks. Without them his position is precarious. It has been suggested that Austria could supply him with what he requires, but that she is not willing to do so even in return for a payment in such exports as Poland can furnish and Austria needs. Whether Bohemia would approve of Austrian assistance to Poland is uncertain. Present relations between the Czechs and the Poles are not good. The Czechs are much irritated at the recent seizure by the Poles of disputed territory in Silesia. The Poles on their part accuse the Czechs of imperialism and of a desire to get a corridor to the eastward. The fear of Bolshevism, however, oppresses to greater or less extent all the nations in this part of the world.

A promising suggestion that has been made is that a truce should be concluded between the Poles and the Ukrainians under the terms of which eastern Galicia should be left as an autonomous district in the hands of its present Ukrainian possessors, and Lemberg be ruled by a government half Pole and half Ukrainian, until the Peace Conference shall have determined the final boundaries. In the meanwhile the forces of both can be used against the Bolsheviks. I believe that this plan will be submitted to the British Government with the hope it may be supported from that quarter.

I have been told that in Upper Silesia at the present time the great landowners are almost indifferent to their national fate, not knowing in what direction their interests will lie. This attitude is not likely to be permanent. The miners are rather in favor of continued union with Germany, believing that it will be more of their interest to be part of the German economic union than of the Polish one. The agricultural population, on the other hand, are more national in sentiment and desire union with Poland.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/5

[Document 157]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 13

VIENNA , January 10, 1919.
[Received January 23.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that the following are some of my first impressions in Vienna. It should be remembered that most of the people I have seen so far are high officials, though belonging to all the three parties who have combined to form the present government, namely the Socialist Democrats, the Christian Socialists and the German Nationalists, so I have chiefly got their point of view.

The government here feel almost overwhelmed by the magnitude and the multiplicity of the task with which they are confronted. They and the people also are oppressed by the terrible uncertainty of their future, and particularly as to what their boundaries are to be and how they are to get on their feet again financially. In very human fashion they tend to put all the blame for the faults and errors of the past on their former rulers and to look on themselves as victims who were no more to blame for the war than the other nationalities who took part in it. They therefore do not see why they should receive any particular punishment and should be forced to assume a disproportionate part of the huge national debt. They declare that if they have to do so, the only result will be bankruptcy and that this will drag down the other shares in the debt and holders of the vast mass of Austrian paper money, a conclusion from which, however unpleasant it may be, it is difficult to escape.

The government are much exercised as to when if at all they will be allowed to send representatives to the Peace Conference. I believe that the German Austrians are sincere when they express their admiration for President Wilson and say that their chief trust is that

America will recognize the justice of their cause. Doubtless some emphasis is added for my benefit, but by accepting unreservedly the principles of the fourteen points and basing on them their claims in regard to the future national boundaries, they have adopted a very strong position, if their past is to be overlooked. They also hope for help or they say "justice" from England. France they regard as hostile.

The authorities are rather proud of the way in which they met the sudden and huge task of demobilisation and the despatching to their homes of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who passed through Vienna, soldiers not from German Austria alone, but also from all the other parts of the empire. They point out that they did this without any serious disturbance or pillaging and that they never left any great number together long enough to become a menace to the public security. They are likewise proud of the order they maintain and contrast the quiet of Vienna with what has happened in Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest and elsewhere, and they express confidence in their national guard (*Volkswehr*), which is now chiefly made up of workmen of the better class and whose councils of soldiers have so far been helpful to them. On the other hand they believe their capacity to maintain order and carry on a government successfully depends above all things on their receiving a sufficient supply of food and fuel from outside. Without these they will answer for nothing. The number of unemployed workmen and of factories closed or working only part time is disquieting enough. There are Bolshevik agents here, apparently well supplied with money, and a paper with Bolshevik doctrines is published in Vienna. I enclose a copy as a specimen.*

Internal affairs in the main attract little attention. The elections which are to take place in the middle of February excite a certain interest but no very decided result seems to be expected from them. There is curiosity as to how the newly enfranchised women will vote and a belief that they will strengthen the clerical party. The streets of the city are crowded but the physical condition of the people is obviously poor and the prices, especially of necessities, are terribly high.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

^{*}
_ No Inclosure. [penciled footnote on the original]

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/6

[Document 158]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 14

VIENNA , January 11, 1919.
[Received January 28 (?).]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that I have received from Lieut. Foster in Warsaw a letter dated January 9th, from which I enclose the essential paragraphs:

[“]*Politics*

The *Coup d'Etat* that you have read about in the papers most probably is considered by everybody as being a farce. It was the creation of a few men only, Prince Eustache Sapieha being at the head of the affair. None of the details had been worked out and none of the other parties knew of it. Three members of the ministry were placed under arrest on Monday night by a small number of the Milice who had been brought into the scheme. They then placed the Chief of Staff of the army, General Szeptycki under arrest instead of simply guarding his dwelling as had been planned. He pointed out what it would mean in the way of demoralization to the armies now fighting if he did not resist arrest and the Milice let him go. He went at once to Pilsudski who had the ministers released and Sapieha arrested but Pilsudski realising that there was a demonstration against his ministry sent his Chief of Staff at once by special train to Cracow to get Paderewski and bring him to Warsaw. Paderewski and Pilsudski have been in conference since Tuesday and the report is that the possibility of a coalition ministry being formed is very good. Nothing has been said as yet and nothing may be actually done until the 12th when a general meeting is to be held of delegates from

Posen, Galicia, Pomerania and Warsaw. The *Coup d'Etat* was not directed at Pilsudski, for whom there seems to be a general respect as a patriot if not for his political ability, but against his ministry which without doubt was absolutely inefficient—all save the ministers of Finance and Ravitaillement whom Kellogg reports as being able men. These two men would not join the ministry and have been serving outside. A Conservative said to me today that his party was the only one that the Pilsudski government would talk with and therefore he had hopes that if some sort of a coalition was decided upon that the Conservative party would be recognized in the Ministry. It is reported, however, that Pilsudski at first would hear nothing but Socialists. I will try and get in touch with some of those men tomorrow and may be able to send you a more detailed report.

Frontiers

Have had only general discussions of which the general trend are that that is a matter for the Peace Conference and the pressing thing now was to form a stable government and equip an army that can hold off the Bolsheviks.

Socialistic Theories

Discussion of the cutting up of the large estates for division among the peasants has brought several interesting points from the owners of large estates, both in Cracow and Warsaw. They state that the peasant in the first place is lazy and would not work his ground properly. This they prove with instances of peasants owning lands in the vicinity of their properties or of land that they have rented out to the peasant for periods of six years. Secondly agriculture demands a certain amount of intelligence and knowledge that the majority of peasants have not got. Beet growing was particularly instanced. Thirdly is the question of implements and fertilizers which the peasant cannot afford for a small tract of land. In answering the question as to the possibility of educating the peasant it was stated that the minute that a peasant could read and write he

was through with farming. The answer of these large estate owners to the question of the disposition of these large estates was taxation at a rate that would necessitate careful and intensive cultivation or else the sale of the property by those who did not wish to farm their property. One large property owner, only, advocated the parcelling out of estates and I learned afterwards that his property had been practically ruined by the war!

Pogroms

I am enclosing a series of newspaper articles taken from Jewish papers and gotten out by a Jewish organization that belittles certainly the reports of the Pogroms. The opinion seems to be that these so called Pogroms are nothing more nor less than bandit raids and that they hit the Jews particularly because in the towns the Jews are the small store owners and it is the small merchandise that the bandits take.

Bolshevism

This is a very serious and important subject and one that should receive immediate attention. The Poles all say "Why discuss politics and frontiers when the Bolsheviks are practically at our doors and there will soon be no Poland left about which to discuss. What we need is the moral support of Allied troops and right away." Lemberg is three quarters surrounded just the railway line being open and trains passing over this line are constantly bombarded. The city is practically without food, the water supply has been cut off and there is no coal. Women and children are defending the city with the men, for it is understood that if the town falls it is to be turned over to the entering troops for pillage. The tales of death and torture by the Bolshevik troops for those who have come in their path are beyond belief in their barbarity. It is easy to understand their fear with troops threatening from the East and North and Germany just balancing on the edge.

In Cracow the streets were crowded with unemployed and it is said that the people do not want to work. The Austrian system of pensions by which the soldier drew not only his pay but also 120 crowns a month for a wife, 80 crowns for a mother and 50 crowns for each child has demoralized the people. They have tasted of good things without effort and they are not anxious to work again. It is reported that stealing is rife. The high cost of living has also upset conditions. Where a servant has to pay 500 crowns for a pair of shoes she has demanded more pay in order to clothe herself. Prices are very high everywhere for food and clothing. The housekeepers and hotel servants are now on strike here in Warsaw demanding exorbitant wages.

Military

The army is divided between the three fronts—Germany, Ukraina and Vilna. Its actual strength I have not determined but the impression is that with supplies of equipment and ammunition an army of about 500,000 could be put into the field in a comparatively short space of time, making use of the men returning from the Russian, Austrian and German armies. It is clothes and shoes as well as munitions that are actually lacking. They have German guns but no German ammunition; Austrian ammunition, but no Austrian guns etc. It has been stated that a general mobilization is also feared on account of the number of men of bolshevistic tendencies that would get into the army. On the whole the country is considered to be strongly anti-bolshevistic and all that would be necessary would be a very small detachment of Allied troops to relieve the situation. Sort of a steady nucleus. Every one is anxiously waiting news of General Haller⁶ and his troops which are reported to be on the way. They believe that these troops alone might save the situation. An officer at Cracow spoke of three wounded men from his regiment that had just returned from the Ukrainian front who said that the Ukrainian troops immediately gave way before any decided resistance or attack and that the peasants in those armies were tired of fighting. German and Austrian officers are reported as in command and that communication with those

countries is kept up by airplane. A train of 200 cars of food supplies en route from Ukrania to Austria as payment for war supplies was caught by the Government of Cracow according to a report in the Warsaw papers tonight. Four Jews arrived in Cracow from Russia well lined with Bolshevik money and people said that the effect in the town was felt almost immediately. It is all of that as well as the realization that they cannot expect much assistance from outside until a stable government of some sort is formed that lends hope to good results from the conferences now under way. Paderewski had a wildly patriotic reception but that does not mean necessarily that he is considered as a possible successor to Pilsudski.

All of the above is hardly of sufficient detail to be of great value but I hope that it will give you a bit of an idea of the conditions as they impressed me on arrival and also of the attitude of many of the people. I have met only those of the middle and upper classes as yet. I hope to arrange with the former secretary of the American Consulate to do work for our Mission. Someone to run around card and letter leaving and who knows the people and the city is very necessary. He can also read the press for me and knock around the lower parts of the city as well. He is now in the employ of the Spanish Consulate handling whatever American correspondence that comes up but it takes but one hour of his time daily which would be no inconvenience to us and I don't think that his employment would be considered as meaning diplomatic recognition in any way as he is a Pole. I would give much to take over the old consulate, however, as it would be ideal for sleeping quarters and office space for our Mission.

A bit of gossip is that the upset in Posen at the time of Paderewski's arrival was due to his being accompanied by Col. Wade of the English Mission. It has since been proved that Col. Wade had orders to accompany him though the newspapers came out with a statement to the contrary.

Later

Nothing has developed from the Pilsudski-Paderewski conference and it is said that Pilsudski still is holding out for an entire socialistic Ministry. The *Coup d'Etat* has strengthened the present socialistic government on account of its failure. If anything results from the present conferences it might almost be called a success, however. The real uniting factor will be the approach of the Bolshevist armies. Vilna is definitely in the hands of the Bolsheviks and Lemberg cannot hold out much longer. I think that all the parties are beginning to realize that help from the Allies cannot be expected until some sort of a coalition government is formed and most probably this will be the result of the meeting of the delegates from the various parts of Poland "to-be" that takes place on the 12th. The men from Posen have already arrived Seyda at their head. It is curious the way that many people of all sorts and kinds speak about the political ability of the Posen Poles and their greater experience. There seems to be much confidence placed in them. This is of course due to their German education and comparative freedom in Governmental matters during past years whereas the Russian Poles have been given practically no opportunities. The attempt of the present socialist Ministry is an example of inefficiency.

The old Milice formed under German occupation has been replaced by a new Milice of Socialists almost entirely and this organization is being extended throughout Poland. How much it can be counted on is therefore a question. Last night there was shooting outside our house and inquiry brought out the fact that a guard down the street thought he saw someone entering the bank he was guarding and so fired several shots. The guard in front of the English Mission's house thereupon shot too just so as to let the other guards know that they were there on the job. Thank Heaven we have no guard outside of this building."

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

6 Commander of Polish troops on several fronts during the war.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/7

[Document 159]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

No. 15

VIENNA , January 12, 1919.
[Received January 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to report that no question concerning the future of German Austria weighs more on the minds of public men here than does that of the German speaking portions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. In the last few days I have heard a number of them hold forth long and eloquently on the subject and shall now try to give the pith of their views, as usual without comment of my own. I append for convenient reference an ordinary uncritical popular map.⁷

The German-Austrians, including those in Bohemia, accept a new independent Bohemia as a thing they have no power to change even if they had the wish. They regard separation between themselves and the Czechs as final and in many ways do not regret the dissolution of their former partnership. They are many of them willing to admit, with sadness, that the German islands in the middle of a predominantly Czech population must be regarded as lost, but they protest most strongly against the inclusion in the Czecho-Slav state of large blocks of thoroughly German population, and they contest on every ground the Czech arguments in support of such a course. It should be remembered that the German districts in dispute are divided into three separate and not really contiguous portions, namely—southern Bohemia and Moravia, Northern Bohemia and the so-called Sudetenlands of Eastern Bohemia, Northern Moravia and Silesia. Although these all abut on solid blocks of German speaking people, in only one of the three cases are these people in Austria. The other two are in Germany. The same arguments do riot all apply with equal force in the three regions.

I. *The Geographical and Economic Argument.* The German Austrians admit the geographical, and to a certain extent, the economic unity of Bohemia (including Moravia), but they do not regard this as sufficient to outweigh other considerations, and they point out that the Czechs, who are so categorical in demanding this unity for Bohemia, refuse to pay the slightest attention to it in their demand for the Slovak territories of Hungary, a state whose natural geographical limits are equally well marked. They also point out that the argument of a natural frontier, though holding for Northern Bohemia and to a lesser extent for the eastern block of German territories in Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, does not apply to the German speaking territories in Southern Bohemia and Moravia where there is no physical separation from the provinces of Upper and Lower Austria. The population on the two sides of the boundary is the same and belongs together. Its political separation is a matter of historical accident. The economic unity too of Bohemia, though in part natural, is largely a matter of historical growth and of protective tariffs. It is true that the manufacturing regions furnish the more agricultural central portion with goods and that the center produces food for the manufactories, but the great established Bohemian industries, most of which were founded by Austrians or by German Bohemians are in their hands, rest on a world-wide market, and not on that of their next neighbors. Naturally a division of Bohemia would produce great economic disturbances and cause suffering, just as the breaking up of the Austrian Empire is doing on a much larger scale at the present moment, but this is a transitory evil which has to be endured. The economic life of all these countries will readjust itself in time.

II. *The Historical Argument* Here again the German Austrians admit the unity of the Bohemian state, (except for the Eger district which came in much later and whose separate entity was long recognized), though they claim a much greater share in its history and glory than is accorded to them by the Czechs, and here again they point out the analogous case of Hungary, a country that has also had a unified history, and one not without many glories, but is none the less being subjected to partition. They admit too that the Czechs are the older as well as the more numerous population, although there were Germans there at an earlier period, but they

declare that it is absurd to regard the Germans who colonized Bohemia some seven or eight hundred years ago and whose descendants have lived there to the present day, as intruders without rights. If one goes back as far as this, where does one stop short of the cave-dwellers? The territory in which the Germans settled was at the time of their coming practically vacant. The Czechs, not being numerous enough really to fill the whole of it, had taken up the central and more fertile parts. German colonists came in with the cordial encouragement of the Bohemian princes, and peopled the poorer lands around the edges, which have been German ever since in their history and their sentiment, although loyal to their country, in whose history and development they have often taken the leading part. Now, however, that a new state is being established on nationalistic principles hostile to themselves, they claim the right of not being forced into it. The German Austrians say that in conformity with their loyal acceptance of President Wilson's principles of self-determination they now regard historical arguments as no longer of much value. They have not urged them in the question concerning the boundaries between themselves and the Jugoslavs, where also one finds a unity that has lasted several centuries, and they do not feel that they should have weight in the case of Bohemia.

The great argument on which the Germans of Austria and Bohemia rest their case is, as they are never tired of repeating, the principle of self-determination. They declare that they have accepted President Wilson's fourteen points without qualification and have acted accordingly. When after the cessation of hostilities the Czechs, instead of disarming, called their men to the colors and occupied the German parts of Bohemia, people in those regions were inclined to resist by force. The government of Vienna, however, forbade all such resistance, declaring that the matter could be settled only by the Peace Conference in Paris, and that the Germans of Austria and Bohemia should peaceably await its decision trusting to the justice of their case. They meet the Czech statement that many of the German Bohemians wish to belong to the new state for economic reasons with the reply that in these districts they are willing to submit the matter to a popular vote, provided that vote be taken under an impartial neutral administration. The territory now seized from them

by the Czechs is German to the core and has few Czechs in most of it, except in Northern Bohemia where the industrial development of recent years has led to a large influx of Czech workmen. To tear away some three millions of Germans from their fellows and to unite them against their wills to a Czechish population of barely double their numbers would not only be a most flagrant violation of the principles which the Allies and especially the United States have proclaimed as their own and which have been accepted by Austria, but would utterly destroy any hope of a lasting peace. It would create an Austria Irredenta, conquered provinces less contented and harder for the conqueror to assimilate than ever were Alsace and Lorraine, supported as they would be by equally intense regret and sympathy from the country which had lost them. Anything like good relations between the Czecho-Slovak state and its German and Austrian neighbors would be as impossible as they have been for the last century between Germany and France. The German Austrians are now powerless to resist any decision which the Allies and the United States may impose upon them, but a decision which shall place one third of them under the heel of a foreign people who have already begun to take steps to denationalize them will mean an end to any hope of permanent peace in this part of the world. Sooner or later the question must and will come up again, and in the meantime the "Balkanization" of the former territories of Austria will be a source of woe and peril, not only to the territories themselves but to the rest of the world. In the eyes of the German Austrians today the issue is a clear one between the new doctrine of self-determination from which so much is hoped and naked imperialism of the old discredited type.

I have [etc.]

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

[7](#) Map not reproduced.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/7¹/₂

[Document 160]

***Professor A. C. Coolidge to Professor W. E. Lunt, of
the Commission to Negotiate Peace***

[VIENNA ,] January 13, 1919.

DEAR LUNT: I am afraid that the question of getting some evidence with regard to the present national tendencies of the Ladins is a rather special one. It would take much time on the part of some one particular person, who ought to go into the Ladin district and talk with the people as much as the authorities would let him. When I have scattered my crowd to their various posts I shall have only a few left here, and they would be obliged to confine themselves to pretty broad general subjects of current interest. I shall tell them, however, to keep the Ladin question in mind. The only contribution of my own that I have to offer is that among the Tyrolese delegates who visited me the other day there was a representative from the Ladin region. He told me that his people speak Ladin in their daily life but that many of them knew German (and some of them Italian), and that they lived on the best of terms with their German neighbors, indeed they had always done so, and had no desire to be detached from them now. He and others have emphasized the fact that Ladin is an independent language, not a dialect of Italian, and that even if it is akin to Italian this is no reason why the people who speak it should be united to Italy when they prefer Austria. Of course the feeling of the people may be quite different, and especially in these times of confusion and uncertainty the Ladins may want to join the winning side. I give the above statements for what they are worth.

Hoping that all goes well with you, I remain

Yours very truly,

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

Paris Peace Conf. 184.011/49: Telegram

[Document 161]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson)

PARIS , January 16, 1919.

37. [From Lansing.] Your 88, January 9th.⁸ Please inform Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge Vienna that I approve his suggestion to make use of available consular quarters there. Department also telegraphed its approval January 15th. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁸ Not printed; it transmitted the message quoted by Professor Coolidge in his report of Jan 8, 1919, p. 225 [*Pg. 225 includes portions of [Doc. 154](#) and [Doc. 155](#)*].

Bulgaria

[\[162\] The Bulgarian Armistice Convention, Signed September 29, 1918](#)

September 29, 1918

[\[163\] The Special Agent at Corfu \(Dodge \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Corfu , November 14, 1918—6 p.m. [Received November 15—11:50 a.m.]

763.72116/603: Telegram

[\[164\] The Minister in Greece \(Droppers \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Athens , November 21, 1918—1 p.m. [Received November 22—10:48 a.m.]

763.72/12326: Telegram

[\[165\] The Minister in Greece \(Droppers \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Athens , November 22, 1918. [Received November 25—5:15 a.m.]

763.72/12342: Telegram

[166] The Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge).

Washington , November 25, 1918—3 p.m.

763.72116/603: Telegram

[167] The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Sofia , November 29, 1918. [Received December 1—4:58 p.m.]

763.72119/2842: Telegram

[168] The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Sofia , November 30, 1918. [Received December 4—5:55 a.m.]

763.72/12428: Telegram

[169] The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Sofia , December 3, 1918. [Received December 5—12:05 p.m.]

763.72/12435: Telegram

[170] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , December 10, 1918—noon. [Received December 12—12:40 p.m.]

763.72119/2969: Telegram

[171] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Sofia , December 10, 1918—1 p.m. [Received December 15—2:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/13: Telegram

[172] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 12, 1918—10 a.m. [Received 7:40 p.m.]

763.72119/2971: Telegram

[173] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew).

Sofia , December 12, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/12½

[174] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , December 12, 1918—11 a.m. [Received December 14—2:38 p.m.]

763.72119/2988: Telegram

[175] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Sofia , December 16, 1918—12 a.m. [Received December 19—12:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/16: Telegram

[176] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Sofia , December 16, 1918. [Received December 30.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/2

[177] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , December 19, 1918. [Received January 18, 1919.]

763.72119/3443

[178] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 21, 1918—11 a.m. [Received 2:55 p.m.]

763.72119/3132: Telegram

[179] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , December 21, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 874.0144/2

[180] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Sofia , December 24, 1918—10 p.m. [Received December 26—11:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/3: Telegram

[181] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Consul General at Saloniki (Horton)

Paris , December 27, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/16: Telegram

[182] Professor Clive Bay to Mr. William C. Bullitt

[Paris ,] December 28, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.4124/16

[183] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Sofia , December 30, 1918—11 p.m. [Received January 3, 1919—10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Bulgaria/2: Telegram

[184] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Sofia , January 1, 1919—10 p.m. [Received January 4—7:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/20: Telegram

[185] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , January 9, 1919. [Received February 8.]

763.72119/3712

[186] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Sofia , January 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/7

[187] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 14, 1919—6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/9: Telegram

The Bulgarian Armistice Convention, Signed September 29, 1918 [1](#)

September 29, 1918

MILITARY CONVENTION REGULATING THE CONDITIONS OF SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS AND BULGARIA

- (1) Immediate evacuation of the territories still occupied by Bulgarians in Greece and Serbia; no cattle, cereals, or provisions to be exported from such territories, which must be left undamaged, the Bulgarian civil administration will continue to function in the parts of Bulgaria actually occupied by the Allies.
- (2) Immediate demobilization of the entire Bulgarian Army, with the exception of a righting force comprising 3 divisions of 16 battalions each, 4 regiments of cavalry, which will be employed, 2 divisions for the defense of the east frontier of Bulgaria, and of the Dobrudja and 1 division for guarding the railways.
- (3) Surrender at points designated by the high command of the armies of the east of arms, munitions, and military vehicles belonging to the elements demobilized, which will be stored by the Bulgarian authorities and under the control of the Allies. The horses also will be handed over to the Allies.
- (4) Restitution to Greece of the material of the Fourth Greek Army Corps, taken from the Greek Army at the occupation of eastern Macedonia, in so far that it has not been sent to Germany.
- (5) The elements of the Bulgarian troops now at the west of the meridian of Uskub will lay down their arms and will be considered, until further order, as prisoners of war; the officers will be allowed to keep their swords.
- (6) The Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East will be employed by the allied armies until the peace without reciprocity as concerning the prisoners of war of the Allies. These last will be immediately surrendered to the allied authorities and deported civilians will be wholly free to reenter their own country.

- (7) Germany and Austria will be allowed a delay of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations from Bulgaria. The diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as well as their citizens, must withdraw in this same period. The orders for the cessation of hostilities will be given at the time of the signature of the present convention.

Gen. **FRANCHET D'ESPEREY**
ANDRÉ LIAPTCHEW
Gen. **LOUKOFF**

**MILITARY COVENANT REGULATING THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS
AND BULGARIA**

SECRET ARTICLES

- (1) The eventual passage of the Allied military forces over Bulgarian territory, as well as the utilization of railways, roads, waterways, and harbors, will be the object of a special covenant between the Bulgarian Government and the High Command of the Army of the East. Some negotiations to this effect will begin in about eight days at the most. They will concern, also, the control of telephone, telegraph, and the stations of T. S. F.
- (2) A certain number of strategical points in the interior of the Bulgarian territory will be occupied by the great allied powers. This occupation will be provisional, and will serve purely as a guaranty. It will not give way to coercion or arbitrary requisition. The General in Chief of the armies gives assurance that unless unusual circumstances arise, Sofia will not be occupied.
- (3) The General in Chief reserves for himself, in case of necessity, the right to demand absolute cessation of every relation between Bulgaria and her former allies.
- (4) The opening of Bulgarian ports to the vessels of allied and neutral powers.

Gen. **FRANCHET D'ESPEREY**
ANDRÉ LIAPTCHEW
Gen. **LOUKOFF**

¹ Reprinted from S. Doc. 147, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24. A copy of the French text of the Armistice with Bulgaria certified as authentic by M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, may be found under file No. 763.72119/6664. For correspondence concerning the Bulgarian armistice negotiations, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 321–331, 476–480*](#).

763.72116/603: Telegram

[Document 163]

***The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the
Secretary of State***

CORFU , November 14, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received November 15—11:50 a.m.]

Foreign Office circular note states that Servian Government has decided to create international commission to investigate violations of the Hague Conventions in view of the great number violations by Bulgarians, Austrians and Germans and requests the Government of the United States to appoint a member of the commission. Servian Government trusts the Government of the United States will accede to this request which is especially urgent.

Another circular note incloses three official documents enumerating violations international law especially by Bulgarians. The atrocities described are appalling. Copies by next mail.²

DODGE

² Not printed.

763.72/12326: Telegram

[Document 164]

The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS , November 21, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received November 22—10:48 a.m.]

610. The following from Murphy for Secretary of State:

“186, 20th. Yesterday afternoon Prime Minister was informed by General Chrétien, Chief Entente military mission Sofia, that ‘by order of French Government’ Bulgarian army must evacuate Dobrudja. Order violates armistice signed 29th September last, paragraph 2 of which provided for immediate demobilization of Bulgarian army except ‘three divisions of 16 battalions each, 4 regiments of cavalry, which will be employed, 2 divisions for the defence of the eastern frontier of Bulgaria and of the Dobrudja and 1 division to guard the railroads’. Cabinet immediately resigned, but King holds matter in abeyance. The order has created deplorable situation, for change of Government may lead to resuscitation Bolshevism. Cannot United States intervene and bring about revocation of order? Murphy.”

DROPPERS

763.72/12342: Telegram

[Document 165]

The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS , November 22, 1918.
[Received November 25—5:15 a.m.]

612. Forwarded at the request of Murphy. Trust I am complying with regulations of the Department in forwarding it.

“Number 187, 21st. Following yesterday’s telegram number 186. The Prime Minister replying note Chief Entente Mission said:

‘It is clear that the evacuation of Dobroudja does not figure in the conditions of the Convention of September 29 which conditions the Royal Government adheres to and has loyally fulfilled in all respects; proof of this is not lacking. Considering therefore the impossibility of fulfilling a new condition imposed contrary to the convention and not being able either to admit of the interpretation given to the Convention the Bulgarian Government has handed its resignation to the King.’

The King will hold resignation Cabinet in abeyance for some days. Large majority Parliament insist upon Cabinet remaining and are indignant violation terms armistice. People generally of same mind. Plainly speaking, French are intriguing overthrow Government, but if attempt succeeds, revolution inevitable. What must be done to save Bulgaria is to revoke order French Government directing Bulgarian troops leave Dobroudja and have freedom Entente and Americans come here investigate and make truthful report to Versailles. British Officers and Italian General here in accord with my views and already have telegraphed their

Governments. French disturbing tranquility of the country by their intrigues and may bring about renewal of Bolshevism order. Situation demands prompt action. Please advise President. Murphy.”

DROPPERS

763.72116/603: Telegram

[Document 166]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu
(Dodge)***

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918—3 p.m.

Your November 14, 6 p.m. In view of the fact that American forces did not participate in the military campaign in the Balkans, this Government does not feel that it can properly accept the invitation of the Serbian Government to appoint a member to an international commission to investigate Bulgarian atrocities. A similar reply has been made to a like invitation from the Greek Government.

LANSING

763.72119/2842: Telegram

[Document 167]

***The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the
Secretary of State [4](#)***

SOFIA , November 29, 1918.
[Received December 1—4:58 p.m.]

190. Prime Minister informs me Roumanian troops crossed river Danube last night, search-lights having been used on Roumanian side. As population Toulcha greatly disquieted, Prime Minister asks that United States intervene that terms armistice be strictly adhered to.

MURPHY

[4](#) Forwarded to Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 132, Dec. 6, 1918, 3 p.m.

763.72/12428: Telegram

[Document 168]

***The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the
Secretary of State***

SOFIA , November 30, 1918.
[Received December 4—5:55 a.m.]

192. Situation Dobroudja improved. Roumanian troops withdrawn by order and recrossed river. So far as can be ascertained no excesses and no damage. Bulgarian civil administration will remain in charge railroads, posts and telegraphs.

MURPHY

763.72/12435: Telegram

[Document 169]

***The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the
Secretary of State***

SOFIA , December 3, 1918.

[Received December 5—12:05 p.m.]

193. Situation changed for worse. Bulgarian civil administration in Dobroudja which it was promised should continue now ordered leave. Roumanian troops are to occupy territory and Theodoroff Cabinet may resign as protest. Country much disquieted. Bulgarian population Dobroudja fearing renewal cruel treatment will probably flock en masse to Bulgaria. Neither food nor fuel to supply them. Bulgaria asks only that English and French troops occupy Dobroudja and that neither Roumanian military nor civil authorities be permitted there pending settlement by Peace Conference.

MURPHY

763.72119/2969: Telegram

[Document 170]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

SOFIA , December 10, 1918—noon.
[Received December 12—12:40 p.m.]

33 [3?]. Reports have reached me from French, English, Greek and American Red Cross sources that Bulgarian officials are rendering repatriation of Greeks as difficult as possible and subject them to great and unnecessary hardships making them pay railroad fare and other expenses. Another report less well confirmed as coming only from Greek sources is that Bulgarians in emigrating eastern Macedonia are taking with them all horses, cattle, flocks, et cetera, which is in distinct violation of terms of armistice. French commander in chief whom I saw in Salonica and who is expected here shortly told me that he intends to speak energetically to the Bulgarian Government regarding these two points. Above repeated to Paris.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/13: Telegram

[Document 171]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Ambassador in France (Sharp)***⁵

SOFIA , December 10, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received December 15—2:15 p.m.]

2. Had long talk with Mr. Theodoroff, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. He received me most cordially [and] expressed great admiration for President Wilson and the United States, a feeling which he assured me was shared by practically all, then went on to say Bulgaria owed much to the United States in the past and that now in the darkest moment of its history she looked to the United States as the only country which could save her practically from annihilation. The Minister then undertook to justify and explain and excuse entrance of Bulgaria into the war on the side of Central Powers which he characterized as a crime on the part of his country. He claimed however that the Bulgarian people had always been against joining the Central Powers and that it was due to the ex-King, a small band of unscrupulous politicians in the pay of Germany, as well as intrigues on the part of Greece and Roumania. He stated that the army had been opposed to the war and that it had been necessary to adopt a very severe coercion with heavy punishments in order to keep proper authority in the army fighting unwillingly against the Allies. The Prime Minister stated that when the Radoslavoff Government fell and Malinoff Government of which he was Minister assumed power, it was decided to seize the first opportunity to break with Germany. This opportunity came when Germany refused to send troops at Bulgaria's request. Bulgaria then immediately proposed an armistice although Germany then used every promise and threat to hold her. The Minister hoped that the Allies would take this action of Bulgaria into consideration for it is realized that Bulgaria must suffer for her part in the war but nevertheless [her] demand for an armistice had been the beginning

of the end of the war, for the Bulgarian army was not by any means at the end of its power and could have prolonged the war for at least some months longer. He especially hoped that the United States would appreciate these facts. He said that Bulgaria would never have gone into the war if it had realized that it would have to come into conflict with England and the great powers; that all countries except Servia and Roumania had declared war on Bulgaria, not Bulgaria on them. The Minister referred to the very effective propaganda work being carried on in the Allied countries by Servia, Greece, Roumania and deplored fact that Bulgaria was not allowed to send agents to the Allies to explain her position and counteract some of the accusations made against her. He asked me to renew previous requests that Bulgaria be allowed to send representatives official or unofficial to Paris to present to the Allies the Bulgarian side of the case. He spoke of the action of the Allies in Dobrudja which he claims is in violation of the terms of the armistice signed with the Allies and which has caused considerable internal unrest in the country. It was as a protest [to this] alleged violation that Malinoff the former prime minister resigned and the position of his successor is made difficult and precarious. The Minister next spoke of Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia stating that according to the principles of nationality recently declared by President Wilson, Bulgaria is bound to receive that part of Macedonia which was recognized as Bulgarian in the secret annex to the treaty between Bulgaria and Servia of 1912⁶ before the [first] Balkan war. The Minister finally spoke of the food situation. He said that in country districts the situation was not so bad and population could probably get through winter but in Bucharest especially and other towns supply of wheat sufficient for 40 days. He said that America was the only country to which Bulgaria could look and ask for support and their appeal for 20,000 tons wheat would be sufficient to tide over the situation. Food riots and disorders were brooding [*brewing?*] and he could accept no responsibility for outcome which might bring Bulgaria to conditions resembling conditions now in Russia.

Next had conference with Minister of War Liaptchew. He was Bulgarian delegate who signed armistice with the Allies. He spoke with considerable bitterness on the subject of the alleged violations of the armistice as to Dobrudja. He complained of the high-handed

acts of the Allies in [apparent omission] and in Bulgaria, saying that it was sometimes difficult to decide who was governing the country. He further stated that it looked to him as if, insofar as the Balkans were concerned each state would at the end of the war be armed to the teeth to protect itself against its neighbors. I replied that as far as the United States was concerned this was the exact situation which it desired and intended to do away with after the war.

This morning Prime Minister made me visit of an hour and went into Dobrudja question in great detail. This is evidently the question most on his and the public mind at the present moment and its effect upon internal situation of the country may be unfortunate as bringing about disorders which might upset present Ministry. At this moment, however, it seems as if a temporary solution satisfactory to Bulgaria has been reached. What Bulgaria feared was that the civil administration might be given into the hands of the Roumanians, but he is now assured that it will be in hands of Allied Military authorities to which Bulgaria has no objection. The Minister fears, however, that this agreement like former ones may not be kept too strictly. I think that Bulgaria is going to adopt the role of posing as a victim having been dragged into the war against the real wishes of the country and people and on that ground appealing to the magnanimity and generosity of the great powers, especially the United States, at the Peace Conference at the same time appealing to principle of nationalities as set forth by President Wilson to secure the return of the Dobrudja and certain territory in Macedonia. The above sent immediately Department of State.

WILSON

⁵ The last two paragraphs of this telegram have been supplied from the text transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in France in telegram No. 6345, Dec. 17, 1918. 6 p.m. (763.72119/3040)

⁶ For text, in French, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cv, pp. 941, 942.

763.72119/2971: Telegram

[Document 172]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 12, 1918—10 a.m.
[Received 7:40 p.m.]

250. I have conferred with General Bliss but he says that he sees no remedy for conditions of the sort described in your telegram⁷ which are apparently local and temporary. He states that if conditions at Toulcha are really serious they will be subject of earnest consideration at the Peace Conference.

EDWARD HOUSE

⁷ No. 132 of Dec. 6, 1918; see footnote 4, p. 244 [*Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 165, Doc. 166, and Doc. 167*].

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/12^{1/2}

[Document 173]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Secretary
of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

SOFIA , December 12, 1918.

MY DEAR GREW: I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram⁸ which a number of the missionaries of the American Board, residing in Bulgaria, requested me to telegraph to the President. I did not feel justified in sending a telegram, but informed them that I would transmit their communication to you in Paris in case you should find it possible and proper to bring it to the notice of the President through the proper channels.

In connection with this communication I would point out that all the American missionaries in this country are strongly pro-Bulgarian and strong partisans of Bulgarian territorial ambitions. I understand that during the war they have carried on a considerable propaganda work in the United States, especially with a view to preventing a declaration of war against Bulgaria, and they are now continuing this propaganda in a more intense form in the hope that Bulgarian aspirations for increased territory will receive favorable consideration at the Peace Conference, and especially secure the support of the American delegation. I have been informed on good authority that two American missionaries (one named ...) recently left Bulgaria for the United States for propaganda purposes, their expenses being paid by the Bulgarian Government.

The Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War and Finance have all requested me to secure permission from my Government for some of the American missionaries in Bulgaria to go to Paris, officially or unofficially, to place before American and other allied public men Bulgaria's position and aspirations for increased territory.

One, and the chief reason of the strong pro-Bulgarian sentiment among American missionaries in this country is due to the fact that Bulgaria is the only Balkan state where their efforts have met with any success. In Greece, Servia and Roumania, even if they are permitted to carry on their work at all, they have been entirely unsuccessful in proselytizing. On the contrary the establishment of American missionary schools in Bulgaria has been encouraged and welcomed by the Bulgarian Government and people, and they have met with considerable success in making converts.

This explains the attitude of the American missionaries in Bulgaria, who by carrying on propaganda in favor of that country in the United States, hope to arouse in certain circles a feeling of sympathy which will influence the American members of the peace conference, so that Bulgarian territorial aspirations will receive favorable consideration.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES S. WILSON

⁸ Not attached to file copy of this letter.

763.72119/2988: Telegram

[Document 174]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

SOFIA , December 12, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received December 14—2:38 p.m.]

6. Referring to conversation I had with Captain Lippmann, in Paris, I fail to find in Bulgaria any special interest in Thrace or any indication that she would consider expansion in that direction as compensation for parts of Macedonia. On the other hand talking with Greeks and others, it appears that Greece has almost unlimited ambitions and aspirations in Thrace. The most burning question for Bulgaria is to secure the return of Dobrudja, and next comes the acquisition of that part of Macedonia granted to Bulgaria by the secret annex to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912 before first Balkan War. Bulgaria looks to Peace Conference and especially influence of United States there, to secure for her these two bits of territorial expansion of which she claims she cannot be deprived, if the principle [of] nationalities is honestly carried out. Regarding a second inquiry of Captain Lippmann as to the possibility of Bulgaria in the course of time joining or being absorbed into a strong Yugoslav State, I have had many conversations on the subject with various persons of different nationalities, diplomats and others. They all agree that the idea is most improbable and practically impossible. The only exceptions have been a number of Yugoslav officers who think it is possible. I gather that this is a scheme launched and fathered by the Yugoslavs, who of course desire it, but I do not think it will receive the slightest consideration or favor in Bulgaria. Above sent Paris.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/16: Telegram

[Document 175]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Ambassador in France (Sharp)***

SOFIA , December 16, 1918—12 a.m.
[Received December 19—12:30 p.m.]

6. The Prime Minister called on me yesterday to request that I convey to the President of the United States, in the name of the Government of Bulgaria, and its people, congratulations upon his arrival in Europe. He said further that this was to Bulgaria an event of prime importance as Bulgaria looked to the President of the United States to save Bulgaria from annihilation: He also renewed request already made several times that Mr. Cueshobeluga [*Gueshov?*], former Minister Paris, Berlin, Constantinople, and Mr. Vladimartzanoff, graduate of Harvard, and former Associated Press correspondent at Petrograd, and officer in both Balkan and late wars, who is now attached to Ministry of War, be allowed to proceed to Paris to lay Bulgarian cause unofficially before the President of the United States, and the American peace delegation. Similar requests have been made to British and French Governments to send two other prominent Bulgarians to each of these countries. Kindly repeat to Department.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/2

[Document 176]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Ambassador in France (Sharp)***

SOFIA , December 16, 1918.
[Received December 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith, for transmission to the American Peace Delegation, a copy of a despatch to the Department⁹ transmitting (1) an article from the *Echo de Bulgarie*, the official government organ, of December 13, 1918, containing the reply of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to an interpellation in the Chamber concerning the situation in the Dobrudja, and (2) a copy of a communication addressed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to General Chrétien, Commander of the Allied armies in Bulgaria, on the same subject.⁹

I am [etc.]

CHARLES S. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

Article From “L’Echo de Bulgarie,” December 13, 1918

In reply to an interpellation of M. D. Kiortcheff, a Liberal Deputy, M. Th. Theodoroff, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, made important declarations concerning the Dobrudja in the session of the Sobranie on Wednesday (Dec. 11, 1918.)

After stating that the Government will publish the full text of the armistice concluded at Salonika, the President of the Council spoke of the evacuation of the Dobrudja. By a note dated November 19th,

he said, we were required to withdraw Bulgarian troops from that part of Dobrudja which belonged to Roumania in 1913, in virtue of the treaty of Bucharest of 1913.¹⁰ After the retreat of our troops, or rather at the moment this demand was made, there was no question of our administration which then existed in that country. It continued to remain there provisionally, until the allied governments should pronounce on the subject. When the question was settled by a note dated December 5th, the withdrawal of our administration was also demanded. This note refers to the recall of officials who had been sent from Sofia. Here is the text of the passage:

“The civil administration, under the authority of the allied troops of occupation, shall be entrusted as to details to the native authorities of the Dobrudja. The officials sent from Sofia may not remain. The evacuation of Bulgarian officials is arranged to take place after the occupation of the country by allied troops. This evacuation will take place progressively under the following conditions. It must be finished in the Department of Constansa by December 8th; Department of Toultscha, December 13th; Department of Silistrea, December 18th; Department of Dobrich, December 23rd”.

In demanding the departure of the officials sent from Sofia, and of the administration authorities, the matter was not definitely settled of replacing them, and whether this substitution would be composed of Roumanian officials appointed from Bucharest, or by officials appointed by the military forces of occupation, that is by the High Command of the allied armies in the Dobrudja, entrusted as it is known to General Berthelot, Commander of the Danube Army.

On account of lack of clearness on this point, steps were taken by the Government, and on December 8th we received an explanation signed by General Chrétien, Commander of the allied troops in Bulgaria, of which the following is the conclusion:

“It is decided from the preceding that the administration of the Dobrudja will be placed under the direct order of General Berthelot. This will be a military administration having full powers, which will continue until the conclusion of peace. It is

an allied and not a Roumanian administration. It goes without saying that the local administration will be native so far as possible, in conformity with the orders of the Allied Governments.”

Such is the actual situation, and the Bulgarian Government considers that after the withdrawal of the Bulgarian troops and the officials sent from Sofia, the Dobrudja is occupied by the allied armies—English and French. The French will occupy the north—including the Cernavoda–Constantza railway and the English the south. The troops which occupy the country will administer it, appoint and dismiss officials, take all measures for maintaining order and feeding the population and in general doing everything pertaining to a good administration. There will be no Bulgarian troops, but neither will there be Roumanian troops or officials.

The Dobrudja is placed in the hands of the allied armies which will take charge of its administration. It is clear that in this respect the Dobrudja has not the same fate as the territory which we were obliged to evacuate in virtue of the convention of September 29th, by which we were obliged to purely and simply turn the territory over to the states to which it had belonged before—part to the Servians and part to the Greeks. Here we cede nothing to Roumania.

We are evacuating this province under certain conditions which I have described, leaving it under the occupation of the allied troops and under an administration which they will set up under their own responsibility. We have received a formal written declaration that Roumanian troops will not be admitted in any case or in any way.

The tranquility of the population of the Dobrudja will be assured in an efficacious manner by the military authorities which occupy the country.

Consequently all the complaints which may be made until the conclusion of peace, should be addressed to the military authorities charged with the maintenance of order and tranquility in the country. The most formal assurances have been given us that the properties, lives, and tranquility will be guaranteed to Roumanians,

Bulgarians, Tartars, Russians, and all elements living there. At the same time we have been assured that the occupation does not prejudice in any way the question as to whom the country will belong. This question—it is stated in the communications, will be definitely settled at the peace conference.

This, Gentlemen, is the reply I must make concerning the Dobrudja. I do not think this moment propitious for an appreciation or a discussion of the existing situation. It is even less opportune to inquire whether these acts are regular or not, and to look for the responsibility of the government, if there is such responsibility. I believe that parliament should be satisfied at present by knowing the facts, especially as very soon, it will have the text of the convention. I consider it however my duty to add that this new situation does not inspire us with uneasiness, and that our national work is not exposed to danger. The question of knowing to whom the Dobrudja shall belong remains open; as before the occupation. It will be settled, not on the basis of the effective occupation, for the Dobrudja is occupied by the allied troops, but on entirely other considerations, on the subject of which we have already had occasion to express ourselves. These considerations will be set forth at the conference, in which we may say entire humanity will participate. Confiding in this conference which will pronounce upon all our national claims, convinced of the justice, I might say of the sacredness of our cause and of our right to realize the unity of our people, we do not lessen in any way our chance of receiving satisfaction in the Dobrudja, as well as eventually in Macedonia and Thrace, within the limits where our aspirations extend. We must be calm and have full confidence in the conscience of humanity and in the spirit of justice of the great people and the great powers which will pronounce on all the questions which concern our future in such an intense manner. We must not allow ourselves to be impressed by isolated incidents nor draw hasty conclusions. I am convinced that parliament will act calmly and in full confidence toward the great powers, who are obeying in this case considerations which do not concern us. It is from them that we await the determination of our fate, and it is upon them that we must base our hopes. I am convinced that in so acting we shall obtain what is due us and that we shall not have to regret our attitude.

We must avoid everything of a nature to raise obstacles to our task. Our defense will not be based on hatreds, recriminations or bitterness. It will be reasonable, and I believe that it will be worthy of the attention of the great men who govern the great nations. It will be an appeal to the conscience of humanity. (Applause).

⁹ Not printed.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ For text, in French, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

763.72119/3443

[Document 177]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 6

SOFIA , December 19, 1918.
[Received January 18, 1919.]

SIR: During the first ten days of my stay in Bulgaria, I have had occasion to talk with a considerable number of persons, Bulgarians and others, including the King, the Bulgarian Ministers, various leaders of political parties, the heads of the British, French, Italian, Greek and the Servian Military Missions, American Missionaries and others and the following report is the result of some of the conclusions drawn therefrom.

There is no question in my mind but that both the Bulgarian people and Government are today pro-Ally, glad to be free of German control, glad to have the Allied Armies in the country, at least for the present, and regretting sincerely that they entered the war on the German side. This regret is not entirely owing to the fact that they misjudged the situation and must suffer for being on the losing side, but also to the fact that Bulgaria allowed herself to be drawn into the war by the King and a few agents of Germany against the will and contrary to the sentiments of the Bulgarian people as a whole.

Their point of view is, however, peculiar in regard to their participation in the war on the side of the central powers. They realize that they committed a "crime", as the Prime Minister called it, but once having admitted this fact, they seem to think that this is an end of the matter, and cannot seem to understand why there should be any hard feeling or resentment among the Allies towards Bulgaria, or why there is anything to prevent Bulgaria from resuming her pre-war position as "The Spoiled Child of the Balkans". The Prime Minister is almost the only one who does not adopt this attitude.

This feeling is especially strong in regard to the United States, for whom Bulgaria has always had the warmest feelings, and the fact that Bulgaria and the United States have not been at war makes it apparently impossible for the Bulgarians to understand that American public feeling is not so cordial towards their country as before the war. Every Bulgarian with whom I have spoken looks to the United States to espouse the Bulgarian cause at the Peace Conference, and states that they have the most absolute confidence in President Wilson and his theory of nationalities, which they expect will fulfill all their aspirations for territorial expansion. I have not spoken to a single Bulgarian who has not told me that no pressure could have induced Bulgaria to side with Germany if she had believed that the United States would enter the war. It is also a fact that Germany used every argument and threat to induce Bulgaria to declare war on the United States and that the latter refused even at the risk of a break with her allies.

From England also the Bulgarians seem to expect support at the peace conference. Up to the time of the war, England had always been more favorably disposed to Bulgaria than to the other Balkan states, and I understand that even now there is [*are*] a number of prominent Englishmen, both in Parliament and out, who favor a lenient treatment of Bulgaria.

Bulgaria further counts upon Italian jealousy of the Yougo-Slavs and a greater Serbia to bring Italy to use her influence at the conference to secure for Bulgaria a slice of Macedonia, in order to prevent it from being joined to Serbia.

In fact France is the only one of the great powers from whom Bulgaria seems to fear great hostility at the peace conference. Every Bulgarian whom I have met has asked me anxiously, "Is the feeling in France against us terribly bitter"? It is believed that the Yougo-Slavs are the special protégés of France, who at the peace conference will use all her influence to increase the Yougo-Slav state, especially at the expense of Bulgarian territorial aspirations in Macedonia.

There is also a much less friendly feeling in Bulgaria for the French troops forming the army of occupation than for the English and

Italian. The latter especially seem to get on excellently with the Bulgarians with whom they have to deal and are as a matter of fact a fine lot of troops.

The Bulgarians too seem satisfied with the English troops and say that those parts under English jurisdiction have no cause of complaint and are well administered.

There does not seem to be the same cordial feeling for the French forces in the country. This is due largely to the fact that the whole army of occupation is under French command, and that naturally all orders, unpopular or otherwise, emanate from the French. Also, perhaps, the French troops in Bulgaria are not quite of such a good class as the English and Italians. The fact that many of them are colored is resented by the Bulgarians, and there is furthermore no doubt but that the feelings of the French, both officers and men, is [*are*] less friendly to Bulgaria than those of other nations. General Chrétien, the French officer at the head of the Allied forces is an excellent man for the place. He is able to understand the Bulgarian point of view and desires and works for strict justice for Bulgaria.

Colonel Napier, head of the British Military Mission, goes even further and is in my opinion decidedly friendly towards the Bulgarian people even to sympathizing with their aspirations for increased territory.

As to Bulgaria's feelings for her Balkan neighbors, these still remain intensely bitter towards Greece and Roumania, as she feels that it was largely owing to these two countries that she was tricked into going into the war with the Germans, and she still remembers her loss of territory to them both after the second Balkan war. On the contrary all Bulgarians with whom I have talked about Serbia seem to look forward to a *rapprochement* with that country, and to closer relations, at least commercial ones. There is some vague talk of Bulgaria and Greater Serbia making some sort of a union sometime in the indefinite future, but I am not inclined to give much weight to this idea, especially as far as Bulgaria is concerned, though I believe it is favored by the Yougo-Slavs and Servians.

There is no doubt but that a Servia with ports on the Adriatic would have a strong attraction for Bulgaria, and would tend to increase commercial relations and possibly political ones as well, and there is a possibility that if Bulgaria is given no increase of territory by the peace conference or worse still should be reduced in territory, she would of necessity be absorbed by a Greater Servia, and completely lose her individuality as a separate nationality.

The difference in feeling towards Greeks and Servians is shown by what is taking place in the repatriation of civilians of those two countries from Bulgaria. The Chief of the Servian Military Mission tells me that everything is going smoothly so far as the Servians are concerned, while there is no doubt that efforts to make the repatriation of Greeks hard and painful are in some degree intentional.

I have been unable up to the present time to form any opinion on Bulgarian relations with Turkey, present or future, beyond the fact that every Bulgarian cherishes a profound hatred for the Turks. A few days ago the Bulgarian Minister and staff from Constantinople and the Bulgarian Consuls in Turkey arrived in Sofia. The official newspapers stated that the Entente had obliged Turkey to expel them as according to the terms of the armistice Turkey was to break relations with her former allies. Sweden has taken charge of Bulgarian interests in Turkey.

As reported in my telegrams the burning question for Bulgaria is the Dobrudja which is now under Allied Military jurisdiction. To this temporary arrangement the Bulgarian Government has no objection, provided that this district be restored to Bulgaria by the peace conference. Next to this comes Macedonia, or rather that part of it which Servia, in the secret annex to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, acknowledged as purely Bulgarian, and without interest for Servia. If these two bits of territory are awarded to Bulgaria I believe that she will be satisfied and cease to be a source of trouble in the Balkans. If, on the other hand, Dobrudja is awarded to Roumania and the above-mentioned part of Macedonia to Servia and Greece, Bulgaria will never accept the decision as final, and sooner or later trouble will again begin in the Balkans. Bulgaria has, I firmly believe,

abandoned her chauvinistic ideas and exaggerated territorial pretensions in Macedonia and would be fully satisfied with the rather modest increase referred to above. And even more important for future peace is her regaining possession of the Dobrudja. In view of the large territorial acquisitions which it seems likely will be granted Serbia and Roumania, it is to be hoped that they will not grudge these two bits to Bulgaria, as such a settlement will surely strengthen the chances of a lasting Balkan peace. As to Thrace, Bulgaria seems, in spite of the large Bulgarian element in the population there, to have largely disinterested herself. In any case she would not in my opinion, consider the acquisition of territory there as compensation for her claims of the Dobrudja and a part of Macedonia.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the American Embassy in Paris for transmission to the American Peace Delegation.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES S. WILSON

763.72119/3132: Telegram

[Document 178]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 21, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received 2:55 p.m.]

6414. Following from Saloniki from Sofia with request to repeat to Department:

“Number 5, December 15, 10 a.m. Had audience of hour and half with King yesterday most of it spent in general conversation. He was very cordial and expressed pleasure that United States had sent a diplomatic representative at present critical time. He inquired anxiously as have all persons I have met here what I found the attitude of France towards Bulgaria. It is clearly believed here that while United States, England and Italy will be favorable to Bulgaria or at least not hostile, France will be very decided and favor Yougo-Slavs at Bulgaria's expense.

His Majesty inquired whether I believed the reports were true that the enemy countries would not be represented Peace Conference but merely called in to ratify decisions concerning themselves arrived at by the allies. He remarked that this hardly seemed in accord with previous statements of the allies and the policy of justice declared by President Wilson; and that decisions reached in this way would never be accepted as final by the states who were not allowed to be represented at conference. Like all others I have met here he referred to the unfair treatment Bulgaria in not being allowed to send agents to Paris to ruin [*present?*] her case and refute some of the calumnies repeated against her by Greeks, Roumanians and Servians. His Majesty spoke with admiration of President

Wilson and the United States and concluded by saying that Bulgaria placed her whole reliance of receiving just treatment in the United States whose attitude has been expressed so fully and clearly by President Wilson. The King expressed some apprehension in regard to Bolshevism but said that he did not especially fear an outbreak in Bulgaria unless it should become epidemic in Europe generally in which case Bulgaria would be attacked like all other countries. He said that he felt the break up of Austria was unfortunate and dangerous and increased the likelihood of dispute and war among the numerous newly created nations. The King struck me as young and boyish, but intelligent and very frank and honest in expression of his views. It is generally understood that he has always been pro-Allied in his sentiments and opposed to the pro-German policy his father the ex-King, by whom however he was entirely cowed. Wilson, Chargé d’Affaires. Horton.”

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 874.0144/2

[Document 179]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 8

SOFIA , December 21, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith clippings from the Bulgarian press of December 17th and 18th, and to especially call attention to the article from *L'Echo de Bulgarie*, of December 18, 1918,¹¹ containing extracts from a speech of the Prime Minister concerning Bulgarian territorial aspirations which it is hoped the Peace Conference will take under favorable consideration.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES S. WILSON

[Enclosure—Translation]

Article From "L'Echo de Bulgarie." December 18, 1918

THE HOPES OF BULGARIA

Last Sunday Mr. Theodoroff, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, pronounced at a meeting of the National Party a masterly discourse, of which the *Mir* gives the substance. We borrow from this paper the part of Mr. Theodoroff's speech dealing particularly with the international situation of Bulgaria. The President of the Council said:—

“All our friends, American, English, French, or Italian tell us frankly what they expect of us:—

‘Do you wish to gain our sympathy and our confidence? Keep quiet, maintain order and calm in your country, let us finish quietly our common work. We do not ask you to become our allies, to flatter or glorify us. Do you wish to inspire us with confidence? Show yourselves a peaceful and reasonable people; be an industrious people and not Utopians and people carried away by passions.’

“If I have anything to recommend as a principle of conduct, an appeal to your love of country, it is to give full support to the government, which will enable us to maintain until the peace, order and calm in the country. For this is the condition *sine qua non* upon which we shall secure the peace which the people desire. The Government which directs affairs at this time includes six different parties and represents the crushing majority of the Bulgarian people. It has no desire or interest in injuring anyone and is inspired solely with a desire to conduct Bulgaria to a safe port. There may be differences of principle in the parties forming this ‘bloc’, but the interests of the country bid us all to unite and work together. The armistice outside ought to be followed by an armistice within.

No doubt but that the question of the chances of Bulgaria at the peace conference deeply interests you all. I must, however, tell you that at this moment this matter is not clear. To name a lasting and eternal peace all circumstances will be weighed, and the necessary measures taken to remove all danger and obstacles.

Words fail me to show you how much a peace favorable to us depends on our good conduct and on our attitude as an element of peace and order in the Balkans. It does not suffice alone to have the right on our side in our claims on Macedonia, Thrace and the Dobrudja. We must prove that we are a people which can create all the conditions of a peaceful life towards progress and not capable only of alarms and disputes with our neighbors. The Justice of our cause is so clear that it has no need to present exceptional proofs. All

intelligent men understand and share it. We are accused of having failed in gratitude towards our benefactors and of not having known who were our true friends, and this under the reign of a sovereign such as Ferdinand whose abdication was a blessing for Bulgaria; but the most horrible is the accusation that during the war we have committed atrocious crimes. Our adversaries are trying now to prove that in order to assure order and security of life and property in the Balkans it is necessary to entrust the direction of affairs in the Balkans to people more civilized, less barbarous. However if in fact there have been crimes the responsibility does not fall upon the whole Bulgarian people, nor upon the Bulgarian army; the guilty are isolated individuals who must and shall expiate their crimes, of this I can assure you most formally. Bulgaria reached an independent existence as a result of cruelties of this kind committed against our people—cruelties which are actually imputed to us. But we will not leave unpunished the crimes by which those isolated individuals have caused the gravest harm to our people which is by nature peaceable and not vindictive.

All this does not indicate that I have not faith in the great nations who will be called upon to pronounce their judgement upon us. On the contrary I am convinced that the justice of our cause, supported by our dignified attitude will be respected and sanctioned by the congress which will unite the representatives of all humanity. I am convinced that the great nations which will take part in the peace conference will not allow themselves to be influenced by sentiments of vengeance and punishment toward the Bulgarian people, but will accomplish a lasting work of peace in conformity with the principles of right and justice which they have always loudly proclaimed.

I am firmly convinced that the great people of America led by the noble Mr. Wilson who has already arrived in Europe and is at this moment in Paris, will intercede energetically in favor of the application of the lofty principles that he has himself proclaimed. Among these principles the first place is held by

that of nationality, of respect for the will of peoples. This principle leads us to believe that the map of Bulgaria will be drawn in such a manner that we shall realize in full the unity of the Bulgarian people and lands.

The great British, which nation has always given us its precious support in our struggle for liberty and unity, which first spoke of our sufferings through the mouth of the immortal Gladstone (which led the Russians to freeing us), who again lent us their aid in 1885, at the time of the reunion of the two Bulgarias, who supported our efforts at the Treaty of London in 1913¹² —this great nation cannot at this moment also refuse us its precious support, knowing that our participation in the present war took place under influences foreign to our people.

France, that country of humanity and progress which has always eagerly embraced lofty ideas and has never ceased to profess fraternity and liberty in its struggle for its sons in Alsace and Lorraine, cannot oppose the realization of our national claims, especially at this time when our neighbors can dispose of what belongs to them.

Italy, which like us is struggling for her unity, who has always been kindly disposed toward us and has never shown the least hostility toward us, cannot fail to declare herself as truly sympathetic toward our national cause.

I hope that that great Russia, the country to which we owe our freedom, will, if possible, by a diplomacy which will have consideration and influence at the international congress, be the first to intervene in favor of Bulgaria.

I hope also that the other Slav countries, Poland, Bohemia, Croatia, with whom we have had no quarrels, and for whom we have only sympathy, will also consider us with justice. I believe that they will exercise their influence upon the feelings of their sister Serbia, with whom we could at this time more

easily come to an understanding in order to avoid hostile competition and live in future as good neighbors.

I believe that Greeks, Serbs and Roumanians will be more conciliatory and will be inspired with the idea of a good future and peace between the Balkan people.

I have tried to show you that Bulgaria has every reason to await quietly the world congress, where, as more than once in the past, she may count on just judges among the great nations. A nation, sound, reasonable and industrious, such as ours, has the right to hope that everyone will recognize that it possesses all the conditions to become a factor of peace and progress in the Balkans and to a greater extent than it has been up to the present”.

¹¹ Of the clippings enclosed, only one article is printed.

¹² For text, in French, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 656.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/3: Telegram

[Document 180]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

SOFIA , December 24, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received December 26—11:30 p.m.]

For Ammission. Referring to portion of Legation's telegram number 2, December 10, 11 a.m. [1 p.m.] regarding Dobrudja, learn that in further acknowledged violation of armistice and in spite of recent assurances given Bulgaria by Allies, Roumanian officials, gendarmes and even troops are being introduced into Dobrudja. Bulgarian Government has acceded to all Allied demands regarding this province on understanding that upon withdrawal of all Bulgarian Civil and Military Officials it should remain under strictly allied military administration and especially the Roumanian administration should not be permitted until status of Dobrudja definitely settled by Peace Conference. French Generals commanding Allied Forces and Adjutant, chief of British military mission agree with me that trouble is being stirred up unnecessarily by introduction of Roumanians into Dobrudja at the present time and that it is in violation of armistice. Understand they have so reported to their Governments, but present action is due to orders from Paris. I fear entry of Roumanians into Dobrudja may not only cause fighting there between them and natives, but may have unfortunate effect on internal situation in Bulgaria proper, even possibly to extent of causing fall of present ministry which question signal for revolution.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Greek troops have crossed Bulgarian frontier near Druma. Greeks deny this, saying boundary not clearly marked at this spot. French Commander sending mixed commission of French, Bulgarian, and Greek officers to investigate. He says he can say with some truthfulness that he believes Greeks

would like to provoke collision with Bulgarians, throwing blame on latter in order to exhibit themselves [*sic*] to Allies on eve of Peace Conference as trouble breeders in the Balkans. Please repeat above to Department.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/16: Telegram

[Document 181]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Consul General at Saloniki (Horton)

PARIS , December 27, 1918.

3. Your 18th to Embassy Paris transmitting number 5 [6] from Sofia.^{[13](#)} Kindly inform Mr. Wilson that President desires an expression of his thanks conveyed to Bulgarian Prime Minister for his congratulations, and say to Mr. Wilson that other matter mentioned in his telegram must of necessity in present circumstances await action of French Government on the request addressed to it.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[13](#)} See *ante*, p. 250 [Pg. 250 includes portions of [Doc. 174](#) and [Doc. 175](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.4124/16

[Document 182]

Professor Clive Bay to Mr. William C. Bullitt

[PARIS ,] December 28, 1918.

Re: Violation of the Armistice in the Balkans.

The American charge d'affaires in Sofia reports that Rumanian officials, gendarmes, and troops are being introduced into the Dobrudja in violation of the Armistice.

The Bulgarian government acceded to Allied demands regarding the Dobrudja on the understanding that, upon the withdrawal of all Bulgarian civil and military officials, the Dobrudja should remain under strictly allied military administration and especially that Rumanian administration should not be permitted until the status of this province had been definitely settled by the Peace Conference.

This is only a further instance of a policy now becoming prevalent among the Balkan nations. The effort to affect the final settlement (1) by occupying as much debatable territory as possible, (2) by trying to incite an opponent to action prejudicial to his cause and reputation, may lead to deplorable international relations and make more than ever difficult a lasting and amicable solution in the Balkans.

The President could do much to stabilize conditions, pending the approaching settlement, if he would notice the danger in one of his public addresses, and give formal warning that the Commissioners of the United States will not recognize a change in the status effected by violence or acts contravening the Armistice.

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Bulgaria/2: Telegram

[Document 183]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

SOFIA , December 30, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received January 3, 1919—10 p.m.]

5. 6, December 16, 11 a.m. [12 a.m.?], to American Embassy Paris.
Would be grateful if some reply could be made to Bulgarian request
for permission to send delegates unofficially to Paris. Am in receipt
of daily inquiries from Bulgarian Government as to decision of my
Government.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 874.00/20: Telegram

[Document 184]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

SOFIA , January 1, 1919—10 p.m.
[Received January 4—7:20 p.m.]

8. In Parliament yesterday Prime Minister stated he had received telegram from Mr. Hoover indicating possibility of Bulgaria securing flour from the United States. Announcement received with unanimous applause all parties. Leader of opposition (the papers in the case which brought Bulgaria into war on German side) [*sic*] took floor and paid glowing tribute to United States and President dwelling on fact that there had not been war on land of Bulgaria and United States and on fairmindedness and justice of American market [*sic*]. Parliament then voted unanimously to thank American Government in name of Bulgarian Government, Parliament and people for its possible willingness to send flour wherewith Vice-President of Parliament directed to communicate to me above vote. He called upon me today for this purpose. He has been during war one of the strongest leaders of the pro-German party as his speeches and telegrams to Kaiser show. He stated to me, however, that he was not pro-German but only interested in welfare of Bulgaria. He predicts [*praises?*] United States and President in whom he said that all the hopes for Bulgaria for justice were centering. I confined myself to thanking him for the cordial expressions towards the President and the United States as evidenced by the vote of Parliament and his perpetual peace remarks which I promised to report to my government. Please repeat Department.

WILSON

763.72119/3712

[Document 185]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 23

SOFIA , January 9, 1919.
[Received February 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to previous telegrams and despatches of the Legation in regard to the situation in the Dobrudja, where apparently all pretense of keeping to the terms of the armistice between Bulgaria and the Allies has been thrown aside by the latter.

As the Department is aware, the armistice which was signed on September 29th between the representatives of Bulgaria, and General Franchet d'Esperey, representing the Allies, provided in the first two articles as follows:

“Art. I.... The Bulgarian Administration shall continue in those parts of Bulgaria actually occupied by the Allies.

“Art II. Immediate demobilization of the whole Bulgarian army except the continuance on a war footing of a group of all branches of the army consisting of:

3 Divisions of 16 battalions each
4 Regiments of cavalry,

which shall be used, two divisions for the defense of the Eastern frontier of Bulgaria and the Dobrudja, and one division to guard the railways.”

In spite of this formal agreement all Bulgarian troops were shortly afterwards ordered to leave the Dobrudja, but at the same time the French High Command gave written assurances that the Bulgarian civil administration should continue under existing Bulgarian

officials. A little later however, practically all these civilian officials, appointed from Sofia, were ordered to leave the district, but a further written engagement was made that the strictly local Bulgarian officials would be allowed to remain (this would include, mayors of towns, local police, and priests), and that the rest of the administration would be a purely inter-Allied military one. It was especially and chiefly understood that no Roumanian officials whatsoever should be introduced. Next, however, came an order ordering practically all Bulgarian officials to leave the Dobrudja, including school-masters, priests, and local police, although mayors were to be allowed to remain if "not pro-Bulgarian in sympathy". The police and other officials were however to be Roumanian, though under control of the Allied Military forces. It was even then distinctly understood that no Roumanian military forces were to be allowed in the district. As a matter of fact however, Roumanian gendarmes immediately entered the Dobrudja and I learn that these are only nominally gendarmes, but are actually part of the Roumanian regular army, and though I cannot vouch for the truth of the statement I am told that actually Roumanian regiments have also arrived.

The Bulgarian Government did not fail to protest to the French at each of these violations of formal agreements, but without effect, and they are now trying to make the best of the situation imposed upon them. The Government is also endeavoring as much as possible to keep the true situation in the Dobrudja from the knowledge of the public, fearing lest public opinion may become excited and internal disturbances occur which will prejudice Bulgaria in the eyes of the world. Little reference, therefore, is made to the Dobrudja in the Press.

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Theodoroff, and the Ministers of War, Interior, and Finance have all spoken to me within the last few days with the greatest bitterness of the manner in which the Allies have failed to respect their agreements. They have said that they had supposed that written agreements were looked upon as "scraps of paper" by the Germans only, but that they have learned to their cost that the Allies have exactly the same ideas on this subject. I regret to say that the good name and prestige of the

Allies have suffered a blow in Bulgaria from which it will be difficult for them to recover.

The French, British, and Italian military commands in personal and confidential conversation with me have not hesitated to express their dislike of the orders which they have been obliged to carry out by commands received from higher authorities, and they state that Bulgaria has every right to complain of her treatment in this matter by the Allies. They also appreciate fully the loss of prestige suffered by the Allies.

The following extract from a personal letter from an English officer of the British Military Force in the Dobrudja voices the general opinion of the French, British, and Italian military officials in Bulgaria with whom I have spoken:

“The situation in the Southern Dobrudja is fantastic and would be ludicrous if it did not verge on the tragic.

“The Roumanian officials have returned though the Bulgar mayors are to remain, the gendarmes (soldiers in reality) have also arrived in considerable numbers. In the towns they are more or less under our protection, but are of course quite powerless as the people have formed their own civil police; something in the nature of special constables who wear a white armlet. In the villages the people will not let them enter at all, and are prepared to prevent their coming by force. In some cases we have planted them in a village despite this, by sending a strong force of British soldiers, but in such cases we have to have a detachment in the village to look after them.

“The way this question has been handled by the Allies is ridiculous and very stupid. One might think they wanted to create disorders in the Balkans instead of bring peace. All British officers who have been in the Dobrudja are unanimous in their conviction that the country is Bulgar.”

Even in conversation with the Greek and Servian military missions, who are of course delighted with what is actually taking place in the

Dobrudja, it is clear that their belief in the honesty and fairness of the Allies is shaken, and that they distrust what may happen in their own countries, where also the word of the Allies may become a “scrap of paper” as with the Bulgarians.

Personally I believe the person chiefly responsible for the present situation in the Dobrudja is General Berthelot, Commander of the French forces in Roumania. He is, as is natural, strongly pro-Roumanian and consequently anti-Bulgarian. His reports, also quite naturally, have influence with General Franchet d’Esperey, Commander of the Allied forces in the Orient. Having fought against the Bulgarians this officer is also naturally anti-Bulgarian,... The reports of these two high military officials have of course great influence on the French High Command in Paris, from which are issued the orders concerning Bulgaria and the Dobrudja. The reports from French officials in Bulgaria do not seem to have much weight there.

The French are in supreme command in Bulgaria, and apparently action is taken by them without consulting the British and Italian Military Missions, which is resented by the latter, and is partly the cause of the lack of cordiality and cooperation, not to put it stronger, existing among the Allies in Bulgaria, to which I have had occasion to refer before.

In the above report I am not in any way holding a brief in favor of Bulgaria. However, in this country the United States is popularly considered as one of the Allies, and therefore in a way a party to the Bulgarian-Allied Armistice. As the influence of the United States is firmly believed in Bulgaria to be binding on all the Allies, a failure on its part to urge observance of the Allied-Bulgarian Armistice of September 29, 1918, reflects on the United States as well as on the actual signatories.

A copy of the above despatch has been forwarded to the American Peace Mission in Paris.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES S. WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/7

[Document 186]

The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 24

SOFIA , January 10, 1919.

SIR: Referring to the Legation's confidential despatch No. 23, of the 9th instant, in regard to the situation in the Dobrudja, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a *memoire* presented to the Brigadier General commanding the British forces of Silistra, signed by the Mayor of that town in the name of the inhabitants.

I would call attention to the fact that Silistra is the largest town in the Southern or Bulgarian portion of the Dobrudja.

A copy of this *memoire* has been sent to me by the Mayor of the town in a letter, copy of which is enclosed herewith,¹⁴ of which I have merely acknowledged the receipt.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES S. WILSON

P. S. A copy of the above despatch has been forwarded to the American Peace Mission, Paris.

[Enclosure]

The Mayor of Silistra to the Officer Commanding the British Forces in Silistra

SIR: Yesterday the proclamation signed by General Berthelot was made known to the inhabitants of our town, by which the population

of Dobrudja is notified that in virtue of the decision of the Inter-Allied Council, the Bulgarian civil administration will be replaced by Roumanian civil administration throughout the Dobrudja, under the protection and control of the Allied Troops. We obey the decision of the Inter-Allied Council with full confidence that the ruling of the Roumanian authorities, being under the control of the Allied Forces, will not degenerate into a real injustice, to the like of which we were witnesses in the course of 3 years.

Pointing out our faith in the efficacious control which will be exercised by the British Troops, we wish at the same time to call your attention upon the following questions in which our people are very much concerned and which cannot be considered as settled by the proclamation in favour of the Roumanian point of view for a full replacement of the authorities in general.

- I. According to the proclamation, to the occupied Dobrudja may come only civil Roumanian authorities and not military. In our case we see that a general, a military person, comes as a prefect. The Chiefs of the gendarmery are military persons, and the very gendarmery is according to the Roumanian laws a pure military institution, recruited by active soldiers.
- II. Dobrudja is an occupied territory by the Anglo-French Troops, the fate of which will be decided at the peace conference. Neither Bulgaria, nor Roumania have sovereignty over it. The Roumanian judicial and financial authorities do not have *raison d'être*, because through the lack of Roumanian sovereignty no justice could be administered and no taxes imposed. The judicial and financial authorities cannot work and their presence is unnecessary burden to the population.
- III. The municipal authority is a local authority and is absolutely independent and free from any state authority. Each interference of the State Authority is a violation to the principle of the self-government of the municipalities, therefore the interference of the Roumanian state authority in the proceedings of the municipalities must be removed. The privilege of a separate policy belongs to the municipalities.
- IV. In the proclamation is expressly pointed out that no inhabitant, no matter what his nationality, may be, should be, deprived of his

rights in any way. The right to learn and pray in our mother language is the most sacred privilege of each individual. We see already the coming in of teachers who are preparing themselves to replace the Bulgarian teachers and take away the Bulgarian schools built at the expense of the local Bulgarian citizens, for which we have also formal documents. The times of 1913 are being repeated. Then the Bulgarian schools were taken away by the Roumanian authorities and the schoolboys were compelled to leave their homes in the course of 3 years in order that they may continue their education in their mother language. We beg for your guarantee of our rights; in the town and district. There are no Roumanian inhabitants in order that the coming of the Roumanian teachers be justified.

- V. The Committee for food-supply is in a very critical state. Any change of the present state will expose the inhabitants to starvation, that is why we beg of you the preservation of its present state and take it under your protection.

By pointing out the above facts, we request you, Sir, for intercession.

For the population of Silistra

L. RIBATCH

Mayor of the town

¹⁴ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.0144/9: Telegram

[Document 187]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 14, 1919—6 p.m.

6738. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy, dated Army of the Danube, January 10th:

“The Roumanian Government and public opinion are extremely affected by the attitude of the Allies in Dobroudja. It is observed that the invasion of this part of the national territory the integrity of which we have guaranteed is the result of Roumania’s intervention on our side and the Entente should therefore have purely and simply handed this territory over to the Roumanian Government. On the contrary the Allies have requested Roumania not to make a military occupation in Dobroudja and their local agents have even opposed the sending of Roumanian custom officers giving as an excuse ‘the opposition of the Bulgarian Government.’ This state of affairs is aggravated by the fact that the Allied officers fraternize with the Bulgarians and give the impression that they are granting preferential treatment to the enemy to the detriment of its [*their?*] Ally, Roumania, concerning the affairs of the latter. The sovereigns themselves have voiced to us their complaints on this attitude as well as their grave apprehension as to the consequences that such attitude can lead to in the extremely difficult situation in which the country finds itself.”

BLISS

Turkey

[\[188\] The Ambassador in Italy \(Page \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Rome , November 13, 1918—1 p.m. [Received November 16—1:15 a.m.]

763.72119/2640: Telegram

[\[189\] President Wilson to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , 16 November, 1918.

763.72119/2669

[\[190\] The Italian Ambassador \(Macchi di Cellere \) to the Counselor for the Department of State \(Polk \)](#)

Washington , November 19, 1918.

763.72119/3116

[\[191\] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Cairo \(Gary \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Cairo , November 25, 1918—10 p.m. [Received November 26—3:12 p.m.]

763.72119/2791: Telegram

[192] The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Acting Secretary of State

Athens , December 4, 1918—10 a.m. [Received December 6—12:50 p.m.]

763.72119/2890: Telegram

[193] The Greek Legation to the Department of State

Washington , December 6, 1918.

763.72/12552

[194] The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington , December 16, 1918.

763.72119/3147

[195] The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 21, 1918.

763.72119/3266

[196] Admiral W. S. Benson to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris , 29 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 867.00/44

[197] The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

Washington , January 2, 1919.

763.72119/2861

[198] The American Commissioner at Constantinople (Heck) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Pera , January 4, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 9—3:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 867.00/48: Telegram

[199] Professor W. L. Westermann to Mr. William C. Bullitt

[Paris ,] 7 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 861g.00/2

[200] The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Chargé (Valentino)

Washington , January 22, 1919.

763.72119/3116

[201] The Acting Secretary of State to the French Chargé (Chambrun)

Washington , February 6, 1919.

763.72119/3478

763.72119/2640: Telegram

[Document 188]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 13, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received November 16—1:15 a.m.]

2337. The chairman of the three Armenians representing the Armenian Committee to Italy called on me. This Committee is formed of the representative in Italy of the national Armenians who is also the delegate accredited to Allied powers with headquarters in Paris, the President of the Armenian Committee of Italy, and the political editor of the Italian [periodical?] *Armenia* who is also Secretary of the Committee. They were presented to me by Luzzatti, former Prime Minister of Italy and I received at the same time a note from the French Ambassador informing me I would be waited on by this Committee. They expressed France's regret that Armenia had appeared to be omitted from the list of new states whose independence has been advocated by the President and spoke with earnestness of the situation and hope of Armenia. At my suggestion they have sent me a memorandum¹ accompanied by a letter from Luzzatti, copies of which I am sending to Department by post. This memorandum outlines the political organization and national aspirations of the Armenian people, refers to history and sufferings of Armenia before and during war, states that they have been pro-Ally and many Armenians have fought with Allies; outlines situation of Armenia in Russia and Persia, includes general remarks in favor of the Armenian State. Their general demands are territorial liberty, complete elimination of Turkish sovereignty, recognition by Allies of Armenian State, unification of Russia and Turkish Armenia into one free state, solution of Persian-Armenian provinces left to Allies, geographical limits of territory.

NELSON PAGE

¹ Not printed.

763.72119/2669

[Document 189]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , 16 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My interest in the Armenians is profound and my sympathy for them really poignant, and I hope that you will through the proper channels reply to the enclosed that in every way we will do what we can.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

Signor Luigi Luzzatti to President Wilson

ROME , November 8, 1918.

At a meeting held on Sunday evening at Rome on the initiative of authorized representatives of the Armenian nation, presided over by Deputy Luigi Luzzatti, Minister of State, and attended by Deputy Meda, Minister of Finance, Deputy Borsarelli, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Indri, Under-Secretary of State for Finance, Deputy Teso, Under-Secretary for the Navy, Count de Martino, Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Senator Bodio, Deputy Cesaro, Chairman of Italian Committee on Armenian independence, Deputy Area, Sir Mark Sykes, M. P., and a large number of other prominent politicians, professors and publicists, resolutions were passed to the effect that Armenia in consideration of the past and present martyrdom, and military aid spontaneously lent to allied cause, as proved by official testimony, of

the part taken throughout history by the element of civilization, be at once constituted into a free and independent State. All agree that Armenia is destined to become one of the jewels of society of nations the advanced sentinel of civilization in the East. The meeting also resolved to apply to the President of the United States of America, the creator of freedom of nations and to the most worthy heads of the Governments of France, England and Italy; Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando for the immediate recognition of Armenian national delegation headed by Nubar as a government by the same titles and in the same manner as the Polish, Czech, [Yugo-]Slav Governments have been recognized. The meeting unanimously takes the liberty of cautioning Allied Governments against Turkey whose domination over Christian peoples is a standing menace to the civilization and peace of the world.

LUIGI LUZZATTI

763.72119/3116

[Document 190]

***The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the
Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)***

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: In connection with our conversation of yesterday, I take pleasure in transmitting to you a memorandum regarding the situation in Tripoli arising out of the violation of the armistice by Turkey,² and the necessity of putting an end to it. I shall appreciate it if the American Government will approach the British Government with the view of having Turkey keep faith to her engagements.

With appreciation [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

[Enclosure]

The Italian Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

In connection with the fulfillment of the clauses of the armistice granted to Turkey, the Italian Government learns that the opinion is being spread in Lybia that it is optional with the Turkish officers to remain there under the orders of Ahmed, the former sheriff. It is also reported that there recently arrived in Lybia a Turkish personage and that there are reasons to suspect that he might be the famous Enver Pasha.³ It is at any rate positive that a Turkish superior officer landed at Tripoli and that he is endeavoring to organize civilians and

military men. He has offered the government of the Ghebel to a Turkish general.

The Italian Government, moreover, is without any news as to the Italian prisoners at Misurata. And a telegram addressed November 12th by the Governor of Tripoli to the Italian Government states that the enemy, who had been inactive for a long time, in the afternoon of the 11th, subjected the Fort of Belal (which is one of the defenses of the city of Tripoli) to an artillery fire with 37 millimeter guns for 45 minutes, which was followed in the evening by rifle fire and caused the Italians the loss of one dead and one wounded. It is to be remarked in this connection that, as it is well known, the artillery in Tripoli is directed by Turkish officers.

It is obvious that such an attack is a flagrant violation of the terms of the armistice granted to Turkey. It is also obvious that the landing of a Turkish superior officer is a violation of the terms of the armistice.

Sections 15 and 16 of the armistice, not to mention other ones, read in fact as follows:

Sec. 15: "Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripoli and Cyrenaia to the nearest Italian garrison."

Sec. 16: "Surrender of all occupied ports in Tripoli and Cyrenaia, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied representative."

And it is inconceivable that, while the whole world is being restored to peace, fighting should continue in Tripoli.

The Italian Government has called the attention of the Allied Governments to this unbearable situation, asking them, especially the British Government, to take proper steps through their representatives at Constantinople to put an end to it.

In view of the fact that the United States Government has not at present its own representative at Constantinople, the Italian Embassy suggests, and shall appreciate it if the State Department will approach the British Government, pointing out to it the necessity for Turkey to keep faith to her engagements, thus doing away with a

state of affairs which manifestly works to the prejudice of the Italian Nation, but could also be freighted with dangers for the general peace.

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1918.

² For terms of the Anglo-Turkish armistice, see undated telegram No. 32 from Colonel House, [*Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441](#) .

³ Turkish Minister of War, Jan. 1914 to Oct. 1918.

763.72119/2791: Telegram

[Document 191]

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Cairo (Gary) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO , November 25, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received November 26—3:12 p.m.]

226. I have the honor to quote as follows the official text of a joint declaration by the British and French Governments:[4](#)

“The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people themselves. To realize this aim France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognize these governments immediately they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid the normal working of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted. To guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two allied governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories.”

The above declaration was published in the local press on November 8th as an official communiqué and was reported to the Department in my despatch number 7100 of November 11th,⁵ but the rapid development of the political situation here has decided me to telegraph the text of the declaration.

In a conversation with British High Commissioner he said that he was in doubt as to what effect this declaration might have in Egypt. I believe he fears Egypt may make claims for somewhat similar treatment.

GARY

⁴ By Department's telegram No. 35, Dec. 30, 1918, 5 p.m., the text of this declaration was repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

⁵ Not printed.

763.72119/2890: Telegram

[Document 192]

The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Acting Secretary of State

ATHENS , December 4, 1918—10 a.m.

[Received December 6—12:50 p.m.]

623. I have received lately and especially on Thanksgiving Day innumerable petitions from Greeks for the redemption of their fellow countrymen from foreign governments, especially the Greeks in northern Epirus and the Dodecanese, from the Bulgarian in Thrace, and from Turkish in especially the Smyrna district. Most of these petitions in the original Greek, but regard the first two requests as wholly justified, inasmuch as population is largely Greek, and almost solidly so in the Dodecanese. As to Turkey, I see no solution to this question as France, Italy, England will all have a slice if Greece takes hers, so I much prefer to see the country remain as a unit giving to non-Turkish population every guarantee, and removing police and finance from native hands. For some years we shall have the worst passions let loose in Asia Minor unless we settle question with a single eye to resident population. Colonel House informed.

DROPPERS

763.72/12552

[Document 193]

The Greek Legation to the Department of State

[Translation][5a](#)

No. 4181–4182

AIDE MEMOIRE

The Royal Government is daily receiving reports from Turkey which arouse in its mind a most serious concern about the fate of the Christians living in Thrace and Asia Minor.

Turkey having laid down her arms and the Allied fleets having cast anchor in the Bosphorus, the Christians who after centuries were liberated gave vent then to their joy. The manifestations of gratitude to the Allies succeeded one another uninterruptedly. That aroused [the?] Moslem fanaticism, a circumstance which the parties interested at once turned to advantage.

Thus the Turkish press continued to keep the people under the illusion that Turkey had not been defeated but had asked for peace of her own accord. The Turkish people consequently continued in the same taunting attitude towards the Christians whom they provoked.

Although its chiefs have fled the Young Turk Committee is still in control. Having at its disposal the Chamber and the Senate composed of its henchmen, it continues in fact to rule Turkey. Moreover, the Government is composed of the same personnel as heretofore, that is to say, is in the hands of the Young Turk Committee which in this hour still wields the whole power.

It would even seem that the power of the Committee has increased since a large part of the old Turks have joined the Young Turks, and formed a new party styled the “renaissance” so as to create an illusion that it was still possible to inaugurate reforms in Turkey and that the party to undertake the task was already organized. The only result that has been achieved is that the Moslem population is now united and ready to attack the Christians as soon as the word is given.

The Allied Representatives do not appear to have grasped the imminence of the danger, relying on deceiving appearances, on false explanations of the Turkish officials. They refrain from seeing to the strict execution of the terms of the armistice. For instance, the disarming of the Turks has not even begun. On the contrary arms have been given out to all the Moslem population for use on the Christian population when the word is given.

Bands of out-laws consisting mainly of deserters or of soldiers discharged with their arms keep the country in a state of terror. Crimes are being committed on a larger scale than in the past. The Christians are incapable of offering any defence as they are without arms.

The Allied commanders acting on the advice of Levantines who are known by everyone to be closely connected with the Young Turks, instead of assuming the only attitude that a Turk understands, a threatening attitude, keep on negotiating with the Turkish administration. For instance, they are in continued relations with the ex-Vali of Smyrna, Rhami Pacha. His men encouraged by this attitude of the Allied Commander at Smyrna behave towards the Christians in an arrogant way so as to create disturbances. Brigands walk the streets of Smyrna without intervention from the allied authorities who merely declare that they cannot take any action.

The Royal Government deems it a duty to draw the attention of the Government of the United States as it has done with the other Allied States, to the danger which threatens the lives of Christians especially in the interior of Thrace and Asia Minor. The massacre of Christians after the defeat of Turkey would be a crime. These people

who have suffered so much for centuries are entitled to better attention now that the tyrant is overthrown. It is absolutely necessary to shield the lives of the Christians with positive safeguards. And this can only be done by having important centers in Thrace and Asia Minor, occupied by allied troops as force alone has any effect on Turkey. But that force must be seen, must be felt by the Turkish populace.

The Government of the United States has so often given evidence of its good will toward these unfortunate people that the Royal Government is convinced that it will kindly take into earnest consideration the awful situation of the Christian population and begin such action as may be necessary to save their lives. It is furthermore necessary to look into the repatriation of the refugees in Greece who are a serious burden on the Royal Government, This repatriation can only be attempted when their safety is assured.

WASHINGTON , December 6, 1918.

[5a](#) File translation revised.

763.72119/3147

[Document 194]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR AT ROME, DATED DECEMBER 13TH

While in London the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
communicated a memorandum containing the following statements:

-
1. That a strong contingent of the Italian 35th Division should be despatched to Constantinople in accordance with the agreement for the International occupation of that town which was settled some time ago.
 2. That if Turkey continues non-compliance with the terms of the Armistice regarding Tripolitania, Italy will on her own account proceed to occupy some locality in Anatolia to which she is entitled, in accordance with the Inter-Allied agreement regarding Turkey.

As regards 1. You should inform the Italian Government that there has never been any agreement for the international occupation of Constantinople, and that the Armistice does not provide for it, and enquire as to the meaning of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' reference to this.

As regards 2. You were instructed on November 29th to point out to the Italian Government that the failure of the Turks to comply with the Armistice terms regarding Tripolitania offered no sufficient ground for action in Asia Minor without previous consultation with the Allies. In view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' announcement that the Italian Government intended to proceed to occupy Anatolia without such consultation, you should point out again that such action on the part of the Italians will certainly provoke similar steps by the Greeks, and that His Majesty's Government in such an event

would find it impossible to oppose the Greek claims to follow the Italian example. You should add that His Majesty's Government see no objection to Italian troops proceeding to Turkey and Thrace, and that the necessary arrangements to this end are being made by General Franchet d'Esperey.

WASHINGTON , December 16, 1918.

763.72119/3266

[Document 195]

The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government has just informed me that the representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople have suggested the following measures in carrying out Article 19 of the Armistice with Turkey:

1. The German and Austrian civilians numbering about 4,500 to be shipped to Trieste on German and Turkish vessels coaled by the English Navy;
2. The German and Austrian invalids to be shipped to Genoa on hospital ships at present under the Ukrainian flag, which would likewise be coaled by the English Navy;
3. The enemy soldiers (9,000 Germans and 1,500 Austrians) to be put on German vessels which would be summoned from Germany with enough German coal to effect the voyage both ways. Those vessels, placed under an Allied flag, would carry the German soldiers direct to their country.

The French Government, fully realizing the necessity of removing those dangerous and undesirable persons from Turkey, is ready to accede to the propositions so formulated by the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

I should be very thankful to you if you would kindly let me know whether the Federal Government is inclined to concur therein.

Be pleased [etc.]

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

Paris Peace Conf. 867.00/44

[Document 196]

***Admiral W. S. Benson to the Secretary of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

M-5/G

PARIS , 29 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. GREW: Replying to your letter of the 28th instant⁶ to which you attached a copy of the telegram from the American Minister at Athens,⁷ stating as his opinion, that it would be desirable for the United States to send an Admiral as High Commissioner at Constantinople; I beg to inform you that this matter was taken up a fortnight ago with the Navy Department, and by that Department was taken up with the Department of State.⁸

I have since been informed that the view of the Department of State is that it will be unnecessary to send an officer of high rank to Constantinople at the present time, but that a Flag Officer should be sent with a station-ship at Salonica. In conformance with this policy the U. S. S. *Nahma* has been ordered to Salonica and Rear-Admiral M. L. Bristol has been directed to proceed to that port and to hoist his flag on the *Nahma*.

Sincerely yours,

W. S. BENSON

⁶ Not found in Department files.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ For papers previously printed on the subject of the appointment of an American Commissioner at Constantinople, see [*Foreign Relations. 1919, vol. II, pp. 810*](#) ff.

763.72119/2861

[Document 197]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

No. 351

WASHINGTON , January 2, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 30th ult. [November 30, 1918]⁷ transmitting a communication from the German Government¹⁰ concerning German civilians in Turkey.

In that communication the German Government states Art. XIX of the Anglo-Turkish armistice provides that all civilians of German nationality must leave the Ottoman Empire; that if this provision be enforced the German hospitals and asylums for the blind and orphans, the latter of which principally take care of Armenian children, will be compelled to close, thereby causing new sufferings in the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire. The German Government therefore requests that the President should intervene in favor of the German civilians being permitted to remain in Turkey.

In reply I beg to inform you that as the United States Government was not one of the signatories of the above mentioned armistice, it does not feel warranted in transmitting to the Entente Powers any communication from the German Government in favor of any Germans in Turkey.

As regards the hospitals and asylums for the blind and orphans, the latter of which, according to the German communication, principally take care of Armenian children, the Department of State is informed that practically all the funds expended for such children are furnished by American Missionary or other philanthropic organizations, and that German civilians connected with such hospitals or asylums can turn over the work and whatever funds they may have in hand to the nearest American Missionaries or their

Armenian associates. In this way the charitable work may continue undisturbed.

In conclusion I have the honor to assure you that this Government notes with interest that the German Government is now evidencing concern in the welfare of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire and that it is now expressing the desire that this population be spared new sufferings.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

⁷ Not printed.

¹⁰ Same as second wireless message of Nov. 15, 1918, from the German Government, quoted in telegram No. 38, Nov. 16, 1918, noon, to Colonel House, p. 18 [*Pg. 18 includes portions of [Doc. 4](#) and [Doc. 5](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 867.00/48: Telegram

[Document 198]

The American Commissioner at Constantinople (Heck) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

PERA , January 4, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 9—3:15 p.m.]

No. 1. Political. At the present time ordinary government activities of country are badly disorganized. Tewfick Pasha cabinet contains no prominent or really able men and has no real hold on country, great majority of officials being still members of C. U. P. organization.¹¹ Army officers are also in the main commanded by men [sic]. Orders issued by Constantinople therefore often receive but scant consideration in the provinces and public safety is very poor throughout Asia Minor.

Supported by Sultan, the Cabinet last week dissolved Parliament and promised to soon arrange for new elections, but in present circumstances the C. U. P. would be almost certain to succeed, as they have the only political organization covering the entire country and elections are considered improbable for immediate future. Dissolved Parliament had a great majority of Committee members, and its continual attacks on the Cabinet rendered the latter's task impossible, so that in general dissolution was favorably received. Government has taken over several of the banking and commercial enterprises established by the Committee and has seized some of its archives, thus indicating intention of endeavoring to maintain political control. So far, Allied representatives here have strictly observed terms of armistice, but with steady weakening of Governmental authority, more drastic measures will soon be required and a military occupation within the next few weeks is not unlikely.

Cabinet has adopted some measures to aid and to repatriate deported Christians, but their situation is very bad in all parts of the country. It would be advisable for most Armenians to remain where they are until spring, or until future status of Armenian State is defined, but they are already beginning to return to their homes, only to find these destroyed or occupied by Napa [sic] immigrants. The Fuller [Barton? ¹²] Expedition expected from America is anxiously awaited. This expedition should be self-contained as to all transportation, as railway traffic has entirely stopped on account of lack of coal. Suggest for a consideration, whether some of Army automobiles now parked at switching [?] could not be turned over to this relief expedition.

Food situation of Constantinople continues uncertain, but main problem here is coal. With all importations of German coal stopped, and Black Sea mines badly wrecked, local public service has at times been entirely suspended for lack of fuel. Conditions here November slightly better, and production of Turkish mines is slowly being increased. Trains are now moving for transportation of [disbanded?] soldiers and to bring food to Constantinople, as plentiful supplies of grain are reported to be along the Anatolia railway. Reports from some interior districts, especially Black Sea littoral indicate precarious food conditions.

Conditions of Armistice are being gradually executed and German and Austro-Hungarian troops under Von Sanders are interned on the Princes Islands in the launches [sic].

There is a large mushroom press in all languages but a political censorship has been established on the ground that it is necessary to curb conflicting political propaganda. The Armenians have on the whole behaved well and have been moderate in their claims avoiding all agitation which might provoke further trouble in the interior. Such prudence is essential in view of poor public security and danger of further outrages. The landing at Mersine of a large number of Armenians with French troops is claimed by the Turkish Armistice Commission to be a direct provocation and very likely will lead to troubles in the Asia Minor district where Turkish population is much aroused. If an independent Armenia is to be established, official

announcement should be kept in abeyance until either a firm Allied Military Control is established in Asia Minor, or until a large number of the persons guilty of the previous massacres have been placed under arrest in order show to the Turkish population the danger of indulgence in further massacres.

On the other hand, the Greeks are very extravagant in their claims which include the city of Constantinople. They have sent here Naval and Military forces, and local Greek population has been provocative towards the Turks, although so far, there have been no serious disorders between the two elements.

General attitude among Turks is one of hopeless[ness], waiting the outcome of the Peace Conference. They resent permission accorded to Armenians and other racial elements to send representatives to Paris while such permission has been refused to them. As publicly expressed, their chief hope is in the application of the President's principles of nationality and self-determination, as they feel that other Allied Powers are likely to be more severe than the United States. An Armenian delegation of two members is about to proceed to Paris, consisting of Archbishop Tourian and Professor Hagopian of Robert College. At present Turks are trying to create friction between British and French by praising the former, and criticizing latter at every opportunity. However large French investments and financial interests in the country are counted on in some circles to secure French support for the future maintenance of independent Turkish Government.

Financially, the situation is becoming more and more critical as the revenues of Government are decreasing and paper money is no longer issued. Exchange value of Turkish paper money has been going lower every day since the removal of Government control over foreign exchange, and absolute uncertainty as to the future of this currency, based upon German credit, still prevails here. All business and industries except a few essential trades and the supply of foodstuffs are at entire stand-still, but with lifting of blockade there will be great demand for foreign goods as old stocks are entirely cleared out, British, French and Italians are planning to take

advantage of opportunities, representative of the British Trade Corporation having just arrived here.

Nothing new to report concerning American interests in Turkey, but we are cut off from Syria and Palestine, so that the situation there should be followed from Egypt. The institutions here and Smyrna have not been seriously molested at any time, and have maintained their activities. Certain institutions which were seized by the Turkish authorities at Marsovan, Cesarea, Konia, are now being vacated by the Turks.

Please repeat to Washington as my number 7.

HECK

¹¹ i. e., Committee of Union and Progress.

¹² Possibly a reference to Dr. James L. Barton, director of the American Commission for Relief in the Near East.

Paris Peace Conf. 861g.00/2

[Document 199]

Professor W. L. Westermann to Mr. William C. Bullitt

[PARIS ,] 7 January, 1919.

A Memorandum has come from the American Embassy in London¹³ containing a letter signed by the Delegate of the Georgian Government, concerning the claims of Georgia to recognition as an independent state.

It is of interest to note that the Georgian Government is now advancing a claim to the Sandjak of Lazistan, which is the eastern section of the Trebizond Vilayet. Regarding this portion of the former Turkish Empire, I wrote you a note last week, suggesting this very thing as quite desirable on ethnographic lines. The Georgians also set up a claim to the district of Olti and the district of Ardahan in the province of Kars in Trans-Caucasia which, by the general agreement between the Georgian, Azerbaidjan and the Armenian Republics of Trans-Caucasia, had been temporarily assigned to Armenia.

It is a hopeful sign that these different republics are beginning to crystallize their desires and are willing to present these difficulties to the Peace Conference for consideration and decision.

¹³ Not printed.

763.72119/3116

[Document 200]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Chargé (Valentino)

WASHINGTON , January 22, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of November 19, 1918, transmitting a memorandum regarding the situation in Tripoli arising out of the reported violation of the armistice by Turkey, and stating that the Italian Government would appreciate it if the American Government would approach the British Government with the view of having Turkey keep faith to her engagements.

In reply I have the honor to inform you that as the United States is not at war with Turkey and is not a party to the armistice it is unable to take the requested action in this matter.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

763.72119/3478

[Document 201]

The Acting Secretary of State to the French Chargé (Chambrun)

WASHINGTON , February 6, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 21, 1918, in which you inform me that your Government has advised you that the representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople have suggested certain measures for the removal of German and Austrian subjects in that capital in carrying out Article 19 of the Armistice with Turkey. You inquire whether the Government of the United States is inclined to concur in these measures.

In reply I beg to inform you that, although the United States is deeply interested in the determination of all questions relating to the permanent settlement of Turkish affairs, this particular question appears to be a military question relative to the carrying out of the armistice with Turkey, with which this Government not being at war with Turkey or a party to the armistice is not immediately concerned.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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[215] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

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[216] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

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[217] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

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763.72119 P 43/910: Telegram

[218] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

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[219] The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12317: Telegram

[220] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12319: Telegram

[221] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12320: Telegram

[222] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

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[223] The British Embassy to the Department of State

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[225] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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[226] The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State

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[227] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

[Washington ,] November 22, 1918.

763.72/13490

[228] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , November 22, 1918—5 p.m.

763.72/12308: Telegram

[229] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

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p.m.]

860h.00/42: Telegram

[230] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

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[231] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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[232] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12355: Telegram

[234] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

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[235] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12356: Telegram

[236] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12358: Telegram

[237] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

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763.72/12397: Telegram

[238] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House

Berne , November 30, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.00/9

[239] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

Rome , December 2, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 3—1:19 p.m.]

763.72/12414: Telegram

[240] Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

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860h.00/43: Telegram

[241] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

Rome , December 3, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 5—9:12 a.m.]

763.72119/2888: Telegram

[242] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome , December 4, 1918—10 a.m. [Received December 5—3:57 p.m.]

763.72/12436: Telegram

[243] The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

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763.72/12562

[244] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome , December 6, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/93

[245] The President of the Italian National Council of Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State

Fiume , December 7, 1918. [Received December 9—6 p.m.]

763.72119/2959: Telegram

[246] The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

Washington , December 11, 1918.

763.72/12615

[247] The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

Washington , December 13, 1918.

763.72/12616

[248] The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State

Belgrade , December 14, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 17—10:09 p.m.]

763.72/12555: Telegram

[249] Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour), December 15, 1918

December 15, 1918

Edward M. House Papers

[250] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

U. S. S. "Gregory," Fiume , 15 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/98

[251] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

U. S. S. "Gregory," Fiume , 16 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99

[252] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 17, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 19—
10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/105: Telegram

[253] The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 18, 1918.

763.72/12565

[254] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

December 19, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[255] The President of the Italian National Council of Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State

Fiume , December 21, 1918. [Received January 25, 1919.]

763.72119/3515

[256] General Tasker H. Bliss to President Wilson

Paris , December 23, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 811.22/1

[257] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

Fiume , December 23, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/108: Telegram

[258] The Commamder of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

December 25, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[259] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

Venice [undated].

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[260] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 26, 1918. [Received January 9, 1919.]

763.72/12649

[261] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

December 26, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 123–Bennington/1: Telegram

[262] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Rome , December 27, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 28—9 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/109: Telegram

[263] The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

Fiume , December 29, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[264] The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Belgrade , December 31, 1918—6 p.m. [Received January 2, 1919—
2:25 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/144: Telegram

[265] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris , January 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/144

[266] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Paris , 9 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/155

[267] The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 9, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

[268] The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 10, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

860h.01/105: Telegram

[Document 202]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 11, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received 2:39 p.m.]

89. For the President. Italian affairs. If you decide to recognize the National Council of Zagreb as representative of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation, or the territory formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy it would be well to assure the [Jugo-Slavs] in a very guarded way that the question of their territorial aspirations is a matter to be decided by the peace conference. This action is advised in order to reassure them in the face of the Italian occupation of the Dalmatian coast along the line of the convention of London,¹ against which I protested and consented only upon the explicit promise that this territory should have the same status as the territory to be occupied under the terms of the German armistice. It is to the interest of Italy also that the conditions of the armistice be not made the pretext for presaging [*prejudging*] this most difficult territorial question. United States now [*alone*] is in a position to speak caution since France and Great Britain are committed by the Pact of London. A statement that its frontiers would be determined in the interests of all concerned and in accordance with principles accepted by all the Allies would be reassuring to all small nationalities who are now in a state high tension.

EDWARD HOUSE

¹ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

763.72/12540

[Document 203]

The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State

No. 128

CORFU , November 12, 1918.
[Received December 16.]

SIR: In my telegram of the 9th. instant, 2 p.m.² I mentioned the receipt of the following documents; copy of a radio communication received by Vice Admiral Gauchet, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, from the Yugo-Slav Delegate at Cattaro and copy of the Vice Admiral's reply; certified copy of the formal act of surrender by the Austro-Hungarian Government of its fleet to the Delegates of the Yugo-Slav National Council of Agram (Zagreb); and copy of a letter received by the Naval Commander-in-Chief from the Yugo-Slav Provincial Government of Dalmatia regarding the landing of Italian forces in Dalmatia. Although these documents may have reached the Department from other channels, as they are of considerable interest I am enclosing other copies of them, which I have made, herewith.³

I am endeavoring to keep the Department informed by telegraph of all the information which I am able to obtain here regarding the formation of the new Yugo-Slav Government (the "National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs" at Agram (Zagreb)), the negotiations between it and the Serbian Government for some form of union, and the movements of the Italian forces which are a source of considerable alarm to both the Serbian Government and the National Council. Events are moving on so fast that it seems useless to report them by mail. I may however amplify what I have already reported as to the new Yugo-Slav National Council by the following information given to me by Mr. Tressic-Pavisc, the Delegate of that Government who has recently been here: the National Council's authority extends at present over all the former Yugo-Slav Provinces

of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Each of these former Provinces has established a local Council, chosen from the Yugo-Slav leaders of the former Province. The National Council is made up of seventy delegates from all these Provinces and has chosen from its members about thirty delegates who form a sort of executive Committee. This Committee has in turn selected from itself a sort of Cabinet consisting of about seventeen persons. The President of the National Council is Dr. Korochetz, a Roman Catholic priest from Slovenia and formerly the President of the political group in the Austrian Reichsrat known as the "Yugo-Slav Club". The Vice President of the National Council is a Mr. Pribicevitch, one of the two Pribicevitch brothers who have for many years been identified with the Yugo-Slav movement in Croatia. It will be remembered that these brothers were the principal accused in the famous Friedjung trial held at Agram in 1909. Another brother, Colonel Pribicevitch, was employed in the United States last year by the Serbian Government in recruiting Yugo-Slavs, and is now in the Serbian army.

In his discussions regarding some form of union between the Serbian Government and the Yugo-Slav National Council at Geneva, Mr. Pashitch has had with him four of the principal leaders of the Opposition groups in the Serbian Skupschtina: Mr. Marinkovitch, leader of the Progressive group, Mr. Draschkovitch, leader of one fraction of the Young Radical group, Mr. Davidovitch, leader of the other Young Radical fraction, and Mr. Trifkovitch, leader of the Dissident group. The Yugo-Slav delegates included Dr. Korochetz, Mr. Chingria and Mr. Trumbitch, the last the President of the Yugo-Slav Committee of London. I am informed that the Geneva discussions are now continuing at Paris and are expected to end in a few days. My telegrams have advised the Department of the two plans for union desired by different leaders, a single Cabinet or the present two Cabinets with a central body for common affairs only, either including members of the two Cabinets or only Ministers for these common affairs having no seats in the Serbian and Yugo-Slav Cabinets. Certain personal ambitions (that of Mr. Trumbitch is especially mentioned) are urging the separate Cabinets with some central body. Of course all these plans are only temporary and until the definitive form of the union is determined by a constitutional convention to be held as soon as circumstances permit.

The reconquest of Serbia and the determination of these questions of Yugo-Slav unity have made the formation of a coalition Cabinet for Serbia absolutely essential. Mr. Pashitch has shown his realization of this necessity by calling in the Opposition leaders to participate in the discussions above mentioned. A coalition Cabinet is also practically agreed upon, so I am informed, and I learn that its members will probably be the following: Mr. Pashitch, Old Radical, President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Gavrilovitch, belonging to no party but having Young Radical tendencies, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Protitch, Old Radical, Minister of Finance, Mr. Yankovitch, Old Radical, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, General Rashitch, belonging to no party, Minister of War, Mr. Trifkovitch, Dissident, Minister of the Interior, Mr. Voulovitch, Young Radical, Minister of Public Works, Mr. Davidovitch, Young Radical, Minister of Public Instruction, and Mr. Marinkovitch, Progressive, Minister of Justice. It is quite probable that some changes in this list will still be made and there is a likelihood that some new portfolios may be created, as Minister of Food Supply and Minister of Railways, so as to take in a couple of other prominent political men. The list as it stands includes the leaders of all the political parties except the Liberal, the former Austrophile party. It shows that both Mr. Pashitch and the Opposition leaders have made concessions beyond what they were willing to concede during the parliamentary crisis of last Winter: Mr. Pashitch has agreed to giving over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to a "neutral" and the Opposition leaders have agreed to allowing Mr. Protitch to remain in office, although they have apparently obliged Mr. Yovanovitch to retire. It will be remembered, as formerly reported, that Mr. Yovanovitch is extremely obnoxious to certain leaders of the Opposition on account of the part which he played in gathering the evidence for the Salonica "Black Hand" trial. It may be noted that Mr. Davidovitch, the probable new Minister of Public Works, belongs to that fraction of the Young Radical party which is generally supposed to have had dealings with the "Black Hand" society. Under normal circumstances it might well be doubted whether such a Cabinet would have much permanency but at present the case may be different. All the Old Radicals mentioned for the new Cabinet are members of the present all Old Radical Cabinet. Mr. Protitch, the present, and possibly

future, Minister of Finance, is the strongest man in the Old Radical party after Mr. Pashitch.

Although telegraphic communications are slow and the Serbian Ministers are scattered in Paris, Corfu, Uskub (Skoplje) and Belgrade, what news is actually received here is stated to show the most enthusiastic desire of all the former Yugo-Slav provinces for union with Serbia. Delegations are stated to have come to Belgrade from Bosnia-Herzegovina asking for immediate union but they were told that they should direct their efforts through the National Council at Agram. The Serbian Government desires the recognition of the Agram Government by the Entente and the United States and I am informed has addressed a circular in this sense to these Powers. The character of the future Government I am told is desired to be democratic but Monarchical, under the House of Karageorgevitch, by a large majority of the Yugo-Slav population although the Yugo-Slavs in the United States are stating to be making strong efforts to have a republican form of Government adopted.

The most disquieting element in the present situation is the attitude assumed by Italy which threatens to produce an open collision with the Yugo-Slavs in Dalmatia and Montenegro. Thus far Italian forces are apparently the only ones of the Entente which have landed in these regions and the effect of this has been extremely irritating and alarming to the population. The attitude of the population is in no way hostile to a joint landing of the Entente forces but only to the Italians being allowed to act alone. This appears now to be realized and to be in a fair way to be corrected. The landing of American forces would be especially agreeable and quieting to the population. In this connection I may mention that the feeling between Italians and French at Corfu has become very bitter. Lately four large Italian battleships have arrived here whereas until their arrival there were only occasionally small Italian cruisers here. Since their unexpected arrival their Commander has acted on several occasions with singular tactlessness towards the French Commanding Vice Admiral.

I have [etc.]

H. PERCIVAL DODGE

² [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 870*](#) .

³ Enclosures not printed.

763.72119/2610: Telegram

[Document 204]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER (BERNE), November 13, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 15—9:53 a.m.]

5751. I have received communication from Doctor Korosec, President of National Council of Zagreb, representing the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, enclosing protest of National Council addressed to Allies and United States.^{[3a](#)} Communication states similar protest being sent by King of Servia.

This protest states following: Although zone of occupation by Entente troops fixed by terms of armistice, this zone was not to prejudice the final demarcation of the western frontier of Austria-Hungary. It is unfortunate however, that zones determined upon by armistice are same as those traced by treaty of London of April 25 [26], 1915, which treaty was concluded against wish and undoubted right of Yugo-Slavs at the time when the principle of self-determination was not yet officially recognized by the Allies as a principle of international law of civilized peoples. It is to be feared that at the time of the final demarcation of this frontier the right of self-determination will not prevail. This fear is enhanced by manner in which the terms of the armistice are being executed. Not Allied, but Italian troops are forming army of occupation. Localities such as Fiume, outside of prescribed zone, are being occupied without any military justification, since the troops of the National Council of Zagreb are already in possession. In occupied districts military authorities address proclamations to the people which foreshadow definite annexation to Italy. Contrary to terms of armistice, civil governors and local authorities are being nominated by occupying army. Such procedure arouses justified discontent among the people and unless measures are taken with the least possible delay to

remedy situation National Council declines in advance to accept any responsibility for the consequences which may result.

In connection with above protest, I have just received rumor that general mobilization of Yugo-Slav forces against Italians has been declared.

STOVALL

3a Communication and protest printed as enclosures to the Minister's despatch No. 5267, Nov. 18, 1918, p. 298 [*Pg. 298 includes portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)*].

865.01/2: Telegram

[Document 205]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 13, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 14—8:40 p.m.]

2342. Doctor Antoni, calling himself plenipotentiary delegate of the city of Fiume, after interview with Prime Minister, has addressed [himself] through Prime Minister to Allied Governments stating immediately after freeing itself from Austrian-Hungarian yoke, city of Fiume with territory constituted from ancient times upon statutory basis *corpus separatum* of crown of Saint Stephen, proclaimed its autonomy and independence through its legal representatives, mayoralty and national council; that pursuing Wilsonian principles of rights of people to self-decision, city has resolved annex itself to Italy, and asks Italian Government to extend necessary protection during transition period.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/2637: Telegram

[Document 206]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 14, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 15—11:50 p.m.]

2349. Situation regarding regions beyond Adriatic much discussed here in political circles. There is much suppressed feeling against France on the part of both English and Italians here, she being charged by them with being at bottom of present Jugo-Slav movement along Austrian and Dalmatian coast. Aubrey Herbert, Member of Parliament, who has always been deeply interested in Albanian independence, now advocates substantially Sonnino's plan on the ground that it will either be under France or Italy. He spoke of willingness of Albanians to take on an Italian king.

Foregoing, I think, reflects views and possibly policies of both British and Italian persons of influence. Herbert's views are conversion rather recent to the Italian view and are, I believe, due to what France had been doing in that region. Meantime press full of account of enthusiastic reception of Italians in Fiume and all that region with declarations of desires to be united with Italy doubtless in part arranged, but also having a considerable amount of sincerity.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12262: Telegram

[Document 207]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 14, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 17—2:15 p.m.]

2351. Naval attaché informs me that he has received communication from Admiral Thaon di Revel, Chief of Staff of Italian Navy, requesting joint occupation of city of Spalato on Dalmatian coast by Americans, British, French and Italians to prevent repetition of disorders. Naval attaché has referred matter to Rear Admiral Bullard now reported to be in Dalmatian Islands. I feel that this is very important.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/2638: Telegram

[Document 208]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 14, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 16—1:35 p.m.]

2355. Some Italian correspondents from the front claim that Austro-Hungarian military representatives trying to give peculiar and restrictive interpretation certain claimed for [*clauses of?*] armistice [with?] evasions and objections which eradicated [*indicate?*] diplomacy to be employed at Peace Conference. Already certain Italian conquests are held illegal by Austrians due to questioning moment hostilities suspended.

Dalmatian question assuming more importance daily and Italian feeling growing more intense. This is complex problem solution of which is not viewed calmly on either side. It appears Jugo Slavs are exercising police regulations over towns claimed by Italians....⁴ It is pointed out that in the case of Italians territorial boundaries coincide with ethnical boundaries. Important fact cited is that Italian armies are welcomed in territory formerly occupied by Austrians because of liberal government they establish. Association Tyrolese Republic at Innsbruck welcomes near presence of Italian troops. This friendly acceptance of Italian military considered of practical importance in keeping order at this moment. Government making no attempt to conceal its encouragement of Italians in Dalmatia to treat with Italy. Delegation from Fiume brought forward at capitol yesterday message of greatest cordiality.

NELSON PAGE

⁴ The deleted passage was so garbled as to be unintelligible.

763.72/12256: Telegram

[Document 209]

***The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the
Secretary of State*** [5](#)

CORFU , November 14, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 16—6:16 a.m.]

Cabinet ministers express strong irritation Italian attitude in Austro-Hungarian fleet question and because Italy so far has been able to occupy practically alone Fiume and a number Dalmatia and Montenegro ports, and state Italy is apparently endeavoring to secure permanently such territory as possible and intriguing to prevent Yugo-Slav unity, desiring small separate states. Although 80 percent of Montenegro is for union with Servia, Italy is supporting the king of Montenegro, and contemplates occupying Cettigne and other interior towns already occupied by Servians in Montenegro. Feeling against Italians stated to be so strong in Montenegro and Dalmatia that outbreak against them feared unless the United States or other allies will land with Italians. Am informed that the American Naval Commander [at] Cattaro reports the situation there is critical, as the Italians insist upon landing notwithstanding the objections the United States, British and French commanders, and that Yugo-Slavs will probably resist unless other allies or the United States forces also land.

DODGE

[5](#) Transmitted to the Ambassador in France in Department's telegram No. 6312, Nov. 16, 1918, 6 p.m., which also contained the following instructions: "Department desires you to confer with Colonel House and to give immediate report of the Italian Yugo-Slav situation as regarded in Paris."

763.72/12283: Telegram

[Document 210]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 16, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received November 17—12:12 p.m.]

2363. Feeling aroused against Jugo-Slavs by latter's action regarding Austria's fleet has been further augmented by Jugo-Slav efforts to forestall Italian possession of various ports on Adriatic. Italian feeling also going against France which is credited with inspiring and encouraging much of what Italians term Jugo-Slav imperialistic aggressiveness. Situation in Fiume is typical. Hungarian Government abandoned Fiume night of October 28th, turning over city to Croatian Governor and Jugo-Slav troops which now hold city while Italian Squadron which arrived November 4th under Admiral Rainer, sent at the request of Italian population of Fiume, lies in port "to protect Italians and interests of Italy." Many incidents of violence but no bloodshed. Both Italian troops and Jugo-Slav commander reported as showing commendable moderation but situation is one in which a clash may readily occur. Due reparation rendered by both sides to insults of other's flag. Italian population Fiume reported Austria census about 30,000, Jugo-Slav 13,000, Hungarian 7,000, other nationalities 2,000.

Delegate plenipotentiary sent some 10 days ago by municipality and National Committee of Fiume received by Italian Premier and on 13th by the Italian Mayor of Rome. Proclamation issued October 30, 1918, declared decision to unite Fiume to Italy and placed decision "under the protection of America, mother of Liberty." This decision apparently represents the will of majority of inhabitants of Fiume. In any event, Italian public now boldly claim Fiume as an Italian city.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12261: Telegram

[Document 211]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 16, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received November 17—6:20 a.m.]

2368. Learned that detachment of troops have [occupied?] Fiume, but some doubt exists whether Italians only or international force.

The Fiume Italian Deputy, who called on me to-day, states that after talk with Premier Orlando, he [sent?] a note to Baron Sonnino the evening the latter left Rome for Paris requesting that Fiume be taken under the Allies.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12263: Telegram

[Document 212]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 16, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 17—5:38 p.m.]

2370. Department's 1828, November 13th.⁶ See my telegrams from number 2341 to 2355⁷ and for former situation see my despatch number 1005, September 17th.⁸

General trend of Italian opinion today on Adriatic and Jugo-Slav question might be summarized thus:

1. Sentiment of Italian Government of Istrian and Dalmatian cities even of those not included in pact of London is sincere desire to be united with Italy. This sentiment though aided by Italians was not created by them.
2. Long-standing belief among Italians assures me Croatians and Jugo-Slav[s] are troublemakers and racial enemies of Italy apparently justified by recent developments and attitude.
3. Croat element in Dalmatia and Istria tends to Bolsheviks and would appear to justify urgent appeals from Italians in those towns for armed intervention to preserve order.
4. Thoughtful Italian element desires modification pact London not for imperialistic purposes of increasing claims, but in order to secure harmony and lasting peace in complex Adriatic situation. Pact London did not take into consideration dismemberment Austria-Hungary. This now opens opportunity to relate nationalist groupings in Dalmatia. Italy wants no people of other races; considers them a danger but insists upon all that was and is Italian.
5. Opinion regarding Fiume divided some stating permanent Italian control debatable, though prominence given, with the permission

of Government, to demonstrations and propaganda [which?] will render future renunciation difficult.

6. Italian Government's attitude somewhat uncertain while awaiting decisions made by Allies regarding Austria-Hungary, as on this depends Adriatic situation.
7. The nation almost unanimous in relying upon Sonnino to maintain its aspirations.
8. Italians feel that America will be best judge after complexity of situation is studied and understood.

NELSON PAGE

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Telegram 2346 is printed *ante*, p. 185 [*Pg. 185 includes portions of [Doc. 110](#), [Doc. 111](#), and [Doc. 112](#)*]; 2342, 2349, 2351, and 2355 are printed on pp.

292–293 [*Pgs. 292–293 include portions of [Doc. 205](#), [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), and [Doc. 208](#)*]; 2353 is printed in [vol. I, p. 442](#); others not printed.

⁸ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 832](#).

763.72/12285: Telegram

[Document 213]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 18, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 19—3:20 a.m.]

2378. I hear that the French have taken over bay near Fiume. They say as naval base for their troops in the country, reason which Italians seem to question.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12287: Telegram

[Document 214]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 18, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 19—3:19 p.m.]

2376. Occupation of Fiume by Italian forces was made November 9th. Reported that detachment marines landed from Italian destroyer [name garbled] at Volosca and Abbazia near Fiume followed November 11th by a battalion which promptly disarmed Croat and Austrian officials. Conditions Fiume reported serious. Croat element and disbanded Croat, Serb and Slovene soldiers resorting to violence and disorder against property and to overthrow Italian element. Further stated that mob of ex-Servian prisoners of war and Croat and Sloven armed soldiers created reign of terror ...⁹ Italians declared that then in Fiume forty-odd thousand citizens of Italian stock, that schools, official documents municipality, archives, newspapers, languages and customs are and have been up to the present Italian. Conflict between Croats Slovenes breaking [out] and conflict between Croats and Servians was expected. Contingents of Allied and American troops have been sent there. Similar detachments have been sent to Cattaro and I hear to Pola. The British have sent a Brigadier General in command of their battalion stating it is because they need someone of experience and judgment.

Belief prevails here that French agents inspired disorder for unknown reason. An Italian just returned from Fiume states that a few days past French warships entered harbor and commander spent several hours in conference with Jugo-Slavs and left without calling on Italian authorities only sending them his card. Belief growing in Italy that Jugo-Slavs have no intention observing Pact of Rome.¹⁰ Evidence of this shown in fact that Dr. Ante Trumbić is reported excluded from Jugo-Slavs committee organized by Koraszek.

I hear also that the Servian Government has broken with the Jugo-Slavs and now speak only of a greater Servia.

British opinion gathered here is apparently in accord with Italian view that Jugo-Slavs are against Italy and will continually play into hands of Germany bringing latter down to Adriatic. 'Meantime everyone appears to feel that presence of Allied and American troops necessary to prevent serious outbreak.

NELSON PAGE

⁹ The deleted passage was so garbled as to be unintelligible.

¹⁰ General agreement among the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary, April 10, 1918. See Adriaticus, *La Question Adriatique, Recueil de documents officiels* (Paris, Imprimerie Typographique, 1920), Document VI, p. 24. A translation of the agreement may be found in René Albrecht-Carrré, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 347.

860h.00/33: Telegram

[Document 215]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 18, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 18—7:27 p.m.]

120. Secret for the President. Doctor Korosec, President of the Jugo-Slav Provisional Government at Agram, called on me today and expressed apprehension lest owing to the want of sympathy between the Jugo-Slav and the occupying Italian troops, conflicts might ensue. He expressed the fear that political agents might even attempt to provoke such conflicts. He consequently requested the American Government to send American troops to occupy strategic points and points where trouble is feared, in common with the Italians. As Signor Orlando made an identical request of me less than a week ago, asking that American troops be sent to occupy towns and [villages] in former Austro-Hungarian territory, where half of the population was Italian and the balance Slav, I feel that the request of Doctor Korosec merits your earnest consideration.

Doctor Korosec said that he ventured to make this request because he and his countrymen regarded the President as a liberator, and the United States as their second fatherland, owing to the large immigration of recent years.

As events are moving rapidly, if any steps are taken they should be taken promptly. I ought to say that even with your approval it will be necessary for me to take matter up with both the British and French Governments as they might have objections.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2879

[Document 216]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 5267

BERNE , November 18, 1918.
[Received December 4.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 5751 of November 13, I have the honor to transmit herewith for the Department's information a copy and translation of a communication addressed to me by Doctor Korosec, President of the National Council of Zagreb, dated November 11, 1918, together with a copy and translation of the protest by the National Council of Zagreb, representing all the Servians, Croatians, and Slovenes in the former Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

I have the honor to add that copies of the enclosed documents have been forwarded to the American Embassy at Paris.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

***The President of the National Council of Zagreb (Korosec) to the American
Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)***

BERNE , October 29/November 11, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to ask you to be so good as to bring the enclosed protest to the knowledge of the government of the United States of America.

An analogous note will be presented by the government of His Majesty the King of Servia.

In thanking you for your kindness, I beg you [etc.]

D. KOROSEC

[Subenclosure—Translation]

Protest of the National Council of Zagreb, Representing All the Servians, Croats and Slovenes in the Former Monarchy of Austria-Hungary

In accordance with the armistice concluded between the Allied Powers and the United States on one side, and the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the other, the conditions of which were drawn up at the Versailles Conference, a zone which is to be occupied by the troops of the Allied Powers and the United States has been established at the Western frontier of the former Dual Monarchy. In the same way it was decided that this occupation must not in any way prejudice the final determining of this frontier.

These arrangements, drawn up at a time when it was not known that a national power of the allied Serbo-Croat-Slovene people had been established in the interested territories, were in themselves unfavorable to any satisfactory solution of the questions concerning this part of Europe. The frontiers fixed for the zone of occupation agree, unfortunately, with those laid down at London the 25th [26th] April 1915. This London agreement was concluded without the knowledge of and against the will of our people, at a time when the principle of the right to self-determination had not been officially recognized by the allied powers as one of the principles of the international law of civilized peoples. That aroused a justified restlessness among the population interested as well as among the whole Servian, Croatian and Slovene peoples, because the London agreement had paid no attention whatever to our indubitable rights.

It is feared that upon the occasion of the definite solving of the question of the Western frontier considerations opposed to the right to self-determination of the peoples will prevail in spite of the clause

in the armistice to the effect that the present occupation must in no way influence the determining of the definitive frontiers.

The manner of carrying out the abovementioned conditions of the armistice threatens to emphasize this impression. According to the news that penetrates into these territories it appears that the announced occupation will not be achieved by the Allied troops, as there was every reason for expecting, but by Italian troops only. Although, as a result of the transfer of all actual power to the Council of Zagreb, which, by the way, also has at its disposition all the military and civil forces of the countries in question, all strategic need of occupation has ceased to exist, the occupation is nevertheless being put into effect in its entirety and occupation of territories outside of the indicated zone has even commenced. For example, Fiume, although already occupied by the troops of the National Council of Zagreb, has been occupied without any military justification.

In the occupied districts only Italian flags are being run up, instead of the flags of all the Allies. The military authorities are addressing proclamations to the population foretelling the definitive annexation of these territories to Italy. Finally, in direct opposition to the express stipulation of the armistice that local authorities shall not be disturbed and that the military command alone shall have the right of control over their activities, civil governors and local authorities are being named.

Procedures of this sort are transforming the restlessness of the interested populations and the Servian, Croatian and Slovene peoples, into justified discontent. The Serbo-Croat-Slovene people, having by its persevering struggle against the Central Powers (as well as in Austria-Hungary) contributed noticeably to the common cause, now finds itself being treated as though it were a vanquished enemy instead of an allied people. Being possessed of an absolute faith in the loyalty and spirit of justice of the Allied Powers, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people cannot believe that the justified indignation of the civilized world against the Prussian "scrap of paper" theory has to do with written treaties only. With an admirable confidence in the various declarations concerning the right of the peoples to self-

determination and Liberty, this people engaged unreservedly in the great struggle and endured the heaviest sacrifices. It cannot tranquilly submit to the rejuvenation of old theories about “pawns and pledges” and their application against itself, nor can it submit to the manifestation of tendencies toward conquest.

The National Council of Zagreb, representing the whole Serbo-Croat-Slovene people, calls the attention of the Allied Powers and the United States to the danger of the situation which is being created by procedures of this description. By raising its voice most energetically in protest against injury to recognized rights, it demands that with the least delay measures be taken to prevent the consequences which are likely to result therefrom. The representatives of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people decline in advance, before the tribunal of the civilized world, to shoulder any of the responsibility for these consequences.

GENEVA, November 9, 1918.

763.72119 P 43/910: Telegram

[Document 217]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918—4 p.m.

50. [From President Wilson.] Referring to your 119,^{[11](#)} shall try to get Miss Tarbell to go over.

Referring to your 120,^{[12](#)} I entirely approve, and hope that you will in my name urge the acquiescence of the Supreme Command. This seems to me essential to a peaceful settlement. Woodrow Wilson.

LANSING

^{[11](#)} [Vol. I, p. 160](#) [↗](#).

^{[12](#)} *Ante*, p. 297 [*Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 214](#) and [Doc. 215](#)*].

763.72/12308: Telegram

[Document 218]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 20, 1918—5 a.m.
[Received 3:21 p.m.]

5924. Department's number 6312, November 16th.¹³ Upon receipt of Department's number [6263] November 9, 7 p.m.,¹⁴ I conferred with Colonel House upon the situation presented. We both thought that on account of Mr. Vesnitch's, the Servian Minister's, familiarity with the inside circles of the Yugo-Slav representatives in Paris, he might throw some light on the position which they would take towards Italy in the event of further aggressions by that country. By appointment I later saw Mr. Vesnitch. Going carefully over the situation, he seemed to think that it might produce grave consequences. While it is well to keep in mind that the Minister has always consistently distrusted Italy's designs and looked upon her as a traditional enemy of Serbia and the Yugo-Slav people, yet to my surprise he for the first time intimated to me that he was also suspicious of the purposes of the Yugo-Slav[s] insofar as they concerned a future coalition or amalgamation with Serbia. He thought Mr. Trumbic, the London agent of the Yugo-Slavs, was too much under the influence of the British Government. He did not seem to think that Great Britain's plans for the future development of the Yugo-Slavs were likely to be in entire harmony with those of Servia. He also thought that it was an imperative necessity that an American war ship should at once be sent into the upper Adriatic along the east coast. This, I learned through Admiral Benson, has already been done though here again the Admiral tells me he was compelled to raise an emphatic protest against the order of the Italian Admiral to the effect that only British war ships could proceed to those points.

This noon I had a long talk with Doctor Korosec, the official head of the Yugo-Slav movement and [slated] to be the president should the people declare in favor of a republican form of government. It is through him that all the Yugo-Slav representatives among the Allied Powers exercise authority. The doctor has been vainly trying to get out of Paris to proceed to the coast of Dalmatia for the ostensible purpose of preserving order among his people. The Italian Government refuses to allow him to cross Italian territory. He declared to me that he was practically interned in Paris and feared very serious consequences would follow in his country if he not permitted to return to it. We discussed fully the pretensions of his people as to future territorial rights. Consulting maps of Austria and Hungary, the doctor drew a line extending down to Serbia and Montenegro, the extreme west point and beginning of which extended over to about twelve and one-half degrees of longitude in the western portion of Carinthia and then extending eastward in an undulating line hugging the 47th parallel of latitude clear across Carinthia, Styria, across the western portion of Hungary, thenceforth in a southwesterly [*southeasterly?*] direction bordering on Switzerland western [*Hungary west?*] of Lake Balaton continuing south and eastward down across the 46th parallel to the western border of Transylvania and thenceforth down to the northern boundary of Servia. To the southwest this new state was to include all that territory to the Adriatic and along its eastern coast down to Montenegro, embracing Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. Trieste was included in this program.

When I asked the doctor where the capital was to be located he replied that the present plans contemplated the city of Agram in northwestern Croatia, but he added that if a union with Servia was made Belgrade might be finally chosen as the capital of a nation composed of all the Yugo-Slavic people. He estimated that Servia contained four million of these, Montenegro a half million and the Yugo-Slav territory seven million. Like Doctor Trumbic, Doctor Korosec strongly denounced the London treaty of 1915 by which Italy was promised such valuable concessions of territorial rights on the east shores of the Adriatic. After talking with these representatives of the Yugo-Slavs, and I have met many delegations of them on different occasions, I am forced to the conclusion that

preponderating as they are in numbers over a large section of territory, above described, their aim is for the establishment of a republic and that secretly they do not care to be tied to the fortunes of Servia. They are intensely bitter towards the Italians and claim that it was due to the internal rebellion of the Yugo-Slav people in Austria-Hungary that finally forced her collapse. Only the moderation and forbearance of Italy in my judgment will avoid serious conflicts between these peoples. While one should prudently discount to some extent the claims of these Yugo-Slav representatives, for they are here to plead before the coming conference for the most enlarged recognition possible, yet among all the Allied differences that are to come to the surface from now on, I think this situation presented by the Yugo-Slav, Italian controversies is the most vexatious.

That I might give the French point of view on this question I saw Mr. Pichon this evening and secured from him the encroachment [*statement?*] of his opinion as well as what attitude he thought the other Allied powers should take. He said that the Yugo-Slav representatives had given him the greatest trouble. He did not [*think?*] the Yugo-Slav people could be recognized as a nation until after the terms of the armistice had been concluded, that while he was in favor of their ultimate recognition yet it would be a matter which would necessarily have to be discussed at the coming conference. While cautious in reference to the position taken by Italy, he deplored the fact that that Government was taking such a course towards the Yugo-Slavs as to inevitably bring on trouble. He hoped that Italy would not persist in carrying out any acts of aggression until all rights could be finally and justly determined.

I am strongly of the opinion that our government should unite with England and France in making urgent representations to Italy that consequences might [*not?*] result in further activities of Italian arms on territory the possession of which is disputed by the Yugo-Slavs.

SHARP

¹³ See footnote 5, p. 294 [*Pg. 294 includes portions of [Doc. 209](#) and [Doc. 210](#)*].

¹⁴ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 869](#).

763.72/12317: Telegram

[Document 219]

***The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the
Secretary of State*** [15](#)

CORFU , November 20, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received November 21—1:20 p.m.]

Foreign Office received today telegram from Servian Minister of War stating substantially:

“Servia delegate Agram reports that Italian and American forces landed Fiume, former occupying military building and disarming Yugo-Slav troops; that the population greatly excited against the Italians and that Agram National Council declares itself able to maintain order Fiume and will not be responsible for anticipated conflict if more Italians land as announced. General Esperey has appointed French Commandants at Fiume and Ragusa, and is sending Servia French troops there.”

DODGE

[15](#) Forwarded to Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 85, Nov. 27, 1918, 6 p.m.

763.72/12319: Telegram

[Document 220]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 20, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 21—1 p.m.]

2384. Adriatic and Jugo-Slav questions paramount subject discussed in all Italian circles. Some show indignation against tolerance by Allies and even Italian Government to Croats in their extraordinary action in Fiume and on Dalmatian coast. Many claim such Croats are part of Austrian army who, under terms of armistice, should have evacuated territories and so far as territories were included in armistice, this contention is difficult to reject. Many of these officers were formerly Austrian, certain of them still wear Austrian uniforms with new insignia. Press filled with accounts of critical conditions of Fiume, Zara, Sebenico, etc., which are inflaming Italian opinion. This is increasing feeling against French who are believed to be stirring up Jugo-Slav hostility toward Italians and according to all reports, including those of our naval people, have acted throughout to [in?] opposition Italians and in a way to intensify Jugo-Slav hostility.

Without relation to final disposition I deem it proper to say that it must be unwise to permit those who were but lately among most active belligerents against Allies and ourselves, to assume day following complete defeat their armies, position of neutrals or Allies and seize strategic territory and warships agreed by armistice to be surrendered. This situation, unless promptly resolved will certainly increase the already tense relations Italy and France and may finally involve us also.

The opinion of our naval people, who have been at conferences along Adriatic is, I hear, that the French representative has been very difficult, declining generally to agree with Italian suggestion even

when all other representatives united therein. This is in accord with French policy as indicated in many directions in French press.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12320: Telegram

[Document 221]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 20, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 21—3:28 p.m.]

2385. My telegram 2384.¹⁶ In audience which I have had with the King, he expressed much pleasure that Allied contingents are going into ports along Eastern Adriatic coast as they will not only have quieting effect but can see for themselves, and he mentioned particularly the influence of the American flag here. He evidently shares in apprehensions that those over there will eventually fall under German influence and open a way for the German people to get down to the Mediterranean through the Adriatic and Aegean which will create new difficulties and perils. He feels that the situation there is fraught with much future trouble. He spoke with highest appreciation and feeling of what America has done for Italy.

He expressed great pleasure at the President's reported approaching visit to Europe and said everyone here wants to see him.

NELSON PAGE

¹⁶ *Supra.*

763.72119/9120: Telegram

[Document 222]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 20, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received 8:55 p.m.]

129. The Italian Ambassador in Paris has just transmitted to me the following confidential telegram which he received from the Italian Prime Minister today:

“During a conversation which the French Ambassador at Rome held with the Italian Prime Minister by order of his Government, the former referring to the recent occupation of Fiume made the following requests.

First. That the Italians should keep within the territorial limits agreed upon in the armistice.

Second. That they should abstain from occupying territory beyond these, as such occupation was to be carried out by the Franco-Serbian forces of the army of Saloniki only.

Third. That in principle, Allied troops should cooperate [in] occupation of territories specified in the armistice.

To these three requests Mr. Orlando replied that the occupation of Fiume had taken place upon positive information of ill-treatment of Italians in that city, such information having been confirmed by English and American citizens. Furthermore, that territorial occupation for reasons of public order was admitted by the conditions of the armistice beyond the limits indicated therein, and that it would be unjust to deny such faculty to the Italians while reserving it to the Franco-Serbian forces. Moreover, the occupation of Fiume by Inter-Allied forces had taken place and American contingents had already reached the city. As to

the intervention of the Inter-Allied forces in the territory specified under the armistice, there could be no doubt that the Allies were entitled to this privilege, but to bring undue pressure upon the Italian Government to enforce this right would hardly be friendly. In any event, such cooperation in occupied territory should be carried out by Allied troops belonging to the armies which have fought on the Italian front.”

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72/12331

[Document 223]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 1306

MEMORANDUM

The British representative at Nish reported on November 14th that he had had a discussion with Monsieur Pavitchitch, who was leaving to rejoin the National Jugo-Slav Council at Agram.

Monsieur Pavitchitch stated emphatically that the entire Jugo-Slav population, except possibly a few politicians, wished for the closest union with Serbia, a union which might indeed be regarded as already accomplished. He referred to the majority of the Slavs over the Italians in Istria and Dalmatia.

Monsieur Pavitchitch also mentioned his desire that British ships might be sent to places occupied by Italian forces, a matter which he had already mentioned to the Commander of the British Forces in the Adriatic.

The British Minister thought that Monsieur Pavitchitch appeared dissatisfied with the reports which had reached him as to the discussions between the Jugo-Slavs and Serbs at Geneva. He mentioned the apparent wish of Monsieur Trumbitch to replace Monsieur Pashitch and to use for this purpose the antagonism of the Serbian opposition leaders to Monsieur Pashitch.

The British Ambassador at Paris was recently informed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that no agreement had yet been established between the Jugo-Slavs and the Serbians. Monsieur Pashitch had told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that he was shortly leaving for Corfu and Uskub, with a view to reaching such an agreement. The Minister is of opinion that no recognition should be

given to the Jugo-Slavs until an accord has been arrived at, and he states that Monsieur Pashitch and Monsieur Vesnitch agreed with this view.

WASHINGTON , November 20, 1918.

763.72/12324: Telegram

[Document 224]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 21, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received November 22—8:54 a.m.]

2386. Italian Government has received deed of transfer of Austro-Hungarian fleet to representatives of Jugo-Slavs. Press comments with scathing expressions of indignation and contempt, especially as document would appear to be dated a few days after armistice was signed between Italians and Austria-Hungary. Question is raised of who in Austria-Hungary would indemnify Allies and ourselves. Some suggest Italy be indemnified by Hungary and by Duchy of Austria and by Jugo-Slavs if their anti-Italian policy continues. Announcement now made that Italian troops with Allied contingents have occupied Fiume. This done it is explained not only on account restoring public order upon urgings of Italian citizens who asked for protection. Vice Admiral Millo of Italian Navy, has landed at Sebenico and has taken possession as representative of Italy, of the Allies, and of the United States.

Yesterday I received two reports from the Prime Minister which he states illustrate manner in which Jugo-Slavs are acting towards Italy. Among these was copy of protest which Italians of Spalato made to commander French squadron against abuses committed by National Guard of Provisional Local Jugo-Slav Government in that city. These acts, Prime Minister states, were so unjustifiable that even said Government had to deplore them. Also at Gorizia, he states, Jugo-Slavs give proof of their sinister designs. There they constituted a sort of provisional government and have even refused handing over military magazines containing foodstuffs and, with 1,500 Jugo-Slavs, are committing extraordinary acts, such as occupation public

telephone and telegraph offices, seizure of safety deposit offices, appropriation of foodstuffs, et cetera.

It would appear that unless the Jugo-Slav committees, styling themselves provisional local governments, have a [apparent omission] they will soon reach a point where the Italians will take matters hi their own hands and we shall have a disastrous clash.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12327: Telegram

[Document 225]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 21, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received November 22—6:56 p.m.]

2390. In a conversation with Baron Sonnino this morning, he expressed much apprehension over situation along Eastern Adriatic. His conviction is that whole movement is Austrian and its gravity is increased by French support. He mentioned that the French general had sent troops into those regions, which was accepted by Jugo-Slav element as supporting their pretensions. He mentioned several places to which troops had been ordered, including Scutari, where, however, on Italy's protest the order had been withdrawn. He also cited fact that in a Dalmatian port town where the Italian flags were flying without opposition the French sent a war vessel, immediately upon the appearance of which the Jugo-Slav element tore down all the Italian flags. He believes unless this checked it will lead to Bolshevism. The new Jugo-Slav admiral, he says, had declared that he has endeavored to promote Bolshevism for three years. Says further that he has given instructions that all the Allied flags should be hoisted wherever Italy has gone with the Italian flag. Says that Italy has shown a great self-control not only for herself but for the Allied cause.

He feels that America being independent and not being a party to the critical questions besetting the other Allies and having no political interests in this direction can have great influence in the settlement of these questions and has expressed the earnest wish that we could send men to those countries who without predilection could observe the situation on the spot. He feels sure that this would render great assistance to the proper solution of these critical questions. He feels also that Montenegro should have consideration given to it and that

it should not be turned over simply as a province to any country, meaning doubtless Serbia or Jugo-Slavia, adding that Montenegro's history in the struggles for freedom justifies its claim to remain free.

I feel that at present the situation along the Eastern Adriatic is one which should be resolved without delay or its consequences may become extremely grave.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12364: Telegram

[Document 226]

***The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the
Secretary of State*** ¹⁷

CORFU , November 22, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received November 27—12:46 p.m.]

Upon [my] taking leave of him, French Naval Commander-in-Chief expressed very great anxiety at the attitude of Italian Government and their occupation Dalmatia mentioning especially occupation Cattaro, reported intended Italian occupation Cettigne, breach of Italian promise not to land Fiume if the Servian forces withdrawn, the failure of Italian fleet and fort to celebrate German armistice and the constant delay and mutilation telegrams received from French Admiral, Venice.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs states that he has reason to believe Italian Government sending agents to Bulgaria to make trouble for Servia and Greece and that Italian Government clearly are endeavoring to create spirit in Italy which can be turned to account in impressing upon the Entente the difficulties of evacuation Dalmatia and Fiume. Also states that elections for constitutional convention to decide regarding union with Servia are reported to be proceeding in Montenegro and that the provisional government Dalmatia has requested Agram National Council to hasten the conclusion some agreement regarding union with Servia.

DODGE

¹⁷ Substance repeated to the American Embassy in Paris for Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 117, Dec. 3, 1918, 4 p.m.

763.72/13490

[Document 227]

***Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Phillips)***

[WASHINGTON ,] November 22, 1918.

I sent for the Italian Ambassador this morning and told him that we had been receiving information from abroad for some time past regarding the relations of the Italians with the Jugo-Slavs, which was disturbing us and that we hoped that the Italian Government would take no steps in the disputed territory (territory outside of the pact of London), which could in the slightest degree alienate our sympathies with Italy; that this Government wanted to be in complete sympathy and accord with Italy, etc., etc. The Ambassador replied at length on the subject of the relations of Italy with the Jugo-Slavs and more especially with France. He pointed out that Italy had acted on the Dalmatian coast only according to the terms of the armistice and the agreement of London. He said he felt sure that our reports originated in Paris where there was intense antagonism to the Italian cause and that there was a growing feeling on the part of the French to deprive Italy of the result of her successful war and of territory promised under the pact of London; in fact he was sure that the French were stirring up the Jugo-Slavs to make trouble and was clearly under the impression that the French had practically recognized the Pact of Corfu¹⁸ which was of course entirely inconsistent with the pact of London.

At the end of his remarks the Ambassador showed me a telegram this morning received from Sonnino, reporting a conversation with the French Ambassador in Rome, in which it was agreed that the Italian and Allied flags would fly together on territory on the Dalmatian coast outside of the territory occupied by Italy under the armistice. I said I was glad to hear this and hoped that much of the difficulty would be solved in this way. The Ambassador frequently showed

great bitterness towards France and French diplomacy and repeated several times that if Italy was deprived of her just claims under the pact of London, a revolution would surely follow in Italy.

¹⁸ Signed July 7/20, 1917, by the Serbian Prime Minister and the President of the Yugo-Slav Committee. English text in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920), vol. v, p. 393.

763.72/12308: Telegram

[Document 228]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
France (Sharp)^{[19](#)}***

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918—5 p.m.

6379. Your 5924, November 20. The Italian Ambassador was today orally informed that the Department is disturbed at the reports showing Italian–Jugo-Slav friction in the Adriatic and that this Government hoped that Italy would take no step which would tend to increase such friction until all matters could be frankly discussed at the coming Peace Conference. The Ambassador showed Department a telegram just received from Sonnino, reporting a conversation with the French Ambassador at Rome, at which it was agreed that the Italian and Allied flags shall fly from all occupied places outside territory occupied by Italy under the armistice.

POLK

^{[19](#)} The same to the Ambassador in Italy as Department's No. 1854, Nov. 22, 1918, 4 p.m.

860h.00/42: Telegram

[Document 229]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 22, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 22—9:20 p.m.]

145. For the President. Pursuant to your number 50, November 19, 4 p.m., in answer to our number 120, I communicated with the British Government through Lord Derby respecting this matter and requested him to ascertain the views of his Government. I am now in receipt of the following communication from Lord Derby:

“I telegraphed to Mr. Balfour the contents of your letter of yesterday and he has replied asking me to let you know that His Majesty’s Government consider that if the Italian troops occupying part of the former empire of Austria-Hungary or which propose to occupy it could be accompanied by American troops it would be of the very greatest value.”

As soon as I hear from the French Government I will take the matter up with the Supreme Command through General Pershing.

EDWARD HOUSE

860h.00/34: Telegram

[Document 230]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 24, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 24—5:36 p.m.]

163. Referring to 106 [*120?*]^{[19a](#)} and 145.^{[20](#)} I have received the following reply from the French Foreign Office:

“I have the honor to inform you that the French Government is favorable to the presence, in regions of the former Austrian Hungarian Monarchy where the populations are partly Italian and partly Jugo-Slav, of troops belonging to the Allied countries who would not find themselves drawn into conflicts of nationality. The French Government can, therefore, only regard with pleasure the despatch of American troops to the territories where they will find French detachments beside them.”

EDWARD HOUSE

^{[19a](#)} *Ante*, p. 297 [*Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 214](#) and [Doc. 215](#)].*

^{[20](#)} *Supra*.

763.72/12361: Telegram

[Document 231]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 25, 1918—12 midnight.
[Received November 26—6 p.m.]

2406. Regarding sudden change on the part of Austro-Hungarian officers to Jugo-Slav officers. I have received information from the Government here that a considerable number Austro-Hungarian officers, German in sentiment and previously bitter enemies of the Slavs, now embodied in Jugo-Slav state as officers. It cites case of Lieutenant Marshal Istvanovich who took active part in taking of Belgrade in 1915, now commander Jugo-Slav military corps of Lubiana. Also lieutenant who torpedoed Italian warship *Garibaldi* and was decorated for it now seen wearing Jugo-Slav cockade. Peculiar situation thus is created by which enemy forces directed and constituted by German or Austro-Hungarian officers are transformed into alleged friendly forces claiming exercise of same rights as Allies.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/3013

[Document 232]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

No. 1072

ROME , November 26, 1918.
[Received December 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith translation of a letter received yesterday from Dr. Viogian Antonio, "Syndic of the Free City of Fiume and its District," and Dr. Antoni, "Delegate of the National Council," which letter deals briefly with the history of and present status of conditions in the City of Fiume.

I have [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Syndic of the Free City of Fiume (Antonio) and the Delegate of the National Council of Fiume (Antoni) to the American Ambassador in Italy (Page)

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the city of Fiume, as far of [as] its right of auto-decision is concerned has placed itself under the protection of the United States of America, as its proclamation of annexation to Italy has taken place on the basis of the principles enunciated by President Wilson and constituting the fundamental basis of the new arrangement of Europe, whose peoples now freed from Teutonic Imperialism intend to constitute themselves into independent and nationally homogeneous states.

The city of Fiume constitutes a "corpus separatum" of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen on the basis of a diploma of Maria

Theresa of the year 1779, confirming anew the autonomous prerogatives of the city which can be proved with historical documents.

During the revolution of the year 1848 the Croats took Fiume by violence and held it in their power until the year 1867; with the exception of this brief period of time Fiume never belonged to Croatia although the Croatian Governments took advantage of every occasion to enforce their pretended rights over Fiume. Thus in the year 1868 when the matters of constitution and of public right outstanding between Hungary and Croatia were regulated, the last named claimed again for itself the city of Fiume. Hungary and the city of Fiume opposed this strenuously and in order to settle the question the national deputations were called composed of an equal number of representatives of Hungary, of Croatia and of the city of Fiume: this is an absolute proof that the city of Fiume was considered equal to Hungary and to Croatia in the matter of public right; as a consequence of this neither the Hungarian parliament nor the Croatian diet nor both together would have been able to decide the destiny of Fiume without the consent of the city itself. Today on the other hand we see that Croatia,—which has never possessed the city of Fiume legally or actually,—has committed an illegal and arbitrary action by incorporating in a still unrecognized and entirely embryonic state this “corpus separatum” without first obtaining the consent of Hungary and even more that of the city of Fiume.

Here it is well to note that as soon as constitutional rights were granted to the peoples of Austria-Hungary in the year 1867, all power of Croatia over Fiume came to an end and consequently the Croatian authorities were compelled to abandon the city. Then, as an agreement could not be reached, Fiume, in its quality of third factor of the lands of the Hungarian crown, obtained a civic statute, confirming its autonomous prerogatives and its municipal rights,—in which Statute (paragraph 127) the principle was sanctioned that without the consent of Fiume this Statute could not be modified.

Hence Fiume was temporarily united to Hungary, preserving however its own special autonomy which is traceable to historic and

constitutional rights recognized and confirmed officially “ex tempore immemorabili”.

Following on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary after the Italian victory, the National Council of Zagabria, taking advantage of the unbalanced situation, decreed at once the annexation of Fiume “corpus separatum”, and independent Commune of Italian nationality—and enforced this annexation with the help of the disbanded troops and of the Austrian ex-officers.

This decision of an embryo State unrecognized on the basis of the principles of International Law, is devoid of a juridical basis or foundation; Fiume, being now freed of the bonds which bound it temporarily to the lands of the Hungarian Crown and having therefore become free and independent and master of its own destiny, has of its own free will and by a plebiscite of the people proclaimed its union with Italy and has constituted its National Council, which is now in office.

It follows from all this that the Yugoslav National Council tried in a manner contrary to every principle of equity and justice and in spite of Italy, England and the United States of America, to commit at Fiume an action planned in the ingenious hope that such action once accomplished would later have constituted a basis of right for pretensions which are simply absurd.

The city of Fiume protests loudly against such aggression which injures its national and independent rights, and requests the recognition of its condition of independent State, placing its right of auto-decision under the protection of the United States of America. Such auto-decision will in no wise render difficult or hinder the free lines of communication to the sea either for Jugoslavia or for Hungary, as the port of Fiume may serve as a free opening to the sea for these two new States and by reciprocal agreements they will be able to have all the facilities connected with their maritime commerce.

Will Y. E. kindly forward the present to your Government, to which the city of Fiume and its National Council through the medium of the

undersigned legitimate representatives humbly appeal with the request that the possibility of exercising freely and without interference from any quarter the right of auto-decision which is due to it, may be ensured to the city.

With all esteem and respect.

DR. VIORGIAN ANTONIO

Syndic of the Free City of Fiume and its District

DR. ANTONI

Delegate of the National Council

763.72/12355: Telegram

[Document 233]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 26, 1918—noon.
[Received 9:23 p.m.]

2407. The Foreign Office informs me that it has telegraphed Italian Embassy, Washington, urging that American troops in Italy and Fiume and Cattaro be not withdrawn. It requests me to support this, stating that such withdrawal would have bad political effect upon Jugoslav situation from Italian standpoint.

I feel that the matter demands most serious consideration as I believe that our presence there will have great effect in preventing clashes and their removal will have opposite effect.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12663

[Document 234]

***Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Phillips)***

[WASHINGTON ,] November 26, 1918.

The Italian Ambassador mentioned today a conversation he had recently with the President in which the President referred to the Italian–Jugo-Slav situation, by giving the impression that in his opinion the pact of London which gave to Italy such important territory could now be disregarded, inasmuch as the pact was made to safeguard Italy from Austria-Hungary and now that Austria-Hungary no longer existed the pact itself might be supposed to have disappeared. The Ambassador seemed to think that Italy was as much endangered by a pan-Serbian organization on the lines of the Corfu declaration as a state of Austro-Hungarian proportions. He felt that it would be terribly dangerous for the President to enter the Peace Conference with the idea that the pact of London need not be considered inasmuch as the whole of Italy was enthusiastic for it. The Ambassador scented danger so had not reported the President's conversation to his Government.

W[ILLIAM] P[HILLIPS]

763.72/12356: Telegram

[Document 235]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 26, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received 11:05 p.m.]

2405. Situation in Eastern Adriatic reported somewhat ameliorated. [Admiral] Bullard, now Rome, has acted with discretion and apparent success. Both he, naval attaché who was recently there, have same views with mine that situation inherently difficult was rendered more so by the Jugo-Slav organizations, till now strong Austro-Hungarian supporters, being supported quietly by the French naval people which the Italians resent. The French Admiral at Corfu received on his flagship and gave a private dinner to the first Jugo-Slav committee which came from the Istria-Dalmatia region immediately after armistice and drank [to] Jugo-Slav state.

The French attitude has apparently suddenly changed and I learn that the French Admiral has been instructed in the last three days to act sympathetically with the Italians. The French Ambassador here also begins to talk in a different tone about the Jugo-Slav demands recognizing that there must be a certain give and take policy adopted. I also hear on good authority that Sonnino has stated that in Paris recently he found that those whom he supposed most against Italy, viz, the French, were sympathetic while those he had supposed sympathetic, viz, the British and Americans, were against him. This possibly signifies some new orientation on the part of the French. The King of Italy has, according to the press, arrived in Paris which may be connected with this.

One questionable policy I encounter is that no information is sent to me here as to our policy while instructions as to political policy are being sent directly to our Naval Commander in the Adriatic from our

Naval Commander at Paris. Fortunately my knowledge of the policy of our Government has enabled me to act along the same lines.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12358: Telegram

[Document 236]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State ²¹

ROME , November 27, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 28—9:43 p.m.]

2417. Baron Sonnino has spoken to me most earnestly of the reported order to withdraw the American regiment from Italy. Says he can understand the trouble of having a single regiment on detached service but that the good effect of the presence of the American flag is so obvious and the effect of withdrawing even this one regiment may be so unhappy that he hopes very much they will be left. He went quite fully into situation and effect presence of our troops has. He expressed wish that we could send more troops here instead of withdrawing these few. Also expressed importance of Americans being able to see for themselves true situation Adriatic Littoral.

Though as far as anyone in world from wishing United States to get involved in any Balkan questions, I held to [*can not?*] help conviction that Sonnino is right regarding effect of withdrawal of our troops. Their presence will do more to prevent clashes which may lead to disastrous consequences than any other one thing.

NELSON PAGE

²¹ Forwarded to Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 105, of Nov. 30, 1918, 7 p.m.

763.72/12397: Telegram

[Document 237]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , November 29, 1918—9 p.m.

[Received December 1—2:28 a.m.]

2426. The naval conference relating to the Eastern Adriatic conditions in session here for several days has adjourned. I learn from our representative, Rear Admiral Bullard, the following facts: that the Italians landed troops at Cattaro including a battalion of our troops and proposed to send troops to Cettigne but were opposed by the Servians who threatened to attack any Italian troops which should attempt to march to Cettigne, whereupon the Italians appear to have agreed not to send Italian troops, but did order there a battalion of American troops. These, however, were met by the Servian officials or troops who protested against their proceeding and after the explanation given by them, the commanding officer of our troops turned back. It is reported further that the Servians say they will welcome Allied and American troops but not Italians. This last, I think, comes from French sources.

I hear that the French Admiral at the conference requested the withdrawal of the Italian troops from Cattaro which the Italian Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral Thaon di Revel, opposed hotly as he also opposed the withdrawal of American troops. Further, that the French proposed to occupy Pola which, under the armistice with Austria, it was agreed may be occupied by Allied and American troops. Also that the French Admiral claimed that the Italians had exceeded their rights at Pola. This charge Admiral Thaon di Revel resented and as the decisions of the conference were required to be unanimous, the matter was referred to Versailles.

The situation changes so rapidly in that region that much embarrassment is experienced by our representatives not having either the authority to decide on the questions which arise or instructions which would enable them to take any action whatever.

In view of foregoing and of the new questions which constantly arise, I feel that authority to decide ad interim the questions which arise or instructions as to American action ad interim should be given to Admiral Bullard, General Treat,^{[22](#)} or myself. I have not seen General Treat but I gather that Admiral Bullard concurs in this view. The Admiral would appear best, being nearest on ground, but should keep me informed of steps taken so that I may act here in accord with his action. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

^{[22](#)} Maj.-Gen. Charles G. Treat, chief of the American Military Mission to Italy, June 1918 to May 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.00/9

[Document 238]

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House

BERNE , November 30, 1918.

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: When in Paris Mr. Wilson^{22a} had a conversation with Captain Lippmann, concerning the question of the Yougo-Slavs and their junction with the kingdom of Serbia. This conversation took place shortly after the so-called "Geneva pact" by which six persons, three from the former Austro-Hungarian regions and three from old Serbia, were to constitute a provisional Government and obtain, if possible, recognition from the Allies on this basis. Details of this have already been sent on.

Within the last few days the press has brought the information that the National Council at Zagreb (Agram) has voted for a junction with the kingdom of Serbia, recognizing the reigning dynasty and naming the heir apparent as Regent of the countries formerly under Austro-Hungarian domination.

It has taken some time to ascertain the reasons which caused this action, which was so entirely contrary to the spirit in which the delegates were at the time of their conference with Pachitch at Geneva. I am now in receipt of information which I believe to be trustworthy to the effect that three reasons caused this change of orientation:

1. Pachitch is reported to have promised the Yougo-Slavs that if they fell in with his plans concerning the kingdom of Serbia he could guarantee the claims of the Yougo-Slavs against the Italians;
2. The peasant party, of which Raditch is the head, is growing in proportions which the Government consider alarming and which

they fear might bring conditions of Bolshevism in the country and they felt it would be necessary to hunt a support outside.

3. The majority party, a Serbo-Croatian coalition of the moderate parties, was split with internal dissensions and could not count on or put maintenance [sic] on their own power.

An interesting detail concerning the fate of the Geneva pact is the report that the six men named as the coalition provisional government proceeded to Paris to present their report of the interview and their hopes for the future to M. Pichon. They were received courteously by the latter, who listened to their explanation and, when they finished, informed them that Pachitch had called on him half an hour previously and had stated that the whole Geneva pact was unreliable and that another solution must be sought.

Sincerely,

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

22a Hugh R. Wilson, secretary of legation in Switzerland.

763.72/12414: Telegram

[Document 239]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , December 2, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 3—1:19 p.m.]

2433. Friction continues in parts of eastern Adriatic coast. The French claiming to have prior contract seized [in] Italian ports Austro-Hungarian merchant ships and hoisted the French flag, which Italians claim violates terms of armistice; that they carry the Italian and International Transportation Service flags.

I learn further that the Italians claim the French authorities receive Jugo-Slavs on board their vessels and foment trouble between them and the Italians. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

860h.00/43: Telegram

[Document 240]

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 2, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 2—7:48 p.m.]

221. Secret for the President. Referring to my telegram number 120 of November 18th and your reply number 50 of November 19th.

I at once took the matter up with the French and British Governments and found that they were in favor of the despatch of American troops to Italy. I thereupon requested General Pershing after conferring with Marshal Foch to inform me whether he approved of despatching American troops for service in Italy. He replied that as far as the military situation was concerned he was opposed to taking this step, but he thought that the troops already in Italy might be used for occupying the disputed territory. He accordingly telegraphed to General Treat to notify him of the disposition which had been made of the American soldiers in Italy. General Treat replied that one battalion was at Cattaro, one at Fiume, and one at Treviso. General Pershing is now in receipt of the following telegram under date of November 28th from the War Department:

“Confidential. The use of American troops with the Italian army is a very difficult and complicated matter and the Secretary of War is of the opinion that our troops there should be withdrawn to your command. Please take this matter up with Marshal Foch and arrange to have American units returned to you. March. Harris.”

In view of the above telegram General Pershing recommended General Treat to assemble the American troops at an Italian port with a view of returning them to United States direct. Notwithstanding the desire of the War Department to withdraw all

American forces from Italy, in view of your one six [105?] of November 30th^{[23](#)} I am still of the opinion that they should be retained there for some little time longer both for the purpose indicated in my telegram above mentioned and also because their withdrawal at this particular time might create an unfortunate impression in Italy. The numbers involved are very small and the Italian Government has made few demands upon the American Expeditionary Force. I suggest that any step which may be taken in this connection be made through the Secretary of War.

EDWARD HOUSE

^{[23](#)} See footnote 21, p. 316 [*Pg. 316 includes portions of [Doc. 235](#), [Doc. 236](#), and [Doc. 237](#)*].

763.72119/2888: Telegram

[Document 241]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME , December 3, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 5—9:12 a.m.]

2438. I am informed that certain “Adriatic Deputies” who started from the Italian cities on the Eastern Adriatic intending to go to Washington are now holding themselves in readiness to go to Paris, or London to see the President. Their programme is, I learn, the boundary line fixed by the papers [*pact?*] of London modified however by certain concessions in exchange for some agreement about Fiume and possibly the inclusion of Spalato in the Italian claims. Also liberal concessions regarding commercial rights, such as making Fiume and even Trieste free ports with agreed guarantees in commercial, political and cultural lines on behalf of Slavs within these cities.

I hear also that there is probably a definite though undisclosed agreement between these political leaders and the Hungarian leaders.

I am informed furthermore that there is great difficulty in presenting to the American public Italian claims in the Adriatic because France appears to be barring out all cable news sent by the press from Italy relating to the Yugoslav situation, and that the only information touching the Adriatic question from Italian sources which reaches America is that sent by this Embassy. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

763.72/12436: Telegram

[Document 242]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

ROME , December 4, 1918—10 a.m.
[Received December 5—3:57 p.m.]

2445. Colonel Buckey, military attaché, just returned from Dalmatian coast reports conditions there quiet now in towns occupied by the Italians, but great bitterness existing between Italians and Jugo-Slavs, also French whom the Italians believe instigating Jugo-Slav enmity. Reported that French have acquired the important Hungarian-Istrian Steamship Line which the Italians claim violates spirit of armistice.

About 20 Austro-Hungarian merchant vessels still at Sebenico awaiting crews, these will be turned over to the Allies.

Buckey reports seeing at Sebenico telegram received from Diaz^{[24](#)} December 2d ordering immediate withdrawal from Cattaro of all Italian forces pursuant to agreement made by Sonnino in Paris under which Italian occupation is confined to Dalmatia and Northern Albania and French and Serbians will occupy Cattaro and the remainder of the coast.

Buckey saw the Hungarian deputy from Fiume to last Hungarian parliament who was in Vienna November 27th. Latter is of Italian sympathies. He stated that economic conditions in country districts of Croatia and of Austria serious but far less so than in cities. In Vienna the Red Guard already organized and famine of food and coal exists. He fears that unless situation promptly relieved Bolshevism will greatly increase. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

²⁴ Gen. Armando Diaz, chief of the general staff of the Italian Army.

763.72/12562

[Document 243]

The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

WASHINGTON , December 5, 1918.

AIDE MEMOIRE

On the request of the National Council (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) in Zagreb the Serbian Government begs to bring to the knowledge of the United States Government the unfriendly proceedings of the Italians in prohibiting the importation of food stuffs, which will eventually force starvation upon the population.

The Italians have confiscated all merchandise in Rijeka, and, quite recently, they stopped two steamers at Kotor, laden with food, which were on their way from Senj to Split, and took them to Italy.

The purpose of this action on part of the Italians is to persuade the people in Dalmatia and on the Croatian coast to declare themselves in favor of Italy.

The Serbian Government anticipates that the United States Government will favorably meet the request to do its utmost to curb the friction existing between Italy and the National Council, and to use its great influence toward an amicable settlement of the question.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/93

[Document 244]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 1087

ROME , December 6, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter which has been handed to me by Mr. Roberto Ghiglianovich, Deputy to the Dalmatian Diet. This letter sets forth the conditions at Spalato and the indispensable occupation of that place by Allied troops.

I have [etc.]

THOMAS NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure—Translation]

Mr. Roberto Ghiglianovich to the American Ambassador in Italy (Page)

ROME , November 30, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: Encouraged by the favourable reception given to me and to my colleagues on the occasion of the projected journey to America, I take the liberty of addressing to you the following earnest request.

I have very serious information from Spalato, where the citadel is entirely in the hands of the provisional Yugoslav Government for Dalmatia, which is abusing thereof not only to the detriment of the Italians of Spalato, but also as a base of general anti-Italian propaganda. The Italians of Spalato, which constitute a considerable portion of that population, being outraged in their sentiments and rights, are in abnormal and dangerous conditions, being compelled

by violence to repress any national or political manifestation. Such a condition of affairs can only be mended by the military occupation of the city. It would be Italy's duty to do this; but I think that the only scruple which prevents it from doing so is the fear of giving access to those who may have been given to an erroneous interpretation of an excess in the application of the terms of the armistice, and to overbearing tendencies, whilst in reality the reason is merely humanitarian and based on a question of proper balance. In order to safeguard every interest, the indispensable occupation of Spalato should be carried out by mixed troops, that is to say by Italo-American troops. I have reason to believe that this solution, calculated to maintain the peace in such an important economic and commercial centre of Dalmatia—where even the matter of provisions is most pressing—would correspond with the views of the Government and the Italian Admiralty staff.

To whom should I entrust the fostering of this just solution if not to you, Excellency, representative of the great and free American people, so deeply interested in our affairs, and who has always shown so much personal sympathy for the cause of the Italians of Dalmatia?

This is the reason of my taking the liberty of addressing you, and absolves me from further blame.

Believe me [etc.]

ROBERTO GHIGLIANOVICH

763.72119/2959: Telegram

[Document 245]

***The President of the Italian National Council of
Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State***

25

FIUME , December 7, 1918.
[Received December 9—6 p.m.]

The free city, port, and district of Fiume, which within the meaning of the laws and special conventions, formed part as a separate political body of the countries belonging to the Hungarian crown, availing itself of its indisputable national right and of the right of self-decision expressly recognized by the laws and by the civic statute, on October 30th, 1918, declared the Hungarian Government to have fallen and reconstituted itself into an independent political entity, with full state powers within the limits of its territory as determined by the [civic] laws. The exercise of the public powers was assumed by virtue of the will of the people by the national Italian council. The national council, in this its capacity as sovereign government of the free city, port, and district of Fiume, has the honor to bring the above to the knowledge of Your Excellency, while at the same time expressing its firm confidence that the absolute desire of the union of Fiume with Italy, as declared by the population through a plebiscitary manifestation, will be recognized by the Peace Conference. Very respectfully,

ANTONIO GROSSICH

25 Forwarded to Colonel House as Department's telegram No. 174,
Dec. 12, 1918, 4 p.m.

763.72/12615

[Document 246]

The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

WASHINGTON , December 11, 1918.

AIDE MEMOIRE

The Serbian Government begs to bring to the knowledge of the United States Government the following note which was addressed to the Serbian Government by the National Council of Ljubljana:

“The Italians have begun to proclaim that the territory which they are now occupying belongs to them under the London Treaty. General Pizlin in Goritza has summoned the Yugoslav political leaders to his presence, and informed them that all former Austrian officials are dismissed from the service even though they have taken the oath to Yugoslavia. He has allowed them to remain at their posts, if they desire, but they will be transferred in the near future. The Italians have ordered that in all administrative affairs the official language used shall be Italian, even in the village government offices where no one understands Italian; the Slovenian language is nowhere recognized. Our administration refused to obey this order; therefore, their official function has ceased.

In Goritza the Italian soldiers everywhere have torn down the old Slovenian signs and flags, and thrown them in the mud. Upon our protest against these actions the Italian General replied that the display of the Yugoslav flags (Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian) was a provocation.

The Italians are making it most uncomfortable for the people, particularly for those who are indigenous to the country. All Slovenian teachers, who commenced their profession after 1914, have been compelled to leave the town immediately.

Even the oldest families are refused identification cards, which are necessary to procure food, in order to force them to leave the country, but with the appearance of the action being voluntary on their part. In the night the Italian soldiers, together with the vagrants of the town, enter the Slovenian homes by force, and cause great damage.

All arms and military equipment, abandoned by the Austrian Army on their retreat, and appropriated by the Yugoslavs, have been confiscated by the Italians without scruple. They have also acquired the inventory of this war material made by the Yugoslavs. With the determination to collect everything of this nature the Italians go so far as to investigate the private homes of the Yugoslavs, and the stock of the merchants is likewise counted as war material. Therefore, the stores are robbed of great quantities of their goods and supplies, particularly food stuffs, for which they receive not the slightest return. No food is brought in from Italy, and all the Italian troops are fed from our provisions. Since October 24th the entire male population, wearing the military uniform, were proclaimed prisoners of war and interned, notwithstanding that these soldiers had taken the oath to Yugoslavia. Even the most trivial offenses are tried under martial law. The railway traffic is stopped. The courier of the National Council of Ljubljana, on his way to Goritza, was detained, and all his papers confiscated. The demarkation line is strongly fortified by artillery.

We implore the Serbian Government to request the United States Government to exert its great influence toward persuading the Italians to retire from all the territory they are now occupying that belongs to Yugoslavia.

Should it transpire that the United States Government would be prevented from lending its assistance on account of infringing upon some diplomatic formality, we hope that the United States Government will urge that the occupation of this territory be left to Serbia without Italian troops; and, further, that this unlawful appropriation of food and supplies

be stopped; that an inventory be made by an International Commission of the war material still remaining; that all Yugoslav officials be permitted to return to their previous posts of duty; that the operation of the postal and telephone service, as well as the railway traffic, be resumed.

These unwarranted mandates inflict great hardships and affect the fate of nearly half a million Slovenians, who represent some of the best people of our nation, and this nation is now in the hands of the Italians.”

The Serbian Government anticipates that the United States Government will take into consideration the fatal consequences that will arise if the Italians are permitted to continue the course they have adopted toward Yugoslavia, and the Serbian Government further begs that the United States Government will use its best endeavors toward a correction of these existing conditions.

763.72/12616

[Document 247]

The Serbian Legation to the Department of State

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918.

AIDE MEMOIRE

On the 17th of November, new calendar, Italian troops entered Rieka under the pretext of organizing and keeping order in the town and its suburbs, notwithstanding the fact that nothing had occurred to justify this order. The Commandant of the Italian troops conducted himself as if he were on enemy territory by immediately taking possession of all state buildings, the war fleet, merchant marine, etc.

The Serbian Government and the National Council are grievously surprised by this unfriendly attitude evidenced by the Kingdom of Italy toward one of her allies, particularly, as before this Italian occupation, all the Jugoslavs residing in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, including the town of Rieka, had proclaimed their independence, avowing their faithful and complete loyalty to the Allies.

The Serbian Government begs to draw the attention of the United States Government to this protest against the trespassing of the Italians on any part of Jugoslavian territory, and to the fact that these events are creating a most depressing effect in the soul of our nation.

Serbia has sacrificed everything in this great war, hoping that on the cessation of hostilities all the dreadful injustice she has endured for centuries would be rectified, and, now, she is obliged to submit to this Italian occupation.

The Serbian Government would further request the United States Government to take into consideration the entire situation, and to

employ the most energetical means to influence the Italian Government to change the orders to their troops.

There is nothing to justify these vexatious measures of this Italian administration in the Yugoslav territory where she has usurped absolutely all power; she has forbidden the functions of all autonomous authorities; she has closed all schools, and has taken possession of all steamers, railways and telegraph lines, as a result of which the entire population is bitterly indignant. Italy is making it difficult to feed the people who are already economically drained.

In view of these actual conditions it is most likely that a bitter struggle might arise in many places which could develop into very great consequences.

763.72/12555: Telegram

[Document 248]

The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State

BELGRADE , December 14, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 17—10:09 p.m.]

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me today of Italian attitude, stating confidentially that to him personally complaints to Italy and seeming indifference to Yugo-Slav interests of Allies were inexplicable, and that while Serbia will do everything to restrain her troops and greatly irritated Dalmatian population an incident might occur at any moment involving the most far-reaching consequence. Italy seemed bent upon provoking such an incident with a view to alienating Serbia from her Allies. He referred, among other matters, especially to irritation caused by Yugo-Slav ships being obliged to fly Italian colors. They would willingly fly any other Allied flags.

Minister's expression may be considered representative of present prevailing opinion here.

Italian residents at Zara recently insulted British and Japanese flags, Italian officers present not interfering. Italian divisions Fiume reported increased to three.

DODGE

Edward M. House Papers

[Document 249]

Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour), December 15, 1918

December 15, 1918

I have been asked by Colonel House to make to you and to you alone the following communication.

The attitude of the President with regard to the dispute between the Yugo-Slavs and Italy will probably be as follows:—The United States of America were not a party to the Treaty of London of 1915 nor will they become a part of it. The President, Colonel House and experts are examining this Treaty in order to see how far their views, more especially as regards territorial cessions, can be assimilated to it. In the event of its being found, after such consideration, that the views of the United States Government do not coincide with the terms of that Treaty, a suggestion will be put forward by the President to the effect that, should it not be possible for the interested parties to come to an amicable arrangement, the territory in dispute should be neutralized under the guarantee of the Great Powers, [until such time as they might be able to agree].^{[26](#)}

^{[26](#)} Brackets on the original; the material within the brackets is in pencil.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/98

[Document 250]

The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

U. S. S. "GREGORY," FIUME , 15 December, 1918.

Subject: Report activities Eastern Adriatic.

1. Captain Gherardi, U. S. Navy, arrived on board on Tuesday, December 10, while the *Birmingham* was at Spalato, bringing certain verbal instructions and memorandum notes from Admiral Benson regarding policy to be followed by the United States Representative in Adriatic affairs.
2. *Stribling* left Spalato on Tuesday December 10, carrying the different representatives of the United States at Pola in connection with the terms of the Austro-Hungarian armistice. On receiving notice of her arrival, I was able to report that arrangements for executing the terms of the armistice on the part of the United States, as far as it related to former Austro-Hungarian Men of War, naval equipment, etc., were completed.
3. There being no further immediate need of my presence at Spalato, and desiring to get in closer touch with the Allied representatives of the Naval Committee for the Adriatic, I left Spalato in the *Birmingham* on Wednesday December 11 for Venice, arriving off harbor at daylight Thursday December 12. The weather was very foggy and entrance into the harbor could not be effected until late in afternoon. I found that the French Admiral Fatou, a member of the Naval Committee for the Adriatic was seriously ill and would have to go to a hospital. British Admiral Kiddle had left earlier in the week for Fiume. On Friday afternoon I received despatch from Admiral Sims appointing me United States representative on a commission to hold an inquiry and make a report to the Allied Governments showing clearly what is the existing situation, and

what measures it is necessary to take to watch against disagreement or trouble in any territory of the Adriatic occupied by, or to be occupied by, Allied Forces outside of those mentioned in Article 3 of the Austrian armistice terms, such as Corfu, Spalato, Fiume, etc. I was directed to report to senior representative of the commission without delay. Accordingly, at once made plans for going to Fiume where I was informed the Italian admiral was, as he was the Senior representative of the Commission. I left Venice at daylight Saturday December 14 in the *Gregory*, leaving the *Birmingham* at Venice as it was necessary she should coal. Captain Gherardi accompanied me, as it was my desire to retain him until the return of Captain Hussey, as the latter might bring further points on which uncertainty might exist, and Captain Gherardi could return with full information.

4. I had some time previously received word from the Admiral Cagni at Pola that new mine fields had been discovered in the ordinarily used route to Fiume, and therefore it was necessary to go to Pola to obtain a pilot and first hand information. Arrived at Pola at 11:30 a.m. and had conferences with Admiral Cagni and our senior representative Commander G. C. Logan. The latter reported that everything was progressing smoothly and he had every assistance offered him and courtesies shown by the Italian authorities. He reported that they had not started to make inventories as yet, but would soon begin. Left Pola at 1:30 with pilot and arrived at Fiume at sunset and made fast to wharf. I found the senior representative of the New Commission to be Rear Admiral Mola, temporarily quartered in an Italian Battleship and I reported to him in person. Rear Admiral Kiddle of the English Navy, the British representative, was quartered in an English Gunboat. I informed Admiral Mola of Admiral Fatou's illness and of his inability to attend any meeting until all four representatives were present, and telegraphed the Italian Naval Ministry with request to forward to French Naval Ministry to appoint another representative.
5. Rear Admiral Kiddle called on me and detailed the serious situation that had arisen involving the French and the Italians. The French had not recognized the right of the Naval Committee for the Adriatic to allow only Italian authorities to requisition Austro-Hungarian merchant ships, and accordingly the French representative, Commodore Dumesnil, acting under orders of the

French Commander in Chief, Admiral Gauchet, hoisted the French flag in six merchant ships and announced his intention of requisitioning them for the French navy. Meanwhile the Italians said if they put to sea without an escort and a safe passport issued by the Italian authorities they would be arrested for breaking the blockade. Admiral Kiddle appreciating the grave consequences of such an act persuaded the French Commodore to wait a reasonable time, explaining that the action of the Naval Committee of the Adriatic required the requisitioning by Italian authorities and the trade routes were to be determined by the Allied Maritime Transport Committee of London. In the meantime the French Commodore was called away hurriedly and while he was gone, a subordinate French officer was persuaded their projected course was not justified, and hauled down the French flags. Immediately the Italian authorities stepped in and removed four of the ships to Pola for requisitioning. On return of the French Commodore, who had received positive orders to hoist the French flag and take the ships to sea, he hoisted the French flag on the remaining two and one put to sea with a French representative on board, and was not molested, and announced his intention of sending the other one the next morning, Sunday December 15. The Italian authorities by this time, firmly believing in their right to arrest these ships, repeated their intentions to arrest this second ship if attempt was made to go to sea. Such were the conditions when I arrived on the scene. Admiral Kiddle suggested an informal meeting to discuss the affair and I attended, expecting to do what was within my power to prevent the Italians from carrying out their purpose of making this arrest. Fortunately, I had seen the Chief of Staff of Admiral Fatou in Venice just before sailing and he told me of a visit he made to Rome to see Admiral Revel, Chief of Staff of Italian Navy and President of the Naval Committee for the Adriatic, and how he had arranged that the French should requisition certain ships, fly the French flag, and have a French representative on board. This was quite at variance with the decision of the Naval Committee of the Adriatic, and changed in principle, the Committee's action without in any way informing the Committee or even the Italian Representatives themselves. Recognizing here was a way out of the difficulty, I presented the memorandum copy which I had obtained from the Chief of Staff to

Admiral Fatou, and as it had his signature the Italian representatives consented to receive it as an official document, and Admiral Kiddle and myself directed a letter to the Italian Admiral recommending that he play no part in carrying out the threatened arrest, and he accordingly informed the French Commodore that having received later information, the sailing of the ship would not be contested, and thus the incident passed without the probable grave consequences that might have accompanied it. I explained this condition in a despatch and explained that as the threatened state of affairs would take place in a few hours and I could not refer the matter further, requested approval of my action.

6. While at Pola I learned that orders had been given by the Italian C-in-C that certain persons would be deported from that place. I do not know where the authority comes for such an order, but apparently the Italians are proceeding on the assumption they are never to be moved. Their action certainly cannot be based on any terms of the Armistice. This might be a fruitful source of inquiry by the new Commission, but this Commission is barred from considering anything included in the area described in Article 3 of the Austrian Armistice terms. I made the report of this deportation in a special despatch, Adriatic Nine,^{[27](#)} and the full text of the proclamation is contained in a written report from the U. S. Naval Representative at Pola, copy of which is forwarded herewith together with other proclamations and information of interest collected there.^{[28](#)} This report came to me at Pola which explains the delay in forwarding. There are no means of sending mail between ships of my forces except by destroyers, and as their presence is needed as station ships and for communication purposes, mail communication is practically at a standstill.
7. Owing to the presence of so many ships at Fiume, the air is constantly filled with radio messages making the reception of messages sent from here extremely difficult, and an attempt is being made to arrange a sending schedule for ships of various Navies. There is a telegraph line from Fiume connecting with the lines of other countries, but at the best telegraph communication is bad and subject to severe delays ... Messages are repeated by radio whenever possible to the station ship at Venice, there to connect with the telegraph line, but the same conditions exist there and I

never feel confident that my despatches go through. Some despatches from London and Paris have taken five days.

8. I feel the need of a small ship to carry stores, supplies, etc., and act as general tender to the disarmed ships at Spalato, but have refrained from asking for a special government ship, hoping I could get one of the small Austrian coasting vessels now at Spalato. I have sent despatches concerning the same, both to London and Rome and trust to have some measure of success. This may involve the regular requisitioning of the ship, but I think there will be no complications in the details concerning this, as whatever expense is incurred will be well repaid by the services rendered. With only such boats that the destroyer station ship carries in addition to a few boats on the battleships, there is not much in the way of communication involving long distances or carrying capacity.
9. Conditions at Fiume are generally quiet with now and then a local outbreak due to temper or exasperation on the part of the populace. It has the air of a purely Italian permanent occupation, and Italian flags fly everywhere and I was informed that there was a soldier wherever an Italian flag was flying to see that it was not disturbed. There are constant forms of different propaganda: parades with flags flying, the issuing of a special class of literature, and public utterances. There are only a few Jugo-Slav flags seen. Nearly every person wears some sort of a national emblem to show his nationality and sympathies. Sometimes this leads to street fighting among the disorderly element. I understand an Italian governor has been appointed and most of the business of the city is in the hands of the Italians. Wherever they have entered along the Adriatic, they have entered in force and entrenched themselves in every possible way. There seems thousands of Italian troops, certainly 12,000 and soldiers are met everywhere. There is also a battalion of English soldiers and a battalion of American soldiers. I saw a French General on shore but no troops. Later learned there was one battalion. The condition here will be thoroughly examined into by the new Commission. I saw the Commanding Officer of the American Forces, Colonel Wallace, and he said he expected to call on me. The American Officers are quartered in an Austrian-Hungarian steamer and have every comfort and even luxury. It is the part of the Italians to keep them under obligation in every way. I have repeatedly expressed the opinion there was no necessity for

troops in this city, as I could not see it was provided for in the Armistice, except in the general clause which allows troops to be landed to quell disorder and preserve peace, but this does not require the landing of thousands of troops as the Italians have done. Without definite instructions I shall use my best endeavors in persuading my colleagues that if any troops are needed at all, they should be but a small representation, certainly not more than a battalion, and trust this may meet with approval. The fact that the French wish to make this a port for evacuation of troops from the interior and from the east, and that supplies will be forwarded from here to the permanent Army of Occupation will probably lead them to wish for a much larger force.

10. The *Leonidas*, *Mazont*, fuel ship, and chasers have left for Corfu. One unit of these boats had arrived in Greece and another was on its way.

W. H. G. BULLARD

²⁷ Not found in Department files.

²⁸ No enclosures with file copy of this document.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99

[Document 251]

***The Commander of United States Naval Forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral
W. S. Benson***

U. S. S. "GREGORY," FIUME , 16 December, 1918.

Subject: Report of Events in Eastern Adriatic.

.....

2. The more I see and study conditions at Fiume the more incomprehensible they seem. Italy has virtually taken possession of this city and to my mind without the slightest justification. I enclose a clipping from a note which I received from the Italian Lieutenant General²⁹ who is acting as governor "Commanding inter-Allied Corps of Occupation of Fiume". These incidents may be entirely without [my?] jurisdiction, but think they should be brought to your attention. I have never been informed there was an Allied International Occupation of Fiume, though to be sure there are troops of all Allies here and he is the senior. Twelve thousand Italian troops, and a battalion of American troops may compose an Inter-Allied army, but it looks to me as though it was a real Italian Army. Certainly our Senior Army officer has no independent command, his force constitutes a constituent part of the Italian Army, just as much now as it did on the Piave, and he has had no different orders since that time. I had some information tonight, though not yet confirmed, that the Italian authorities had consented to the use of this port by the French for a base for their troops, both of evacuation and to supply stores for the army remaining inland. I do not know where the Italians got the power to give permission to anybody and this is given as an illustration of their complete dominance, and acceptance of authority. I took a long ride today into the interior to visit some

small neighborhood towns, and I was greatly surprised to see the extent to which the Italian domination extends in and near the city, but in the country hardly any but Jugo-Slav or Serbian flags were seen and I believe the country population are strongly Slavic. As soon as we were recognized as Americans every attention was paid us and every courtesy shown, and politeness and respect was the rule everywhere. A battalion of Serbians are in barracks just outside the city to look after the interests of their expected new country and port, but their force is so small it is lost in the complete domination of the Italians. I cannot describe the situation but one of complete occupation and domination, and Fiume appears almost as an Italian city as Venice or any other city in Italy. Coercion is practiced and the real Slav supporters are afraid to exhibit their flags, while the Italians put up flags everywhere and put a soldier on guard over them and resort to all kinds of propaganda. At the so-called Palace where the Governor resides, “Mayor”, I believe, is the real term, an immense Italian flag floats over it in a high conspicuous place, while over the balcony float all other Allied flags in a horizontal row on the same level, and they had the look of being exposed for decorative purposes—rather than one of nationality.

3. Colonel Wallace, U. S. Army, called on me today and after his visit I sent you despatch Adriatic 16.³⁰ I asked him where his troops were quartered, and being told, remarked that I had seen no flag to mark their nationality and he reported it was not flying. I suggested and advised that it should fly where his troops were, as I believe it to be axiomatic that [where] our troops are there also should be our flag.
4. Adriatic 17³⁰ was prepared with the idea of testing the direct telegraphic communication to [*from?*] this port to Paris. If it is successful it will not be necessary to keep a destroyer at Venice for communication purposes and the services of this destroyer are needed elsewhere for messenger and mail service.
5. The *Birmingham* was to have left Venice today for Fiume but her sailing was delayed by fog. There is a great deal of fog on the Italian side of the Adriatic at this time of year, but on the eastern side the weather is ideal.

6. Adriatic 18^{[30](#)} was based on a report received from the *Leonidas* reporting arrival at Curzola on way to Corfu with chasers. The critical conditions spoken of, I do not know of, but will eventually get a report.
7. I am afraid this is going to be a week of inactivity as nothing can be done towards a meeting of the committee of inquiry until the return of Commodore Dumesnil from Corfu, to which place he went for instructions. What the character of these instructions will be I have no means of knowing, but the instructions of the English Admiral and mine are identical and contain no details whatsoever, and I believe none are necessary. I shall keep you informed by despatches of all developments.

W. H. G. BULLARD

^{[29](#)} No enclosures with file copy of this document.

^{[30](#)} Not found in Department files.

^{[30](#)} Not found in Department files.

^{[30](#)} Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/105: Telegram

[Document 252]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 17, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 19—10:30 a.m.]

40. Following from Italian Embassy December 11th:

“The Commander of the Italian forces in Dalmatia has received, on November 21st ultimo, a telegram from the provincial government of Zagabria asking that the orders of the Italian command to the local authorities be imparted through the central committee of Zagabria. In this telegram the provincial government also protested against Admiral Millo having prevented officials residing in the territory occupied by the Italians, to take the oath of allegiance to Yugoslavia. To this protest Admiral Millo replied that while he, according to the terms of the Armistice, has control of the local authorities, no reference is made in the Armistice to other authorities residing beyond the territory of occupation. He could not grant the request made him but had to continue in dealing only with the local authorities. It is also reported that the same committee has forced officials in Spalato to take the allegiance oath, justifying such action with the authority derived by the fact that it was recognized by the powers. Magistrates and other employees of Italian nationality who, deferring to the decisions of the Peace Conference, refused until then to submit to take the oath, have been because of this resistance declared deposed and a disadvantageous settlement of their rights to pensions has been imposed upon them. It is expected that arbitrary measures of the same kind will be taken against local officials of other classes. Your Excellency cannot fail to see the illegality of such actions on

the part of the Jugo-Slav Committee which cannot, not even when it is question of zones lying beyond the line of Armistice, perform acts in contrast with the manifest situation there existent as Spalato is occupied by the Allies and America. It behooves the Associated Governments to cause a conduct to prevail there based on the principle that the occupying military authority has not the right (excepting for all essential exigencies of military character or of public order) to consent to any modification to the instructions and laws in force. While asking me to bring what precedes to Your Excellency's knowledge the Royal Government expresses the desire that instructions inspired by the same principles be also imparted by the United States Government to their military and naval authorities in the Adriatic."

Italian Chargé d'Affaires added orally that French officer in command at Albania had reported that Italian delegates had been called to establish government, and intimated that the Italians were parties to it. The Italians said they had never called such a meeting and feared trouble would result. Baron Sonnino was anxious the United States should know they were not at fault in case of trouble. Chargé also said there was trouble in Southern Albania. He wanted to know what we knew about the Serbs occupying Banat. He was informed that all those questions should be settled in Paris.

POLK

763.72/12565

[Document 253]

***The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Acting
Secretary of State*** [31](#)

No. 243

WASHINGTON , December 18, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by the Serbian Government to bring to your attention the following:

The Italian Army is occupying places in Kranjska which is in disregard of the demarkation line included in the armistice. The Treaty of London specifically states that the line follows the water boundaries between the River Save and the Adriatic Sea, but, in contravention of this stipulation in the Treaty, the Italians are occupying St. Peter, Adelsberg and the Mountain Loitch [*Ober-Loitsch?*], which are all within the boundaries of the rivers tributary to the River Save. Moreover, the Italian Army is in possession of four kilometres of territory in the region of Vrhinke [*Vrhnika*] (Ober-Laibach) which is also contrary to the demarkation line.

These facts are creating antagonism among the inhabitants directly interested in the territory usurped by the Italians, but they are patiently submitting to the injustice, believing that through the intervention of the great powers their just demands will eventually be righted.

In bringing the above to your knowledge the Serbian Government anticipates that the United States Government will endeavor to persuade the Italian Government to instruct its army to keep within the limits prescribed in the armistice.

Please accept [etc.]

Y. SIMITCH

³¹ Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 90, Dec. 21, 1918, with added sentence: "Chargé informed matter has been referred to you."

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[Document 254]

***The Commander of United States Naval Forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral
W. S. Benson***

DECEMBER 19, 1918.

Adriatic 23. I have received a long memorandum from the Committee of the National Jugo-Slav Council of Fiume-Susak setting forth the history of the administration of Fiume, events concerned with the occupation by Italians, reciting the wrongs done, the general oppression practiced by the usurpers, the Italians, and generally a statement of their grievances supported by affidavits. They protest against the occupation on the part of Italy, first because it has aspirations for territory inhabited by Slavs which forms an ethnographical integral part of Jugoslavia and which declared itself on the 29th of October 1918 held by its National SHS Committee, allied to the Entente and to the United States of America. Second, because it was altogether superfluous since nowhere after the downfall of Austria-Hungary was there any disorder or tumult and which was due afterwards only to the occupation. Third, because it does not seem to have for its aims the maintenance of order, but rather the oppression of the Jugo-Slav population in favor of the Italian aspiration over our [*their?*] territories. Fourth, because it represents a grave peril for our [*their?*] national welfare.

They pray first, that the Jugo-Slav element in the occupied territories be protected by the removing of the Italian troops, replacing them by troops of other powers of the Allies and the United States, or at least reducing their contingent to a minimum and confiding the supreme command in the hands of another power, so that at least the Jugo-Slav might enjoy the same rights and liberty as the Italianophiles. Second, to avoid the exportation and confiscation of wheat and food in general, which belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Army and Navy,

and which are absolutely necessary for the feeding of the city, and thus prevent the threatening famine. Third, to limit the occupation ordered by the Allies and the United States, if such must be maintained, only to military measures and to replace the officers of the governing political administrative offices to the legal Jugo-Slav authorities.

BULLARD

763.72119/3515

[Document 255]

***The President of the Italian National Council of
Fiume (Grossich) to the Acting Secretary of State***

No. 314

FIUME , December 21, 1918.
[Received January 25, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to confirm our telegram of December 19,
stating as follows:

“The Italian National Council has been informed by the
interallied headquarters in Fiume that a part of the harbour of
this town with its buildings is seized by the French
Government to make a base for supplying the Eastern Army.

Fiume was in the past a free town and is now an independent
state and, therefore, has to protest against such an act which
is considered as a breach of its sovereign powers.

The town protests against this arbitrary occupation, also
because it fears that Servians and Jugoslaves troops,
belonging to those Governments which, by violence, had taken
possession and had been running Fiume without any right
and at present would like to annex it, should consider
themselves as authorized to enter into the town.

At the same time the town of Fiume, whose Italian population
has always shown a friendly attitude towards the Entente,
declares itself not only ready but delighted to facilitate and if
necessary to take over the supply services for the Eastern
Army. This declaration has been already made to the
representatives of the French Army in Fiume who have taken
it into consideration and who have signed a protocol
concerning the disembarking, storage and transmission of the
goods to the Eastern Army.

The above reported decisions which have not been communicated to this National Council, which is running the town, are in contradiction with those signed in the said protocol by the French authorities.

The National Council in name of the town and district of Fiume begs you to examine its right claim and would highly appreciate if you would communicate with the allied governments to which we have already submitted this claim, in order that the sacred rights of this free town may be safeguarded and in this case to have the concessions made to France annulled and to have this National Council, as government running the town, entrusted with the supply services for the Eastern Army,["]

I have [etc.]

The President of Fiume's National Council
ANT. GROSSICH

Paris Peace Conf. 811.22/1

[Document 256]

General Tasker H. Bliss to President Wilson 33

PARIS , December 23, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At the request of the American Peace Commission, I submit the following for your consideration:

The Commission held a meeting today at 12:30 o'clock, in the apartments of Admiral Benson, for the purpose of hearing a statement presented by Captain Gherardi, United States Navy, of the present conditions on the east coast of the Adriatic. Captain Gherardi has just returned from that quarter, having been sent there to investigate these conditions.

I do not now refer to these conditions in general, but only to those which concern, and which to some extent have been brought about by, the use of the small force of American troops serving with the Italian Army.

It is the unanimous opinion of the American Peace Commission that Captain Gherardi's statement of facts as observed by him indicates that the American troops are being used to further a policy of occupation and penetration which, if not contrary to the terms of the armistice with Austria-Hungary, is at least unnecessary under that armistice. In one case, an attempt was made to use a small American force to effect, without any apparent justifiable reason, a penetration into Montenegro.

In general, it seems that the policy governing the use of this regiment has been to ensure the scattering of it so that at no time does it come, as a unit, under the control of its commander who is the only experienced officer with it. The result appears to be that the regiment is being employed not for legitimate military purposes but to further

political aims. And this, almost of necessity ensues from having a small force entirely separated from the control of its Supreme Command.

I have already stated to you my reasons for thinking that it would not be well, at this late stage in the operations under the armistice to entirely withdraw this American regiment. But the American Peace Commission thinks that you may find it desirable to authorize it to draw up certain general rules to govern the use of this regiment (without, of course, the slightest interference with its command or administration), to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France and transmitted by him to the Commander of the American regiment in Italy for his general guidance during the armistice. These rules would be transmitted to the regimental commander through the American general who is our Liaison Officer in Italy and who would effect a general understanding on the subject with the Italian authorities.

Very respectfully,

TASKER H. BLISS

³³ This paper bears the notation: "Approved WOODROW WILSON".

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/108: Telegram

[Document 257]

***The Commander of United States Naval Forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral
W. S. Benson***

FIUME , December 23, 1918.

Adriatic 30. Unpleasant incident occurred at Spalato between Italian destroyer Carabinieri and Slav population. Leading Jugo-Slav citizens and Serbian officers prevented disorder. Have reports which will communicate to Italian Admiral at Sebenico. Entirely local and no further consequences expected but is typical of feeling between two nations.

First meeting Naval Inquiry Committee December 22.

BULLARD

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[Document 258]

The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

[Paraphrase]

DECEMBER 25, 1918.

Adriatic 34. The French General Tranié and the Italian Lieutenant-General Grazioli were before Commission today and explained at length the situation and conditions at Fiume in response to questioning. Prefacing his answers to questions furnished him yesterday, General Grazioli made remarks in which he took exception to the questions furnished him by the Commission to answer. In support of the contention he referred to a copy of the order he received in which he states the Commission was limited to investigation of actual conditions in Fiume and not to what had transpired heretofore. He commented at length at the same time upon immediate action being taken in regard to establishment of a French base in Fiume. General Grazioli was informed by the Commission that the scope of their investigation under their orders was a matter to be decided by the commissioners and requested that he answer the questions with which he had been furnished yesterday. The following important points were brought out in reply to the nine sets of questions and various others by the different members of the Commission. General Marzano was relieved as Commander of the Allied troops in Fiume on December 1st, 1918, by General Grazioli under order of the Italian Supreme Army Command which was not at present to be made known to the Commission except by permission of the higher authorities. These orders, however, contained nothing political and were simply to suppress disorder. General Grazioli stated that his only knowledge of the reason for

sending General Marzano, his predecessor, to Fiume, was from reports from distinguished residents of disorders and hidden arms, and particularly to prevent a coup by Austrians, Serbians, and Croats, whom they feared might take Fiume. The British, Americans, and Italians have sent detachments to the Allied forces, but the French detachment, which belongs to the Eastern Army, are under the French General Tranié, and recognized him as Commanding Officer General at Fiume, but he had not presented any instructions. By a map General Grazioli indicated the limits of Fiume which General Diaz had directed him to hold, and orders from General Diaz would be required to reduce these limits or to reduce the number of troops by a single man. These limits are roughly 12 kilometers around Fiume. Beyond these bounds there is no limit to the distance which the forces under his command could go, even to Budapest. A copy of this map would be furnished to the Commission, he states, also a memorandum showing the disposition of the forces under his command and their station. The boundaries between the area to be assigned for operation of the Eastern Army and of the Inter-Allied forces in Fiume were also settled by General Grazioli. General Grazioli states that the same mayor was in office and that the local government was of the same character as previous to the occupation. He states that Fiume is not under martial law, and that he did not meddle with the Civil Government, which is Italian, and superseded the Croatian Council. The nine sets of questions were very fully answered by General Tranié without reservation. He stated that he received orders to establish a military base at Fiume under the terms of Clause Four of the Armistice, which gave the Allies that right, which orders he received from the Commander-in-Chief French Army of the Orient. He explained that he found the city in Italian control and that every obstacle was put in the way of establishing a base, and that he was placed in a position of being obliged to beg for everything from the Italian National Council. He did not consider himself under the orders of General Grazioli or part of the Allied troops occupying Fiume. He must make necessary arrangements with the municipal government for the use of a telegraph line to Zagabria, and also to get trains to move his troops, The railroads are controlled by Italians through a civilian commission with an army officer at the head, but for a distance of about 12 miles only, where the Jugo-Slavs take charge. Houses for his troops or combatants

cannot be obtained by him, and every obstacle is placed in his way. A very much smaller number of Italian troops would be sufficient, he states, to preserve order, and he suggested that a small force composed of troops from each nation be commanded by a General who had no special interest, and suggested either British or American. The entry of Fiume by land by Italian soldiers immediately after word was given by the Italian Admiral that no Italian troops should be landed for three days was described by General Tranié. The base question causes very strained relations between the French and the Italians.

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[Document 259]

The Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral W. S. Benson

VENICE [undated].

Adriatic 36. English General Gordon before naval committee forenoon December 24th, his general statement:

“No disorder before landing Italian troops but immediately after flags and shop signs torn down and great excitement among people due to landing such large number of troops. Strong protest against landing was made by British and French naval officers and landing was effected by breach of faith on the part of Italy. Overwhelming number of Italian troops shape policy, Italians appointed civil government and giving impulse to propaganda that leads to grave results and situation is now tense. Italian population feel protected while Jugo-Slavs feel abandoned and depressed. Troops necessary to preserve order, not more than four battalions, possibly one of each of Allies and United States. Consider existing Italian municipal government better than former Jugo-Slav government because latter had not time to get affairs working before it was harassed by Italy. Fiume absolutely necessary for French base, no other place so available or convenient, but should not be more than 5,000 troops at one time in addition to those already present. Had knowledge of disorder only after arrival at Italy”.

Lieutenant-Colonel Everson before committee:

“Italy had complete control of town when Americans arrived 19 November. No hospitality shown them on arrival and

impression was formed that at least civilian population did not want them. Fiume had every appearance of being occupied by Italians and not by Allies. Never received orders from his senior officer that his force formed part of Allied forces. Considered his force part of Italian army, though always representing American interests. Too many troops here and conditions much better if Italian troops were reduced more to those of other nations. Only called in conference once. Knew little of municipal government affairs, could not obtain information except by conferring with other government officials.”

BULLARD

763.72/12649

[Document 260]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

No. 6889

PARIS , December 26, 1918.
[Received January 9, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose, in copy and translation, a protest addressed by the Yougo-Slav Assembly to the Allied Powers against the occupation by the Italian naval forces of certain territory claimed by the Yougoslav nation.

Copies of this protest have been forwarded to Colonel House's mission.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Yougoslav Assembly to the Allied Powers and the United States

The Yougoslav Assembly, met at Paris, under the Presidency of Mr. Jean Zujovic, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia, comprising all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovaks, without distinction as to regions or parties, solemnly and energetically protests to the Allied Powers against the occupation by the Italian naval forces of the Adriatic ports of Fiume and Zara, the islands of Curzola, Lissa, Lagosta, or any other territory belonging to the Yougoslav nation.

It considers that this occupation constitutes a flagrant violation of articles 3, 4, 6 and 8 of the Armistice of October 31st which order the occupation “by the Allied Forces and the United States of America”, of the territories evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

It deplores, at the same time, that the territories in question, forming an integral part of the Yougoslav national patrimony, were in the Armistice Treaty considered as enemy territories subject to a foreign military occupation, contrary to the spirit of the declaration of President Wilson as of October 18th who recognized in the most complete manner the justness of the national aspirations of the Yougoslavs for liberty.

Imbued with faith in the wisdom and in the democratic spirit of the powerful allies, and of the United States of America, the Yougoslav Assembly solicits, in conformity with the declaration of responsible statesmen of the Entente and of the United States of America, the recognition of the Serbo-Yougoslav Government, as well as the imprescriptible rights of the Yougoslav nation in the whole of the territories which, according to the terms of the Declaration of Corfu, appertain to the national Yougoslav patrimony.

In case of conflict with the Italian Government on the subject of the delimitation of frontier territories, the Assembly deems that there is need of a liberally organized plebiscite in the contested territories.

Finally, the Assembly makes appeal to the sentiments of justice of the Italian democracy for the cessation of a state of affairs incompatible with its traditions and with the principle of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves.

Paris, November 13, 1918.

The President of the Assembly
IVAN M. ZUJOVIC

The Rapporteur
L. DE VOINOITEL

Paris Peace Conf. 123–Bennington/1: Telegram

[Document 261]

***The Commander of United States Naval Forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral
W. S. Benson***

DECEMBER 26, 1918.

Adriatic 38. Naval committee reconvened today. Conditions reached a stage where all the committee except the Italian Admiral wished to call persons who could tell of conditions preceding and during the occupation of Fiume, so as to form correct idea of actual existing conditions. Italian Admiral Mola insisted his instructions would not permit this and requested time to consult his Government. This means more delay but agreed to in interests of harmony.

.....

BULLARD

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/109: Telegram

[Document 262]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

ROME , December 27, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 28—9 a.m.]

33. Following received from Chief of American Military Mission Padua for transmission to American Mission Paris:

“Relative to your despatch of December 22nd General Badoglio’s infraction [*injunction?*] that at Goritzia and points similarly located within Armistice bounds displays of flags other than of four Allied Nations participating in occupation here prohibited. Nothing known of incidents of reported hauling down and trampling on Slovenian flags in mind [*mud?*]. In Fiume and similar places outside of Armistice boundary no prohibition on display of flags is ordered. No definite knowledge obtainable to substantiate charge that Italian soldiers are forcing departure of inhabitants of occupied territory by curtailing sources of food supply. Rest of telegram to follow later.”

NELSON PAGE

[undated] [Received December 30.]

33–A.³⁴ “Occupied territory however is believed heavily garrisoned by Italian soldiers. Reported action Antonio Grossich may be possibly in a measure correct. Will report results further inquiries. Signed Treat.”

NELSON PAGE

34 Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/112.

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/99: Telegram

[Document 263]

***The Commander of United States Naval Forces in
the Eastern Mediterranean (Bullard) to Admiral
W. S. Benson***

FIUME , December 29, 1918.

Adriatic 42. No meeting naval authorities today. Today officials visited outlying districts to question natives and lead men. Their testimony is there is no trouble with troops but they are not needed or desirable and should go away. No schools for children because school houses are needed to house soldiers. Some towns do not get food sent from Zagabria because Italians requisition it for their own use. No further report of complications along coast.

[BULLARD]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/144: Telegram

[Document 264]

The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

BELGRADE , December 31, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received January 2, 1919—2:25 p.m.]

Please communicate to Secretary of State and repeat to the Department:

Servian Chief of Staff states about 4,000 Italian troops advancing along railway about 20 miles from Buxtadtra [?] were resisted by the population. Troops attacked using artillery. Small Servian detachment near-by withdrawn according to orders sent to Commander second Servian Army to avoid conflict. Chief of the Staff urgently requests General d'Esperey and British Military Attaché to prevent further Italian advance into [Jugo-Slavia] in order to avoid undesirable consequences.

Italians landing and resulting popular conflict reported Spalato.

These and other provocative incidents, the intriguing against Servia, of Italy, in Bulgaria and Albania, stated by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to be proved beyond doubt, and the recent occupation interior points Montenegro by the Allies, with Italian preponderance according to the Allies' decision, added to [garbled group] agitations believed to be incited by Italy that Servia must evacuate Banat in view of 1916 treaty, considered to be invalidated by Servia, have produced utmost depression and anxiety. Prince Regent deeply depressed at the seeming indifference of Allies and unaccountable compliance with all Italian desires. Chief of the Staff states that Army, although perhaps not the people, can be counted upon to obey orders to avoid conflict although its patience not inexhaustible after long hardships suffered and recent magnificent advance.

In Montenegro, reported entirely quiet before occupation, a great popular meeting, including partisans Bang Nicholas, protested Italian occupation. Proposed French-Servian joint occupation Banat is preferred to Servian evacuation.

Situation critical, and growing opinion that the United States and the Allies [indifferent] is most unfortunate. Even if conflict can be avoided at present by restraining Italy, granting to Italy substantial portions Dalmatia or Montenegro would certainly create seed-bed future conflict.

Foregoing communicated through the Paris Embassy to Secretary of State.

DODGE

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/144

[Document 265]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS , January 6, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: May we respectfully request the favor of an expression of your views regarding the matters touched upon in the enclosed copy of an urgent and confidential telegram from the American Charge d’Affaires at Belgrade^{[35](#)} reporting concerning alleged acts of intrigue and aggression by Italy against Serbia and her interests.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

^{[35](#)} *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/155

[Document 266]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 9 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This communication^{[36](#)} concerns matters unhappily accumulating with which I confess I do not know how to deal. It occurs to me that it might be wise for you to call the attention of Baron Sonnino, now that he is in Paris, to these particular statements, and then as a next step confer with the representatives of others whom he may think are involved.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[36](#)} Telegram of Dec. 31, 1918, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in Serbia, p. 344 [*Pg. 344 includes portions of [Doc. 263](#) and [Doc. 264](#)*], concerning: which Secretary Lansing had written to President Wilson, Jan. 6, 1919, *supra*.

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 267]

The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] January 9, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Serbian Minister here has notified to my Gov^t that a Delegation of the National Council at Agram, representing the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene countries, of former Austria-Hungary, have proclaimed the union of the said countries with the realm of Serbia; which the Regent thereof has assented far.

A Montenegrin delegation has also notified to the same Regent the deposition of King Nicholas and his dynasty, and proclaimed the union of their country with Serbia; which has, in the same way, been accepted. A unique Gov^t for all has been formed on Dec. 21.

My Gov^t is willing to recognise the new State, if the Amⁿ, British and Italian Gov^{ts} are desirous to do the same. I am asked therefore to inquire what are your intentions.

In case the 4 Gov^{ts} were not in complete agreement, the best w^d of course be to let the peace conference decide.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 268]

The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] January 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wrote to you the other day,³⁷ concerning a possible recognition of the new Serbian-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom, in case the 4 Powers chiefly interested agreed as to this.

The British and Italian Gov^{ts} prefer that the question be settled by the Peace Conference. We have no objection.

My Gov^t considers that an answer of some sort sh^d be made however to the Serbian note, which answer might be something like this:

“The Allied Gov^{ts} having taken knowledge of the notification made to them of the union under the Karageorgevitch dynasty of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, must specify to the Serbian Gov^t that they can not recognise a political transformation realised on the eve of the Congress of Peace, which is alone qualified to decide on the definitive attribution (fate) of territories and the constitution of new states, taking into acc^t both the general situation and the wishes of the populations.”

Would that meet your approval.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

37 *Supra.*

Montenegro

[\[269\] The Ambassador in France \(Sharp \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 21, 1918—9 p.m. [Received November 22—1:56 a.m.]

873.00/25: Telegram

[\[270\] The Ambassador in France \(Sharp \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 22, 1918—9 p.m. [Received 2:22 p.m.(?)]

763.72119/2743: Telegram

[\[271\] The Ambassador in France \(Sharp \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 27, 1918—11 p.m. [Received November 27—11:08 p.m.]

873.00/26: Telegram

[\[272\] The Montenegrin Minister \(Gvosdenovitch \) to the Assistant Secretary of State \(Phillips \)](#)

Washington , December 4, 1918.

873.00/28

[273] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)

Washington , December 4, 1918—8 p.m.

873.00/29a: Telegram

[274] Manifesto of the National Executive Committee of Montenegro Directed to the Government of the United States

Podgorica , November 24/December 7, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/6

[275] The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

[Washington ,] December 7, 1918.

873.00/45

[276] The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

[Washington ,] December 7, 1918.

873.00/46

[277] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Rome , December 9, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/1: Telegram

[278] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State

Pontarlier (Berne), December 12, 1918—10 a.m. [Received December 13—9:45 p.m.]

873.00/29: Telegram

[279] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 13, 1918—6 p.m. [Received 9:11 p.m.]

873.00/30: Telegram

[280] The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State

Belgrade , December 18, 1918. [Received February 19, 1919.]

873.00/64

[281] The Secretary of the Montenegrin Legation (Matanovitch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 24, 1918.

873.00/33

[282] The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss).

Neuilly-sur-Seine , December 28, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/8

[283] The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/4

[284] The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss).

Neuilly-sur-Seine , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/5

[285] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , January 4, 1919.

873.00/63

[286] King Nicholas I of Montenegro to President Wilson

Paris , January 7, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[\[287\] The Ambassador in Italy \(Page \) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Rome , January 7, 1919—6 p.m. [Received January 9—3:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/13: Telegram

[\[288\] The Ambassador in Italy \(Page \) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Rome , January 8, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 9—11 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/14: Telegram

[\[289\] The Ambassador in Italy \(Page \) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Rome , January 9, 1919—1 p.m. [Received January 10—12:10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/15: Telegram

[\[290\] President Wilson to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , 9 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[\[291\] President Wilson to King Nicholas I of Montenegro](#)

Paris , 9 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[292] Manifesto of Certain Montenegrins Resident in France Directed to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)

Paris , January 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/16

[293] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Paris , 11 January, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

[294] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris , 13 January, 1919.

Robert Lansing Tapers

[295] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 13, 1919—6 p.m.

873.00/41: Telegram

[296] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome , January 14, 1919—11 p.m. [Received January 15—2:15 p.m.]

873.00/42: Telegram

[297] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 24, 1919—12 midnight.

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/18: Telegram

873.00/25: Telegram

[Document 269]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 21, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received November 22—1:56 a.m.]

5958. A letter has been received by the Embassy from Radovitch, President of the Montenegrin Committee for National Union, Ex-Premier of Montenegro, violently attacking King Nicholas and the present Montenegrin Government. He states in substance that King Nicholas has acted the part of traitor to his country; that he has been abandoned by his people and that he no longer represents their will. Copy of this note being forwarded by pouch.^{[1](#)}

SHARP

^{[1](#)} Not printed.

763.72119/2743: Telegram

[Document 270]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 22, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received 2:22 p.m.(?)]

5970. The Montenegrin Government has addressed to me another note complaining against the action of Serbia in sending into Montenegro irregular bands which it alleges are massacring the inhabitants. It states also that Serbia is planning to absorb Montenegro against the wish of the Montenegrin people. Copy of note follows in pouch.^{[1](#)}

SHARP

^{[1](#)} Not printed.

873.00/26: Telegram

[Document 271]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 27, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 27—11:08 p.m.]

The Montenegrin Government of His Majesty writes me under date of November 25th that meeting of Menaces [*Montenegrins*] has taken place at Podgoritza to discuss the question of the relations between Montenegro and Jugo-Slavia. The note states further that a General of the Servian Army has been nominated commander of Cettigne, and again complains that Serbia is endeavoring to penetrate and absorb Montenegro in divers ways. Copy of note follows next pouch.^{[3](#)}

SHARP

^{[3](#)} Not printed.

873.00/28

[Document 272]

***The Montenegrin Minister (Gvosdenovitch) to the
Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)***

[Translation]

No. 124

WASHINGTON , December 4, 1918.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith to you a copy of a dispatch which I have just received from my Government.

Accept [etc.]

GENERAL A. GVOSDENOVITCH

[Enclosure—Translation]

***The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the
Montenegrin Minister (Gvosdenovitch)***

Cablegram:

“Your telegram of December 2, at hand.

Report from Germany that the Skoupchtina (National Assembly) assembled at Podgoritza, deposed the Bang and dynasty and voted that Montenegro and Serbia be under the sceptre of King Peter, is groundless.”

The Government adds in the telegram: “Under the Montenegrin Constitution the National Parliament, whose members are elected by the people, has the sole right of making decisions with regard to the

sovereignty of the state and dynasty. From the constitutional standpoint Skoupchtina is non-existent as many deputies are still confined in Austrian jails and others are in allied or neutral countries. The parliament cannot possibly be convened at present. Adversaries of Montenegro are endeavoring to spread ill intended reports for the purpose of injuring the vital interests of the country and paralyze its role at the Peace Conference.”

MINISTER CHOTCH

873.00/29a: Telegram

[Document 273]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in
Switzerland (Stovall)***

WASHINGTON , December 4, 1918—8 p.m.

3447. Press reports originating in Vienna indicate that the King of Montenegro has been deposed and succeeded by the National Assembly, meeting at Podgoritza. The Montenegrin Minister has communicated to the Department an official despatch from his Government,⁴ stating that such reports had no foundation whatsoever. Please investigate and report facts immediately.

POLK

⁴ *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/6

[Document 274]

***Manifesto of the National Executive Committee of
Montenegro Directed to the Government of the
United States*** [5](#)

[Translation]

No. 149

PODGORICA , November 24/December 7, 1918.

The National Executive Committee of Montenegro, elected by the Great National Assembly of the Servian people in Montenegro in its sitting of November 13/26, of this year, and invested with the Sovereign Power of the People of Montenegro, begs to communicate to the Government of the United States the two following resolutions adopted by the Great Servian National Assembly of Montenegro:

First, it was resolved at the sitting of the Great National Assembly of November 13/26, this year, that: Nikolas I Petrovitch Njegoch, King of Montenegro, and his Dynasty are dethroned forever from the Throne of Montenegro and that the Union of Montenegro and Servia under King Petar I Karadjordjevic is proclaimed.

Second, it was resolved at the sitting of the Great National Assembly of November 16/29, this year, that: all goods in Montenegro owned by Ex-king Nikolas and by his Dynasty are confiscated to the benefit of the Servian people in Montenegro, and finally Ex-King Nikolas and his Dynasty are forbidden forever to enter our country.

In communicating these two resolutions of the Great Servian National Assembly to the Government of the United States, the National Executive Committee of Montenegro, in the name of the Servian people of Montenegro, extends its cordial thanks to the Government of the United States for having undertaken the gigantic

struggle for the destruction of usurpatory and aggressive aspirations, and for causing the subdued nations to spring up from the ruins of their usurpers and, according to the principles proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, to freely determine and shake off the yoke not only of the usurpers of the power but also of the tyrants within the country. In the spirit of these high principles, the Great National Assembly of the Servian people in Montenegro has dethroned King Nikolas and his dynasty and proclaimed the Union of Montenegro and Servia into one country under King Petar I Karadjordjevic, thus constituting the Union of Servians, Croats and Slovenes under one Government.

The National Executive Committee of Montenegro

Members: **STEVO VOUKOTITCH**

MARKO DAKOVITCH

SPASOJE PILETITCH

LAZAR DAMJANOVITCH

RISTO JOITCH

[5](#) Entrusted by the Executive Committee to the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 332d Infantry, U. S. Army, at Cattaro, for delivery to the representative of the United States at Paris.

873.00/45

[Document 275]

The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

[WASHINGTON ,] December 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY: I beg to submit herewith the enclosed copy of a cablegram, which has been officially forwarded to the undersigned, concerning the proclamation of the union of Montenegro with the Kingdom of Serbia.

Please accept [etc.]

Y. SIMITCH

[Enclosure]

Copy of the Telegram Forwarded by the Serbian Legation to the Department of State

Great National Shupsltina assembled at Podgoritza of Serbian people in Montenegro, on its own sitting of to-day, considering political, economical interests of Montenegro,

Resolved, first—That the King Nichola Peborich Njegus be deposed from the throne of Montenegro;

Second—That Montenegro be under the Dynasty of Karageorgevitch, and, united, enter into a common State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes;

Third—That a special National Council be elected, which shall direct the work for the union of Serbia and Montenegro until the union shall have been accomplished;

Fourth—That this resolution be communicated to the former
Bang Nichola, to the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia,
the friendly entente powers and all neutral states.

Resolution was adopted unanimously by individual voting.

The people received the news of this resolution with great
enthusiasm and believe in their future.

Solemn Mass and national festivities arranged for tomorrow in
celebration of the Union.

GENERAL PECHITCH

873.00/46

[Document 276]

The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)

[WASHINGTON ,] December 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Permit me to bring to your attention the enclosed copy of the Declaration of the delegates of the National Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Zagreb, which was presented in solemn audience to His Royal Highness, Prince Regent Alexander of Serbia, and forwarded to the Legation by the Serbian Government.

Please accept [etc.]

Y. SIMITCH

[Enclosure]

The Prime Minister of Serbia (Protitch) to the Serbian Chargé (Simitch)

Yesterday evening, December 1st, (November 18th, old style) His Royal Highness, the Crown Prince Regent, received the delegation of the National Council of Zagreb, composed of twenty-seven members in solemn audience.

The delegation transmitted to His Royal Highness an address for the union in a new state of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes inhabiting the former Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Kingdom of Serbia in a single state of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

The Prince Regent Alexander, surrounded by the Ministers (Mr. Stoyan Protitch, Acting Minister of Finance, Prime Minister and

Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim; Mr. Yovanovitch, Minister of the Interior; Mr. Nintchitch, Minister of Public Works; General Rachitch, Minister of War) replied to the address presented by the delegation, and accepted, in the name of the Kingdom of Serbia, its union with the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes inhabiting the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. These two historical documents are drawn up in the following terms:

ADDRESS OF THE DELEGATION

Your Royal Highness: The National Council desires that a national representation shall be provisionally established in common accord, between the National Council and the representatives of the people of the Kingdom of Serbia, and that responsibility of the Government shall be established according to the principles of modern parliamentarism. The National Council sends this representation who shall sit in permanence until the meeting of the constituent assembly in order that the constitutional principles of parliamentary responsibility may be given their full expansion. For the same reasons the former administration and autonomous institutions will remain in vigor under the control of the Government who will be responsible for their working to the autonomous representations.

In this period of transition it will be necessary, in our opinion, to create the preliminary conditions for the definite organization of our United State. Our Government should, with this end in view, prepare the summoning of the constituent assembly which, according to the proposal of the National Council, should be elected on the basis of a direct secret and general and proportional vote, and will be convoked not later than six months after the conclusion of peace.

In this historic hour, when we present ourselves before Your Royal Highness as the representatives of the Yugoslav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, we are profoundly grieved to be obliged to place on record that a

great part of our natural soil is occupied by the troops of the Kingdom of Italy which is allied with the Powers of the Entente, and with which we desire to live in friendly relations, but we cannot recognize the opportunity of any Treaty, not even that of London which is in violation of the principles of nationality. We would be obliged to cede a part of our nation to others. We desire to draw the attention of Your Royal Highness to the fact that the extent of the Italian occupation greatly exceeds the limits and the regions foreseen in the clauses of the armistice concluded with the commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian army, after the proclamation of these territories as independent, and an integral part of the Serb, Croat and Slovene State, and we will furnish the Government of Your Royal Highness with proof of this, in the full conviction that Your Royal Highness will make it his task, together with our entire nation, to see to it that the definite frontiers of our state are drawn in such a way that they accord with the ethnographical frontiers, and are in conformity with the principles laid down by President Wilson of the United States and the other powers of the Entente.

Long live His Majesty, King Peter! Long live Your Royal Highness, long live the entire nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, long live Yugoslavia, free and united!

His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent Alexander, pronounced the following speech:

“Gentlemen: Your arrival in the name of the National Council of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, worthy representative of our great national idea, as well as your communications of its historic decision of November 24th, by which it proclaimed the political unity of the whole nation and the entire martyred but glorious country, fills me with the most profound joy.

In receiving this communication I am convinced that by this act I fulfill my royal duties because by it alone We definitely realize what the best of the sons of our race of all the three confessions, and of the three names on both sides of the

Danube, the Save and the Drina, prepared in the reign of my august grandfather, Prince Alexander, and Prince Michael, which corresponds to the vows and desires of my people.

In the name of His Majesty, King Peter, I proclaim the union of Serbia with the provinces of the independent State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

May this great historic act be the best recompense for your efforts and the efforts of your colleagues of the National Council and all your collaborators, who have freed you from a foreign yoke by an audacious revolution, as well as by the high conscience and by the victims from all part of our nation, represented by the National Council, which to-day lays laurels on the graves of my officers and soldiers fallen for liberty, and places the highest decorations on the breasts of their more fortunate comrades who have conquered with me and survived the victory over a powerful enemy with the generous aid of our great allies.

The glory of the victories won is shared by my old warriors and by the glorious soldiers of the Yugoslav units in my army. They all hastened to respond, and were received as one receives brothers. I thank you for this. In the name of my army, thanks!

In return for the enthusiasm with which you have expressed confidence in the Kingdom of Serbia, in the people, in my august father, His Majesty, King Peter, and in myself, I, on my side, assure you and the National Council from which you hold full powers, you and all your brothers and all my Slovene, Croat and Serb brothers, whose will and thought you represent, that I and my Government, and all that Serbia represents, will always and everywhere be guided solely by the fraternal love for your interests and for all that is sacred in the souls of those in whose name you have come to me.

I and my Government assure you of our complete acceptance of your desires which you have just laid before me. The Government will at once occupy itself with a realization of all that you have expressed regarding the transition and provisional period up to the conclusion of the labors of the constituent assembly as well as the election of that body.

Faithful to the example which the King, my father, has given me I will be solely the King of free citizens of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and will always remain faithful to the great constitutional and parliamentary principles, found on the general rights. For this reason I ask your collaboration for the formation of a government which will represent all the united fatherland. The Government will always be in contact with you, firstly, with you, and, secondly, with the national representation. It will work with it and will be responsible to the national assembly and to the entire people.

The Government will have as its first duty to trace together with you the ethnographical frontiers of our entire nation. I have the right to hope that our great Allies will judiciously appreciate our point of view, for it corresponds to the principles they have themselves proclaimed, and for which they have poured out so much blood. I am persuaded that the work of the liberty of the world will not be humiliated by the placing of so many of our valiant brothers under a new yoke. I further hope that this point of view will also be admitted by the Italian Government, for that country owes its birth to the same principles which were so brilliantly interpreted by the pens and the acts of her great sons during the last century. I am not afraid to say that in the respect for these principles and traditions and in the sentiments of our friendship the Italian people will find more well being and security than in the realization of the Treaty of London, signed without you and never recognized by us, and made under circumstances where no one foresaw the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

In this work and everywhere else I hope that our people will remain united and powerful to the end, and will enter on its

new life proud and worthy of the greatness and happiness which await it.

I beg the honorable delegates to carry my royal word and my greetings to all my dear brothers, to all the Jugoslavs, free and united. Long live the entire Serb, Croat and Slovene people! May our Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes always be happy and glorious!”

The address to the Prince Regent was signed by the two Vice-Presidents of the National Council of Zagreb, Dr. Ante Pavelitch and Svetozar Pribitchevitch, and the other members of the Council.

The reply to the address was signed by the Crown Prince Alexander, and countersigned by the Minister of Finance, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim, Mr. Stoyan Protitch, and the other ministers at present at Belgrade.

PROTITCH

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/1: Telegram

[Document 277]

***The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace***

[Paraphrase]

ROME , December 9, 1918.

4. For your information. Important. I have learned that on December 6th, delegates from the Montenegrin Stuppina, 18 in number, left for Belgrade to proclaim annexation to Serbia. It is confirmed by pro-Serbians that Montenegro is discontented.

NELSON PAGE

873.00/29: Telegram

[Document 278]

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Acting Secretary of State

PONTARLIER (BERNE), December 12, 1918—10 a.m.
[Received December 13—9:45 p.m.]

6139. Department's 3447, December 4th, 8 p.m. An unofficial but reliable informant reports that the Montenegrin National Committee which is in general in opposition to the policy of the King has representatives in all large cities of Europe. Chief of the movement is Radowitch at present in Paris. He sent agitators some time ago to Montenegro who convoked a great meeting at Podgoritzza which debated question of dynasty. Four-fifths of those present opposed dynasty and advocated union of all Yugo-Slav countries under scepter King of Servia with conservation of local powers. This assembly although not provided for by the constitution was a meeting of the chiefs of all Montenegrin clans and therefore thoroughly representative.

STOVALL

873.00/30: Telegram

[Document 279]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 13, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received 9:11 p.m.]

6159. I am in receipt of a note from the Montenegrin Committee for National Union stating that the National Scoupchtina elected by the people of Montenegro and assembled at Podgoritza has decided as follows:

1. The deposition of King Nicholas Petrovitch Njegoch.
2. The union of Montenegro with Serbia under the dynasty of the Karageorgevitchs, its entry thus into the common country of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
3. The election of a national committee specially entrusted with the management of the affairs of Montenegro united to Serbia.
4. The communication of the said decision to ex-King Nicholas, to the Royal Government of Serbia, and to the Entente Powers friendly to Montenegro, as well as to the governments of the neutral countries.

The note adds that the decision was voted unanimously.

On the other hand a note received from the Montenegrin Government here states that if the Scoupchtina has as stated deposed King Nicholas and his dynasty in favor of the dynasty of Serbia, such action was illegal, inasmuch as the Scoupchtina is nonexistent.

Copies of the two notes follow by pouch.^{[6](#)}

SHARP

⁶ Not printed.

873.00/64

[Document 280]

The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 135

BELGRADE , December 18, 1918.
[Received February 19, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose to you herewith a copy of a letter which was formally handed to me yesterday with its enclosure by the three first signers, in the name of the delegates in Belgrade of the Montenegrin Constituent Assembly. I also enclose translations of these documents⁷ which I have made. The enclosure will be found to purport to be a French translation of the resolution passed by the Montenegrin Constituent Assembly on November 26th. last, reviewing the situation of Montenegro and the conduct of King Nicholas; resolving the dethronement of King Nicholas and the Petrovitch-Nyegosh dynasty from the Montenegrin throne; the union of Montenegro with Serbia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Karageorgevitch dynasty; the election of an executive council to be in charge of the Montenegrin Government until the execution of the union with Serbia; and finally the notification of the text of the resolution itself to King Nicholas, the Serbian Government and the Allied and neutral Powers. The letter requests me to convey the text of this resolution to my Government.

On the day previous to that when this letter was handed to me the Montenegrin Delegates, eighteen in number, two from each department of Montenegro, formally handed a copy of the resolution to the Prince Regent who in a short speech, which I believe has not been published, accepted the union of Montenegro with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Although the Regent's acceptance is considered to have made the union effective, the Serbian Skupschtina at its coming session will be called upon to ratify it.

I have had several conversations with the Montenegrin Delegates, especially with the Metropolitan of Ipek, one of the principal Orthodox prelates of Montenegro, and with Mr. Spassoevitch, a prominent Montenegrin political leader and a Minister in several Cabinets. They have told me that as soon as the Austro-Hungarian debacle began steps were immediately taken by the leading patriots remaining in the country, who were soon joined by others from abroad and who had succeeded in escaping from Austrian prison camps, to maintain order which was seriously threatened by the disorderly masses of Austro-Hungarian troops in the country and flowing back from Albania. It was soon found possible to hold elections for delegates to a Constitutional Assembly throughout the small State, the only question placed before the people for decision being that of union with Serbia. The Delegates were duly elected and met at Podgoritzza where the resolution of union enclosed was unanimously passed. Except for the opposition of a few personal followers of King Nicholas, the people are stated to have been unanimously for union. Whether or not this account is entirely exact I am unable to judge as every one here appears to be, as is natural, strongly in favor of this union and of course not inclined to admit any different version even if such exists. I have had some confirmation of it however for while I was at Ragusa, during the first days of December, I met several of our naval officers who had been at Cattaro at the time of the elections and Constituent Assembly. They stated that they had heard of the election and had even seen something of it and that so far as they had heard everything had passed off quietly and without disorder. At the time Italy was making efforts to occupy Cettigne as she had already occupied the Montenegrin ports of Antivari and Dulcigno but through the efforts of the Allies was dissuaded from this step. Our officers told me however that two companies of Italian troops actually had started for Cettigne, with two companies of American troops (332nd. Infantry) when before reaching the frontier the American commander, Major Scanlon, thought it best to return. The Italians continued and were received at the frontier with gun-shots from the Montenegrins at which they also returned to Cattaro. The Montenegrins are stated to have declared that they would willingly have allowed the Americans to go to Cettigne but absolutely refused to allow the Italians to pass.

Serbian troops were occupying Cettigne at the time as well as the principal points of Montenegro.

I now learn from Mr. Gavrilovitch, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and from other sources, that the King Nicholas is making desperate efforts to recover his lost throne and that his cause is being supported by the Italian Government. It appears that attempts are being made to stir up public opinion in Italy with a view to the restoration of the old King whose country it is hoped would then come under Italian influence and serve as a welcome addition to Albania. Mr. Gavrilovitch however does not appear to believe that the Italian people take much interest in these efforts. Nevertheless this is another link of the vexatious and threatening circle which Italy is engaged in drawing around the new Kingdom. This circle is now complete with the Italians at Fiume, on the Dalmatian coast, in Albania, and intriguing in Bulgaria and Rumania. Mr. Gavrilovitch assures me that he has unimpeachable information that Italy is intriguing in both Albania and Bulgaria against Serbia and that the recent rather truculent attitude of Rumania in the Banat is due to Italian support of Mr. Bratiano who is glad of the opportunity to take a vigorous stand in that region as he believes that it will help him in the approaching Rumanian elections.

I may add that the substance of the above report has already been communicated to the Department in my telegrams.⁸

I have [etc.]

H. PERCIVAL DODGE

⁷ No enclosures printed.

⁸ Not printed.

873.00/33

[Document 281]

The Secretary of the Montenegrin Legation (Matanovitch) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 145

WASHINGTON , December 24, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to send you, herewith, a copy of a cablegram received today by the Legation from the Montenegrin Government.

Accept [etc.]

G. MATANOVITCH

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the Montenegrin Minister (Gvosdenovitch)

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE , December 23, 1918.

Montenegrin Government declares that report that Skoupchtina voted for annexation of Montenegro to Serbia is inaccurate. It is now preparing to return to Montenegro. Skoupchtina will not be called until it returns in accordance with Constitution.

CHOTCH

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/8

[Document 282]

***The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France
(Bliss)***

[Translation]

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE , December 28, 1918.

MR. CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES: Montenegro is formally blockaded by the Serbian authorities. The conspirators and agents of official Serbia alone have access to the country. The Montenegrins are no longer masters in their own home. The Statesmen of Montenegro and the Deputies of parliament appeal to the Allies in order that this blockade be removed and that they be allowed to come out of the country to come to Rome and Paris. The reports received by us are to the effect that the occupation of Montenegro by Serbian troops is identical with the occupation by the enemy. Regrettable consequences are to be feared and armed conflicts to be foreseen. The Montenegrins beg that the Allied troops may be sent immediately to Montenegro and that the Serbian troops and authorities be sent away from the country. The Serbian command is already proceeding to the enrollment of Montenegrins and intends to send them into Serbia.

Following on our preceding notes, I have the honor to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of our Great Allies.

With assurances [etc.]

DR. P. CHOTOH

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/4

[Document 283]

The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

PARIS , January 4, 1919.

The American Embassy at Paris presents its compliments to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and has the honor to enclose herewith for its information, copy and translation of a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a. i. of Montenegro transmitting translation of a note received by him from the Servian Chargé d’Affaires near the Montenegrin Government, in which the latter states that his functions have come to an end from the date of December 4th on which date, he writes, the union between Montenegro and Serbia became effective.

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)

No. 2929

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE , December 29, 1918.

MR. CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES: This morning we have received from the Chargé d’Affaires of Servia near the Montenegrin Government, a note informing us that the diplomatic functions of the representative of the Servian Government have come to an end “inasmuch as on the 4th of this month, the union between Montenegro and Servia became effective.” (Kindly find enclosed the literal translation of the said document.)

Such an action fully shows up in all their cynicism the arbitrary procedures of official Servia. It discloses even to those minds most

prejudiced against Montenegro, her sovereigns, and her legal representatives, the secret motives of the odious campaign which started eleven years ago and was conducted these last months with unheard of violence. The inadmissible note we are communicating to you proves how thoroughly justified were the remarks we had thought fit to express to you previously regarding the clandestine plans of the Servian Government.

In order not to disturb the harmony which should reign between Allies, we have hitherto in sad resignation borne calumny, defamation, insult, denunciation and plottings, but this time, with all our strength, we indignantly raise our voices in protest against an action which violates our most sacred rights and which, we dare to hope, will meet with unanimous reprobation from the civilized world.

The actions of the Servian Government are not only an outrage to the sovereignty of Montenegro; they offend the ideas and designs of the Allies who have solemnly proclaimed on several occasions their wish to reinstate our country whose liberty and independence have been acquired after six centuries of strife.

Therefore, in the name of the Royal Government of Montenegro, I have the honor to place before Your Excellency our most earnest protests. They are those of a country which has sacrificed itself through solidarity for Serbia and which, in 1915 saved the army of that monarchy so eager to-day to annex its former ally. The heroic devotion and abnegation of Montenegro is now reaping this day the reward that Jesus met with Golgotha!

We are convinced that our Great Allies will surely receive our legitimate protests with sympathy. Do they not denounce a flagrant violation of the principles upheld by the Entente and their associates? Since Metternich and Bismarck such machinations are no longer seemly, and those for whom obligations and right are not mere scraps of paper, can but severely censure official Serbia for its brutal covetousness. We are confident that your Excellency's Government will find the way to exact respect for our undeniable

rights from the Servian Government which has forgotten what is due to all the Allies in the great war.

Kindly accept [etc.]

DR. P. CHOTCH

[Subenclosure—Translation]^{[9](#)}

The Chargé d’Affaires of the Serbian Legation to Montenegro (Popovitch) to the Montenegrin Ministry for Foreign Affairs

No. 432

PARIS , December 15/28, 1918.

By order of the Royal Government, I have the honor to inform the Royal Government, that the diplomatic functions of the representative of the Royal Government near your Ministry, must be considered as having ceased, inasmuch as on the 4th of this month, the union between Montenegro and Servia became effective.

TIHOMIR POPOVITCH

^{[9](#)} Translation filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/2.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/5

[Document 284]

The Montenegrin Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chotch) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)

[Translation]^{[10](#)}

No. 20

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE , January 4, 1919.

MONSIEUR LE CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES: The Parisian press of this day, at the same time that it announces the entry of French troops into Cettigne (as early as the 2nd of December), gives news of the formation of a “directory” charged with the administration of the affairs of Montenegro until the union with Serbia may be effected. It is sufficient to examine only for an instant the composition of the “directory” to be convinced that it is the work of agents of the Serbian Government and that the will of the Montenegrin people is enslaved. Of the five members composing the “directory” in question, three were convicted in 1907 for the role that they played in the bomb-shell affair (conspiracy plotted at Belgrade against the security of the Montenegrin State and its dynasty).

Any act of this strange organism, as well as any which has been done since the entrance of Serbian troops into our territory, is and will be tainted with illegality, violates the constitution of the country and delivers a blow against its established powers, recognized by the Allies, tending uniquely to thwart the integral restoration of Montenegro.

Referring to our preceding notes, of which the last was No. 2929 of Date 29 December last,^{[11](#)} I have the honor to bring the foregoing facts to the knowledge of our Great Allies as new facts, which prove what

proceedings official Serbia is using against Montenegro, her rights, and her honor.

Accept [etc.]

DR. P. CHOTOH

¹⁰ File translation revised from French text filed under Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/8

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 359 [*Pg. 359 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)*].

873.00/63

[Document 285]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 17

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that the Montenegrin Government have received a communication from the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, dated December 28th, to the following effect: "By order of the Royal Government I have the honour to inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the diplomatic functions of the representative of the Serbian Government must be regarded as having ceased seeing that on the fourth instant the union of Montenegro with Serbia was effected."

The Montenegrin Government are outraged by the form and substance of this communication and they have requested His Majesty's Representative accredited to them to transmit to his Government their formal and most energetic protest. They state that this act throws full light on the hidden reasons for the odious campaign carried on for years by Serbia against Montenegro which has reached, during the last few months, unexampled violence. They point out that the action of the Serbian Government is not only aimed at the Sovereignty of Montenegro, but is at the same time a challenge to the solemn proclamation of the Allies that it is their intention to restore the liberty and independence of Montenegro. The Montenegrin Government compare the methods of Serbia with those of Count Metternich and Bismarck and refuse to believe that the Allies will not insist that the rights of Montenegro are respected.

In informing the United States Government of the above, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to point out the undesirability of such a precedent in view of the attitude of the Allies regarding the necessity for the territorial changes being left to the Peace Conference. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is further directed to add that His Majesty's Government propose to instruct their representative at Belgrade to protest formally to the Serbian Government against their action in creating a *fait accompli* in Montenegro and thus attempting to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference. His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade will also be instructed to warn the Serbian Government that they will recognize no title acquired by such action in Montenegro or elsewhere.

His Majesty's Government will be glad if similar action will be taken by the Associated Governments.

WASHINGTON , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[Document 286]

King Nicholas I of Montenegro to President Wilson

PARIS , January 7, 1919.

VERY DEAR AND GREAT FRIEND: You brought into the war the greatest and most pacific of the Republics in the name of outraged right and in the defence of the weak. You caused the Allies themselves to realize the true meaning of their heroic efforts and of the noble aims they were to strive for. You wished for victory in order that upon it peace might be fashioned by the hands of the just. You gave a definite form to the desire of all civilized peoples and to the principles on which perfectible humanity ought to build up its true happiness. In your person we are compelled to see the great conscience of our epoch.

It is because you are all this that to-day the oldest of the heads of States writes to you to appeal to your sense of equity.

My Government has already informed your Government of the facts which oblige me to break that reserve which I have perhaps too long observed.

On December 28, 1918, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Serbian Government near the Royal Government of Montenegro addressed to the latter the following note: “By order of the Royal Government I have the honor to inform the Royal Ministry that the diplomatic functions of the representative of the Royal Government near that Ministry should be considered as at an end for the reason that on the 4th of this month the union of Montenegro to Serbia came into effect.” These few words, this short, brutal sentence, have with cynicism put an end to the long and patient hypocrisy of official Serbia. Her tactics are revealed, her aims discovered, her greed avowed!

In 1914, when the ambition of Austria-Hungary threatened Serbia, Montenegro at once flew to arms. Nothing forced it so to act; it only obeyed a sentiment of fraternal solidarity. It fought courageously, not listening to offers made by the enemy, nor stipulating conditions for its Allies. At my desire the Montenegrin command was entrusted to Serbian officers. In 1915 our little Army sacrificed itself in order to cover the retreat of the Serbs, and thus saved them from disaster. This act of abnegation exhausted Montenegro. It was compelled to abandon the struggle. The brave Montenegrin soldiers were destined to die of cold and hunger in prison camps, and Austria occupied the whole of its territory.

Quickly lightened of its burden of gratitude, the Serbian Government at once sought to take advantage of the precarious situation of its unfortunate Ally and neighbor. It immediately saw the way to exploit the exile of the official representatives of unhappy Montenegro.

In spite of the hospitality extended by France, soon around us began to be heard the whisper of mischief-making, then the murmur of slander. Little by little rumours, at first of the vaguest kind, took shape and grew in volume; subterranean slander broke out into definite accusation. What had so far only been said soon began to appear in print; clandestine libel was replaced by widely distributed printed pamphlets; and these yet anonymous pamphlets were shortly followed by articles in publicly circulated newspapers. All and every means were good enough provided that the King of Montenegro, his family, his surroundings and his Ministers were cried down and vilified; every arm was legitimate if from the wound it made flowed some of the prestige of heroic Montenegro and its old sovereign.

To what end? It was necessary to cause a people to become disgusted with its dynasty, with its Government and even its independence. It was necessary to wear down the sympathy that the Allies were disposed to show towards the misfortunes of the smallest of their number. It was necessary to bring the minds of all thinking people to accept the absorption of one people by another.

Too soon the Serbian Government thought success won: and in 1917 came the declaration of Corfu, signed by the President of the Serbian

Council. It was attempted by this act to draw up a pure and simple declaration of the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia. Without its being a question of consulting a single Montenegrin subject, it pretended to place our people under the scepter of the Karageorgevitchs. This attempt was in fact a failure, but a failure far from discouraging its authors. In November 1918 they imagined that they saw in the armistice another favorable opportunity. They hastened to smuggle Serbian troops into Montenegro as soon as the Austro-Hungarians had been evacuated therefrom, and then at once began armed propaganda.

The exploits of this propaganda are known to all. By clumsy artifice a “great Skouptchina” was created, while such an assembly is unprovided for in the Constitution of Montenegro, and while according to the laws of the country the national parliament cannot be legally called together when the King and his Government are on Allied territory and a number of its members are still interned or on their way home.

This assembly without a mandate was credited with authority. The result of a vote which was not even properly elaborated was trumped up—and throughout the world, thanks to the simplicity and cupidity of the Press, was spread the news of the union of Montenegro with Serbia and, at the same time, the deposition of Nicholas I.

The union of Montenegro with its Yugoslav brothers? But all my life I have been the most resolute and most listened to partisan of it! Only, I have always felt that it was necessary to leave to my people an independence which they have so dearly bought by five long centuries of strife, and I have always proclaimed that in the formation of a Yugoslav community each member ought to preserve its autonomy. This I re-stated in October 1918. No Jugoslavia is possible, in my opinion, without liberty and equality among its members.

To this conception what is the conception opposed by Serbia? Distinctly imperialist, the latter desires to see placed beneath the scepter of its King the divers Yugoslav countries thus reduced to

nothing more than docile provinces of an exacting and authoritative monarchy.

In this there is a danger which all the diplomats of Europe and of America must perceive. In this in any case there is a violation of those very principles to which it has rightly become a habit to give your name.

It is in the name of these principles and in the name of eternal justice that I raise my voice in complaint to-day. I complain that the Serbian Government ignores my acquired rights, and treats official Montenegro with ignominious disrespect. I complain that official Serbia has made an attempt on the sovereignty of the Montenegrin people. I complain that an attempt is made to cause the Allies to forget their formal promise to restore and re-constitute Montenegro on the same footing as Serbia and Belgium. I complain that by force and ruse one people is doing its utmost to annex another!

I protest with all my strength against this scandal.

If the methods of Prussia have not been for ever abolished by the war just brought to a close; if the old practices of imperialism are still exercised and honored; if Might is Right, then I am wrong to speak. I ought to resign myself to the silence of the weak and the vanquished!

But if the methods of a Bismarck have been uprooted from this world by the hand of the victors; if the will of nationalities and peoples is sacred; if Right is no longer a vain word; the United States and their associate, the Entente, will compel my adversaries to let go their prey and will not allow a political crime to be committed.

Je suis Très cher et Grand Ami
Votre sincère Ami

NICOLAS

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/13: Telegram

[Document 287]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

ROME , January 7, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received January 9—3:10 p.m.]

54. Monsieur Popovitch, delegate from Montenegro to Peace Conference, has just called on me and made the following statement: That Montenegro is at this moment in complete revolution, which is supported by about 380,000 Montenegrins of the peasant party, composing about four-fifths of the population, and on the third of January occupied militarily by force Podgoritsa [*Podgorica*], Danivgrad [*Danilov Grad*], Nishich [*Nikšić*], Colascilla [*Kolašin*], Virbasar [*Virpazar*], and yesterday were fighting to take Cittinge [*Cettigne*], They are reported to have 45,000 militia with rifles and some machine guns and under the command of two generals, General Milutine Vucinitch and Djuro Petrovitch. They have overthrown the government in all the cities, except Cittinge and they have demanded the intervention of the Allied troops making this demand on Venel, the French Commandant at Catspaw [*Cattaro*], and through Popovitch on the Italian Government here.

Popovitch states that the desire of the Montenegrins is to be free and independent and as such united with Jugo-Slavia in a confederating form of government, Montenegro retaining its freedom indisputable and they will resist being absorbed and merged in the Serbian people. They prefer a representative form of government to any monarchy, but prefer the old dynasty to the Serbian or any other dynasty. He states that Italy wishes Montenegro to be free and independent, but would prefer it a republic. (I am far from sure as to whether Italy would not have had it to be republic). The other one-fifth of the Montenegrin population Popovitch states are in favor of uniting with Serbia. This one-fifth composes mainly city population,

who comprise intellectuals, but he states the peasants were the people who have [apparent omission] Montenegro free for three hundred years. Popovitch delegate has just returned to inform me he has received radio telegraph message from Cattaro informing him American troops have entered Cittinge.

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/14: Telegram

[Document 288]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

ROME , January 8, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 9—11 p.m.]

60. The following telegram has been sent from Cattaro by the Ministry Marine for the Montenegrin Minister here:

“January 6th. French General is making a French-Serbian penetration into Montenegro admitting no other than Serbian authority. The intervention of his troops has a counterrevolutionary character. There are about 3,000 of which 500 were landed at Ragusa, 400 of the latter having already arrived at Cattaro have gone into Montenegro in French uniforms and with Serbo-French officers. Immediate help and energetic diplomatic steps indispensable since the enemy is energetically stirring up sedition.”

The following comprise two telegrams received by the Minister of Marine here from Cattaro:

“January 6th. The French General has been informed that the plans for the French Company which have been sent to Montenegro are to break the blockade of Cettigne restoring the Serbians in possession. Even though requiring other Allied forces the Serbian power will remain unchanged. General Venel prevents Montenegro from being visited by officers on detached duty even though acting singly to study the situation. [”]

[“]January 7th. American Commanding Officer went to Cettigne yesterday. He arrived there while the fight was on. The civil authorities falsely attribute the fight to lack of food.

According to the last reports the Serbian National Flag raised over the Municipal Building has been replaced by a sign reading 'Long live King Nicholas first King of Montenegro'. This morning an American Company with an Italian platoon left for Montenegro. ["]

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/15: Telegram

[Document 289]

***The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace***

ROME , January 9, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received January 10—12:10 a.m.]

61. The following telegram from Cattaro was received yesterday by the Minister of Marine here.

“January 8th. Insurgents urgently ask for the arrival of Italian [apparent omission]. They have determined to resist to the last. Period of ultimatum given by French General ends tomorrow evening. His orders prevent our troops from being moved.”

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[Document 290]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 9 January, 1919.

MY DEAR LANSING: This is a very moving letter,^{[13](#)} and I would highly value your advice concerning it. I am inclined to advise and request that you have a very frank talk with the representative of Serbia and say how much distress and what serious questions are arising in our minds because of the dealings of Serbia with Montenegro.

Undoubtedly the sympathies of the people of the United States are as much with Montenegro as with Serbia. Our people have always admired the sturdy independence of the little kingdom, and I feel that the whole cause of Yugoslavia is being embarrassed and prejudiced by the apparent efforts to decide by arms what ought to be decided by pacific arrangement and consent. I hope that this course will commend itself to you and that you will seek the earliest possible opportunity to express these sentiments to Mr. Vesnitch.^{[14](#)}

I am enclosing my reply to the King^{[15](#)} and hope, unless you see some diplomatic complication in it, you will be kind enough to have it delivered.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[13](#)} Letter from King Nicholas of Montenegro, p. 362 [*Pg. 362 includes portions of [Doc. 285](#) and [Doc. 286](#)*].

^{[14](#)} Milenko R. Vesnitch, member of the Serbian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.

^{[15](#)} *Infra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/7

[Document 291]

President Wilson to King Nicholas I of Montenegro

PARIS , 9 January, 1919.

MY GOOD FRIEND: I have received your letter of January seventh and read it with considerable interest. I must at present content myself with a brief acknowledgment of it, but I beg that you will believe that the days will not be too crowded or too hurried for me to drive the interests of sturdy Montenegro out of my mind or to lessen in the least my sincere desire to do everything in my power to see that justice is done her. The matters to which you call my attention will have my most serious and sympathetic consideration.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/16

[Document 292]

Manifesto of Certain Montenegrins Resident in France Directed to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)

[Translation]^{[16](#)}

PARIS , January 10, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: On the eve of the Peace Conference, on which is incumbent the task of reestablishing liberty and justice once and for all times, we learn with grief news of the terror reigning over the smallest and weakest people among the Allies.

Without regard to the fact that Montenegro entered the war for the cause of her sister Serbia, and for the deliverance and union of all the Yugo-Slavs; without taking count too, that, in the course of eighteen months she has endured sufferings and superhuman privations, carrying on with an army in rags and underfed, without preparation, a sanguinary war against the common enemy; without regard finally, to the fact that, at the end of 1915 Montenegro saved from disaster the greater part of the Serbian army in bravely covering its retreat and in sacrificing to this object her own existence,—today this little martyr country which has indeed merited aid and protection from her powerful Allies, has become the theater of tyranny. For a long time official Serbia has exercised in the Allied countries revolting intrigues, spreading against Montenegro the worst calumnies. Already, two years ago, the Royal Government of Serbia organized a so-called Montenegrin Committee for the National Union the aim of which was to calumniate and plot against the honor and the sovereign rights of Montenegro.

Three months ago the enemy retired from Montenegrin territory whilst the Serbian Government sent its troops thither. Now the first task these undertook was the annihilation of Montenegro's sovereignty by tearing up the Constitution and laws of the country for which reverence was guaranteed by the Allies. Since legal institutions have been thus violated, the Serbian authorities have organized reunions without legal authority, the aim of which is to falsify and do violence to the true wishes of the Montenegrin people.

Here is the object of all these plots:

To make miscarry all the obligations which the Allies have in regard to Montenegro, and which they have so many times recognized: that is to say the integral restoration of Montenegro;

To reunite Montenegro to Serbia by force so that our little state may not enter on a footing of equality the Yugo-Slav community, as a co-operative member of it, but subject to the will of others,—this which is unworthy of her past and contrary to her interests and the dignity of sovereign states; and again

To prevent at any price that Montenegro, a belligerent allied state, be represented at the Peace Conference and thus, in a manner unique in history, have its political individuality wiped out for ever.

Because of the facts above exposed, the citizens of Montenegro, who find themselves in France, take the liberty of presenting to Your Excellency this Protestation:

Against the rule of oppression now existing in Montenegro;

Against the falsification of the people's will in Montenegro;

Against the brutal manner employed in order to destroy a sovereignty jealously guarded during six centuries alone in the Balkans, and

Against the plots which have for their aim the non-representation of Montenegro at the Peace Conference.

We have the honor to appeal to Your Excellency so that the principle of the free disposition of peoples be integrally applied. not only in Montenegro, but in all the Yugo-Slav countries equally, Serbia included, and that, as much in their interior affairs as in their exterior. This is the only way to make of the Yugo-Slav countries a guaranty of order and peaceful stability and solid pillar for the future policy of the Entente in the Balkans.

We beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of our profound respect.

In the name of 502 signers, Montenegrin citizens now in France:

P. VOUTCHKOVITCH , *former minister.*

DR. J. YOVITCHEVITCH , *member of the High Court of Control.*

V. POPOVITCH , *lawyer and former president of the Municipal Council of Cettigne.*

P. BOGDANOVITCH , *Editor-in-Chief of "La Voix de Montenegro".*

DAUCHAN VENEZITCH , *merchant.*

¹⁶ Translation filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 772.73/10.
File translation revised.

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 293]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 11 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: King Nicholas of Montenegro is seeking an interview with me. I would very much value a tip from you and your fellow Commissioners as to whether it would be wise or serviceable for me to give him an audience.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

Robert Lansing Tapers

[Document 294]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS , 13 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Replying to your letter of the 11th, regarding an interview for King Nicholas of Montenegro, I believe in view of the attitude of the Allied Governments toward the King it would be unwise at the present time to have an interview with him.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

873.00/41: Telegram

[Document 295]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 13, 1919—6 p.m.

208. Department has received telegram dated January 7th from Embassy Rome relative to statement by Monsieur Popovitch, delegate from Montenegro to Peace Conference, concerning political conditions Montenegro and presence American troops there.

Embassy states Paris informed this matter.¹⁷ Department entirely uninformed as to presence American troops Montenegro and its information concerning political situation Montenegro vague, uncertain, and conflicting. Attention is called to complaints and requests of Montenegrin Government forwarded to Department in several despatches from the American Embassy, Paris. Are there persons with proper qualifications in Paris who could be sent to Montenegro to make thorough and impartial investigation and report situation.

POLK

¹⁷ See telegram No. 54, Jan. 7, 1919, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Italy to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 365 [*Pg. 365 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)*].

873.00/42: Telegram

[Document 296]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

ROME , January 14, 1919—11 p.m.
[Received January 15—2:15 p.m.]

2538. My 2537.¹⁸ Two reports just received from quite different sources. One from Captain Brodie, British Army and member of British Mission to Montenegro, who left Montenegro on the 9th show that conditions there are exceedingly grave, that the Serbians feeling themselves backed by French authorities there have occupied militarily Montenegro, dispersing Montenegrin revolutionists who rose in revolution about the 3rd and 4th demanding the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Montenegro and demanding occupation of Montenegro by Inter-Allied troops who would guarantee free expression of Montenegro's will in an untrammelled elective or referendum. Radovich the representative of so-called Montenegrin administration is declared to be in Serbian pay and is working for the complete annihilation of Montenegrin independence. The French General Venel who is apparently supporting this side strongly stopped the American and the Italian troops who had been ordered by the Italian commander to Cetinje in response to appeal of the Montenegrin insurgent party declaring that none but Serbian and French troops should occupy Montenegro.

The Montenegrin insurgent forces appear to have been dispersed after a collision in which several hundred men one side or the other are reported to have been killed, some returning to their homes, others seeking refuge in Albania or in places under the Italian flag, but all are armed with rifles and are reported as declaring that Montenegrin independence will be preserved if it takes 500 years. Captain Brodie informs me that although previous to these collisions with the Serbians there was little sympathy with the idea of restoring

the Montenegrin dynasty, since the fighting, certain change is discernible in their attitude.

Full reports follow by pouch tonight.¹⁹ Unless something be done very soon the situation there may become irremediable. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ Reports not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 873.00/18: Telegram

[Document 297]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 24, 1919—12 midnight.

425. Your 208, January 13, 6 p.m. Under authority of the War Department, the military attaché at Rome has been directed to send Captain James Bruce to observe political, economic and military conditions in Montenegro. Both the Commission and the Department will be furnished with his reports. General Churchill informs the Commission that Captain Bruce is known personally to him as possessing exceptional qualifications for this duty.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Albania

[\[298\] The Secretary of State to the British Chargé \(Barclay \)](#)

Washington , November 16, 1918.

875.00/35

[\[299\] The British Chargé \(Barclay \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 19, 1918.

875.00/37

[\[300\] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Washington , December 20, 1918—4 p.m. [Received December 21—5 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 875.00/28: Telegram

[\[301\] The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 875.00/32

875.00/35

[Document 298]

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

No. 315

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. 1234 of November 6, 1918,^{[1](#)} stating that His Majesty's Government have learned from Berne that the Albanians in Switzerland intend to make a request to the Italian Government for their immediate sanction to bring under a single administration all the liberated districts of Albania, and that His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that no action of a nature to prejudice this should be taken, and they also feel that nothing should be done to prejudice the consideration of the Albanian question by the Peace Congress, and requesting an expression of the views of the United States Government on this question.

In reply I beg to inform you that the United States Government is not contemplating any action regarding Albania pending the Peace Conference.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

^{[1](#)} Not printed.

875.00/37

[Document 299]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 1292

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the latter's note No. 315 of November 16th, has the honour to inform him by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 14th stating that the Italian Government, who had communicated the text of the Albanian Appeal of October 12th to His Majesty's Government and to the United States and French Governments through the Italian Embassies in their respective capitals, were of opinion that no action should be taken calculated to limit the freedom of the Albanians in expressing their views as to the future organization of Albania, the future political status of which country would of course be definitely established as a result of decisions taken in common by the Powers.

His Majesty's Government instructed His Majesty's Ambassador on November 18th to inform the Italian Government in reply that while His Majesty's Government had no objection to the Albanians expressing their views on this question, they earnestly trusted that the Italian Government would take no action and would allow no action to be taken on these proposals until the Peace Conference had decided the future of Albania.

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 875.00/28: Telegram

[Document 300]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 20, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received December 21—5 p.m.]

72. Following received from Italian Embassy:

“By direction of my Government I have the honor to make known to your Excellency the enclosed letter addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Rome by Albanian residents in Switzerland about the future of Albania:

‘We, the undersigned Albanians residing in Switzerland truly voice the sentiments of all our fellow countrymen and take the liberty of submitting herein below to your Excellency, the grievances of our country at the moment when the destinies of the large and small states of the world will be settled on the basis of justice and the principle of nationality. This is not a place for us to make a history of our country which contains memorable pages. We shall say nothing of the five last years which have wrought deep changes in the Balkan peninsula. Those changes caused at the Conference of London in 1913, the creation of an independent and neutral Albania whose neutrality was guaranteed by the six great powers. But unfortunately, interior troubles caused by reasons already known have hampered that undertaking.

It was thus that Italy intervened by solemnly proclaiming the independence of Albania and promising to defend it against any foreign interference or snare. Recently your Excellency declared rightfully

in your speeches that it belonged to the powers assembling for the general peace treaty to state the precise boundary of Albania in accordance with the principle of nationalities, the self-determination of the people as also proclaimed by President Wilson seeing that at the time of the partition of the Balkans in 1913 our country was sacrificed to the advantage of its neighbors and that on account of the imminent danger of European conflagration that should be adverted at any cost.

Now that the conflagration is over and about to be settled by the triumph of the right of all the peoples, we are fully convinced that the rich country that is purely Albanian and is indispensable to Albania will be rightfully returned to the Motherland.

Encouraged by your Excellency's declarations, we come to you with the request that you kindly communicate the present petition to the other great powers of the Entente in order that our cause may be upheld to our benefit in common with the great powers to accord with indisputably great Congress and that permission be given to Albania which has also suffered from that war, to present through its representatives, its just claims in the interest of the country and of future tranquillity of the Balkans.

In the meanwhile and until the Peace Congress reaches its final decision we also express a very earnest wish that all the territory of our country be entirely occupied by the troops of Italy which has proclaimed our full liberty and independence with the object of tranquillizing our people and enabling them while so united by a natural administration to decide freely upon the final form of government and their own institutions.

Hoping that this appeal will be taken into consideration, we beg your Excellency kindly to accept.
Signed Turkam-Sureya bey Vlora, Minister
Plenipotentiary, with other signatures.”

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 875.00/32

[Document 301]

The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

The American Embassy in Paris presents its compliments to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and has the honor to transmit herewith copy and translation of a note of December 30th 1918 from the Italian Embassy concerning the present situation in Albania.

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Italian Embassy in France to the American Embassy

A meeting of prominent Albanians of all the provinces was recently held at Durazzo to express their national aspirations, and after a long discussion, voted the constitution of a provisional Government under the leadership of Tourkhan Pacha.

General Piacentini has received instructions from the Italian Government to notify this assembly for its own information that the Government of the King advised them that the definite settlement of the political situation of Albania would be determined by the decisions of the Peace Congress, and that, consequently, there was no reason to take action prior to those decisions. This being established, the Italian Government reserves for itself the right to examine ulteriorly the respective positions between the Italian Military authorities and this new organisation, as well as its legal position and the arrangement of its composition and of its functions. The Italian Government has not in principle any objection to

recognise from now on the right of this organisation to call itself the interpreter of Albanian national aspirations.

The Italian Royal Embassy at Paris is instructed, and has the honor to inform the Embassy of the United States of the preceding, and asks it to inform the Federal Government.

PARIS, December 30, 1918.

Czechoslovakia

[\[302\] The Chargé in Great Britain \(Laughlin \) to the Secretary of State](#)

London , November 18, 1918. [Received December 5.]

763.72/12451

[\[303\] The Swedish Minister \(Ekengren \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 21, 1918.

763.72119/2788

[\[304\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen , December 2, 1918—3 p.m. [Received December 2—
11:32 a.m.]

763.72119/2853: Telegram

[\[305\] The Swedish Legation to the Department of State](#)

Washington , December 13, 1918.

763.72119/3050

[306] The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš) to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 20, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.2125/9

[307] The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 23, 1918.

763.72119/3263

[308] The Secretary of State to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš).

Paris , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.2125/9

763.72/12451

[Document 302]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

No. 10241

LONDON , November 18, 1918.
[Received December 5.]

SIR: With reference to the Department's telegram No. 1663 of September 27, 7 p.m.,^{[1](#)} relative to the future boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak State, I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed a copy of a Note I have just received from the Foreign Office together with a memorandum setting forth the difficulties with which this question is connected. A map showing the ethnic distribution of the Czecho-Slovaks is also enclosed.^{[2](#)}

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the American Chargé (Laughlin)

No. 178793/W/3

LONDON , November 13, 1918.

SIR: With reference to Mr. Page's Note, No. 1272, of the 30th September last, relative to the future boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak State, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Balfour to transmit to you, herewith, a memorandum as to the difficulties with which this question is connected, and to assure you that His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive any views which the Government of the United States may entertain on the subject.

I have [etc.]

For the Secretary of State,
R. GRAHAM

[Subenclosure—Memorandum]

Suggestions for Reply to the American Ambassador Concerning Boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak Nations

1. The Czechs and Slovaks having repeatedly declared their desire to form one single State, H. M. G. treats their territories as those of one single State.
2. The enclosed map, which may be taken as reliable, shows the ethnic distribution of the Czecho-Slovaks. It will be noted that they inhabit the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia and part of Austrian Silesia, and the north-western and northern districts of Hungary.
3. The northern and north-western frontier districts of Bohemia are predominantly German in population. With regard to them we shall be confronted by a very difficult problem—to what extent the new Czecho-Slovak State should inherit the historic frontiers of Bohemia, which are also its natural geographical frontiers, and to what extent the ethnic divisions could be made the basis. In some districts, e. g. round Eger and Reichenberg, the frontier might perhaps be rectified to some extent without unduly impairing Bohemia's strategic defences or economic resources; in other districts these interests are of such paramount importance as to override all other considerations.
4. The matter has not hitherto been the subject of official considerations. We are of course collecting materials bearing on this and similar problems, and it would be of great advantage if those who do the work for H. M. G. were given opportunities for exchanging views with those who do similar work for the American government.

4/10/18

L. B. N.

¹ Not printed.

² Map not reproduced.

763.72119/2788

[Document 303]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

No. 5652

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to request Your Excellency to kindly convey the following communication, which I have received today through my Government, to the President of the United States:³

“To the President of the United States of North America,

Mr. Wilson:

“In your last message⁴ to the peoples freed from the old Austrian State and the previously ruling dynasty, you drew the line of conduct in obtaining and securing the liberties of the Nations of Austria upon the principle that the several nations must refrain from violent invasion of the rights of other nations. You have repeatedly and solemnly made it known that the right of self-determination of all nations was the underlying principle of the North American people's participation in the work of liberation of the peoples. In the name of two and one-half million Germans in Bohemia who appealing to that right of self-determination consider themselves a constituent part of the free German Republic, we enter the most earnest protest against the oppression to which our territory is subjected through the armed forces of the Czech States. It is plain that the Czech State wants to lead by force and exaction the German population to relinquish its right of self-determination and to create a situation which forestalls a free agreement of the peoples on the peace conference. We turn to the whole civilized world, when we call upon you, Mr. President, to witness those acts of violence and

imperialistic encroachments of the Czech States loudly claiming the right solemnly proclaimed by you of self-determination for the nations, and we lay before you our claim that you stand by us in the fight forced upon us and do not permit that we be barred of our right of self-determination by the use of force. Let no doubt stand that the claims of the Czech nation must come to a halt and not have preference over the indisputable rights of German Bohemia no matter what the situation be which the Czech Government has in the meanwhile created by resort to force.

“In the name and by the direction of the National
Representation of German Bohemia:
Dr. Lodgmann, Seliger, Maixner.”

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

³ The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the Minister; the file translation has been revised. A translation was sent to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 100, Nov. 30, 1918, 3 p.m.

⁴ See telegram No. 3275, Nov. 5, 1918, 4 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland, [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 470*](#) .

763.72119/2853: Telegram

[Document 304]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 2, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received December 2—11:32 a.m.]

3236. Department's 1221, November 8 [18], 7 p.m.⁶

Query 3. According to German and Danish press reports, the government in Prague has had some success in establishing authority by force of arms over the Czecho-Slovak districts of Hungary, but it is impossible to determine to what extent this has taken place. On the 20th ultimo a note was sent to the Karolyi Government, stating that the terms of the Armistice were not binding for the Czecho-Slovak Government, and that according to the acknowledgment of the Entente the districts in Hungary inhabited by Czecho-Slovaks no longer belonged to the Hungarian State. Simultaneously, a partial mobilization in Bohemia was ordered and it was announced in Prague that Marshal Foch was despatching French and Czecho-Slovak troops to the aid of the Home Government against Hungary. In the German districts of Bohemia some armed resistance to the efforts of the Prague Government to secure control has also been reported.

Query 5. There have been no press reports concerning the authority of the Government at Agram over the Bosnian National Council. Apparently all the local South Slavic councils are cooperating with the Agram Government or the Servian Government. Repeated to House. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

⁶ Not printed; it transmitted the queries listed in telegram No. 112, Nov. 16, 1918, 3 p.m., from Colonel House, [vol. I, p. 197](#) .

763.72119/3050

[Document 305]

The Swedish Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

On the 12th inst., the Legation received a cablegram from the Royal Swedish Foreign Office requesting the Legation to transmit to President Wilson the following communication from the Austro-German Government:⁷

It appears from a communication from the Czecho-Slovak Government that the Allied Powers intend to incorporate with the Czechoslovak State those large, coherent territories of Bohemia and Moravia, which are populated by more than three million Germans. This measure, it is said, will be taken without awaiting the results of the peace conference. Notwithstanding that the Austro-German Government supposes that this is due to incorrect information from the Czecho-Slovak Government, it feels obliged to call this fact to everybody's attention and to insist upon that tendencies of this kind are not practically carried out. There can be no doubt as to the German character of the territories in question. Their population has on several occasions manifested their ardent desire to maintain their liberty and their independence of the Czecho-Slovak state. This desire of the people has been expressed especially by the unanimous vote of its representatives, elected on basis of equal suffrage. If, however, the Allied Powers have any doubts in this regard, the Austro-German Government proposes to make clear without delay the situation by a plebiscite superintended and guided by neutral authorities and to give every guarantee besides, as to the liberty of vote. In such a case, the Austro-German Government asks the Allied Powers not to decide upon the fate of the people in question except upon basis of the results of this plebiscite. This way of procedure seems to be the only

one in conformity with the principles recently proclaimed by the Entente itself and expressed in President Wilson's message of the 8th of January, 1918, in articles 2 and 4 of his speech of the 12th [*11th*] of February, 1918, and in his speech of the 4th of July, 1918;⁸ that is to say, in conformity with the principles of justice, of the world's peace and the nations' rights of self-determination.

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918.

⁷ Repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 46, Dec. 18, 1918, 6 p.m.

⁸ For texts, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 12*](#)[🔗], [*112*](#)[🔗], and [*368*](#)[🔗].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.2125/9

[Document 306]

The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Beneš) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 20, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: The Government of MM. Bauer-Renner in Vienna has recently sent a note to the Entente Powers and to the United States in which it requests the Allies not to reach a definite conclusion concerning the status of the Germans of Bohemia until a plebiscite has been held.⁹ It further demands that this German population be not included within the confines of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

It is with reference to these matters that I take the liberty of calling your attention to the following important facts:

1. When impartially examined, the problem presented by the presence of the Germans in Bohemia, appears in quite a different light from that in which M. Bauer presents it. Herewith, I take the liberty of sending you a detailed communication on this subject.
2. The German population of Bohemia, mixed as it is with a very large percentage of Czechs, is quietly accepting its incorporation with the Czecho-Slovak State. It is only the Government in Vienna that during the last four weeks has sought to avail itself of every possible means to agitate Bohemia with the purpose of embarrassing our Government and discrediting us in the eyes of the Entente.

With this purpose in view the Vienna Government threatens the Entente with an outbreak of Bolshevist revolution in Vienna and attributes the responsibility for the same to the Czechs because they refuse to supply Vienna with food and coal, but at the very same time it should be noted that the Vienna Government continues to send arms across Bavaria and Saxony to equip the German bands in the

north of Bohemia and in Silesia, lawless bands composed of the very people who have prevented the mining of coal and its transportation not only to Vienna but even to the Czechs and German districts of Bohemia.

At one and the same time, the Vienna Government carries on a treacherous campaign in the neutral countries by deluging the newspapers with accounts of violent acts reported to have been committed by the Czechs to the detriment of the Germans in the regions of mixed populations, acts, which as a matter of fact, have never taken place.

3. M. Bauer, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, is a minority Socialist who participated in the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd in the year 1917. He undoubtedly favors by every means the extremist movement in other countries. The Czecho-Slovak Republic is making headway, order is restored and a normal economic life is developing. In this respect it stands alone in Central Europe, but at present our Republic is seriously menaced by this Bolshevik movement acting from without. Every day bands of Bolsheviks are going from Germany across the frontiers of northern Bohemia for the purpose of carrying on their propaganda among us. This is only possible because the German population of northern Bohemia, incited so to do by the Vienna Government, opposes the establishment of law and order by our authorities on the actual frontiers of Bohemia. In this way, it may be said, as a result of this activity, the Czecho-Slovak Republic has no frontiers against Germany and consequently is always exposed to the dangers arising from this movement and from the constant sending of arms to our enemies from Vienna.

This situation cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely although the note of M. Bauer has for its particular object such a continuance and for as long a time as possible. Certainly such a continuance would tend to the complete disorganization of the recently formed Czechoslovak State.

4. The Czecho-Slovak Republic is being organized economically and financially as allied territory and this is one of the most difficult tasks that the situation presents, and, of course, the liquidation of Austria

in this connection presents a formidable problem. However, we are endeavoring to leave nothing undone that will aid towards establishing a normal state of affairs and preparing ourselves for the Peace Conference.

However, the Government of German Austria leaves nothing untried that might tend to make our tasks more difficult. It simply floods our country with its depreciated paper money which spells disaster for us. It is constantly urging the German population of Bohemia to export into Germany its manufactured articles, its food supply and raw materials. All this goes on in spite of the fact that ours is an allied country. Germany an enemy country and that the orders for the blockade still remain in force.

It was only possible to bring about the conditions by which we are confronted because the Czecho-Slovak Republic wishing to proceed tactfully and moderately, and believing that its views on this subject were shared by the Allies, tried to bring order and a settled state of affairs into the mixed regions of northern Bohemia without violence and in harmony and cooperation with its inhabitants.

The Vienna Government by its disloyal action has prevented the realization of our plan and by its note which we are now reviewing asks for a continuance of this impossible state of affairs.

The Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic confronted by this situation is of the opinion that the following stringent and categorical measures must be taken.

1. That the Government of Prague, which is the only Government in Central Europe recognized as an allied government, be permitted to establish order within its territory.
2. That the frontiers of the territory to which it is entitled must be settled in agreement with the Allies and the United States and that it must be empowered to exercise its authority so that a continuance of the deplorable conditions indicated above may be avoided.
3. These measures, of course, may be of a provisional nature because it is only within the province of the Peace Conference to lay down

definite decisions on this subject. But, in the meantime, in order that an endurable state of affairs may be established, it is absolutely necessary to take some such steps as I shall indicate in the following paragraph:

It might be well for the Allies to make a declaration in the following sense: The Czecho-Slovak State shall organize and govern the peoples living within the historical boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia, of Austrian Silesia and Slovakia (bounded by the Carpathians, March, Danube, Ipola (Eipel) as far as the city of R. Szombath, from there following a straight line towards the east, to the River Bodrog and the Ung down to the Carpathians). This temporary decision shall be later examined by the Peace Conference which will give to the problem its definite solution. But, for the present the German inhabitants and adjacent Governments would have to submit to the arrangement that is outlined above.

I appeal to your Government, Excellency, in requesting you to make an examination of this difficult question. During the war our Nation has pursued a loyal, open and sincere policy in all its relations with the Allied Governments. We have made sacrifices and have not failed to show our devotion to the ideals which we have in common. Even today, when the fighting in the west is at an end, our people continue to shed their blood in the defense of our common interest on the far away Siberian plains. This is done very willingly, but at the same time our Nation cannot remain indefinitely at the mercy of those enemies of the olden days which we also have in common.

The prestige of the Allies and the United States cannot be disputed by our enemies and it is certain that all would accept without protest such a decision as is indicated above.

I take the liberty, Excellency, of placing before you this memorandum in the hope that it may be helpful in making clear the purpose of the note that has reached you from the Vienna Government and with the request that you may be good enough to examine this communication although it is of a somewhat cursory character, and in conclusion I beg to present to you, Excellency, the assurance of my deepest consideration.

DR. EDUARD BENEŠ

[Enclosure]

Copy of the Reply of the French Government to the Government of German-Austria, Communicated Through the Swiss Legation

The Swiss Legation has been good enough to communicate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the dates of December 13th and 16th two communications from the Government of German Austria.

The first of these notes is in the form of a protest against the alleged intention of the powers of the Entente to place in subjection to the Czecho-Slovak state the Germans of Bohemia and of Moravia. In this note it is affirmed that the Germans in question are desirous of separating themselves from the Czecho-Slovak state and a plebiscite is proposed at an early date for the purpose of clearing up the situation.

In the second note it is proposed to submit to arbitration all questions relating to the frontiers between German Austria and both the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav states.

These requests cannot be favorably received; the boundary questions which are here presented cannot as a matter of fact be settled except by the Peace Congresses and they must be carefully examined with this purpose in view at an early date by the Allied Governments.

In the meantime as far as the Czecho-Slovak State is concerned the French Government holds that it should in conformity with the recognition which has been extended to it by the Allied Governments, have for its boundaries, at least until the decision of the Peace Conference is reached, the boundaries of the historic provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and of Austrian Silesia.

In regard to Slovakia the boundary line should be drawn in the following manner: along the Danube from the present western boundary of Hungary to the river Eipel, along the stream of the Eipel

to the town of Rima Szombat, then in a straight line proceeding from west to east to the river Ung, then following the course of the Ung to the frontier of Galicia.

This boundary line is identical with the one behind which General Franchet d'Esperey has invited the Hungarian Government to withdraw its troops. This request has been complied with and is already an accomplished fact.

Paris, on 19th of December 1918.

PICHON

⁹ For text of this note, see memorandum from the Swedish Legation to the Department of State, Dec. 13, 1918, *supra*.

763.72119/3263

[Document 307]

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , December 23, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: By order of my Government I have the honor to transmit to You the following communication from the Austro-German Government which communication has been simultaneously transmitted to all of the allied powers:[10](#)

“The Council of State finds itself under the necessity of taking the most formal exception to the military occupation by the Czechoslovak State of German Bohemia and of several parts of the Sudetes region and the Znaim district in Moravia. The armistice terms left the German Austrian Government powerless to resist the above mentioned invasion by force. The aforesaid occupation by Czechoslovak troops cannot however in any way impair the right of the German people concerned to shape out their own destinies. The German Austrian Republic insisting on the principle that no nation can be forcibly subjected to a foreign State again appeals to all the civilized States urging them to recognize the right of the aforesaid people to choose the State to which the territory shall hereafter belong by means of a plebiscite superintended by neutral authorities and protected by neutral troops. Neither the Government of the Republic nor the two local Governments can under those conditions accept responsibility for the proper conduct of public administration.”

With renewed assurances [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

¹⁰ The following is a translation of the French text quoted by the Minister. A translation was sent to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 126, Jan. 7, 1919, 3 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.2125/9

[Document 308]

***The Secretary of State to the Czechoslovak Minister
of Foreign Affairs (Beneš)***

PARIS , January 4, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 20th ultimo, addressed to me in my character of Secretary of State of the United States, concerning the request made of the Government of the United States and the Governments of the Entente Powers that a definite conclusion regarding the status of the Germans in Bohemia be not reached until a plebiscite shall have been held, and the attitude of the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic with respect thereto.

Your note and its enclosures have had the attentive reading which you requested, and I have lost no time in forwarding them to the Department of State at Washington.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

Roumania

[\[309\] The Minister in Roumania \(Vopicka \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Jassy , November 9, 1918. [Received December 28—5:55 p.m.]

763.72119/3215: Telegram

[\[310\] The Minister in Roumania \(Vopicka \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Jassy , November 10, 1918. [Received December 28—6:45 p.m.]

763.72119/3211: Telegram

[\[311\] The Minister in Roumania \(Vopicka \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Jassy , November 12, 1918—6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/3: Telegram

[\[312\] The Minister in Roumania \(Vopicka \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Jassy , November 13, 1918. [Received December 28—10:15 p.m.]

763.72119/3217: Telegram

[313] The Roumanian Chargé (Lahovary) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 17, 1918.

763.72/12488

[314] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 20, 1918—1 a.m. [Received 10:24 a.m.]

763.72/12306: Telegram

[315] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 22, 1918—12 p.m. [Received November 23—7:26 a.m.]

763.72/12333: Telegram

[316] Queen Marie of Roumania to President Wilson

Jassy , November 24, 1918. [Received November 28.]

Woodrow Wilson Papers: Telegram

[317] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 25, 1918—6 p.m. [Received November 25—3:05 p.m.]

763.72/12341: Telegram

[318] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 26, 1918—6 p.m. [Received November 26—5:15 p.m.]

763.72119/2798: Telegram

[319] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 27, 1918—9 a.m. [Received 9:43 p.m.]

763.72/12360: Telegram

[320] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 27, 1918—9 a.m. [Received 7:56 p.m.]

763.72/12363: Telegram

[321] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 28, 1918—3 p.m. [Received 10.48 p.m.]

763.72119/2805: Telegram

[322] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

Jassy , November 30, 1918—4 p.m. [Received December 4—5:55 a.m.]

763.72/12352¹/₂: Telegram

[323] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

Jassy , December 2, 1918. [Received December 12—4:01 p.m.]

763.72119/2977: Telegram

[324] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 4, 1918—4 p.m. [Received 9:55 p.m.]

763.72119/2885: Telegram

[325] President Wilson to Queen Marie of Roumania

Washington , December 6, 1918.

763.72119/3795e: Telegram

[326] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House

Berne , December 7, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.3123/13

[327] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 9, 1918—7 p.m.

763.72/12517a: Telegram

[328] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 11, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 12—3:45
a.m.]

763.72/12514: Telegram

[329] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 12, 1918—5 p.m. [Received 8 p.m.]

763.72/12515: Telegram

[330] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 12, 1918—12 p.m. [Received December 13—7:07
a.m.]

763.72/12518: Telegram

[331] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 14, 1918—3 p.m. [Received December 15—
11:20 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/34: Telegram

[332] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—2 p.m. [Received December 16—11:52
a.m.]

763.72/12545: Telegram

[333] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 19, 1918—12 m. [Received 11:10 p.m.]

763.72/12564: Telegram

[334] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

Bucharest , 19 December, 1918. [Received February 17, 1919.]

763.72119/3769

[335] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 23, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 23—5 p.m.]

763.72/12581: Telegram

[336] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

Bucharest , December 5 [27], 1918—4 p.m. [Received December 30—
10:27 a.m.]

763.72119/3222: Telegram

[337] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

Bucharest , December 27, 1918. [Received January 1, 1919—4:04
p.m.]

763.72119/3242: Telegram

[338] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

Bucharest , December 28, 1918. [Received January 2, 1919—5:44
p.m.]

763.72119/3244: Telegram

[339] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 30, 1918—11 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 771.72/1: Telegram

[340] The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

Paris , January 4, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

[341] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

Bucharest , 7 January, 1919. [Received January 18.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/36

[342] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

Bucharest , 10 January, 1919. [Received January 22.]

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/38

[343] The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Belgrade , January 10, 1919—10 p.m. [Received January 14—3 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 771.72/2: Telegram

[344] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—12 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.00/9: Telegram

[345] The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand)

Paris , 13 January, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

763.72119/3215: Telegram

[Document 309]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

JASSY , November 9, 1918.

[Received December 28—5:55 p.m.]

133. This morning a message was sent to me with the King's wishes to accept me in audience this afternoon at four o'clock. When I arrived there, the King expressed his thanks for the communication which came here by wireless, in which you, [Mr.] Secretary, are quoted as recognizing the situation of Roumania and favoring the union of all the Roumanians who live in the territory adjoining the Kingdom of Roumania.¹ The King asked me to express his thanks to the President and to you, Mr. Secretary, for this good news to the Roumanians. After he said that, I answered that in recognition of that, Roumania should enter the war at once today and request the German army now in Roumania to capitulate, and by such action, aid and advocate to make the Germans accept all the conditions dictated by General Foch. I said that I had talked the matter over with our Military Attaché today at noon, who was of the same opinion as I regarding the matter. He said that this idea was a good one and he would at once consider it. We spoke over an hour together, and afterwards I spoke to Prince Stirbey, the King's adviser, and I told him that this idea came to me only at noon and I had had no time to talk it over with my colleagues, as we have a meeting only tomorrow. He said that this suggestion was a good one, and he would probably call me and my colleagues within a couple of hours to a conference. And surely, at 7:30 in the evening, I was called with my colleagues to the past and future Prime Minister Bratiano, where he already had a note prepared for the German Government, of which a copy was sent in the telegram of the Allied Ministers, asking the Germans to surrender within 24 hours. The mobilization of the army was immediately ordered. About an hour after, I received telegram from

Her Majesty the Queen of Roumania from Bicz, her summer home, with request to communicate it to you. She says:

“I saw with the greatest satisfaction the message issued at Washington by Mr. Lansing, concerning the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Roumanian Nation. The terms of this message are what we have always expected from the noble American people and Mr. Wilson, their eminent President, who have entered this war for the rights and liberties of all nations, small and great, in order to establish a new order of things in this world on a humanitarian and righteous basis. Roumanian people have endured, for the accomplishment of their national ideal for which they are struggling, for centuries every sacrifice and suffering. I beg you to convey also on my behalf to the President and Mr. Lansing, my heartfelt thanks and those of the Roumanian women for their interest in the justice of the Roumanian cause. I must also thank you personally for the part you have taken in defending the Roumanian interests by contributing to make known in America, and for which the Roumanian peoples owe you sincere gratitude. Marie.”

VOPICKA

¹ See Department's telegram No. 283, Nov. 5, 1918, 5 p.m., [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 785*](#) .

763.72119/3211: Telegram

[Document 310]

The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

JASSY , November 10, 1918.

[Received December 28—6:45 p.m.]

144 [134]. Before I received Department's number 133 [233],³ the radio brought the expressions regarding Roumania and therefore this is also an answer to the last-mentioned telegram. To this the Government answered as follows:

“Day after tomorrow [*sic*] when our entering into action was made possible and in the moment when the Allies established the definite conditions prescribed for the peace of the world, I have the honor to send your excellency the enclosed memorandum which shows the situation of our country at this hour. The love of justice which animates your noble people and your eminent President assures the triumph of our cause and we take this occasion to renew to you with emotion the extraordinary expression of gratitude of the whole of the Roumanian people for the testimony of friendship which was received from the American people in the moments of our worst trials and of which the last message of Mr. Lansing makes the last manifestation.”

The memorandum referred to will be telegraphed tomorrow.⁴ Have also received following letter from His Majesty the King:⁵

“Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, Washington. At the same time we received your Government's wonderful message concerning Roumania and the Roumanian people we heard of the Allied troops arriving on the Danube. After long and unheard of sufferings and humiliations we are at last able

to act again. Roumanian people have taken up arms and with the support of their faithful Allies they are looking forward to accomplishing their national ideal. In these moments our grateful thoughts are directed towards America who entered this war for the cause of justice and humanity of all nations. Signed Ferdinand.”

VOPICKA

³ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 785](#) .

⁴ See telegram No. 142, p. 387 [*Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 310](#), [Doc. 311](#), and [Doc. 312](#)*].

⁵ By telegram No. 109, Jan. 6, 1919, 4 p.m., the text of this letter was transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for President Wilson (Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/89).

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/3: Telegram

[Document 311]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

JASSY , November 12, 1918—6 p.m.

139. Yesterday Her Majesty the Queen of Roumania called me up on the phone and permitted me an audience, in the course of which she again expressed her thanks to the American people, the President and Mr. Lansing for recognizing the uniting of Roumania. She also stated that she was anxiously waiting for the food and other merchandise sent for the Roumanians by the American Red Cross. She also wanted to know if the foodstuffs which I have ordered will arrive soon. After speaking to Her Majesty for an hour she finished by praising America.

VOPICKA

763.72119/3217: Telegram

[Document 312]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

JASSY , November 13, 1918.
[Received December 28—10:15 p.m.]

142. The following is the memorandum referred to in my telegram
134 of November 10th:

“Roumania has the right, both morally and politically to realization of her claims. She knows that the Allies recognize them in virtue of the principles which they represent and which were formulated by President Wilson on September 27th, 1918, when he declared ‘That the solutions of the war are born from the nature and the circumstances of the war itself; all that the statesmen or assemblies could do is to realize or betray’.⁶ In fact the question of the Roumanians of Hungary was imposed by its own nature the day when the principles of justice, of independence and of liberty of the people were proclaimed; it was also imposed by the circumstances of the war when by the treaty of August 17, 1916,⁷ the Allies engaged themselves to assure to the Roumanians their national unity. Roumania has fulfilled her part of this treaty, the spirit of justice which animated the Allies made known to them that in the common work of great and small Roumania has bravely and loyally brought her contribution of efforts, sacrifices and results, because at an hour which could be decisive for the enemy her action has turned from other fronts and attracted on her an effort out of all proportion with the force which she represented in the fight; but naturally the results were also greater than those which she had the right to expect from her intervention.

The Peace of Bucharest⁸ which has never been sanctioned by the King nor ratified should not cancel the engagements of this treaty because Roumania has not submitted until after the peace of Brest-Litovsk⁹ and the subjection of Ukraine to the Central Powers, that is to say before a state of right in which Russia the representative of the Allies at the side of Roumania who had promised direct collaboration has made an agreement with the enemy.

Till the last hope of a smaller partial remaking of a Russian front Roumania resisted all menaces; as also up to last hour she resisted all proposals which, before the Russian definite peace, could have made her situation easier.

The official representative[s] of the Allies in Jassy have recognized that the armed tentative [?] exercised by the Roumanian army against the Bolsheviks, was the last military effort which anyone had the right to expect from her; after this effort the great care imposed by the common interest was to withdraw the Roumanian army from conditions which would have taken from it all possibility of a new action in some other phase of the world war. This phase has commenced.

It is natural because it is just that all which followed the Brest-Litovsk peace and the submission of Ukrainia to the enemy should be considered as null in its essence and in its results. And this because immediately the possibility presented itself Roumania, without a moment of delay, has retaken also on military ground a collaboration with the Allies dictated by the bonds which the King and the country have never considered as broken.”

VOPIOKA

⁶ For exact text, see [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 316](#) .

⁷ French text in R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e Convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

⁸ See [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771](#)⁸.

⁹ [Ibid., 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 442](#)⁹–[475](#)⁹.

763.72/12488

[Document 313]

***The Roumanian Chargé (Lahovary) to the
Secretary of State***

[Translation]

No. 1102

WASHINGTON , November 17, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: By order of my Government I have the honor to communicate to your Excellency the following cablegram dated October 28/November 10, signed by the new President of the Council, the General Aide de Camp Coanda, which I have just received.

“Contrary to assurances given, the Central Powers have increased their contingents of troops in Roumania and have also erected new fortifications, which has had the effect of causing the Allied Armies to concentrate their forces along the Danube and to bombard towns in Roumania where the German Commander had purposely erected batteries. Although the German Commander was fully aware that the Armistice concluded by Austria-Hungary only left fifteen days for the evacuation of German troops, he has not taken the necessary steps for the evacuation of Roumania during that time. Necessarily this will have the effect of an Allied offensive being carried on in Roumanian territory. In order to prevent Roumania from once more becoming a field of battle, a delay of 24 hours was allowed, terminating this evening at nine o'clock, for the Germans to evacuate national ground, and this period passed, they were to lay down their arms and abstain from any kind of violence or destruction, for which the German Government would be held responsible. The German Commander has been notified that in the event he refused to

comply, Roumania would be obliged to employ force in order to carry out this order.

For the mobilization of the Royal army all classes will be called upon commencing with the 1914 class.”

I take [etc.]

LAHOVARY

763.72/12306: Telegram

[Document 314]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 20, 1918—1 a.m.
[Received 10:24 a.m.]

5923. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 10th received by French Foreign Office on 18th:

“As soon as the French Minister informed us that the Allied armies had reached our territory and that the commander believing that the necessary conditions for our reentry into action were realized asked our cooperation, His Majesty then decreed the mobilization of the Roumanian army and demanded within 24 hours the capitulation of the German troops in Wallachia. Roumania acted thus in conformity with the treaty of August 4/17, 1916, which binds her to her Allies. She considered herself bound to act without a moment's delay as soon as the disastrous consequences of the disappearance of the Russian armies could be obliterated by the presence of an Allied army on the frontiers of the Kingdom. Faithful to our engagements we are proud and happy again to be able to find ourselves at the side of your glorious armies in the struggle for the triumph of the great cause for which the Allies and ourselves have already shed so much blood and willingly suffered proportion [ately] great trials. The King as a matter of fact immediately responded to the appeal of General Berthelot¹⁰ without hesitation and without awaiting the news which has still not reached us today that the Allied troops have crossed the Danube. He did not ask us either for a confirmation of our engagements before taking his decision. We confirm that in Roumania[’s] present state of misery and destitution the utility of mobilization is especially [apparent

omission] on account of the moral effect. But as soon as the Allies are in a position to assist her she could furnish important and excellent results which would greatly facilitate the action of the Allies in the efforts for the common cause.”

SHARP

¹⁰ French officer in command of an Allied army on the Roumanian front.

763.72/12333: Telegram

[Document 315]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 22, 1918—12 p.m.
[Received November 23—7:26 a.m.]

5975. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy,
November 17th:

“The Roumanian Government has reported to me that the German armies in withdrawing through Transylvania are seizing the railway rolling stock there. Although so far as we are aware from the information to hand at the present moment the terms of the armistice do not appear to cover this point. The Roumanian Government asks us to intervene so that the German troops may not appropriate to themselves public or private property which they find in Transylvania and especially the railway’s rolling stock. We draw attention to the political interest which lies in giving satisfaction to this request and to the military interest which may be found in protecting this railroad material which can be used for communication with the Allies.”

SHARP

Woodrow Wilson Papers: Telegram

[Document 316]

Queen Marie of Roumania to President Wilson

JASSY , November 24, 1918.
[Received November 28.]

I seize the very first moment of liberty after having been cut off by a relentless enemy from the rest of the world, to send you my own and my country's most heartfelt thanks for the wonderful help the American Red Cross is giving to my people, suffering sorely, at an hour when their need is greatest.

MARIE
Queen of Roumania

763.72/12341: Telegram

[Document 317]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 25, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received November 25—3:05 p.m.]

6003. Following joint telegram received from the Allied Ministers at Jassy dated November 21st, 1918:

“Urgent. The national committee of Dobroudja has sent us an address asking our intervention with our Governments in order to hasten the departure of Bulgarian troops and authorities in Dobroudja in order to render possible the return to their homes of the population now taking refuge in Moldavia and in Bessarabia where they are deprived of means of existence and of shelter.”

SHARP

763.72119/2798: Telegram

[Document 318]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 26, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received November 26—5:15 p.m.]

6023. Following joint telegram received from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 20th:

“Urgent. The delegates of the National Council of Transylvania have arrived at Jassy in order to notify us as well as the Roumanian Government, of their decision to proclaim their union with Roumania as soon as the units of Transylvania now in process of formation shall have established sufficient protection against the Hungarian troops.”

SHARP

763.72/12360: Telegram

[Document 319]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State 11***

PARIS , November 27, 1918—9 a.m.
[Received 9:43 p.m.]

6029. Following joint telegram received from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 23:

“The Roumanian Government has advised us, in asking that they be brought to the knowledge of our Governments, the following facts which are furthermore confirmed by all information at hand and especially by that supplied us by General Berthelot. The German troops still in Roumania in no degree respect the conditions imposed upon them by the conclusion of the armistice; in fact the troops in question, on leaving the ravished kingdom, are giving themselves over to veritable devastation, especially by blowing up the bridges, which on account of the season renders communication and the feeding of the population impossible in occupied territory. The depredations continue, especially the carrying off of provisions of all sorts, movables, and domestic animals; and what is worse, a large portion of the goods carried off from our sorely tried population are afterwards sold during the retreat at a low price in Transylvania. Therefore, the Roumanian Government asks our Governments to protest to the German Government, and to agree that a mixed commission composed of an equal number of Allied and Roumanian officers should be charged with guarding or overseeing in Transylvania, the retreat of the German troops, in order to prevent a repetition of the facts stated above.”

SHARP

¹¹ By telegram No. 6499, Dec. 3, 1918, 3 p.m., the Department instructed the Ambassador in France to repeat this telegram to Colonel House.

763.72/12363: Telegram

[Document 320]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 27, 1918—9 a.m.
[Received 7:56 p.m.]

6036. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers, dated Jassy, November 23.

“We transmit herewith to our Governments the following note of the Roumanian Government. See our telegram number 814. The Roumanian Government has been glad to [regard?] the assurance relative to the Dobrudja [as?] a new evidence of the intentions and sentiments of the Allies with regard to Roumania. Roumania has never feared that on the day of the victory of the Allies, the integrity of her territory would be sacrificed to the profit of the enemy against whom she has struggled by the side of her Allies through such these cruel experiences. The annulling of the treaty of Bucharest, from the first moment, has confirmed her legitimate confidence. She cannot only attribute a provisional and purely military character to the measures which have not yet permitted her to take possession of a part of her territory whose political status is fixed by international treaties, and the constitutional laws of the Kingdom. She sees with gratitude the friendly haste with which the inter-Allied command proposes to liberate the northern part of this unhappy province from the invaders, who by fire, blood and pillage have destroyed the work of a half of a century of civilization. It is, however, necessary to extend without delay, in conformity with the condition of the general armistice, the measures projected by the Allied command to all the territory of the Kingdom, such as it was in 1914. The interests of the cruelly tried population require the

prompt return of civil administration throughout the province, as is prescribed by the armistice for all countries evacuated by the enemy. It is just and natural that the Roumanian army should participate in the execution of the measure necessary for this operation, and should contribute thus to facilitate for the Allied command the work which would suffer dangerous delays in case the military contingent immediately available should not be sufficient: to this effect the command of the Roumanian troops has received the order to take the steps necessary to a cooperation with the Allied troops both on this side of the Danube and beyond it.”

SHARP

763.72119/2805: Telegram

[Document 321]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 28, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received 10.48 p.m.]

3222. Your 1221, November 18, 7 p.m.^{[13](#)} Query 4. Danish press on November 13 reported on the aversion [*assurance?*] of a Vienna newspaper, that Roumania had sent Hungary an ultimatum demanding that Siebenbuergen be immediately evacuated and left to the Roumanian Crown. Further details not given. Danish press reports this morning that Roumanian forces have actually occupied extensive Hungarian territories, and that fears are expressed in Budapest that the occupation will include all districts up to the capital. Repeated to House, referring his 112, November 16, 3 p.m. to Department.

GRANT-SMITH

^{[13](#)} Not printed; it transmitted the queries listed in telegram No. 112, Nov. 16. 1918, 3 p.m., from Colonel House, [vol. I, p. 197](#) .

763.72/12352¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 322]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

JASSY , November 30, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received December 4—5:55 a.m.]

The Roumanian Government removed this week to Bucharest and all the diplomats left Jassy Thursday and arrived in Bucharest yesterday the 29th. Stay permanently. Their Majesties, the King and Queen, will arrive tomorrow in Bucharest where great reception awaits them. General Berthelot and the Allied army will enter Bucharest at the same time as Their Majesties.

VOPICKA

763.72119/2977: Telegram

[Document 323]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

JASSY , December 2, 1918.

[Received December 12—4:01 p.m.]

6. Yesterday Roumania celebrated the greatest day in her history when the King and Queen reentered Bucharest at the head of the Roumanian and Allied armies accompanied by General Berthelot. The Diplomatic Corps with the chief military and civil officers met the King and Queen at the entrance to the city. The troops were then reviewed by the King, Queen and General Berthelot, the Royal family and diplomats watching same from the stands erected for that purpose. Many thousands of parade passed and the enthusiasm was great. After the parade the King and Queen together with the Royal family, diplomats and chief military and civil officers attended divine service at the Cathedral after which the King was presented by the Minister of War with a diploma from the Roumanian Army raising him to the rank of Marshal of Roumania. In evening the King gave a great banquet to the diplomats, the chief officers of the Roumanian and Allied armies and the principal civil officers at which he made a speech thanking the Allies for all they have done for Roumania and expressed his joy that Roumania would be enlarged and all the peoples of Roumanian race would at last come together.

VOPICKA

763.72119/2885: Telegram

[Document 324]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 4, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received 9:55 p.m.]

6123. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 24:

“It appears from a telegram of General Franchet d’Esperey that the Allied Governments have decided upon the evacuation from Dobroudja to [apparent omission] on the part of the Bulgarian troops and that until a definite adjustment of the status of this province by the peace treaty, it shall be occupied by the Allied troops. This declaration by the terms of which Dobroudja is regarded as debatable territory and which is in absolute contradiction to the reiterated assurances which we have given in conformity to instructions from our Governments, caused great concern to the King and the Roumanian Government. The Roumanian Government states that the reinstallation of the Roumanian authorities in Dobroudja should be immediate in order that this province may take part in the legislative elections which are to be held. We send *en clair* a note which the Roumanian Government has sent us on this subject. We call attention to the great importance of stopping all [apparent omission] concerning the fate of Dobroudja comprising the territory ceded to Roumania in 1913, which is considered here as an integral part of the ancient Roumanian territory. We warn our governments against the suggestions of Roumanians without official authority now in Paris and in London whose statements without doubt are not always in accord with the sentiments of the Roumanian Government and people.”

SHARP

763.72119/3795e: Telegram

[Document 325]

President Wilson to Queen Marie of Roumania

WASHINGTON , December 6, 1918.

Your Majesty's message^{[16](#)} has given the deepest pleasure, and I beg to assure you that it has been and always will be considered a privilege by the American people and government to do whatever is possible by way of friendly assistance to the people of Roumania.

WOODROW WILSON

^{[16](#)} [Ante](#), p. 390 [*Pg. 390 includes portions of [Doc. 314](#), [Doc. 315](#), and [Doc. 316](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.3123/13

[Document 326]

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to Colonel E. M. House

BERNE , December 7, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: At the request of the Roumanian Minister in Berne, and his associates, I desire to enclose you a copy of an "Aide-Memoire" which he left with me and which bears on the proclamation of Union made by Transylvania and other States with Roumania proper.

I have [etc.]

P[LEASANT] A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]^{[17](#)}

The Roumanian Legation in Switzerland to the American Legation

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. Seven hundred delegates from all the Roumanian provinces of Transylvania and Hungary, representing all social classes, all occupations, all religious confessions and all political opinions (among them appeared 40 Socialists), met December 1 at Alba Julia, the old capital of the principality of Transylvania and proclaimed unanimously, amid indescribable enthusiasm, the definitive and unconditional union of these provinces with Roumania.

One hundred thousand inhabitants, from all parts of the country, gathered around the place of meeting, awaited the result of the deliberations. When the result was made known to the throng it was

received with delirious joy. The Roumanian people knew such happiness as never before.

2. The conditions of the armistice arranged between the Magyar authorities and the high command of the Allied Army of the East should be modified as follows:

- (a) A new arrangement ought to be made between the Roumanian Government and the Allies, who are henceforth its allies.
- (b) The old armistice concluded at Belgrade, signed by a Government foreign to Roumania (the Magyar Government) divides the Roumanian people into two parts, which causes difficulties and considerable confusion.
- (c) The Magyar officials, especially the Magyar police, should be disbanded and the authority transferred to the Roumanian Government, which undertakes and guarantees the preservation of order.

The presence of the Magyar officials, hostile to the native element (the Roumanians) and grieved at seeing themselves deprived of these provinces, daily provokes regrettable incidents whose consequences cannot be foreseen.

3. Two great dangers are to be guarded against:

- (a) Famine, productive of rash actions, and the lack of articles of prime necessity, such as textiles, thread, cotton, leather, etc.
- (b) The Bolshevik menace, which is encouraged even by the Magyar Government. Especially we call attention to the presence at Budapest of the friend and co-worker of Lenin, the famous Bulgarian anarchist, Dr. Rakovsky, who is in most dangerous company for the spread of Bolshevism in Slovakia, Yugoslavia and particularly Transylvania.

We have on this subject proof of the complicity of the Karolyi Government which wishes to provoke trouble in these regions with the sole purpose of maintaining its hold upon these provinces which are escaping from its control.

¹⁷ Translation supplied by the editor.

763.72/12517a: Telegram

[Document 327]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 9, 1918—7 p.m.

6579. Associated Press on November 12, 1918, reported under Paris date a despatch of the Frankfort *Gazette* in Budapest that the new Roumanian Government had declared war on Germany. Please ascertain if it is a fact that the Roumanian Government has declared war on Germany, and whether the French Government now regards Roumania as at war with Germany on the side of the Allies.

POLK

763.72/12514: Telegram

[Document 328]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 11, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received December 12—3:45 a.m.]

6234. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers dated Jassy, November 12.

“The Roumanian Government has ceased all movements of Roumanian troops at the moment prescribed by Marshal Foch. This order was maintained by all [apparent omission] the enemy military forces. But the Roumanian Government has brought to our notice the necessity in which it finds itself to intervene everywhere where anarchy has been organized by the enemy after his retreat where the Roumanian population claims its protection, especially in Bukovina and in Transylvania where grave excesses are being committed by the Austrian and Hungarian Bolsheviks. The famine and the propaganda organized by the Germans in “Wallachia may create at certain points a dangerous state of affairs. Consulted by the Roumanian Government, we expressed the opinion that the order of Marshal Foch should apply to all military operations properly speaking, but not to police operations”.

SHARP

763.72/12515: Telegram

[Document 329]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 12, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received 8 p.m.]

6244. Department's number 6579, December 9th, 7 p.m. Mr. Pichon informs me that while there is no doubt but that the Roumanian Government is in a frame of mind to declare war on Germany, yet as a matter of fact the new Roumanian Government will not go into power until the coming January. He understands that no declaration of war could be made by the present Government as now constituted, but he looks upon Roumania as to all intents and purposes an ally though not formally so recognized.

SHARP

763.72/12518: Telegram

[Document 330]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 12, 1918—12 p.m.
[Received December 13—7:07 a.m.]

6258. My number 6244, December 12th. Since sending my telegram I have had a talk with both Mr. Antonesco Roumanian Minister to France and Mr. Danielopol, new Roumanian Minister to the United States, in which they declared that unless the Allied powers desired Roumania to declare war on Germany no such action would be taken either under the present or the new government to come in at the beginning of the year. They said that the French General Berthelot had asked some Roumanian divisions to be sent into Ukrainia some time ago which had been done but that there was no thought of any other military operations on the part of Roumania. They said that while the best of order now obtained in their country yet the food situation and that of clothing, particularly shoes, were very acute. They hoped to see Mr. Hoover to obtain speedy relief to supply such needs.

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/34: Telegram

[Document 331]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received December 15—11:20 a.m.]

26. Following from Roumanian National Council, Vienna, Dec. 9th:

“Informed that the Serbs prevent the return of spectators [Roumanians] of the Banat who attended National meeting of Dec. 1st at Alba Julia and intern them at Belgrade subjecting them to very ill treatment. The population of Roumania begs that steps be kindly taken to have another army of the Entente take the place of the Serbian, an [as] army of occupation. Sunday, Dec. 1st at four o'clock, an unknown malefactor fired several shots from the window of the present Minister, Doctor Etienne C. Pop, without hurting anyone. The War Minister, Doctor Pop, was then at Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar) at the Constituent Congress. It is not yet known whether it was an act of vengeance or terrorism. Investigation has been set on foot and has already uncovered facts that [are compromising] several members of the Magyar Society. Roumanian National Council, Vienna.”

POLK

763.72/12545: Telegram

[Document 332]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 16, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received December 16—11:52 a.m.]

6303. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy dated the Army of the Danube via Salonica December 12:

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs us that the European Commission of the Danube not having been in session for three years, and in consideration of the fact that there is occasion for the discussion of numerous and important questions concerning this international institution, he advises us that the Royal Government would be glad of the arrival at Galatz of our delegates to said commission as soon as possible.”

SHARP

763.72/12564: Telegram

[Document 333]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 19, 1918—12 m.
[Received 11:10 p.m.]

6395. Your 6579, 9th, and my 6244 and 6258, 12th. Am now in receipt of a note from Foreign Office stating that several Parisian newspapers did [sic] indeed, towards mid-November, published information to the effect that the new Roumanian Government had declared war upon Germany which information in all likelihood resulted from a confusion. On November 9th the Roumanian Government served an ultimatum upon Marshal Mackensen enjoining him to begin evacuating Roumania within 24 hours. This ultimatum very probably gave rise to the incorrect news transmitted to the United States. No declaration of war ensued nor could reasonably ensue inasmuch as two days later the armistice was concluded between the Allies and Germany.

SHARP

763.72119/3769

[Document 334]

The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 58

BUCHAREST , 19 December, 1918.
[Received February 17, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that since we came back to Bucharest many celebrations connected with theatrical performances and banquets have been given in honor of the delegates from Bukovina, Transylvania and Banat. These delegates brought in the resolutions of the inhabitants of these districts to join unconditionally Roumania, their mother country. I spoke with the delegates of Transylvania and Bukovina, and they all expressed their joy that they can join Roumania.

I beg to call the attention of the Department to my telegram No. 121 of October 9th 1918,^{[19](#)} in which I stated that Banat was given by arrangement of the Entente to Roumania, but I personally know that only half of it is occupied by Roumanians, the other half being occupied by Jugo-Slavs, and therefore there is certain to be a dispute about it between the Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs, who will claim at least the western half of it.

The division of the Banat will have to be left to the Peace Conference for decision to avoid future disagreements.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

^{[19](#)} Not printed.

763.72/12581: Telegram

[Document 335]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 23, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 23—5 p.m.]

6447. Reference your 6723, December 21, 7 p.m.^{[19](#)} When telegraphing to the Department joint telegrams from the Allied Ministers at Jassy, this Embassy has automatically sent copies to the American Mission. This custom has also been followed with all telegrams and other communications containing information which is thought to be of interest to the Mission. See my 6144, December 5, 7 p.m.^{[20](#)}

SHARP

^{[19](#)} Not printed.

^{[20](#)} [Vol. I, p. 205](#) .

763.72119/3222: Telegram

[Document 336]

The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State 21

BUCHAREST , December 5 [27], 1918—4 p.m.
[Received December 30—10:27 a.m.]

32. As I expected, the conflict between the Roumanians and Servians on account of Banat has already commenced. The Prime Minister of Roumania gave me yesterday the following telegram, which he says he has received from Doctor Stefan Pop, chief of Army and Public Safety, Sibiu (Hermanstadt) with the request that I telegraph it to the Department:

“The Servian army in the Banat has interned in Belgrade hundreds of Roumanians from the Banat. The town of Arad is full of refugees who have fled from Banat in terror of the Servian army. The Servian commander at Timisoara has dissolved the Roumanian National Council in the Timis district and all the Roumanian National Guards. The Roumanian population are profoundly irritated against the Servian army which they have always admired and with which they suffered during the days of cruel trials.”

As I reported before, two-thirds of the population of western Banat are Servians and only one-third Roumanians, so that if the principle of nationality is adopted the Servians should get the western portion of the Banat. But on the other hand the Roumanians claim there will always be trouble if the entire Banat is not given to Roumania which will bring their frontier to the Danube on one side and the Tissa River on the other side and divide them from the Servians, so that there will never be any trouble, once the boundaries are made. They also claim that the Entente Powers promised the whole Banat to them. After receiving the above-mentioned telegram I sent for

Servian Chargé d’Affaires here and asked him for information regarding it and he made the following statement: The contents of the telegram mentioned are not true as the Servian troops operate in Banat under the French High Command; he Said further that the Entente Powers should not be bound too strictly, to the contract made before the war because Roumania will get more land than she was promised. She will get the northern part of Bukovina and she wants Bessarabia, neither of these two territories being contained in the contract mentioned. If President Wilson’s programme regarding the principle of nationalities will be accepted there is no doubt that western Banat will be given to the Servians. Not only should Servia receive this part of the Banat on the nationalities question but also for the protection of Belgrade, her capital, opposite which this portion of Banat is situated. This surely is a very important case for the peace conference to decide.²² Servia’s only hope is in the United States.

VOPICKA

²¹ Transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in the Department’s telegram No. 52, Dec. 31, 1918, 5 p.m. Several passages in the telegram as received in the Department have been corrected on the basis of a copy enclosed in a despatch of Jan. 9, 1919, from the Minister in Roumania to the Secretary of State at Paris (Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/3, enclosure 7).

²² This sentence did not appear in the telegram as received in the Department of State.

763.72119/3242: Telegram

[Document 337]

The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

BUCHAREST , December 27, 1918.

[Received January 1, 1919—4:04 p.m.]

34. I was asked by my colleagues, the French, English, and Italian Ministers, to send the following telegram which they have sent themselves to their respective Governments and which has reference to the agreement made before the war between these three countries, Russia and Roumania:

“The Roumanian Government is disturbed because it has not yet received precise assurances that the engagements taken regarding the convention of the 17 August, 1916, and mentioned again in the memorandum which we have sent November 10th by our identic telegram number 767.²³ As we have already declared the Roumanian Government considers that said convention was never broken, not only morally and politically, but also judicially. The peace of Bucharest, which was never ratified and which was imposed by *force majeure* owing to the hopeless situation which resulted from the treachery of Russia, was absolutely not the fault of Roumania. The Roumanian Government states that if any doubt exists as to the last statement it should be proven by their coming into the war before the armistice was signed. The King and the Prime Minister received on that occasion from London and Paris a telegram of congratulation that Roumania again joined the Allies. Mr. Bratiano showed us the urgent necessity to disperse in the public opinion every uncertainty on said point. The Government needs all the moral authority it can get so that it can control the situation, which is very grave and which results from the extreme misery and famine. Any deception

from the national point of view will disappoint them in presence of that situation and make it impossible for Roumania to cooperate with the Allies in Russia.[”]

I know that Bratiano is forcing the Entente Ministers to give to Roumania not only everything which was promised by the Entente but a great deal more. My opinion is that this copy the Entente telegram is sent for the purpose to influence our country regarding the disputed part of Banat in favor of Roumania.

VOPICKA

²³ For text of the memorandum, see telegram No. 142, Nov. 13, 1918, from the Minister in Roumania, p. 387 [*Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 310](#), [Doc. 311](#), and [Doc. 312](#)*].

763.72119/3244: Telegram

[Document 338]

The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Acting Secretary of State

BUCHAREST , December 28, 1918.

[Received January 2, 1919—5:44 p.m.]

35. The committees of Transylvanians which brought the documents for the union of Transylvania with Roumania^{[24](#)} came to the Legation and asked me to extend their hearty thanks to President Wilson and our country for freeing them from the Hungarian yoke.

VOPICKA

^{[24](#)} See p. 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 324](#), [Doc. 325](#), and [Doc. 326](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 771.72/1: Telegram

[Document 339]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 30, 1918—11 p.m.

6572. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy dated Bucharest December 27th:

“The Roumanian government has communicated to us the following telegram which it has received from the Directing Committee of Transylvania:

‘The Serbian army of Banat has interned at Belgrade hundreds of the Roumanians of Banat. [The town of Arad?] is full of refugees which the terror of the Serbian armies has driven from Banat. The Serbian Commander of Timisoara has dissolved the Roumanian National Council of the district of Timis and all the Roumanian National guards. The Roumanian people is profoundly indignant at the Serbian army which it has always admired and with which it has suffered during the days of cruel trials.’

In order to avoid new conflicts it is indispensable to have all of Banat temporarily occupied by Allied troops. The occupation of a portion of this province by the Serbians results without doubt from the armistice concluded between Austria and Italy. It may favor the Italian policy which tends to set Roumania against Serbia in order to weaken the last-named in the Adriatic. But we cannot lend ourselves to this action without jeopardizing for the time our prestige and the harmony necessary between the Allies. It does not suffice to declare as we have already done according to our instructions, that the occupation of territory by the troops of a certain

nationality will nowise influence the definite allotment of these territories. One must in addition take clever measures to avoid violent incidents which embitter the relations between the Roumanians and the Serbians. Mr. Bratiano moreover has not failed to point out to us that our *demarche* is without object as far as he is concerned since the Roumanian troops occupy no territory promised to another Allied State whilst the Serbian troops occupy the Banat. The rights of Roumania have been recognized by the Entente when the Allies entered the War. We have however learned that the Roumanian troops are said to have occupied a portion of the Bukovina beyond the limits fixed by the convention of August 17th, 1916. If this infringement is confirmed we shall not fail to make the befitting observations."

BLISS

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 340]

The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , January 4, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you are doubtless aware, the *Moniteur Officiel* of Roumania has published, on Dec. 26, a decree uniting Transylvania and the Banat to Roumania.

This has, in the eyes of my Gov^t no consequence one way or the other from the International point of view, for such annexations cannot be consecrated by Roumania alone, but by the general Treaty of Peace.

My Gov^t consider that, to prevent all misunderstandings, it w^d be appropriate that the French, Amⁿ, British and Italian Gov^{ts} prescribe to their representatives in Bucharest to express themselves in this way and remind the Roumanian Gov^t that the Congress of peace can alone decide, and will do so, taking into acc^t the g^{al} situation and the wishes of the population.

My Gov^t would be very grateful if you agreed to send to your Representative in Bucharest instructions to that effect, asking him to act in agreement with his three colleagues.

It w^d seem appropriate also that, through the representatives of the same countries in Belgrade the Serbian Gov^t be informally made aware of our point of view.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/36

[Document 341]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

BUCHAREST , 7 January, 1919.
[Received January 18.]

SIR: To-day the Prime Minister called a meeting of the Entente Ministers and myself, and stated that he is dissatisfied with the treatment which he is receiving from the Entente Powers. He impressed upon the Entente Ministers that his country is entitled to the whole Banat and Dobrogea in accordance with the contract which he signed with the allies and which has not been broken by him, and he wanted them to notify him whether they will keep this agreement or not. He called me to the meeting for the purpose of hearing the opinion of my country. I told him that my Government had not expressed any opinion, but that my opinion was that the whole question will be settled by the Peace Commission, and that all the Allies should be in favor of establishing a permanent peace in Europe on the nationality basis, and should not let a small piece of land here or there hinder them.

The Entente Ministers sent a telegram urging their Governments to give the whole of the Banat to Roumania as per their agreement, also the whole of Dobrogea, and indirectly attacked in their telegram Mr. Take Ionescu, who is at present in Paris.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3312/38

[Document 342]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

BUCHAREST , 10 January, 1919.
[Received January 22.]

SIR: From the correspondence that I am sending you,^{[25](#)} you will easily see that there is a great deal of bitterness between the Servians and the Roumanians on account of the western portion of the Banat. I have been asked about this both by Mr. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, and by the Chargé d’Affaires of Servia here, and I said it would be a great deal better if Roumania could agree with Servia before the opening of the Peace Conference, and I also told Mr. Bratiano that it would be well for him to go to Paris to speak to the different representatives of the Allies there. He now tells me that he has decided to go to the Conference, and will leave Bucharest tomorrow. I am sure that this question can be settled between the Roumanians and the Servians if the Roumanians will receive a free hand regarding the northern portion of Bukovina and Bessarabia.

I am sending this latest news for your information and consideration.

I have [etc.]

CHARLES J. VOPICKA

^{[25](#)} Enclosures not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 771.72/2: Telegram

[Document 343]

The Chargé in Serbia (Dodge) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

BELGRADE , January 10, 1919—10 p.m.
[Received January 14—3 p.m.]

10. For the Secretary of State and for repetition to the Department of State. It is reported that Roumania has complained to the Allies that the Servian Military authorities are interning large numbers of Roumanians in the Banat. Servian Chief of Staff assures me that only between thirty and forty Roumanians have been interned temporarily pending investigation owing to their provocative behaviour to the Servian troops and incitements to disorder.

Roumanian Prime Minister arriving here in a few days en route to Paris is expected to confer regarding Banat.

I have communicated foregoing to the Secretary of State.

DODGE

Paris Peace Conf. 871.00/9: Telegram

[Document 344]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 11, 1919—12 a.m.

6707. Identical telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy dated Bucharest January 6th:

“The President of the Council has called us in meeting this morning to communicate to us the following declaration:

‘The Roumanian Government continued the struggle as long as it was possible even after the total defection of Russia and in spite of the hostility of that power whose cooperation constituted an important promise of the Entente. Roumania did her full duty and fulfilled to the extreme limit her obligations to her allies. The suspension of arms represented by the treaty of Bucharest which was never sanctioned by the King ceased without a day’s delay as soon as the Army of the East was in position to take the place abandoned by the Russian Army at the Roumanian frontier. The Royal Government therefore does not doubt that the treaty of August 17th, 1916 is fully in force. However, in a sentiment of solidarity with the general interests which the Allies have at heart it is ever disposed to facilitate their work. To that end and taking into consideration the new condition of Russia which precludes the danger of her intervention in the affairs [apparent omission] it would have no further objection to calling arbiters designated by the Allies to examine the Serbian population of Banat, that of Roumania, of Serbia, and

of the Macedonians to be equally investigated according to the same principles.'

Mr. Bratiano has again called our attention to the extreme gravity of the internal situation which is resulting from the famine and from the menace of Bolshevism. There would be no way out of it, he says, if difficulties of an external order were added to it. In this case he would not know how to advise the King on the choice of his successor. In fact the party of Mr. Take Ionescu has not in the country a sufficient basis for permitting him to assume the power without the concurrence of General Averesco. Now this latter seeks to impose himself by demagogical means and is said to have had clandestine relations with the enemy. Moreover, these two personalities inspire an equal distrust to the King. We hope very sincerely that our Governments will receive favorably the above declaration. It furnishes the sole means of avoiding a redoubtable crisis by saving Roumania from what everyone here would consider as a disgrace and Roumania it is said would be dishonored before history as not having fulfilled her agreements if the treaty of 1916 were annulled by the Allies. This formula moreover leaves a door open to concessions which would be judged necessary. It is also important to give no pretext for recriminations which would not be without foundation. Aside from other serious griefs against the Allies it is repeated here that the first cause of the country's disaster was the impotence of the Entente to [apparent omission] her formal engagement to undertake the offensive of Saloniki one week before the entrance into action of Roumania."

BLISS

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 345]

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand)

PARIS , 13 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to your letter dated January 4th,^{[26](#)} regarding the question of making representations in connection with the publication of a decree of the Roumanian Government uniting Transylvania and Banat to Roumania, I take pleasure in informing you that the matter has been referred to the American Embassy here for appropriate action.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

^{[26](#)} [Ante](#), p. 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of [Doc. 340](#) and [Doc. 341](#)].

Poland

[\[346\] The Minister in Switzerland \(Stovall \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Pontarlier [Berne], November 14, 1918—3 p.m. [Received November 15—9:45 p.m.]

860c.01/166: Telegram

[\[347\] The British Chargé \(Barclay \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 15, 1918.

763.72119/2673

[\[348\] The Chargé in the Netherlands \(Bliss \) to the Secretary of State](#)

The Hague , November 16, 1918—4 p.m. [Received November 17—10:24 a.m.]

860c.01/168: Telegram

[\[349\] The Secretary of State to President Wilson](#)

Washington , November 18, 1918.

763.72119/2624¹/₂a

[350] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 18, 1918. [Received December 2.]

860c.01/179

[351] The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 26, 1918.

860c.01/176

[352] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen , November 28, 1918—1 p.m. [Received 11:40 p.m.]

763.72119/2806: Telegram

[353] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 29, 1918—4 p.m.

860c.4016/186b: Telegram

[354] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome , December 5, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 6—11:56 a.m.]

860c.01/180: Telegram

[355] Memorandum by Major Julian L. Coolidge

December 11, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.20/3

[356] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 12, 1918. [Received December 18.]

Paris Peace Conf. 8611.0146/1

[357] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 21, 1918—3 p.m.

860c.01/185a: Telegram

[358] The President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski) to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 27, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/5

[359] The President of the National Council of the Western Ukrainian Republic (Petrouchevitch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Vienna [undated]. [Received December 29, 1918.]

763.72119/3224: Telegram

[360] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne [undated]. [Received January 1, 1919—10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 760c.62/3: Telegram

[361] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , January 3, 1919. [Received February 25.]

763.72119/3897

[362] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 3, 1919—4 p.m. [Received January 4—1:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.20/1: Telegram

[363] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen , January 4, 1919—11 p.m. [Received January 6—9:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/13: Telegram

[364] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 6, 1919—8 p.m. [Received 10:22 p.m.]

860c.01/192: Telegram

[365] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris , 6 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 811.2222/1

[366] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

Paris , January 8, 1919—3 p.m. [Received 6:58 p.m.]

860c.01/195: Telegram

[367] Colonel William R. Grove to General Marlborough Churchill

Warsaw , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/14

[368] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 9, 1919—12 [noon].

Paris Peace Conf. 86Oc.20/1: Telegram

[369] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[Paris ,] 9 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 86Oc.20/4

[370] The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Chew) to the Chargé in France (Bliss).

Paris , January 13, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 86Oc.20/5a

[371] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 15, 1919—1 p.m. [Received January 16—3:20
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 86Oc.20/7: Telegram

[372] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew).

Paris , January 17, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/8

[373] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 18, 1919—5 p.m.

86oc.01/198: Telegram

[374] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris , January 23, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/9

[375] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 25, 1919—4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/7: Telegram

[376] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris , January 27, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/10

860c.01/166: Telegram

[Document 346]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Secretary of State***

PONTARLIER [BERNE], November 14, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received November 15—9:45 p.m.]

5775. I have received the following information which comes from the Polish Government in Warsaw: Pilsudski was received by the Regent, Lubomirsky, on his arrival in Warsaw. Pilsudski's relations with the Regency are friendly and he has been requested to form a government for all Poland including Silesia. A meeting of all Polish parties has been called for the formation of a coalition cabinet and Daszinski who was the leader of the Republican movement which lately began in Lublin will also be present. Polish troops have left Cracow for eastern Galicia and have retaken Przemysl. The German authorities have informed the Polish Government that Podlachia, the Government of Chelm, has been turned over to Poland. The Yugoslav authorities have informed the Polish Government through the Polish mission at Vienna that Polish soldiers returning from the Italian front will not be dissolved. Polish representatives have been appointed to Prague and Laibach.

STOVALL

763.72119/2673

[Document 347]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 1278

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that the representative in London of the Polish National Committee has been informed that His Majesty's Government would view with serious displeasure any military or other action of the Polish Government in East Galicia or elsewhere of a nature to prejudice or forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference.

WASHINGTON , November 15, 1918.

860c.01/168: Telegram

[Document 348]

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

THE HAGUE , November 16, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received November 17—10:24 a.m.]

5208. Following statement received from Wlodek, unofficial representative of Polish Government in Holland, who is in communication with Pilsudski to whom counsel [*council?*] of Regency has [apparent omission] entire formation of coalition government. Poland must introduce political and social reforms of great importance which will change the life of the country and offset influence of Russian Bolsheviks and German revolution; that these reforms when introduced by a well and strongly organized Government can be effected quietly and bring great prosperity to the country but by a weak government fraught with internal and foreign difficulties can only result in anarchy and destruction of the social order and culture of the country; that it would, therefore, be to the interest of the Associated Governments to [apparent omission] and aid that government in Poland which can guarantee the maintenance of order. It is therefore necessary that the republican government now being formed should as soon as definitely constituted be recognized by the United States and the Allies and receive their economic and moral support. It is not sufficient for the United States and the Allies merely to be in relation with the Polish institution's committees abroad which represent only one political party of Poland. The moral and economic support which the Polish Government would receive in entering relations with the United States of America would give it greater strength than the assistance of soldiers of the Associated Governments who might be in Poland. Every intervention in the internal affairs of the country, as for instance the question of the alleged maltreatment of Jews in Poland, which has recently been unjustly raised, injures the order established

in Poland as well as the friendly relations between the new Polish states and the United States of America. The government which is now being formed in Poland should be composed of moderate democratic elements, that is of the national moderate socialists, of whom Ignace Baszynski is the President, and the united parties of peasants of former Russian and Austrian Poland.

BLISS

763.72119/2624¹/2a

[Document 349]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , November 18, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose two radiograms which have been received—one addressed to the Governments of the four Powers¹ and the other to you personally.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

General Pilsudski to President Wilson

WARSAW [November 17, 1918].

In the name of the Polish Army under my Chief Command I beg you, Mr. President, kindly to consent to letting the Polish military formations now under the American flag be sent at the earliest possible date to Poland and incorporated in the Polish Army henceforth united under my command. The Polish Nation which was so long subjected to occupation of the country by foreign troops is now preparing in the greatest enthusiasm to welcome to the native land the sons of the Motherland scattered the world over. It appeals to all the soldiers of Polish birth who have fought under foreign flags. Your consent, Mr. President, whom Poland regards as its foremost protection, will be taken by the whole nation as one more proof of your interest in and good will to the Polish cause.

PILSUDSKI

¹ This radiogram is a translation of part of note received through the Swiss Minister, Nov. 26, 1918, *ante*, p. 34 [*Pg. 34 includes portions of [Doc. 23](#), [Doc. 24](#), and [Doc. 25](#)*] (763.72119/2811).

860c.01/179

[Document 350]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 6791

PARIS , November 18, 1918.
[Received December 2.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 5866, November 16th, 11 A. M.,^{[2](#)} I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed copy and translation of a memorandum received by me from the Polish National Committee protesting against the occupation of Lwow and Przemysl by Ukrainian troops commanded by and composed largely of Germans, and against the machinations of Germany to prevent the union of Galicia and Poland.

I have acknowledged receipt of this memorandum to the Polish National Committee.

I have [etc.]

W. G. SHARP

[Enclosure—Translation]^{[3](#)}

The Polish National Committee to the American Ambassador in France (Sharp)

MEMORANDUM

The Polish National Committee considers it to be its duty to bring the following facts to the knowledge of the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States:

Germany and Austria, forced by the Allies to capitulate, and seeing that the Polish question will not be solved in accordance with their plan, are endeavoring, with the aid of the Ukrainians, devoted to their cause since the beginning of the war, to obstruct the unification of the new-born Poland.

Since Galicia proclaimed its separation from Austria in order to form a single independent State united to the other Polish territories, German armed forces, followed by Ukrainian detachments and acting, it is alleged, in the interests of the Ukrainian cause, occupied, after a struggle with the Polish Legionnaires, the cities of Lwow and Przemysl. The fact that the Archduke William, German candidate for the Ukrainian throne, commanded these troops and that the latter for the most part were composed of Austro-Germans clearly shows the object pursued and indicates who was to benefit by the movement.

To render Poland as weak as possible and to create a Ukraine governed by Germany—such were the aims of German policy in Eastern Europe. To this end Germany has opposed during the entire war a union of Galicia and Poland and is even now exerting a supreme effort to prevent this union. It is for the same reasons that the Germans have granted the Ukrainians, by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk,^{3a} the province of Chelm which has always been a part of the kingdom of Poland and whose Polish character was proven even by the Austrian census.

The Polish National Committee protests vigorously against these German attempts which infringe the integrity of Polish territory and which at the same time are contrary to the interests of the Entente in Eastern Europe. It declares that not only are the principal cities of Eastern Galicia Polish because 80 percent of their population is Polish, but also that all of Eastern Galicia, which has been a part of Poland since the XIV century, is, by its civilization, as well as by its history, inseparably bound to Poland and could not be detached from it.

PARIS, November 13, 1918.

² Not printed.

³ File translation revised.

^{3a} [Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 442–475](#).

860c.01/176

[Document 351]

***The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the
Secretary of State*** [4](#)

[Translation][5](#)

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government informs me that it has been asked by the Polish National Committee for recognition as a *de facto* government with regard to

1. Foreign representation,
2. Political direction of the Polish Army,
3. Civil protection of Polish nationals abroad.

The Bolshevik movement showing tendencies to develop at an alarming rate in Poland, it seems necessary, in the interest of the Poles and ourselves, to strengthen the parties of order which have heretofore lacked cohesion, and it would appear that recognition of the National Committee by the Allies would justify its position and create a central organ around which the pro-Entente elements which are now scattering their activities could rally.

The Government of the Republic therefore believes that the request of the National Committee which since its organization has always showed itself true to the Entente is justified and would for its part be inclined to grant the desired recognition. I would be glad if the Allied Governments could come to an agreement on this point.

I should be thankful to Your Excellency if you would kindly let me know at your earliest convenience whether the Federal Government is ready for its part to adopt this view.

Be pleased [etc.]

JUSSERAND

4 Copy transmitted to the Ambassador in France, for Colonel House, in instruction No. 2406, Dec. 10, 1918.

5 File translation revised.

763.72119/2806: Telegram

[Document 352]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , November 28, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received 11:40 p.m.]

Your 1222 [1221?] November 18, 7 p.m.^{[6](#)}

Query 2. According to Koenigsberg and Danzig papers Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils control these cities.

Query 5. There has been no letter received Polish or Bolshevik uprisings in Posen, Prussian Silesia or in the neighborhood of Danzig according to the information at the Legation's disposal. In Posen the Poles have secured a majority of representatives in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils but the latest German press reports state that this organization's Polish and German members are cooperating. The earlier reports that Polish legionaries were marching on Posen have now been denied. It is further reported that a Landtag for parts of the province of Posen is being engineered from Warsaw whither various Polish members of the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag have gone. It seems improbable that the present Berlin Government would attempt to oppose any such meeting. In Silesia there has been a strike in the coal mines along the Polish frontier of Germany, attributed to Polish agitation. Yesterday's Berlin papers report that work has now been resumed. Repeated to House referring his 112, November 16, 3 p.m. to Department.

GRANT-SMITH

^{[6](#)} Telegram No. 1221 not printed; it transmitted the queries listed in telegram No. 112, Nov. 16, 1918, 3 p.m., from Colonel House, [vol. I, p.](#)

860c.4016/186b: Telegram

[Document 353]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 29, 1918—4 p.m.

102. Department has received many communications from Jews alleging pogroms and other mistreatment Jews by Poles. Polish organizations deny all these charges. Very important Department be informed true facts quickly as possible. Any Americans sent to Poland should carefully investigate and report this matter.

LANSING

860c.01/180: Telegram

[Document 354]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State

ROME , December 5, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 6—11:56 a.m.]

2447. Polish Committee in Italy anxious regarding alleged activities of enemy in spreading exaggerated reports of anti-Semitic pogroms in Galicia. This committee concedes riots have taken place, but that they were small affairs due to Bolsheviki's influence, and were between Poles and Ukrainians, Jews having sided with Ukrainians, who are controlled and directed by Austrian generals. Committee also worried over tendency in international circles to reduce territorial holdings of new Polish States. They assert that over three million prisoners will pass through Poland, and they urge sending American troops to Poland to reestablish order and check spreading of Bolshevism.

It is announced that Pope has notified Archbishop of Warsaw that Vatican has recognized officially independence of Poland. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/3

[Document 355]

Memorandum by Major Julian L. Coolidge 8

DECEMBER 11, 1918.

1. For some time there has been much discussion of the question of sending some of the Polish Troops, now in France, to Poland. The reasons for such a step are obvious.

For years, there has been no generally recognized Government in Poland. At the present moment there is a *de facto* Government of General Pilsudski recently released from a German prison, but that Government lacks stability. Moreover, the Bolshevist danger is very acute. The government of Lenine is spending large sums of money in Bolshevist propaganda in Poland. The German Government, also, has favoured the revolutionary movement in Poland with the view to embarrassing a neighbouring state and, recently, a large number of penniless and half starving Polish and Russian prisoners have been thrust from Germany into Poland and left to shift for themselves.

The need, now, for an armed force is so great that Pilsudski has telegraphed to the various Allied Governments asking for the release of Poles which [*with?*] various armies to help in maintaining order in Poland.

2. The first Polish Division in France is a well organized unit and under the command of the capable French General Vidalon. Some of its regiments have already seen service. Such a division may be of great value maintaining order in Poland, but the question of sending it is beset with political difficulties.

3. The *de facto* Government of Poland is that of Pilsudski as already stated. On the other hand, there is, in Paris, the bulk of the Polish National Committee which Committee has been formally recognized

by the Allied Governments as the basis for the constitution of the future Polish State.

It is very hard to form a just estimate of the relations between these two Polish Governments. Pilsudski has sent Representatives to Paris and the National Committee has just sent one of his Members to Poland.

It is realized by all intelligent Poles that, unless unity of action can be found, the Peace Congress will deem Poland incapable of Self Government and will be little disposed to aid the Polish Cause, but it is easier to approve of unity in theory than to carry it out in practise.

4. If the first Polish Division is going to Poland, shall it go as a Polish or as an Allied Army? If it goes as a Polish Army, what will be its relations to the Pilsudski's Government when it has been organized in sworn allegiance to the Authority of the National Committee? If it goes as one of the Allied Armies, what becomes of the promise, to all who entered it, they would join in a truly National Organization to fight under their Country's Flag?

5. The question of sending this Polish Division to Poland cannot be separated from that of the transfer of the Polish National Committee to that country. If the soldiers go before National Committee does, they are cut off from the Authority upon whom they depend and are in danger of being employed for purposes which that Authority does not approve. If the National Committee goes before the soldiers, they are without the reliable backing in case of armed conflicts. Finally, if the National Committee and the Troops go at the same time, there is danger that it will seem as though the Committee were entering the country accompanied by an armed force in order to suppress their political arrivals [*rivals?*].

6. Such are some of the difficulties with which the Polish Authorities, in Paris, are, at present, confronted. It is to be hoped that a solution will be quickly found as, otherwise, Poland is sure to become a seat of Bolshevik revolution.

J. L. COOLIDGE

⁸ Chief Liaison Officer with the Polish National Army. Memorandum transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace by the American Embassy in Paris, Jan. 8, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 8611.0146/1

[Document 356]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 2

BERNE , December 12, 1918.
[Received December 18.]

GENTLEMEN: With reference to my report No. 1 of to-day's date,⁹ I have the honor to quote herewith a statement received from the Lithuanian Bureau of Information at Lausanne with regard to the occupation by Polish troops of Lithuanian territories:

[“]For some time the Polish Press Bureau has been giving out communiqués to prepare public opinion for the occupation of certain regions of Lithuania. We must declare that the Lithuanian population has taken no steps to obtain any protection whatsoever against the Bolshevik bands. It is rather organizing itself by its own means, under the direction of the Provisional Lithuanian Government, for the maintenance of order and the defense of the country. And if the Polish troops were tempted to occupy a portion of the territory of Lithuania, they would find the Lithuanian people united as one man to defend it by force of arms.”

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

⁹ Not printed.

860c.01/185a: Telegram

[Document 357]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
France (Sharp)***

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—3 p.m.

6704. Investigate carefully and report promptly exact relations existing between Polish National Committee in Paris and Polish officers in charge of affairs in Poland.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/5

[Document 358]

The President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 27, 1918.

SIR: I have the honour of enclosing the text of the resolutions which the Local Parliament of German Poland, in a meeting held at Posen on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of December, decided to communicate, through the channel of the Polish National Committee, to the Entente Powers and to the Government of the United States. I likewise enclose the text of the telegram sent by the Local Parliament to President Wilson.

As a matter of information I trust I may be permitted to add that this Parliament, elected by general suffrage, without distinction of sex and upon the widest democratic basis, can be entirely relied upon as faithfully reflecting the national opinion of the Poles residing within the boundaries of the former German Empire.

I have [etc.]

ROMAN DMOWSKI

[Enclosure 1]

Telegram From the Poles of the Former German Empire, Sent to President Wilson, December 16, 1918, Through the Channel of the Polish National Committee

The Poles residing within the boundaries of the former German Empire request you to tender the expression of their deepest homage to the illustrious President of the United States upon the occasion of his arrival on the Continent and particularly in the

capital of France. The Poles firmly believe that he who during the recent war was the first to hoist the banner of justice in favour of Poland, will use his influence to complete the work of justice in spite of all intrigue. Such justice can only be achieved if the whole of Poland is united and independent and has her own sea coast.

[Enclosure 2]

***Resolutions of the Local Parliament of Posen, Forwarded December 4, 1918,
Through the Channel of the Polish National Committee to the Government of
the United States and to the Entente Powers***

I

The representatives of four million Poles from Posnania, Silesia, Western Prussia, Pomerania, Ermonia, Prussian Mazovia and of the Polish emigrants settled in Germany, elected by general suffrage without distinction of sex, held a meeting at Posen as Local Parliament on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of December in order to express in the name of the Poles from Germany, the will of the Nation tending towards the reconstruction of a free, independent and united Poland.

The Allied Powers have not only shown their friendship for Poland during the present war, but have placed the reconstitution of a free and united Poland among their war aims, seeing in this program one of the essential guarantees of victory over Prussian militarism and for the establishment of just and lasting peace.

At the present moment, when the settling of this terrible war is drawing near and the Allied Powers have reached their aims, we ask that the crimes by which Poland was torn to pieces more than a century ago, be made good through the return to her of the territories which were hers before the division, including the Polish sea coast. We likewise wish, in accordance with the ideas expressed by President Wilson, and the decisions reached at Versailles, that the provinces of the former kingdom of Prussia, inhabited for centuries by a Polish population, may become part of the Polish State.

The Polish nation, during its long slavery, made several efforts to free itself by force from the foreign yoke. Rising against its oppressors it had to yield to their number but never ceased through its representatives to protest against the wrong inflicted upon Poland.

The Prussian Government, taking unfair advantage of its strength and mighty resources, tried by all means to destroy the Polish population. It germanised it through its schools and flooded our provinces with exclusively German officials. It expropriated the Polish landowners and put German emigrants in their place. It prevented the Poles from building houses on their own land, trying in this way to give the Polish provinces a German appearance in order to acquire a right of property over them.

If, under these circumstances, Poland's right to claim all regions inhabited for many centuries by a Polish population should not be recognized, it would not only mean sanctioning the deed done by the divisions of Poland, but would at the same time ratify the policy of violence and injustice of which the Polish population was a victim and which was aimed at its complete destruction.

As long as injustice and violence are not made good the Poles will not be able to forget the crimes committed against them.

II

The German nation, long ago persuaded by its government as to its superiority over other nations, does not even to-day see the necessity for atoning for this secular injustice and endeavours by all means to check the efforts of the Polish nation towards reconquering its rights.

In order to set the public opinion of the world, until now favourable to the Poles, against them, the Germans started a violent anti-Polish campaign in their own and in the foreign press, claiming that the Poles are anticipating upon the decisions of the Peace Congress by forcibly occupying towns and territories and incorporating them into the new Polish State.

Although the German authorities have ascertained the emptiness of these claims, they no less send troops to our provinces under the pretence of guarding the frontier and thus produce an exceptional state of war meant to hinder the organization of the Polish population.

We protest against these interferences with the free evolution of our national movement. Unable and unwilling to answer violence by violence we beg the Allied Powers to afford us prompt help by sending their representatives on the spot. They will ascertain the state of things.

III

The Polish nation, as has been proved by History, has distinguished itself by its spirit of toleration and fairness towards other nationalities and creeds. It will avail itself of the same principles of toleration in the Polish State now coming to life and will allow minorities the benefit of equal rights.

For this reason we most energetically protest against the anti-Polish campaign in the German press which spreads false reports about an anti-Jewish movement in Poland. This press, hostile to Poland, denies her rights over the Polish provinces under German yoke and endeavours to throw discredit upon the Poles before the world's opinion, thus weakening the sympathies which the cause of Poland enjoys among the Allies and hindering our efforts towards the unification of the Polish territories.

If Poland, having to proceed to her organisation under the hardest circumstances and while invaded by numerous deserters and Russian prisoners of war, has unfortunately been unable to prevent disorders breaking out in some localities, these were by no means directed exclusively against the Jews and it is only through an entire lack of good faith that these doubtlessly painful incidents could be made out as resulting from a regime of terror practised by the Polish nation against the Jews.

We raise an earnest call for a delegation to be sent which might impartially ascertain the real state of things as well as for the removal to Poland of the Polish army now in France. This army would help the country to maintain order during the period of organization.

IV

During the period of transition and as long as the Polish Government, regularly constituted and representing the entire Nation, has not appointed its representatives to the Allied Powers and to the Peace Congress, we entrust the Polish National Committee in Paris with the defense of our cause.

763.72119/3224: Telegram

[Document 359]

***The President of the National Council of the
Western Ukrainian Republic (Petrouchevitch) to
the Acting Secretary of State***

[Translation]

VIENNA [undated].
[Received December 29, 1918.]

The Polish Government at Warsaw is continually sending troops in large number to Eastern Galicia. Its object is to overthrow by military force the former Ukrainian state of Halytch reestablished within its territory by the Ukrainian nation in the exercise of the peoples' right of self-determination and at present constituted as the "Western Ukrainian Republic" and to annex it by violence to the Polish kingdom. The Ukrainian nation of Galicia is desperately fighting that hostile invasion and calling, in vain thus far, for help to stop that violation of the right of national autonomy and of the armistice by the Poles. General Rozvadowski, Commander in Chief of Galicia is ordering the arrest of peaceful Ukrainian citizens to be held as hostages, other pogroms that are even more frightful, is manhandling and persecuting the Ukrainians in the most brutal manner, while Polish emissaries carry on with the Governments of the Allies and in the press a campaign of most incredible slander and lying against the Ukrainian nation of the Western Ukrainian Republic to prevent any neutral step being taken by the Governments of the High Allies. The Roumanian army has likewise occupied the Ukrainian parts of Bukowina and annexed them to Roumania in the name of King Ferdinand. The Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia and of Bukowina are but exercising in its national territory the right of autonomy recognized by President Wilson and by the High Allies and I, as President of the Ukrainian National

Council at Leopold take upon myself the honor to beg the High Governments of the Allies kindly to urge upon the governments of Warsaw and Bucharest the immediate evacuation of Eastern Galicia by the Polish troops and of the Ukrainian parts of Bukowina by the Roumanian army in order to stop the awful bloodshedding and to enable the Ukrainian population of the above-named regions freely exercise without restriction, as the other nations of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are doing, its right of self-determination in the sense of the principles upheld by the Allies.

Dr. EUGENE PETROUCHEVITCH

Paris Peace Conf. 760c.62/3: Telegram

[Document 360]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERNE [undated].

[Received January 1, 1919—10:30 a.m.]

64. Following from Zaleskie of Polish Mission.

“I am instructed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency the following facts. The Polish General Staff had for some days entered into negotiations with the German military authorities of the Ober Ost (vast region *des etapes* of the former oriental front) and with the popular government of Berlin respecting the passage of Polish troops to Vilna. The German army proposed to evacuate Vilna on January 4th and the city was to be immediately occupied by Bolshevik troops if the Polish troops do not obtain from the German military authorities the possibility of entering Vilna. Captain Gorka, Delegate of the Polish General Staff, had already succeeded in settling the question in all its details with the German military authorities of the Ober Ost and General Hoffmann, when the Berlin government gave telegraphic orders to the Commandant of the Ober Ost to break all negotiations and categorically refused the right of passage to the Polish troops under the pretext that this would be in contradiction with the general conditions of the armistice.

It is absolutely urgent that the Entente powers and the Spa Armistice Commission impose upon the German Government the immediate realization of our demands, demands which have for sole aim the preservation of order and the security of the Polish inhabitants of Vilna. In the contrary event Vilna

will undergo all the terrors of the Bolshevik regime and the Bolshevik danger will be able to penetrate from there to the whole of Poland.

At Vilna an agreement has been reached between the Poles, the Lithuanians and the Jews, all of whom await the arrival of Polish troops, to begin the common action of defense against the Bolsheviks.

It is necessary that the German troops leave to the local anti-Bolshevik Polish organizations a sufficient quantity of arms for this defensive action. In view of recent events at Berlin the Polish government supposes that the German Government desires to contribute to the development and the spread of Bolshevism in Poland and that it desires to paralyze all defensive action on the part of the Poles.

The Polish Government therefore hopes that the Allied Powers will be good enough to take the necessary measures to forestall the threatening development of Bolshevism in Lithuania and that they will conform in this to the desire of the local population which demands assistance to Poland in the interests of the public order and security.”

This information has also been sent to Secretary of State, Washington.

STOVALL

763.72119/3897

[Document 361]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting
Secretary of State 10***

No. 1995

COPENHAGEN , January 3, 1919.
[Received February 25.]

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 3385,¹¹ of yesterday's date, with regard to the visit of M. Paderewski to Posen, I have the honor to enclose herewith the memorandum on which that telegram was based.

I have [etc.]

LITHGOW OSBORNE

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chargé in Denmark (Osborne)

[COPENHAGEN ,] January 1, 1919.

The British Chargé d'Affaires to-day showed me an original despatch from Colonel H. H. Wade, British Military Attaché in Copenhagen, dated from Posen December 28 (?), 1918, relative to M. Paderewski's visit to Poland.

The despatch stated that upon his arrival in Danzig, together with Monsieur and Madame Paderewski, he was visited by a German official who requested that no demonstrations be organized in Danzig. Colonel Wade replied that he could not prevent M. Paderewski's friends from meeting him at the station. The German

official endeavored to induce Colonel Wade and M. Paderewski to proceed to Warsaw via Thorn, but Colonel Wade insisted on going to Posen.

The party was given a saloon car from Danzig. On the way to Posen a representative of the German General Staff in civilian clothes boarded the train and informed Colonel Wade that his safe-conduct called for his transit through Germany to Warsaw and requested that he should not proceed to Posen. Colonel Wade replied that he had received orders to proceed to Posen, where he was to meet the rest of his mission, and that the German Foreign Office must be cognizant of this fact. In consequence of this statement by Colonel Wade, the representative of the German General Staff withdrew, saying that in that case he only wished to enter a formal protest, which Colonel Wade reported that he took note of.

Colonel Wade further reported that upon their arrival in Posen they were greeted with great enthusiasm by the populace; their carriage was escorted by Polish soldiers from the railway station to the hotel; the soldiers finally ended by carrying the mission into the hotel. The following day shots were heard, and it was soon reported that German soldiers had stormed the offices of the Polish National Council and had torn down the Polish and Allied flags and stamped them into the gutter. These German soldiers were supposedly "reactionaries." At the time of writing the despatch, Colonel Wade stated that the hotel was being besieged by these German troops and defended by Polish soldiery.

Colonel Wade further reported that agitation was under way by the Germans for the organization of forces of defense in the province of Posen, and that these German forces were following a policy of repression against the Poles, suppressing the language, etc. He had despatched Lieutenant Commander Rawlings, R. N., who was attached to him, to the Commander of the Fifth Army Corps, with the message that the British Government would hold him responsible for the consequences of the attitude of the German troops. The Commander of the Fifth Army Corps replied that he had no official knowledge of Colonel Wade's mission.

Colonel Wade further stated that the German forces in the province of Posen were removing valuable material of all kinds and in general treating the territory as if they were forces of occupation and in a manner contrary to the terms of the armistice. He recommended that Allied or neutral commissioners be despatched to exercise surveillance.

Enclosed with Colonel Wade's despatch were the following:

- (1) An American flag torn to shreds, stated to have been one of those pulled down by the German troops from the offices of the Polish National Council.
- (2) A proclamation signed by the Commander of the Fifth Army Corps, the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, the Jewish Council, and other city organizations, promulgating a state of siege for the city.
- (3) A hand-bill printed by some German organization setting forth the consequences of Posen's becoming Polish and calling upon the German population to "vote German" for the National Assembly.
- (4) A copy of the same manifesto republished by the German organization in question with notations by a Pole made on the original hand-bill.
- (5) An official order issued by the Commander of the Fifth Army Corps and countersigned by the "Schlichtungskommission" stating that disorders had broken out in the city, that it was still too soon to determine the guilt in the matter, but calling upon all troops to maintain order, in view of the hardships which they had undergone together during the war.
- (6) An official order signed by the Commander of the Fifth Army Corps and countersigned by the "Schlichtungskommission" stating that a British commission had arrived and that, as it was under the protection of international law, it was not to be interfered with. The order further stated that the commission would carry the British flag.
- (7) A clipping from a German newspaper in Posen calling for the formation of voluntary militia for the protection of German interests in the province of Posen.

In a letter to his wife, Colonel Wade stated that field-guns had been drawn up in front of the hotel, which was being fired on by machineguns from the neighboring buildings. Bullets had entered Mr. Paderewski's room.

Colonel Wade also indicated that he was not in complete accord with M. Paderewski's ideas as to the territorial extent of Poland, which he seemed to regard as exaggerated.

¹⁰ A copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, was sent to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 18, 1919, by the American Embassy in Paris.

¹¹ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/1: Telegram

[Document 362]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 3, 1919—4 p.m.
[Received January 4—1:20 p.m.]

81. For Secretary of State. Sec[retary] of War calls my attention to the fact that Polish troops are being enlisted in this country with the knowledge and consent of the War Department. This arrangement had also the approval of the Department. In view of the fact that the Poles are apparently beginning hostilities against the friendly nations,^{[12](#)} the Secretary believes the time has now come to refuse to permit any further enlistment in this country for foreign governments, particularly the new governments as he believes that the troops may be used to enforce by arms claims of these new governments. Please take the matter up with the President and ask him to be good enough to instruct the Secretary of War as to the course he shall pursue.

POLK

^{[12](#)} For correct reading of this passage as sent, see the Department's telegram No. 236, Jan. 15, 1919, 1 p.m., p. 431 [*Pg. 431 includes portions of [Doc. 370](#), [Doc. 371](#), and [Doc. 372](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/13: Telegram

[Document 363]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN , January 4, 1919—11 p.m.
[Received January 6—9:30 a.m.]

70. Following written undated message received through British Legation addressed to Colonel House, Paris, signed Paderewski:

“Situation most critical. Bolshevik invasion of former Polish territories still in progress. Thousands of people tortured, murdered, many buried alive. Vilna, Minsk, even Grodno menaced. Huge population in danger of extermination. Invading army daily increased by prisoners of war returning from Germany. Starving veterans are fed by Bolsheviks provided they join the ranks. Poland in assisting present Partisan Government, too weak to organize any resistance; human material still considerable but no arms, equipment, munitions. Disaster imminent. At this tragic hour my country appeals to her best, most generous friend asking for help, for salvation. 50,000 Americans, one division of French and one of British troops if sent immediately with necessary material for a large Polish army will certainly stop further progress of this barbarous movement. If action is delayed our entire civilization may cease to exist. The war may result in establishment of barbarism all over Europe.”

OSBORNE

860c.01/192: Telegram

[Document 364]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 6, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received 10:22 p.m.]

174. [From Lansing.] Please refer to note from French Ambassador at Washington to Secretary of State dated November 26th, 1918 saying that the French Government has been asked by the Polish National Committee for recognition as *de facto* government in regard to: (1) foreign representation; (2) political direction of the Polish army; (3) civil protection of Poles abroad. The French Ambassador says his Government believes request justified, and is inclined to grant desired recognition suggesting further that Allied Governments come to agreement on this point. Last paragraph requests early expression of opinion from Secretary of State. Please transmit by telegraph complete text of reply made by the Department to the French Ambassador's note. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 811.2222/1

[Document 365]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS , 6 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I call your attention to this telegram in regard to enlistment of Poles in the United States.^{[13](#)}

There are two sides to the question. The armistice does not end the state of war and I believe that the Poles would resent a change of policy at this time. On the other hand, the cessation of actual hostilities is a good excuse to stop enlistments, if it seems advisable to do so.

Will you be good enough to indicate what reply you desire to make to the request of the Secretary of War for instructions?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

^{[13](#)} Telegram No. 81, Jan. 3, 1919, 4 p.m., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 424 [*Pg. 424 includes portions of [Doc. 361](#), [Doc. 362](#), and [Doc. 363](#)*].

860c.01/195: Telegram

[Document 366]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , January 8, 1919—3 p.m.
[Received 6:58 p.m.]

6655. Your 6704, December 21st, 3 p.m. Members of the Polish National Committee at Paris have been selected and from time to time elected by the Polish societies outside of Poland. They do not claim to be representatives of their country by due process of law but do claim to represent and until two months ago they unquestionably did represent the majority of opinion of the Polish people in its nationalistic aspects. Both Dmowski, President of the Committee, and Professor Grabski are prominent and have numerous followers in Poland but also many active political enemies.

When the armistice was signed and the German troops withdrew from Warsaw and Russian Poland the Council of the Regency which had been imposed by the Germans formed a ministry very acceptable to Polish National Committee in Paris but which only survived a few days and was superseded by the Government of General Pilsudski, an Austrian Pole recently liberated by Germany, with large political following, who in 1913 had formed a Polish Legion to fight with the Austrians against Russia, thus opposing policy of National Committee favorable to Russia, but who, on discovering he had been deceived by Germany finally refused obedience and was interned by Germans.

This change of Government being a great shock to Paris Committee, they were momentarily uncertain as to what course to pursue, but on December 10th Professor Grabski left for Warsaw in hopes of bringing about some sort of *modus vivendi* with Pilsudski, stating that he would propose to latter the formation of a National Council

composed of 30 members representing proportionally all the various parties and political groups in Poland with exception of Bolshevists and pro-Germans but up to the present he has not been successful in his mission. His latest move, I am told is an appeal to the people through the press to support this proposal.

On the 4th instant a delegation from General Pilsudski arrived at Paris whose visit to France was suggested by the French Government according to a declaration recently made by Monsieur Pichon in the Chamber of Deputies. Dmowski informed me yesterday that this delegation is here with the intention of obtaining recognition from the Allied Governments of existing Polish Government. Dmowski stated that the first conference between the Polish committee and these delegates is to take place today, that he understands they are to offer him the position of Polish representative at the Peace Conference in exchange for which the Committee is to recognize the Government of Pilsudski until after the elections which are to be held in Poland on January 26th. This proposition Dmowski states is unacceptable to the Committee as it enable[s] Pilsudski to control completely the elections. The Committee is however disposed, he says, [to] recognize Pilsudski in any official office even that of President if necessary provided he will appoint a coalition government and that he is disposed to accept this proposal but his party, the Socialists, is obdurate.

Dmowski further states that on account of Poland's geographical situation between the Russian Bolsheviks and German revolutionists, it would be inviting disaster for a government to be formed in Poland which did not include participation of the Socialists, but that the Polish Committee at the meeting would not consent to the control by the Socialists alone of the coming elections, and that the Committee is therefore endeavoring through the efforts of Grabski and Paderewski to obtain the consent of the various parties to hold the elections under the ruling of those various parties acting in concert.

BLISS

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.00/14

[Document 367]

***Colonel William R. Grove 14 to General
Marlborough Churchill***

WARSAW , January 9, 1919.

Subject: Conditions in Poland.

1. On the afternoon of Jan. 7th, Dr. Vernon Kellogg, Chief of the Food Administration Mission to Poland, and I, called on Mr. Paderewski, who spoke frankly about the political situation here. He considers that Pilsudski is a good man, but that he represents a party only, and not the whole of Poland; that what is necessary is a. National Council, which would include Galicia and Poznania; that certain members of the Ministry are impossible, having had no training whatever for the work at hand, and apparently having been put in solely to placate certain interests, these interests being in the main either socialistic or Bolshevistic, that industrial conditions are rapidly becoming intolerable, account of lack of work, high prices demanded by labor to meet living conditions, lack of food and clothing at any price, and to some extent perhaps inefficient governmental control, though to me the contest [*sic*] seems excellent in the face of all the difficulties, which are tremendous.
2. It is understood that all concerned are trying to get together in the formation of a National Council, and that a meeting to complete this arrangement will be held Sunday, Jan. 12th.
3. The situation in Warsaw is apparently growing worse, and the fear of Bolshevism is prevalent on all sides. The Polish Army is apparently loyal to the present government, but there is a peculiar situation with respect to the regular army and National guard or militia. The Army is under control of the Minister of War, and the National Guard under control of the Minister of the Interior.

4. The Jews in Warsaw are supposed to have large quantities of ammunition, as well as rifles, hidden away, and there are daily combats of a very local character between the soldiers searching the Jewish quarter for hoarded supplies of food, etc., and the Jewish merchants, shots being fired by the soldiers, presumably more to frighten the people than to do actual harm.
5. The food supply in Warsaw is not yet desperate. The bread and soup lines are long, and there is some scrambling for place in line, but the very mild weather (no snow on the ground), makes suffering much less than there would be with colder weather, which usually comes about this time of the year.
6. Wilna fell into the Bolshevist hands on the 5th, (the Germans having evacuated on the 4th), according to our best information. The Polish cavalry escaped, but we understand the Polish Infantry garrison was captured by the Bolshevists, who have declared a sort of Holy War on the Poles, and the Poles here fear that the Polish population of Wilna (total population about 1,000,000,—80% Poles) will be terribly punished, and many massacred. The Poles could not relieve Wilna, as it was on the other side of the German “corridor”, which they, (the Germans), are keeping for the return of the Germans out of Ukrainia. This corridor extends along the line Rowno, Kowel, Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok, Koenigsberg. I saw this morning a representative from Grodno, which is on the other side of the corridor. He believes that his town will next fall into Bolshevist hands, and says the Germans are facilitating Bolshevist advances by supplying munitions, rolling stock, etc.
7. Everyone with whom I have talked says the Germans are aiding the Bolshevists on the eastern Polish border, the evident intention being to convert Poland to the Bolshevist rule, in order to divert her as a competitor for Danzig and Poznania. This appears to be a matter for action on the revision of the Armistice on January 17th. It at least shows that the Germans have not yet decided to entirely give up the struggle for Poland. On the other hand, the Poles may be making claims for territory to which they are not ethnographically entitled. The great outstanding fact is that something must be done quickly to stop the westward advance of Bolshevism.
8. Brest-Litovsk will, it is understood, be evacuated by the Germans about Jan. 15th. It will then be entirely controlled by the

Bolshevists. This will put them within 120 miles of Warsaw, and unless some sort of relief in the way of arms and munitions comes to the Poles, Warsaw will undoubtedly be taken, as there are many Bolshevists within the city, and at a time like this, when there is much actual suffering and dissatisfaction, any change would perhaps be welcomed by many of the people of the lower classes.

9. Lemberg is still in possession of the Poles, though their hold on it is uncertain. I expect to visit it on the 15th in connection with relief work. The Germans are said to be providing the Ukrainians also with arms and munitions. There is said to be real destitution there, and we are endeavoring to arrange a rush shipment of canned milk and some hospital supplies through the branch of the American Red Cross in Switzerland. This would have to come by train through Austria and Czecho-Slovakia.

10. I enclose copies of three telegrams handed me by 2nd Lt. Gosta Melin, of the Polish Army.¹⁵ They were taken from alleged copies of the original and I cannot vouch for their authenticity. They are only sent as having some possible bearing on the actions of Austria after the Armistice of Oct. 31st. One appears to be unintelligible, possibly due to faulty copying.

11. The Polish army officers with whom I have talked, including the Acting Minister of War, consider that if the Allies could at once supply the necessary war materials, such as small arms, artillery, transport, uniforms and medical supplies, the Poles could defend themselves from [apparent omission].

Before this could be done it would, of course, require the recognition of Poland's government by the Allies. It is believed that the Poles are trying hard to reorganize their government so such recognition would be possible.

12. As a representative of the Political Mission to Poland, Lt. Foster, U. S. Army, arrived this morning, and as my work on the food relief will doubtless become more pressing, I will refrain from writing you unless something exceptional should develop as the result of one of my trips.

WM. R. GROVE

¹⁴ Of the Food Administration Mission to Poland.

¹⁵ No enclosures with file copy of this report.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/1: Telegram

[Document 368]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] January 9, 1919—12 [noon].

212. Please refer to following statement in your 81, January 3rd:

“In view of the fact that the Poles are apparently beginning hostilities against the friendly nations, the Secretary (of War) believes the time has now come to refuse to permit any further enlistment in this country for foreign governments etc.”

The Commission's information relative to the foregoing indicates no hostilities have been in progress between Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, the only neighboring nation that might be described as friendly. Lithuanian Forces in Eastern Galicia appear to have started fighting. These forces aided by German and Austrians are scarcely to be termed the Army of a friendly nation. The only other neighboring peoples with whom Poles have been fighting are Germans and Bolsheviks.

Before taking up matter with President as requested in your 81, Commission desires to be informed full details regarding nature of Secretary of War's information that Poles are “Apparently beginning hostilities against friendly nations” and also source of the reports.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/4

[Document 369]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] 9 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Is there not in Paris some representative of the Polish Committee with whom you could have a frank talk about this?¹⁶ It is clearly out of the question to allow Poles to be enlisted in the United States to fight against peoples with whom the United States is at peace and whose affairs the United States is trying to compose, but I think the representatives of the Poles should be told this before we take official action.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

¹⁶ See Secretary Lansing's note of Jan. 6, 1919, to President Wilson, p. 425 [Pg. 425 includes portions of [Doc. 363](#), [Doc. 364](#), and [Doc. 365](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 86Oc.20/5a

[Document 370]

***The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
(Chew) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)***

PARIS , January 13, 1919.

MY DEAR BOB: By direction of Mr. Lansing, I beg to send you the enclosed papers which explain themselves.^{[17](#)}

Mr. Lansing will be grateful if you will find it possible to get in touch with the Polish representatives here, with a view to ascertaining their attitude regarding the question of recruiting Poles in the United States, and indicating that the United States Government would be unwilling to allow Poles to be enlisted in the United States to fight against peoples with whom we are at peace, and whose affairs we are trying to compose.

Please follow the line indicated in the President's letter to the Secretary^{[18](#)} and be good enough to let me know the result of your conversation with the Poles in this regard, returning the enclosures with your reply.

Yours very sincerely,

J. C. GREW

^{[17](#)} Concerning recruiting of Poles in the United States. Papers not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

^{[18](#)} *Supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/7: Telegram

[Document 371]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received January 16—3:20 a.m.]

236. Department's 81, January 3rd reads: "Poles are apparently beginning hostilities against Germans."

Does not this reading obviate the inquiry made in your 212, January 9th?

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.20/8

[Document 372]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS , January 17, 1919.

SIR: I beg to inform you that, following the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant enclosing papers relative to the recruiting in the United States for the Polish Army, I discussed the matter referred to therein with Mr. Dmowski, President of the National Polish Committee at Paris.

Mr. Dmowski stated to me that it was his impression that orders had been given to the Polish representative in the United States to discontinue recruiting for the Polish Army. I have asked him to confirm this statement and to inform me of the date on which this instruction was sent to the United States. As soon as I am in receipt of his reply, I will hasten to acquaint you therewith.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

86oc.01/198: Telegram

[Document 373]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 18, 1919—5 p.m.

297. Your 174, January 6, 8 p.m., and 303, January 16, noon.¹⁹ Copy French Embassy's note mailed to Ambassador Sharp for information Colonel House December 10.²⁰ Department delayed reply to French Ambassador's note on account of great uncertainty as to relations existing between Polish National Committee in Paris and other Polish factions.

On December 20th [21st] Department cabled American Ambassador Paris, "Investigate carefully and report promptly exact relations existing between Polish National Committee in Paris and Polish officers in charge of affairs in Poland." Answer to this telegram received last week²¹ that while negotiations for united government are pending between Paderewski and Pilsudski factions no final arrangement has yet been reached. A reply to French Ambassador would involve a decision on points of difference between different Polish factions and Department has not felt it has been in possession of facts sufficiently complete and reliable to justify it in so doing. It has been hoped and still is hoped that the Polish factions may come to some agreement themselves. Department has further felt that any premature and ill-considered action on its part might embarrass the American Mission in Paris.

Press reports just received would seem to indicate that the Paderewski and Pilsudski factions are now in substantial accord.

POLK

[For papers already published on the recognition by the United States of the Polish Provisional Government, January 22, 1919, see [Foreign Relations, 1919, volume II, pages 741–745](#).]

¹⁹ No. 303 read: “Reply to our No. 174 of January 6th is requested.” (860c.01/198)

²⁰ See footnote 4, p. 412 [*Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 350](#) and [Doc. 351](#)*].

²¹ See telegram No. 6655, Jan. 8, 1919, 3 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 426 [*Pg. 426 includes portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/9

[Document 374]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)***

PARIS , January 23, 1919.

SIR: Referring to my letter of the 17th instant, concerning the recruiting in the United States for the Polish Army, and to your acknowledgment thereof, I beg to inform you that the Polish National Committee notified me in a letter from the Chief of the Military Department of that Committee, that the recruitment referred to would be stopped on February 15th. I thereupon had another interview with Mr. Dmowski, President of the Polish Committee in which I pointed out the advisability that the recruitment be discontinued forthwith. He replied that he would again take up the matter in council with the members of the Committee, and I am glad to inform you that on again communicating with him to-day he has informed me that a decision has been taken by the Committee to at once order the discontinuance of further recruitment in the United States.

I have requested Mr. Dmowski to inform me whether the necessary instructions to this effect have been sent to the representative of Poland in the United States and I will not fail to inform you of his answer.

In accordance with the desire expressed in your letter of January 13th relating to this same matter, I return herewith the enclosures which you forwarded at that time.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

Paris Peace Conf. 86oc.20/7: Telegram

[Document 375]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 25, 1919—4 p.m.

436. Department's 81, January 3rd, 4 p.m., 236, January 15th, 1 p.m. Chargé d'Affaires Paris has been assured by President of Polish National Committee in Paris that a decision has been reached to order immediate discontinuance of further recruiting for Polish Army in United States. The Commission has however not yet been informed whether instructions have actually been sent to Polish representatives in the United States to this effect. As soon as such assurance is given the Commission will advise you. Please report in case there is evidence that recruiting is continuing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.20/10

[Document 376]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

PARIS , January 27, 1919.

SIR: Supplementing my letter of the 17th, referring to the recruitment in the United States for the Polish Army, I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of a communication which has just reached the Embassy from the Polish National Committee, confirming the understanding which I had with Mr. Dmowski by telephone, and from which letter it appears that orders have been given to telegraph to the United States to discontinue at once all recruiting for the Polish Army.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the Military Department of the Polish National Committee (Wielozieyski) to the American Chargé in France (Bliss)

Military Department
No. 1140

PARIS , 25 January, 1919.

DEAR SIR: The President Dmowski duly transmitted us your honored of yesterday's date as well as the telephonic communication of January 23rd for immediate execution.

Hereby we take the liberty to inform you that the necessary instructions have been given on 23rd January with regard to sending

a telegram to the United States in order to discontinue at once all recruiting for the Polish Army.

We beg to remain [etc.]

WIELOZIEYSKI

Belgium and Luxemburg

[\[377\] The Minister in Belgium \(Whitlock \), Temporarily at Le Havre, France, to the Secretary of State](#)

Le Havre , November 7, 1918. [Received November 25.]

763.72119/2780

[\[378\] Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide of Luxemburg to President Wilson](#)

The Hague , November 11, 1918—11:28 a.m.

763.72119/2668: Telegram

[\[379\] The Belgian Minister \(Cartier \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 13, 1918.

763.72119/2708

[\[380\] The Belgian Minister \(Cartier \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 15, 1918.

763.72/13433

[381] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Washington , 16 November, 1918.

763.72119/2668

[382] The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 21, 1918.

763.72119/2846

[383] The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State

Brussels , November 28, 1918—8 p.m. [Received November 30—4:35 a.m.]

763.72119/2816: Telegram

[384] The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State

Brussels , December 7, 1918—12 a.m. [Received 9:03 p.m.]

763.72119/2933: Telegram

[385] The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 9, 1918.

763.72/12512

[386] The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Brussels , December 15, 1918—7 p.m. [Received December 16—7:15
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.0146/3: Telegram

[387] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

The Hague , January 4, 1919. [Received January 4—10:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.00/4: Telegram

[388] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

The Hague , January 9, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 10—9:40
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.00/5: Telegram

[389] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Hague , January 11, 1919. [Received February 7.]

763.72119/3672

763.72119/2780

[Document 377]

***The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock), Temporarily
at Le Havre, France, to the Secretary of State ¹***

No. 636

LE HAVRE , November 7, 1918.
[Received November 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that one of the minor problems that will doubtless come up for discussion at the peace conference will be that of the disposition of the international territory of Moresnet. This little bit of territory which lies between Belgium and Prussia and was of course invaded by German troops in the early days of August, 1914, is one of the curiosities of European political geography. It presents a difficulty that has existed for nearly a century. Under the French Empire the territory belonged to the Department of the Ourthe which, at the fall of Napoleon, was divided between Prussia and Holland. Of the department, however, there remained a small piece of territory of about one thousand acres upon the disposition of which the powers could not agree, and this almost forgotten little piece of territory, with its Castle of Moresnet, and the little town around it, remains as it were a free city. The principal cause of dispute between the two powers was the fact that on this territory is found the famous zinc mine of La Vieille-Montagne. On numerous occasions negotiations as to the status of Moresnet were opened between Holland and Prussia, and later between Belgium and Prussia, but no agreement was ever reached, and the situation of Moresnet, that had been proclaimed provisional at the Conference of Aix la Chapelle in 1816,² has remained undetermined ever since.

Before the war there were about 3500 inhabitants, of which about 400 were native, and the rest composed of about equal numbers of Belgians and Prussians. The town and the surrounding territory are governed by a mayor with two chiefs of department, one of which is the director of the zinc mine. The mayor, with a common council of

ten members, administers local affairs. The state expenses amounting to about 3000 francs used to be divided between Belgium and Prussia, but the principal source of revenue is the zinc mine. Since 1859 there has been an income tax. In addition to this the city raises its revenue by the unscientific methods of taxation prevailing in most cities of the world, comprising a tax on entertainments, balls, dogs, and a license on public houses. The Code Napoleon is in force, though in some cases the parties to litigation have the right of appeal to Belgian or Prussian tribunals. There is one local policeman, and in case of need he calls on the gendarmes of Belgium or Prussia. There are three postmen, one a Belgian, one a German and the other a neutral. There is no compulsory education but there are two schools one of which is supported by the zinc mine. There is no military service for natives of Moresnet, and Belgians and Germans living there are compelled to perform military service in their own countries. There is no law providing for the naturalization of foreigners. At one time an effort was made to establish gambling at Moresnet but Belgium and Prussia were opposed to the project and it was abandoned.

As I have said, at the beginning of the war the Germans invaded Moresnet and have held it ever since. It is the hope of Belgians that the territory will be annexed to Belgium at the peace conference.

I have [etc.]

BRAND WHITLOCK

¹ Copy transmitted to the Ambassador in France, for Colonel House, with Department's instruction No. 2408, Dec. 10, 1918.

² For text, in French, of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. III, p. 720.

763.72119/2668: Telegram

[Document 378]

***Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide of Luxemburg to
President Wilson***

[Translation]

THE HAGUE , November 11, 1918—11:28 a.m.

Referring to solemn protests of Luxemburg people and their Grand Duchess against foreign occupation, I pray the President kindly to intervene to save the Grand Duchy from the passage of German troops and to protect, at the peace negotiations, the rights and interests of the Luxemburg free and independent small people.

MARIE ADELAIDE

763.72119/2708

[Document 379]

The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 13, 1918.

SIR: With reference to preceding communications concerning the attitude of the Belgian Government towards the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, I beg to transmit to you the enclosed Memorandum, defining the Belgian Government's policy in the Luxemburg question.

I have made a rough translation of the original document, which was drawn up in French, and I herewith take the liberty to enclose it.

I beg to remain [etc.]

E. DE CARTIER

[Enclosure—Memorandum—Translation]^{[3](#)}

The Belgian Government has the honor to recall the attention of the Government of the United States to the note which the King's Government transmitted to the United States Government, in August 1917, concerning the question of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.^{[4](#)}

After calling to mind the long centuries of common history uniting Luxemburg and Belgium and after referring to the enforced separation, in spite of the wishes of the population of both countries—a separation brought about solely for the advantage of Prussia—the note of the Belgian Government claimed the restitution of this former province of Belgium, in case the independence of the Grand

Duchy should not be maintained on account of Germany's violation of the treaty of 1867.⁵

Subsequent events have convinced the Belgian Government that a return to the "status quo ante bellum" is impossible in the case of Luxemburg.

The status quo ante bellum is impossible because it would definitively hand over the Grand Duchy to German influence which is contrary to the wishes of the people of Luxemburg.

The status quo ante bellum is also impossible because a continuation or re-establishment of a state of affairs which would subject the Grand Duchy to foreign influence would constitute a grave danger to Belgium.

The entrance of the Grand Duchy into the Zollverein had, ever since 1842, given Germany a considerable economic influence in the Grand Duchy.

This economic influence was added to the political influence which was due to the presence of a German garrison in Luxemburg.

The Grand Duchy was only relieved of this garrison in 1866 [1867], by virtue of the treaty of London, which however left the country neutralized, disarmed, and completely open to German penetration.

Later on, the convention of 1872⁶ still further facilitated this penetration by handing over the most important railways of Luxemburg to German Imperial administration.

The accession to the throne in 1890 of a German dynasty, foreign to the country, accentuated this tendency which was strongly reinforced during the war and of which the most recent manifestations have been the visit of Chancellor Count Hertling, soon followed by the announcement of the proposed union between the reigning family of the Grand Duchy and the chief of the German army in Flanders, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

Notwithstanding the policy of complacency and various actions which practically delivered the country and the direction of its affairs to German influence, the people of Luxemburg have no wish to be made subservient to such German influence.

Since the invasion of 1914, to which the international status of Luxemburg did not allow effective opposition to be made, the internal political life of Luxemburg has been greatly perturbed. Governments have followed one another without being able to have their authority accepted and internal disputes have reached a stage of acuteness without precedent.

Both the Government and the dynasty have been the object of the most violent criticism. It was only at the cost of a permanent internal crisis that the Government of Luxemburg succeeded in keeping up the fiction of maintaining a neutral attitude between the German invader, to which it was in fact subjected, and the nations associated against Germany.

To leave without redress the wrong done by the enemy in violating the Treaty of 1867, or to re-establish (after four years of occupation during which Germany has been the master of Luxemburg) a *status quo* determined by the Treaty of 1867, by the Treaty of 1872 and by the German Customs Union, would be to decide that the Grand Duchy should be for the future, definitively and irrevocably, a dependency of Germany.

It can be maintained with certitude that the people of Luxemburg would rise against the idea of such a situation.

The separation from Belgium in 1839, with its inevitable consequence of delivering the people of Luxemburg to Prussia, has brought about a grave menace to the existence of Belgium.

Belgium could never accept a state of things which, under the guise of neutrality, would maintain a center of hostile influence on her borders in a contiguous country bound to Belgium by the closest ties of common interest.

The political separation enforced upon Belgium and the Grand Duchy against the wishes of the inhabitants has enfeebled both countries without, however, disassociating their destinies.

During the two crises which shook Western Europe in the course of the past fifty years, Belgium and Luxemburg shared the same fate. Their territory which had been respected by Prussia in 1870 were both invaded in 1914 in consequence of military strategy.

The frontier between the Grand Duchy and Belgium is one hundred and ten kilometers in length; this frontier is longer than that between Belgium and Rhenish Prussia. The Treaty of 1867 had done away with the immediate menace of the presence of German troops in Luxemburg, only to replace it by the new menace of a door open to aggression against Belgium.

Luxemburg, unprotected on account of its disarmed neutrality and whose railroads were controlled by the Germans, was in fact a point of concentration and a means of easy access for an army invading Belgium.

The roads of Luxemburg lead into Belgium. They were not used by the Prussian Army in 1870, but the German invaders followed them in their onrush towards France, through Belgium, in 1914; a large part of the German hordes which invaded Belgium in 1914 had previously crossed neutral Luxemburg.

Deprived of the strategic position of Luxemburg which commands access to the southeastern part of Belgium, the Belgian army was unable to protect the Belgian province of Luxemburg and the right bank of the Meuse.

These military reasons, in addition to the considerations of policy and sentiment set forth in the note of the Belgian Government delivered in 1917, show that Belgium would seriously compromise her future security if she did not ask the revision of the international status of Luxemburg.

The violation of Germany of the guaranteed neutrality of Belgium, has shaken to its foundations the whole system established in 1839.⁷ Therefore, the Belgian Government considers that the bases on which rested the guarantees of existence of the Belgian state must be revised.

The Belgian Government is convinced that the new guarantees which must be obtained in order to establish the future security of Belgium on a more solid foundation, are in perfect harmony with the interests of the Luxemburgers.

The solution of the question lies in the free reunion of both populations.

As to the modality of this reunion, Belgium, who has throughout the centuries upheld the right of peoples to determine their own destinies and has always claimed such right for herself will submit the question to the freely expressed will of the two populations.

The Belgian Government, remembering the sympathy with which the Government of the United States received its first memorandum on the subject, relies upon the kind assistance of the Powers associated with Belgium to aid in the realization of these objects which are of such vital and sacred importance to her.

³ The translation is filed separately under 763.72119/2683.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ For French text of this treaty, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LVII, p. 32.

⁶ For German text of this treaty, see P. Ruppert, *Le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg dans ses relations internationales: Recueil des traités, etc.* (Luxembourg, 1892), p. 105.

⁷ For texts, in French, of the treaties signed Apr. 19, 1839, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXVII, pp. 990–1003.

763.72/13433

[Document 380]

The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I beg to inform you that the Minister of State of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has requested the intervention of the Belgian Government to obtain the evacuation of the Grand Duchy by the Germans.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium has replied that the Belgian Government had, since the beginning of October, spontaneously approached the Allies with the view to securing such evacuation.

Furthermore, Mr. Lefort, the Chargé d’Affaires of Luxemburg at Berne, has requested through the Belgian Minister to Switzerland, the aid of Belgium for the revictualing of the Grand Duchy.

To which request the Belgian Government responded that it had already taken the necessary steps in that matter and had also instructed the Belgian Minister at Washington to endeavor to obtain that the measures taken by the Government of the United States for the revictualing of Belgium be extended to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

The Chargé d’Affaires of Luxemburg at Berne told the Secretary of the “Union économique Belgo-Suisse”, that the Government of the Grand Duchy is preparing to withdraw Luxemburg from the German Customs Union with the view to forming an economic Union with Belgium.

The Minister of State of Luxemburg has also enquired from the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the intentions of the

Belgian Government concerning the appointment of a successor to the late Belgian representative to the Grand Duchy, who died recently.

Recent articles published in the Luxemburg newspapers even now under the German occupation, indicate the evident desire of the people of the Grand Duchy for a closer bond with Belgium in the future.

This information confirms the trend noticed of late in the new orientation of the Government of Luxemburg which, no doubt under the pressure of recent events, is endeavoring to effect a change of front more in harmony with the feeling of the people.

Under these circumstances, the Belgian Government would be grateful if the Government of the United States would be good enough to take into account the above facts and the present policy of Belgium towards Luxemburg in the event that the Government of the United States or its representatives abroad should be again approached on matters pertaining to Luxemburg.

I remain [etc.]

E. DE CARTIER

763.72119/2668

[Document 381]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , 16 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you not be kind enough to acknowledge through the proper channels this message of the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg^{[8](#)} and say that her request about the passage of troops has been transmitted to the Supreme War Council at Versailles; at the same time transmitting the message to the Supreme War Council?

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[8](#)} Telegram of Nov. 11, 1918, to President Wilson, p. 436 [*Pg. 436 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#), [Doc. 378](#), and [Doc. 379](#)*].

763.72119/2846

[Document 382]

The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor of informing you that my Government has received, from official Luxemburg sources, confirmation of the news that the Grand Duchess, in accord with her Ministers, has decided to take no part in affairs of State until the people shall have expressed their wishes as to the future of Luxemburg.

According to our information, certain individuals endeavored to start an agitation in favor of union with France, but this movement met with no success among the people, and the Chamber of Deputies clearly expressed its sentiments against such a union.

A Bale newspaper (*National Zeitung?*) published a telegram from Luxemburg, under date of November 14th, announcing the failure of the above mentioned movement, and stating that the people of Luxemburg wish to develop, in full liberty, their friendly relations with Belgium, or else simply to be reunited to Belgium.

My Government has also informed me that Luxemburg has asked the King of the Belgians to protect its interests during the peace negotiations; the Belgian Government has replied that it will continue to protect on all occasions the interests of the people of Luxemburg.

Thinking that you would be interested in this information, I have taken the liberty to communicate it to you and I beg to remain [etc.]

E. DE CARTIER

763.72119/2816: Telegram

[Document 383]

***The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the
Secretary of State***

BRUSSELS , November 28, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 30—4:35 a.m.]

158. I learn through a deputy from Luxemburg, where the powers of the Grand Duchess have been suspended by the chamber, that the liberal element in the Grand Duchy fear an effort on the part of France to annex it. He says that the enlightened opinion in Luxemburg favors an arrangement looking to possible eventual reunion with Belgium. The Luxemburg question may be a difficult point at the peace conference. I am sending by mail to Washington and to Colonel House at Paris a lengthy report on this situation and on the problem of Dutch Limburg and the mouth of the Scheldt.^{[9](#)}

WHITLOCK

^{[9](#)} Not printed.

763.72119/2933: Telegram

[Document 384]

The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Acting Secretary of State

BRUSSELS , December 7, 1918—12 a.m.
[Received 9:03 p.m.]

162. The activities of De France, the new French Minister at this post and the fact that while American and British troops have not considered it necessary to make detours to pass through Brussels, French divisions are being daily paraded along the boulevards with halts for ceremonies before the French Legation and other signs seem to indicate a studied purpose to augment French influence in Belgium. The fact is everywhere remarked and from my British colleague I learn that England is concerned and will take steps to contest French supremacy. From his conversation I infer that England will oppose the desire of the French Government to annex Luxemburg and that she will not consent to Belgium's securing the left bank of the Scheldt. Repeated to Colonel House.

WHITLOCK

763.72/12512

[Document 385]

The Belgian Minister (Cartier) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , December 9, 1918.

SIR: The Government of the Netherlands has taken the initiative of reestablishing on the lower Scheldt, the normal regime of peace time.

In consequence, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed the Belgian Minister at The Hague, Baron Fallon, on November 30th, 1918, to take due note of that fact. Baron Fallon was also instructed to state to the Government of the Netherlands, at this occasion, that the Belgian Government entertains the view that for the time being, the pre-war regulations concerning the navigation, the buoying and the lighting on the river, based on art. IX of the treaty of April 19th, 1839,¹⁰ should remain in force. These regulations would retain their effect until it is possible to make new arrangements which have been rendered necessary because events have deeply affected the system created by the treaty of 1839.

The Belgian Minister at The Hague has, at the same time, informed the Government of the Netherlands that already now, although the state of war is still existing, the material and supplies of the Belgian military base at Calais have been sent to Antwerp by the River Scheldt; moreover that the Belgian Government reserves to itself the faculty to use the same way in order to transport military supplies and material in general.

I have been instructed to make this communication to you and to tell you that the Belgian Government hopes that the Government of the United States will give its support to the views entertained by the Belgian Government in regard to this matter.

Please accept [etc.]

E. DE CARTIER

¹⁰ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXVII, p. 1000.

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.0146/3: Telegram

[Document 386]

***The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Chargé
in France (Bliss)***

BRUSSELS , December 15, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received December 16—7:15 a.m.]

164. For Mr. Lansing. The Belgian Foreign Office has given me a copy of an instruction it was about to send Cartier at Washington with the request that I forward [it] to Mr. Lansing at Paris. I condense it as brief[ly] as possible: Marshal Foch invokes difficulties of a military nature as a reason why Belgian troops should not enter the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which is not in the French zone. He has a regiment of French infantry as a personal guard of honor, which he never had at his headquarters. At the request of the Belgian Government Pichon reminded Foch of the agreement by which Belgian troops were to participate in the occupation of the Grand Duchy. Foch did not welcome Colonel Menshaert of Belgian army and replied to Pichon that he would examine that question later. The Belgian Government has the impression that Foch's action indicates ulterior political motives on the part of the French Government [an impression] that is confirmed by the intense French propaganda in the Grand Duchy, despite the solemn promises made to Belgium. Foch's delegate at the Inter-Allied conference stated the other day that Luxemburg must be treated as a French Department and declared to the Belgian representatives that he was admitted to the conference merely as a neighbor and not because of any priority of interests in Luxemburg. The Marshal's delegate announced the intention to name a territorial Commander in the Grand Duchy, and the Belgian Government has demanded at Paris, that this Commander be a Belgian officer. The Belgian Government would be gratified if General Pershing could aid in securing the assignment of a Belgian regiment to Luxemburg. The Belgian Government is assured that the friendship for Belgium in the Grand Duchy is

unanimous, and that the great majority would favor at least a personal union with Belgium as soon as the influence of the German Grand Duchy could be prolonged [*be put aside*]. The Belgian Government is displeased by the French propaganda which it considers very much out of place and would be happy if the American Government could approve the Belgian point of view.

WHITLOCK

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.00/4: Telegram

[Document 387]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

THE HAGUE , January 4, 1919.
[Received January 4—10:10 p.m.]

69. Following is translation of telegram received from Foreign Minister of Luxemburg:

“In my note of December 31st last¹¹ I had the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Grand Ducal Government had just cancelled the conventions existing between the Grand Duchy and Germany relating to the accession of the Grand Duchy to the German Customs, as well as to the exploitation of the Guillaume Luxembourg Railroads. Conforming with the unanimous aspirations of the Luxembourg people the Government desires to enter upon negotiations with a view to arriving at an economic understanding between the countries of the Entente and the Grand Duchy. It would be glad to be able to examine with the representatives of the powers the conditions and means of reaching such an understanding. The Ducal Government praises the declarations made by the governments of the Allied and Associated powers on the subject of the rights of small nations and hastens to place the independence of the Grand Duchy as well as the rights of the Luxembourg people toward (vis-à-vis) Germany under the high protections of their powers. Signed Reuter, Minister of State.”

[Note of] December 31st above referred to has not been received.

GARRETT

¹¹ *Post*, p. 446 [*Pg. 446 is part of [Doc. 389](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 850a.00/5: Telegram

[Document 388]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

THE HAGUE , January 9, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 10—9:40 a.m.]

83. My 69, 4th. Note of December 31 referred to therein received today reiterates the facts already communicated to you. The only difference being that the dates of the abrogated conditions [*conventions?*] are cited, namely, November 11, 1902 and October 20, 25, 1865. Text follows by pouch.

GARRETT

763.72119/3672

[Document 389]

***The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. Lux. 12

THE HAGUE , January 11, 1919.
[Received February 7.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 5609 of January 9th [*4th*],^{[12](#)}
I have the honor to transmit herewith for such action as may be
deemed appropriate, copy and translation of a note received
yesterday from Mr. E. Reuter, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, under date of December 31, 1918,
informing me that the Government of the Grand Duchy had
denounced the conventions with Germany of November 11, 1902,^{[13](#)}
as well as the treaty with Germany 20th/25th of October 1865.^{[14](#)}

I have [etc.]

J. W. GARRETT

[Enclosure—Translation]

***The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg (Reuter) to the American
Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett)***

LUXEMBOURG , 31 December, 1918.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: I have the honor to call to the attention of
Your Excellency the fact that the Grand Ducal Government has just
cancelled, at the office of Foreign Affairs at Berlin, the conventions
concluded between the Grand Duchy and the German Empire on
November 11, 1902, concerning the exploitation of the Guillaume
Luxembourg railroads, and the accession of the Grand Duchy to the

German Customs Union as well as the treaty of the 20th/25th of October, 1865, concerning the continuation of the accession of the Grand Duchy to the customs system of Prussia and the other States of the Customs Union. The Government has declared that it no longer considers these treaties and conventions obligatory for it.

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg will cease to be part of the German Customs Union from January 1, 1919.

Accept [etc.]

E. REUTER

¹² Same as No. 69, Jan. 4, 1919, to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 444 [*Pg. 444 includes portions of [Doc. 386](#) and [Doc. 387](#)*].

¹³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv, p. 780.

¹⁴ P. Ruppert, *Le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg dans ses relations internationales: Recueil des traités, etc.*, p. 367.

Aaland Islands

[\[390\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm , November 12, 1918. [Received December 14.]

763.72119/3008

[\[391\] The Minister in Sweden \(Morris \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm , November 25, 1918—5 p.m. [Received November 26—
1:05 a.m.]

763.72119/2784: Telegram

763.72119/3008

[Document 390]

***The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the
Secretary of State***

No. 1486

STOCKHOLM , November 12, 1918.
[Received December 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith an address to the President from the Executive Committee of the Provincial Assembly of the Aland Islands, begging him to have the question of the ownership of the islands examined at the peace conference and decided according to the wishes of the inhabitants by union with Sweden. I also enclose a French translation of the address and an English translation of the address handed to the King of Sweden on December 31st last by the Åland delegation, expressing to him their wish to be joined to Sweden.¹

These documents were handed to me yesterday by two members of the Executive Committee.

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

¹ No enclosures printed.

763.72119/2784: Telegram

[Document 391]

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM , November 25, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 26—1:05 a.m.]

3213. For attention of the President. In a conversation which I had with King Gustav of Sweden today, he requested me to bring before the President's attention that at the proper time, when the question of the Åland Islands was brought up either at the Peace Conference or otherwise, he hoped the President would help in the settlement of the question so that these islands might become a part of Sweden. The King stated that this was the desire of the inhabitants themselves and that he hoped that this could be brought about in accordance with the President's views on self-determination.

The King asked me if I would inquire of the President in an informal way whether Sweden and other neutral countries would be represented at the Peace Conference as he stated that many questions, political, economic, and otherwise, which had arisen during the war and which were to confront these countries after the war, made the situation such that they were vitally interested [in a?] place at the Conference.

The King discussed with me the Bolshevik situation in Russia, Germany and Scandinavia. He felt that it was vitally necessary for the interests of the world that something be done at once in Russia where the Bolsheviks continue using all endeavors in spreading their cause throughout the world. It was his belief that Esthonia, Lithuania and the Baltic provinces in general as well as Ukraine and other parts of Russia would be under the terror and anarchy of the Bolsheviks shortly after the withdrawal of German influence. The King stated that the Bolsheviks had for a long time been doing propaganda work

in Germany and that he himself had notified the German Government of vast transactions which the Bolsheviks were carrying on in Germany. The German Government at the time was disinclined to believe this but towards the last realized on what a big scale the Bolsheviks had been producing results. The King took up this matter at that time with the German Minister in Stockholm as well as Prince Max, formerly German Chancellor. The King stated that from intimate information which he had, he knew the food situation in Germany has now grown very acute, and also that there was a great probability that Bolshevism would spread in that country.

He stated that a great deal of propaganda had also been carried on in Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia and that his Government was arranging to withdraw its representatives in Russia under the pretext of economic conditions in Russia and that after the safe withdrawal they were going to dismiss the Bolshevik representation here, Vorovsky, the Bolshevik Minister, and others connected with his regime.

In connection with the Bolshevik question, the King particularly desired me to point out that the great scarcity of food among the masses and starvation practically staring the people in the face helped to bring about very much the Bolshevik conditions in the various countries where they have been meeting with success, therefore making converts to the Bolshevik cause and he wished me to emphasize the great importance of relieving the economic strain not only in Sweden but also in other countries such as Finland. In this connection the King hoped that the blockade in Europe of foodstuffs would be lifted at the earliest possible moment.

The King confidentially told me that a few weeks ago the Socialists had informed him that it was the desire of their party eventually to create a republic in Sweden and that Branting, their leader, in addressing a Socialist conference had told them that the question of the policy of a republic would be brought up to a referendum vote. The King stated that Branting's desire in doing this was to cause a [postponement?] as indeed would be necessary in such a case, to change the constitution of Sweden which would require perhaps several years. The King personally expressed himself to me that he

was in great doubts as to the outcome and had no idea how long he would be occupying the throne and stated that of course there was nothing else for him to do but as the people wanted in the matter.

The King stated that he knew that in the Peace Conference President Wilson would only want what was fair and just to everybody concerned.

After my four years' sojourn in Sweden my relationship with the King has become very friendly and if there is anything in particular which you desire me to ascertain, either regarding Sweden or the other countries including Germany I think I would be able to obtain the information direct from the King himself who is married to a German Princess, Victoria of Baden.

MORRIS

Schleswig

[\[392\] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative \(House \)](#)

Washington , November 21, 1918—7 p.m.

759.6214/10: Telegram

[\[393\] The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House](#)

Washington , November 30, 1918—3 p.m.

759.6214/62: Telegram

[\[394\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith \) to the Acting Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen , December 5, 1918. [Received January 6, 1919.]

759.6214/19

[\[395\] The British Chargé \(Barclay \) to the Acting Secretary of State](#)

Washington , December 5, 1918.

763.72119/2925

[396] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 13, 1918.

759.6214/14

[397] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 13, 1918—6 p.m. [Received 8:50 p.m.]

763.72119/2984: Telegram

[398] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

Washington , December 14, 1918.

763.72119/2925

[399] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , December 14, 1918. [Received January 25, 1919.]

763.72119/3499

[400] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 21, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 22—
9:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1143/15: Telegram

[401] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 3, 1919—6 p.m.

763.72119/3161: Telegram

[402] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1143/41

[403] The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 7, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

[404] The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand)

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

759.6214/10: Telegram

[Document 392]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918—7 p.m.

55. American Legation, Copenhagen reports:

“To-day’s papers publish a telegram from Aabenraa in North-Schleswig to the effect that at a large meeting held there on Sunday last, a Danish member of the late German Reichstag, Hanssen Nørremølle, read a letter from Solf saying that North-Schleswig question would be settled upon the basis of the right of self-determination. He added that the Danish Government would shortly receive a note requesting them to accept North-Schleswig if a plebiscite should result favorably to Denmark. [Grant-Smith.]”

LANSING

759.6214/62: Telegram

[Document 393]

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON , November 30, 1918—3 p.m.

101. Department has received following telegram from Copenhagen:

“3186, November 24, 2 p.m. My 3155, 18th.^{[1](#)} *Politiken* reported yesterday that Hanssen-Nørremølle arrived Berlin last Friday, and handed to Danish Minister statement to be sent Danish Government wherein Danish population North Schleswig ask Denmark to accept Danish portion of that province. Government are further requested to take up North-Schleswig question at Peace Conference. Grant-Smith.”

LANSING

^{[1](#)} See Department's telegram No. 55, *supra*.

759.6214/19

[Document 394]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. 1930

COPENHAGEN , December 5, 1918.
[Received January 6, 1919.]

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 3246, of the 4th instant,² I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of a note from the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 28th ultimo, enclosing a resolution adopted by the Electoral Association of North Slesvig at a meeting held at Aabenraa on the 17th ultimo.³

This resolution expresses the wish of the Association that a plebiscite be held at which the population of North Slesvig may be allowed to vote for or against a reunion with Denmark, and was forwarded to the Danish Government by Mr. Hanssen-Nørremølle, a Danish member of the late German Reichstag, with the request that the Government appeal to the Allies to the end that the Danish population of North Slesvig may attain, at the time of the peace conference, the recognition of their national rights.

In his note M. Scavenius states that the Danish Government now submit the question to the Associated Governments, with the hope that the solution may be reached in a similar spirit to that which prompted the resolution, and that they would be pleased to receive a communication from the Associated Governments as to the further steps necessary to attain this end.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

2 Not printed.

3 Enclosures not printed.

763.72119/2925

[Document 395]

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 1356

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that His Majesty's representative at Copenhagen reports that he has received a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a copy of a resolution passed by the electors of the Association of North Schleswig at Aabenraa, and stating that the Danish Government would be grateful to receive a communication from the associated Governments as to what further measures should be taken, with a view to obtaining a solution of the Schleswig question, which all Danes hope to reach.

His Majesty's Government propose, if the United States Government concur, to reply that the Danish Government should themselves put an official request to the Allies to consider the matter at the Peace Conference.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive an expression of the views of the United States Government in the matter.

WASHINGTON , December 5, 1918.

759.6214/14

[Document 396]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

No. 2415

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918.

SIR: The Department encloses, for the information of Colonel House, copies of the following despatches from the American Legation at Copenhagen, with reference to the cession of the Province of North Slesvig:

No. 1889, dated November 8, 1918; No. 1890, dated November 8, 1918, with enclosure; No. 1895, dated November 12, 1918, with enclosure.

I am [etc.]

For the Acting Secretary of State:
BRECKINRIDGE LONG

[Enclosure 1]

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State [4](#)

No. 1889

COPENHAGEN , November 8, 1918.

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 2946, of October 14th,[5](#) last, informing the Department of my interview with the King of Denmark regarding the matter of Slesvig I have the honor to report that after H. M. subsequently sent for M. Scavenius, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the interview which followed was anything but of an amiable character.

The King is said to have reproached M. Scavenius for having assured me that no conversations were being had with Germany in regard to the cession of North Slesvig, when he knew the contrary to be the case. The Foreign Minister is reported thereupon to have reminded the King that diplomatic representatives should be called into audience only through the intermediary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have not been able to learn the details of the negotiations but the fact that they actually occurred, with the full knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been satisfactorily established and his denial, reported in my telegram No. 2940, of October 14th last,⁵ was based on purely technical grounds. I am inclined to think that he realized at the time that he was not deceiving me.

The forces which have been consistently opposed to Germany and friendly to the cause of the Allies, headed by the King, and composed chiefly of the shipping interests, are throwing their weight against the policy of the present Government which, from the beginning of the war, has been based on the presumption, if not of German victory, at least a draw between the belligerents whereby Germany would continue to be an ever present menace to the independence. Now that Germany has gone under and the Associated Governments are victorious they charge the Government with a lack of elasticity in adapting itself to the new conditions. The early retirement of M. Scavenius from the Foreign Office is prophesied but they do not seem inclined to seek the overthrow of the entire Cabinet. The feeling is that the more socialistic the complexion of the Government, the better chance it will have in dealing with the situation which is upon it.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

[Enclosure 2]

No. 1890

COPENHAGEN , November 8, 1918.

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 3028, of October 25th last,⁷ I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum⁷ handed me by Lieutenant Commander John A. Gade, Naval Attaché to this Legation, which was given to him by the Chief of the Danish Admiralty, Admiral Jøhnke, with reference to the hoped for recovery of a portion of the Province of Slesvig, which was annexed by Prussia after the war of 1864, together with a revised version prepared by Lieutenant Commander Gade, in which he has attempted to make the meaning more clear. According to Admiral Jøhnke the memorandum in question was prepared by M. Munch, Minister for Defence, (a well known pacifist) and was revised by M. Scavenius, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as by a Committee of the Rigsdag.

On handing the note, accompanied by the charts, to the American and British Naval Attachés, Admiral Jøhnke is reported to have said that since it was the consensus of opinion of the present Danish Government, he hoped that it would be forwarded to their respective Governments; and that, owing to the fact that the Danish Government did not desire to take any official steps in the matter they took the unusual method of bringing it to the attention of the American and British Governments through their Naval Attachés because of the interest which they had personally shown in the matter.

The charts in question are being sent as an accompaniment.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

[Subenclosure]

Memorandum on the North Slesvig Question

Denmark ceded the Duchy of Slesvig in 1864 and has later disclaimed all rights to the Duchy as provided by paragraph 5 of the peace of Prague.⁸ This paragraph provided for the return to Denmark of the Danish speaking portion of the province in case a plebiscite should decide in favor of such a return. Denmark herself has thus no further rights in the matter, nor can well bring it forward, this devolves upon the Danish speaking inhabitants of Slesvig themselves.

It is stated that they are now most anxious to return to Denmark. They desire a new boundary line permitting the incorporation in Denmark of all who speak and feel Danish, but only of such.

It is feared, in case the German portions of the Duchy are also returned to Denmark, that endless controversies will ensue, making affairs unbearable for the Danish portions and a union which might not prove lasting. It is further feared that Germany once again having regained its strength might take occasion to interfere in the affairs of Slesvig, should the incorporation of a discontented German portion prove unsatisfactory and troublesome. This fear on the part of the Danish Slesvigers is shared by an overwhelming majority of the Danish people. The Danish people further hope that the matter may be so decided that the entire Danish population of Slesvig may be rejoined to Denmark, but none of the German inhabitants. Should Germans come under Danish rule, it is then feared that the troubles of centuries will be reverted to. The population of Northern Slesvig is essentially farmers, of similar manners and customs to those of North Jutland. The rural population of Southern Slesvig consists on the other hand principally of large owners of estates, thoroughly German in names and sympathies. Returning the German speaking portion of Slesvig to Denmark would thus in reality bring about a reversal of the state of affairs since 1864, instead of a Danish speaking population under German rule, there would be a German speaking one under Danish. The position Denmark has up to now taken in the matter would have been absolutely inconsistent—it would be following a course which it has for years reproached Germany with.

With the principles of today of the self determination of nations—principles which have been supported by leading Germans it seems beyond doubt that Germany will consider it its duty to cede to Denmark the Northern portion of Slesvig. Germany could decidedly oppose the ceding of any territory to Denmark which has a German population. Should such territory be ceded by outside powers, Germany would constantly be considering the recovery, with the resulting dangers to Denmark. Should the Allies now determine that entire Slesvig should revert to Denmark, such a determination would probably in time be regretted by them. The Allies will probably remain hostile to Germany for some time to come. Such a feeling cannot naturally be participated in by Denmark. Any future Slesvig trouble would thus mean diplomatic and military difficulties to be met by the Allies who had caused the return of the Entire Duchy including its German source of trouble.

We have but to revert to the first Slesvig war of 1848–50 to see what might happen. The fruits of it were denied Denmark by the great powers who were guarantors of the peace which concluded it. In 1852 the same powers deemed it in the interest of Europe that the whole of the Danish Monarchy be kept intact. A few years later Denmark was advised by them to give way to Prussia's demands, and when she preferred to fight was left absolutely isolated.

It may be urged that one of the many reasons of the present war was the error committed by Prussia, permitting her to seize Slesvig in 1864. The maritime and military results of the seizure, including the Kiel Canal have been far reaching.

The powers were however not unaware of what might happen. As early as the first Slesvig war, they fully understood the change of status which would take place in regard to the Baltic if Prussia were permitted to procure the harbor of Kiel and develop its naval power.

In judging the Slesvig question, at this present moment, Denmark cannot merely consider the political situation of today, nor the possibility that this way will do away with "might being right". She must look ahead. Whatever political developments may ensure [*ensue?*], the fact remains that Denmark and Germany will remain

next-door neighbors. If Denmark is forced into a position which is beyond her and one opposed to Germany, the latter will surely, even without exerting military pressure, force Denmark into a corner. Owing to Denmark's geographical position she must out of economic reasons, remain on friendly terms with Germany, whatever the latter's position may be after the present war. Added to this, should Denmark have numbers of Germans within her borders, she might be subjected to considerable German intellectual, economic and political pressure. Germans within Danish borders will not assist Denmark in her effort to maintain her national characteristics nor her economic and political independence. They would on the contrary weaken them and bring with them the danger of German influence, up to now so successfully withstood.

It is thus desirable from a Danish point of view that the question of Northern Slesvig be solved by the claims of nationality. If such claims are abandoned, conditions will only arise claiming future readjustment Those that have been wronged will claim redress.

Such is the opinion of practically the entire Danish nation. A small minority, not worth considering, claim that the new Slesvig frontier should be the old historical frontier of the Eyder river. None desire a more southerly line. All Danish parties are agreed in hoping that the coming peace conference may give Denmark back such territory as is genuinely Danish, and nothing more, and that Denmark may thus receive national justice.

[Enclosure 3]

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

No. 1895

COPENHAGEN , November 12, 1918.

SIR: Adverting to my despatches Nos. 1889 and 1890, of the 8th instant,¹⁰ I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, copies and translations of two newspaper articles on the Slesvig question, the first from the Copenhagen *Nationaltidende* of October 2nd last and the second from the

Hamburgischer Correspondent of the 3rd instant.¹¹ Both these articles indicate that the Germans resident in Slesvig expect to meet with stubborn resistance any attempt to return the territory to Denmark.

In this connection, I learn through the British Legation that the proposed German condition for a franchise in any plebiscite which may be held to decide the Slesvig national question is residence in Slesvig for at least five years ending not less than five years ago, and that the German Government have offered pecuniary assistance, including all expenses, to persons in other parts of Germany who have fulfilled these conditions if they are willing to return and vote.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

⁴ Filed separately under 759.6214/12.

⁵ Not printed.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Filed separately under 759.6214/13.

⁷ Not printed.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Treaty of Aug. 23, 1866, between Austria and Prussia, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LVI, p. 1050.

¹⁰ Enclosures 1 and 2 *supra*.

¹¹ Neither printed.

763.72119/2984: Telegram

[Document 397]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 13, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received 8:50 p.m.]

3298. My 3246, December 4th, 6 p.m.^{[12](#)} Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, under date of 12th, instant,^{[13](#)} states that the French Minister has informed him that his Government had suggested that if Denmark desired to have the question of the recovery of North Schleswig taken up at the Peace Conference, an official request in that sense should be made to the Associated Governments. M. Scavenius, therefore, makes the formal request that the Peace Conference should take this matter under consideration.

GRANT-SMITH

^{[12](#)} Not printed.

^{[13](#)} For text of note, see p. 457 [Pg. 457 includes portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)].

763.72119/2925

[Document 398]

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Great Britain, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the latter's memorandum of December 5, 1918, regarding a communication from the Danish Government concerning the question of North Schleswig. Mr. Barclay states that the British Government propose, if the United States Government concur, to reply that the Danish Government should themselves put an official request to the Allies to consider the matter at the Peace Conference, and adds that His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive an expression of the views of the United States Government in the matter.

In reply Mr. Polk begs to inform Mr. Barclay that the views of His Majesty's Government in this connection are shared by the Government of the United States and that the American Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen has been instructed to inform the Danish Foreign Office that this Government is of the opinion that the Danish Government should address to the Allied Governments an official request that the matter be considered at the Peace Conference.

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918.

763.72119/3499

[Document 399]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. 1962

COPENHAGEN , December 14, 1918.
[Received January 25, 1919.]

SIR: Adverting to my telegram No. 3298, of yesterday's date, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of a note from the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 12th instant, requesting me to convey to my Government the official request of the Danish Government that the question of the future of North Slesvig be brought before the peace conference.

I have [etc.]

U. GRANT-SMITH

[Enclosure—Translation]

***The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Scavenius) to the American Chargé
in Denmark (Grant-Smith)***

COPENHAGEN , December 12, 1918.

MONSIEUR LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: Referring to my note of the 28th ultimo,¹⁴ concerning the Slesvig question, I have the honor to inform you that the Royal Government, in response to their request as to the procedure to be followed further with regard to the solution of this question, have received a communication from the French Government¹⁵ stating that the Danish Government should, if they desire the adjustment of the matter, present to the Associated

Governments an official request to have it brought before the Peace Conference.

Conforming to this communication, I take the liberty of having recourse to your kind intermediary to forward to your Government the official request of the Royal Government to be good enough to bring before the Peace Conference the question mentioned above.

Please accept [etc.]

ERIK SCAVENIUS

¹⁴ Not printed; for substance, see despatch No. 1930, Dec. 5, 1918, from the Chargé in Denmark, p. 450 [*Pg. 450 includes portions of [Doc. 392](#), [Doc. 393](#), and [Doc. 394](#)*].

¹⁵ See p. 461 [*Pg. 461 includes portions of [Doc. 403](#) and [Doc. 404](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1143/15: Telegram

[Document 400]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 22—9:40 a.m.]

91. Answering Copenhagen's 3246 of Dec. 4, 6 p.m.,^{[16](#)} regarding recovery of North Schleswig by Denmark, Department replied:

“You are instructed to inform Danish Foreign Office that this Government [is] of the opinion that the Danish Government should address to the Allied Governments an official request that the matter be considered at the Peace Conference.”

Copenhagen in telegram that crossed Department's cable of December 25 [14], 11:00 a.m.^{[17](#)} states:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 3298 of December 13, 1918, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in Denmark, printed on page 456 [*Pg. 456 includes portions of [Doc. 396](#) and [Doc. 397](#)*].]

POLK

^{[16](#)} Not printed. See despatch No. 1930, Dec. 5, 1918, from the Chargé in Denmark, p. 450 [*Pg. 450 includes portions of [Doc. 392](#), [Doc. 393](#), and [Doc. 394](#)*].

^{[17](#)} Not printed.

763.72119/3161: Telegram

[Document 401]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 3, 1919—6 p.m.

85. Department has been informed by the British Embassy that British Minister at Copenhagen has received an official request from the Danish Government asking British Government to raise the Schleswig question at the Peace Conference. British Minister has been instructed to reply that British Government is ready to consider the question at the Peace Conference in concert with the other Allied Governments as soon as the latter shall have agreed to do so.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1143/41

[Document 402]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting
Secretary of State*** 18

No. 2005

COPENHAGEN , January 4, 1919.

SIR: Adverting to Mr. Grant-Smith's despatch No. 1930 of the 5th ultimo, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the recovery by Denmark of North Slesvig, I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a resolution passed at Aabenraa, North Slesvig, on the 30th ultimo, by the leaders of the Electoral Association of North Slesvig, as reported in the Copenhagen *Politiken* of the 4th instant.

This resolution is a reiteration of their desire for a solution of the border question on the principle of the right of self-determination and a protest against the actions of the German authorities in obstructing the possibility of an impartial plebiscite, through their interference with public meetings and through their denial of the right of petition.

I have [etc.]

LITHGOW OSBORNE

[Enclosure]

***Translation of Resolution of Leading Members of Electoral Association of
North Slesvig***

Ritzau's Bureau reports from Aabenraa, North Slesvig, under date of January 3rd, that at a meeting held by the leaders of the Electoral

Societies in North Slesvig on December 30, 1918, the following resolution was passed:

- (1) Now that the Entente has been victorious and Germany has accepted President Wilson's program as the basis for a world peace, we consider the separation of our native soil from Germany and its reunion with Denmark an established fact. Although we are as yet German citizens and as such are fully entitled to participate in the election to the German National Assembly, we consider it under these circumstances improper to exercise any influence upon the internal affairs of the German people. We therefore encourage all Danes in South Jutland to abstain from participating in the coming election to the National Assembly.
- (2) While we adhere to the standpoint assumed by the Danish Rigsdag through its resolution of October 23, 1918, which was submitted to us by the Danish Foreign Minister, in reply to our note, we state anew that we desire the border question solved upon the basis of the right of self-determination of nationality and by the production of satisfactory guarantees that the same be exercised freely.
- (3) While the administration and board of supervision of the Electoral Societies of North Slesvig have thus once more proposed the solution of the national question of North Slesvig in accordance with the right of self-determination of nationality, which is just and fair to both parties and which harmonizes with the views held by the large majority of the population of North Slesvig, it makes the following statement:
 1. We make a sharp protest against the efforts on the part of the German rulers to place obstacles in the way of creating, through the medium of a free exercise of the right of public meeting and the right of petition, the basis for a free vote.
 2. We emphasize the fact that owing to the above-mentioned procedure on the part of Germany, the right of self-determination of nationality has temporarily been rendered illusory.
 3. We recommend to the Danish Government, when it protects our interests at the peace conference, that they draw attention to the fact that under these circumstances the Danish population in

Middle Slesvig cannot hope to attain their national rights through the medium of a referendum.

¹⁸ Printed from copy received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 20, 1919.

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 403]

The French Ambassador to the United States (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] January 7, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are, as you know, quite willing, and so are the British, and so are you, I believe, that the question of the Slesvig be submitted by Denmark to the peace conference.

Our minister in Copenhagen has exchanged letters on this subject with the Danish For. Minister. As it may interest you to know those documents, I enclose copies.

Very sincerely yours

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure 1—Translation][²⁰](#)

The French Legation in Denmark to the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

COPENHAGEN , December 10, 1918.

NOTE VERBALE

The French Minister at Copenhagen has made known by a telegram to his government the text of the communication, dated November 28th last, by means of which the Royal Danish Government, in transmitting the text of the resolution passed November 17th at Aabenraa and in recalling to mind the sentiment expressed by the Danish parliament on the question of Sleswig, indicated the desire of

being informed about the procedure to be followed further with view to the solution of this question.

The French government believes that the Royal Danish Government should, if it desires the settlement of the matter, present to the Associated Governments an official request with the intent of bringing it before the Peace Conference.

[Enclosure 2—Translation]^{[20](#)}

The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Scavenius) to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)

COPENHAGEN , December 12, 1918.

MR. MINISTER: In reference to the *note verbale* from the Legation of the French Republic dated the 10th of this month, concerning the procedure to be followed further with view to the solution of the question of Schleswig, permit me to turn to you as a friendly intermediary for forwarding to your government the official request of the King's government desiring to bring before the Peace Conference the question mentioned above.

[File copy not signed]

^{[20](#)} Translation supplied by the editor.

^{[20](#)} Translation supplied by the editor.

Robert Lansing Papers

[Document 404]

***The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador to
the United States (Jusserand)***

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have your letter of January 7th
enclosing certain documents regarding the Schleswig-Holstein
question and am indeed grateful to you for sending me the
interesting information.

With kindest regards [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

Russian Affairs¹

¹ For additional papers previously published dealing with Russian affairs during the Peace Conference, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vols, I*](#) [↗](#)– [III](#) [↗](#), and [*ibid., 1919, Russia*](#) [↗](#).

[\[405\] The Minister in Norway \(Schmedeman \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Christiania , December 2, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 3—2:11 a.m.]

861.00/3323: Telegram

[\[406\] The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House](#)

Washington , December 2, 1918—9 p.m.

861.00/6535a: Telegram

[\[407\] The Chargé in Great Britain \(Laughlin \) to the Secretary of State](#)

London , December 2, 1918. [Received December 18.]

763.72/12561

[\[408\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith \) to the Acting Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen , December 4, 1918—12 a.m. [Received 11:45 p.m.]

763.72119/2886: Telegram

[409] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 4, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 4—4:49 p.m.]

861.00/6537: Telegram

[410] The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

Washington , December 6, 1918—6 p.m.

861.00/3323: Telegram

[411] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 8, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 8—4:45 p.m.]

763.72114/4225: Telegram

[412] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 9, 1918—4 p.m.

763.72114/4237a: Telegram

**[413] Memorandum by Lieutenant A. A. Berle, Jr.,
December 10, 1918**

December 10, 1918

Paris Peace Conf. 861.48/1

[414] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 11, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 11—7:06 p.m.]

763.72114/4238: Telegram

[415] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 13, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 14—9:08 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1145/2: Telegram

[416] The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

Washington , December 18, 1918—7 p.m.

763.72114/4238: Telegram

[417] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 24, 1918—6 p.m.

763.72114/4295a: Telegram

[418] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 25, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/18a: Telegram

[419] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 28 [27], 1918—5 a.m. [p.m.] [Received
December 28—10:36 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 861.77/9: Telegram

[420] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 27, 1918—7 p.m.

861.77/604e: Telegram

[421] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 30, 1918. [Received January 25, 1919.]

763.72119/3526

[422] Memorandum by Mr. A. W. Dulles, December 30, 1918

December 30, 1918

Paris Peace Conf. 8611.00/14

[423] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 31, 1918—8 p.m. [Received January 1, 1919—
10:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/71: Telegram

[424] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 2, 1919—10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.77/4: Telegram

[425] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 2, 1919—1 p.m. [Received January 3—8:20
a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/4: Telegram

[426] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , January 6, 1919—3 p.m. [Received January 7—12:42
a.m.]

860m.48/2: Telegram

[427] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—7 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/104a: Telegram

861.00/3323: Telegram

[Document 405]

***The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the
Secretary of State***

CHRISTIANIA , December 2, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 3—2:11 a.m.]

1403. I beg leave respectfully to transmit to the Department for its consideration an idea which has suggested itself in consequence of the character and activity of Bolshevism as recently manifested in Scandinavia, Russia and elsewhere. The idea is that much might be gained towards a solution of Bolshevik problem if the Associated Governments took the opportunity presented by the forthcoming peace negotiations to procure [from] the defeated enemy unrestricted access to the archives of the late Imperial Government at Berlin and of the German General Staff with a view to obtaining an accurate insight into the relations of the latter with the Bolshevik movement in Russia and into the detailed methods employed for developing the movement in that and other countries. An investigation of this sort might bring to light very valuable information, the possession of which by the Associated Governments might conceivably greatly facilitate their action in eradicating the menace of Bolshevism outside of Russia and in restoring Russia herself to ordered life. Paris advised. Copy to London.

SCHMEDEMAN

861.00/6535a: Telegram

[Document 406]

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON , December 2, 1918—9 p.m.

115. Situation in Russia

Archangel: Conditions unchanged. Morale of American and French troops not good and further weakened by considerable friction with British in spite of ability and spirit of cooperation shown by new British Commander General Ironside.

Conditions at Petrograd and Moscow very little changed except that food situation at Petrograd daily approaching conditions of real famine. Policy of terror against *bourgeoisie* continued by the Bolsheviks.

Regarding Ukraine. Conflicting reports received. One that General Denikin with Russian Army has taken Kiev, second that the Hetman of the Ukraine has issued a proclamation to the Allies expressing his intention to organize the Ukraine as part of a federated Russia.

Siberia: Situation on the Volga Front rather better. Russian troops relieving Czechs effectively and allowing them to take a much needed rest. Government set up by Kolchak² apparently growing firmer. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kolchak Government is being held open for Sassonoff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Czar. Kolchak also hopes to establish cooperation with General Denikin's Army on the Lower Volga.

Kolchak and his advisers appear determined to ignore, for the present, political groups east of Irkutsk and to concentrate their efforts on Siberia west of Lake Baikal and endeavor to establish contact with European Russia through Perm, Samara and Rostov. They appear to believe it best to cut loose entirely from Eastern

Siberia as far as possible and deal with the whole Far Eastern situation at some later date after the more important questions involving European Russia have been definitely solved. This attitude is no doubt prompted by the accumulation of evidence that the Japanese are deliberately supporting Semenov and undermining strength of the Siberian Government at Omsk by supporting or encouraging Semenov and others in Eastern Siberia.

Siberian Railways: The Japanese now admit that they have 70,000 troops of all arms in North Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Reliable reports indicate that the real number is probably well over 100,000. John F. Stevens³ reports that they have put the final seal upon their determination to monopolise North Manchuria by formal demand of the Chinese President of the Chinese Eastern Railway that he turn over the railway to the Japanese. The Japanese Government has been wholly uninfluenced by this Government's expressions of protest and amazement that a mutual agreement to send small forces to Siberia should have developed the presence of over 100,000 troops and a policy of monopoly which is utterly at variance with the publicly expressed purpose of Japan.

This Government is concerned in the Siberian situation primarily because reports show that the paralysis of railway traffic created by the Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern and absorption of the railway for military purposes, renders it impossible to furnish to the Russian population of Siberia the economic assistance which is vital to enable them to pass the winter without great misery and hardship. Furthermore the whole question of shipping supplies to the Russian and Czech forces in Siberia is imperilled.

LANSING

² Admiral Alexander V. Kolchak, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia at Omsk, Nov. 18, 1918.

³ President of the technical board for the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways.

763.72/12561

[Document 407]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

No. 10300

LONDON , December 2, 1918.
[Received December 18.]

SIR: With reference to my despatches Nos. 9011 of May 10, 9724 of August 19,⁴ and 10229 of November 14, 1918,⁵ I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of a letter which has been received from Professor Antoine Piip, who is described as Diplomatic Representative of Esthonia and Member of the Esthonian Council, and who is at present residing in London, protesting against certain acts of violence by the German army on the occasion of a demonstration which took place in Reval to celebrate the Allies' victory and the early deliverance of Esthonia.

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure]

The Diplomatic Representative of Esthonia in London (Piip) to the American Ambassador (Davis)

LONDON , November 26, 1918.

SIR: According to information at hand, on the occasion of the Allies' victory and in view of the early delivery of the country, a manifestation took place in Reval, organised by the Esthonian National Council and the Provisional Government, Constantine Pats,

Prime Minister, being at the head. This legal expression of joy by the Esthonian people was violently disturbed by the German troops, who are still in the country. They fired on the peaceful population holding the above-mentioned demonstration. A number of people were killed.

On behalf of the Esthonian National Council and the Provisional Government I have the honour to protest strongly against such acts of violence by the German army, and to ask you to kindly make the necessary arrangements that German troops must leave the whole Esthonian territory with the least possible delay.

I have [etc.]

ANTOINE PIIP

⁴ [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 826*](#) , [*831*](#) .

⁵ Not printed.

763.72119/2886: Telegram

[Document 408]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

COPENHAGEN , December 4, 1918—12 a.m.
[Received 11:45 p.m.]

3247. Department's 1221.⁶ In re query 1, Legation received the following information from reliable Russian source. It is confirmed by Danish, German and Finnish press reports.

Finland: Finnish Government, which was headed by the pronounced pro-German Svinhuvud, was anti-Russian in character and excluded all Socialists from participation in government, has now been replaced by government containing equal numbers Monarchists and Republicans, and headed by General Mannerheim, formerly Russian general, who cooperated with Germans in freeing Finland from Bolsheviks. He later resigned, supposedly because of disagreements with Germans. It is announced that the constitutional questions, probably including the state form for Finland, have been postponed until the election of a new popular assembly, at which time a recrudescence of Socialist influence may be expected. There are already such signs. Many of the extreme Finnish socialists have fled to Russia and are probably at the bottom of the armed Bolshevik attacks on Finland, reported in the Danish press in the last few days. The present government is unquestionably anti-Bolshevik. There are no indications of connection between revolutionary Germany and Finland. The leaders of the German revolution were opposed to intervention in Finland and are doubtless eager to withdraw the German troops as soon as possible. The present Finnish Government probably hopes to obtain recognition from the Peace Conference: (1) Finland's independence, (2) the Finnish claims to the Russian [districts] north and east of the present Finnish border, (3) right to all Russian property in Finland. The second demand seems hardly

justified as the districts in question are populated by Russians and Karelians, the former being in the majority. The third claim is based on the wrong assumption that Finland was at war with Russia.

Baltic provinces: Since the German revolution, soldiers councils have been formed by the German garrisons which have offered no opposition to the proclamation of an Estonian and a Lettish republic, Latvia, and the assumption by the governments of these, of the executive and administrative authority. The territories included in these republics is unknown. Presumably Estonia includes the old Russian Government of that name, together with a portion of Livonia, while Latvia includes the remainder of Livonia and all of Courland.

Latvia's seat of government is at Riga. Nothing known of the character of the premier, Karl Ulmann, or that of his government. Considering the part played by the Lettish battalions in supporting the Soviet Government in Russia, there may be danger of Bolshevism but there have as yet been no indications of friendly contact with the Moscow Government; on the other hand the latter's reported demand for permission to establish Workmen and Soldiers Councils, under threat of invasion, has not yet been complied with. In Estland, the government is headed by a popular social democrat named Petz, who was taken to Germany after the occupation and imprisoned and has been released since the revolution. Presumably the Estonian Government is less radical and more defiantly anti-Bolshevik than the Lettish.

Lithuania: Soldiers councils have also been formed by the German garrisons, and probably a native local government has been formed, as in the Baltic provinces. There have been practically no reports concerning Lithuania, which would indicate that the situation there is peaceful for the present. Repeated Paris for House. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

⁶ Not printed; it transmitted the queries listed in telegram No. 112, Nov. 16, 1918, 3 p.m., from Colonel House, [vol. I, p. 197](#) .

861.00/6537: Telegram

[Document 409]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 4, 1918—9 p.m.

[Received December 4—4:49 p.m.]

227. Your number 115, December 2, 9 p.m. respecting situation in Russia. This telegram was very helpful and I appreciate being kept advised along these lines.

EDWARD HOUSE

861.00/3323: Telegram

[Document 410]

***The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M.
House***

WASHINGTON , December 6, 1918—6 p.m.

134. Referring to telegram from Legation Christiania, December 2d, 6 p.m. to Department repeated to Paris and London Embassies, subject deserves discussion by the associated Governments. Department inclined to believe that archives of German Foreign Affairs and General Staff contain much to show the wholly sinister policy pursued towards Russia and would do much to disclose unscrupulous methods of Bolshevik leaders.

POLK

763.72114/4225: Telegram

[Document 411]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 8, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 8—4:45 p.m.]

241. Your December 6, 3 p.m.⁷ through Embassy quoting telegram received November 30th from Roumanian National Council at Vienna respecting difficulties in the way of return of Roumanian prisoners from Russia. I strongly recommend that the United States Government lend its assistance to the Government of Roumania in any way that may be practicable. I am not sufficiently advised as to the physical situation to be able to make suggestions.

EDWARD HOUSE

⁷ Not printed.

763.72114/4237a: Telegram

[Document 412]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , December 9, 1918—4 p.m.

154. Military Attaché, Berne, reports under date of December 5th^{[8](#)} critical condition of 20,000 Russian officers now prisoners in Germany. Fear that if they returned to Russia it would mean certain death. Department would like to know whether the matter was being considered by the Supreme War Council and what action if any had been taken.

POLK

^{[8](#)} Report not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.48/1

[Document 413]

***Memorandum by Lieutenant A. A. Berle, Jr.,⁹
December 10, 1918***

December 10, 1918

AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA

Economic intervention was proposed as a solution to the Russian problem in the early days of the Bolshevik regime, in the belief that this would foster stable government, alleviate suffering, and lead to resumption of Russian hostilities against the Central Powers. At that time Russian territory was open to representatives of the United States. Throughout the subsequent difficulties the United States Government has continued to regard the Russian people as friends and allies, whose rights were nowise modified by their misfortunes. Economic aid was recognized as merely extending the policy adopted when the Stevens Railway Commission was sent in 1916 [1917]¹⁰ at the expense of the Petrograd government, a portion of the deposit then paid us remaining at present in the United States treasury. Famine and want have lent a strong humanitarian appeal in addition to the political motives involved.

As an economic unit, the Russian Empire was integrated and self-supporting above all other powers. Divided into separate units, no single part, save perhaps Siberia, can exist without imports. The north-Russian block,—Great Russia, so-called—never produced either food or raw materials sufficient to supply her needs. Three of her old dependencies, the Ukraine, Western Siberia, and the Caucasus, with the product of her own Volga Provinces, supplied food. The Ukraine and the Urals produced all necessary raw materials. When the Bolshevik revolution paralyzed the distributive processes and its nationalization decrees of March and April, 1918, wrecked the manufacturing and commercial processes, the outlying

regions were glutted with some products and in want of others, while Great Russia had no products and no manufactures to attract their import. The relief problem therefore involved distribution—that is, transportation,—and rehabilitation of industry. With a friendly central government the United States might have undertaken the task. When in June *de facto* warfare commenced, the situation changed. In July the President announced that the United States would attempt economic intervention as its primary policy, but would couple it with a military force to protect its process.^{[11](#)}

The summer of 1918 injected various external elements. Czech troops, proceeding to Vladivostok, were first disarmed and then attacked by Bolshevik forces, but, encouraged by Allied promises, seized the Trans-Siberian railroad and maintained a precarious front on the Volga River, capturing the Grain Provinces instead of pursuing their original intention of cutting a way out to the Pacific, and thus imposing on the Allies the obligation of aid. This could not be accomplished in the Far East without American approval. The Japanese proposed and actually commenced, the occupation of Manchuria, with the object of continuing into Transbaikalia. The French and British looked to us. Meanwhile the Jews in the United States urged immediate economic aid on the one hand, though opposing any military operation against the Bolsheviks. Early in August, in cooperation with the British, we landed troops in Kola, Archangel and Vladivostok, and thus became actively hostile to the *de facto* Russian government. It was by this time obvious that a mere Economic Mission was impracticable, as it could operate only within the lines of an Allied force.

Meanwhile the organization of an Economic Mission to Russia had been entrusted to the Department of Commerce, under Secretary Redfield's supervision. Fanatics and intriguers of all sorts attacked that department.^{[*](#)} The situation became unfortunate, and offered no promise of success. The first week in August found a Czech representative in Washington asking whether anything was to be done for the heavily-pressed and starving Czech army. The President announced publicly that while the idea of economic intervention had not been given up, the departure of the Mission was indefinitely postponed, despite which the preparations of the Department of

Commerce continued. The President then requested Mr. Vance McCormick, Mr. Hurley, and Mr. Baruch informally to submit plans for the relief of the Czechs, for his personal attention. Almost simultaneously he requested a project for the relief of the available regions in Siberia; and at this juncture the Allied troops made connections with the Czechs at Chita and opened thereby the entire Trans-Siberian line. Specifications for the relief of the Czech troops and for economic relief to Siberia were drawn,[†] and as a result the War Trade Board was formally entrusted with the assistance to the Czecho-Slovaks and informally charged with carrying out the present program of economic intervention. It accordingly organized a Russian Bureau,¹² to which was assigned \$5,000,000 of funds at the President's personal disposal, and undertook the supply of material to the Czecho-Slovaks, and the relief of the population of the parts of Russia under Allied control, including Archangel and Murmansk.

Consuls Cole at Archangel and Caldwell at Vladivostok were instructed to ascertain the exact needs in their respective fields, and to secure for export to the United States such products as could be shipped, the object being to supply credits against which American shipments could be made. Fifteen thousand tons per month was supplied as an initial instalment by the Shipping Board, and cargoes were dispatched the second week in September to Vladivostok for the Czech troops. Hardware, railway spare parts, shoes and cloth were got together for consignment for the civil population, and food was sent to Archangel. Licenses for the import of furs from the Maritime Province, and of flax from North Russia were granted, and applications for licenses to export to those regions from the United States were invited. In September relations were opened with the Union of Siberian Cooperative Societies and with the American offices of the Moscow Narodny Bank representing the Russian cooperative associations. Ambassador Morris was sent as temporary director of the policy from Tokio to Vladivostok, and was replaced on the first of October by Mr. Heid, representing the War Trade Board, who is at present in charge. The National City Bank at his invitation opened a Vladivostok agency two weeks later. The plan was adopted of sending men along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway to collect goods for export, and to distribute in return the products shipped from the United States for relief purposes, so as to

“ensure the supplies reaching on equitable terms the actual consumers who need the same....¹³ It is of the utmost importance that excessive profits be avoided, and that no basis be permitted for charges of exploitation....¹³ You will have clearly in mind the military situation and the importance of creating a friendly population in the areas where American and other allied troops are operating. We regard it as most important that supplies be made available to Russians located in areas where the Czecho-Slovaks are operating or along the route over which supplies to the Czecho-Slovaks are to be shipped.” (Cable, Oct. 3, State department to American Consul, Siberia.)

And eventually, by this process of collection and redistribution, at normal commercial exchange throughout the empire was to be attained.

International cooperation in this program has been, and is now being sought with rather barren results. Owing to the attitude of Japan, Great Britain and France there has been constant danger of our becoming involved in an apparently imperialist policy. The machinery of cooperation is indeed present. In Archangel, the Tchaikovsky government is virtually in the hands of the Ambassadors. In the far East, Japan on August 19 announced the appointment of a Temporary Economic Mission, headed by Baron Megata, to deal with the Siberian situation, and about the same time Great Britain and France appointed High Commissioners. It is understood these governments regret the decision of the United States not to appoint a similar official. But despite the apparent cooperation in organization, differences in policy immediately developed which have never been reconciled.

The first question presenting itself was that of currency: the local Kerensky rubles varied in value from six to thirteen cents, and were not accepted by the peasants. The United States Government proposed an international ruble, guaranteed by the Associated Governments, and communicated this view to Japan, France and Great Britain. While the matter was pending, Japanese General Headquarters issued in Manchuria and Eastern Siberia

“headquarters notes”, redeemable in yen, and enforced a rate of exchange which virtually excluded non-Japanese activities. The British Government, apparently agreeing in principle to our proposal, caused the printing in August of ruble notes redeemable in pounds sterling, to the amount of one hundred million rubles for issue in Archangel, and on Oct. 26 the flotation of this currency was formally proposed. A conference between representatives of the four powers engaged in intervention was held in London, which agreed, over the protest of the United States, to the establishment of this form of money in North Russia, and likewise to a French issue in Siberia. The situation was forced by the extreme shortage of money in both the north and east. The War Trade Board cabled to Stockholm on November 2 that

“It is evident to us from our conversation and from exchanges of notes with the British that they desire to work toward the establishment of certain spheres of influence in Russia, and that they desire a free hand in Archangel, leaving to the United States to work out with Japan and France the question of which of these governments shall take the lead in Siberia....¹⁵ We regard it as most unfortunate that the Allies should at different points introduce different currencies.”

Similar difficulties developed in other fields. On October 22, a month after American food shipments to North Russia had commenced, Ambassador Francis cabled

“The British entirely control the Allied food Committee and they are endeavoring to impress the civil population with the idea they are the sole distributors of supplies....¹⁶ I am not disturbed but amused over the report that (General) Poole has gone to London for the purpose of demanding my recall from Archangel....¹⁶”.

Poole had already acquired prominence by supporting the Chaplin *coup d'état* against the Tchaikovsky government although the Ambassadors, including the British, had supported the latter.*
Meanwhile the Japanese troops substantially excluded the Stevens

Commission from the Chinese Eastern and Amur railways, causing the suspension by the United States of licenses to export cotton and import silk to and from Japanese markets: a situation which apparently remains unresolved. It may consequently be assumed that our own purposes toward Russia are not identical with those of the other Associated Governments, and that a plain understanding as to the status of both economic and military intervention has yet to be reached.

The present situation may be summarized concisely. The new areas opened by naval occupation of the Black Sea have (so far as the writer is informed) not yet been included in the scope of the economic program. Archangel however is being relieved by shipments of food distributed by an Allied Food Committee, and by an independent program of commercial relations with the United States, the basis of the operation being the barter of flax and North-Russian products, including timber, for American steel and textiles, under the direction of the now incorporated Russian Bureau. The Siberian program is in its initial stages, but has already engaged the space of thirty thousand tons of bottoms monthly; and a force of 250 agents is being gathered and sent out to attend to distribution and barter. The currency question is unsettled: Kerensky rubles are used in Archangel, provided they have been stamped by the local banks, and the British issue is ready for delivery. The Siberian Expeditionary Force has apparently been authorized to issue small-denomination notes for temporary use. Yet in Siberia, and even more so in Archangel and Murmansk, the shortage of currency is so great as to cause serious popular unrest. It is, meanwhile, increasingly apparent that the United States Government possesses the confidence of the Russian People more than any other, and that the logical consequence of intervention will force upon it the responsibility for a large share in the guidance of Russian affairs.

A. A. BERLE, Jr.
2nd Lt., Inf., U. S. A.

9 Member of Russian Section, Commission to Negotiate Peace.

¹⁰ See [Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 183](#) ff.

¹¹ See *aide-mémoire* of July 17, 1918, to the Allied Ambassadors, [ibid., vol. II, p. 287](#).

* The writer, out of a number with whom he came into contact, mentions three: Batolin, of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, Lied, of Lied, Inc., and M. C. Martens & Co. [Footnote in the original.]

† The writer had some part in drawing these plans. [Footnote in the original.]

¹² See [Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 147](#) ff.

¹³ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹³ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹⁵ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹⁶ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹⁶ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

* Report of Prof. A. C. Coolidge. This incident took place Sept. 12–15. [Footnote in the original.]

763.72114/4238: Telegram

[Document 414]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 11, 1918—9 p.m.

[Received December 11—7:06 p.m.]

248. Your number 154, December 9, 4 p.m. General Bliss has advised me that this matter has never been considered by the Supreme War Council and that therefore no action has been taken with respect to it.

EDWARD HOUSE

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1145/2: Telegram

[Document 415]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 14—9:08 a.m.]

Misc. 11. The Russian Ambassador at Washington, under date of October 31, 1918, submitted the following statement of eventual peace terms regarding Russia, which he wished to present to the Conference. He submitted the proposals in response to a note from the Secretary of State of October 23,¹⁷ in which correspondence between the United States and Germany regarding the Armistice was enclosed, and he requested his views and conclusions:

1. Exterior unconditional abrogation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk¹⁸ and all other agreements concluded by the German Government after November 7, 1917, either with the authorities acting in the name of Russia or with whatever National or Political group claiming to represent authority on any territory of the former Russian Empire.
2. Evacuation of German troops from the territory of the former Russian Empire, evacuation or isolation of prisoners of war including their disarmament, withdrawal of all German Officials, experts and agents of whatever character, return of all Russian prisoners of war.
3. Suspension of [*by?*] Germany of financial and military assistance to the present authorities in Russia and the discontinuation of supplying materials which might be used for military operations against the Allies or for the upholding of massacre and terror.
4. Immediate restitution by Germany of all naval and commercial vessels, auxiliary crafts and material, as well as the restitution of arms, rolling stock, war and railway materials taken after November 7, 1917.

5. Restitution of all Russian gold reserves, bullion, securities and banknotes commandeered by Germany or transferred to her by the acting authorities after November 7, 1917.
6. Abrogation of all franchises, financial and economic agreements entered into by the German institutions public or private with Russian establishments of whatever character after November 7, 1917; cancellation of purchases of Russian stock and securities effectuated after same date by German institutions directly or through substitutes.

POLK

¹⁷ See [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 383](#) , footnote 1.

¹⁸ [Ibid., 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442](#) .

763.72114/4238: Telegram

[Document 416]

***The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M.
House***

WASHINGTON , December 18, 1918—7 p.m.

183. Department's 154, December 9th. Your number 248, December 11th. Owing to the critical condition of the 20,000 Russian officers now in prison in Germany and the fact that the matter has never been considered by the Supreme War Council, the Department is of the opinion that the question of their relief should be considered by the International Peace Conference at the earliest possible date. Do you concur?

POLK

763.72114/4295a: Telegram

[Document 417]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 24, 1918—6 p.m.

6752. Reports from several sources indicate deplorable condition of (1) Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria, (2) German and Austrian prisoners in Russia. At date of armistice there were estimated nearly three million Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria and nearly one and a quarter million German and Austrian prisoners in Russia and Siberia.

Department thinks it highly desirable that general policy and plan relative to these matters should be adopted by associated Governments. Can the adoption of such a policy and plan be now determined by Associated Governments?

Necessary to determine action to be taken as to food and clothing for these two classes of prisoners and to check and counteract spread of Bolshevism among them.

International Committee Y. M. C. A. has assumed salary and personal expenses of Scandinavian Y. M. C. A. secretaries in Siberia; is now considering sending American secretaries to Siberia. Latter step recommended by American Consul General Siberia. Also see Department's 6631, December 14, 6 p.m.^{[19](#)}

In regard to Russian prisoners in Germany see Copenhagen's 3291, December 12, 4 p.m. and Christiania's 1440 December 12, 2 p.m. to Department.^{[20](#)} International Committee Y. M. C. A. willing to assume financial responsibility those doing war prisoner work in Central Powers for any portion salaries and expenses not paid by neutral countries. It is understood American Red Cross here

appealed to by its representative Webster at Copenhagen and has referred matter to Paris.

What are Hoover's plans, if any, relative to food for both classes of prisoners? Y. M. C. A. anxious to be advised relative to functions it may be permitted to perform. Situation merits prompt consideration. Department not in a position to take definite steps as not informed of attitude of associated Governments. Advise Department if Mission prefers that Department take this matter up separately with interested Governments.

POLK

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Neither printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/18a: Telegram

[Document 418]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 25, 1918.

43. Your 6691.^{[21](#)} It is my view that the most suffering in Europe to-day is that of Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria and en route home. They are dying wholesale from neglect. This is a matter of charity which Government therefore cannot handle. It would seem to me a proper work for the American Red Cross and I understand that Commissioner here has put up to them the question as to whether their funds are available for that purpose.

HOOVER

^{[21](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.77/9: Telegram

[Document 419]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 28 [27], 1918—5 a.m. [*p.m.*]
[Received December 28—10:36 a.m.]

11. For Secretary Lansing. Department has taken no action regarding recommendation of Consul General Harris²² for strong collective note from England, France, Italy and America in regard to Japan's action in Siberia, believing that you yourself would prefer to discuss this question with the President for action at Paris or London.

Department's number 92, December 21st, 9:00 p.m.,²³ has presented to you the general question of our relations with Great Britain in the Far East. A telegram from Mr. Davis says that he read to Mr. Balfour the questions which we directed Mr. Morris December 16 to take up with the Japanese Government in regard to its political policy in Siberia,²⁴ and that he received the impression that Mr. Balfour shares our anxiety in regard to Japanese action. I think the time [has] come when Great Britain, France, and Italy, and the United States should agree on some joint expression of opinion to Japan. If you agree, I think the question could be taken up by you at Paris much more effectively than anything we could do from here. I shall be glad if you will let me have your views and what decision you reach.

POLK

²² Telegram No. 235, Dec. 14, 1918, from Consul General Harris at Ekaterinburg; not printed. It was repeated in substance to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for Secretary Lansing, in telegram No. 83, Dec. 21, 1918, 5 p.m.

²³ Post, p. 517 [*Pg. 517 is part of [Doc. 436](#)*].

²⁴ See telegram of Dec. 16, 1918, 6 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 462*](#) .

861.77/604e: Telegram

[Document 420]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 27, 1918—7 p.m.

13. For Secretary Lansing: I have been forwarding to you important telegrams regarding Siberia and have also tried to keep you posted to date about the progress of the railway negotiations. The following from Consul General Harris at Omsk, 255 dated December 25th further illustrates that principal and only real difficulty in railway negotiations lies with the Japan[ese?].

[Here follows the text of telegram No. 255, printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, volume III, page 300*](#) .

We are informing Harris of the situation. You will have seen from the telegram I sent to London December 24 for Ambassador Davis²⁵ and to forward to you, that the British representatives in Siberia who cordially endorsed the plan agreed upon two months ago by Stevens and Morris with Oustrougoff and Horvat are advocating a plan of their own not apparently because they believe it is better but because they believe it has some chance of meeting the views of the Japanese who seem determined to keep control of the Chinese Eastern. I believe we have an obligation to carry out our purpose expressed to the countries concerned when we proposed to employ Mr. Stevens, namely that Stevens should operate the railway in conjunction with Russian officials and personnel and in cooperation with the Allies without modification of existing rights by whomsoever held. We have also said that we do not consider that either the Bolshevik movement or the presence of Allied military assistance in Siberia should be allowed to modify the rights of either Russia or China. Consequently I do not see how we can consent to Japanese control of the Chinese

Eastern as one of the direct results of our agreeing with Japan to send troops to Siberia.

I believe you are in a position to press this whole matter at Paris better than we can here and will be glad to know if you feel inclined to do so after conferring with the President. The matter is obviously one of the greatest urgency.

POLK

²⁵ [Ibid., vol. III, p. 299](#).²⁵

763.72119/3526

[Document 421]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

No. 36

LONDON , December 30, 1918.
[Received January 25, 1919.]

SIR: With reference to Mr. Laughlin's despatch No. 10265 of the 6th instant,²⁸ relative to the recognition of the Lettish National Council, I have the honor to transmit herewith, a copy of the original, with translation, of a letter dated the 20th instant, addressed to me by Mr. Henri Simson, containing a protest against the alleged violation by Germany of Article XII of the Armistice, signed on November 11 and renewed on December 13, 1918.

The writer states that the German forces are evacuating Latvia without having received any order from the Allied Powers, and that they are ravaging the country and supporting the Bolshevik forces.

I have [etc.]

JOHN W. DAVIS

[Enclosure—Translation]

***The Representative of the Provisional Government of
Latvia (Simson) to the American Ambassador in Great
Britain (Davis)***

LONDON , 20 December, 1918.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that the German armed forces, contrary to the stipulation of Article XII of the

Armistice dictated by Marshal Foch on November 11th, and renewed on December 13th, 1918, are evacuating Latvia without having received any order from the Allied Powers.

The German forces are opposed to the organisation of the local authorities, and are supporting the Bolshevik troops by delivering up to them arms, munitions and fortified posts. In the course of their retirement the German troops are systematically devastating the country and are pillaging and murdering in concert with the Russian troops who are coming in to take their place.

In the name of the Provisional Government of Latvia I energetically protest against the flagrant violation by Germany of the terms of the Armistice, and I request your Excellency to be good enough to transmit to your Government the request of Latvia that Germany be compelled to respect her own signature.

Please accept [etc.]

HENRI SIMSON

²⁸ Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 8611.00/14

[Document 422]

Memorandum by Mr. A. W. Dulles, December 30, 1918

December 30, 1918

LITHUANIA AND POLAND—THE LAST BARRIER BETWEEN GERMANY AND
THE BOLSHEVIKI

During the past few days I have had occasion in Berne to talk with a number of Lithuanians, Poles, Hungarians and Austrians. Their own internal, political and economic difficulties appear to be forced into the background as a result of their dread of the Bolshevik invasion. In pleading for immediate military assistance, two leading Lithuanians stated that the present feeble but anti-Bolshevik Government in Lithuania and the Pilsudski Government in Poland were the last line of defense between a Germany that was tending more and more toward Bolshevism and the forces of Lenine in Russia.

The Lithuanians stated that there was in Lithuania the nucleus of an army, but that they lacked a General Staff and arms and ammunition. Among the Lithuanian peasantry, where the literacy is high, there is a natural opposition to the Bolsheviks, but there is no means of organizing this opposition. According to latest reports, the Lithuanian Government (Taryba) has retired westward from Vilna to Kovno and a soviet formed in Vilna. In case the Allies desire to utilize the still existent anti-Bolshevik forces of Lithuania, immediate military assistance is vital. This could be furnished either through the port of Memel or Libau, preferably the former if the armistice conditions permit. Both these ports are reported to be ice free.

The Lithuanians assert that a relatively insignificant force of from four to six thousand men with a well equipped General Staff and arms and ammunition would be sufficient to rally the anti-Bolshevist

forces of the country. In Poland the situation is apparently very similar. The Pilsudski Government has, up to the present, succeeded in maintaining the support of the Socialist elements, (which appear today to be all powerful in Poland) without, however, committing itself to radical Socialism or Bolshevism. Much as Pilsudski would personally like to reach an agreement with Dmowsky and the National Democrats, he is unable to do it in view of the socialist opposition, as it would cost him his position in case the Socialists could charge him with negotiations with either Dmowsky or the national democrats, whom the Polish Socialists regard as reactionary and imperialistic. If the Socialists lose confidence in Pilsudsky and overthrow him, the triumph of radical Socialists or even Bolshevik doctrines in Poland is the probable outcome.

The Pilsudsky Government is apparently ready and willing to work with the Lithuanians in case the latter are willing to accept an economic and military alliance with Poland. This information is furnished by M. Gabrys, a prominent Lithuanian leader, who has just arrived in Paris (with a French diplomatic passport) at the request of M. Pichon and M. Franklin Bouillon. M. Gabrys said he did not know the exact task for which the French Government had summoned him, but it is significant that he has been won to the idea of an autonomous rather than an entire independent Lithuania closely allied to a greater Russia or if that were impossible, to Poland.

From the above it may be fair to conclude that the moment is a propitious one for a cooperation between Lithuania and Poland with allied assistance to combat Bolshevism. The present almost tottering condition of the provisional Government in both Lithuania and Poland makes immediate action desirable in case it is deemed wise to take advantage of this opportunity. With the present situation in Berlin, a situation which may spread to other industrial towns of Germany, the breakdown of the last barrier between the Bolsheviks of Russia and the Liebknecht party of Germany might mean flooding with Bolshevism all western Europe up to the allied forces on the Rhine.

Polish and Lithuanian informants in Switzerland agree that the Allies should not be deterred from a military expedition because of the fear

that it would require hundreds of thousands of men. All they ask is a small army as a nucleus for their own forces. They affirm that the growth of the Bolshevik power is due to the fact that they have never met a serious military defeat. In invading new districts, the Bolshevik army forces able bodied men to choose between incorporation in its ranks and immediate death. In this way it has gathered together an army of persons, who, for a large percentage, are serving against their will and therefore an army which would be greatly weakened by desertion as soon as it met any real opposition.

According to the statements of Austrians and Hungarians, they are watching with fear and trembling the approach of the Bolsheviks and with the ever increasing tendency towards Bolshevism which is especially making itself felt in Hungary they do not believe that either Austria or Hungary would act as a barrier to its advance but rather as fertile soil in case Poland and Lithuania are eliminated.

A. W. DULLES

Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/71: Telegram

[Document 423]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 31, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received January 1, 1919—10:30 a.m.]

57. For Secretary of State from Polk. Had a long talk with Senator Swanson this morning in regard to speech of Senator Johnson attacking Russian policy of Government and resolution calling on State Department to submit all information in regard to Russian situation.²⁹ Johnson's speech more or less on the same lines as Oswald Villard's article in *Nation* ³⁰ which you saw. Johnson's resolution calling on Department for information came up in Foreign Relations Committee and failed to pass by a tie vote, Senator Pomerene and Senator Thomas voting for the resolution. It is now the intention of the Committee to ask me to appear at an executive session to give such information as I can. I see no objection to this proposal as I think our policy in regard to the Archangel expedition and Siberian expedition clear and it would be better to frankly give such information as is proper rather than refuse to appear. Of course it would be undesirable to discuss at length the difficulties with Japan. Please cable me at once whether the President has any objection to my appearing at an executive session of the committee.

Swanson fears that there will be great pressure brought to bear for the immediate withdrawal of our troops at Archangel and Siberia and urges that some decision be reached as to the future policy and cabled to the Department as it would be helpful to present situation.

POLK

²⁹ For text of Senator Johnson's speech and resolution, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 57, p. 342.

³⁰ Dec. 21, 1918, vol. CVII, p. 763.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.77/4: Telegram

[Document 424]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[PARIS ,] January 2, 1919—10 a.m.

131. [From Lansing.] Your 92, December 21st, 9 p.m.³¹ This was called to the President's particular attention before his departure for England. He is due back tonight and I hope to be able to take up the Siberian Railway Situation with him tomorrow before his departure to Rome.

Referring to your number 11 of December 28th [27th] and subsequent telegrams on the same subject, please realize that in addition to the absence of the President I am also handicapped by the fact that we have not as yet met the British and the French Commissioners and that no conferences have been held up to the present time. In view of the urgency of the matter and the impossibility of obtaining any action here, I would suggest that you continue to use the regular channels for presenting the matter to the Governments concerned. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

³¹ *Post*, p. 517 [Pg. 517 is part of [Doc. 436](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/4: Telegram

[Document 425]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 2, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received January 3—8:20 a.m.]

61. For Secretary of State. Your 43 through the Navy Department from Hoover.^{[32](#)}

As both Mr. Davison^{[33](#)} and Mr. Gibson are in Paris suggest subject be discussed with them there. Red Cross War Council here is of the! opinion apparently that while they can act as agent and assist in distribution the question of supplies both as regards food and clothing is beyond the scope of their proper activities.

The Department is of the opinion that the question of Russian prisoners of war who have fought against the Central Powers and are now destitute, is one which requires the concerted action of the representatives of the Associated Governments at Paris either through the War Council or such organizations as may be in process of establishment by Mr. Hoover. The difficulty of funds for any such undertaking is one which perhaps you will wish to bring to the attention of the President with a view to possible action by Congress.

POLK

^{[32](#)} Telegram of Dec. 25, 1918, from the Food Administrator to the Acting Secretary of State, p. 478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 417](#), [Doc. 418](#), and [Doc. 419](#)].

^{[33](#)} Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross.

860m.48/2: Telegram

[Document 426]

The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN , January 6, 1919—3 p.m.
[Received January 7—12:42 a.m.]

3408. Department's 1312, December 31 [30], 4 p.m. Legation's 3392, January 1 [3?], 2 p.m.³⁴ Professor Woldemar stated food situation in Lithuania not bad if Germans did not send great quantities home; otherwise country could well support its own population and the army [of occupation.] Order and quiet prevail in general. Financial situation difficult, as Government faced with necessity of using either Russian rubles (to Bolshevik's advantage) or German currency, hitherto specially issued for occupied eastern territories, unless it is possible to obtain loan in the United States.

Woldemar has been instructed to request that the Germans be induced to hold Jakobstadt-Divinsk-Molodecheno-Baranovichi line, maintenance of which is necessary for country's defense against Bolsheviks; also to ask whether assistance can be expected in the shape of arms and if possible, troops, preferably Americans (perhaps of Lithuanian origin) which could be brought in through Libau. Woldemar makes a good impression and I am very much inclined to give credence to his reports, which check up with what information is at Legation's disposition. Advisability of sending relief moneys evidently depends largely upon whether imminent danger of Bolshevik invasion is averted or becomes a fact. My informant told by Haase in Berlin that Germans would do utmost to keep Bolsheviks out of Lithuania, but seems to doubt greatly whether this can be depended on for long. Woldemar has requested information as to line of conduct his Government should purpose [*pursue*]. He is returning to Wilna but states that Lithuanian representative here [has] been acknowledged by Danish Government as representing *de*

facto government, and is in cipher communication with Wilna.
Repeated American Mission, Paris.

OSBORNE

34 Neither printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/104a: Telegram

[Document 427]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 11, 1919—7 p.m.

250. [From Lansing.] Your 57 of December 31. The President sees no objection to your appearing before Foreign Relations Committee at Executive Session and agrees with your judgment as to course to be pursued. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

The Far East

[\[428\] The Chargé in Siam \(White \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Bangkok , November 14, 1918. [Received December 31.]

763.72119/3307

[\[429\] The Minister in China \(Reinsch \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Peking , November 23, 1918. [Received December 23.]

763.72119/3173

[\[430\] The Minister in China \(Reinsch \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Peking , November 24, 1918—8 p.m. [Received November 28—11:15 a.m.]

763.72119/2809: Telegram

[\[431\] Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State \(Long\)](#)

Washington , November 27, 1918.

763.72119/5931

[432] The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison)

Washington , December 14, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.115/11

[433] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 16, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 17—
6:40 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 893.77/10: Telegram

[434] The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Peking , December 16, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 17—8:24
a.m.]

763.72119/3019: Telegram

[435] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)

Washington , December 21, 1918—5 p.m.

763.72119/3019: Telegram

[436] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 21, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 23—
2:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf, 861.77/4: Telegram

[437] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 24, 1918—4 p.m.

763.72115/3421: Telegram

[438] The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Peking , December 24, 1918—5 p.m. [Received December 24—2:47
p.m.]

763.72119/3162: Telegram

[439] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington [undated]. [Received January 5, 1919—5 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/8: Telegram

[440] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)

Washington , January 6, 1919—6 p.m.

763.72119/3162: Telegram

[441] The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Peking , January 6, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 7—9:34 a.m.]

763.72119/3309: Telegram

[442] Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

undated

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/9

[443] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Paris , 10 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 762.94/2

[444] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—7:40 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/8: Telegram

[445] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 13, 1919—9 p.m. [Received January 14—6:40
p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/10: Telegram

**[446] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State**

Paris , January 15, 1919—10 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72115/3a: Telegram

763.72119/3307

[Document 428]

The Chargé in Siam (White) to the Secretary of State ¹

Unnumbered

BANGKOK , November 14, 1918.
[Received December 31.]

SIR: I have the honor to comply herewith with your telegraphic instructions of November 5th, 4:00 p.m.² to report to you personally on the probable programme of Siam at the Peace Conference as also in regard to the reasonableness of the same.

Already three months ago I made enquiries as to the war aims of Siam and elicited the information that none had been formulated. Thus the American Adviser to the Foreign Office told me that he knew of no official desiderata and considered that the Government ought in its own interest to proclaim its views. He confided to me that Mr. Pitkin had made a written enquiry to this Government but without eliciting any response. The British Minister, who is very influential here, expressed his ignorance likewise and did not consider that the views of the Siamese Government had crystallized as yet in this respect. He expressed the opinion that the Siamese had acted on high grounds, and with a view to the rights of small nations.

In contrast with the silence of official spokesmen are emphatic statements in the press (of which I have forwarded to the Department sundry examples) that at the end of the war, the Allies of Siam will, almost as a matter of course, abrogate their extra-territorial rights in this country. I think there is no doubt that such is indeed the hope of the Siamese Government. How actively the goal is to be sought, I do not know; and most probably no plans have yet been formed.

As to the desirability of abolishing extra-territorial rights in Siam, I think that there is abundant data already available in the Department, so, unless you instruct me to make another detailed study of the question, I will content myself with the following observations.

From the point of view of rewarding an Ally. The sacrifices incurred by Siam as a result of her entry into the war have been slight (see enclosure for Revenue and Expenditure figures²). The contribution of Siam has consisted in an expeditionary force numbering less than 2000 men and which recently reached France. More important than this military aid, Siam has broken up German business relations in this country. The British, Danes and Japanese have been the principal gainers by this policy. One American to my knowledge has also gained. The abrogation of extra-territorial rights was not held up as an inducement to Siam to become a belligerent.

The French intend to modify their remaining extra-territorial privileges in favor of Siamese pretensions. The negotiations may well become active with the advent of the new French Minister next month. The reasons prompting French policy in this respect are, I think, primarily those of enhancing their influence, which is by no means equal to that of Great Britain, coupled with a desire to act correctly towards an Ally. I anticipate that they will endeavor to obtain, either as a direct *quid pro quo* or by creating a favorable atmosphere, additional Advisers to the Siamese Government, and the right to establish better communications by rail or road with Indo-China. I gather that no attempt will be made to secure tin concessions in Southern Siam, as that would be considered trespassing on British preserves.

(N. B.—In connection with railroad communications between Siam and Indo-China. I am informed that the Colonial Government gives precedence to the completion of a railroad northwards from Saigon to Tongking, over Westerly construction. American capital has, I hear, been considering the construction of the latter route. The Colonial road system is almost complete to the Siamese frontier, near Battambang. Thence to Bangkok there is no construction and much swamp. I gather that the deficiency of communications with Indo-

China inspires confidence in those Siamese officials who still remember the aggressive attitude of France in the nineties of the last century.)

A canvass of my colleagues representing nations having extra-territorial rights in Siam, revealed no enthusiasm among them for the surrender of these privileges. In fact quite the reverse.

Otherwise than as a war measure, I apprehend that the United States might forego their extraterritorial rights either for a *quid pro quo* or on the intrinsic merits of the question at the present time, I have heard of no adequate *quid pro quo*. The privileges of a political nature which we might acquire would not compensate for those we should surrender; and economic gains could only be realized when American capital is ready to invest in a specific proposition. Personally I adhere to the opinion of those who do not consider that either the administration of justice in Siam or its general level of progress call for a modification of the present treaty rights. Such also is the private opinion of those Americans in Siam with whom I have discussed the matter.

It has occurred to me that we might (1) forego our right to maintain a 3% import duty—against adequate guarantees. (2) Agree to administer Siamese instead of American Law in the Consular Court when Codes or subsequent legislation had been completed and approved by us; (3) promise to abolish the Consular Court itself, whenever other nations dispense with the services of their legal advisers. Such a modification however would be rather consistent with the well known generosity of American policy towards small nations than with the legal theory of capitulations. Moreover I doubt whether the Siamese in their present temper would accept any such half way measures. The detriment of American extraterritorial rights is rather to Siamese pride, where it exists, than to anything concrete.

I have heard the opinion expressed that capitulations, being eventually doomed to disappear, those who first part with their rights will reap the greater advantages. If we accept the premises, I would suggest that rather than suffer our rights to lapse with time, or bargain them away for less than they are worth, provision should be

made for the merging of extraterritorial privileges in a super national judicial structure of the League of Nations.

I have [etc.]

J. C. WHITE

¹ Copy sent to American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

² Not printed.

² Not printed.

763.72119/3173

[Document 429]

The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State

D. No. 2342

PEKING , November 23, 1918.
[Received December 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to report concerning preparations on the part of the Chinese Government for the coming Peace Conference and to lay before you certain considerations regarding the same.

His Excellency, Lu Cheng-hsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has, been appointed as the head of the Chinese delegation. With him there are to act the present Chinese Ministers to the United States, to Great Britain, and to France; and Mr. Sunchow Wei, formerly Chinese Minister at The Hague. It is probable that an additional diplomat, someone from among the Southern leaders, will be appointed. Among the secretaries and attachés are Dr. Hawking L. Yen, a graduate of Columbia University, and Captain Ken Wang, a graduate of Princeton University and West Point.

About three weeks ago a member of the Foreign Office called on me and reported the substance of the desiderata of the Chinese Government which he stated had also been telegraphed to the Chinese Minister at Washington with a view to communicating them informally to yourself. The desiderata were arranged under three headings: Territorial Integrity, Restoration of Sovereignty, and Economic Freedom; they include the following:

Under the first heading, the restoration to China of the foreign urban concessions and leased territories;

Under the second heading, the abolition of the restrictions imposed upon China by the Protocol of 1901,^{[4](#)} particularly the

withdrawal of the foreign troops from China; and the abolition of consular jurisdiction in China;

Under the third heading, the granting of complete tariff autonomy.

Being asked for my opinion on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I stated that it was but natural for the Chinese Government to aspire to such restorative and liberating action as detailed in the above program. However, in proposing action to be taken at the Conference, the elements of the present international situation and particularly of that in which China finds herself must be carefully considered. I then expressed myself in substance as follows:

The Peace Conference will concern itself, in the first place with the settlement of matters relating to the war. On this score, the Chinese Government would desire to have adjusted such matters as damages for the destruction of Chinese lives on the seas, the proper disposal and adjustment of previous German rights and interests in China, as well as matters growing out of the un-neutral use of Chinese railways by Germany, and the participation of China in the Siberian expedition. These matters have already been discussed and are in the minds of the Chinese delegation.

But when we come to the desiderata as expressed by the Chinese Government in the program mentioned above, we enter upon the second phase of the work of the Peace Conference. It is my belief that it would be wise for the Chinese Government to avoid any attitude which would imply that it has a right to make certain demands or to ask for compensations. Even those Powers which have made the greatest sacrifices in this war do not propose to obtain for themselves advantages as a compensation for what they have contributed—each question is to be settled on its own inherent merits.

It appears to me that the situation in China will be taken up not with the view of rewarding the Chinese Government for its

participation in the war, but as a part of the second great object of the Peace Conference; namely, the establishment of such principles and the creation of such institutions as will assure the development of peaceful life and prevent the recurrence of a situation which would bring about again a catastrophe such as we have just experienced. The Chinese Government can, therefore, best contribute to the work of the Conference by viewing its own situation from the vantage ground of the general interests of humanity and civilization. In coming before the Conference, indeed as a loyal associate deserving of friendly consideration, but also as one who is threatened in her own territory and national life to become the object of ambitions and rivalries like those which have brought about the present war and which must at every cost be made impossible if the world is to have peace,—China will have the best chance of obtaining that attention which her situation urgently requires.

The great peril of China lies in the localized preferences or spheres of influence which divide foreign action and policy in China and which threaten to develop rapidly into causes of the most serious friction. Therefore, the essential point to be gained for China at the Peace Conference is to give specific substance to general declarations hitherto made in favor of Independence and Territorial Integrity. The total abolition of the policy of localized preferences is as essential to the peace of the world as it is to the freedom of national development in China. The separatist, economic and political action of the Powers in China must be replaced by the idea of a trusteeship in behalf of an united China exercised in the general interest; that is, the foreign enterprise and expert assistance existing in China must be organized, not to support the growth of different foreign national localized interests, but to support and develop the unified process of Chinese national life. In order that no local preferences may be claimed and that foreign action take on and preserve the character of a trusteeship in behalf of the general interest, it is essential that treaties and agreements kept secret after their conclusion should be denied all validity.

I was assured that the Chinese Government and the Chinese delegation desires to approach the work of the Conference in this spirit and from this point of view, believing that without question the realization of all the detailed desiderata presented would be of no avail should the growth of localized preferences continue. But that, were once the principle of national unity fortified by the abolition of the disintegrating action of localized interests, all the other desiderata would follow to achievement naturally and rapidly. I agreed that, stated by themselves, without the precedent establishment of the general principle, a great deal could be urged against the desiderata. The abolition of Consular jurisdiction and the granting of tariff autonomy are not practicable unless the Government and its action can first be strengthened so as to guarantee legal protection and freedom from abuses in taxation. These things can be only gradually approached and their realization is dependent upon the rapidity with which the action of the Central Government can be strengthened and improved.

I now have the honor to state to you more in detail the conclusion to which I have come after giving this question the most serious consideration and after discussing it from time to time with the best informed among Chinese and foreign officials and experts, including the principal among my colleagues.

A just settlement of the Chinese situation is essential unless the work of the Conference is to fail in protecting the world against a recurrence of the very troubles which brought on the present war. Unless such a settlement can be effected, we must abandon hope that the world can be freed from the curse of militarism. For in that case either the rivalries of Powers having local interests in different parts of China will inevitably lead to armed conflict meanwhile poisoning the international atmosphere; or, should Japan be given a freer hand and should anything be done which could be interpreted as a recognition of a special position of Japan, either in the form of a so-called Monroe Doctrine or in any other way, forces will be set in action which make a huge armed conflict absolutely inevitable within one generation. There is no single problem in Europe which equals in its importance to the future peace of the world, the need of a just settlement of Chinese affairs.

If the poisoning of international relations is to be stopped now and prevented in the future it is essential that the system of localized preferences should be abolished. The existence of these preferences contradicts in detail the general principles of Chinese integrity and independence which have so often been solemnly reiterated; it sets one nation against another and therefore inevitably creates motives of action which are inimical to Chinese unity and progress, to international peace, and to the equal rights of nations. Under the system of localized preferences, the influence and enterprise of foreign nations in China pull in different directions, spend half their energy in blocking each other, fail to develop China constructively as a whole, act in a retarding, reactionary manner, and involve constant friction and danger of world conflict. Instead of that, foreign influence and enterprise ought to be united in the practice of a trusteeship in behalf of the general interest of China and the other nations. Under the present system the main interest of each nation is to fortify its special position and privileges; under the system proposed all nations would be given an equal interest in preventing encroachment and aggression; their interest would become synonymous with the development of a unified China.

If there is to be an end put to the dangerous system of localized preferences, if foreign activities in China are to be co-ordinated with the unified development of Chinese national life and with the equal rights of free nations here, and if the evils of secret intrigue are to be avoided, it is necessary that the Great Powers should agree substantially on the following principles of action:

The Powers engage themselves to give up mutually all claims to exclusive preferences in any part of China and to base their action on the principle that China must be treated as a unit and that foreign action in China will be exercised so as to apply uniformly to all parts of China alike. The Powers pledge themselves that they will insist that activities undertaken on behalf of the Chinese Government by their nationals shall be carried out in every detail in the spirit of trusteeship for China, without an attempt to establish special national interests. The Powers will treat as invalid any agreements

relating to China which are not made public upon their conclusion or which aim to establish localized preferences.

In order to invest foreign assistance to the Chinese Government with the character of a trusteeship, the Powers agree to support the following system:

1. The methods of efficient national administration, in finance, communications, internal improvements, police, etc., are to be determined by national commissions of experts, including Chinese and foreign members. These commissions will standardize methods of administration and assure the application of the methods adopted. They will not interfere with the political action of China, but will confine their work to making effective the duly expressed national will through maintaining efficient and honest administrative action.
2. The making of contracts and furnishing of supplies are to be open to all responsible competitors on an equal basis, under the uniform standards established by the above commissions within their respective fields.
3. The sole criterion for the action of the said commissions shall be what is required by the needs of development in all parts of Chinese national life and by the demands of efficiency and honesty in administrative methods.

The giving of assistance in such a manner as outlined above, is the only way in which foreign effort in China, instead of remaining a disintegrating and actually demoralizing force as far as Chinese life is concerned, shall become a constructive agency supporting the development of China as an unified, peaceful, industrial nation. There are but two alternatives: either China will be developed in this spirit with due respect to her own needs and rights, preserving her fundamental traditions, and giving the peaceful spirit of the nation a chance to survive; or China will remain the field of intrigue and will inevitably be forced into partial or total dependence, by means of intrigue and military force, to the end of creating a sinister military regime which cannot fail to disturb the peace of the world and bring about a conflict even more terrible than the one just passed. These

words are not said without a sense of responsibility as to what they imply. If no attention is given to this situation or if statesmen are satisfied with the general phrases which have hitherto been used, without insisting that these general principles shall be given their full connotation in action and institutions, then there is no hope for the peace of the world. In framing the public law of the world, the proper safeguarding of freedom and humanity in China is of the utmost moment.

The question has been brought up as to how far these matters can be settled or advantageously discussed at a general conference. Opinion is practically unanimous that if a solution is to be achieved, the main conference must frankly face the situation and lay down adequate principles of action. It may be found that the application of the general principles in detail, is work more appropriate to a special conference. It is, however, indispensable that the general principles should be specifically worked out and expressed in such detail as to form a system of action which would remove the existing evils and provide an adequate guide and restraint for the future.

It may also be suggested that if the principle of unification of China and of the abolition of all local preference, together with the principles of trusteeship and non-secrecy of agreements be established, the creation or evolution of expert administrative commissions may follow gradually, as needed, through special arrangements among the powers chiefly interested. In order to participate in this matter a Power ought to have a sufficiently great interest in Chinese affairs to assure a real sense of responsibility. It has happened in the past that representatives of small powers, only remotely interested, have lent themselves to do work for stronger powers which the latter hesitated themselves to assume the responsibility for.

To support the need of devoting attention, at the Conference, to Chinese affairs, many extracts could be cited from President Wilson's public utterances. I shall quote only from his address to Congress, February 11, 1918,⁵ which applies thoroughly to the Far Eastern situation:

“I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. *They cannot be discussed separately or in corners.* None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.”

For the safe ordering of the future, for the protection of the interests of China and of the friendly powers who have sacrificed their blood and treasure in this war, it is necessary that all treaties and agreements made since August 1, 1914, should be laid on the table in order that it may be ascertained how far they are in conflict with the national rights of China and the general principles of action hitherto solemnly agreed to. Whether this is done at the main conference, or at a conference subsequently convened to carry out the principles adopted in the former, the essential point is that a scrutiny and revision of the arrangements secretly made while the Allies were engaged in a death struggle in Europe, cannot be evaded without great present injustice and peril to the future peace of the world.

It will be possible to give general form to the system above outlined, as applicable to China, by decreeing such principles for all countries where in the past public administration has been partly in the hands of people other than the natives of the respective countries (such as Turkey, Persia, China, and Morocco). It is of course also most desirable that a liberal economic regime, in other words, “the open door policy”, should be applied to all colonial possessions, thereby removing dangerous causes of friction; but the principles applied would naturally require to be given a different form from those respecting countries independently organized though actually in a weak position.

There are herewith enclosed memoranda prepared by experts concerning the action of China after the Peace Conference.

The memorandum prepared by Dr. W. W. Willoughby⁶ agrees in its main outline with the system proposed in this dispatch. This important subject has been often discussed between Dr. Willoughby and myself, and he is in full accord with my conclusions on the subject. The letter of Dr. W. C. Dennis deals particularly with the question of what action can be taken in the general Conference; he thoroughly believes that the importance of the matter requires that it should be placed among the principal agenda of the Peace Conference.

A memorandum⁷ of Mr. J. E. Baker, advisor to the Ministry of Communications, contains an attempt to work out more in detail, as applied to the railway system of the country, the principles of international co-operation and trusteeship. The manner of dealing with the railways is of essential importance, as the railways have been in the past the chief instruments for creating local spheres of influence. I have the honor to commend Mr. Baker's memorandum to your special attention, and I hope to make an additional report relating particularly to the railway situation, in time to be of service. Mr. Baker's report has been sent to the Department of Commerce by the Acting Commercial Attaché and Trade Commissioner, Mr. Paul P. Whitham, who on November 22nd addressed a special despatch on this matter to the Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Mr. Whitham urges that the principle of "no special privileges, but equal opportunity to all in China" can be carried out only through such a system as is proposed by Mr. Baker, which, also corresponds to the system of international expert commission recommended in this despatch. There being only a limited number of copies of Mr. Baker's memorandum available, further copies will be forwarded with the next pouch.

I have [etc.]

PAUL S. REINSCH

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by Dr. W. W. Willoughby

OBSERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO CHINA'S POSITION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

With the coming of peace a large number of questions of an international significance will demand a settlement. How many of them will be determined in the Peace Conference, and how many will be postponed for consideration in Conference later to be called, it is impossible to say. Special Conferences will probably be called to consider the establishment of a League of Nations, and for the authoritative statement of certain principles of International Law, especially of those dealing with the conduct of war on land, in the air, and on or under the seas. In the judgment of the writer a Special Conference on Far Eastern affairs will be needed in order to apply the general principles which it may be expected the Peace Conference will declare.

Speaking broadly, the international questions which demand a settlement may be grouped as follows:

1. *The Treaty or Treaties of Peace* between the Powers party to the Great War. By the terms of these Treaties will be determined what territorial concessions shall be made by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, what disposition of these concessions shall be made; what indemnities, if any, shall be paid; what reparation shall be made for injuries inflicted; and what military, political, and commercial guarantees for the future shall be given. All these are matters which will necessarily find their place in the treaties of peace.
2. *Determinations Tending to Establish International Justice and Permanent Peace.* The Entente Powers and the United States have fought the war, not for purposes of national aggrandizement, nor solely for their own security, but that political conditions may be established throughout the world which will satisfy the just wishes of national groups and thus lay the basis for national prosperity, permanent international peace, and friendly international cooperation. It may be expected, therefore, that the Peace Conference, in addition to determining the conditions under which

peace will be granted to Germany and her Allies, will make some attempt to lay at least the basis for subsequent action which will tend to prevent the recurrence of wars in the future. It is by no means certain, however, how far the Peace Conference can be induced to go outside of Europe and the Near East and concern itself with conditions in the Far East—that is, with matters other than those directly involved in the Great War. This, it does not need to be said, is a matter of vital concern to China, and to this point the writer will presently return.

As regards the grounds upon which China is entitled to a participation in the Peace Conference and the action which she should urge upon that body, the following observations may be made.

THE TREATY OF PEACE

China has been one of the belligerents, and though her armies have not participated actively in the fighting, certain of her national interests and rights have been directly involved. Military operations have been conducted upon her soil, a considerable number of her citizens have lost their lives as a result of acts upon the part of the enemy; she has taken possession of German and Austrian public property, taken prizes, and interned enemy subjects. Questions have thus been raised which require settlement in the Treaty of Peace. Thus, without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of the questions arising directly out of the war, with which China is concerned, the following may be mentioned.

1. The future status of the territory of Kiao-Chow formerly leased to Germany, and now in military possession of the Japanese.
2. The disposition of German rights in Shantung and elsewhere, including the German and Austrian “Concessions” in places like Tientsin, Hankow and other cities.
3. The revival or permanent abrogation of treaties between China and the Powers with which she has been at war.
4. Indemnity from Germany and Austria-Hungary for cost of maintaining interned citizens of those countries; also for the lives

of Chinese citizens lost upon transports sunk by German or Austrian submarines.

5. Indemnity for the use by the Germans in violation of treaty, of the Railway in Shantung for other than purely commercial purposes.
6. Whether the Boxer Indemnity shall continue to be paid by China to Germany and Austria-Hungary.
7. And, finally, of course, all the questions arising out of the Sino-Japanese military operations which have been and are still being carried on in Manchuria. Among these questions is that of the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The foregoing are matters necessarily and directly involved in any treaty of peace that may be entered into with Germany and her Allies.

DETERMINATIONS TENDING TO ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND PERMANENT PEACE

It has already been said that the Peace Conference will concern itself not only with arranging the terms of peace between the belligerent powers but with establishing conditions which will render wars less likely in the future, which will secure the realization throughout the world of principles of national right and justice which tend to the maintenance of permanent peace. It will be in pursuance of these great proposes [*purposes?*] that China must seek for the action upon the part of the Conference which will secure for her the conditions under which her national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the material prosperity of her people may, in the future, be secured. It is therefore of the utmost importance that her Delegation to the Peace Conference should be able to demonstrate to the Conference that in China there now exists a situation which is not only in violation of the fundamental political principles to which America and the Entente Powers are committed, but that there are forces in operation in the Far East, and especially in China, which, if unchecked, will lead to future international strife. The Chinese Delegation should, therefore, be prepared to show, to the point of absolute demonstration, the character and gravity of existing conditions in China, that her sovereignty and territorial integrity are being constantly violated, especially by Japan, and that if aid is not

extended by the Powers, those same principles of Prussian militarism and autocracy will be imposed upon the peaceful and democratically minded Chinese people which the Powers have sought to expel from Europe.

The Chinese Delegation should also be prepared to show by accurate statistics and other incontestable data that it is not merely a matter of justice and right that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China should be preserved, but that it is to the material interest of the Powers that China should become a strong, independent, and prosperous state. This will mean the presentation of data which will show not only the possibilities of the Chinese worked [*market?*] for export and import trade, if freed from all restrictions, but that whenever Japan has been permitted to obtain control, whether in Manchuria or Shantung, the trade of the other Powers has invariably suffered.

It would seem highly desirable therefore that the Chinese Delegation should be provided with data showing in detail the relations between China and Japan during recent years, the controversies that have arisen between the two countries, how they have been settled, and what rights or special principles Japan now claims in China.

ACTION BY THE CONFERENCE WHICH CHINA SHOULD SEEK TO SECURE

It is not likely that the Conference, burdened as it will be with many other matters, can be induced to pronounce in specific detail upon conditions in, or relating to, China; but it is to be hoped that the Conference can be persuaded to lay down certain general principles which are to be applied in the Far East, and to provide for the convening in the immediate future, of a special Conference on Far Eastern Affairs whose province it shall be to apply in specific detail the broad principles which the Peace Conference lays down. It thus becomes necessary to consider what should be the character and scope of the principles applicable to China which the Conference should be asked by China to declare. Two of these comprehensive principles are of paramount importance. They are, indeed, in the writer's opinion, indispensable as a foundation upon which to base all other improvements of China's present lot. They are as follows:

First, that henceforth no recognition shall be given to any claims of individual nations to localized special rights or “Spheres of Interest” of any sort within the borders of the Chinese Republic.

And

Second, that henceforth no special claims upon China of any sort, not publicly declared within a certain time, shall be recognized as valid by China or by the other Powers. This will mean that at the Conference to be called to consider Far Eastern Affairs, every nation will have to lay upon the table all its claims of special right, privilege or immunity in China, whether based upon treaties, less formal documents or upon mere understandings, so that these claims may then be passed upon,—those without a sufficient basis or fundamentally inequitable to be declared void, and those which, though valid, are in essential conflict with other valid claims or inconsistent with the principles henceforth to be applied, to be modified or abrogated in a manner just to all the parties concerned.

In this connection it will [be] of great advantage to China if the general Conference can be persuaded to declare the doctrine that only a presumptively valid and not a conclusive character shall be ascribed to those international agreements which have been entered into with China since the outbreak of the war in August 1914. In other words, the point may very well be argued that, so abnormal have been international conditions since the outbreak of the war, it will not be just to China and certainly not to the other Powers that recognition should be given to agreements entered into while those other Powers were not in a position to protect their own interests or those of their ally, China. In view of the circumstances under which China was compelled to agree to them, the Sino-Japanese agreements, growing out of the famous Twenty-One Demands of 1915,⁸ should be especially subject to revision or abrogation. This is a point which the Chinese Delegations should insist upon. But the fundamental matter is to obtain the establishment the Conference that henceforth local “spheres of interest” in China will not be claimed or recognized, and that no claims upon China not publicly made will be accepted as of even persuasive force by other Nations. When these principles have been declared and applied China will be free seek foreign assistance, financial or otherwise, from whatever

quarter she will; she will thus be able to set her own house in order and establish public administration upon such a basis that release from limitations upon her fiscal powers and from the exercise within her borders of extraterritorial rights can no longer be denied to her.

Railways

In connection with the abolition of special spheres of interests it is highly desirable that the Peace Conference should lay down some general principles upon which to base a recognition [reorganization?] and improvement of China's present railway situation. Some general scheme should be approved under which all the railways of China can be brought into one national system so that, in the future, new lines will be located where most needed; that contracts for construction and supplies will be open to free competitive bids from all persons or firms without regard to their nationality; and that, in general, the railways may be efficiently operated under a unified overhead control. The scheme should provide that all expert assistance given to China in the operation of her railways, shall be so employed and organized as to produce a uniform system of administration throughout the country, the just interests of China and of the friendly powers being safeguarded, but the ruling principle being that these experts or overhead administrators shall act in a fiduciary capacity as trustees for China as a whole and not for the advancement of the particular interests of the nations of which experts may happen to be citizens.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DETERMINATIONS WHICH CHINA MAY PROPERLY ASK OF THE CONFERENCE AS RIGHTS DUE TO HERSELF AND THOSE WHICH SHOULD BE URGED UPON GROUNDS OF GENERAL CONCERN

China has a right to demand of the Conference that it determine equitably the Chinese interests which have been directly involved in the war. She hardly has the right, however, to demand of the Conference that it grant to her, as of her own right, privileges which she has not previously possessed and which have not been directly involved in the war. To repeat what has been already said, these latter she should ask for only on the ground that they flow from the

broad principles which President Wilson has declared and which the Allies have substantially accepted; that they are in consonance with the interests of the Powers; and that their recognition will lend to the preservation of permanent peace. It will be a tactical mistake, therefore, as the writer believes, to bring forward these political or adjustments and reforms as matters which China demands as due primarily to herself. They should be urged as adjustments and reforms demanded by the true interests of the other nations as well as of China herself. It is also absolutely essential that at the same time that the Chinese Delegation ask that present infringements upon her sovereignty, territorial integrity, and fiscal freedom be abolished, that the obligation of China to do what is needed upon her past be freely and fully acknowledged. Thus, for example, it can not be expected that the Nations, however friendly and well disposed, will surrender the right of extraterritoriality with regard to their nationals until there exist in China Courts which by their personnel, organization, procedure, and control by the Central Government, command the respect and confidence of Western Powers. Nor, likewise, can it be expected that these Powers will consent to the abrogation of the present treaty limitations upon the power of the Chinese Government to fix maritime customs rates, until better guarantees than now exist, or at least a better operation of these guarantees are or is provided for.

If it had so happened that China had played a more active part in the War and had made greater sacrifices in men, material and money in its prosecution, or even if China had succeeded in fulfilling more satisfactorily her obligations as an Ally with regard to the internment of alien enemies, liquidation of enemy business concerns etc. she would be in a position to ask of the Conference, as a *quid pro quo*, that she be relieved by the Allies of certain limitations upon her freedom of national action even though the original imposition of those limitations had had no relation to the War. As it is, she must ask to be released from them not as a right growing out of the war but as dictated by the interests of the other Powers and as in accordance with the general principles to which America and the Entente Powers stand pledged.

What has been already said gives support to the last observation which the writer desires to make in this Memorandum. This is that it be frankly recognized by the members of the Chinese Delegation that its best, indeed practicably to [*its?*] only, chance of obtaining from the Conference action that will substantially improve its present international and domestic condition, is to persuade the British, French and American Delegations, but especially the American delegation, to urge upon the Conference the action which she, China, desires to have taken. From what the writer can learn, Great Britain will be disposed to accept America's judgment as to what shall be done in the Far East, and France is almost certain to adopt any Far Eastern policy upon which Great Britain and America are agreed. From a tactical point of view therefore, the Chinese Delegation will be well advised if it makes every possible effort to maintain close, personal, cooperative, working relations between itself and the American and British and French Delegations.

The chief point to be gained will be to convince these Delegations, to awaken in them a true realizing sense and conviction, that unless radical measures are taken to correct present conditions in China a war in the future is certain if Asia is to be saved from subjection to an autocratic and militarized control equally as objectionable and opposed to the interests of the other nations of the World, as was the Prussian political philosophy and militarism which has just been expelled with such vast sacrifices, from Europe. It will be well therefore for the Chinese Delegation to the [*be?*] prepared to show by cumulative proof of the policy which Japan, by her many acts, has pursued towards China, and to assert the willingness of the Chinese Government to do what is deemed necessary upon its part to make certain that the principles which the Conference may be persuaded to declare will be effectively carried out.

Respectfully submitted,

W. W. WILLOUGHBY

[Enclosure 2]

***The Legal Adviser to the Chinese Government (Dennis) to
the American Minister in China (Reinsch)***

PEKING , November 18, 1918.

DEAR DR. REINSCH: I am sorry that I have delayed so long in endeavoring to comply with your request that I submit for your personal perusal such observations as occur to me in connection with our conversation the other day in regard to China and the peace conference. This delay has been due to the fact that I have been sick and very busy and celebrating all at once.

As to the first question you raised my own opinion is clear. As I said the other day I believe that Eastern questions should be taken up and settled at the same conference which deals with the other questions growing out of the war. This for the following reasons:

(1) The problem of reconstituting the world is one problem which must be settled in accordance with the same general principles everywhere, and I think these principles can best be applied by the same men at the same time. This does not mean that there should not be specialists to deal with each question, but the work of these specialists should be correlated by men whose business it is to see the problem as a whole. The world has accepted President Wilson's principles of which perhaps the most important is equal and exact justice to all, friend and foe, East and West. Now when we come to redress the wrong done to France in 1870 by the application of certain principles, we want the same principles applied to Germany and Japan in Shantung, to Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia etc. We don't want to wait perhaps a year to say to another set of men give China the same treatment that you have just given France.

Again take the question, what shall be done with Germany's colonies? This should be considered as a whole. The same men who say what shall be done with German East Africa should pass on the disposition of Tsingtao and the Pacific islands. Of course General Smuts should be there to speak for British Africa while others speak

for Australia, China, etc. If we are to have a special conference for Asia why not for Africa? All the world is interested in every part of the settlement. As President Wilson said in response to the German proposition as respects dealing with France, Russia etc. separately “these questions cannot be settled in corners” (I quote without looking the passage up.)⁹ A world war calls in the nature of things for a world settlement.

(2) I believe it would be a great blow to American influence in China if the United States consented to have the Eastern Problem treated separately. China would regard herself (I believe) as abandoned. Japan would take the position that she was thereby confirmed in a special relation to China in a sense that the United States would not be willing to accept. I have never been prouder of my country than when I read President Wilson’s answer to Austria saying that the Czechs etc. and not he must determine their relations to Austria.¹⁰ For about the first time in history a great nation which had availed itself of the services of revolutionists in war did not abandon them when it came to making peace. Let us not do anything which even seems to abandon China.

(3) It is pretty generally agreed that with the clearing up of the Near Eastern Question which is certain, or apparently certain, to come about as the result of the war the Far Eastern Question is the next dangerous problem which the world must solve if another war even worse than the last is to be avoided. The whole world is interested in preventing such another catastrophe. This war has shown that in the future the safety of nations rests not in attempting to safeguard neutral rights but in preventing war. Under modern conditions neutrality means little in a great war even if the belligerents try to respect it. We are all in one boat; our safety lies in controlling the ship not in watertight compartments or life-buoys. All the world ought therefore to have a say in the settlement of the Far Eastern Question. The problem of the undeveloped country again reverting to No. (1) above occurs in South America as well as Africa and Asia.

(4) All the great questions raised by the proposed League of Nations concern all the world including China which must eventually at any rate be a member on terms of absolute equality (as I understand

those words). And the questions raised by the League are intimately connected with the questions which concern the immediate settlement. China I submit ought to be heard as to all of them.

When I say the nations of the League ought to be on equal terms I do not mean that they ought to have the same influence either in drawing up its constitution or operating it. "Russia and Geneva are equal" in their rights before the International Court etc. In my judgment it would be the essence of inequality to give them the same power in determining matters of policy. But they ought all to have some power and some chance to control their own destiny. Merely formal representation at the world conference in my judgment would not meet this need. The Great Powers acting as trustees for civilization will have to control the conference but all should be fully heard.

As to the second question you suggested I know little of the details of the financial side of the Eastern Question. But I feel that the money which practically every one thinks will have to be loaned to China to finance the reorganization which must come should be loaned by the League or by the direction of the League ultimately. It may be necessary for the United States, England, France and Japan to go ahead and loan the money at once but it ought to be understood that they are doing this for the benefit of the peace and order of the world not for any selfish advantage and that they are ready to render an account of their stewardship. The loans should not be used as a means of forcing the sale of goods etc. I realize this is all easy to say, hard to do. America ought not to be called on to loan her much needed money for others to get all the benefit. But America ought to be willing to ask no more than an even chance to sell her goods etc. The difficulty of course is to work out a practical way of bringing this about. But this should be the ideal. In the past of course there has not even been the slightest pretense at this.

The loans in my judgment should be moderate in amount. If China could get rid of her superfluous armies by paying them off and giving them some useful employment she could afford to go slowly in the matter of "development". I believe most strongly in the policy of China for the Chinese provided there is enough foreign development

for educational purposes. Large loans means longer and stronger foreign control of finance.

Very sincerely,

W. C. DENNIS

⁴ [*Foreign Relations*, 1901, Appendix \(Affairs in China\), p. 312](#) .

⁵ [*Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 108](#) .

⁶ Adviser to the Chinese Government.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ See [*Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 79](#)  ff.

⁹ For exact wording, see quotation from the President's speech of Feb. 11, 1918, p. 496 [*Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 429*].

¹⁰ See [*Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 368](#) .

763.72119/2809: Telegram

[Document 430]

The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State 11

PEKING , November 24, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 28—11:15 a.m.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs in personal conversation informed me today that the Chinese delegation at the Peace Conference would probably propose the following:

First. The settlement of proposals relative to the annulment through declaration of war of the treaties between Germany, Austria-Hungary and China, particularly with respect to permanent abrogation of the protocol of 1901 and treaty port concessions as far as concerns Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Second. That in the matter of damages for injury suffered the Chinese delegation would be guided by the general principles adopted by the Allies.

Third. That in the eventual making of new treaties with Germany or Austro-Hungarian states the principle of equal international rights implying complete reciprocity should be taken as a basis.

His Excellency also expressed the hope that in the general interest of world peace the Conference might make such arrangements as would effectively protect the integrity and independence of China particularly by discontinuing localization foreign interests and influences in different parts of China. As this would involve a change of policy as well as a relinquishment of certain existing arrangements, not only on the part of former enemies but also on the part of friendly governments, the Chinese Government could not make such a demand upon the latter but would only trust to that desire to bring about conditions which would guarantee the peace of the world through protecting integrity. In the same manner he

entertained the hope that the friendly powers might be willing on their part also to relinquish the burden laid upon China by the protocol of 1901 particularly with respect to the remaining Boxer indemnity which funds the Chinese Government would be happy to devote to the cause of popular education. The entire abrogation of the protocol of 1901 containing terms incomparably harder than those of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, terms in large part already fulfilled, perhaps might be considered by the friendly powers as in accord with the new spirit which now animates international relations. The Minister stated that he entertained the hope that these suggestions might win the approval of President Wilson.

In connection the above report I have the honor to express the following carefully considered opinion on the settlement Far Eastern affairs at the Peace Conference.

The great peril of China lies in the localized [preferences?] or spheres of influence which divide foreign action and which threaten to develop rapidly into causes of the most serious friction. Therefore the essential point to be gained for China at the Peace Conference is to give specific substance to the general declaration hitherto made in favor of independence and territorial integrity. Total abolition of localized preferences is equally essential to world peace and to extend freedom of national developments in China. The separatist, economic, and political action of the powers in China must be replaced by the idea of a trusteeship in behalf of united China exercised in the general interest: foreign enterprise and expert assistance existing in China must be organized to support and develop the united processes of Chinese national life. To stop all action inconsistent with trusteeship in behalf of general interest it is essential that treaties and agreements kept secret after their conclusion should be informed [*devoid?*] of all validity.

Without a just settlement of the Chinese situation the Conference would fail to protect the world against peril, for in that case either the rivalries of powers having local advantage in different parts of China will inevitably lead to armed conflict,—meanwhile poisoning international atmosphere,—or should Japan be given a freer hand and should anything be done which could be interpreted as a

recognition of a special position of Japan either in the form of a so-called Monroe Doctrine or in any other way, forces will be set in action which will make huge armed conflict absolutely inevitable within one generation. The substance of a general agreement to safeguard the world from danger would be as follows:

The Powers engage themselves to give up mutually all claims to exclusive preferences in any part of China and to base their action here on the principle that China must be treated as a unit open to foreign commerce and enterprise under the provisions of general treaties. The Powers pledge themselves that they will insist that activities undertaken on behalf of the Chinese Government by their nationals shall be carried out in every detail in the spirit of trusteeship for China without an attempt to establish special national interests. The Powers will treat as invalid any agreements relating to China which are not made public upon their conclusion or which aim to establish localized preferences.

On the question as to how far these matters can be settled at a general conference, opinion is practically unanimous to the effect that Conference cannot achieve its task of safeguarding world peace unless it frankly faces the situation and lays down adequate principles to cover its requirements.

It may be found that the application in detail of the general principles adopted is work more appropriate to a special conference. It is, however, indispensable that the general principles should be specifically worked out and expressed in such detail as to form a system of action which would remove the existing evils and provide an adequate guide and restraint for the future.

It may also be suggested, that if the principle of unification China and of the abolition of all local preference, together with the principles of trusteeship and non-secrecy of agreements be established, the creation, or evolution, of expert administrative commissions may yet govern as needed through special arrangements among the powers chiefly interested. In order to participate in this administrative cooperation a power ought to have

a sufficiently strong interest in Chinese affairs to assure a real sense of responsibility.

For the above reason the rights of China and of the friendly powers who have sacrificed their blood and treasure in this war it is requisite that all treaties and agreements made since August 1, 1914 should be laid on the table in order that it may be ascertained how far they are in conflict with the national rights of China and the general principles hitherto solemnly agreed to.

It will be possible to give general form to the system above outlined as applicable to China by decreeing its principles for all countries where in the past public administration has been by treaty agreement partly in the hands of men other than the natives of the respective countries such as Turkey, Persia, China and Morocco.

All the above considerations are commended most earnestly to the attention of the United States Government as essential to a permanent settlement of Far Eastern problems.

REINSCH

¹¹ Repeated to Colonel House in Department's telegram No. 179, Dec. 12, 1918, 9 p.m.

763.72119/5931

[Document 431]

Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

WASHINGTON , November 27, 1918.

The Chinese Minister¹² called today and discussed China's program for the Peace Conference, which included the following:

1. The establishment and revision of the full territorial integrity.
2. Her political sovereignty and its full realization.
3. Her physical and economic independence.

Program was further developed as follows:

1. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

- (a) Their concessions and settlements; their abrogations. He said that the original reason for their establishment had ceased to exist; that they had been created to give occidental merchants some place of safety and security in the days when China was not conversant with Western ways and Western people, and that they had been found and developed in the settlements with political rights and that they each were an infraction upon the territorial integrity of China.
- (b) Leased territories and their relinquishment.

He said that they had been taken by force or by threat under various pretext and that they served to create a balance of power in China, but a balance of power not between China and other Governments but between different Governments who had interests in China. He felt that the abrogation of all of them would leave the same balance of power between the other Governments and would reestablish general political integrity. He further stated that they were in many instances strategically situated and constituted a hindrance to the

development of China and to the free exercise of her sovereignty, because by reason of their situation and the political activities possible there which impeded or could be used to interfere with the exercise of China's free will. He felt that they were separate and distinct territorial sub-divisions with political attributes used by foreign powers for purposes other than those which were entirely consistent with China's ambitions; that they were really, as he expressed it, Imperia Imperium [*imperia in imperio*].

2. SOVEREIGNTY

- (a) The abrogation of Articles 7 and 9 of the Protocol of September [December] 22d, 1900¹³ and the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, pertains to the Legation guards and private communications between Peking and the sea.
- (b) Extraterritoriality; its abolishment as regards China.

He argued that China was different from Egypt, Turkey and Persia in that the extraterritoriality in those countries was imposed by military and political situations which existed in the countries or in other countries near them and that had grown up and developed from mediaeval times but that in China extraterritoriality was a recent development and had not [?] been imposed upon China by treaty. He felt that the same reasons did not exist and that it was also a hindrance to the free and full development of China.

3. PHYSICAL ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

- (a) Freedom of tariff and administration.

He feels that the tariff is limited to a five per cent duty and based upon a valuation which was small enough many years ago at the time the population remained stationary. During a period of years in which the crisis generally has arisen and the revenue derivable from that source is not only totally inadequate to China's needs but wholly inconsistent with the scale of prices of dutiable goods and with the revenues which other countries derive from the tariff.

- (b) Spheres of influence; their renunciation.

He feels that it is quite anomalous for spheres of influence to exist in China and says that China has never consented to it; that they do not now but they have simply grown up by an agreement between other Governments as to what part of China they might set aside for themselves and in which each of them was to have special rights, both economic and industrial in this sphere which that power claimed for itself. I told him that we did not recognize that spheres of influence existed and that we were thoroughly sympathetic to his nation's ambitions in that respect.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

¹² Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo.

¹³ See joint note of the powers to the Chinese Government, [*Foreign Relations, 1901, Appendix \(Affairs in China\), p. 59*](#).⁴

Paris Peace Conf. 185.115/11

[Document 432]

***The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to
the Assistant Secretary of the Commission to
Negotiate Peace (Harrison)***

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918.

DEAR MR. HARRISON: I am enclosing a memorandum on the Pacific Islands. There are two copies. I hope you will be very careful with them, as they are very confidential thoughts expressed very frankly. One copy ought to be delivered to Mr. E. T. Williams for his attention and for him to take up in the regular manner with the Secretary. I have spoken to Mr. Williams about it, and he is just about to sail, so that he should be there by the time this reaches you.

The other copy I want you, if you will be good enough to do so, to deliver to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss and ask him to bring it to the attention of Colonel House.

I am [etc.]

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

[Enclosure]

***Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State
(Long) on the Disposition of the Ex-German Islands of the
Pacific Ocean Now in Possession of Great Britain and
Japan ¹⁴***

[WASHINGTON ,] December 14, 1918.

UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION

The British took possession in 1914 of all the German-owned islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator. These islands lie in two localities:

- (A) Between the 140th and 160th degrees of latitude, and between the Equator and five degrees south, and the Island of Nauru just east of this section and north of the Equator.
- (B) The Samoan Group.

Referring to these in order, the United States has little or no interest in the ownership of those designated as being in Group (A) above. As regards the Samoan Group, (B), the United States has considerable interest. Part of the Samoan Group are in the possession of the United States, including the Island of Tutuila and its harbors. Great Britain has a great number of islands lying to the west, southwest, south, and southeast of the Samoan Group, including the Fijis, Palmerstons, Tongas, and Cooks. North of the Samoan Group, it has only Fanning and Washington Islands, the former being its cable station. Also north of the Samoan Group, and between it and the Hawaiian Group, are the Palmyra Islands and a small island just west of due north of Palmyra (United States possessions). The only other islands lying between the Samoan and the Hawaiian Groups are the Guano Islands, of which there are quite a number, some of them of doubtful existence, some certainly existent, and some certainly non-existent. (The existence or nonexistence of these islands is shown by a map delivered to Mr. Harrison for the Secretary.) These Guano Islands—some of them have been claimed by the United States, some by Great Britain, some by both, and some today are of doubtful sovereignty. Generally, they are not valuable. From a naval or strategic standpoint, they are not very valuable, except insofar as they might be fortified or used, some of them, for naval bases. In them the United States has an interest. Their possession will not be very strongly contested by Great Britain, and because of their very close juxtaposition to the Samoan Group and their interposition between the Samoan and Hawaiian Groups, they become of strategic importance to the United States. It is

recommended that an effort be made to have ownership of these islands transferred from Great Britain to the United States.

UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The Ex-German Islands lying north of the Equator were taken possession of and are now held by Japan. These islands consist of three principal groups: the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls, and a few scattered outlying islands in the same vicinity, and all lying between the 130th and the 170th degrees east longitude, and between the first and the twenty-first degrees north longitude. Principal among the outlying islands not connected with any of the groups is the Island of Yap, which is the southeastern terminus of the cable connecting Yap with Shanghai, and which was once a German cable now in possession of the Japanese. Yap is also connected by cable now with Guam. Guam lies between the Marianas on the north and the Carolines on the south, with Yap to the southeast. It is practically surrounded by islands now under occupation by the Japanese. Guam is a cable station of great importance to the United States. Our Pacific cable runs from Manila to Guam, and from Guam to San Francisco, touching at Midway and the Hawaiian Group. The cable line runs from Guam north to Yokohama, emerging, however, at Bonin Island, which is the extent to which the United States owns the cable northward. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States owns the cable to that point, landing is there made upon Japanese soil and operators other than Japanese are not allowed on that Island. Consequently, Japan is in control at that point of the American cable. As has been stated, Guam is also connected with Yap, and, consequently, can communicate through Yap directly with Shanghai over the German cable. This makes Guam the principal cable station in the Pacific Ocean. The cables from Manila, Shanghai, Yokohama, and San Francisco center there. Its utility to the United States as a cable station is jeopardized by the fact that it is practically surrounded by islands under foreign jurisdiction and control. The Ex-German Islands now under Japanese occupation have been closed to foreign trade. Vessels flying the American flag and belonging to American interests which formerly did a large copra business in these islands have been precluded from landing and from continuing their business (except that permission has been granted

for one specified steamer to call at two specified islands—one in each group—to collect copra there deposited). So that because of the fact that American vessels have been denied the privilege of coasting between and stopping at the islands in these three groups, we are without information as to what has been done by way of defense and fortification in those islands. It has been rumored that the Japanese have fortified to a considerable extent a few of them. This may and may not be true. If it is true, our cable station is already jeopardized. If it is not true, it can easily be true, and the utility of our station is thereby jeopardized.

So that in these islands the United States has a very material interest. In time of war the cable could be very easily cut by ships operating from any one of the islands lying north, south, southeast, or southwest of Guam. If the cable were cut at that point, our communication with the Philippines would be not only interrupted, but prevented. Besides serving as a menace to the continuity of our cable communication with the Philippines, these islands also form a screen separating the Philippines from the Hawaiian Group and from the United States. Any boat going to the Philippines, unless it passes through Japanese waters, must pass either through or close to the islands on the north or south of Guam (all now under Japanese occupation). It would be impossible to send any military forces to the Philippines with any safety, if the convoy were directed through the usual channels. Also, they would be a constant menace to naval ships moving through the Pacific and between the Philippines and the United States.

SUGGESTIONS

Japan will undoubtedly claim possession of the islands she now occupies, formerly German. England will undoubtedly do the same as regards those islands which she now occupies. While the United States has an interest, and while it would be greatly to the advantage of the United States to own Samoa and the Carolines and the Marianas, the United States can not make a direct claim to them or to any of them. Immediately that a claim is made, we admit the right of both England and Japan to claim.

It is conceivable that if the United States took the position that some or all of the Pacific Islands should be returned to Germany, the United States could, after the Peace Conference adjourns, come to some arrangement with Germany which would transfer the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Samoan Group to the sovereignty of the United States. If a war indemnity is demanded and obtained from Germany, the payment of the indemnity, or a part of it, might be offset by a transfer of these islands to the sovereignty of the United States. Of course, this could not be done morally while the Peace Conference sits. The insistence of the United States upon the return of the islands to Germany would be unpopular and would not be understood in this country. (Let us hope not in Japan or in England.) No other procedure which would insure to the United States the possession of those islands which are so material to our present possessions and future safety appears at the present time.

It is, therefore, recommended:

- First, that the United States take the position that the Carolines, Marshalls, Marianas, Yap, and the Pelew Islands and the Samoan Group be returned to Germany by the Peace Conference.
- Second, that after the Peace Conference adjourns the United States immediately enter into negotiations with Germany to obtain possession of the Marianas, Carolines, Yap, and the Samoan Group, and such others as may be desirable or obtainable.
- Third, that the Guano Islands lying between the Samoan and Hawaiian Groups be arranged for transfer from Great Britain to the United States, or that such of them as are claimed by Great Britain shall be assigned by her to the United States.

Since Germany, under the terms of the armistice, has surrendered practically her whole navy to the Allied command, she is no longer a naval power, and for many, many years can not hope to be. England and Japan are great naval powers. The possession by England and Japan of many islands throughout the Pacific which can be used for naval bases and which are situated at strategic points is a constant menace to the United States and to its dominant position in the Pacific. The argument that the return of the islands to Germany will

place her in a position to disturb the peace of the Pacific has now no foundation, and fails utterly.

Note.—In connection with this memorandum please see map showing the sovereignty of the Pacific Islands in colors, and map showing the existence and non-existence of the Guano Islands of the Pacific, and two volumes confidentially printed as follows: “Notes on the Sovereignty of the Islands of the Pacific” and “Notes on the Guano Islands of the Pacific,” all of which were delivered to Mr. Harrison for the Secretary of State.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

¹⁴ Printed from the copy filed in the Breckinridge Long papers. It bears the notation: “Prepared by me for the U. S. Delegates to the Peace Conference. BL.”

Paris Peace Conf. 893.77/10: Telegram

[Document 433]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 16, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 17—6:40 p.m.]

6648. For Secretary Lansing. Confidential telegram December 12, 6 p.m.^{[15](#)} reports that the Japanese have concluded or are attempting to conclude with the Chinese Minister of Railways an agreement to the effect that the Shantung Railway should be jointly administered by China and Japan regardless of which of them might be given a title to the railway at [by] Peace Conference; the railway to be policed by Chinese military guards under instruction of Japanese; Japan to manage under the same conditions as contained in the German control [the two] branch railways in Shantung recently granted to Japan. In return for trader [this] agreement the Japanese are to withdraw their civil administration along the railway lines.

As this agreement will give Japan effective control of the railways in Shantung the American Consul at Tsingtau considers that it would be highly [unfortunate] if the present temporary possession by the Japanese of the Shantung Railway were to be confirmed by the final peace treaty, inasmuch as it would not only [impair] China's sovereign rights in Shantung but also be detrimental to the commercial rights of other nations.

POLK

^{[15](#)} From the Minister in China; not printed.

763.72119/3019: Telegram

[Document 434]

***The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PEKING , December 16, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 17—8:24 a.m.]

Chinese Postal Administration wishes to acquire German post office in Legation quarters. As this question comes under the cancelation of the 1901 protocol between China and Germany, my colleagues consider with me that it must be subordinated to arrangements to be reached at the Peace Conference. Similar telegrams went to British, French and Japanese Governments. I request your instructions.

REINSCH

763.72119/3019: Telegram

[Document 435]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in
China (Reinsch)***

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—5 p.m.

Your December 16, 6 p.m. Legation Quarter by terms of protocol of 1901 being subject to exclusive control Legations, Department considers that Chinese authorities should not take possession German postoffice in Legation Quarter without express consent protocol Powers arranged at Peace Conference or otherwise.

Telegraph your views desirability opening Legation Quarter in any degree to Chinese occupation.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf, 861.77/4: Telegram

[Document 436]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received December 23—2:30 p.m.]

92. For the Secretary of State. In a cable dispatch from Tokyo dated December 18, on the Siberian railway situation,¹⁶ Morris reports that his British colleague, failing to receive instructions from his Government, has relapsed into his former unsympathetic indifference. Morris then asks:

“Would it be expedient at this time to point out to the British Ambassador reasons affecting the entire situation in the Far East, and particularly China, which call for closest cooperation of our two Governments in establishing a policy which shall limit pecuniary, exclusive commercial or political control?”

In raising this question Morris has evidently in mind Japan's demands on China in 1915,¹⁷ her subsequent loan policy, the secret military agreements of this spring intended to give Japan control of Chinese military establishment, equipment and related industries, Japan's extensive military activities in Siberia, and in general the tendency of Japan's policy to so combine her commercial and political activities that they become one and inseparable, and in practice to make both as far as possible exclusive of the interests of all others wherever she obtained sufficient foothold. Minister Paul S. Reinsch is even more emphatic in his statements as to the tendency and probable results of Japan's policies in China and the Far East.

I am very anxious, as you know, about the whole Far Eastern situation, feeling that if matters are left to their course, the doctrines of equal opportunity for all will disappear as the Japanese political

and commercial program extends and that herein lies an actual danger of future complications between the powers concerned in the Far East.

Morris is evidently impressed with the feeling that in order to meet the situation the American and British Governments should reach a frank understanding of each other's purposes and act at least on parallel lines in order to avoid needless misunderstandings and possible antagonisms.

It occurred to me that with the approaching visit of the President and yourself to London, the opportunity will come as perhaps never again, to reach some broad and comprehensive understanding with the British Government on the whole question of relations of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East, particularly as to whether the interests and ideals of the two nations and those of France and even Italy are not identical; and if so, whether this is not the moment to agree upon a reasonable policy and to have our respective representatives clearly so instructed.

In another telegram from Morris just received,¹⁸ he states that the general staff controls the Siberian situation and that popular opinion in Japan favors a strong policy in all Asiatic questions. He believes that the Hara Ministry are sincerely convinced that Japan's interests will best be served by policy of cordial cooperation with the United States, but that without popular support they are too weak to take issue with the general staff. It would seem, therefore, that a complete understanding between the United States and the European Governments might strengthen the hands of the liberal element in Japan as against the ambitious political program which is now being conducted by the military party.

I sincerely hope that this question and the opportunity for its solution will appeal to the President¹⁹ and to yourself as it does to me.

POLK

¹⁶ [Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 296](#) .

¹⁷ See [ibid., 1915, pp. 79](#)  ff.

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ See telegram No. 131, Jan. 2, 1919, 10 a.m., from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 484 [*Pg. 484 includes portions of [Doc. 424](#) and [Doc. 425](#)*].

763.72115/3421: Telegram

[Document 437]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , December 24, 1918—4 p.m.

123. Legation Peking reports^{[20](#)} that British and French Legations are urging internment of all Austrians and Germans in China and liquidation of enemy property. The Department has instructed Mr. Reinsch that in its opinion such questions should await results of Peace Conference.

POLK

^{[20](#)} Telegram not printed.

763.72119/3162: Telegram

[Document 438]

***The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting
Secretary of State 21***

PEKING , December 24, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received December 24—2:47 p.m.]

The Allied representatives have recommended to their Governments that the following arrangements for the permanent abolition of German-Austro-Hungarian privileges in China should be adopted by the Peace Conference.

First Internationalization of German and Austrian concessions in Hankow, Tientsin with Chinese participation in their municipal government and liquidations of enemy property there.

Second. The definitive abrogation of the protocol of 1901 with respect to Germany-Austria-Hungary with all the consequences involved particularly regarding landed commitments in the Legation quarter and in case of a new distribution of holdings a preference to those Entente powers which at present have no land in diplomatic quarter.

Third. Application to German and Austro-Hungarian merchandise of a general tariff with augmented rates.

Extension to China of all general measures which may be taken to prohibit the access of Austro-Hungarian German subjects and vessels to the territory and ports of the Allied powers. The representatives also recommend that their governments seek means for obtaining the exclusion of Austria's German interests from all participation financial or industrial in foreign groups operating in China.

The above is reported for your consideration with a view to action at the conference.

²¹ Substance of this telegram repeated to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as Department's telegram No. 117, Jan. 6, 1919, 8 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/8: Telegram

[Document 439]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON [undated].

[Received January 5, 1919—5 p.m.]

97. Telegram in substance as follows has been received from Legation at Peking: The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs during course of short conversation in Tokyo with Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs said that desires of China at Peace Conference would be supported by Japan but Japan would expect that status of Shantung should without delay be settled amicably between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. It would seem that the Chinese are being encouraged by the Japanese to make demands which it is a foregone conclusion will not be granted categorically by the Powers such as abolition of extraterritoriality and of customs tariff restrictions, and in return for their support the settlement of the Shantung question is being urged. All general provisions made by the Peace Conference for the protection and salvation of China would be futile if Japanese special right in Shantung should be acknowledged.

POLK

763.72119/3162: Telegram

[Document 440]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in
China (Reinsch)***

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—6 p.m.

Your December 24, 5 p.m. You will please be careful to abstain from any participation along the lines mentioned until you are so instructed. Matter is being communicated to Paris for information.

POLK

763.72119/3309: Telegram

[Document 441]

***The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting
Secretary of State [24](#)***

PEKING , January 6, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 7—9:34 a.m.]

I beg to request you to transmit the following to the President to reach him in Europe.

I feel in duty bound to call your attention to the imperious necessity of including a thoroughgoing and permanent settlement of the Chinese question among the arrangements to be made for the establishment of peace. I appeal to you directly not only because of your determined purpose to create a just foundation for human relations throughout the world but also because you have become to the people of China the embodiment of their best hopes and aspirations. Your championship of the four great principles laid down in your speech of July 4th,^{[25](#)} has found a deep response throughout China. These people whose rights have been trodden under foot while the war of liberation was going on in Europe, know from their own bitter experience, the vast importance of these principles for protecting free development and justice within the nations and for preventing coercion, plots and conspiracies from without. Never before have the words of a foreign statesman entered so deeply and directly into the hearts of the Chinese people, from the President of China who has again and again cited them in his manifestoes, down throughout all the ranks of the people. Though with bitterness akin to despair they observed that while the western powers were fighting for human rights in Europe the rights of the Chinese people were invaded by one of the Allies with every device of corruption and coercion, they now again have raised their hearts in hope and confidence that those who defeated evil in Europe and especially their leader and spokesman, the President of the United

States, will no longer tolerate in Asia the execrable practices of military domination, secret trafficking with fundamental rights and the corruption of the life of a people and they ask no charity but justice, they ask no support but the assurance that the constant exertion of evil influences from without and the attempt of foreign military autocrats to seize control of the Chinese resources, finance and defenses shall be put an end to so that the Chinese people may continue the arduous work of establishing a representative Government without having every constructive attempt maimed and every weakness aggravated by selfish interference from without.

I need not recall to you that the action of China during the war was inspired by the example of America and by a desire to realize our common ideals of freedom and justice. It was the liberal elements that are working for representative government which determined the rupture of diplomatic relations in February 1917. Could we at that time have devoted attention to China, her entire course in the war could have been guided by America as China sought earnestly of one accord to follow this guidance. The new President, though trained in the older school of statesmanship, singled out your greeting as the most noteworthy statement upon his accession and has since in words and action expressed his desire to guide the country after the models of American statesmanship. In their trouble, aggravated by foreign intrigues, both sides have repeatedly and fervently expressed the assurance that if you would consent to mediate all China would be happy to accept your judgment and advice. Such has been the attitude of the Chinese people throughout the war during the latter part of which, unhappily, the controlling power in the government fell into the hands of men who through ignorance, corruption and treachery prostituted their public trust to Japanese desire for power.

Nor need [I] more than summarize the acts of Japan during the fateful years of the war while her Allies were shedding streams of blood for liberty. In 1915 coercion was applied and China was forced by threats to solidify and extend the privileged position of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia and to agree prospectively to a like regime in Shantung together with the beginnings of special position in Fukien province. After this there was a change of methods although the policy tended to the same end, domination over China. Instead of

coercion, [they] used secret and corrupt influence through alliance with purchasable officials kept in office by Japanese support. The latter insidious policy is more dangerous because it gives the appearance that rights are duly acquired through grant of the Chinese Government; no demands or ultimatums are necessary because corrupt officials strongly supported by Japanese finance, acting absolutely in secret channels, suppressing all discussion with the strong arm of the police, are able to exercise contractual rights regular in form though of corrupt secret origin and evil tendency.

Japan has used every possible means to demoralize China, by creating and sustaining trouble, by supporting and financing most objectionable elements particularly a group of corrupt and vicious military governors in their methods, by employing instigators of trouble, by protection given to bandits, by the introduction of morphia and opium, by the corruption of officials through loans, bribes and threats, by the wrecking of native banks and the depreciation of local currency by illegal export of the copper currency of the people, by local attempts to break down the Salt Administration, by persistent efforts to prevent China from going into the war and then seeing to it that China was never in a position to render to the common cause such aid as would be in her power and as she would willingly render if left to herself, finally by utilizing the war and the preoccupation of the Allies for enmeshing China in terms of a secret military alliance.

As a result of these methods and manipulations Japan has gained the following: A consolidation of her special position in Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia and the foundation of the same in Shantung and Fukien; control in the matters of Chinese finance through the control of the Bank of Communications and the Bureau of Public Printing and the appointment of a high financial adviser together with the adoption of the unsound gold note scheme happily not yet put in [to] force. She has secured extensive railway concession [s] in Manchuria, Shantung, Chihli and Kiangsu; mining rights in various provinces and special monopolistic rights through the Kirin forestry loan, the telephone loan and others. Through the secret military convention Japan attempts not only to control the military policy of China but [incidentally] national resources such as iron deposits. All these

arrangements are so secretly made that in most cases not even the Foreign Office is in possession of the documents relating thereto. Together with this goes the persistent assertion of special interests which are interpreted as giving a position of predominance.

I realize that this is a strong indictment and I feel the fullest responsibility in making these statements to you. Fundamentally friendly to the Japanese as my published expression[s] show, I have been forced through the experience of five years to the conclusion that the methods applied by the Japanese military masters can lead only to evil and destruction and also that they will not be stopped by any consideration of fairness and justice but only by the definite knowledge that such action will not be tolerated. As a steady stream of information from every American official in China and from every other source as well as my own experience have made this conclusion inevitable, I owe the duty to state it to you and to the American Government in no uncertain terms, nor is this said in any spirit of bitterness against the Japanese people but from the conviction that the policy pursued by their military masters can in the end bring only misery and woe to them and the world. During this period it has not appeared possible for the European powers or the United States to do anything for China; the United States, though assisting all other Allies financially, could not contribute one dollar toward maintaining the financial independence of China as undivided attention was necessary to the requirements of the West Front. The Lansing-Ishii notes²⁶ undoubtedly intended to express a friendly attitude towards any legitimate aspirations of Japan, while safeguarding the rights of China, was perverted by the Japanese into an acknowledgment of their privileged position in China. Now at last when the pressure has been released America as well as European countries must face the issue which has been created which is whether a vast peaceable and industrious population whose most articulate desire is to be allowed to develop their own life in the direction of free and just government, shall become material to be molded by the secret and unconscionable plottings of a foreign military despotism into an instrument of its power. If it is said that the aims of Japan are now but economic and in just response to needs of Japan's expanding population, it must be remembered that every advantage is gained and maintained by political and military pressure and that it is exploited by the same

means in a fashion taking no account of the rights of other foreign nations or of the Chinese themselves. Divested of their political character and military aims the economic activities of Japan would arouse no opposition. The fact that at present when it has been announced that Japan will tolerate only bona fide economic business in China, huge iron enterprises, loans, mining concession[s], et cetera, are being actively promoted by Japanese with the assistance of subservient members of northern military clique who desire to use the proceeds for the purpose of increasing their personal forces—gives a clear insight into the method of Japanese economic business in China.

Detailed reports on the facts of the recent situation as well as discussions of remedies to be applied have been sent the Secretary of State in considerable volume, particularly in my telegrams of October 19, noon; November 7, 6 p.m.; November 12, 6 p.m.; November 18, 4 p.m.; November 23, 6 p.m.; November 27, 11 p.m.; December 4, 5 p.m. (?); December 10, 5 p.m.; December 20, 6 p.m.; December 20, 7 p.m.; December 24, 7 p.m.; December 27, 3 p.m.; December 30, 6 p.m.;²⁷ and despatches number[s] 2342, November 23rd; 2361 and 2362, both December 3rd, and 2408, December 20th.^{27a}

Only the refusal to accept the result of Japanese secret manipulation in China during the last four years, particularly the establishment of Japanese political influence and privileged position in Shantung can avert the onus of either making China a dependence of a reckless and boundingly [*boundlessly?*] ambitious caste which would destroy the peace of the entire world or bringing on a military struggle inevitable from the establishment of the rival spheres of interests and privileges in China. Peace is conditioned on the abolition for the present and future of all localized privileges. China must be freed from all foreign political influence exercised within her borders, railways controlled by foreign nations and preferential arrangements supported by political power. If this is done China will readily master her own troubles particularly if the military bandits hitherto upheld by Japan shall no longer have the countenance of any foreign power.

The advantages enumerated above were gained by Japan when she was professedly acting as the trustee of the Associated Powers in the Far East and they could not have been obtained at all but for the sacrifices made in Europe. They are therefore not the exclusive concern of any one power. With respect to Shantung, the German rights there lapsed together with all Sino-German treaties upon the declaration of war. A succession of treaty rights from Germany to Japan is therefore not possible and the recognition of a special position of Japan in Shantung could only proceed from a new act to which conceivably some weak Chinese officials might be induced [apparent omission] but which would be contrary to the frequently declared aims of international policy in China and which would amount to the definitive establishment of exclusive spheres of influence in China leading in turn to the more vigorous development of such exclusive spheres by other nations. The present situation of affairs offer[s] the last opportunity by which to avert threatening disaster by removing the root of conflict in China. This can be done only by abolishing localized preferences and particularly by commercializing all Chinese railways under unified Chinese control with such foreign non-political expert assistance as may be necessary. Slight sacrifices of special advantages already held by one or two European powers would be justified by the suppression of formidable danger to civilization. [Thereby] the opportunity for the infiltration of political influence in the interior of China is precluded; the development of stable and free government is assured particularly if America should give some practical indication that we are not indifferent to the preservation of the right of the Chinese people to develop freely.

Never before has an opportunity for leadership toward the welfare of humanity presented itself equal to that which invites America in China at the present time. The Chinese people ask for no better fate than to be allowed freedom to follow in the footsteps of America; every device of intrigue and corruption as well as coercion is being employed to force them in a different direction, including constant misrepresentation of American policies and aims which, however, has not as yet prejudiced the Chinese. Nor is it necessary on this account to exercise any political influence. If it were only known that an exchange [*sic*] in concert with the Liberal powers would not

tolerate the enslavement of China either by foreign or native militarists, the natural propensity of the Chinese to follow liberal inclinations would guide this vast country towards free government and propitious developments of peaceful industrial activities, even through unavoidable difficulties in the transition of so vast and ancient a society to new methods of action. The eager attention which has been paid to your words, the trust and confidence which the Chinese feel in your policies and aims, are evidence of a spontaneous desire to follow along the path of American action and aspiration which you have made so clear to the world. If China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present time the consequence of such disillusionment on her moral and political development would be disastrous, and we, instead of looking across the Pacific towards a Chinese nation sympathetic with our ideals, would be confronted with a vast materialistic military organization under ruthless control.

REINSCH

²⁴ Forwarded to the Commission to Negotiate Peace as Department's telegram No. 168, Jan. 10, 1919, 4 p.m.

²⁵ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 268](#).

²⁶ See [Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 258](#) ff., and *ibid.*, [The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, vol. II, pp. 432](#) ff.

²⁷ Of the telegrams cited, only three are printed: Oct. 19, noon, [Foreign Relations, 1918, p. 112](#); Nov. 18, 4 p.m., *ibid.*, [Paris Peace Conference, vol. I, p. 242](#); Dec. 10, 5 p.m., [Foreign Relations, 1918, p. 197](#).

^{27a} Despatch No. 2342, *ante*, p. 491 [*Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429*]; No. 2361, [Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. I, p. 566](#); others not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/9

[Document 442]

Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

undated

PROBLEMS AND POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

1. The American Minister to China has sent a lengthy cable which he desires to have called particularly to the attention of the President.
2. The message is a powerful plea for a “thorough-going and permanent settlement of the Chinese question”.
Its features are: (1) A presentation of the fundamental factors which underlie the whole problem of settlement and policy in and with regard to the Far East; (2) interpretation of facts and suggestions as to policy; (3) predictions as to the danger which attends neglect of the present opportunity.
3. As to the Minister’s statements of fact,—it is the opinion of the writer that they are uniformly and absolutely accurate.
4. As to the Minister’s expressions of opinion,—the views expressed represent the mature judgment of a man long recognized as a first-rate authority on international questions—particularly on problems of the Far East. In advance of the Boxer uprising of 1900, Dr. Reinsch predicted the bursting of that storm. He has been during the past five years the Representative of the United States at Peking, the political storm centre of the Far East.
5. This message is worthy of the most careful consideration of the Peace Commissioners. The necessity for arriving at a just and practicable settlement of various outstanding Far Eastern questions is, in its bearing upon the problem of safeguarding the peace of the world, most urgent. The problems are vital. Upon their treatment depends the directing of the course which will be followed in the future political development of races which constitute one half of the world’s population, and, incidental

thereto, of the relations of those races to the peoples of the Occident.

6. There are attached hereto:

A. A précis of the contents of the cable;^{[28](#)}

B. A copy of the cable.^{[29](#)} (It has been somewhat mangled in course of transmission.)

Respectfully submitted by

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

^{[28](#)} Not printed.

^{[29](#)} *Supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 762.94/2

[Document 443]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 10 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am quite willing to cooperate with the Allies in this matter^{[30](#)} and hope that you will do so in the appropriate way.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure]

212961/10F/18

MEMORANDUM ^{[31](#)}

Early in 1918, the Allied Powers, including the United States, persuaded the Chinese Government to agree to the expulsion of all Germans in China, estimated to number about 3500. Shipping was provided by His Majesty's Government and the Japanese Government, and the arrangements for their deportation and internment in Australia were completed for the first batch to start on June 22nd. At the last moment however the Supreme War Council at Versailles decided, in view of the pressing need of all available trained troops on the Western front and also on account of a request for the re-examination of the question of deportation put forward by the Belgian Government in consequence of their fears of the reprisals threatened by the German Government that the vessels allotted for the purpose should be diverted to Vladivostok for the transport of

Czecho-Slovak troops to Europe, and the deportation of the enemy residents in China was therefore abandoned.

The Chinese Government then proposed to intern the more dangerous enemy subjects at Fangshan south-west of Peking and on Chusan Island off the Chekiang coast. The proposal was approved by the Allied Representatives at Peking, with the exception of the Belgian Minister who feared German reprisals against the population of Belgium. By December so little progress had been made with the internment arrangements by the Chinese Authorities, that it was evident that the policy could never be made a success from the Allied point of view. The Allied communities in China began to clamour for the repatriation of all enemy residents before the conclusion of peace, and at a meeting of the Allied Representatives at Peking on December 13th it was decided to recommend to the respective Allied Governments that all undesirable enemy subjects in China be repatriated. The Representatives stipulated only that the Allied Governments should guarantee to provide the necessary shipping before they approached the Chinese Government. The resolution was worded to cover only "undesirable enemy subjects" to suit the instructions of the United States Minister, which did not permit him to go further. The French Government entirely approved the proposal and His Majesty's Government held that the expulsion should be enforced against all enemy residents and not only against those regarded as undesirable by the Chinese Government and informed His Majesty's Minister of their readiness to provide the necessary shipping. The Chinese Government viewed the proposal favourably expressing the hope that in return China would be able to secure the repatriation of a number of Chinese still detained in Germany.

On December 28th His Majesty's Minister at Peking reported that the United States Minister had been informed by his Government that the question of the repatriation of enemy subjects in China was being reserved for consideration at the Peace Conference and was therefore no longer prepared to join his Allied Colleagues in urging the Chinese Government to apply the measure either to all, or even only to undesirable, enemy residents.

His Majesty's Government desire to draw attention to the fact that this change of attitude on the part of the United States Minister at Peking on instructions from his Government means that the solution of the question, already agreed upon in principle by the Allied Representatives and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs must be deferred until it will be too late to give practical effect thereto, as the arrangements for providing shipping and collecting enemy subjects will necessarily take some time and could hardly be accomplished before the signature of peace unless proceeded with forthwith.

The result of postponing the present plan for dealing with enemy subjects in China will be to inflict humiliation on the Allied prestige in that country and to place the Germans in a position to reap the fruit of their hostile activities and resume their commercial enterprises in China on the conclusion of peace. Being on the spot they will moreover be in a more favourable position to seize upon any new openings offered, than the Allied businessmen who have sacrificed their prospects for military duties and whose return to China may be subjected to considerable delays.

³⁰ See enclosure.

³¹ The channels through which this undated British memorandum reached President Wilson are not indicated on the file copy.

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/8: Telegram

[Document 444]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 11, 1919—7:40 p.m.

257. [From Lansing.] Your telegram number 97 undated³³ giving substance of telegram received from the Legation at Peking. If you have not sent any instructions to Legation at Peking suggest that you instruct Legation to make occasion to say orally to the Chinese Foreign Office that American Commissioners will be unable to help China at Peace Conference if Japan comes here with China's grant of special rights in Shantung as a *fait accompli*.

Advise action taken, as I propose to say the same to Mr. Lou, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs who arrived here today. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

³³ *Ante*, p. 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 793.94/10: Telegram

[Document 445]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 13, 1919—9 p.m.
[Received January 14—6:40 p.m.]

214. Your number 257, January 11, 8 [7:40] p.m. Legation at Peking
is being instructed as you suggest.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 763.72115/3a: Telegram

[Document 446]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 15, 1919—10 a.m.

293. [From Lansing.] I have received a note from President Wilson^{[34](#)} enclosing a memorandum from the British Government intimating a desire on the part of the Allied Governments to repatriate all undesirable enemy subjects resident in China and asking the cooperation of the American Government in urging China to take action as proposed.

The memorandum reviews the proposals heretofore made for deportation to Australia of such enemy subjects, the reasons for abandoning that plan, the subsequent promise of the Chinese Government to intern the more dangerous enemy subjects and the failure successfully to carry out the arrangement.

The memorandum continues as follows:

[Here follows that portion of the memorandum printed on page 527 [Pg. 527 is part of [Doc. 443](#)], beginning with the second paragraph, fourth sentence, the phrase “at a meeting of the Allied Representatives”, and continuing to the end.]

The President states that he is quite willing to cooperate with the Allied Powers in the matter mentioned and asks the Department to do so in the proper way.

The British Government desires to have the measure applied to all enemy subjects without delay. Before indorsing Such sweeping action it would seem advisable to have the opinion of Minister Reinsch as to the probable effect. There are persons registered as subjects of Austria who may be in full sympathy with the Allies.

I suggest that the Department instruct Minister Reinsch to consult his colleagues of the Allied Governments and learn their views. He should then separately urge upon the Chinese Government the action desired unless he sees reason first to report to the Department and ask further instructions.^{[35](#)} Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[34](#)} *Ante*, p. 526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)].

^{[35](#)} See the report of the Minister in China for the quarter ending Mar. 31, 1919, [Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. I, pp. 328](#) [↗](#), [332](#) [↗](#).

Financial Questions

[447] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 13, 1918—1 p.m. [Received November 14—3:25 a.m.]

102.1/1420: Telegram

[448] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 22, 1918—7 p.m.

102.1/1420: Telegram

[449] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 7, 1918—7 p.m.

102.1/1736c: Telegram

[450] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 11, 1918—2 p.m.

763.72119/2960b: Telegram

[451] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 13, 1918—7 p.m. [Received December 14—12:54 p.m.]

102.1/1518: Telegram

[452] Financial Protocol Signed at Trèves, December 13, 1918

Trèves, December 13, 1918

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/1

[453] The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , December 18, 1918.

763.72119/3261

[454] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 19, 1918—1 p.m.

102.1/1518: Telegram

[455] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 19, 1918—10 p.m. [Received December 20—
11:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 800.51/2: Telegram

[456] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 26, 1918—6 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.]

763.72119/3163: Telegram

[457] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 31, 1918—9 p.m.

763.72119/3465b: Telegram

[458] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 2, 1919—4 p.m.

033.1140/180d: Telegram

[459] The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington , January 2, 1919.

763.72119/3327

[460] The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State

Paris , 2 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.51/2

[461] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 3, 1919—6 p.m. [Received January 4—2:45 a.m.]

872.51/141: Telegram

[462] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 3, 1919—11 a.m. [Received January 3—11:05 a.m.]

763.72119 P 43/48: Telegram

[463] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 3, 1919—3 p.m. [Received January 4—3:09 a.m.]

033.1140/114: Telegram

[464] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 6, 1919—6 p.m.

033.1140/111: Telegram

[465] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 7, 1919—4 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 182/28a: Telegram

[466] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 8, 1919—10 p.m. [Received January 9—4:43 a.m.]

033.1140/148: Telegram

[467] Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House

Paris , 9 January, 1918 [1919].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/6

[468] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 9, 1919—7 p.m.

763.72119/3359¹/₂: Telegram

[469] Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House

Paris , January 10, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/6

[4.70] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 10, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 11—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 711.63113/2: Telegram

[4.71] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 10, 1919—6 p.m. [Received 11:42 p.m.]

033.1140/161: Telegram

[4.72] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Christiania , January 11, 1919—1 p.m. [Received January 12—4:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/24: Telegram

[4.73] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

Copenhagen , January 11, 1919—5 p.m. [Received 11:20 p.m.]

763.72119/3380: Telegram

[4.74] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—7 p.m. [Received January 12—3 a.m.]

033.1140/178: Telegram

[4.75] The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State

Paris , 11 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

[4.76] General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State

Paris , January 13, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/4

[4.77] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 13, 1919—12 midnight. [Received January 13—7:19 p.m.]

102.1/1607: Telegram

[4.78] The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Paris , January 14, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

[479] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 14, 1919—11 a.m. [Received January 14—10:07 a.m.]

033.1140/182: Telegram

[480] The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Copenhagen , January 14, 1919—7 p.m. [Received January 15—10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/28: Telegram

[481] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 15, 1919—12 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 868.20/2: Telegram

[482] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 15, 1919—4 p.m.

763.72119 P 43/48: Telegram

[483] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 15, 1919—5 p.m.

033.1140/178: Telegram

[484] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 15, 1919—6 p.m. [Received January 16—noon.]

Paris Peace Conf. 102.1/5: Telegram

[485] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Paris , 17 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/5

[486] The Secretary of State to the Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby).

Paris , January 21, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

102.1/1420: Telegram

[Document 447]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 13, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received November 14—3:25 a.m.]

5830. For McAdoo from Crosby. Number 666. Referring further to the matter presented in my telegram number 664 and to my letter dated October 25th¹ I beg to lay before you the following facts and considerations:

1. A movement exists in France and in Italy and with somewhat less force in Great Britain, tending toward the maintenance of governmental control of the industries of those countries for a period, the length of which is not to be determined by the date of the peace treaty but by supposed internal conditions. Some suggest one year, some up to five years.
2. In France and in Italy there seems to be an assumption, not yet officially expressed, on the part of France that beyond the date of the peace treaty the United States Treasury, through new legislation if necessary, should continue to lend to European treasuries during period of control and that our governmental agencies should combine with European governmental agencies in determining the distribution of raw materials throughout the world.
3. The fact that such distribution supposes a continuation of strong governmental control in the United States of our domestic activities is not seriously taken into account, or if so, it is presumed that it be done in conformity with the corresponding action that is desired by many to be taken in European countries.
4. There are, of course, elements practically [*particularly?*] in Great Britain which run counter to all theories of continued

governmental control and which will insist upon a return to individual action substantially on pre-war lines.

5. Inasmuch as the actual peace negotiations may be prolonged over a period, during which, outside of the Central Empires, commercial movements will be freed from war restraint, it follows that a continuation of liberal loans from the United States Treasury to the existing governments would strengthen the hands of those who stand for the policies of centralization above indicated and would in fact constitute a large force in shaping both the domestic and international policies of European countries.
6. Industrial disturbances possibly leading to radical political changes are feared by many as concomitant of the period of readjustment. This is particularly urged by Italian representatives as a reason for continuing our help. Such occurrences are indicated as possible in all countries. If it should be decided to make loans to prevent such disturbances the demands are likely to be so numerous that a policy of opportunism will be imposed by the necessity of the case. This, I think, can best be exercised if we retain complete freedom of action in the disposal of our resources. This freedom of action, in turn, can best be maintained by restricting the function of Inter-Ally Programme Committees to the mere study and report upon conditions; even this function could be performed by our own representatives seeking information from those who desire to share in our resources.
7. Although it has been more or less difficult in the past it will be far more difficult in the future to adopt any guiding principles determining the amount of financial assistance which should go to one Ally as compared with that going to another and hence more likelihood of ill feeling.
8. As a possible general exception to the statement that very great difficulty will be had in fixing upon the relative general commercial needs of the Allies it may be said that the need of foodstuffs in an Allied country or any other can be determined with approximate accuracy and would thus lead to the establishment of definite credits without creating jealousies if you desired at any time to take such action.
9. You may desire to take into account the fact that the depreciation of the dollar in neutral countries and to liquidate the large neutral balances lying in New York will require shipments of goods which

would then be largely curtailed by a continuation of our present liberal policy of calling on credit. Suggest that, if credits be continued for a short time covering purchase of such things as cotton, foodstuffs, and other materials that have been resold by governments to civil population, I be instructed by you to inquire immediately into the possibility of private banking agencies taking the place of governments in this respect, that Allied Governments be put on notice that the maximum effort in this direction will be expected to be made, and that they be notified that assistance from the United States Treasury for these purposes will cease at an early date. I am satisfied that if private assets available in Allied countries be used to a maximum as a basis for credit in familiar or unfamiliar ways, that means will be found to purchase nearly all, if not all, of the materials required by these countries for their general use.

[10?] Provisions to Finance Ministers, copy of which was attached to my letter of October 25th was written for reasons as stated therein, and also because various persons of influence have unofficially proposed to me various plans of international control of exchange. I have no views favoring such control, but desired to make it clear that the way has been opened for official discussion, if Ministers shared the views of those near them who were urging such plans.

SHARP

¹ Neither printed.

102.1/1420: Telegram

[Document 448]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918—7 p.m.

2976. For Crosby from McAdoo. Treasury 576. Embassy's 5620 from Paris October 29 midnight. Your 634. Embassy's 5662 from Paris November 1, 12 p.m. Your 644. Embassy's 5830 from Paris November 13, 1 p.m. Your 666.²

First. The outstanding contracts in United States of Allied

Governments are being compiled. Indications are they will not reach very heavy total and that they will be substantially reduced by cancellations.

Second. Regard it as unlikely that Allied Governments will desire to make further additional purchases here for strictly military purposes to any important amount but their applications for new purchases will be strictly scrutinized. Our loans for war purposes should rapidly diminish and soon cease. Loans to some countries for food may have to continue as a war measure until declaration of peace.

Third. Have no authority to make advances for reconstruction or other after-the-war purposes but expect to ask authority to establish credits after peace for limited period and to limited amounts so as to be able to furnish credits for some of Allied Governments who for a time after peace is declared would not be in a position to purchase except on credit certain of our commodities of which they are in need. Such sales may aid us in finding markets for our commodities and there may be considerable pressure here to induce Government to extend such aid. I feel we must be careful not to involve our Government too deeply and must encourage private financing of foreign business as much as possible.

Fourth. Under existing legislation we have authority before peace within limits of existing appropriations to establish credits from which advances may be made to take care of commitments made in the United States by Allied Governments in order that supplies they require for prosecution of the war should go forward in an orderly manner. I propose to establish such credits to the extent necessary to care for such commitments but have given no assurances in this respect to Allied Governments nor do I consider myself bound to make advances for this purpose as some of Allied Governments may be in a position to meet their commitments otherwise than through borrowings from the United States.

Fifth. Our advances for purchases other than those named in the United States should cease as soon as possible and new commitments for neutral purchases should not be made by any of Allied Governments in the expectation that our advances may be used to meet same. See our 560.³ Assuming additional authority for credits given by Congress then as soon after declaration of peace as practicable, and before if possible, our loans to Allied Governments should in general be limited to expenditures for extraordinary replacements and not cover commodities for general consumption.

Sixth. Approve of your indicating informally to Allied Governments that they should notify their nationals who are interested in the import of articles of general consumption to undertake at once to make private arrangements for their purchases and to state that a policy of retrenchment in the Government's loans from the United States must be contemplated as a consequence of the armistice. The views above expressed coincide with the conclusions which you indicate you have reached as set forth in your 666. This is fortified by the important considerations set forth in paragraph 5 of your cable of that number.

Seventh. I would like to see all restrictions on arbitrage exchange transactions removed and our advances to support exchanges discontinued. We must however recognize that the ability of a foreign government and its nationals to obtain commodities from us depends on their ability to prevent their exchange going to prohibitory figures which in turn would prevent them from utilizing our markets through private transactions.

Eighth. Am interested to know that in your opinion private assets available in allied countries if used to maximum will suffice as basis of credit for transactions involving private needs. While I approve of discussions with Allied Governments on the lines that the Treasury may not make advances to foreign governments for these purposes, the time has not yet come to take final and positive stand on the subject.

Ninth. It is obviously important that United States should retain the utmost freedom of action in the disposal of its resources. Am disposed to agree with your conclusion as to restricting the functions of inter-allied bodies and gradually decreasing their activities and importance, thus concentrating all important negotiations and decisions in Washington. I do not think however these considerations should cause us to ignore the advantages of cooperation in certain situations, and I am quite willing to consider cooperation where-ever the advantages to be derived therefrom are demonstrated.

Tenth. Determination of other branches of government and decisions at peace conference must have important effect in determining the Treasury policies. Am therefore unable at present to prescribe any hard-and-fast rules, but for your guidance give you my present views in the light of such information as I have at hand.

POLK

² Only No. 5830 (Crosby's No. 666), *supra*, is printed.

³ Not printed.

102.1/1736c: Telegram

[Document 449]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 7, 1918—7 p.m.

3330. For Crosby from McAdoo. Treasury 615. Referring to your recent cables and particularly paragraph 10 number 787.⁴

First: Convinced that peace conference will deal with fourteen points of the President and that no questions will be determined by conferees regarding our past or future loans or the date of their maturity. This is apparent as Treasury has not been given official representation at the conference and my opinion has not been asked about these financial questions as undoubtedly would have been the case if American representatives expected to discuss such questions.

Second: All questions regarding (a) the amount which the United States shall loan Allied Governments within the limits approved by the President and (b) the form of the obligations and the date of their maturity so far as not fixed by statute are matters which Congress has delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury and they must be determined by him. These questions should not, even if technically possible to do so, be settled at the peace table. The peace conferees will certainly not wish to interfere with authorities expressly delegated by Congress.

Third: As Treasury is not to be officially represented at Peace Conference you will appreciate that it must not be unofficially represented there.

Fourth: Secretary of the Treasury is prepared whenever the Allied Governments desire, to discuss with them in Washington and to determine all questions regarding conversion and maturities of our foreign debt. Congress has delegated to him settlement of these

questions and all discussions in regard to these matters should be confined to Washington.

Fifth: I am convinced that time is rapidly approaching if indeed it has not already been reached when all financial discussions should be conducted in Washington by the Secretary of the Treasury and therefore think matters should be shaped looking to as early a discontinuance of the Inter-Ally Finance Council and the return home of your organization as can be accomplished with dignity and a due regard to the feelings of the Allied Governments.

Sixth: If you should deem it desirable to visit Washington in the immediate future to discuss the entire situation before terminating the existence of your organization I should entirely approve of your doing so. While however I appreciate the advantage to the Treasury and to the new Secretary of such a discussion I leave to your judgment the decision as to the relative importance of such a visit and of your presence in Europe during the next few weeks.

POLK

⁴ Not printed.

763.72119/2960b: Telegram

[Document 450]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 11, 1918—2 p.m.

166. For Col. House from McAdoo. While I have recently been in cable communication with the British Chancellor regarding rates of interest, maturity and other details of obligations of foreign governments held by United States, inquiries have been lately made by representatives of foreign governments which make me apprehensive that an effort will be made by some of European Allies to bring questions concerning our foreign loans into discussions at the peace conference. These questions include (1) cancellation of our foreign loans, (2) fixing the maturity and other terms of our foreign obligations, (3) exchange of obligations of one Allied Government which we hold for those of another, (4) equalization of loans as between lending belligerents, and (5) linking our foreign loans with questions such as reparation by Germany and financing reconstruction of France and Belgium. That some financial questions touching our foreign loans may be attempted to be brought up at the peace conference seems to be the more probable if, as current reports indicate, Bonar Law, Beading and Tardieu, all of whom are well versed in finance, are included in the British and French peace missions, respectively. I have been advised from Europe as follows:

First: Suggestions have been not infrequently made in important but unofficial quarters in both London and Paris regarding the possibility of the cancellation of all loans made by the Governments associated in the war to any other of such governments.

Second: British Treasury has suggested probably unofficially that future aid to Allies should now be taken over by the United States

on theory that our loans to Allied Governments should be equalized with British loans to such governments.

Third: British Treasury has asked information regarding our war expenditures and annual growth of our wealth before the war.

Fourth: British foreign office has made public announcement that its Allies and United States are ready to contribute all their resources to work of restoration of economic basis of civilized and orderly life to countries which prove they wish civilization and order. British Treasury has stated that it will not borrow from United States to cover supplies to needy countries of materials of same nature as Great Britain may be importing from United States.

I have instructed Treasury representatives in Europe as follows:

First: Our loans to foreign governments will now be greatly decreased.

Second: Our loans for purchases without United States will be promptly discontinued.

Third: Treasury will not consider or discuss suggestions to cancel our foreign loans as it has no power to make such cancellations.

Fourth: Treasury will not make loans on theory of equalizing same with British loans.

Fifth: Treasury opposed in principle to use of our foreign loans at peace conference in an endeavor to conciliate rival claims for indemnities and other advantages.

Sixth: Treasury prepared to discuss in Washington with governments concerned conversion of our foreign demand obligations into long time obligations.

Seventh: That I understand it is the intention of our Peace Conferees not to deal with our loans at conference.

Eighth: That as Treasury is not officially represented at Peace Conference it must not be unofficially represented there.

In presenting our foreign loan bills to Congress I have given my opinion that the loans made are good and will be collected in due season. I am confident that cancellation of our foreign loans or any action which would diminish their value would not meet with the approval of Congress or of our people who would thereby be subjected to heavy additional taxation. I have sent to Ways and

Means Committee of House draft of bill permitting loans to be made for purposes growing out of the war and after peace to governments previously associated in the war to the extent that existing appropriation remains unexpended. I have estimated such unexpended amount at \$1,500,000,000. Indications are there will be some opposition even to this bill which is designed to enable Treasury, with approval of President, to establish credits in case progress of events shall demonstrate necessity therefor. Already the suggestion of cancellation of our loans has caused concern as well as opposition in some quarters of Congress to the making of further loans and to any enlargement of existing powers of Secretary of the Treasury to make loans after return of peace. I feel very strongly that there is no valid reason why our financial relations with the Allies should be involved with any other questions and that all discussions in regard to the loans which we have made or loans which we may hereafter be willing to make for war or reconstruction purposes should be kept out of the conference if possible. This seems to me desirable from the standpoints of international and internal policy alike. If events should develop so that consideration of these financial questions at the conference cannot be avoided I trust it will be arranged that Treasury will be given ample warning and opportunity to present its views in an adequate way. Satisfactory disposition of these financial questions is of very great importance to our future. I cannot speak for my successor but he would doubtless desire to have Treasury views presented by representatives selected by him for that express purpose if it should prove impossible for him to deal with these questions in Washington.

POLK

102.1/1518: Telegram

[Document 451]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 13, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received December 14—12:54 p.m.]

6272. For McAdoo from Crosby. Number 682. From interview with Klotz,^{[4a](#)} following results.

First. I stated that if he cared to have his representatives discuss with you matter of maturities of French obligations, you would be glad to do so. His reply in substance is this: that maturities which his Government would consider as desirable and fair to them will depend upon moneys made available to them from Germany as a result of peace terms, the availability in question to cover not merely the total amount, which may be large and stretch over many years, but also that availability within short period during which reconstruction is desired to be urged forward. If Germany is required, and is found able, to deliver large amounts of material to be directly used in France, or which may be converted into exchange in foreign countries, then French Treasury will correspondingly need less or perhaps nothing from the United States and might find itself in position to begin payment of its obligations. He, therefore, concludes that no definite arrangement could wisely be made at this time.

Second. In respect to the Inter-Allied Council, while agreeing that there are now few occasions in which its original functions are required to be performed, he would consider it unwise to dissolve it, since at some moment it may be desirable to refer questions to it under the agreement by which it exists.

Third. Concerning the amount of money which will be demanded from Germany, no conclusions can be reached until a clearer definition is agreed to between Allies as to the meaning of that

clause in the armistice which refers to reparation. He assumes, at present, that if his own interpretations are followed, the amount asked for by all of the Allies will be large enough probably to absorb for many years, say forty or fifty, the annual increase of wealth in Germany before the war, estimated by Doctor Helferich [*Helfferrich*]⁵ at ten billion marks.

Fourth. In view of the fact that Finance Minister a few months ago strongly urged settlement of question of maturity and now prefers delay, we may surmise he has in mind some plan of proposing cancellation or of connecting uncertainty of situation with the amount or method of payment of indemnities.

SHARP

^{4a} L. L. Klotz, French Minister of Finance.

⁵ Karl Helfferrich, German Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury, January 1915 to June 1916.

***Financial Protocol Signed at Trèves, December 13,
1918*** [6](#)

Trèves, December 13, 1918

[Translation]

I

The German Government pledges itself not to dispose, without previous agreement with the Allies, of the metal reserve in the Treasury or in the Reichsbank (Imperial Bank), of paper drawn on foreign countries or of property held in foreign countries, or of foreign transferable securities belonging to the Government and to the public banks.

The German Government pledges itself not to give, without previous agreement with the Allies, to any individuals or companies permission to draw out any of the above-mentioned property or securities possessed by said individuals or companies.

II

The German Government pledges itself to take, in agreement with the Allied Governments, all necessary measures to decide, with the least possible loss of time, under what conditions the stocks and bonds (*titres*) lost or stolen in the invaded regions shall be restored to their legitimate owners.

III

The German Government lays on itself the obligation to pay to the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine as they reach maturity, and in

conformity with the laws now in force, all debts and all bonds which have reached maturity or which will reach maturity during the armistice and concerning the German public banks (*Caisses*), for example: treasury bonds, checks postal and otherwise, transferals, acceptances, etc., the above enumeration being declarative and not restrictive.

The German Government lays on itself the obligation not to hinder in any special way the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine from disposing freely of any property, securities, stocks, bonds or deposits belonging to them and situated in Germany.

IV

The German Government pledges itself to consider, in agreement with the Allied Governments, the measures to be taken for the restitution, in the shortest possible time, of goods sequestered to the detriment of nationals of allied countries.

Have signed:

For France:

Mm. CH. DE LASTEYRIE

P. TIRARD

For Germany:

Mm. BUSING

RATSEN

⁶ Translation filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/12.

763.72119/3261

[Document 453]

The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON , December 18, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: By order of my Government I have the honor to communicate the following to you:

The extension of the armistice with Germany was signed on the 13th of this month at Trèves by Marshal Foch, Admiral Wemyss, Messrs. Erzberger and Oberndorf, General Von Winterfeld and Major Vanselow.⁷

The extension is for one month, that is to say, it will be in operation until January 17; it is agreed that, subject to the approval of the Allied Governments it may be extended until the peace preliminaries are concluded.

The following clause was added to the Convention of November 11 last: "The Allied High Command here and now reserves to itself the right to occupy, whenever deemed expedient and under the head of further guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank of the River Rhine, North of the bridge head at Cologne and as far as the Dutch frontier. Such occupation will be preceded by a six days' notice."

On that occasion, a financial protocol was signed to provide for the conservation of the securities that have been pledged to the French Government and serve as a guarantee for the collection of the common debts. Reliable information is said to have shown that the

Germans were doing large transactions with the neutrals to our detriment.

The main article of that financial protocol is Article I worded as follows:

“Undertaking on the part of the German Government not to dispose, without a previous understanding with the Allies, of the cash assets of the Treasury or the Reichsbank, or of the bills and credits payable or held abroad, as well as of the foreign securities owned by the Government or public funds.

“Undertaking on the part of the German Government not to issue, without a previous understanding with the Allies, any permit to let out of the country any of the above mentioned belongings or securities owned by private persons or by companies.”

The other articles of the protocol deal with the restitution of securities stolen or lost in the invaded regions, the payment to the Alsatians and Lorrainers of the debts and bills of exchange maturing during the life of the armistice, and lastly, the measures to be taken for the restitution of property sequestered from nationals of the allied countries.

The provisions of Article I imply the appointment of a commissioner (who, as suggested by the Government of the Republic, should be a Frenchman) and who might be assisted by delegates of the other Powers concerned if so desired.

Notice of the financial protocol will be promptly served on the neutrals so as to acquaint them with the terms subscribed to by Germany and with the risk taken by third parties in the event of her continuing to break those terms.

The French military and financial attachés will be ultimately charged with the duty of making the authentic text of the two protocols known to the Federal Government.

Be pleased [etc.]

⁷ *Ante*, p. 11 [*Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 1](#)*].

102.1/1518: Telegram

[Document 454]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 19, 1918—1 p.m.

6674. For Crosby from Rathbone. Treasury 649. Embassy's 6272, December 13, 12 p.m. [7 p.m.]. Your 682.^{[8](#)} First: Treasury not disposed to press France to discuss at this time questions relating to whether and to what extent we will convert our demand loans into long time obligations. Second: Secretary Glass agrees with all the views set forth in Treasury 615,^{[9](#)} notwithstanding paragraphs second and fourth of your 682.

POLK

^{[8](#)} *Ante*, p. 540 [Pg. 540 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)].

^{[9](#)} *Ante*, p. 537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 800.51/2: Telegram

[Document 455]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 19, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received December 20—11:40 a.m.]

65. For the President from Glass.

First. On assuming my duties as Secretary of the Treasury, situation regarding our foreign loans gives me grave concern.

Second. Our loans to foreign governments now aggregate nearly eight billions of dollars and will probably approximate eight billion five hundred millions of dollars before declaration of peace, an amount sufficient to pay all our governmental expenses for about eight years on the basis existing immediately preceding our entry into the war. Congress believes these loans are good and should be collected, and the possibility that the debts may be forgiven or exchanged for debts not as good is fomenting opposition to extending the authority of Treasury within the limits of the existing ten billions of dollars appropriation to make loans after the war to Allied Governments previously participating in the war against the enemies of the United States, for purchases in the United States for reconstruction purposes.

Third. I judge from the recent semiofficial inquiries that European Allies may attempt to bring up at Peace Conference query concerning our foreign loans. You will recall speeches which Wickersham and Beck¹⁰ have made advocating our cancelling foreign obligations. An Associated Press despatch from Paris published December 17th, announces probable presentation by French Government to Chamber of Deputies a bill to establish an International Union to distribute the expenses of war already incurred and to be incurred between nations on basis of populations and power to contribute. Same despatch states similar

plan under consideration by British Government, but no definite steps taken by it.

Fourth. While British loans to the foreign governments exceed seven billion dollars including British loans to Russia of about two billion seven hundred million dollars, it might be that Great Britain would not be averse to cancelling war loans which it has made, in consideration of cancellation of perfectly good debt of British to United States, now about four billion dollars.

Fifth. French Finance Minister has indicated that he does not think it desirable to discuss at this time converting French demand obligations held by United States into long-time obligations, as the maturities which French Government would consider as desirable and fair will depend upon moneys made available to them from Germany as a result of peace terms. As a few months ago Finance Minister strongly urged settlement of maturity dates, he had in mind the proposal of some plan permitting France to settle her debt to us by transferring a part of her claim for reparation against Germany.

Sixth. From Treasury standpoint it would be distinctly advisable to keep all questions regarding our foreign loans out of discussions at Peace Conference in which event I can undertake definite settlement of these matters in Washington in such manner as to fully preserve the value of our foreign loans. If, however, Allied Governments are able to force discussion of these matters as a preliminary to or as part of peace agreement I recommend that Treasury be officially represented so that it may keep you advised of my views concerning these and any other financial questions arising, and be prepared to participate in such discussions as may be necessary. I feel that these financial questions are different in character from those with which existing Treasury representatives in Europe have been dealing and I agree with my predecessor's instruction to them, not to participate in the pending peace discussions. If you should determine to have Treasury represented, trust you will notify me as far in advance as circumstances permit, so I may select and personally instruct my representatives and send them to Paris for this express purpose.

POLK

¹⁰ George Woodward Wickersham, Attorney General, 1909–1913, and James Montgomery Beck, New York lawyer and publicist, Assistant Attorney General, 1900–1903.

763.72119/3163: Telegram

[Document 456]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 26, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received 10:50 p.m.]

82. For Secretary Glass from Edward House. The Commanding General S. O. S. has received telegram from General Rhodes, our representative on the Armistice Commission at Spa, substantially to the effect that:

“The French financial representatives recommend that a specially qualified commissioner from each of the Allied Governments be appointed immediately to take up with a commission, representing the German Treasury and the Imperial Bank, questions of the general financial conditions in Germany, with the special reference to retiring German marks and controlling exportation of German securities. The Financial Committee of the Armistice Commission recommend that, in view of our probable food supplies to Germany, our Government should get in touch with the French Government at once, that one of our most prominent and best qualified financiers be selected to sit with the eminent representatives already chosen by the French, German and Belgian Governments and states that the British Government is about to take similar action.”

In addition [to] the above questions, it will probably be necessary to determine what expenses of our Army of Occupation are to be met by Germany and to make arrangements regarding same. The above was submitted to the President who said he thought it desirable to take such action and that he took for granted that the representative of

the Treasury, whom we are hoping you will appoint, may himself represent us in these important conferences.

I recommend for this mission Norman Davis. It is unfortunate that you and Davis are not acquainted for in addition to the above questions and the work he is looking after, there are constantly arising matters with which he is conversant and can be most useful.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

763.72119/3465b: Telegram

[Document 457]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 31, 1918—9 p.m.

6808. For Davis from Glass.

First: Col. House having suggested your appointment as Commissioner in connection with armistice discussions at Spa I have recommended to the President your appointment as such. I regard this as a most important mission upon which must necessarily depend many of the important matters which will have to be determined at the Peace Conference, and I hope you will find it possible to accept the appointment. I regret not being personally acquainted with you but what I have been told about you by Leffingwell and Rathbone, who are to continue their positions in the Treasury, and by others has convinced me that you are admirably qualified to perform these important duties with advantage to our country and credit to the Treasury.

Second: I have advised the President that so far as your time is not occupied by such special mission you will be available to furnish such general financial and economic advice as he may desire regarding questions which may arise not directly touching our foreign loans.

Third: I regard it as important that all questions regarding our foreign loans be discussed and settled in Washington. These questions include making of further loans, conversion of demand obligations, dates of maturity, interest rate and special provisions of long time obligations received by us in exchange and claims of one government against another for dollar reimbursement.

Fourth: I shall expect you to keep me fully informed and I will give you instructions from time to time as may be necessary.

POLK

033.1140/18od: Telegram

[Document 458]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 2, 1919—4 p.m.

66. For President from Glass.

First: I have received your message of December 23,¹¹ cable from Col. House number 82 of December 26,¹² and Crosby's resignation as Special Finance Commissioner addressed to you dated November 28 reading as follows:

“I have the honor to place in your hands my resignation as Special United States Commissioner of Finance in Europe. This resignation is offered with a high appreciation of the privilege I have had of being of some service to our country during the war. It seems not improbable that the functions connected with the office I now hold may be beneficially continued for several months to come. But, inasmuch as my appointment by you was due to Secretary McAdoo's recommendation, I think it fitting that my resignation should thus be presented in order that a change may be made more readily should you, or Secretary McAdoo's successor desire to be represented in Europe by some one else. Renewing my expressions of appreciation, I remain, Mr. President.”

Second: Crosby's work as President of the Inter-Ally Council of War Purchases and Finance for which he was sent to Europe¹³ has been practically completed.

Third: In transmitting his resignation Crosby refers to his intention of soon publishing his book dealing with League of Nations.

Fourth: I will appreciate advice from you as to action on Crosby's resignation.

Fifth: I am greatly relieved that you feel there can be no proper basis for a discussion of our foreign loans in connection with the peace conference. Such being the case I am reluctant to send an Assistant Secretary to Paris to head a financial organization to deal with other financial questions which may arise in connection with Peace Conference. I fear that such an organization would serve to give the opportunity to foreign governments to raise in Paris the questions regarding our loans that should if possible be discussed and settled in Washington. Such questions include the making of further loans, conversion of demand obligations now held into long time obligations, elate of maturity, interest rate and special provisions of great importance of long time obligations and claims of one foreign government against another for dollar reimbursement. The only Assistant Secretaries familiar with these matters are Leffingwell and Rathbone. I cannot well spare Leffingwell at this time when domestic financial problems are so pressing, nor Rathbone if the questions referred to regarding foreign loans are to be discussed and settled here.

Sixth: Davis went to Europe to enable Hoover to obtain through him with least possible delay Treasury's view on such financial problems as Hoover might wish to submit. I should be glad to have him appointed Commissioner in connection with the armistice discussions at Spa as recommended by House.

Seventh: Davis if designated as suggested, so far as his time not occupied by his special mission, or Crosby if you desire him to remain in Europe, could furnish general financial and economic advice regarding questions which may arise not directly touching our foreign loans, retaining from the present Treasury organization in Europe such other men as might be useful during Peace Conference.

Eighth: With your approval I would instruct a financial organization such as suggested in paragraph Seventh of this cable not to discuss the matters concerning our foreign loans. If contrary to present expectations matters touching our foreign loans should be drawn into the discussions of the Peace Conference, thus necessitating their settlement outside of Washington, I can then send

Leffingwell or Rathbone to Paris, or if they are not available some other person fully conversant with my views on these subjects.

POLK

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² *Ante*, p. 546 [*Pg. 546 includes portions of [Doc. 455](#) and [Doc. 456](#)*].

¹³ See [Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, pp. 572](#) ff.

763.72119/3327

[Document 459]

The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON , January 2, 1919.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: AS I had the honor to inform you by my note of December 18, the financial protocol appended to the convention for the renewal of the armistice with Germany stipulates in its first article that the German Government “undertakes not to dispose except under a previous agreement with the Allies of the cash assets of the Treasury or the Reichsbank, of the bills payable or credits held in foreign countries, and all foreign securities belonging to the Government and public funds” and, on the request of the Germans, provision was made for the appointment of a Commissioner to handle those matters.

As I had occasion to inform you in our conversation of yesterday, the Government of the Republic appointed to that office Mr. Louis Marin, under-Governor of the Crédit Foncier, Commander of the Legion of Honor, Inspector General of France, formerly Director General in the Ministry of France, formerly Counselor of State. That high official has been instructed to proceed as early as January 3 to Mainz where he is to have his headquarters and which was chosen as being a central city near the large German city of Frankfurt.

I am instructed by the Government of the Republic to inquire while acquainting you with Mr. Marin’s appointment whether the Federal Government intends to designate an American delegate to serve with the French delegate. I am further instructed to say that an American delegate would be welcome.^{[14](#)}

Be pleased [etc.]

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

¹⁴ On Jan. 27, 1919, the Acting Secretary of State replied that “Mr. Norman Davis has been appointed as American representative to serve with the French Commissioner.” (763.72119/3327.)

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.51/2

[Document 460]

The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 2 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just received a telegram from Mr. Dodge, our diplomatic representative at Salonica. After giving some details in regard to advances made to the Serbians in the past, he writes as follows:

Minister of Finance leaving in a few days for Paris to confer with you and British and French Governments desiring considerably increased loans for Yugo-Slavia, stating receipts of Governments from taxes nothing and likely to continue so for a considerable time owing chiefly to administrative disorganization, destruction tax lists and certain amount of Bolshevism in Yugo Slav provinces while all salaries necessarily increased on account of high cost of living. Army cannot be demobilized owing to Italian situation.

I surmise that, in using the term "Yugo-Slavia," Mr. Dodge intends to cover the whole of Serbia and the new territories liberated from the Austrian Empire. Evidently the Government there is going to ask for loans quite independent of relief in the way of food supplies, which you have lately been discussing with Mr. Hoover. The Secretary of the Treasury will doubtless desire recommendations on the subject, if he feels that, under existing statutes, aid can be given of the kind apparently in question.

I am wiring Washington the general situation disclosed by Dodge's telegram. The matter being urgent, may I see you this afternoon at 5 o'clock?

Cordially yours,

OSCAR T. CROSBY

872.51/141: Telegram

[Document 461]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 3, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received January 4—2:45 a.m.]

6614. For Secretary of the Treasury from Crosby. Number 920.

First. Dodge wires from Servia no balance now left with no advances made to the Government of Servia for quarter ending September. On the other hand they have managed to expend from their own funds 120,000 francs and upon same objects heretofore covered by our advances. Dodge not yet able to learn what are commitments of American Red Cross in Siberia [*Servia?*]. Hoover, in conference with Davison¹⁵ here, will probably clarify Red Cross situation concerning which Davis will wire you. Servian Government extremely anxious to obtain at once the regular 3 million advance for quarter October, November, December and 1 million additional for purpose not clearly explained. Dodge recommended both. Am wiring him to clarify doubt as to whether the 4 million above-mentioned is asked for as additional to relief loan of 15 million which you have agreed to establish but of which Dodge may know nothing.

Dodge further wires as follows:

“Minister of Finance leaving in a few days for Paris to confer with you and British and French Governments desiring considerably increased loans for Yugo-Slavia, stating receipts of Government from taxes nothing and likely to continue so for a considerable time owing chiefly to administrative disorganization, detailed [*destruction*] tax lists and certain amount of Bolshevism in Yugo-Slavia provinces, while all

salaries necessarily increased on account of high cost of living. Army cannot be demobilized owing to Italian situation.”

Minister of Finance referred to in quotation apparently expects act for Serbia and for the Yugo-Slavia territories about to be combined with Serbia.

Second. You may desire to question whether the statute permitting loans to be made to Governments engaged in war against Germany would apply to a case in which two powers meeting the condition of belligerency with respect to Germany are at the same time maintaining forces for possible hostilities against each other.

Third. The continuation of our previous advances to Serbia as well as the use of the special relief loan involves the support of Servian and Yugo-Slav activities in a general way. Having in mind the last sentence of quotation from Dodge, of the doubt suggested in paragraph 2, I make no immediate recommendation as to a continuance of Servian advances for the purposes heretofore covered by them, although there is reason to believe that the moneys requested are badly needed and if received will strengthen the Governments of Serbia and Yugo-Slavia.

Fourth. For your information I quote from letter to me written by Harris¹⁶ in Rome.

“Mr. Page is desirous of our not coming to any definite agreement with the Italian Government until after Mr. Wilson has been to Rome and procured their adhesion to his principles.”

Fifth. The situations thus presented indicate that in addition to inquiries concerning (a) the actual need of commodities asked for on Government credits, (b) the possibility of supplying such need in the United States, (c) the ability of European Governments or their nationals to purchase in the United States or in other sources of supply, there arise questions concerning (d) the possibility of relieving regional shortage in Europe by political action tending to the removal of artificial barriers to traffic between various countries,

and (e) the propriety of supporting belligerents in various undertakings.

Sixth. While preparing to terminate my work here I am bringing to the attention of our political representatives information coming to me such as that herein reported to you and which may bear upon (d) and (e) above and shall transmit to you any views expressed on this subject by our political representatives unless such views reach you independently.

BLISS

¹⁵ Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the War Council, American Red Cross.

¹⁶ H. B. Harris, a Treasury representative in Europe.

763.72119 P 43/48: Telegram

[Document 462]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 3, 1919—11 a.m.
[Received January 3—11:05 a.m.]

137. [From Lansing.] For the Secretary of the Treasury from the Commissioners Plenipotentiary. American Commission considering it to be necessary that it should have a financial adviser separate from Treasury Department representative here, the Commissioners are united in desiring that Mr. Albert Strauss¹⁷ be that adviser but they do not wish to take any action without approbation. Would you be good enough to telegraph at once whether you are willing that Mr. Strauss should come to Paris and if so would you request him to do so? We are informed that Mr. Norman Davis will be the Treasury representative in the event of Mr. Crosby returning to the United States, which we understand he contemplates. In all matters pertaining to American finance we should of course confer with Mr. Davis. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

¹⁷ Vice Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.

033.1140/114: Telegram

[Document 463]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 3, 1919—3 p.m.
[Received January 4—3:09 a.m.]

138. For Glass, Secretary of Treasury, from Norman Davis:

1. Your cable of December 31st¹⁸ has been received, informing me that you have recommended to the President my appointment as commissioner in connection with armistice discussion at Spa and also insofar as the President may desire and my time is not occupied by the special mission to furnish general economic and financial advice with reference to questions which may arise not directly touching our foreign loans. I wish to thank you and express my highest appreciation for your confidence and recommendation and shall accept with pleasure the appointment.
2. As you are aware, Mr. McAdoo asked me to return to Europe as special representative of the Treasury in relation to European relief. As I cabled Rathbone yesterday, it was decided that a special Inter-Allied Board should be created to coordinate relief work and define general questions of policy and the President designated Hoover and myself the American representatives. This appointment I am accepting as part of my work which, however, should diminish once that a general plan is adopted and put in operation.
3. Colonel House is of the opinion that it will not be necessary for me to be at Spa many days, but that some of that work can be done here. If however, I find it impossible to attend to both duties, I shall advise you.
4. I presume it will be satisfactory to you for me to use any of the Treasury staff here who may be available and needed for my work.

Crosby informs me practically all of them will be free very soon, but some desire to return home.

5. I regret very much not being acquainted with you and appreciate your confidence all the more. I am delighted to know that Leffingwell and Rathbone are to continue with you at the Treasury for I have had full opportunity to appreciate their marked ability and excellent service rendered.
6. I quite agree with you that all questions with reference to our foreign loans should now be discussed and disposed of in Washington, and shall endeavor to keep you fully informed of my work here.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

¹⁸ Telegram No. 6808, Dec. 31, 1918, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 547 [*Pg. 547 includes portions of [Doc. 457](#) and [Doc. 458](#)*].

033.1140/111: Telegram

[Document 464]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—6 p.m.

112. The President from Glass. I fear there is great danger of confusion in regard to the matter of representatives of the Treasury in Europe. Colonel House has suggested that Norman Davis be appointed Commissioner in connection with the armistice discussions at Spa and I have recommended to you his appointment as such. Davis has also advised me of his appointment as one of the American representatives on Special Board created to deal with relief problems. Crosby has tendered his resignation and I have transmitted it to you for such action as you think proper. Secretary Lansing has cabled me saying that the Peace Commissioners wish to have financial advice from some one other than the Treasury's representative and suggested Albert Strauss go over for that purpose if I approve. In view of these demands from various sources for financial representation, and the danger of conflicting councils and disorganization among the Treasury representatives I ask your approval of the creation of a Treasury Commission in Europe under the chairmanship of some one who will be my responsible representative. If you approve I plan to send Mr. Strauss over to head the Treasury's delegation at as early a date as possible.

I have concluded to ask your approval also of sending Thomas W. Lamont of New York. He would be particularly useful in connection with the armistice discussions at Spa. You know he is a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company and the owner of the New York *Evening Post*. The armistice discussions, it seems to me, are likely to involve the whole economic and financial problem of Germany. The British, the French and the Germans will doubtless be represented by their strongest financial men. Our public opinion is

by no means prepared as yet to welcome any effort on behalf of the United States or of the Allies to restore decent conditions in Germany. It is therefore peculiarly important that the financial representation of the United States in these discussions should be such as to inspire confidence in the ability of our representatives to hold their own in a contest with the most expert financiers of Europe and also that the men representing us should be men known to have been thoroughly pro-Ally and anti-German since the outbreak of the European war. Lamont combines these qualifications with a statesmanlike view of the requirements of the situation and recognition of the utter impossibility of preventing the spread of Bolshevism and enabling Germany to meet her indemnities without setting up some plan for the restoration of her economic life. I quite recognize the possibility of objection to Lamont on the ground that he is a member of J. P. Morgan and Company and on the ground that he is the owner of a newspaper. I believe as to the first the advantage of his being a member of that firm for the reasons above indicated far counterbalances any disadvantage in connection with such a negotiation as this. As to the second I understand he has trustee'd the ownership of the *Post* and takes no part in its direction. To summarize, my suggestion would be as follows: That the Treasury be represented in Europe immediately by a commission headed by Strauss and including Davis and Lamont and Crosby, if you do not accept his resignation, and that they should retain the services of Goodhue, Loree²⁰ and Harris and such organization as has been created in Europe under Crosby's direction. I should expect Strauss to act as the executive head and to be my responsible representative in Europe.

The plan and organization outlined in this cable are predicated upon the policy of excluding from discussion in Europe all questions concerning the making, the readjustment or the conversion of our loans to foreign governments. I may add that I assume you will agree with me that so far as the Peace Commissioners or Mr. Hoover, or others in Europe, are in need of financial advice, they should obtain it from an organization acting under my general direction and responsible to me.

POLK

²⁰ F. A. Goodhue, member of the Inter-Allied Committee for War Purchases and Finance, and R. F. Loree, a Treasury representative in Europe.

Paris Peace Conf. 182/28a: Telegram

[Document 465]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 7, 1919—4 p.m.

186. For Polk [for Glass]: The President has approved the following memorandum:

- “1. As you are aware, our government has been represented in Europe upon various Interallied Councils, relating to finance, food, shipping and raw materials, war trade measures, etc. The purpose of these councils is rapidly changing and the American attitude toward them and the problems they represent must change. The matters involved are much interlocked and up to the time of the armistice were coordinated through the Council sitting under your chairmanship. Messrs. Hoover, Hurley, Baruch and McCormick are, or will soon be, in Europe. The working of these bodies still needs coordination by the heads of the departments concerned, who will be in Europe together with the chief representatives here of the departments whose heads are still in Washington.
2. This same group are essential in determination of policies to be pursued by our government in the Peace negotiations.
3. It is recommended that a council be set up, comprising Messrs. Hoover, Hurley, Baruch, and McCormick and Davis, with a Treasury Representative to be appointed by Mr. Glass, under your chairmanship, to discuss and decide such joint policies as are necessary in both these phases and to co-ordinate it with the Peace Commission by inclusion of Colonel House, General Bliss, and Admiral Benson, Colonel House to act as Chairman in your absence or inability to find time.”

Inasmuch as Davis has been appointed Commissioner to represent the United States in matters pertaining to finance at Spa and has been instructed by Secretary Glass to hold himself in readiness to furnish such advice as the President may require in connection with Treasury matters during the coming conferences, it would seem to be proper that Davis should be the Treasury representative on this committee. Please show this telegram to Secretary Glass and request his approval for Davis to act on this committee as Treasury representative.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

033.1140/148: Telegram

[Document 466]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 8, 1919—10 p.m.
[Received January 9—4:43 a.m.]

206. For your information and for the information of Secretary of Treasury. The President on January 6th wrote the two following letters to Norman H. Davis:

Letter number 1: "Secretary Glass has recommended to me your appointment as Commissioner in connection with the Armistice discussion at Spa. He has also advised me that so far as your time is not occupied by this special mission you will be available to furnish general financial and economic advice as I may desire regarding questions which may arise at the peace conferences not directly touching our foreign loans.

I entirely agree with Secretary Glass that questions regarding our foreign loans such as the making of further loans, the conversion of demand obligations, dates of maturity, interest rate and the situation [regarding?] long-time obligations received by us in exchange and claims of one government against another for dollar reimbursements should be discussed and settled in Washington.

I shall take pleasure in following Secretary Glass's recommendation and I request that you act as United States Commissioner in connection with the Armistice discussions at Spa and that you hold yourself available to furnish general financial and economic advice as I may desire from time to time during the Peace Conference.

I have requested the Secretary of State to take the necessary steps to issue your commission in Washington. Until this is done this letter together with the enclosed letter of even date will serve as your credentials.”

Letter number 2: “I appoint you to act as United States Finance Commissioner and as such to take part on behalf of our government in the Armistice discussion at Spa.

Your duties in connection with the Armistice discussion will be to take [up] with the Commission representing the German Treasury and the Imperial Bank questions of general financial [and] economic conditions in Germany with the special reference to retiring German marks and controlling the exportation of German securities. You will sit with the representatives chosen by the British, French, Belgian and German Governments to consider these matters.

In addition to the above questions you will also consider and determine what expenses of our army of occupation are to be met by Germany and to make arrangements regarding same.

This will serve as your credentials to act for the United States with respect to these matters.”

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/6

[Document 467]

Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House

PARIS , 9 January, 1918 [1919].

Memorandum for Colonel House:

I learn from the French Treasury that the next conference at Spa will be held on the 14th instant, when it is expected most important questions will come up in connection with the extension of the armistice which expires on the 17th instant, and also that Count Leystere, the French Financial Representative to Spa, went to London this morning for a conference with the British Government relative to questions which are to be submitted at the conference. I have not been able to ascertain just what these important questions are, but am told that Count Leystere will get in touch with me on his return Saturday night.

In addition to the Armistice Conference, I am informed that there is a conference now in session at Mayence, attended by a representative of the French, British, Italian, and Belgian Governments and of the German Treasury and Imperial Bank. It was especially for this conference that the French suggested that our Government appoint a representative. As nearly as I can gather, this conference is being held for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of German securities and credits outside of Germany, the internal financial conditions of Germany, and also to take up financial questions involved in the armistice in respect to the amount of marks in circulation, payment of the expenses of the armies of occupation, and the payment for food supplies which may be permitted to go to Germany. If this conference is attempting to pass upon the manner in which Germany may pay for: importations of food, I think it a mistake, because this is essentially a question which should be taken up and disposed of by the Council which is being created for undertaking European relief.

It will be impossible for me to attend the conference at Spa and to attend and remain at the conference at Mayence, and also attend the meetings of the Relief Council and be available here for assistance on financial questions in connection with the Peace Commission. I am, therefore, as was suggested by the Peace Commission, taking Mr. F. A. Goodhue with me, who is in the Treasury organization, for the purpose of leaving him at Mayence to sit in the conference there and incidentally to obtain such additional information as may be possible in respect to the liquid assets of Germany and her ability to make reparation for the destruction and damage done by the German military and naval forces. If you think it necessary or advisable to obtain the President's approval for this procedure, I will appreciate it if you will kindly take the matter up with him.

763.72119/3359¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 468]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 9, 1919—7 p.m.

163. For House from Glass.

First: Upon receipt of message from you number 82 of December 26, 6 p.m. and in accordance with suggestion therein contained I cabled President recommending appointment of Norman H. Davis as Commissioner in connection with armistice discussions at Spa. Davis has also been appointed one of American representatives on Special Board created to deal with relief problems. These duties will no doubt occupy a large part of Davis' time.

Second: Upon receipt of message from our Peace Mission Number 137 of January 3, 1919, recommending that Albert Strauss be sent to Europe as financial adviser I cabled President fully regarding Treasury representation in Europe and asking his approval of a Treasury Commission composed of Strauss as Chairman and Davis, Lamont and Crosby if the President does not accept Crosby's resignation. Suggest you obtain copy of that cable.^{[22](#)}

Third: I have now received cable 186 January 7, 4 p.m. from Peace Mission. I will designate Treasury representative to sit in Council upon hearing from President regarding suggestions made to him in my cable referred to in paragraph second.

Fourth: I am in hearty sympathy with the formation of the Council and believe it will enable the best results to be obtained. If President approves my recommendations Strauss would naturally be the Treasury representative on the Council.

Fifth: Lamont's general standing as an international banker will as pointed out in my cable to the President tend to strengthen the confidence of our country in the ability of the Treasury Commission to meet the financial problems which are referred to

it. Crosby has been in close touch with the course of events in Europe for the past sixteen months and if he remains will be valuable to consult and advise with the other members of the Treasury Commission.

Sixth: The financial phases of the questions before the Conference are in my judgment likely to be numerous and wide in range rather than few and specific Finance will be a secondary phase of almost every question. It is for this reason that I desire a Commission the members of which can individually devote themselves to specific problems, just as Davis is already doing, and the combined views of the members of the Commission on important questions involving finance should be of great value to our Peace Mission. I hope you will see your way to favor the appointment of the Treasury Commission which I have recommended to the President.

POLK

²² Department's telegram No. 112, Jan. 6, 1919, 6 p.m., to Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 553 [*Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 463](#) and [Doc. 464](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/6

[Document 469]

Mr. Norman H. Davis to Colonel E. M. House

PARIS , January 10, 1919.

Memorandum for Colonel House:

Mr. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, sent for me today and he stated that he desired to discuss some very important conditions which the French Government proposed for insertion in renewing the Armistice. He is to furnish me with a detailed memorandum of the questions this afternoon, but as they are very desirous of having our answer tomorrow, I shall summarize his statements briefly without waiting for the written memorandum.

1. While the German Government has restored the Russian gold and the securities left in Belgium and Northern France, they have not returned the French bank notes and securities which were taken into Germany and the Germans claim this cannot be done before the end of this month.
2. The Germans have not complied with the Armistice conditions prohibiting the exportation of German securities or the use of German credit abroad.
3. The French Government is greatly concerned for fear the Bolsheviks will get in control of Berlin and of all of the gold and plant for manufacturing bank notes, and in fact they now fear that the Germans are issuing bank notes illegally.
4. They therefore propose that all of the gold and engraving and printing plants as well as the securities in the possession of the Reich Bank be removed from Berlin to Frankfurt which is near the territory occupied by the Allied Armies where there is less danger of Bolshevism and any disorder could be easily stopped.

5. I told Mr. Klotz that I would endeavor to give him an answer tomorrow but that it would be necessary for me to discuss this with you and possibly with the President; that my first impression was that it might create a bad impression in Germany if this is considered merely a step on the part of the Allies to take the gold and securities from Germany and that it would be necessary to show the German people that such will not be the case, but that on the contrary it is being done for their own protection, and that they are to be treated fairly. I also told him the American Government fears also the spread of anarchy in Germany and that the President had been endeavoring to obtain allied co-operation in taking measures to prevent this by making adequate provision for preventing starvation, the breeder of Bolshevism; that also the results feared by him were a consequence of Bolshevism and that the moving of the gold and the printing plants would not prevent it.

Mr. Klotz expresses agreement with me, and in my opinion this is a proper opportunity to insist upon definite agreement on the part of the Allies to the feeding of Germany and to permitting Germany to pay for same, and if the proposal of the French is acceptable provisions should be made that the gold and securities will not be taken from Frankfurt into France upon some imaginative uprising without the approval of the United States and the Allies.

N[ORMAN] H. D[AVIS]

Paris Peace Conf. 711.63113/2: Telegram

[Document 470]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 10, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 11—10 a.m.]

173. Following is Alien Property Custodian's answer to your number 40, December 21, 10 a.m.^{[23](#)}

“When we opened our books we did not anticipate the breaking up of the Austrian Empire and consequently listed the property of the subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as it existed on August 1, 1914. The approximate amount of that property in our hands is \$36,503,107.35.

I think it would be a very splendid thing if the present Government of German-Austria should requisition individual rights from its citizens in the property in my hands as this would facilitate the settlement, but no disposition of such property could be made by me without further legislation by Congress. The only provision made in the courts relative to the disposition of enemy property is contained in Section 12,^{[24](#)} wherein it is provided:

‘After the end of the war any claim of any enemy, or of an ally of enemy, to any money or other property received and held by the Alien Property Custodian or deposited in the United States Treasury, shall be settled as Congress shall direct.’

Thus you will see that before I can part with any alien property in my hands there must be further legislation by Congress, which I assume will promptly follow the treaty of

peace if it shall provide, as it should, for the final disposition of all this property.”

POLK

²³ *Post*, p. 605 [*Pg. 605 includes portions of [Doc. 498](#) and [Doc. 499](#)*].

²⁴ 40 Stat. 423.

033.1140/161: Telegram

[Document 471]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 10, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received 11:42 p.m.]

233. For Rathbone from Davis.

1. Conference for renewal of armistice will take place at Spa on 14th and last for two or three days. A conference will also be held and continued at Mayence near Spa with representatives of German Treasury and Imperial Bank for purpose, as I understand, of obtaining information regarding: (a) German securities and credits outside Germany, (b) internal financial condition and Germany's ability to pay indemnity, (c) compliance with financial conditions of armistice; and (d) possibly for recommending method of obtaining payment for food sold to Germany. It was for this latter conference that French Government especially recommended appointment of American delegate, but as we have not had a representative on Armistice Commission our Peace Commission now considers it very important for you to be represented here.
2. I will leave Monday for Spa and Mayence but as it will be necessary for me to remain [*return*] here within a few days to attend meetings of Relief Council and as Peace Commission also desires my presence here, I am, at suggestion of Peace Commission, taking Goodhue with me in order that he may remain at Mayence for above purpose [and report] to me from time to time for instructions. If this does not meet with Secretary's approval please advise me immediately.
3. The President has in accordance with the Secretary's recommendation appointed me Commissioner. Please send cables for me through State Department to American Mission.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/24: Telegram

[Document 472]

***The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

CHRISTIANIA , January 11, 1919—1 p.m.
[Received January 12—4:10 p.m.]

9. Following telegram sent Department:

“French Legation here sent to the local press a communiqué published yesterday calling attention to the fact that by supplementary clauses to the agreement for extension of the armistice signed at Trèves, December 14th [13th] last, Germany bound herself not to transfer or permit the transfer abroad by German citizens of any kind of property or securities belonging either to the State or German citizens without formal permission of the Allies represented by a special delegate. In consequence thereof the Norwegian public is warned that the Allies will regard as null and void all transactions concluded since this agreement was made pertaining to property, securities, mortgages and all sort of values belonging to Germany or German citizens. The same restrictions are announced as applying to property or securities et cetera belonging to the former Austrian Empire or Kingdom of Hungary or citizens of these States.

Does the Department desire me to make a similar announcement to the Foreign Office? Ammission advised; repeated London.”

SCHMEDEMAN

763.72119/3380: Telegram

[Document 473]

The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the Acting Secretary of State

COPENHAGEN , January 11, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received 11:20 p.m.]

3448. French Minister here on January 3rd sent note to Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs referring to financial protocol signed at Trèves December 14th [13th] whereby Germany pledged herself not to dispose without previous agreement with Allies of her bullion, funds, securities etc., through foreign countries, and to make certain regulations together with Allied Governments concerning restoration of deeds lost or stolen in the invaded regions, etc. Note then draws attention to importance of these arrangements and states that my Government informs me that measures will be taken to deprive contracting parties of the benefit of cessions of [or?] transfers which shall be held to be fraudulent. The Royal Danish Government will no doubt deem it fitting to put Danish subjects on guard against operations of this kind, and against the eventual consequences to which contracting parties, even if acting [in ignorance and?] in good faith might find themselves exposed. A second note of January 9th from the French Chargé d’Affaires states that French [authorities] have decided to treat Austro-Hungarian property on the same principle. While not specifically speaking on behalf of the Allies, the notes give the impression that they are a pronouncement of the policy of all the Associated Governments. The Danish press has accepted the action in this sense, and its first comments indicate irritation at the measure as unwarranted interference with Danish internal affairs, particularly in respect to Germans long resident in Denmark. The British Chargé d’Affaires and the Italian Minister are also without instructions in the matter.

Respectfully request instructions or information. Repeated to
Ammission, Paris.

OSBORNE

033.1140/178: Telegram

[Document 474]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 11, 1919—7 p.m.
[Received January 12—3 a.m.]

252. For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President.

1. With regard to the first 4 paragraphs of your number 66, January 2nd, 4 p.m. I suggest that Crosby's resignation as Special Finance Commissioner be accepted and that he be told that I trust his plans will make it possible for him to hold himself available for consultation on financial matters as the occasion may arise during the Peace Conference.
2. As you know I am in entire agreement with you concerning the matters mentioned in paragraph number 5 of your telegram number 66 of January 2nd, 4 p.m.
3. The Acting Secretary of State has been furnished by cable with the text of letters which I have written Mr. Norman Davis pursuant to the suggestions made in paragraph numbers 6 and 7 of your cable number 66 of January 2nd, 4 p.m.
4. I think it hardly necessary at the present time to create a United States Treasury Commissioner in Europe as suggested in your number 112, January 6th, 6 p.m. Davis has entered upon his work in a manner entirely satisfactory to me and the other members of the Commission and as the official Treasury representative can, I think, give such advice on financial question as we may require. He will need assistants particularly in connection with armistice discussions and in handling Treasury problems and I am satisfied to adopt your suggestion respecting Lamont to help in this work, that the services of Goodhue, Loree and Harris as assistants should be retained if possible.

5. I concur in the suggestion that Strauss should come to Europe to advise with the Commission on general question of international finance as distinguished from Treasury matters. I believe, however, that his services in conjunction with his work on the Federal Reserve Board in Washington (on which there are only four members at the present time) would not permit him to remain here any length of time. It seems to me that Strauss's wide knowledge of international finance makes it desirable that he should return to the United States at the earliest practical moment in order that the Federal Reserve Board may avail itself in full of his services. Secretary Lansing and Colonel House share views.
6. I entirely concur with you that so far as the Peace Commission or Mr. Hoover or others in Europe are in need of financial advice they should obtain it from persons acting under your general direction and responsible to you.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

[Document 475]

The Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 11 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose herewith a copy of a portion of a cablegram sent by me to the Secretary of the Treasury, referring to the Belgian Army.

I shall be glad to transmit to Secretary Glass any suggestions that may be made to me, unless they reach him independently, in which latter case I should be glad to be advised of them.

Cordially yours,

OSCAR T. CROSBY

[Enclosure]

Extract From a Telegram From the Special Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Crosby) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Glass)

[PARIS ,] January 9, 1919.

.....

Thirteenth. Belgian agent here not yet ready to submit new estimates for army, but states that his Government expects to increase its army by approximately 100,000 men. This will result from demobilization of approximately 100,000 who have served at the front, but taking on approximately 200,000 young men of military

age who have not served. There are domestic reasons for this procedure, but it seems to me impossible to suppose that such an increase of military strength is required for the prosecution of the war against Germany. British Treasury disturbed by similar considerations, but will probably pass Belgian requisition for increased number of uniforms, supplying same from old British stocks otherwise of small value.

Fourteenth. The independent determination by European governments of demobilization and generally of their military organizations must present questions of great difficulty in so far as support of these organizations by United States funds is concerned. In conformity with views expressed in my No. 920,^{[24a](#)} I will report to our political representatives in Paris, as I now report to you, proposed increase in Belgian army strength. My present personal recommendation would be against support of increased numbers, but I hesitate to express a final opinion on this subject, since it is connected with political considerations not in my hands.

^{[24a](#)} Telegram No. 6614, Jan. 3, 1919, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 550 [*Pg. 550 includes portions of [Doc. 460](#) and [Doc. 461](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/4

[Document 476]

General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State

PARIS , January 13, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your note of January 11th²⁵ in which you enclose a note addressed to you by Mr. Crosby on the subject of a telegram received by him from the Secretary of the Treasury²⁶ and which refers to the Belgian Army. You ask me to give you my views in regard to Mr. Crosby's communication.

First, I am decidedly of the opinion that the United States should not finance, in whole or in part, any increase in any military establishment in Europe. I know of no reason, nor is there any presented in the papers handed to me by you, why the United States should finance an increase of 100,000 men in the Belgian Army.

Second, I am inclined to think (as I understand the law) that we should not further finance any part of any military establishment in Europe except that which may be necessary in connection with carrying out the conditions of the armistice to which the United States is a party along with its associated powers. I understand that Italy has indefinitely postponed any demobilization of her military forces. If she desires to keep an army on foot in order to prosecute a war for her own interests in Africa, or in order to be prepared for a war to enforce her claims east of the Adriatic, I do not see why we should give her financial support in so doing.

Of course there may be political reasons for our indefinitely continuing our financial assistance for military purposes. But these do not concern me. I know of no military reason for the maintenance of military establishments beyond the usual capacity of the respective countries to support except the necessity of maintaining a

sufficient Allied force to guarantee that the Peace Conference can continue its work without interruption by a resumption of hostilities on the part of the Central Powers.

If the allied powers in Europe did not feel that they have (largely due to the financial support of the United States) a military force sufficiently large to enable them to enforce any will they may choose to form, it is possible that they would take a different view as to the prompt rehabilitation of Europe. Therefore, it seems to me that a gradual, but at the same time rather prompt limitation of our financial aid in the maintenance of these military establishments would be a way in which we might exercise benevolent pressure.

Sincerely yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ Apparently a reference was intended to the extract from Mr. Crosbys telegram to the Secretary of the Treasury, *supra*.

102.1/1607: Telegram

[Document 477]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 13, 1919—12 midnight.
[Received January 13—7:19 p.m.]

6721. For Secretary of Treasury from Crosby. Number 927.

Harris reports as follows concerning Italy:

Recommend total credits for foodstuffs be reduced at once by say 24 percent from rate of shipment for last 3 months, but at same time absolute and proportionate amount milk, condensed and fats be increased. Food credits should be further reduced, say in April, and taper off to complete end, say in September. The Italian Government should be informed of our program in this regard. The maintenance of present food shipments merely sustains present very large Italian military establishment; but, in my opinion Italy can soon feed herself and thus relieve Treasury of this burden, provided Italian Army is substantially demobilized.

Port of Genoa now has 500,000 tons of congested merchandise against a low point of 200,000 tons last summer. Five million lire worth of rotted food supplies recently dumped into harbor. Congestion almost entirely caused by lack of rolling stock on the railways. Am of opinion that Italy overestimates railway supplies to enable railways to reach reasonable conditions as soon as possible. See no reason why Treasury should continue to support of or even aid in control of exchange. Italian Government may as a matter of domestic policy, control imports and exports, which would influence fluctuations in exchange. Investigations among private manufacturers disclose no urgent demand for raw

material at this time except for coal. Believe this demand urgent and legitimate but British Government or producers are apt to care for this. Italy could probably satisfactorily use considerable amounts of raw material during this year but I do not believe that there would be necessarily dire distress among civil population if our credits except for foodstuffs be entirely and forthwith stopped, which I recommend be done with possible exception of credits for railway materials the manufacturing program of which, both in Italy and America I am not familiar with.

Should the Treasury decide to make advances for purposes other than those above mentioned, I strongly recommend such advances be made only after prior investigation and approval, in each case particular attention afforded by a representative of the Treasury in Italy. There is a demand among cotton goods firms for Italian Government to lift embargo on export of this commodity, of which there appears to be a present surplus. This has just been done to a limited extent. See no immediate prospect of exports to any great extent above recommendations made without reference to statutory restrictions on loans, but only on substantial merits of situation.

Harris ready to return to the United States. Shall await your next cable on Italy before finally determining his plans. He reports that sale of Federal Reserve notes mentioned paragraph 6, my number 912,^{[27](#)} should be sale of gold certificates.

BLISS

^{[27](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

[Document 478]

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

PARIS , January 14, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received the enclosed letter of January 11th from Mr. Crosby^{[28](#)} relative to certain requests for loans which had come to him in regard to the expansion of the military establishment of Belgium.

As it appeared to be chiefly a matter as to which General Bliss' advice would be most valuable I submitted it to him and have received the enclosed letter of the 13th on the subject.^{[29](#)}

If it meets with your approval I purpose to answer Mr. Crosby accordingly. At the same time I would direct your attention to the last paragraph of the letter as a matter which should be given careful consideration.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

^{[28](#)} *Ante*, p. 564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of [Doc. 474](#) and [Doc. 475](#)].

^{[29](#)} *Ante*, p. 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of [Doc. 475](#) and [Doc. 476](#)].

033.1140/182: Telegram

[Document 479]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 14, 1919—11 a.m.
[Received January 14—10:07 a.m.]

278. For Secretary Glass from Colonel House. Your 163, January 9, 7 p.m. I have seen the President's cable to you in answer to yours respecting Treasury representation. The general opinion among the Commissioners seems to be that at the present time it would not be wise to have a Treasury commission appointed. They may, however, change their views in the future. I personally believe you have made wise selections in Davis, Strauss and Lamont and I have no doubt they will act for you in a manner entirely satisfactory to you. Warmest regards.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/28: Telegram

[Document 480]

***The Chargé in Denmark (Osborne) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

COPENHAGEN , January 14, 1919—7 p.m.
[Received January 15—10 a.m.]

102. Following despatched Secretary of State, Washington, as
Legation Number 3457.

“January 14, 6 p.m. Legation’s 3448, January 11, 5 p.m.
According to information press, many banks and members of
bourse ceased all business with German firms or individuals
as result of French Legation’s step. This morning’s papers
published text of circular letter sent by French Legation direct
to all financial institutions. This letter corresponds almost
exactly to the notes to the Foreign Office already reported.
Politiken states that the French Legation yesterday ‘Verbally
and unofficially’ informed the banks that it was not intended
‘to place obstacles in the way of normal business connections
between Danish financial institutions and German subjects’.
Paper adds that this modifies greatly the sharp terms of the
circular letter in banking circles; an official commentary on
the letter is expected in the near future from the government
in Paris, but in any case the matter is regarded with greater
calmness than a few days ago. Repeated to Ammission, Paris.”

OSBORNE

Paris Peace Conf. 868.20/2: Telegram

[Document 481]

The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 15, 1919—12 a.m.

6746. For Secretary of Treasury from Crosby. No. 930.

First. Understand from Venizelos that he will urge necessity of further credits for maintenance of his army practically on lines of last year. French and British will also ask that we join them. British have continued to support Greek Army since January first; but Chancellor informed me in London that, before going much further, they would endeavor to learn more than they now know as to the objects to be served by maintenance of the Greek Army on a war footing. It is understood that this maintenance is due to the views of another power as to the military situation. I consider highly probable that Venizelos will appeal to the President on this subject as soon as he has an opportunity of seeing British and French in Paris, where he has but lately arrived.

Second. My own view still is that no advances should be made to the Greek Government until you and the President are satisfied as to the objectives of their military situation and approve of them. Please wire any instructions on this subject.

BLISS

763.72119 P 43/48: Telegram

[Document 482]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919—4 p.m.

242. For Lansing from Glass. Delayed answering your cable 137 of January 3, 1919 pending exchange of cables with President. I am sending Strauss to Europe almost immediately for a short stay. He is familiar with my views and with Treasury policies in determination of which he has taken an important part.

POLK

033.1140/178: Telegram

[Document 483]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919—5 p.m.

244. For the President from Glass. Your message 252 January 11, 7 p.m. has been received.

First: I am cabling Crosby as you direct,^{[30](#)} am instructing Davis^{[31](#)} to retain if possible the services of Goodhue, Harris and Loree, and will endeavor to secure Lamont for service in Europe to aid Davis. Second: I feel with you the disadvantage of Strauss being absent and unable to fulfill his duties as a member of Federal Reserve Board for any extended period. I was reluctant to approve his going to Europe but felt that the opportunity for service as the head of the Commission I suggested would justify the sacrifice. As you do not consider such Commission advisable I entirely agree that Strauss' stay in Europe should be short. In accordance with paragraph 5 of your cable Strauss will leave almost immediately and I hope that during his short stay in Europe his wide experience, judgment and intimate knowledge of Treasury war and post-war policies, in the formation of which he has taken an essential part, will be availed of to the fullest extent. I am cabling House approving Davis serving on the Council.^{[31a](#)}

POLK

^{[30](#)} Cable not printed.

^{[31](#)} Telegram No. 246, *infra*.

^{[31a](#)} Cable not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 102.1/5: Telegram

[Document 484]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received January 16—noon.]

246. For Davis from Glass, Treasury 706.

First. In accordance with word received from President I am accepting Crosby's resignation as special finance commissioner in Europe and advising him that the President trusts his plans will make it possible for him to hold himself available for consultation on financial matters as occasion may arise during Peace Conference.

Second. President has approved your retaining Goodhue, Loree and Harris to assist in Europe. Please express to them my hope that this will be agreeable to them. Approve of Goodhue's assisting you in armistice negotiations.

Third. Are there any others of Crosby's organization whom you need in Europe? Please ask those whom you need to remain, the others whose names please cable, I assume Crosby will direct to return.

Crosby's 777 repeated in his 690 [903]³² agrees to release of Walter A. Peck, code clerk attached to his staff. Please cable whether you need him, if not will have directions sent him to return. I am arranging to send Sawyer to Paris in accordance with your suggestion.

Fourth. I hope to be able to arrange for Lamont to go to Europe to assist you in connection with armistice discussions and other matters that may arise.

Fifth. I have indicated to President my approval of your serving on council, which Peace Mission advises me by cable 186 of January 7, 4 p.m. has been formed.

Sixth. At the request of Mission, approved by the President, I am sending Strauss for short stay in Europe to advise on financial matters. He has assisted in formulating Treasury's policy in regard to various problems which have arisen with cessation of hostilities and will be in a position to explain my personal views on these subjects.

Seventh. Except as our future loans are related to purchases of food in the United States I do not desire that there should be negotiations or discussions in Europe concerning our making further advances. The conversion of or other dealings with the demand obligations which we hold, or the tax on maturing interest rate quantities on any long time obligations which we may receive in exchange for demand obligations, or regarding any claims for dollar reimbursement, should be discussed only in Washington.

See our 687.^{[33](#)}

Eighth. I am in receipt of a message from President in which he states that he entirely concurs with my view that so far as the Peace Commission or Mr. Hoover or others in Europe are in need of financial advice they should obtain it from persons acting under my general direction and responsible to me.

Ninth. Considerable confusion will be avoided if you will number your cables to the Department.

POLK

^{[32](#)} Neither printed.

^{[33](#)} Department's telegram No. 6881, Jan. 7, 1919, 5 p.m., to the Chargé in France, p. 709 [*Pg. 709 includes portions of [Doc. 594](#), [Doc. 595](#), [Doc. 596](#), and [Doc. 597](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/5

[Document 485]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS , 17 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would be obliged if you would, as you suggest, reply to this^{[34](#)} in the sense suggested by General Bliss.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[34](#)} See Secretary Lansing's letter of Jan. 14, regarding proposed loans to Belgium, p. 567 [*Pg. 567 includes portions of [Doc. 477](#) and [Doc. 478](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 855.51/3

[Document 486]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Commissioner
of Finance in Europe (Crosby)***

PARIS , January 21, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. CROSBY: Upon the receipt of your letter of January 11th enclosing a portion of a cablegram sent by you to the Secretary of the Treasury regarding the Belgian Army, I consulted General Bliss and the President in the matter, and we are in accord that the United States should not finance in whole or in part, any increase in any military establishment in Europe and that we should not further finance any part of any military establishment in Europe, except that which may be necessary in connection with carrying out the conditions of the armistice, to which the United States is a party along with its associated Powers.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

Reparations

[\[487\] The Special Representative \(House \) to President Wilson](#)

Paris , November 10, 1918.

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

[\[488\] The Special Representative \(House \) to President Wilson](#)

Paris , November 17, 1918.

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

[\[489\] The Italian Ambassador \(Macchi di Cellere \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 22, 1918.

763.72119/2755

[\[490\] The Special Representative \(House \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 23, 1918—4 p.m. [Received November 23—2:20 p.m.]

763.72119/9187: Telegram

[491] Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Special Representative (House)

Paris , 24 November, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.02302/1

[492] The Chargé in Cheat Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 30, 1918—11 a.m. [Received 11:35 a.m.]

763.72119/2829: Telegram

[493] Colonel E. M. House to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

Paris , December 4, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/2

[494] Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House

London , 4 December, 1918—evening.

[495] Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House

London , 6 December, 1918—noon.

[496] The Diplomatic Liaison Officer With the Supreme War Council (Frasier) to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

Paris , December 6, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/3

[497] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 12, 1918—7 p.m.

783.72119/2829: Telegram

[498] Memorandum by the Advisory Counsel of the American Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance (Cravath)

December 12, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/1

[499] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 21, 1918 [10 a.m.?].

Paris Peace Conf. 711.63113/1: Telegram

[500] General Tasher H. Bliss to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

Paris , December 22, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/8

[501] Memorandum by Dr. A. A. Young

[Paris ,] December 28, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/29

[502] Brigadier General G. H. McKinstry to the Chief of Engineers, American Expeditionary Forces (Langfitt).

Paris , 30 December, '18.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.02302/2

[503] Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris , January 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.02302/3

[504] Memorandum by General Tasker H. Bliss for the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris , January 5, 1919.

Tasker H. Bliss Papers

[505] The Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces (McAndrews), to the Chief of Engineers, A. E. F. (Langfitt).

January 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.02302/2

[506] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paris ,] January 9, 1919—12 noon.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/39a: Telegram

[507] Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles

January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/40

[508] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 11, 1919—4 p.m.

763.72119/3416: Telegram

[509] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 21, 1919—7 p.m.

763.72113/902a: Telegram

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

[Document 487]

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS , November 10, 1918.

11. In view of the enormous claims which the French and Belgian Governments will make on Germany I think we should get our engineers to make an approximate estimate for our guidance. If you approve I can have this begun at once.

EDWARD HOUSE

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

[Document 488]

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS , November 17, 1918.

17. You have not replied to my No. 11 about our getting some sort of estimate as to the damage done in France and Belgium. Shall I proceed or are there objections?^{[1](#)}

EDWARD HOUSE

^{[1](#)} For President Wilson's reply, see undated telegram No. 16 from President Wilson to Colonel House, [vol. I, p. 136](#) . See also Colonel House's telegram No. 18, Nov. 19, 1918, to President Wilson, [vol. I, p. 137](#) .

763.72119/2755

[Document 489]

The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In a communication which I have just received from Baron Sonnino he states that numerous Italians, on account of commercial and family reasons, have important interests and property rights in the enemy countries. In the same position there are evidently many citizens of all the allied countries and of the United States. Granted that the enemy countries shall have to pay indemnities, these citizens, who have already suffered great damages during the state of war, would be subjected to the assessment of their properties towards the payment of such indemnities, obviously against all principles of right and equity.

Baron Sonnino goes on to say that it would be necessary, consequently, to put in the peace treaty either a clause exempting all real and personal property belonging to citizens of the Entente in enemy countries from the imposition of any tax, direct or indirect, for the payment of war indemnities; or a clause providing for the establishment of a special indemnity to be used for the reimbursement of those citizens who in enemy countries would be obliged to pay special taxes for the war indemnity.

As Baron Sonnino expresses a desire to be informed as to the attitude of the United States on this subject, I should appreciate it very much if you will let me know.^{[2](#)}

With assurances [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

² On Dec. 24, 1918, the Italian Chargé was informed that “this question will receive the attentive consideration of this Government.”

763.72119/9187: Telegram

[Document 490]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 23, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received November 23—2:20 p.m.]

151. Secret for the President. Pursuant to your authorization^{[3](#)} I requested General Pershing to detail such officer in his command as he considered most competent to undertake the work of estimating the damage done by the Germans in Belgium and northern France on account of which reparation should be required from Germany. General Pershing has detailed for this work Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry. I have conferred with General McKinstry and have asked him to advise me after he has considered the problem how he believes this work [should?] be done.

EDWARD HOUSE

^{[3](#)} Contained in President Wilson's undated telegram No. 16 to Colonel House, [vol. I, p. 136](#) .

Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the Special Representative (House)

PARIS , 24 November, 1918.

Subject: Preliminary report on verification of Belgian and French estimates of damage to industries in the invaded parts of Belgium and France.

1. Telegraphic orders as follows were received by me on November 20, p.m.:

“Proceed to Paris without delay, reporting on arrival to Mr. House, special representative of the U. S. at that place for temporary duty in connection with the appraisalment of captured (*sic*) property.”

2. Reporting on the morning of November 22nd at 78 rue de l'Université, I received from Mr. Auchincloss instructions in substance as follows: The U. S. Peace Commissioners will be called upon to concur with the Allied Governments in the presentation of claims against Germany for damage to industries in Belgium and France. The U. S. Peace Commissioners will wish to be in possession of evidence sufficient to convince them of the substantial correctness of these claims. It is desired that General McKinstry make an independent investigation of the character and extent of the damage inflicted. If practicable, the investigation should be made without the knowledge of the Belgian and French Governments.
3. Mr. Auchincloss at once put me in touch with Messrs. Summers and Legge of the War Industries Board who had just returned from a trip to parts of Belgium and France which had been held by the Germans, and through the courtesy of these gentlemen I met other members of the W. I. B., notably Messrs. Yeatman and Patterson

who had also inspected damage in the invaded territories. I have also had the advantage of a talk with Mr. Miller, Special Representative of the State Department.

4. For the purposes of this preliminary report, it will suffice to say that a typical case of damage to an industrial establishment would present these features:—

Removal of materials (e. g. copper) or machinery, for which the Germans gave receipts.

Removal of same without receipts.

Removal of materials (e. g. copper) in such a way as to wreck machinery.

Destruction of machine tools or of machinery for the mere purpose of destruction, i. e. to cripple and retard the reestablishment of manufacturing.

Naturally, competitive industries (textile, steel) have suffered most.

5. It will not be necessary at this stage to speculate on the form which “restoration” for Belgium and “reparation” for France will take as the result of the Peace Treaty:—Whether the Belgian and French claims are to be extinguished by an indemnity, leaving Germany in the possession of machinery removed to the homeland, and therefore in a position of tremendous superiority over the ravaged industrial regions; whether stolen property is to be returned or German machinery and plant are to be substituted for wrecked Belgian and French machinery and plant; whether the Allies will confiscate the output of German mills and mines to the value of the ante-war output of Belgian and French mills and mines, pending the rehabi[li]tation of the latter, etc., etc. In any case an estimate of the damage done must be made. Presumabl[y] the Belgian and French Governments are causing such estimates to be made each in its own territory, though possibly cooperatively.

6. Estimating the damage done to a plant, for example, a textile mill, is not a simple process, even when the investigation can be made immediately after the damage occurs and when therefore the minimum quantity of oral and documentary evidence enters the case. The determination of the condition of plant removed can evidently not be made by physical inspection. In many cases, again, destruction is so complete as to render the identification of individual pieces of machinery difficult. These things are mentioned to indicate that an estimate of the amount of damage in

any particular mill, for example, will be a matter of difficulty, unless, of course, "restoration" is to mean providing a mill of equal capacity either by paying for the purchase and installation of equivalent new machinery, or by installing equivalent machinery to be taken from the Germans.

7. Mr. Patterson states that were he charged with estimating the damage to any of the big mills which he has recently inspected in Belgium, he would engage the services of a mill engineer and of an insurance adjuster, and to indicate the character of the service which he would think it necessary to employ he gave me the names of—

Lockwood Greene & C^o, Boston, Mass.

Charles T. Main, Boston, Mass.

as mill engineers, and the—

Factory Mutual Insurance Company,

31 Milk Street, Boston, Mass.

as an insurance adjuster.

8. A similar process, that is, the employment of appropriate construction and machinery experts, would be necessary in the case of each industry examined.

9. The more important industries concerned are the—

Textile,

Steel

Coal

Zinc

Iron

Chemical

General, such as railroads, timber, etc.

Machine shops (every kind of machine tool)

Steam and electrical power plants.

10. The facts convince me that a proper investigation cannot be made by the American government unknown to the Belgian and French governments.

11. A certain number of experts in one or more of the branches above mentioned are now in the Army in France, and I have taken steps to have the qualification cards of officers of the Corps of Engineers consulted with a view to the preparation here of a list of those whose services should be obtained if the investigation here in question is to proceed. As soon as I have the necessary

administrative assistance, I will have this inquiry extended to other branches of the service. It must be said, however, that these qualification cards are prepared from information furnished by the officers themselves and a selection based upon the cards would probably not result in obtaining the same talent as would be obtained by applying to the proper sources at home. I suggest that the President be requested by cable to call on the Chairman of the War Industries Board to cable a list of, say, twenty names of available, high-class men in each of the departments of industry listed in par. 9 above, indicating in the case of each man his present whereabouts (United States, England or France). In view of the information available to the Chairman of the War Industries Board, no other method of obtaining the men needed can rival the one suggested.

12. If you share the opinion that an investigation to be of value must be made openly, we are led to consider whether a checking of the investigations made under the direction of the Belgian and French governments would not yield results superior to those obtainable by an independent investigation. This is quite apart from the duplication of effort involved in an independent investigation. Unless the American investigators are in possession of at least all the facts considered by the Belgian and French investigators, suspicion will at once, and by that mere fact, be thrown upon our results. Our means of arriving at the facts are necessarily inferior at this time to the means which have been and are available to the Belgians and French. If the American representatives make their investigations with the Belgians and French, concurrence in the findings of the Belgian and French Boards would lead to the presentation to the Peace Conference of results in which all the investigators were agreed, while non-concurrence in any particular would be based not upon differences in the data considered but upon differences of method or of assumed values. Differences based on the consideration of different data would be difficult, perhaps impossible, of adjustment. Joint action by the investigators would only be possible with the consent of the Belgian and French governments following formal request by the United States.
13. I would have preferred to write even this preliminary report after a careful examination of a number of wrecked plants. Though not

unfamiliar with cities and villages destroyed by shellfire, incendiarism, and mines, and with individual houses which have been exposed to German vandalism, I have never had the time or opportunity to make a careful examination of mills, mines, or industrial plants which have been the object of systematic spoliation or destruction. It seemed urgent, however, to present the fact that the investigation which you desired is one which must be made by experts, that obtaining the services of these experts will take time, and that when the corps of experts is assembled the investigation itself will take time. I have fortified myself, however, by conversation with the experts of the War Utilities Board Mission, whose technical language I am able to understand, whose recent visit to the despoiled territory has put them in possession of valuable facts, whose descriptions enable me to see to some extent with their eyes, and whose consultations with one another have led to the crystallization of opinions as to the form which the investigation which you have in mind should take. Proper weight will not attach to the opinions expressed herein unless it is borne in mind that they are shared by the gentlemen mentioned.

14. It is unnecessary to express my entire willingness to proceed with an investigation under any instructions that may be given, but as the original instructions were tentative in character, I have felt at liberty to make recommendations somewhat at variance therewith.
15. I recommend that if a verification of the claims of Belgium and France against Germany for damage to industries is thought necessary:—
 - (a) Our investigation be open.
 - (b) It be made in cooperation with the Belgian and French appraisers, if these governments will consent thereto.
 - (c) It be made by men obtained in the manner suggested in the latter part of Par. 11 above.

[C. H.] McK[INSTRY]

763.72119/2829: Telegram

[Document 492]

The Chargé in Cheat Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 30, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received 11:35 a.m.]

4162. Rathbone from Goodhue,⁴ Number 790. As part of information in course of preparation for peace council, in conjunction with British Treasury, I would like to receive promptly as possible, preferably within next few days following information:

1. Approximate value of property of German government in the United States subdivided into: (a) Cash; (b) salable securities; (c) other property.
2. Approximate value property owned by German citizens in the United States with same subdivision as above; (a), (b) and (c) should include all items under above head now in Alien Property Custodian's possession, securities should be subdivided according to nationality of obligor.
3. Approximate value of property in Germany owned by American Government and American citizens with the same subdivision as above. Has any machinery been established in America as in England to ascertain the value of such property and the amount of American claims before the seizure thereof by German government?
4. Estimated amount of German investments in the United States disposed of by Germany sold by Germany or transferred from the United States between outbreak of European war and our entrance into the war. It is recognized that this question can only be answered by an estimate which may be very inaccurate.
5. Estimated total cost of the war to the United States Government including rough allowance for return to peace basis with

subdivision showing amount of aggregate cost represented by loans to allies.

6. Annual pre-war increase in national wealth of the United States.

LAUGHLIN

⁴ F. A. Goodhue, member of the Inter-Allied Committee for War Purchases and Finance.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/2

[Document 493]

Colonel E. M. House to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

PARIS , December 4, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCKINSTRY: The President having requested me to set in motion some machinery to obtain for the use of the American Delegation at the Peace Conference some valuation of damages done by the Germans in the invaded parts of France and Belgium, I have requested General Pershing to assign to me an officer, whose duties would be to conduct this work.

General Pershing having assigned you to me for this purpose and you having reported to me and conferred with me, I trust that you will now proceed with this work, consulting with French and Belgian officials as occasions require.

Yours very sincerely,

E. M. HOUSE

Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House [5](#)

LONDON , 4 December, 1918—evening.

Cravath thinks that final attitude of British as to indemnities is uncertain largely owing to politics here but agrees with Davis that we will be in better position if when negotiations begin we ask British French and Italians for a definite formulation of their attitude on this and financial questions generally in which their interest is more direct than our own. Nicholson [*Nicolson*] of Foreign Office told Cravath that French memorandum on indemnities had been presented which Nicholson [*Nicolson*] described as fantastic. I am planning to return to Paris Saturday unless I receive other instructions.

[5](#) This and the following telegram are reprinted from David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, With Documents* [1924–26], vol. 1, pp. 30 and 36.

[Document 495]

Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House

LONDON , 6 December, 1918—noon.

Following views of Keynes expressed to Davis, Cravath and myself first that French demand for huge indemnity was to be the basis for continued occupation and ultimate acquisition of the Rhine Provinces; second that British memorandum on the extent of German ability to pay indemnities was substantially complete but that he would probably not be authorized to show it to us; third as to relief of Central Europe that the policy of British Treasury would be at least in respect of countries like Poland to finance only their own supplies.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/3

[Document 496]

The Diplomatic Liaison Officer With the Supreme War Council (Frasier) to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

PARIS , December 6, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCKINSTRY: I enclose herewith a copy of a letter just received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in connection with the estimate of damages caused to invaded parts of France by the German Army of occupation.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR HUGH FRASIER

[Enclosure—Translation][6](#)

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to Colonel E. M. House

Dossier: P. 1–3

PARIS , December 5, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL: I have the honor to inform you that I have noted with pleasure the request of the Government of the United States which you took up with me in your letter of November 30.[7](#) I immediately transmitted it to the two French Ministers who have in charge the evaluation of damages in the departments of France which suffered invasion: M. Loucheur, Minister of National Reconstruction and M. Lebrun, Minister for the Liberated Regions.

General McKinstry may communicate with my colleagues who will furnish him with all available information.

I would also remark that the question is extremely complicated and that the research required to estimate the damage done by Germany in France will of necessity be long and will require an extensive investigation. This investigation has begun and in its continuance brings up each day new evidence showing losses to be greater than we had previously supposed.

Accept [etc.]

S. PICHON

⁶ Translation supplied by the editor.

⁷ Not printed.

783.72119/2829: Telegram

[Document 497]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 12, 1918—7 p.m.

3406. For Crosby from Rathbone. Treasury 625. Inform Goodhue as follows:

Referring your 790, Embassy's 4162 November 30. Impossible to obtain replies to any of queries 1 to 5, inclusive, until latter part of next week at earliest, and information regarding several of them will not be available until a much later date. Regarding question 3, State Department has requested American citizens owning property in enemy countries to file statements thereof which are now being received in large numbers and tabulated. Question 6. Best published estimate is that of Sir George Paish who in 1914 estimated annual increase of wealth in the United States at seven billion dollars. This estimate is probably somewhat high.

POLK

Memorandum by the Advisory Counsel of the American Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance (Cravath)

PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS REGARDING INDEMNITIES

NOTE.—Definite conclusions regarding the amount of the indemnities to be paid to the Allies by the Central Powers and the manner of their payment must await a more adequate interchange of views and information than has thus far been possible. The following memorandum has been hastily prepared from the point of view of an American, primarily for the purpose of presenting in concrete form some of the principal problems to be considered in the forthcoming deliberations. The tentative conclusions offered are subject to radical change in the light of fuller information and discussion.—P. D. C.

I.—PRELIMINARY

The subject of the indemnities to be recovered by the Allies from the Central Powers is so complex and has thus far been so inadequately studied that only preliminary observations can be offered at this early stage of the discussion. The following suggestions are intended to present some of the principal questions which must be considered. So far as the writer's own views are presented they are provisional and subject to modification in the light of fuller information and discussion.

In the absence of instructions as to the attitude of the United States Government I have avoided any consideration of the position of the United States in respect of indemnities. The United States is at least entitled to present a claim for the losses due to the sinking and injuring of her merchant ships and their cargoes by German submarines. If the United States is to share in the indemnities the discussion in this memorandum would be applicable if the term "Associated Governments" were substituted wherever the term "Allies" is used.

In the interests of simplicity I have confined my observations to the indemnities to be paid by Germany without considering the other enemy powers. For the same reason I have assumed that Germany would continue as a single nation with substantially her present territory except Alsace and Lorraine, German Poland and her Colonies. If the German Empire should be divided between two or more governments the question of apportioning the burden of the indemnity among the various governments would have to be considered.

I have not attempted in this memorandum to discuss the claims of neutrals. They will doubtless assert claims for injuries done by Germany through the sinking of their ships and cargoes. Claims of that kind may have already been admitted by Germany. The question will arise whether the claims of neutrals should be allowed to rank *pari passu* with those of the Allies, or should be subordinated to them.

II.—THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE INDEMNITY

It is probable that the indemnities to be paid by the Central Powers to the Allies will be measured not by the amounts of the claims which the Allies can establish, but rather by the amounts which the Central Powers will be able to pay.

Although the aggregate of the claims which the Allies can establish will probably be in excess of the ability of the Central Powers to pay, it is none the less important that the amounts of the respective claims should be established by the uniform application of sound principles, so that the Allies may share in proper proportions in the distribution of the aggregate amount of the indemnities which it is finally deemed wise to exact.

It is therefore essential at the outset to determine the basis upon which the indemnities to be claimed by the various Allies should be determined.

It seems very clear that for the basis of determining the indemnities to be paid by Germany we must refer to President Wilson's "Fourteen Points," as qualified by his note to the German Government dated November 5th.⁹ In the latter note it is stated that the "Allied Governments ...¹⁰ declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress in January, 1918 (the 'Fourteen Points'), and the principles of settlement in his subsequent addresses," subject to certain qualifications which he proceeds to state. While I have not seen the communication from the Allies stating these qualifications, I am informed that the statement contained in the President's note to Germany of November 5, correctly and fully states them. None of the other of the President's addresses to Congress referred to in this note deals with the question of indemnities.

In the President's "Fourteen Points" the only references to indemnities are contained in Point VII., relating to Belgium, Point VIII. relating to France, and Point XI. relating to Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. These Points provide in substance for the evacuation and restoration of the invaded portions of France, Belgium, Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro. Clearly, the term "restoration" is here used as equivalent to reparation for damage done and the return of property taken.

The qualifications by the Allies of the foregoing provisions are stated in the President's note of November 5th, as follows:—

"By it (the provisions regarding restoration) they (the Allies) understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and to their property, by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea and from the air."

It could plausibly be argued that the foregoing language, inasmuch as it purports simply to construe the provisions of the Fourteen Points, can have no wider application than those Points, and therefore relates only to the damages suffered by the civilian population of the invaded districts. I think the sounder construction of the provision is that it broadens the scope of the "Fourteen Points" so as to include the damages suffered by the civilian population of the Allies, without regard to the places where such damages were inflicted.

It may be claimed that the basis for indemnities is broadened by the following provision of Article XIX. of the Armistice: "Reparation for damage done." I have not seen the French original of the Armistice, but from the English translation I would infer that the words quoted were intended as a heading for the provisions that follow. But even if they be considered as a substantive provision I do not think that they could fairly be deemed to enlarge the provisions of the President's "Fourteen Points," as qualified by his note of November 5th.

It may be contended that, inasmuch as the President's "Fourteen Points," as qualified by his note of November 5th, do not expressly exclude indemnities, the Allies are free to claim them. This contention impresses me as being wholly without merit. President Wilson was authorised to invite the Germans to enter into negotiations for an armistice with a view to a treaty of peace which should be based upon the Fourteen Points as qualified by his note. While the Fourteen Points are general in their terms, and do not purport to cover details, it seems to me clear that they must be assumed to have covered the essentials of the peace, and it is not now open to the Allies to insist on new essentials not foreshadowed by the Fourteen Points.

III.—ANALYSIS OF THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY THE ALLIES

Upon the basis above stated the following would seem to be the principal items of damages for which indemnity could be claimed:—

(A) Damages done to the property of civilians in the occupied districts of each country, including the value of money and securities removed which cannot be returned in their original form.

(B) The damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by the civil population of the occupied districts.

(C) Damages to person and property suffered by the civil population of the Allied countries, outside of the occupied districts.

(NOTE.—Damages to civilians and their property caused by air raids and bombardment from the sea are included.)

(D) Damages for the loss of, and injury to, ships and cargoes due to the “aggression” of the enemy.

I think that reparation can be claimed for all Allied ships and cargoes destroyed or damaged by Germany, even if in the lawful exercise of the rights of war. The entire war should be regarded as the “aggression” of Germany referred to, and, therefore, the damages to be claimed in this connection need not be confined to those caused by attacks upon the sea which were in violation of the rules of war.

The following items of damage, while capable of being supported by plausible arguments, are not so clear:—

(E) The damage suffered by the civilian population of the Allied countries through the losses of trade and commerce, and the profits thereof, as the result of the war. In the case of Belgium, practically all of whose trade was lost, this would be a very large item, and it might be possible to establish it with reasonable certainty. In the case of England, none of whose territory was occupied, and in the case of France and Italy, only a comparatively small part of whose territory was occupied, the question becomes much more complex and involves the difficult problem of estimating consequential damages.

(F) Damages suffered by the civilians due to the death or incapacity of soldiers upon whom they were dependent for support. The widow and children of an Allied soldier killed in the war have suffered a material loss in the strictest sense of the term. The recovery of damages for such a loss due to the negligence of an individual could be had in the courts of any civilized country. I think, however, it requires a somewhat forced construction of the language under consideration to extend it to such damages as these.

The foregoing classification is by no means complete, but I think it covers the great bulk of the items which can be seriously claimed.

My impression is that the British Government will not press for a wider basis for indemnities than that stated in sub-divisions (A) to (D) inclusive, provided the governments of France, Italy and Belgium take the same view. On the other hand, if the Continental Allies should press for a broader basis, the British Government would doubtless feel constrained to present a claim based upon the same theories as those on which the other Allies compute their claims.

There is every indication that the French Government will be disposed to claim indemnities upon a much more liberal scale than is here advocated. Indeed, in the conferences of French officials on this subject, no attention seems to have been paid to France's acceptance of President Wilson's Fourteen Points as modified by his note to Germany of November 5th.

It seems to be the purpose of the French Government to claim as a part of the indemnity for France the repayment, with compound interest, of the indemnity paid by France to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War. Upon the record there is no basis for this claim except as part of the “righting” of the “wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace and Lorraine.” This does not impress me as a sound claim.

There will also be a disposition on the part of the French to secure what is practically the cost of their war pensions, by claiming indemnification for the damages suffered by French civilians through the death or incapacity of soldiers upon whom they were dependent for support. As stated above, it seems to me that this claim, although plausible, will be difficult to sustain.

Representatives of the French Government have even gone so far as to propose that France should be indemnified for the entire cost of the war. Clearly this claim cannot be sustained upon the basis of the President's Fourteen Points as qualified by his note to Germany of November 5th. Similar claims are being made by election orators in England, but I have no reason to believe that they are countenanced by the responsible financial officers of the British Government.

Italy may be counted upon to compute her claim upon at least as liberal a basis as France. I understand that, recognising that it may not be feasible to enforce her claim for indemnity in full against Austria, Italy will claim a share of the indemnity to be paid by Germany, upon the ground that Germany was at war with Italy, and that it was the German Divisions rather than the Austrian Divisions which were responsible for the Caporetto disaster. The Italians assume that Hungary and the German portion of Austria are in a position to pay an indemnity, but perhaps not one of sufficient magnitude to place Italy in relatively as favourable a position as the Allies. It seems to be assumed that the portions of the late Austrian Empire to be comprised in the friendly governments that are expected to emerge from its wreck (especially Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slovakia) will not be required to share in the burden of indemnities.

I confess that this claim of Italy impresses me as not without merit. It was at the instance of Great Britain and France that she entered the war against the Central Powers. She was at war with Germany quite as much as with Austria. It seems to me that when it comes to indemnities, Italy should not suffer simply because Austria, who happened to be her principal immediate foe, is less able to respond than Germany, the principal foe of all the Allies.

A similar question will doubtless arise in connection with indemnity claims of Greece, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro.

France and Belgium are likely to join in the following contention, which, although plausible, impresses me as unsound. Certain countries have suffered greater losses to their civilian population in proportion to their total population than others. Presumably such losses in Belgium and France per capita greatly exceed those of Great Britain. Therefore (it may be contended), if the aggregate amount of the indemnities which the Central Powers are able to pay is not sufficient to meet all claims, the claims of Belgium and France should be preferred to such an extent that when all the indemnities shall have been distributed the final net loss in each country per capita will be the same.

It may also be proposed that the distribution of indemnities among the various Allies should be governed, to some extent at least, by their respective contributions to the aggregate cost of the war. This would not appear to be a sound basis upon the theory that the indemnities are to represent, not reimbursement for the cost of the war, but simply reparation for damage done to civilians and their property.

In my opinion the only sound rule would be that (possibly subject to the preference in favour of Belgium mentioned below) the aggregate of the indemnities collected from the Central Powers should be divided pro rata among the Allies in proportion to the amounts of their respective claims against all the enemy countries as established upon a fair and uniform application of the principles finally adopted.

Belgium will doubtless claim some preference in the distribution of the indemnities. Her people hold a large amount of paper currency issued by the Germans, which represents that much money, securities, and other property taken by the German Government from the Belgians in payment for which the currency was issued. There is force in the contention that the right to have the value of this currency returned to the Belgian Government is entitled to a preference.

The Belgians may also claim that as their country was invaded wholly without right in a war directed against France and Great Britain, their claim for damages inflicted by German aggression should be paid in full before any payment by way of indemnity is made to the other Allies.

I have discussed the claims now being put forward either officially or semi-officially on behalf of the Allied Governments for the purpose of calling attention to the questions which are likely to arise in the preliminary discussions. Of course it may well be that the position finally taken by all of those governments will more clearly recognise the limitations which seem to have been imposed by their acceptance of the President's Fourteen Points than now seems to be the case.

An interesting question arises as to who would be the beneficiaries of the indemnities paid on account of ships and cargoes sunk by the Germans. With unimportant exceptions, the owners of the ships and cargoes have already been indemnified by the insurance companies, who, in turn, have been fully protected by the premiums paid. In most cases these premiums were paid by the owners of the ships and cargoes. These premiums increased freight rates, which in turn increased prices. The ultimate burden of

these losses was, therefore, borne chiefly by the people of the country whose citizens paid the freights upon the cargoes destroyed. I should, therefore, say that each State should receive the portion of the indemnities based on the destroyed cargoes which belonged to its citizens and the ships by which these cargoes were carried. In the case of ships which were under charter, the Government to whose citizens the ships were chartered should receive the indemnities based upon the loss of those particular ships. For instance, a large number of British ships were operated by the French under charter. Presumably the hire of those ships was sufficiently large to cover the losses. Therefore, France, or the people of France, have already indemnified the British shipowners for the ships lost. The French Government should, therefore, get the indemnities paid on account of these ships.

Property taken by Germany from any of the Allies that is returned in its original form should not count as part of the recipient's indemnity.

It would be fruitless to attempt at this time to estimate the aggregate amounts of the claims of the Allies against the Central Powers. The amounts would vary widely, depending upon the basis adopted for their computation. Even if a definite basis were assumed, the data are not now available on which to base anything approaching a reliable computation. It may even be that we are wrong in the assumption with which this memorandum begins, that the aggregate claims computed upon what is assumed to be the sound basis will exceed the ability of the Central Powers to pay. Presumably all the Allies are now busily engaged in computing their claims, and no doubt ample opportunity will be afforded to check up these claims when presented.

IV.—HOW MUCH CAN GERMANY PAY

We now come to the consideration of the question as to how much Germany can pay. I will consider this question by itself in the first instance, and discuss later the question as to how much it is wise to require Germany to pay.

Information bearing on this question is being assembled by representatives of the American, British and French Treasuries. The discussion in this memorandum will be based upon a forecast of the results of this investigation, which, while subject to material change, is sufficiently near the truth to answer the purposes of the present preliminary discussion.

The indemnity which Germany can pay may be sub-divided into the following classes:—

1. Cash items (by which is meant items of money and property which are capable of immediate payment or delivery).
2. Deferred items (by which is meant items of cash and property to be delivered in instalments in the future).

1.—CASH ITEMS

The cash items which the Allies could extract from Germany in case she were required to give up all her resources of this kind may be roughly estimated as follows:—

Gold and silver	\$750,000,000
Ships (the German merchant ships, including sailing ships, available for ocean trade, including those, about a third of the total, already in possession of the Allies), 5,000,000 tons at the liberal price of \$15 per ton	\$750,000,000
Investments of the German Government and of German citizens in Alsace and Lorraine, of which investments France would expect to become the owner	\$250,000,000
Investments of the German Government and German citizens in German colonies for which Germany should receive compensation from the nations by whom the colonies are taken over	\$50,000,000
German property in Allied countries already seized by Allied Governments	\$1,000,000,000
Other investments in foreign countries owned by the German Government or by German citizens	<u>\$2,000,000,000</u>
Total	<u>\$4,800,000,000</u>

(NOTE.—The foregoing items do not include property such as works of art, specie and railroad rolling stock taken from Allied countries which can be restored in their original form.)

The foregoing is a rough estimate of the aggregate value of the cash items which it would be theoretically possible for Germany to turn over to the Allies. I will discuss later the question as to the extent to which it would be wise to require their delivery.

I have assumed that, without counting as part of the indemnity, property in Germany belonging to citizens of the Allied nations, much of which has been seized by the German Government during the war, will be restored to the owners or appropriate reimbursement made.

Most of the property included in the foregoing statement is not the property of the German Government but of German citizens. I assume that the German Government could be required to requisition the private property of its citizens so far as is required for the payment of the indemnity, and compensate its citizens for this property with German Government obligations. To require Germany to do this would be going very far. In the case of the indemnity imposed on France after the war of 1871, the French Government was left to its own devices in raising the money. Perhaps in the case of the so-called "Cash Items" of the indemnity to be imposed on Germany, the better way would be to fix the aggregate sum to be paid by Germany within, say, a year, and give her the privilege of paying part of the indemnity in ships and part in securities representing German investments in foreign countries. Thus would be avoided the embarrassment of requiring the German Government to requisition the private property of her citizens. The Allies would be relying upon the Government and people of Germany raising the indemnity as quickly as possible in order to get rid of the occupation of German territory by its enemies.

It is assumed that so far as the indemnity is concerned no value will be attributed to naval vessels and munitions of war surrendered by Germany to the Allies, nor to the sovereignty of Alsace and Lorraine, which will be considered by France as mere restitution (subject to proper reimbursement for German investments), nor to the control of the German colonies (subject to reimbursement for German investments therein), which will probably not be looked upon as having a money value.

If practically all Germany's ships were taken as part of the indemnity, it would be necessary to lease part of them back to Germany in order to enable her to carry on her commerce. The best form of lease would be one which provided for a series of annual payments representing in the aggregate the value of the ships, which would be payable annually with interest during a specified period of years, say ten, at the end of which period the ships would become the property of Germany.

2.—DEFERRED ITEMS

A limited amount could be paid from year to year by Germany in kind, that is, by the delivery of German products not required for consumption at home, such as coal (which France and Italy will require from Germany in considerable quantities), iron and potash. It would be possible for the German Government to arrange with its producers of coal, iron and potash to deliver a certain amount thereof each year in return for German currency or German Government obligations, so that the German Government could deliver them to the Allies on account of the indemnity.

On the whole I should be disposed to reject any plan which involved substantial future payments in kind, and to favour the simpler form of cash payments in annual instalments. The most convenient form to provide for such payments would be by the delivery of obligations of the German Government bearing interest and maturing in annual series over as long a period of years as might be necessary.

France and Italy may prefer long term interest bearing obligations with no provision for paying the principal in instalments inasmuch as they could treat the entire annual interest receipts as applicable to the reduction of their taxes.

Other modes of paying the deferred instalments of the indemnity have been suggested, but it seems to me that none of them differ in ultimate result from the plan above suggested.

One suggestion is that Germany should be required to pay to the Allies a tax upon her exports or upon all of her products, or upon products of certain kinds, such as coal, iron, steel and potash. Any such plan

on last analysis is nothing more than the payment to the Allies annually of a portion of Germany's profits. Her ability to make payments abroad would still be largely dependent on her exports exceeding her imports.

It has been suggested that Germany's mines of coal, iron, potash and other important minerals, should be turned over to the Allies either by way of payment of an indemnity or as security. Apart from the inherent objection to the wholesale seizure of German private property which this plan would involve it would be necessary to arrange for the operation of the mines by the German people, and the Allies could not receive more than the profits resulting from such operation. This would simply be another way of paying to the Allies a portion of the annual savings of the German people. There would be the same difficulty in enforcing such an arrangement, and the same limitations in respect of Germany's ability to make payments abroad, as exist in the case of the simpler plan of money payments in instalments.

I now approach the problem of how large a volume of annual payments, by way of principal and interest, Germany could assume if she were forced to the limit of her capacity. The discussion which follows is based upon the following table^{10a} giving the financial position of Germany, and for the purposes of comparison, the financial position of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy.

This table summarizes a large mass of information which has been gathered.

It should be remarked at the outset that the amount which Germany could pay to its own citizens upon an internal debt is one thing, and the amount which she could pay upon an external debt held in other countries is quite a different thing. I shall, however, for purposes of simplicity, discuss the subject in the first instance without considering the difficulty of effecting payments in other countries than Germany.

I will assume for the purpose of the argument that Germany, notwithstanding the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and German Poland, will, through the absorption of the German portion of Austria, continue to have as large earnings and as large a volume of foreign commerce as before the war, allowing of course for a reasonable period to recover from the shock of the war. It should be remarked that this is an extreme assumption, especially in view of the large amount of the mineral resources which Germany will lose by giving up Alsace and Lorraine and Poland. The extent of this loss is shown by the estimate made by a competent authority, that while before the war Germany produced annually 20,000,000 tons of iron and steel, against a production of 5,000,000 tons by France, after the war Germany will produce only 14,000,000 tons, against about 11,000,000 tons by France. Her production of coal and potash will also be reduced.

Assuming Germany to have parted with all of the cash items which she can spare without destroying or seriously impairing her industrial efficiency, her ability to make annual payments upon an indemnity will in the long run be limited by her annual national savings. According to the best information that has been available, her national savings before the war were at the rate of about \$2,500,000,000 per year.

With a proper allowance for the fall in the purchasing power of money during the war, and for possible economies in the expenditure of the German people—this would represent the ultimate possible limits of an indemnity payable in instalments. Presumably there will be a substantial saving in the annual expenditure for the maintenance of the army and navy. On the other hand, this saving will be partially if not entirely offset by enormous expenditures for pensions. Certainly Germany cannot do more than devote to the payment of an indemnity the entire earnings of her people over and above the amount required for their living expenses and the maintenance of the Government. As will be pointed out below, they cannot do nearly so much.

We now come to a consideration of the practical difficulties in effecting payment outside of Germany. In the long run indemnities paid by Germany would be of no value except to the extent that they could be transferred to Allied countries. Assuming that under the head of "cash items" Germany has lost at the outset all the gold and foreign investments that she can spare, no way is left by which she can make payments in foreign countries except by her collections in other countries, which must chiefly be from exports, or to be more exact, by her collections from other countries in excess of her payments to those countries. Before the war the balance of trade was against Germany. The year before the war she imported about \$400,000,000 more than she exported. This adverse trade balance was doubtless offset by freights which she received, and income from foreign investments.

It accordingly follows that if after the war Germany is to pay a large indemnity abroad, through the excess of exports over imports, she will have, by rigid economy, to reduce her imports, and, by commercial energy, increase her exports. The experience of the war has undoubtedly enabled her to make great progress in this regard. For four years she has existed without imports of any considerable magnitude. She will undoubtedly enjoy some permanent advantage in this regard as a result of the habits of economy which her people have formed, and their success in finding substitutes of domestic production for many things which before the war were regarded as essential imports. On the other hand, she has withdrawn from the manufacture of products which require imported raw materials. Without resuming these imports she cannot resume her normal production, and place her people in a position to make the savings which would be required for the large annual payments on account of an indemnity. For a time she will have to make very heavy purchases abroad in order to replenish her depleted stocks and regain her industrial efficiency.

There has not been time for such an analysis of Germany's pre-war imports and exports as will be necessary to form an estimate of the probable relation of her imports to her exports after the war. It could hardly be hoped that year in year out Germany would have a favourable balance of trade exceeding \$1,000,000,000 per year. It is doubtful if this amount will be reached. I should consider \$500,000,000 per year a safer estimate.

SEVERAL OF THE ITEMS GIVEN IN THIS TABLE ARE PROVISIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH WILL BE REVISED ON THE STRENGTH OF FURTHER INFORMATION EXPECTED FROM THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS

	Germany	Gt. Britain	France	Italy	U. S. A.
Total national wealth of all kinds (pre-war estimates)	\$75,000,000,000	\$75,000,000,000	\$60,000,000,000	\$20,000,000,000	\$250,000,000,000
Total annual national pre-war income from all sources	10,000,000,000	11,000,000,000	7,000,000,000	3,000,000,000	40,000,000,000
Total Government debt at end of war*	40,000,000,000	40,000,000,000	28,000,000,000	12,000,000,000	23,000,000,000
Total Government debt before the war	1,200,000,000	3,540,000,000	6,580,000,000	2,890,000,000	971,000,000
Total present income from taxation.	1,888,175,000	4,000,000,000	1,502,000,000	872,000,000	4,000,000,000
Percentage of debt to national wealth	53.33%	53.33%	46.67%	60%	
Annual pre-war increase in national wealth.	2,500,000,000	2,500,000,000	900,000,000	400,000,000	5,000,000,000
Percentage of present annual income from taxation upon pre-war national income.	18.88%	36.36%	21.45%	29.06%	
Percentage of present annual income from taxation upon pre-war national	75.52%	160%	166.8%	218%	

increase in wealth					
Annual expenditure after peace, subdivided into					
(a) Expenses	1,500,000,000	1,500,000,000	1,500,000,000	855,000,000	2,000,000,000
(b) Interest charges, without provision for sinking fund	2,000,000,000	2,000,000,000	1,400,000,000	600,000,000	950,000,000
Percentage of above expenses provided for by present scale of taxation	53.94%	114.28%	51.79%	59.93%	
Pre-war trade					
Total imports	2,672,850,000	3,843,670,000	1,701,000,000	729,000,000	1,792,000,000
Total exports	2,239,200,000	3,174,100,000	1,400,000,000	502,000,000	2,484,000,000
Favourable balance in black; adverse balance in red	^a 433,650,000	^a 669,570,000	^a 301,000,000	^a 227,000,000	690,000,000
	1913	1913	1912	1912	1916
Pre-war expenditures on Army and Navy	{A. 302,150,000 N. 55,215,000	A. 140,355,000 N. 221,825,000	A. 200,000,000 N. 100,000,000	A. 100,000,000 N. 62,000,000	A. 122,000,000 N. 155,000,000

*Figures indicate gross debt.

NOTE.—In comparing pre-war figures with post-war figures allowance must always be made for the very great fall in the purchasing power of money which has taken place during the war.

^a Editor's note: These figures appear in red on the original.

I therefore offer the provisional estimate that it will not be feasible for Germany to make annual indemnity payments to the Allies for a long period of years in excess of \$1,000,000,000 a year, and that the payments should not be less than \$500,000,000 per year.

It should be noted that if the German ships are taken by the Allies and leased backed [sic] to Germany under the plan above discussed, the annual payments by way of rental would automatically reduce what would otherwise be the balance of trade in favour of Germany.

The extent to which it would be possible for Germany to provide for the payment of an indemnity by means of new external loans is apt to be very much exaggerated. In the first place, it is doubtful whether for several years after the war Germany's credit would be sufficiently restored to enable her to place large loans among foreign investors. The very existence of her large indemnity obligations would make such an operation difficult. In the second place, there is the more radical difficulty that the placing of foreign loans to apply on her indemnity payments does not change the essential character of Germany's burden. Her burden would be lightened only to the extent of the advantage of transferring her debt to more friendly hands, and of the interest that might be saved by placing loans among investors at a lower rate of interest than that carried by the deferred instalments of the indemnity. A foreign loan would simply substitute new foreign creditors for old ones. In each case the interest and principal of the debt could be paid in the long run only out of the profits of Germany's industry and commerce and with the

aid of her exports. As I point out later, foreign loans may prove to be a method of enabling Germany eventually to anticipate the payment of the indemnities in whole or in part; that is to say, she may be able to substitute foreign investors for the Allied Governments as the holders of the external debt represented by the unpaid indemnity instalments.

V.—HOW MUCH IS IT WISE TO REQUIRE GERMANY TO PAY

I start with the assumption that the Allies will not make the mistake of imposing such terms as would ruin, or seriously cripple, German industry and commerce. Only a prosperous Germany could make for a considerable period the annual indemnity payments that are contemplated. Therefore, to destroy Germany's prosperity would be to destroy her ability to make the indemnity payments.

I also assume that the Allies desire to keep Germany as a customer for their products. Only by becoming prosperous can Germany make her normal volume of purchases abroad. The importance of this consideration is shown by the following statement of Germany's imports from the United States and the principal allied countries during the year 1913:—

From	The United States	\$427,800,000
"	Great Britain	219,025,000
"	France	146,050,000
"	British India	135,450,000
"	Belgium	86,150,000
"	Italy	79,425,000
		\$1,093,900,000

I also assume that the Allies would not desire so to burden Germany with obligations as to force her people into revolution. In the long run, Germany can secure money with which to make annual indemnity payments only by taxing her people. Clearly a people which is required for a generation or more to pay all of its annual savings in taxes would lose courage and be an easy prey to the forces of disorganisation and rebellion. It would, therefore, seem necessary to leave the Germans some part of their annual savings.

It should also be assumed that Germany must be left sufficient liquid assets to enable her to maintain her solvency and the ordinary machinery for credit and commerce. She should not, therefore, be bereft of all her gold or of all her quick assets. She should be allowed to retain some basis for her currency and some working capital.

For similar reasons Germany should not be forced to completely destroy by taxation or capital levy the value of her large internal debt. That debt represents the interest of its holders in the income from the national wealth. To destroy this debt would simply result in a shifting of the ownership of the national wealth. A substantial part of the German debt is owned by banks. A still larger part is owned by investors, who in turn have pledged their holdings with the banks as collateral for loans. To completely destroy, or radically impair the value of this debt, would cripple, if not ruin, the banks, and might destroy the entire financial structure on which Germany depends for the maintenance of her commerce and industry. It would take years for Germany to recover from such a shock.

Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it becomes necessary to estimate the amount of the indemnity which it would be wise to require Germany to pay, having regard, solely, to the selfish interests of the Allies. Estimates will vary according to the temperament of the person making the estimate.

In order to start the discussion, I venture to hazard a provisional estimate that it would be unwise to exact an indemnity which would exceed the following limits:—

Cash items—	
Minimum	\$2,000,000,000
Maximum	\$3,000,000,000
Average annual payment for a considerable period—	
Minimum	\$500,000,000

Maximum

\$1,000,000,000

It would doubtless be wise to require smaller annual payments during the few years following the war, and thereafter for gradually increasing payments based upon Germany's probable progress in recovering from the shock of the war.

An indemnity upon this scale will, to many, seem moderate. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that there is an important school of economists in Germany and elsewhere who have been contending for months that Germany would come out of the war economically ruined unless she could collect a large indemnity. It should also be borne in mind that Germany's present scale of taxation will produce only about half of the revenue annually required to pay the expenses of the Government and the interest upon the internal debt. It will therefore be necessary for Germany not only practically to double her taxes for the purpose of meeting internal requirements but to add enough more to provide the annual indemnity payments.

As already stated the foregoing suggestions are based upon the assumption that Germany is to be given an opportunity of becoming prosperous so that the annual payments by way of indemnity can be continued for a considerable period of years, upon the theory that in this way a much larger sum will ultimately be collected than would be obtained if an attempt were made to force the payment of the largest amount which could possibly be squeezed out during a limited period of military occupation, say five years. Under the latter policy a larger amount in cash items and a larger amount in annual payments might be extracted under the lash of an army of occupation, but the result would be to leave Germany in a condition of industrial and commercial paralysis, with all the consequences of such a condition.

People talk loosely about the enormous value of Germany's natural resources, particularly her coal, iron and potash, as furnishing an indication of the magnitude of the indemnity which she can pay. This reasoning is wholly illusive. These natural resources are serviceable in paying an indemnity only to the extent of the profit which will result from their exploitation. If their operation is left in the hands of the German people, only the profit remaining after expenses of operation, including living expenses of the Germans employed in their operation, would be available. The same would be true if the property were seized by the Allies and operated for their account. In either case the profits which resulted from their operation would have to be gotten out of Germany chiefly through exports. Of course if the property were operated by the Allies the resulting profits might be exported in kind, but this would not change the ultimate result.

VI.—THE FRENCH INDEMNITY OF 1871

It will be instructive in the present situation to consider how France paid to Germany the indemnity of 1871 of five milliards of francs. This indemnity was payable in funds of Prussia, Great Britain and several other neutral countries. The German armies were to occupy France until the indemnity had been paid in full. It was paid within three years. The export of merchandise seems to have played a minor part in the payment of this indemnity. Probably only about half a milliard was paid by the shipment of metallic currency. Some was paid from the proceeds of French *rentes* marketed in England and elsewhere outside of France. By far the greater part was paid from the proceeds of the sale of French foreign investments. As was stated in one of the official reports on the Finance of France, "the result was substantially the same as if the French had sent their securities to Berlin, and as if they had sent their savings to Berlin in order to purchase securities, just as they had formerly been sending them to Italy, to the United States, to Turkey and to Austria, to buy Italian, American or Turkish obligations, or shares or bonds of the Austrian railroads." In other words, the payment of the French indemnity was accomplished chiefly by the mobilisation during a period of less than three years of assets which I have classed as "Cash Items." The process could not have been carried on indefinitely. When the indemnity was paid, France had doubtless nearly exhausted her accumulation of available "cash items."

VII. WHAT SECURITY CAN GERMANY GIVE FOR THE DEFERRED PAYMENTS

The answer to this question is bound to be very unsatisfactory. An arrangement for Allied control of the customs and tax receipts of Germany, similar to that frequently resorted to in the case of small or weak nations, is manifestly impracticable. It may be assumed that Germany would have few transferable assets which could be pledged, as they would have been taken, as far as seemed wise, under the head of

“Cash Items.” The pledge of internal resources, such as mines and factories, would not be feasible if Germany is to be permitted to continue as an independent and prosperous nation. For a certain number of years the indemnity could be enforced by Allied occupation of German territory, just as Germany occupied certain French territory after 1871 until the indemnity was paid. This remedy is, however, an expensive one, whether the cost of it be borne by the Allies or by Germany. If borne by Germany it would simply reduce by that much her surplus profits available for the payment of indemnities. I think, therefore, that it may be assumed that a military occupation of portions of Germany as a means of enforcing payment of an indemnity would have to be limited to a comparatively short period.

I therefore conclude that there is no available form of security for the payment of the deferred instalments of the indemnity after the military occupation of Germany ceases. Thereafter the Allies would have to rely upon the embarrassment which Germany would suffer if she defaulted in her obligations and thereby became insolvent and dishonoured in the markets of the world. In case of default she could be made to suffer economic privations through concerted action of the Allies. Such pressure, while it lasted, would, of course, only result in further reducing her ability to pay.

The fear that the payment of annual indemnity instalments could not be enforced after the termination of the military occupation of Germany may result in Allied pressure for an arrangement which will force Germany to pay the largest indemnity that can be squeezed out of her during the period of military occupation, regardless of the condition in which Germany will be left at the end of this process.

I think the Allies cannot avoid taking their chances as to the collection of the deferred instalments after military occupation of Germany ceases. The more moderate the indemnity the better the chance of the deferred instalments being paid. It is very doubtful whether the German people could be forced to carry the burden of a colossal indemnity extending over a long period of years. The people of Great Britain and France would hardly go to war to enforce an indemnity. Therefore the aim of the Allies should be to keep their indemnities within such limits of moderation that the German people would feel that the consequences of default—commercial dishonour and isolation—would be more serious than the burdens of the indemnity.

VIII.—TENTATIVE PROGRAM

For the purpose of providing a basis for discussion the following tentative proposals are offered for consideration in the light of the foregoing observations:

1. The Enemy Governments to return all securities, specie and other property taken from the occupied portions of Allied countries, in so far as the identical property can be returned. Claims for damages for property which cannot be returned, or which has been returned in an injured condition, to be treated as part of the claims for damages suffered by the civilian population of the Allied countries which are to be dealt with as hereinafter provided.
2. The citizens of Allied countries to be restored to the enjoyment of their property which was in enemy countries at the outbreak of the war whether or not such property has been seized. In case property cannot be returned uninjured full monetary restitution to be made which is not to be deemed part of the indemnities hereinafter provided for.
3. By the uniform application of approved principles the claims of all Allied Governments for damage done to their civilian population and to their property to be ascertained.
4. The amounts of the indemnities to be exacted from the Central Powers to be determined. It may be that the aggregate claims of the Allies would be sufficiently moderate to be taken as the measure of the indemnities to be exacted. This, however, seems improbable.
5. The aggregate of the indemnities so ascertained to constitute a single fund in which all the Allies will share in proportion to their respective claims, subject to such preferences in favour of Belgium as may be approved. It may be that further discussion will develop other claims that should be preferred.
6. Each Ally to credit upon its claim the value of any German property within its borders of which it shall have taken possession during the war, and also the value of any German property of which it may become the owner through the acquisition of German territory. For illustration France should credit upon its claim the value of German property within its borders seized during the war, and the value of any German property in Alsace and Lorraine which it may acquire. The value of any enemy ships retained by the Allies should constitute a part of the general indemnity fund and each Ally should allow a suitable credit on account of its indemnity claim for the value of the ships which it retains.

Subject to the adjustment of such credits and to such preferences as may be allowed, all amounts coining into the indemnity fund from whatever source to be distributed pro rata among the Allies in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims.

7. The following arrangements to be made respecting the German indemnity (presumably somewhat similar arrangements would be made with the other enemy Governments):
 - (A) Germany to be required to pay a specific sum, say \$3,000,000,000 (representing what I have termed the "Cash Items") within a limited period, say one year, this payment to be made at the option of Germany in gold or in the currency of the various allied or neutral countries, subject to suitable regulations to prevent too large a payment being made in the currency of any one country.
 - (B) This payment to be secured by part or all of Germany's stocks of gold, her merchant ships, and selected foreign investments of Germany and her nationals, other than those which have been taken by the Allies under paragraph 2. Presumably the military occupation of portions of Germany provided for in the armistice would continue at the expense of Germany, at least until the payments provided for in this sub-division were made.
 - (C) Require Germany to pay an additional sum, say, \$15,000,000,000, payable in 28 equal annual instalments, which should include interest at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum upon the deferred payments. This would involve an average annual payment of \$1,000,000,000 a year. It might, however, be well to provide for smaller payments for the first few years, with correspondingly larger payments for the subsequent years, Germany to have the privilege of anticipating any or all of the payments.
 - (D) In order to encourage economy in the expenditures of the German Government, it might be well to provide for a minimum annual indemnity payment based upon an assumed annual expenditure by the German Government, with a provision that the annual indemnity payment would increase in some fixed proportion to any increase in annual expenditure for governmental purposes.
 - (E) Require neither any specific pledge of property nor the appropriation of specific income for the payment of the deferred instalments. It might be wise, however, to provide that the military occupation of portions of Germany should continue until some specific amount of the deferred instalments, say \$5,000,000,000 had been paid. The lien on the assets mentioned in subdivision (B) of this paragraph might be continued.
 - (F) It would doubtless be prudent to add a provision that in case Germany should default in any of her payments she should be subjected to certain specific penalties, such as the exclusion of her ships from Allied Ports and the exclusion of her exports from the markets of Allied countries or their admission to those markets only upon the payment of a large import duty. Such pressure could in any event be applied in case of default, but there would be a manifest advantage in specifically providing for it in advance.

The foregoing plan leaves Germany free to adopt her own measures to provide funds for the payment of the indemnity. There is much to be said in favour of allowing Germany this freedom. As already pointed out, the only effective arrangement for enforcing the payment of an indemnity is by the expensive procedure of military occupation. Any attempt to secure the appropriation of specific receipts in payment of the deferred instalments of the indemnity would hamper Germany without affording real security. On the other hand, if Germany is given a free hand she will have the incentive to use to the full her resources of energy and ingenuity to make such arrangements as from time to time may be feasible to enable her to get rid of the burden of the indemnity. No one can foresee the changes that may occur in industry, commerce and trade. Arrangements that to-day would seem to encourage or aid the payment of the indemnity might have just the opposite effect ten years hence. The measures which France adopted to pay the indemnity of 1871 were undoubtedly very different from those expected by the wisest financiers of both Germany and France. Among the expedients which Germany might eventually adopt would be the placing of foreign loans to enable her to anticipate the payment of the indemnity in whole or in part. Her credit might so improve that she could place loans, not only in neutral countries, but even in Allied countries.

I feel constrained to add that, with my present light, I do not see how Germany, weakened as she will be by the shock of the war and by the loss of important territory containing a large part of her mineral resources, will be able to pay so large an indemnity as is provided for in the tentative program above outlined. I assume there was the same difficulty in 1871 in foreseeing how France would be able to pay the indemnity imposed upon her by Germany. The tentative program now presented is based upon the hope that the mere existence of the indemnity and the natural ambition of the German people to rid the

nation of this burden will stimulate them to degrees of energy and ingenuity which cannot now be foreseen.

In formulating the suggestions offered in this memorandum I have taken into account the undoubted desire of the peoples of the Allied countries to impose upon Germany as large an indemnity as she is likely to be able to pay. Very different conclusions would be reached if the Allied Governments should finally adopt what seems to me the broader and saner view that, in the long run, it would be better for the Allied nations themselves to err on the side of leniency, and to avoid imposing on Germany an indemnity of such magnitude as to require her to be subject to an army of occupation for several years and to a crushing burden of external debt for a generation or more.

PAUL D. CRAVATH

DECEMBER 12, 1918.

⁹ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 468](#) ⁹.

¹⁰ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

^{10a} Printed on pp. 596–597 [*Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 498](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 711.63113/1: Telegram

[Document 499]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 21, 1918 [10 a.m.?].

40. [From Lansing.] I desire to be informed of the approximate amount of property now held by the Enemy Alien Property Custodian belonging to—First, subjects of the old Austrian Empire, and, Second, citizens of the present German-Austria *de facto* government. Under whose orders may this property be disposed of. Does such disposal require Congressional action? If the present government of German-Austria should, in accordance with its laws, requisition from its citizens their individual rights in such assets and transfer such rights to a branch or department of the United States Government with the assent of the Allies, is there any reason why the Enemy Property Custodian should not recognize such title and pay over any available surplus after providing for claims against the fund arising from claims of American citizens against Austria? If so, what procedure would be necessary? I desire an early and full reply as on it may depend the possibility of getting food into Austria and preventing Bolshevistic conditions which threaten the power of the associated governments to conclude a just peace. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.023/8

[Document 500]

General Tasher H. Bliss to Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry

PARIS , December 22, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCKINSTRY: I find a pencil note on my desk signed by Colonel Grant, saying that you would like to be notified as to who is going to make an estimate as to what Germany can afford to pay.

I do not know whether the United States has committed itself affirmatively to the resolution that is understood was passed by a conference in London two or three weeks ago to the effect that each of the interested Powers would make a separate investigation of this.

I think that Colonel House is more closely connected with this question than anyone else of the American Mission, and I suggest that you take the matter up with him.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/29

[Document 501]

Memorandum by Dr. A. A. Young

A SUGGESTION FOR AMERICAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INDEMNITIES

To make it clear beyond question that an indemnity is compensatory rather than punitive, it is not sufficient that the amount of the indemnity should be limited by the amount of injury actually done to civilians and their property. It is equally necessary—and this is the point of the present proposal—that the proceeds of the indemnity should be used for no other purpose than that of compensating for losses actually incurred.

Thus interpreted, restoration involves payments to the French government, for example, not so much because the national economic fabric has been injured, as because the French government must serve as a trustee for the French civilians who have suffered losses through the aggression of Germany. These losses are not merely the basis of the indemnity; they also define its purpose.

It is likely that the principle just stated will meet with little dissent so far as indemnification for damages to property is concerned. But its real significance is shown more clearly in connection with the problem of compensation for injuries to persons.

Consider, for example, the Belgian claim for compensation on account of the illegal killing of civilians, the high death rate among those forcibly deported to Germany, and the impaired vitality and reduced productive efficiency of the survivors. Now the title of the Belgian government to indemnification, on its own account, for these injuries is questionable. The net economic worth of an average man to a nation is hard to determine. It is not large, however, for every man is a consumer as well as a producer, and only by slow accumulations adds to the wealth of the nation. But the direct economic losses incurred by the Belgian families whose bread-

winners have been illegally killed or incapacitated are real, real and measurable.

It would be right to insist that the amount of indemnity to be assigned to Belgium on this account should be measured by the cost of providing an adequate insurance and pension system to cover these personal losses, and that the validation of the claim should be made to depend upon the establishment of such a system.

This is only one out of several possible types of claims where the application of the principle that actual personal compensation is the purpose as well as the measure of the indemnity suggests a solution of what might be otherwise a difficult problem. Furthermore, other reasons may be urged for the adoption of this principle as part of the American policy with respect to indemnities:

1. It affords a basis for throwing out of court at once certain classes of illogical and extravagant claims.
2. It points the way toward a solution of the difficult problem of injuries to mercantile shipping.
3. It will go far to satisfy the expectations of those who expect from the coming settlement, and more particularly from American participation in that settlement, not only a lasting peace but also some definite recognition of the principles of social justice.

[PARIS ,] December 28, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.02302/2

[Document 502]

Brigadier General G. H. McKinstry to the Chief of Engineers, American Expeditionary Forces (Langfitt)

PARIS , 30 December, '18.

Subject: Status of work in connection with evaluation of war damages to France and Belgium.

Reference your memorandum of December 23d,¹¹ and in response to telephone request from General Langfitt, personally, December 29th, you are advised that the nature and status of our work are as follows:

1. Instructions from Colonel House regarding this work are as contained in his letter of December 4th, quoted below:

“Embassy of the United States of America
Paris, December 4, 1918

“My dear General McKinstry:

The President having requested me to set in motion some machinery to obtain for the use of the American Delegation at the Peace Conference some valuation of damages done by the Germans in the invaded parts of France and Belgium, I have requested General Pershing to assign to me an officer, whose duties would be to conduct this work.

General Pershing having assigned you to me for this purpose and you having reported to me and conferred with me, I trust that you will now proceed with this work, consulting with French and Belgian officials as occasions require.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) E. M. House

Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry,
Room No. 107—Elysee Palace Hotel, Paris.”

A few days later I received verbal instructions from Colonel House to proceed with securing the necessary organization but to do nothing more towards calling upon the French ministers for their official estimates until I received further instructions. These instructions, including instructions to proceed with the work, were given to me by Colonel House on December 28th.

2. At my conference with Colonel House on December 28th, the desirability for proceeding with this work in a larger way was apparent. Colonel House stated that we should have perhaps two months in which to submit preliminary approximate estimates, and possibly more, and that undoubtedly the Peace Conference would settle certain of the general principles to be followed and that thereafter a committee would probably be left to which later details should be submitted, so that we should expect the work to continue for several months longer, and possibly more than a year.

3. The question of obtaining competent civilians to assist in this work was taken up with Mr. House and this brought forth the fact that the funds of the Peace Commission were limited and that, therefore, all possible expenses would have to be carried by Army and Navy appropriations, and indicating that this was the reason that we had been limited up to the present to securing personnel from the A. E. F.

4. Colonel House further stated that in the beginning I had been directed to report to him personally, but that from now on as he was only one member of the Peace Commission that I should hereafter report to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, direct.

5. Our plans involve obtaining the official estimates of damages, as may be secured from the French and Belgian governments to determine whether the claims are relevant, that they have been arrived at through proper methods and unit costs, that the proper items have been considered, and to check a certain percentage of

them in detail in order to determine the probable accuracy of the results as a whole.


6. Work has already been started along these lines, and we have been engaged upon procuring the necessary preliminary information and statistics and have had several parties in the field for short periods.

7. The organization for this work is outlined roughly in organization chart below: [11a](#)

8. It will be readily apparent that this work will be very complicated, both with respect to direct and indirect damages, will require a large organization, and will take a considerable time. It is especially important that it be done well and that there be available for it a most competent personnel.

9. The Headquarters for this work will be in Paris, where probably fifty or sixty officers will be permanently stationed. Additional officers ordered here will be stationed in Paris and sent out on more or less extensive trips as necessary. As the work becomes more definitely outlined sub-offices will be established in Belgium and at other places in invaded districts, at which officers will be stationed.

10. It is apparent that the expenses for this organization will have to be borne by appropriations for the A. E. F., and your instructions are requested as to how this shall be done. At the present time we have taken over certain civilian personnel which were formerly with the Technical Board, including some French clerks and stenographers, messengers, etc., and have taken over janitors at the office at 51 and 53 Avenue Montaigne which were formerly with the Air Service. Arrangements have been made through Major Bryant, with the Engineer Purchasing Office, to make the necessary payments for the present at least. We should have, however, definite instructions regarding the employment of a limited number of civilian employees and how they should be paid. Information is also requested as to the practicability of employing a few civilian consulting engineers at rates of from five-hundred to one-thousand dollars per month.



11. Up to the present we have been able to obtain the necessary supplies through the Engineer Department and other Departments in the regular way. We are, however, unable to obtain necessary motor transportation. The demands upon the Peace Commission have been such that we have been unable to obtain from them an assignment of motor cars for this work. We need at least ten high-powered cars immediately, and in the near future will require some fifty cars, and perhaps an equal number of light trucks and motorcycles. It will readily be understood that this work would be in regions where rail transportation is not available, and the nature of the work is such as will require considerable moving around. It is assumed that this motor transportation will have to come from the Motor Transport Corps but it is requested that you give us any assistance that you possibly can in this matter.

12. With respect to personnel: Many additional officers will be required, some of whom, for the more important positions, will probably have to be asked for by name inasmuch as time is not available to obtain competent personnel in any other way. We should also have at once some twelve draftsmen, some fifteen or twenty clerk-stenographers, and a like number of messengers, motor-cycle drivers, and orderlies. Request for these officers and enlisted men will be forwarded as soon as our plans can be definitely formulated. In the meantime it is requested that necessary information be obtained so that they can be ordered here promptly upon request.

C. H. McKINSTRY

11 Copy not found in Department files.

11a Printed on p. 610 [*Pg. 610 is part of [Doc.502](#)*].

***Brigadier General C. H. McKinstry to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

PARIS , January 1, 1919.

Subject: War Damages, France and Belgium.

1. In an interview with Colonel House on December 28th, Colonel House informed me that my work, which had been started under him, before the appointment of the American Peace Commission, would hereafter be done, not under him alone, but under the Commission, and that accordingly, certain questions which I brought up at that interview, and in general all questions relating to the extent and character of the work and the means of accomplishing it, should be addressed in writing to the Commission.

2. My general instructions are contained in the following extract from letter from Colonel House:

“The President having requested me to set in motion some machinery to obtain for the use of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference some valuation of damages done by the Germans in the invaded parts of France and Belgium ...¹² I trust that you will now proceed with this work, consulting with French and Belgian officials as occasions require.”

3. In the beginning there was an expectation that an independent appraisal of damages might be made by the Americans. In my report of November 24th to Colonel House (copy herewith),¹³ I pointed out that our means of obtaining detailed information as to damages were in every way inferior to those available to the French and Belgian Governments and that any independent valuation would necessarily be entitled to less weight than would theirs.

4. For these reasons, Colonel House approved my recommendation that the estimate to be made by my organization should take the shape of a verification of the French estimate; that is, an examination of their methods, coupled with a check estimate of as great a number of individual properties as time would permit.

5. As this method could not be employed without the consent and co-operation of the French, request was made by Colonel House on the French Government for the necessary consent and assistance. A favorable reply was received in letter from the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres to Colonel House, dated December 5th, 1918 (copy herewith),¹⁴ in which it is stated that I may apply direct to the Ministre de la Reconstitution Nationale and the Ministre des Regions Liberees who will furnish me all possible information.

6. About December 5th, Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Belgium, at a meeting in London, agreed to the following resolution (among others):

“That each allied or associated government should formulate its claims for reparation due from enemy states and that these claims should subsequently be referred for examination by an Inter-Allied Commission which will be nominated when claims are ready.”

7. As the acceptance by the United States of this resolution might have affected my work, Colonel House instructed me not to apply to Ministers Le Brun and Loucheur for methods or figures until further notice. On the 28th instant this prohibition was removed, and I at once took the necessary steps to get in touch with these Ministers.

8. The Belgian Government has not yet been formally approached on the subject of a verification by us of the Belgian estimate of damage. It is suggested that the necessary request be made.

9. The damage done by the Germans in France and Belgium affects an extremely wide range of objects—railways, roads, waterways; forests, farm lands, crops, live stock; iron and steel plants; chemical plants, non-ferrous metal plants, textile plants, breweries, beet sugar

mills and many other classes of factories; public improvements, public utilities, water works, power plants; all classes of buildings; coal, iron and zinc mines, etc.; household and other personal property, works of art, etc.; requisitions of money, bank and industrial stocks and bonds, etc. The cost of rehabilitating plants, etc., will of course greatly exceed the damage done, valued as of 1914. There is also to be considered the damage caused by lost profits, losses incident to time necessary to reestablish business, lost good will, lost rents, crops and outputs of all classes, losses to dependents from the death of, or injuries to, soldiers. (See categories of damage in Mr. Cravath's "Preliminary Suggestions Regarding Indemnities.")¹⁵ Even well within the limit at which claims against the enemy states take on a punitive character, it will be difficult to discriminate between various classes of indirect damages. Many of the indirect losses are as real as are direct damages. It is presumed that the Commission will wish to have data for use in deciding which of these claims to admit and which reject. Unless advised to the contrary my organization will make an examination of the subject of indirect damages.

10. It is plain that a comprehensive study and valuation of the damages in France and Belgium will involve major questions of law, finance and economics, as well as of engineering proper. For this work I must have the best available talent in these departments, not only that our methods and results may satisfy ourselves, but may exercise due weight in any contested valuations, as against the results offered by the able men of other countries now or later engaged on the same work. While the greater part of the necessary personnel can be obtained from the A. E. F., it is obvious that the officers whom I need for the more important positions are men who by the very nature of their qualifications are needed elsewhere. It would undoubtedly help me to secure such officers promptly were the American Peace Commission to make suitable representations, by wire, to the Commander-in-Chief, American E. F. Such action is requested.

11. Certain members of the War Industries Board, now in France, have given me valuable information and advice and so long and to the extent that their assistance is available, I shall count on it. We

have established relations with the technical advisers to the Commission. In general, we have made use of every opportunity offered to obtain light on this complicated problem. But in spite of this there still exists in my organization a lack of highly trained and experienced men. There is now in France, at the invitation of the French, a commission of eminent American engineers of international reputation appointed by and representing the principal engineering societies of the United States. Any or all of these men would be of great value to my work, and I am confident that the services of some of them could be secured, I refer particularly to Mr. A. M. Hunt, Consulting Engineer, and member of the Naval Consulting Board; Mr. Lewis B. Stilwell, President of the American Institute of Consulting Engineers and Past President of the Institute of Electrical Engineers; Mr. Charles P. Main, President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and a leading designer and builder of textile mills in New England; and possibly Mr. George Fuller, an expert on city building work and water supply and sanitary construction. The services of these men could be secured at the rate of one-thousand dollars per month in each case. If the necessary funds are not available to the Peace Commission, I would recommend that authorization for their employment be obtained by wire from the Commander-in-Chief. I recommend the employment of these men, not only to insure that consideration of the subject which its importance and difficulty demand, but also to inspire confidence in other countries in the results obtained.

12. A large part of the field work of my organization will be in regions where neither rail nor other transportation is available. For the expeditious and economical performance of this field work I must have definitely placed at my disposal adequate motor transportation. I need at once ten motor cars and estimate that I shall soon need twenty more motor cars and twelve three-quarter ton trucks or ambulances, and six motor-cycles with side cars, all with "drivers. As efforts to secure this transportation have failed, it is requested that the following wire be sent to the Commander in Chief:

Telegram

C-in-C

Chaumont

_____ Ten Cadillac open cars with drivers required at once for field work in connection with estimating war damages period It is requested that these report to General McKinstry Paris period It is further requested that twenty additional cars comma twelve three quarter ton trucks or ambulances and six motorcycles with side cars comma all with drivers comma be provided upon later telegraphic request direct from General McKinstry period Please advise action taken period

House, for American Commission to Negotiate Peace

13. Referring to my general instructions (Paragraph 2 above) you will note that there is specific mention of "damages done by Germans in the invaded parts of France and Belgium." In view, however, of the note of the Secretary of State, dated November 5th,¹⁶ stating the President's agreement with the interpretation "that compensation will be made for all damage to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air," I assume that I am to make a valuation of damages, both within and without the invaded areas, except damage to ships and cargoes. I shall proceed upon this basis unless advised to the contrary. Early notice is requested in case it is desired to extend the work to other countries, such as England, Italy, and the Balkans. No preparations have as yet been made for such extension and timely advice will be necessary to avoid delays.

SUMMARY

14. (a) I am directed to proceed with an evaluation of French and Belgian war damages, reporting hereafter direct to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

(b) The work is to be performed in conjunction with the French and Belgians, and shall consist of a verification of the French and Belgian estimates. Credentials have been received from the French Minister

of Foreign Affairs which will permit me to deal direct with the French Ministers concerned.

(c) Similar diplomatic arrangements should be made with the Belgian Government.

(d) Unless advised to the contrary, I will secure and check information on indirect and consequential damages, as well as on direct material damages.

(e) It is requested that a telegram be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Chaumont, requesting him to honor requests for suitable officers for this work and setting forth the urgency of the work.

(f) It is requested that I be authorized to retain three or four civilian engineers to be paid from funds of the Peace Commission, or, if such funds are not available, that a telegram be sent to the Commander-in-Chief requesting him to authorize me to employ four civilian consulting engineers, for four months, at one-thousand dollars per month, each.

(g) Unless advised to the contrary, I will consider war damages anywhere in France and Belgium, but not damages to ships and cargoes.

(h) Timely advice is requested if my organization is to be called upon to consider damages in countries other than France and Belgium.

(i) It is requested that the telegram suggested in Paragraph 10, above, be sent in order that I may obtain motor transportation for field work.

C. H. McKINSTRY

¹² Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹³ *Ante*, p. 576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of [Doc. 489](#), [Doc. 490](#), and [Doc. 491](#)].

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of [Doc. 496](#) and [Doc. 497](#)].

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 498](#)], 586 [Pg. 586 is part of [Doc. 498](#)].

¹⁶ [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 468](#) .

Tasker H. Bliss Papers

[Document 504]

***Memorandum by General Tasker H. Bliss for the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

PARIS , January 5, 1919.

General McKinstry's letter of January 1, 1919, now before us for consideration, suggests some points for determination in addition to those noted by the Secretary of the Commission in his letter of transmittal dated January 4.^{[17](#)}

1. The Resolution adopted by the Conference in London early in December, 1918, (on which, as I understand, the United States took no affirmative action) provided

“That each Allied or Associated government should formulate its claims for reparation due from enemy states ...”.

Query: Shall or shall not the United States now formulate a claim for reparation due it from enemy states, this claim to be enforced in like manner as the similar claims of the Allied governments, or held in abeyance as an off-set against possible claims made by the latter against the United States? It might be found desirable to do this, in case a lump sum for reparation and indemnity is demanded which may have to be prorated among the claimants.

This question must be determined by the Commission before General McKinstry proceeds further with his work because

- a) if the United States is to formulate such a claim General McKinstry's work must proceed along certain lines of great detail; whereas,
- b) if we are only to check the claims of other governments, his work may proceed on simpler lines.

2. Query: Is the United States Government, explicitly or implicitly, a party to the Resolution of the London Conference of December? Was the resolution of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Belgium, adopted for the purpose of being submitted, for their subsequent adhesion, to the governments of the United States, Italy, Serbia, Greece, Roumania?

It is noted that each of them is requested to formulate its claims. It is further noted that "these claims will be referred for examination by an Inter-Allied Commission" (which excludes the United States) and that this Commission "will be nominated when claims are ready".

I believe that this Resolution grew out of the idea generally accepted by the British and French, that, if the principle of exact and detailed claims for all losses be admitted by the Peace Conference, their formulation will continue over a considerable number of years; that the Peace Conference can only establish a principle for the payment but will never know even the approximate amount; and that the enemy states will be required to sign a treaty of peace binding them to the payment of an unknown sum extending over an unknown number of years.

Of course this ex-parte Conference at London cannot bind the Peace Conference, but it suggests an attitude that may be proposed to the American delegates for their acceptance or rejection.

This raises the further query: What shall be our attitude towards possible claims the amount of which cannot be known in any reasonable life time of the Peace Conference? Shall that conference pass its powers on to a new commission of indefinite continuance with the possibility of later disputes that might require the United States to resume the war or let the claims go by default? Or shall we adopt the principle of demanding a lump sum which can be paid within a reasonable, definite time?

This question also must be settled in order to guide General McKinstry's work.

3. Query: Shall we accept the principle of claims for indirect damages? If so, shall we accept it without limitation? Shall we demand that these claims be submitted to the Peace Conference or agree to their being passed upon by a subsequent Commission of indefinite continuance?

The answer to this question imposes upon General McKinstry or relieves him from a great amount of work.

4. The United States cannot surrender to the Associated Powers the sole determination of the question of damages and indemnities, because on that question may depend the future peace. If, therefore, we pass upon the claims of Great Britain, France and Belgium, we must do so also on the claims of Italy, Serbia and all the Allied or Associated Powers.

To do this, General McKinstry's Commission must be organized on a much wider basis than now proposed and with larger expense involved.

5. The foregoing leads to this conclusion.

In the case of France, alone, there will be an immense number of individual claims—besides governmental claims—representing every individual property owner claiming damage. Each of these will be supported by a mass of documentary evidence.

If the sum total of these claims comes before the peace Conference the Americans must accept it, or reject it on the result of our investigation of each individual case; or we may accept or reject it as the result of the application of the law of averages.

I believe the former solution will be impossible, within any reasonable time limit, if the total of the claims has to be passed on by the Peace Conference.

But it seems to me possible that if, after the French Railway Claims, for example, are formulated, a group of American railway engineers could select certain type cases, make an independent investigation, and judge the approximate accuracy of the entire claim by the result

of this investigation. So with rural village and urban property. And it is perhaps possible that we may apply the average of selected type cases to indirect damages, though admittedly more difficult.

6. I think that our attitude in challenging individual claims, except for the purpose of determining an average on which to base a total, should be very guarded. I doubt if the other nations will enter such challenges. The purpose of Resolution of the London Conference for an examination of the final claims before an Inter-Allied Commission was not to scrutinize claims; but it was in the belief that the total claim would exceed any amount they could hope could be gotten out of the enemy powers and the business of the Commission would be to pro rate this amount.

TASKER H. BLISS

¹⁷ Not printed.

The Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces (McAndrews), to the Chief of Engineers, A. E. F. (Langfitt)

JANUARY 6, 1919.

Subject: Report of General McKinstry, War Damages Board, dated December 30, 1918.

1. The report from General McKinstry calls for an organization, for equipment, and authority for the expenditure of funds of the A. E. F., the furnishing of which is absolutely beyond the bounds of possibility. There is no authority for the expenditure of funds of the A. E. F. for many of the purposes stated. For instance, employment of civilian engineers, clerks, etc., and the renting of the necessary buildings to do the work that pertains wholly to that of the Peace Commission. It would seem impossible to furnish anything like the vast number of officers called for; motor transportation called for; and the clerical force, etc., desired, without seriously crippling the efficiency of the A. E. F. Apparently General McKinstry has not carefully considered the limited means at the disposal of the A. E. F., especially for the performance of work that is really beyond its scope.
2. It is the intention of the C. in C. to in every possible way aid the Peace Commission in the evaluation of war damages in France and Belgium, but the aid given must be such as is possible by using existing facilities. General McKinstry must make use of agencies already existing rather than create a vast organization which must prove wasteful of the limited resources of the A. E. F. Commanding Generals of our Armies, of the S. O. S. and of other parts of the A. E. F. will be directed to place at General McKinstry's disposal existing facilities in order that they may aid in the work desired without taking them from their present duties.

3. There are serious objections to the gathering together in Paris of the number of officers that General McKinstry suggests. Due to conditions, every effort has been made, and is being made by the Commanding General, S. O. S., and by the Commanding General, District of Paris, to reduce to the very minimum the number of American officers stationed in Paris. To add to that number 50 or 60, together with other personnel, cannot be approved, unless the very best of reasons are given as to the necessity for stationing all that personnel in Paris.

Your recommendations on this subject are desired.

JAMES W. McANDREWS

Paris Peace Conf. 185.119/39a: Telegram

[Document 506]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Secretary of State***

[PARIS ,] January 9, 1919—12 noon.

211. [From Lansing.] The Commission would be glad to receive from the Department by mail as soon as possible a statement of the claims of American Citizens against Germany. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles

OBSERVATIONS ON MEMORANDUM BY MR. CRAVATH ENTITLED,
“PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS REGARDING INDEMNITIES” [18](#)

I

While the limiting factor in the indemnity which Germany will pay will doubtless be her ability to pay in a manner satisfactory to the Allies, we must, nevertheless, not demand indemnity in this form, but present a somewhat itemized bill of damages. Mr. Cravath recognizes this, but I think in specifying the items he emphasizes too much the property losses and too little the loss of life and of labor. The character of the bill which we present to Germany will have important political consequences, and may be utilized by the laboring classes as an index of the relative importance which the several Governments attribute to vested property rights on the one hand and life and labor on the other; and, accordingly, I think that considerable prominence should be given to damage items of the latter class. Mr. Cravath, for instance, suggests that reparation can be claimed for all Allied ships and cargoes destroyed or damaged by Germany, even if in the lawful exercise of the rights of war. On the other hand, he does not feel that compensation should be made for damages suffered by civilians due to the death or incapacitation of soldiers upon whom they were dependent for support. Similarly, the memorandum contemplates compensation for damages to the property of civilians in the occupied districts, but does not contemplate compensation for loss of labor by civilians in occupied districts who were compelled to devote themselves to unremunerative tasks.

In formulating an international bill for damages we should not be too much governed by the common law principles, which give to vested

property rights a peculiar degree of protection against which our laboring classes have long complained.

II

On page 13 the memorandum¹⁹ estimates the “cash items” which the Allies could extract from Germany, were she required to give up all her resources of this kind. The estimate of German property and investments in foreign countries totals three billion dollars. I am quite convinced that this is a very great underestimate. The Bureaus of War Trade Intelligence and Enemy Trade, of the War Trade Board, have estimated such German property at six billion dollars, and the estimates of Germans themselves place the value of such property at over six billion dollars, at pre-war values.

The memorandum does not attribute any value to the German colonies as distinct from the private investments of the German government and citizens therein, stating that sovereignty over the German colonies “will probably not be looked upon as having a money value.” I am not aware that there has ever been any transfers of sovereignty except for or as a consideration, and I see no reason why a substantial value should not be attributed to the German colonies in view of the great potential resources which many of them possess.

A further conceivable cash item upon which Germany or Austria could realize would be sales of small portions of their territory to adjacent neutrals. If, for instance, all or some portion of Schleswig-Holstein is given to Denmark, there is no reason why Denmark, whose financial position is very strong, should not make a substantial payment therefor to the Allies for the account of Germany.

If my estimate of German investments abroad is correct and if other cash items of the character indicated are added, there is no reason why the cash items which may be exacted from Germany should not be doubled over the amounts recommended by Mr. Cravath on page 23.^{19a}

III

With reference to the “deferred”—distinct from the “cash”—items, it is, of course, clear that such deferred payments can only be made by Germany creating credits abroad through an excess of commodities and labor exported and services rendered over similar goods, labor or services received from abroad. This being so, the proper test of what deferred payments should be demanded lies not, in my opinion, in the ability of Germany to create such a credit balance, but in the desirability, from the point of view of the Allies, of permitting Germany so to do. Mr. Cravath leaves the question of deferred payments to be made in terms purely of dollars. It should rather be expressed in terms of the commodities which we can advantageously receive from Germany, or the labor which she can render us. When desirable imports or services are thus estimated and balanced against imports into Germany which we will desire to make, or services which we will desire to render her, the difference will be the amount we should demand as deferred payment from Germany. Once this calculation is made, it should be expressly provided that indemnity shall be paid by commodities and labor in a specified form and no other; otherwise, we will again give Germany an ascendancy in our markets which, while it will permit of the ready payment of a large indemnity, will, when the indemnity has been paid, leave her a commanding position in the trade of the world at the expense of the merchants of the Allied countries.

IV

The memorandum takes no account of the ability of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey to contribute. While the ability of these countries to make any cash payment is almost nil, their ability to make deferred payments should be very material in view of their basic economic resources. Even assuming the dismemberment of a considerable proportion of these countries, there should be left a residue capable of making substantial payments, which payments are possible of estimation.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

JANUARY 9, 1919.

¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 584 [*Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 498](#)*].

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 591 [*Pg. 591 is part of [Doc. 498](#)*], as printed in this volume.

^{19a} *Ante*, p. 600 [*Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 498](#)*].

763.72119/3416: Telegram

[Document 508]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 11, 1919—4 p.m.

186. Department informed by Brazilian Embassy that Brazilian Minister in Paris has been instructed by his Government that the following points are to be submitted directly or through the French Government at the Peace Conference:

Germany should give Brazil a formal undertaking that she disclaims property in the ships taken over by the belligerents (owners of German ships which were taken over are planning to bring judicial action for their restitution or for their indemnization).

Following indemnities should be given to Brazil by Germany:

1. For the expenses incurred by fleet in its Atlantic operations.
2. For the attendant expenses resulting from the acts of German crews.
3. For the ships taken or sunk before the declaration of war (Eight of these).
4. An indemnization for relatives of Brazilian sailors killed or wounded on board ships sunk before, as well as after the severing of relations.
5. For expenses resulting from war preparation, including refunding of 500,000 pounds paid in advance to Krupp factories.

Total amount of indemnization for navy is between 3 and 4 million pounds and for Lloyd Brasileiro is 472 thousand pounds. Other indemnizations are to be included in the gross

total of 20 million pounds sterling, which Brazil will most likely claim later.

Copy of Brazilian Embassy's note dated January 7, being sent by mail.^{[20](#)}

POLK

^{[20](#)} Not printed.

763.72113/902a: Telegram

[Document 509]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 21, 1919—7 p.m.

344. Alien Property Custodian requests following reply be sent to your telegram number 40 and dated December 21, 10:00 a.m.

“Referring to the discussions relative to the settlement of enemy debts we have been considering these questions here with the British Embassy and others. We have concluded that the method of settlement appropriate for the Allies is not appropriate for America principally because Alien Property Custodian has already collected a very large amount of enemy debts in this country. He has adopted a pre-war rate of exchange approved by the Treasury Department and has given full acquittances as authorized by Act of Congress to American debtors. Alien Property Custodian is still making such settlements and intends continuing expeditiously as authorized by Congress. The settlement of enemy debts in this country is thus an integral part of activities of Alien Property Custodian and must be disposed of as part of the general question of disposition of enemy property taken over by the Alien Property Custodian.

After consultation with the State Department, the Custodian offers the following general principles for disposing of the entire question of enemy debts and enemy property:

First, property taken by Custodian belonging to all others except nationals of Germany and Austria should be returned.

Second, moneys received by the Alien Property Custodian either from the collection of debts owed by American

nationals to German and Austrian nationals or from the sale of enemy property in this country owned by such enemy nationals, shall constitute a fund from which American claims for private debts and for private property in enemy countries shall be paid.

Third, the balance of the fund shall be available for disposition by the peace conference either by payment to respective enemy governments or settlement of obligations of enemy governments or nationals, as may be decided.

Fourth, to carry out this course Custodian would continue to collect all enemy debts in this country and to sell all enemy property reported or which should have been reported under Trading with Enemy Act including all enemy vessels taken over by Presidential order.

Fifth, claims of American nationals against German and Austrian nationals and against German government should be ascertained and finally adjudicated by State Department or an American commission appointed by President. American claimants having property in enemy country must surrender such property to enemy governments as condition of having their claim adjudicated here.

Sixth, this plan would permit American government to deal separately and finally with all property and debts within^{[21](#)} its jurisdiction and settle with all American claimants leaving enemy countries to deal with their own nationals. Enemy subjects whose property has been taken in America would have claim against their own governments therefor and enemy governments would have right to take over American property with which to pay such subjects. The balance in America would be credited to enemy government and would be disposed of as provided at peace conference. If peace conference decided balance of enemy property in America should be used to offset or pay for allied property seized by Germany and Austria, in that case enemy government would have full value to pay their subjects for all property taken here. In case enemy governments desire to utilize balance in this country in payment of other obligations such as war indemnities or Governmental purchases or obligations of any character, enemy

governments would then be obliged to exercise their own sovereign rights as against their own nationals and settle with them accordingly.

Seventh, in any case action of Custodian here can not be subject to review except by American government because Custodian as authorized by Acts of Congress has already sold many properties transferring titles to American citizens and giving acquittances for proceeds. In such action Custodian has particularly endeavored to eliminate enemy businesses improperly menacing American business or competitors. Any attempt to review action of Custodian through discussion of values received by him or rates of exchange or currency or otherwise would create interminable confusion and might result in serious claims against American government. Custodian has endeavored in every case to secure full value for German enemy property and he must not be accountable to any one except American government.

Eighth, this procedure requires careful study of detail. Custodian desires to be advised whether principles are accepted and whether details should be studied here.

Ninth, the principles herein described were submitted in writing to the President and approved by him. The President took with him Custodian's tentative plan for disposition of enemy debts and property."

From Polk for the Secretary of State.

In general Department believes that the above draft states a fair plan. Woolsey fears however that there are certain points to be covered and he is not in entire agreement with the Alien Property Custodian as to his plan. Woolsey is sick and I was unable therefore to have him confer with Palmer and submit his views.

POLK

²¹ A portion of this telegram, consisting of the rest of this sentence, the two sentences that follow, and the third sentence through the

word “allied”, was omitted from the telegram as received by the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Paris Peace Conf. 711.63113/3).

Food Relief

[\[510\] The Food Administrator \(Hoover \) to President Wilson](#)

Washington , 7 November, 1918.

103.97/837

[\[511\] President Wilson to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , 8 November, 1918.

103.97/837

[\[512\] The Special Representative \(House \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 8, 1918—9 p.m. [Received 10:16 p.m.]

840.48/2585: Telegram

[\[513\] The Swiss Minister \(Sulzer \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington , November 12, 1918.

862.48/37

[514] The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer).

Washington , November 12, 1918.

862.48/37

[515] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

Washington , November 14, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[516] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

Washington , November 14, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[517] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House).

Washington , November 18, 1918—8 p.m.

863.48/38: Telegram

[518] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 21, 1918.

862.48/48

[519] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 21, 1918.

862.48/52

[520] The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 22, 1918.

863.48/42

[521] The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State

[Jassy ,] November 23, 1918—3 p.m. [Received December 28—11 p.m.]

871.48/84: Telegram

[522] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , November 27, 1918—4 p.m.

763.72119/2765: Telegram

[523] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 27, 1918—11 p.m. [Received November 28—1:42 a.m.]

840.48/2598: Telegram

[524] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 27, 1918—6 p.m. [Received 7:17 p.m.]

840.48/2599: Telegram

[525] The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington , November 28, 1918.

862.48/58

[526] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Washington , 28 November, 1918.

840.48/2598

[527] The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

Paris , November 28, 1918(?) [Received November 30.]

840.48/2930: Telegram

[528] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 29, 1918—3 p.m.

840.48/2598: Telegram

[529] The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington , November 29, 1918—9 p.m.

863.48/42: Telegram

[530] President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Washington , 1 December, 1918.

763.72119/10067

[531] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 1, 1918—6 p.m.

840.48/2930: Telegram

[532] Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 1, 1918—6 p.m. [Received December 1—3:22 p.m.]

840.48/2607: Telegram

[533] Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 1, 1918—8 p.m. [Received 9:30 p.m.]

840.48/2606: Telegram

[534] Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 1, 1918—10 p.m. [Received December 1—8:35 p.m.]

840.48/2605: Telegram

[535] Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)

Paris , 1 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[536] Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House

London , December 4, 1918—noon.

[537] The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

Washington , December 5, 1918—7 p.m.

840.48/2608: Telegram

[538] Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House

London , 6 December, 1918—noon.

[539] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 10, 1918. [Received December 18.]

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5019/1

[540] Memorandum of a Conference on European Relief, Held in London, December 10, 1918

London, December 10, 1918

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[541] Statement Furnished by Messrs. Hoover and Davis to the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers To Consider Relief Matters, London, December 10, 1918

London, December 10, 1918

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[542] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Berne , December 11, 1918—12 noon. [Received December 12—3:15 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5019/2: Telegram

[543] Report of the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers To Consider Victualling and Supply of Allied, Neutral, and Enemy Countries

London , December 12, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[544] Memorandum by Messrs. Hoover, Davis, and Cotton

undated

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[545] The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to President Wilson

Paris , December 12, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[546] The British Ambassador to the United States (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)

13 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[547] The Secretary of the American Embassy in France (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

London , 15 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 862.5018/7

[548] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—3 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/1¹/₂: Telegram

[549] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/1: Telegram

[550] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

Paris , 16 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[551] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—11 p.m. [Received December 17—12:35
a.m.]

102.1/1521: Telegram

[552] Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—11 p.m. [Received December 17—12:33
a.m.]

102.2/1766: Telegram

[553] The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 16, 1918—midnight. [Received December 17—4:28 a.m.]

872.51/135: Telegram

[554] Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)

Paris , 16 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[555] The British Ambassador in France (Derby) to Colonel E. M. House

Paris , December 16, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[556] Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)

Paris , 17 December, 1918.

[557] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 17, 1918—7 p.m. [Received December 18—
1:25 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5010/4: Telegram

[558] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Secretary of State

Paris , December 18, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.5018/1

[559] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to Colonel E. M. House

London , 19 December, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[560] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 19, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.48/1: Telegram

[561] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , December 19, 1918—8 p.m. [Received December 20—
8:53 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 863.50/36: Telegram

[562] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 20, 1918—5 p.m.

872.51/135: Telegram

[563] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

Paris , 20 December, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[564] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Food Administrator (Rickard).

Paris , December 21, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/152g: Telegram

[565] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Chargé in Serbia (Dodge).

Paris , December 21, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/3j: Telegram

[566] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 21, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/3n: Telegram

[\[567\] The French Minister for Foreign Affairs \(Pichon \) to Colonel E. M. House](#)

[Paris ,] 23 December, 1918.

[\[568\] The Food Administrator \(Hoover \) to President Wilson](#)

Paris , 23 December, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[\[569\] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Washington , December 27, 1918—6:26 a.m. [Received December 28
—9 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/2: Telegram

[\[570\] The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace](#)

Paris , December 30, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 760f.63/1

[\[571\] The Food Administrator \(Hoover \) to the Ambassador in Italy \(Page \)](#)

Paris , December 31, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/46c: Telegram

[572] Colonel E. M. House to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)

Paris , 1 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/2a

[573] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Paris , January 1, 1919—7:30 [p.m.?)

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3a: Telegram

[574] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)

Paris , January 1, 1919—7:30 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3c: Telegram

[575] Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in France (Derby), Dated January 1, 1919

January 1, 1919

Edward M. House Papers

[576] The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to Colonel E. M. House

Paris , 1 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/2

[577] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 1, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3b: Telegram

[578] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , 2 January, 1919 [4 p.m.(?)]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/2a: Telegram

[579] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , [January 2, 1919.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/18a: Telegram

[580] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to Colonel E. M. House

Paris , 2 January, 1919.

[581] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 3, 1919—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/8a: Telegram

[582] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 4, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 5—6:50 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/7: Telegram

[583] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 4, 1919—6 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 800.51/3b: Telegram

[584] Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)

Paris , 4 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/5

[585] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 4, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 6—8:10 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[586] The French Minister of Commerce (Clémentel) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)

Paris , 4 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/6

[587] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard)

Paris , January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/84a: Telegram

[588] The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Sofia , January 4, 1919—12 p.m. [Received January 8—2:33 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 874.48/2: Telegram

[589] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard)

Paris , January 5, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/88: Telegram

[590] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Rome , January 6, 1919. [Received January 7—3:50 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/95: Telegram

[591] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 6, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/7: Telegram

[592] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 6, 1919—3 p.m.

840.48/1915b: Telegram

[593] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 6, 1919—10 p.m. [Received January 7—12 noon.]

Paris Peace Conf. 864.48/2: Telegram

[594] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss).

Washington , January 7, 1919—3 p.m. [Received January 8.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3a: Telegram

[595] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss).

Washington , January 7, 1919—5 p.m.

033.1140/119: Telegram

[596] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 7, 1919—6 p.m. [Received January 8—5 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/9: Telegram

[597] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 7, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 8—1:30 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[598] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard).

Paris , January 8, 1919—4:40 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/105a: Telegram

[599] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , 8 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/11: Telegram

[600] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 9, 1919—4 p.m. [Received January 10—9:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/12: Telegram

[601] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919—5 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/3a: Telegram

[602] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919—5 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/12a: Telegram

[603] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[604] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[605] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[606] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 9, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[607] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 11, 1919—2 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[608] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington [undated]. [Received January 12, 1919—6:30 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/15: Telegram

[609] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 12, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/15: Telegram

[610] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Rome , January 12, 1919. [Received January 13—12:20 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/163: Telegram

[611] The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to President Wilson

Paris , 13 January, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/15

[612] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Washington , January 13, 1919—7 p.m.

871.48/89: Telegram

[613] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 15, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 16—1:10 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/9: Telegram

[614] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 16, 1919—12:10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[615] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 18, 1919—8 p.m. [Received January 19—8:40 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/12: Telegram

[616] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 20, 1919—10 p.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[617] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 23, 1919—11 a.m.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/14a: Telegram

[618] The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington , January 25, 1919—5 p.m. [Received January 26—6:50 a.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/16: Telegram

103.97/837

[Document 510]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , 7 November, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Please find enclosed herewith a telegram which I am despatching to Mr. Cotton¹ in respect to the proposals for the world's food and shipping supplies to be vested in the Inter-Allied Food Council and the Inter-Allied Maritime Council.

I believe this cable is in accord with the conclusions of our conference yesterday and I am wondering if you could see your way to despatch this same telegram to Colonel House, informing him that it has been sent to Mr. Cotton by myself and that it is with your authorization and, furthermore, if you could state to Colonel House that I will be leaving within the next few days for Paris and that no arrangements looking forward to the handling of food for liberated populations should be undertaken until after my arrival and consultation with him.²

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

¹ J. P. Cotton, in London, member of the Food Administration.

² For the text of the telegram as sent, see [*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 616*](#) .

103.97/837

[Document 511]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , 8 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think the suggestions of Mr. Hoover in the enclosed,^{[3](#)} about sending a copy of the dispatch to House and stating that it was sent with my authorization and approval should be complied with, and I would be glad if you would convey our attitude in this matter to House in the sense contained in the closing lines of Hoover's letter.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{[3](#)} *Supra.*

840.48/2585: Telegram

[Document 512]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 8, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received 10:16 p.m.]

66. Secret, for the President. Probably the greatest problem which will be presented to us upon the cessation of hostilities is the furnishing of food and other essential supplies to the civilian populations of Servia, Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Belgium and Northern France. This relief work, together with the reconstruction of devastated regions, will have to be done almost entirely through American effort and with the use of American food, raw materials, and finished products. Difficult questions of priority and the allocation of tonnage will be presented. At one of the meetings of the Supreme War Council Mr. Balfour proposed that as a condition of the armistice to be offered Germany the large amount of German merchant tonnage now in German and neutral ports be handed over during the armistice for operation by the Allies and the United States under the general supervision and control of the Allied Maritime Transport Council now sitting in London. I advised that this be not made a condition of the armistice but be taken up as soon as the armistice was signed and Mr. Balfour acquiesced in this suggestion. I now advise that instead of adopting Mr. Balfour's suggestion, which presents obvious objections, that you, as soon as the armistice with Germany is signed, propose to Allies and Germany the immediate formation of the "International Relief Organization." I suggest that Hoover be placed at the head of this organization and that McCormick and Baruch be associated with him as American representatives and that two representatives each be named by England, France, Italy, and Germany. Germany should at once be asked to place at the disposal of this organization until the final peace treaty is signed the entire German merchant marine now in

German or neutral ports. The organization should then be charged with securing food and other supplies immediately required for the civilian populations of the countries above set forth and in determining the priority of the needs presented. These supplies would necessarily have to be furnished by the United States and the Allies. It should be pointed out to Germany that only in this way will it be possible for her merchant marine to be placed in service from the inception of the armistice until the final peace treaty is signed and that her willingness to enter wholeheartedly into such a scheme of relief, which would include her own civilian population, would be the best possible evidence of her desire to alleviate the sufferings caused the civilian populations of all countries by the exigencies of the war. In this way also the whole question of relief pending the signing of the final treaty of peace can be kept separate from the very keen struggle which will arise immediately following the signing of the armistice between the various belligerent nations for selfish trade advantage. It is very clear that the terms of the armistice provide that the blockade shall be continued. The impracticability of this so far as food and other essential supplies are concerned, has already become apparent. Conditions in Austria and in Bohemia are of such a character as to make relief on a large scale imperative if serious disturbances are to be averted. I should appreciate very much an expression of your views on this most urgent matter.

EDWARD HOUSE

862.48/37

[Document 513]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State [4](#)

WASHINGTON , November 12, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit the following cable:

“The German Government urgently requests the President of the United States to inform the German Chancellor Ebert, by wireless, whether he may be assured that the Government of the United States is ready to send foodstuffs without delay if public order is maintained in Germany and an equitable distribution of food is guaranteed.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

[4](#) This paper bears the notation: “Handed me by Swiss Min. Nov. 12/18 R. L.”

862.48/37

[Document 514]

The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)

WASHINGTON , November 12, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, transmitting to the President the text of a cable inquiring whether this Government is ready to send foodstuffs into Germany without delay if public order is maintained in Germany and an equitable distribution of food is guaranteed.

I should be grateful if you would transmit the following reply to the German Government:

“At a joint session of the two houses of Congress on November 11th, the President of the United States announced that the representatives of the associated governments in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives; and that steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. Furthermore, the President expressed the opinion that by the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand.

“Accordingly the President now directs me to state that he is ready to consider favorably the supplying of foodstuffs to Germany and to take up the matter immediately with the

Allied Governments, provided he can be assured that public order is being and will continue to be maintained in Germany, and that an equitable distribution of food can be clearly guaranteed.”

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Document 515]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , November 14, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The general food situation in Europe looms more strongly hour by hour through the various reports and telegrams that we are receiving.

In accordance with the arrangements made with your approval, the War Department is to give us shipping for 140,000 or 150,000 tons at once which foodstuffs they will advance to carry into French stocks or southern European ports for re-distribution on methods that may be determined on my arrival.

In addition to this, and in view of the serious situation in Northern Europe, I am—in accordance with our discussions of yesterday—instructing the Grain Corporation to purchase and ship to English ports for re-direction, another 125,000 to 140,000 tons of food to be used, probably in Northern Europe. We can finance this through the Grain Corporation up to the point of sale.

The ability to perform the measure will depend of course on our ability to secure the shipping. Mr. Hurley is making arrangements to divert to us if possible some boats outside of the Army programme but if this should fail I am anxious that the Army should make other sacrifices of its munitions programme to enable this to be carried out at once. I am confident that if we can have started to Europe 350,000 to 400,000 tons of food for these special purposes within the next ten or fifteen days and I can inform the various governments—especially some of the Northern Neutrals—of positive arrivals that will be placed at their disposal, it would enable them to increase rations from their present stocks and probably keep their boats from rocking.

I have had an opportunity this morning to discuss with a group of Senators the question of the provision of an appropriation for working capital to cover these operations. Some of them, especially Senators Pittman and Kellogg, are prepared to place themselves at your disposal, to forward any appropriation for this purpose. On the other hand, I find that amongst some of them bitterness is so great that they would raise strong opposition to raising an appropriation that they thought might be used for feeding Germany. I do believe that appropriation of a revolving fund could be obtained for providing food to the liberated peoples and neutrals and that it might be well to limit this legislation to these purposes; because through such agencies as the Army and the Grain Corporation, with perhaps your Presidential fund, we could probably manage to handle the German problem in itself.

While it should be clear in such appropriation that it is not a gift, but to provide a revolving fund to enable us to carry on relief commerce, it should have a special provision that the foodstuffs may be used for philanthropic purposes if necessary, for the populations of Belgium and Serbia.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Document 516]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON , November 14, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herewith copy of the cablegram which I have dispatched to Mr. Cotton in accordance with your suggestion.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Representative of the United States Food Administration (Cotton)

With regard to various telegrams yourself and Cravath on relief to areas lately under German control. On further consultation with President, he authorized the following further statement to be made to our officials in Europe for their guidance but not for communication and asks that a copy should be sent to Colonel House and Cravath.

Statement begins: We consider ourselves as trustees of our surplus production of all kinds for the benefit of the most necessitous and the most deserving. We feel that we must ourselves execute this trusteeship, that we are not unmindful of the obligation which we have to the sustenance of those who have fought with us against Germany and that, together with the necessities of those populations released from the

German yoke, we feel that they may well deserve a priority in our distribution. On the other hand we cannot undertake any cooperative arrangements that look to the control of our exports after peace and, furthermore and equally important, that the Inter-Allied councils hitherto set up in Europe were entirely for the purpose of guiding Inter-Allied relations during the period of the war and that any extension of their functions either by way of their control of our relations to other nations or the extension of their present functions beyond peace cannot be entertained by us. All relationship involving the use of American food or credit for the people of other nations than the Allies themselves must await Mr. Hoover's arrival in Europe so far as any such supplies or interest of the United States is concerned in which we will coordinate in every proper way. (End of statement.)

You can inform Sir Worthington Evans⁵ that the form of organization involving coordination of the United States Government for distributing its food commodities arising in the United States through the various parts of Europe lately under German subjection can only be settled upon my arrival, that the United States Food Administration is taking steps to at once largely increase the volume of American food stores at various points in Europe in order that the material may be available, and that we have every desire for proper coordination of all efforts.

HERBERT HOOVER

⁵ British Minister of Blockade.

863.48/38: Telegram

[Document 517]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)⁶***

WASHINGTON , November 18, 1918—8 p.m.

45. Department has received the following cablegram through the Swedish Legation from the Government of Austria:

“The city of Vienna is threatened with a coal famine. If shipments of coal do not arrive within 15 days the lighting of the city will have to be stopped. The consequences to public order and safety of persons and property would be deplorable. There is coal in the coal fields of Bohemia and Moravia. The Allied Powers and United States of America are asked to intervene in order that regular and sufficient shipments be sent on to Vienna.”

LANSING

⁶ This same message was sent to the Ambassador in France in Department’s telegram No. 6353, Nov. 20, 1918, 4 p.m., with the addition of the following paragraph: “After conferring with Colonel House, you will take such steps with the Czecho-Slovak National Council as may seem to you desirable, cabling Department action taken.”

862.48/48

[Document 518]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to transmit to your Excellency, upon the request of the Government of German Austria, the following cable communication:

“As a result of the orders issued by the National Council of the Czecho-Slovak State, prohibiting the transit of German coal from Upper Silesia, and of brown coal from Northwestern Bohemia, as well as shipments of gas coal and cokes from the Ostrau-Karwin regions, the coal situation in the German Austrian mountain states, including Lower Austria, and especially in the city of Vienna has become extremely critical. Coal for heating purposes is no longer available. The supplies of coal and wood required for cooking purposes will last one week at the utmost. The flour mills and bakeries will have to close in a few days. There are no supplies to keep up the railroad service. The Gas Works and Electric Power Stations in Vienna will, by observing the most rigid economy, be able to remain in operation for another two to three weeks. In other cities the Gas Works have already been compelled to shut down.

The closing of the Gas Works and of the Electric Power Stations in Vienna will not only deprive the city of the lighting service, but will, at the same time, necessitate the suspension of work in hundreds of industrial concerns and establishments engaged in the production of provisions for the population. Hundred thousands of workmen will be thrown out of work, and the population will be face to face

with misery and starvation, even if the promised food supplies should arrive in time.

The desperate situation of the population would create dangerous social and political disturbances. The Government of German Austria, in accordance with the desire expressed by the Government of the United States and the Allies, is taking all possible measures to maintain internal order and peace, and to prevent a catastrophe. In the interest of humanity it begs to submit to the United States and Allied Governments the instant and earnest request that these governments will bring their influence to bear upon the National Council of the Czecho-Slovak State with a view to obtain permission for the exportation of coal from Ostrau and the furnishing of the necessary means of transportation, as well as for the transit, without restrictions, of other kinds of coal. Special importance is attached to shipments of coal from Ostrau in consideration of the fact that the Gas Works of the city of Vienna cannot be adapted to burn another kind of coal, and that the large stocks of gas coal in the coal mines of Ostrau would permit immediate and sufficient relief.

At the same time, the German Austrian National Council solicits the assistance of the United States and Allied Governments for the improvement of the conditions of transportation, the rolling stock available being quite insufficient to meet the demand. The minimum monthly requirements amount to 25,000 carloads of coal from Ostrau for the operation of the Gas Works and Railroads and 1000 carloads of cokes for the Railroad repair shops. In addition permission should be granted for the transit of 75,000 carloads of brown and hard coal a month, destined for cooking and heating purposes, for the maintenance of establishments engaged in the production of provisions for the population and of Electric Power Stations, as well as for the most urgent requirements of the industry.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

862.48/52

[Document 519]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State [7](#)

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the following cable communication from the German Government to the President of the United States:[8](#)

“President Wilson
Washington

The armistice terms dispel the prospect of an early home coming for the German prisoners of war and interned civilians. Notwithstanding the big hearted offer of food relief, famine remains a danger in Germany and traffic congestion is unavoidable so that provisions cannot be shipped from home as heretofore. The quickest action on a large scale from neutral and heretofore enemy countries alone can save the German prisoners of war and interned civilians from want, disease and despair.

The German Government has approached the Y. M. C. A. of New York with a view to the immediate organization of thorough relief from the United States and begs your personal support of this labor of love. It is especially important to let the American Commissariat immediately place at our disposal, subject to later accounting, the food stuffs, linen, boots, coats, etc. out of the stocks stored in France.

Hundreds of thousands of German prisoners of war and interned civilians and their kin would thank you from their hearts for this humane help in their dire need.

German Government.”

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

7 Forwarded to Colonel House as Department’s telegram No. 173,
Dec. 11, 1918, 7 p.m.

8 The following is a translation of the German text quoted by the
Minister.

863.48/42

[Document 520]

The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State [9](#)

WASHINGTON , November 22, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Baron Sonnino has cabled me that the Spanish Ambassador at Rome has handed him a memorandum stating that Austria-Hungary is completely lacking in clothing, linen, thread, sanitary material and drugs. The lack of linen and thread makes it impossible to prepare white clothing and bandages for the sick and newly born, while the lack of clothing in general will be bitterly felt by all the population during the winter.

The memorandum continues with a request that the Allies and the United States remove the restrictions against neutral commerce and that first of all they inform Switzerland that the above mentioned articles may be exported into Austria-Hungary and stating the conditions under which such an export would be authorized. A special office at Bern could be empowered to determine in regard to the quantities to be exported.

While stating that, on his part, Baron Sonnino has nothing to say against authorizing the requested export, provided the necessary precautions and guarantees are furnished, he adds that from the Swiss Legation the Italian Government has been informed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna suggests that the diplomatic missions of the Entente at Bern be authorized to establish direct relations with the Austria-Hungarian Legation there for the purpose of handling all the questions pertaining to the provisioning of Austria and all matters of an economic character, as the solution of all these questions is of European interest.

Baron Sonnino concludes his communication by saying that he would very much appreciate knowing the opinion of the United States Government on these two requests, and I should be very grateful if you would kindly let me know.

Accept [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

⁹ Transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in the Department's telegram No. 59, Dec. 19, 1918, 8 p.m., p. 679 [*Pg. 679 includes portions of [Doc. 560](#), [Doc. 561](#), and [Doc. 562](#)*].

871.48/84: Telegram

[Document 521]

***The Minister in Roumania (Vopicka) to the
Secretary of State***

[JASSY ,] November 23, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received December 28—11 p.m.]

150. I have just received communication from Roumanian War Department that unless they immediately receive wheat they will be unable to maintain their army. Radio announces today that a large transport of wheat has left America for Europe. Could not the Department arrange that part of this wheat be at once sent to Roumania where it is absolutely necessary.

VOPICKA

763.72119/2765: Telegram

[Document 522]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
(Sharp)***

WASHINGTON , November 27, 1918—4 p.m.

6450. Department assumes that you and Colonel House will bring to Mr. Hoover's attention all correspondence and material which will be of interest to him in connection with the problem which he has in hand. This applies particularly to copies of communications from other allies regarding questions in connection with armistice. It is assumed that Mr. Hoover will convey his views to the representatives of the interested countries at Paris or elsewhere. On the other hand Department is communicating to Mr. Hoover's office copies of all pertinent correspondence for record in his Washington office. Representations of Serbians and Montenegrins for food supplies have become pressing. Department assumes Mr. Hoover is in consultation with Serbian and Montenegrin representatives on this subject.

LANSING

840.48/2598: Telegram

[Document 523]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 27, 1918—11 p.m.

[Received November 28—1:42 a.m.]

188. Secret for the President. Hoover arrived in Paris Tuesday morning. I am advised of and in agreement with his plans. They are in general as stated in my telegram number 66,¹⁰ which you approved by an exchange of notes,¹¹ such alterations having been incorporated therein to meet the Allied desire for coordination of action and our policy of maintaining independence of American action. The chief problem presented is the difficulty of devising a plan which will not antagonize the Allies and particularly Great Britain and at the same time permit single American leadership in relief to the civilian populations of Europe. I am sure you will agree that American leadership is essential taking into account the fact that we are the most disinterested nation and the other Allies are affected by local political interests. Further, the supplies to be used for this purpose must in the main be obtained in the United States and will dominate American market. As I have previously advised you, George has asked Clemenceau, Orlando and myself to come to London on December 1st for a meeting of the Supreme War Council. I replied that while I hoped to be able to be present it would depend on my doctor's decision. I think it wise, for reasons other than presented by my physical condition, not to go to London for this conference. The matters which Hoover and I have discussed will not permit of delay in reaching a decision and accordingly I suggest that the views of the United States Government be presented in writing to the three Prime Ministers at their meeting in London. I suggest that you send me a cable instructing me to present to the Supreme War Council the following plan:

“Sirs:

1. I have given much thought to the formulation of the most practicable means of carrying into effect the resolution presented by Colonel House at the last meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to the effect that the Supreme War Council, in a spirit of humanity, desired to cooperate in making available, as far as possible, supplies necessary for the relief of the civilian population of the European countries affected by the war.
- [2.] In considering this matter, I have had constantly in mind the urgent necessity of the case and the fact that it is essential in the working out of relief of this character on a large scale, that there be a unity of direction similar in character to that which has proved so successful under French and British chief command in the operations of the Allies on the land and on sea, respectively. I suggest that the Supreme War Council proceed along the following lines:
- [3.] In order to secure effective administration, there should be created a Director General of Relief whose field of activities will cover not only enemy populations but also the whole of the populations liberated from enemy yoke and the neutrals contiguous to these territories.
- [4.] It is obvious that present Inter-Allied administrative arrangements cover the Allied countries themselves, and if the whole of the world food supplies could be made available through sufficient shipping, there appears to be sufficiency over and above Allied necessities to take effective care of these other populations, provided that these supplies are administered with care, with economy, and with single direction.
- [5.] The one essential to this plan, in order that all world supplies may be brought into play, is that enemy tonnage shall be brought into service at the earliest possible moment. It would appear to me entirely just that the enemy's shipping, in consideration of relief of enemy territory, should be placed in the general food service of all of the populations released from the enemy yoke as well as enemy territory.

6. I have carefully considered the suggestion made by Mr. Balfour to the Supreme War Council at the same time the terms of armistice to be offered the enemy were under discussion to the effect that the enemy should be required to place under the operation and control of the Allied Maritime Transport Council the enemy mercantile fleet in enemy and neutral ports. It appears to me that in practice there would be many embarrassments presented by this plan, and that the principle should be maintained that this fleet be used as to its carrying capacity for purposes of relief and be under the direction of the Director General of Relief. In order to secure its adequate operation, the Director General should assign appropriate portions of this tonnage, first, for operation individually by Italy, France and Belgium sufficient to transport the relief to actually liberated nationals of these nations. The administration of relief in the three above instances would then naturally fall entirely under the three Governments mentioned, and would not further interest the Director General of Relief. Second, the remainder of enemy tonnage, or such part of it as is necessary should be placed under the operation of the British Ministry of Shipping and the United States Shipping Board in equal portions. These two would be agreeing with the Director General of Relief to deliver in either case cargo equal to the carrying capacity of these two fleets from such sources to such destinations as the Director General of Relief may direct in supplying the balance of populations to be relieved. Under this plan it does not follow that enemy shipping would be employed directly in the transportation of this cargo but that equivalent cargo should be delivered. This enables the use of enemy passenger tonnage in the transportation of the United States or British armies homeward, the respective shipping boards giving an equivalent in cargo delivery to the Director General of Relief. This arrangement would in effect end [add] materially to the volume of the world's shipping and release tonnage for the particular purpose of the individual countries.

7. In the operation of the Director General of Relief, he will, of course, purchase and sell food stuffs to enemy populations and therefore not require financial assistance in this particular further than working capital. In the relief of newly liberated peoples such as Belgium, Poland, Servia including Jugo-Slavia and Bohemia, it will no doubt be necessary to provide temporary advances from the Associated Governments to these revived nationalities with which they can purchase supplies from the Director General, such arrangements to be worked out by the Associated treaties [*Governments?*]. In some cases, public charity may have to be made use of[?].
8. In the Director General's dealings with neutrals, they of course would provide their own shipping and financial resources and probably some tonnage and food either directly or indirectly for the purpose of the Director General, they acting under his direction and authorization as to supplies and sources thereof. The Director General, of course, acting in these matters in cooperation with the blockade authorities of the Allies and the United States.
9. It is obvious that it is only the surplus food supply of the world beyond the necessities of the Allies that is [available] to the Director General.
10. In order to prevent profiteering the Director General must make his purchases directly from the respective Food Administrations of the Associated Governments where his supplies arise from their territories, and when purchasing in neutral markets he should act in cooperation with the established Inter-Allied agencies.
11. It is evident that after the Allies have supplied themselves from their own territories at home and abroad and the balance from other sources, the only effective source of surplus supplies available for relief lies to a minor extent in the Argentine but to a vast preponderance in the United States. The Director General will have a large command of American resources and markets and will require the undivided support thereon in saving and productive activities.

Owing to the political necessity of American control over American resources and the greater coordination and efficiency to be obtained thereby, I am sure that you will agree with me that the office of Director General of Relief must be held initially by the United States Food Administrator and in case of necessity by such a successor as may be nominated by me. I would suggest, however, that the policies [of] the Director General should be determined by the Supreme War Council to whom he should report, it being our united policies in these matters not only to save life but also to stabilize Governments.

All these arrangements to be for the period of emergency and it is highly desirable for them to be liquidated as fast as practicable.

It is exceedingly important that I have your advices concerning this matter at the earliest possible moment.”

EDWARD HOUSE

¹⁰ Dated Nov. 8, 1918, 9 p.m., p. 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 512](#)].

¹¹ Notes not found in Department files. In Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 238, instead of the words “by an exchange of notes” appear the words “in principle.”

840.48/2599: Telegram

[Document 524]

***The Special Representative (House) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 27, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received 7:17 p.m.]

189. For the President. Referring to my cable 188.¹² I have been informed by Davis of the Treasury Department of certain of the financial aspects of this matter. Some of the French officials have expressed a willingness and desire that France should participate with the United States and England in financing the relief convention [*contemplated*]. I understand that the British Treasury has expressed a willingness to participate to the extent of the supplies and services furnished from the British Empire for this relief but nevertheless Davis thinks they would probably be willing to participate equally with France and the United States irrespective of the origin of relief furnished. In view of the fact that we will furnish the major portion of supplies for relief, I had thought it advisable for us to finance such purchases if necessary to the extent of purchases in the United States in order to maintain full directions over our resources so furnished, but if we can obtain this and at the same time a financial subvention from England and France as above indicated, it seems to me that we should do so and I should like to know what your views are in this, and Davis, who is representing our Treasury here in these matters, would like to know McAdoo's views as approved by you for his guidance in operation with the British and French Treasuries. As to France, it is most probable that we would have to advance to them their share of the purchases made in the United States for relief purposes but that as a matter of pride and politics solely [they?] want to participate. It seems that any relief to Poland and Jugo-Slavia furnished by us would have to be financed from your funds. I am informed by Hoover that preliminary discussions with French food officials indicate their support of plan

outlined in my 188, but that discussions with British authorities indicate possible opposition owing to their desire to effectually dominate by stipulating that all operations shall be carried out through Inter-Allied Food and Maritime Councils which are under effective English control. Discussion between Davis, Hoover and British Treasury officials, however, indicates their full approval of our plan.

EDWARD HOUSE

¹² *Supra.*

862.48/58

[Document 525]

The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , November 28, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency the following two communications from the German Government, received by the Legation late last night.^{[13](#)}

1. "The German Government and the German people have thankfully heard that the President of the United States is disposed to take into favorable consideration the question of shipping food products to Germany. But quick action is most imperative. The acceptance of the hard terms of the armistice, and in particular the necessity of providing for the food of the returning army out of our scanty stores, the stagnation of ocean traffic in the North and Baltic Seas through the continuation of the blockade, the danger to our supplies from the unsettled conditions in the East, all this makes our situation daily more unbearable. The danger of anarchy can only be averted by the speediest grant of relief. I, therefore believe that my appeal to the President's humane sentiments will not be in vain, if I lay before him an entreaty to save the German people from destruction by starvation and anarchy in sending as soon as possible to The Hague or any other place plenipotentiaries who would there discuss with plenipotentiaries of the German people the details of the plan for the timely saving of our Fatherland through the magnanimous help of America. The matter might perhaps be put in the tried hands of Mr. Hoover who has rendered grand service in Belgium.

Solf,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”

2. “The stream of troops returning from the West justifies a fear that in the very near future Berlin and the other large cities of Germany will be cut off from the food supplies of the interior.

We therefore in deepest concern repeat our prayer of yesterday not to delay for a moment the meeting, at the earliest date, of the conference proposed by us at The Hague for which city representatives will leave at once. We further earnestly beg the President of the United States to agree to the instant departure for America of a German Commission which would personally present a statement of the conditions in this country to the Government of that country and endeavor to pave the way for the purchase of the most needed foodstuffs.

We indulge the sanguine hope that the humane sentiment of the American people will not defeat any possible effort to save thousands of women and children from starvation.

Solf,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”

I beg leave to inform your Excellency that the above quoted messages are a repetition of the original communications of the German Government, transmitted to me by my Government on November 16th, which, however, failed to reach me.

Accept [etc.]

HANS SULZER

¹³ The following is a translation of the German texts quoted by the Minister; these documents were also received in the Department by wireless from Nauen, Germany, Nov. 15, 1918.

840.48/2598

[Document 526]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , 28 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you not be kind enough (unless you know some reason to the contrary) to send House word at once that he may propose the plan here set forth^{[14](#)} (I presume it will not be necessary to repeat the text to him), stating that we understand that Hoover agrees?

Faithfully Yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

^{[14](#)} See telegram No. 188, Nov. 27, 1918, 11 p.m., from Colonel House, p. 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of [Doc. 521](#), [Doc. 522](#), and [Doc. 523](#)].

840.48/2930: Telegram

[Document 527]

The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , November 28, 1918(?)
[Received November 30.]

Hurley No. 2. Secret for the President. Pending recovery, House, who is improving but not yet able to give personal attention to Allied plans for world's food control, feels I should inform you directly that shipping features in plans for Inter-Allied Director General of Relief, cabled yesterday,¹⁵ were not submitted to me and have not received my approval. My belief is that minor modifications British plans conflicts with your general policy and should be held in abeyance until you have opportunity to outline your program for League of Nations. Feeling in London is that this emergency plan for food control which [sic] is similar to British plan for removing chief incentives for League of Nations. British are willing to give us title of Directorship, but American Director would be under control and report to Inter-Allied War Council. In line with your instructions I have informed Reading that we cannot enter into agreement to yield control of my [our?] ships. Procedure outlined in cable signed House yesterday amounts to surrender control our ships to foreign bodies, to which I believe you are properly and unalterably opposed. Further, the plans would permit available funds of ships carrying our foodstuffs to be wasted through inefficient ... control and management. We are rendering as much service in this manner as we have controlled ships for lifting cargoes required to be furnished by us. We should have unequivocally the temporary use of all enemy passenger steamers for the return of our troops, also cargo ships in enemy ports to lift all relief supplies controlled by us, but plans outlined to you yesterday would divide this tonnage without slightest hope of supplement from British tonnage for this imperative movement of troops. Believe present situation which British would

like to cure with Committee and Director, is complete justification of League of Nations in that it amounts to the disregarding of small nations' rights and yet concedes concerted action is necessary. For any Director General of Relief to control our shipping under European domination as proposed would tie our hands and would be first step to similar control raw materials. Matters can certainly wait until you arrive as in any [case] ships in enemy ports will require shipments for repairs and commissioning. In conference with French and British I will make no concessions without instructions from you.

HURLEY

¹⁵ See telegram No. 188, Nov. 27, 1918, 11 p.m., from Colonel House, p. 636 [*Pg. 636 includes portions of [Doc. 521](#), [Doc. 522](#), and [Doc. 523](#)*].

840.48/2598: Telegram

[Document 528]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 29, 1918—3 p.m.

90. Your No. 188.^{[16](#)} On the assumption that Mr. Hoover agrees, the President authorizes you to propose the plan set forth.

LANSING

^{[16](#)} Ante, p. 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of [Doc. 521](#), [Doc. 522](#), and [Doc. 523](#)].

863.48/42: Telegram

[Document 529]

***The Secretary of State to the Special Representative
(House)***

WASHINGTON , November 29, 1918—9 p.m.

99. For attention Colonel House and Hoover. Following received from Italian Ambassador:

“With reference to the part of my letter to the Secretary of State concerning a memorandum handed to Baron Sonnino, as regards a lack of clothing, linen, etc., in Austria-Hungary,¹⁷ I beg to inform you that Baron Sonnino has communicated to the Swiss Legation that the Royal Italian Government cannot admit of any direct relation between the Italian and the Austro-Hungarian Legations at Berne and that the question of feeding Austria-Hungary can be handled through the Swiss Government.

Inasmuch as concerns particular decisions to be taken in the matter of the most urgent supplies, Baron Sonnino thinks that these questions be decided upon in what regards Austria-Hungary, at Zurich, in what regards Germany, at Paris and in what regards Turkey and Bulgaria, at London. It is understood, however, that in each of these centers the cooperation of all the Allies and of the United States will be naturally considered indispensable.

While bringing what precedes to your knowledge, I beg to ask that you will be so kind as to let me know what is the thought of the American Government on this subject. Macchi di Cellere.”

To this the Department has replied that Mr. Hoover is authorized to take charge of all such matter[s] on behalf of this Government.

LANSING

¹⁷ See the Italian Ambassador's note of Nov. 22, 1918, p. 635 [*Pg. 635 includes portions of [Doc. 520](#) and [Doc. 521](#)*].

763.72119/10067

[Document 530]

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON , 1 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Hurley is quite right in what he says and advises in this message.^{[18](#)} I am sorry to say that I did not see what was involved with regard to our shipping in the plan House sent us about the food administration and which we approved. Will you not be kind enough to have a message sent to Hurley this evening (so that he may receive it early to-morrow morning) expressing my agreement with him in this particular and asking him to confer with and explain to Mr. House, saying that this was an aspect of the arrangement which I had not taken in?

Faithfully Yours,

W[OODROW] W[ILSON]

^{[18](#)} Mr. Hurley's telegram No. 2, for the President, received Nov. 30, 1918, p. 642 [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 527](#)].

840.48/2930: Telegram

[Document 531]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
(Sharp)***

WASHINGTON , December 1, 1918—6 p.m.

6482. For Hurley. Your number 2. President agrees with your position and asks that you confer immediately with Colonel House explaining to him that the aspect stated in your telegram was one which the President had not taken into account in assenting to House's suggested communication to the Supreme War Council.

For the Ambassador. Please advise Colonel House of foregoing as soon as possible.

LANSING

840.48/2607: Telegram

[Document 532]

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 1, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received December 1—3:22 p.m.]

210. Hoover has asked me to send the following message to the Food Administration:

“Please see Secretary Baker and inform him that it will be some days before international agreement will be reached in organization of food matters. Meanwhile the situation demands the continuous despatch of foodstuffs so that we can act, as we are still unable to make detailed arrangements for resale of food from army stocks, and I do not want to delay movement and discharge of steamers. There are now some points, such as Trieste, where food will be wanted in any event. I, therefore, would like for the present to order nearby steamers to Trieste and would like A. E. F. to receive and hold these stocks until Inter-Allied matters settled. If, for any reason, feeding of Austria should not proceed, the Italian Food Administration will agree to take over the stocks. I would like him to instruct the A. E. F. to act on this line and cooperate with me therein. Hoover.”

EDWARD HOUSE

840.48/2606: Telegram

[Document 533]

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 1, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received 9:30 p.m.]

213. For the President. Your number 90, November 29, 3 p.m., which refers to my number 188. After my number 188 had been despatched, it was found that mistake had been made in respect to proposed disposition of enemy passenger ships. Accordingly, Hoover and I, after learning of Hurley's cable to you, had conference with Hurley and explained that feature of food relief plan dividing passenger tonnage with Great Britain was error. This feature has now been eliminated from plan. We feel as he does that enemy passenger tonnage should be available for return of American troops. Hurley asks me to say to you that "Assuming now that you desire early action without awaiting for announcement of League of Nations program he gives his approval to plan, the error having been corrected." Pursuant to the authorization contained in your number 90, I shall propose the plan, but instead of directing this communication to the Supreme War Council, I shall embody it in a formal communication to Mr. Balfour, Monsieur Pichon and Baron Sonnino requesting them to bring it to the attention of their respective Governments. I believe that in this way rather than by presentation to the Prime Ministers collectively at their meeting in London, favorable action can be secured.

EDWARD HOUSE

840.48/2605: Telegram

[Document 534]

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 1, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received December 1—8:35 p.m.]

214. For the President from Hoover.

“In order to give a working capital to the relief, we consider it will be necessary to set up some agreement of Treasury participation and possibly request Congressional appropriation. In the meantime, that we may proceed in urgent matters, I am anxious to know if you could appropriate to this purpose 5 million dollars from your Presidential fund. I could later supplement this by dividends to you from Sugar Equalization Board and might avoid appropriations and consequent discussions altogether. Would it be possible to settle this before your departure. Hoover.”

Please transmit paraphrase to Food Administration for attention Rickard with the following message:

“I have sent foregoing message to the President. Would you follow it up? Hoover.”

EDWARD HOUSE

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 535]

***Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)***¹⁹

PARIS , 1 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. BALFOUR: The President has requested me to communicate to you for the consideration of your government the following memorandum containing his views respecting the general question of furnishing relief to the civilian population of the European countries affected by the war:

“I have given much thought to the formulation of the most practicable means of carrying into effect the resolution presented by Colonel House at the last meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to the effect that the Supreme War Council in a spirit of humanity desired to cooperate in making available, as far as possible, supplies necessary for the relief of the civilian populations of the European countries affected by the War.

“In considering this matter, I have had consequently [*constantly*] in mind the urgent necessity of the case and the fact that it is essential in the working out of relief of this character on a large scale, that there be a unity of direction similar in character to that which has proved so successful under French and British Chief Command in the operations of the Allies on the land and on sea respectively. I suggest that this Supreme War Council proceed along the following lines:

“In order to secure effective administration there should be created a Director General of Relief whose field of activities will cover not only enemy populations but also the whole of

the populations liberated from enemy yoke and the neutrals contiguous to these territories.

“It is obvious that present interallied administrative arrangements cover the Allied countries themselves and if the whole of the world’s food supplies could be made available through sufficient shipping, there appears to be sufficiency to take effective care of these other populations provided that these supplies are administrated with care, with economy, and with single direction.

“The one essential to this plan in order that all world supplies may be brought into play is that enemy tonnage shall be brought into service at the earliest possible moment. It would appear to me entirely just that the enemy shipping in consideration of relief of enemy territory should be placed in the General Food Service of all the populations released from the enemy yoke as well as enemy territory.

“I have carefully considered the suggestion made by Mr. Balfour to the Supreme War Council at the time the terms of armistice to be offered the enemy were under discussion to the effect that the enemy should be required to place under the operation and control of the Allied Maritime Transport Council the enemy mercantile fleet in enemy and neutral ports. It appears to me that in practice there would be many embarrassments presented by this plan and that the principle should be maintained that this fleet be used as to its carrying capacity for purposes of relief and be under the direction of the Director General of Relief. In order to secure its adequate operation, the Director General should assign appropriate portions of this tonnage, first for operations individually by Italy, France, and Belgium sufficient to transport the relief to actually liberated nationals of these nations. The administration of relief in the three above instances would then naturally fall entirely under the three Governments mentioned, and would not further interest the Director General of Relief. Second: The remainder of enemy cargo tonnage or such part of it as is necessary should be placed

under the operation of the British Ministry of Shipping and the United States Shipping Board in equal portions. These two institutions agreeing with the Director General of Relief to deliver a quantity of cargo equal to the carrying capacity of these two fleets from such sources to such destinations as the Director of Relief may direct in supplying the balance of populations to be relieved. Third: The passenger tonnage or so much of it as may be required by the United States Shipping Board should be assigned to them, they giving the equivalent cargo capacity delivery to the Director General of Relief. Under this plan it does not follow that enemy shipping would be employed directly in the transportation of this cargo but that equivalent cargo should be delivered. This plan enables the use of enemy passenger tonnage in the transportation of the United States Armies homeward. This arrangement would in effect add materially to the volume of the world's shipping and release tonnage for the particular purposes of the individual countries.

“In the operations of the Director General of Relief, he would of course purchase and sell foodstuffs to enemy populations and therefore not require financial assistance in this particular further than working capital. In the relief of newly liberated peoples such as Belgium, Poland, Servia (including Jugo-Slavia) and Bohemia, it will no doubt be necessary to provide temporary advances from the Associated Governments to these recuperating nationalities with which they can purchase supplies from the Director General, such arrangements to be worked out by the Associated Treasuries. In some cases public charity may have to be mobilized.

“In the Director General's dealings with neutrals they of course would provide their own shipping and financial resources, and probably some tonnage and food, either directly or indirectly for the purposes of the Director General, they acting under his direction and authorization as to supplies and sources thereof. The Director General, of course, acting in these matters in cooperation with the blockade authorities of the Allies and the United States.

“In order to prevent profiteering the Director General must make his purchases directly from the respective food administrations of the Associated Governments where his supplies arise from their territories, and where purchasing in neutral markets he should act in cooperation with the established Inter-Allied agencies.

“It is evident that after the Allies have supplied themselves from their own territories at home and abroad and the balance from other sources, the only effective source of surplus supplies available for relief lie to a minor extent in the Argentine but to a vast preponderance in the United States. The Director General will have a large command of American resources and markets and will require the individual support of the American people in saving and productive activities.

“Owing to the political necessity of American control over American resources and the greater coordination and efficiency to be obtained thereby, I am sure that you will agree with me that the office of Director General of Belief must be held initially by the United States Food Administrator and in case of necessity by such a successor as may be nominated by me. I would suggest, however, that the policies of the Director General should be determined by the Supreme War Council, to whom he should report, it being our united policies in these matters not only to save life but also to stabilize governments.

“All those arrangements to be for the period of emergency and it is highly desirable for them to be liquidated as fast as practicable.”

I shall be grateful to you if you will advise me as soon as practicable the views of the British Government concerning this matter.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

¹⁹ Similar communications were apparently sent on the same date to M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino. See penultimate sentence of telegram No. 213, Dec. 1, 1918, from Colonel House to the Secretary of State, p. 645 [*Pg. 645 includes portions of [Doc. 533](#) and [Doc. 534](#)*]; also the fourth paragraph of letter of Dec. 17, 1918, from Colonel House to the British Ambassador in France, p. 674 [*Pg. 674 includes portions of [Doc. 555](#) and [Doc. 556](#)*].

[Document 536]

Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House [20](#)

LONDON , December 4, 1918—noon.

I am informed that at yesterday's meeting of Premiers note of President regarding relief^{[21](#)} was referred to a committee names of whom I do not know and that this means postponement of question until President's arrival.

[D. H. MILLER]

^{[20](#)} This telegram is reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. I, p. 30.

^{[21](#)} See *supra*.

840.48/2608: Telegram

[Document 537]

***The Acting Secretary of State to Colonel E. M.
House***

WASHINGTON , December 5, 1918—7 p.m.

127. [From President Wilson.] Please let Mr. Hoover know that, very much to my regret, I fear that the terms of the appropriation for National Security and Defence would not justify my making the allotment to which he refers. Woodrow Wilson.^{[22](#)}

POLK

^{[22](#)} See Colonel House's telegram No. 214, Dec. 1, 1918, 10 p.m., p. 645 [Pg. 645 includes portions of [Doc. 533](#) and [Doc. 534](#)].

Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House [23](#)

LONDON , 6 December, 1918—noon.

Davis says that Hoover and Hurley are now in accord on questions of relief and further that at conference with Reading yesterday Reading agreed in principle to the administration of relief by Hoover but thinks that policies should be determined by committee of four Powers and not by War Council as he thinks latter is not effectively organized for such purpose. Davis says British will not finance one-third of relief. Davis is about to discuss the subject with French and Italian representatives.

[D. H. MILLER]

[23](#) This telegram is reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. 1, p. 36.

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5019/1

[Document 539]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

No. 10

BERNE , December 10, 1918.
[Received December 18.]

SIRS: With reference to previous communications regarding the shortage of coal in Austria generally and in the city of Vienna in particular, I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of a communication from Baron Slatin enclosing a telegram which he has received from German Austria signed by the Lord Mayor of Vienna and Mr. Bauer, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This telegram implores Baron Slatin to intervene with the American and British Legations in Berne in order that pressure may be brought on the Czecho-Slovak Government to allow coal to be forwarded to Vienna. This telegram adds that the shortage is no longer a question of days but of hours; the population of a city of two million people cannot starve and freeze in darkness; order cannot be kept in Vienna under such conditions and food will hold out until the end of this month.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

***Memorandum of a Conference on European Relief,
Held in London, December 10, 1918***

London, December 10, 1918

Memorandum of a Conference held in London on December 10th at which were present Lord Reading, Sir Joseph Maclay, M. Clementel, M. Boret, and M. Crespi, being a Committee appointed by the Allied Premiers to discuss with Messrs. Hoover and Hurley the proposals of the President relative to European Relief. Mr. Hurley being absent, was represented by Mr. Norman Davis, who also represented the U. S. Treasury, and Mr. J. P. Cotton was present, at the invitation of Mr. Hoover.

After several previous meetings for discussion of the President's proposals, this final meeting took place on December 10th, at which were present the above-mentioned gentlemen.

After considerable discussion, and after Messrs. Reading, Clementel, and Crespi had presented the views of their respective Governments, Mr. Hoover, on behalf of the American Members, stated that according to their understanding, the views were not far apart and that the President's plan was accepted in principle, with the exception that a Council with ministerial powers should be set up to perform the functions suggested in the President's plan, for the Supreme War Council, to determine broad policies in connection with the Relief Problem in Europe. Mr. Hoover also explained that it had never been the contention of the United States that the Relief should be solely an undertaking by the American Government, as evidenced by the President's proposal.

The Allied Representatives assented to this interpretation, but as nothing specific had been stated regarding that portion of the

proposal relating to the use of German tonnage (although, as above indicated, it was indirectly accepted) Mr. Hoover, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, called attention to the President's proposal regarding the handling of shipping, and specifically mentioned that it was the understanding of the American Representatives that the whole of the President's views regarding shipping were accepted, and that the only question in relation thereto was the method of approaching the German[s] on the problem. It was agreed that such approach should be made through the Armistice Authorities, with the object, if necessary, of embodying this in a renewal of the Armistice.

Lord Reading specifically abandoned the notion, which he had advanced at previous meetings, that an Allied administrative Board should be created around the Director General of Relief, and it was finally proposed by the American Representatives that the Allied Representatives should draw up a memorandum, for submission to the War Council, expressing agreement with the President's plan in principle, and embodying the exception above mentioned, they stating that, although they had no authority to accept any alteration in the President's plan, yet they believed there would be no objection to the proposals as above indicated.

A discussion took place as to the details of administration which the Director General of Relief would erect, and Mr. Hoover outlined the method of a determination of need, taking up existing bodies, plus other bodies which he would create for the purpose of advising the newly erected Council, and that through this expression of need sufficient co-ordination could be obtained as between Allied and Relief supplies.

At previous meetings, M. Clementel had proposed the erection of a complete economic Council controlling all raw material, finance, transportation, and food, and in the discussion at the meeting above referred to, in answer to a specific question, he stated that he moderated his proposals entirely to the problem of dealing with Food as an emergency measure for the period of the Armistice. M. Clementel emphasized the necessity for consolidation of Relief with other European Food problems, and the necessity of this newly

erected body supervising all European food, including that of the Allies, to which Mr. Hoover represented that it was, from an American point of view, wholly impossible, and submitted a memorandum indicating the domestic reasons in the United States why this was not feasible.^{[25](#)} Mr. Hoover also submitted a memorandum embracing the views of the American Representatives as to the internal organization of the Directorate General of Relief, embodying the views expressed at the meeting.^{[26](#)}

^{[25](#)} Apparently the first five paragraphs of the statement *infra*.

^{[26](#)} Apparently the latter portion of the statement *infra*, beginning with paragraph “The logical development ...”, p. 653 [*Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 541*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 541]

***Statement Furnished by Messrs. Hoover and Davis
to the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers
To Consider Relief Matters, London, December 10,
1918***

London, December 10, 1918

In consideration of suggestions made by the U. S. in connection with relief, it may be helpful to state and understand some of the difficulties in the relation of the U. S. to the task in hand.

The Armistice and the sequent liberation of considerable shipping will open to the Allies the Chief food markets of the southern hemisphere and thus automatically create a larger surplus during the next eight months from the U. S. than would have been the case with continued war. This surplus, however, will be entirely deficient in providing for the larger number of mouths now proposed to feed unless rationing can be continued by the American people on a voluntary basis and any other basis than voluntary action could not be forced upon the American people under Armistice or Peace conditions except under an appeal for high humanitarian service. It must be obvious that the continued provision of such services through voluntary action can only be obtained by American officials and in the belief that these savings are being devoted to purely humanitarian purposes through the administration of their own agents.

The American people, far removed as they are from the seat of action, necessarily believe that the trade restrictions which have been imposed by the Government will be quickly removed and control of price of export foodstuffs which exists today will be felt more and more onerous as time goes on. The pressure of various trades for freedom of action is already being felt to a marked degree and any indication that the price control and distribution of American

foodstuffs was carried out by agencies over which their government did not have absolute control would break down the whole basis of American systems under these policies. The Allied Buying Agencies in the U. S. are already subject to suspicion, not because of any failure of proper action but simply because of the large volume of their transactions and to extend these Buying Agencies to a practical purchasing of the entire surplus of the U. S. would raise an amount of opposition that would break all hope of price restraint. Furthermore, any attempt to use these agencies to control the direct trading between the U. S. and neutrals (with agreed restrictions regarding re-export) would be the death-[knell of such associations.]^{[27](#)}

It should be possible on the background of the necessities of starving people to maintain through the agency of solely American Government Officials who are responsible to their own people, a background of high sentiment upon which a reasonable and proper control can be built. The American people have given ample evidence of their repugnance against profiteering but any action on their part must be voluntary and not compulsory by virtue of the control of foreign buying agencies.

A third matter of great importance lies in the fact that there is a strong tendency on the part of the American people to return to their instinctive desire for separation from European entanglements beyond cooperation with their associates in winding up the war. It is manifest that the American people must be impressed constantly with their national duty in participation in the helping of the Allied and other countries of Europe from the effects of the war. There is no way through which the national conscience can be so awakened and retained constantly upon this problem as through their participation in a matter which so strikes national imagination and that is that by self-denial on their part that they should be providing food stuffs for millions of people in Europe.

The logical development of the organization of relief to liberated neutrals and enemy populations, as proposed by the President, would be as follows:

The Director General of Relief would departmentalize his organization into Purchase, Transportation, Finance, Statistic, Alimentation, etc.

Purchases in countries of Associated Governments would be made from or through the Governmental agencies in such countries and in neutral countries through or in co-operation with established interallied agencies.

Transportation would likewise be secured from the Associated Governments or, in the case of the chartering of neutral shipping, it would be through established Allied Agencies, or in the case of enemy shipping, operated by various governments in accord with the President's proposal.

In finance, neutral countries and Germany must pay in acceptable exchange, some sections of Austria and certain liberated populations probably likewise. This portion of the problem becomes one of working capital which the Director General can probably solve without call upon the European Allies. Certain liberated populations must be financed by advances contributed, presumably by the Associated Governments. Necessarily, accountability for ail operations would be organized under the Finance Department.

Statistics on world supplies and world needs must be organized in close cooperation with agencies of the Associated Governments in determination of available resources.

A Department of Alimentation with competent investigators into the needs of populations relieved would need to be maintained.

In order to maintain intimate contact with the various Food Ministries, Foreign Offices, Blockade, Munitions, and Military Controls of the Associated Governments, and the Inter-Allied Committees on Food Transport, Purchase, Blockade, etc., a series of liaison officers would need to be set up by the Director General between himself and staff and these agencies.

It may be found advisable to maintain a Director of Relief in some of the countries relieved, to attend to Administrative matters, acting in accord with the representatives in those countries of the Associated Governments, in the same manner as the Director General accords with the Supreme War Council or with such delegated body as may be agreed in the broad policies as suggested by the President.

As distribution must be carried out through Governments or Municipalities the Administrative staffs in various countries would be very small.

All staff and personnel would be chosen and retained on the grounds of personal fitness and loyalty to the organization, without regard to nationality.

²⁷ Bracketed phrase supplied from copy filed under Paris Peace Conf. 862.5018/7.

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5019/2: Telegram

[Document 542]

***The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

BERNE , December 11, 1918—12 noon.
[Received December 12—3:15 p.m.]

15. Following is the substance of a communication which I have received from the Swiss Political Department:^{[27a](#)}

The authorities of the neutral diplomatic missions at Vienna in a conference have decided that the neutral governments be requested to call to the attention of the Associated Governments the disastrous situation in which at present Vienna finds itself regarding the coal supply. Through both measures of restriction gas and electric plants will be unable to continue functioning more than 2 weeks longer.

Passenger traffic must be suspended in 1 week and freight traffic in 2 weeks. Coal distribution for purposes of heating has been completely stopped. If Vienna must remain without heat or light grave disorders will certainly follow. It is feared that there will be tremendous infant mortality. In consequence therefore the Associated Governments are entreated by all the neutral diplomats residing in Vienna to take steps with the government of the Czecho-Slovaks in order to liberate coal for Vienna.

STOVALL

^{[27a](#)} This communication was forwarded by the Swiss Government as intermediary only.

Report of the Committee Appointed by the Allied Premiers To Consider Victualling and Supply of Allied, Neutral, and Enemy Countries

At the Allied Conference in London on December 3rd the British, French and Italian Governments remitted to M. Clementel, M. Bouisson, Lord Beading, Sir Joseph Maclay, Signor Crespi and Signor Villa, with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hurley if available, the examination of the question of the victualling and supply of Allied, Neutral and Enemy countries, in its economic, financial and other aspects as well as the connected question of the handing over to the Allies of enemy merchant ships, with a view to the preparation of a full report for the consideration of the four Governments.

(2) In pursuance of this resolution the representatives named in the foregoing paragraph of the British, French, Italian and United States Governments (with the exception of M. Bouisson whose place was taken by M. Boret, and of Signor Villa) have met and examined with the greatest care President Wilson's memorandum which was transmitted to the respective governments by Colonel House.^{[27b](#)}

Before considering the memorandum in detail, the representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments desire to state that they are in complete accord with the expressed wish of the Government of the United States that the populations of Neutral countries and even of enemy countries shall not have to endure unnecessary privation and danger of famine.

The Allied Governments are anxious to maintain in its integrity the principle of cooperation with the United States Government which has hitherto regulated the action they have taken in common. They most earnestly wish to associate themselves, so far as their resources enable them, with the organization and general policy of supply which the United States Government has proposed to them for the

freed territories and neutral and enemy countries, and they have reason to believe that, after arranging for the needs of the invaded regions and the allied countries, the exportable surplus will prove sufficient to meet the needs of neutral and of enemy countries in addition.

There are, however, certain general principles which must govern the supply of food and which may be stated as follows:—

- (a) It is important to avoid the establishment of two parallel and independent organizations, one supplying the needs of the Allies and the other the needs of the liberated peoples, neutrals and enemies. If the associated Governments were to establish such parallel and independent organizations they might give the enemy the impression that the unanimity of view which has marked inter-allied organizations during the War has undergone a change which the enemy might think he could exploit.
- (b) It is equally important that this impression of close unanimity and association should be maintained in each of the associated countries throughout the period when peace negotiations will be taking place and when the unanimity of national feeling ought to be a guarantee of united action.
- (c) It is also important that the peoples who have benefited by a relief in which all the associated countries take part should not consider it as furnished by the United States Government contrary to the intentions of the Allied Governments, who would thus appear to be solely responsible for a policy of prolonging the blockade.

The proposed organization for the relief of the liberated, neutral and enemy countries should be conceived in such a way that during the specially troubled period through which we are passing, it will be a means of safeguarding and organizing peoples menaced by social disruption. The supplies which are allocated to them ought to appear to them as the first beneficent application of the great principles which govern the policies of the associated Governments.

It is in the light of the foregoing principles, which are in agreement with those expressed by the President of the United States, that the Allied Governments have examined the proposal that he has

submitted to them and have elaborated it with a view to united action.

(3) A Council should be formed composed of two representatives of each Government, either Ministers or representatives armed with Ministerial powers.

(4) The Council to be set up under the foregoing proposal would:

(a) consider and determine questions of general policy, and arrange the general programme.

(b) consider and determine the need for importation or relief in the various countries, taking into account the exportable surplus of food available.

(c) consider and determine the Governments or bodies to which allocations of food shall be made in any case.

(d) consider and determine the use of stocks of food held by the enemy in neutral countries.

(e) lay down generally the principles on which the administration of relief should proceed.

(5) To enable them to carry out the foregoing duties the Council shall receive reports from the existing Inter-Allied organizations of the Allied programmes and of their execution. These programmes shall not be reduced for the purpose of supplying Neutrals and enemies. The execution of the Allied programmes shall continue to be carried on as in the past without any change by the existing organizations.

The Council shall receive from the Allied Blockade Committee proposed allocations for the supply of each of the Neutral Countries. It shall receive from the Neutral Countries their proposals as to the countries of origin from which they desire to receive their allocation.

(6) The Council shall if necessary determine by Inter-Allied experts appointed by it the needs, internal supplies, means of distribution, in short, the food position of the liberated and enemy countries.

(7) The council shall establish an Inter-Allied staff to gather information on questions needing decision. The staff shall supply the

necessary statistics and transmit the instructions of the Council to the different organizations concerned.

(8) The Council shall decide the allocations to be made to each of the liberated, Neutral or enemy countries, by countries or origin where there is a surplus at disposal after provision for the Allied needs as determined by the existing Inter-Allied Committees.

FINANCE

Enemy Countries

It would fall to the Council to consider the various financial problems involved. It was stated by the United States representatives that as regards products from the United States there would probably be no difficulty in the United States finding the necessary working capital. It is clear, however, that having regard to the other very large financial claims upon enemy countries, political questions will arise in relation to the payment for food supplied to enemy populations.

Neutrals

As regards Neutrals no difficulty need be anticipated as to payment. Generally speaking the Neutrals have an abundance of gold and credits. Indeed from the point of view of the Exchanges it would appear to be rather an advantage than a burden to supply them with food.

Liberated Countries

There remains the question of the supply of food to liberated peoples who are not able to pay. This question with other financial problems involved will have to be considered by the Council in conjunction with the Treasuries of the associated Governments.

The Council shall determine the compensations to be obtained from Neutrals or enemies, whether in credits or in materials, and shall propose their distribution amongst the four associated countries in proportions to be determined.

ADMINISTRATION

It is most important that the European Allies shall not appear to stand aloof from the work of relieving distress in Europe. This, however, would be the consequence if the administration of relief should be solely by the United States and not by the United States and the Allies jointly. The answer that there will be an Allied Council laying down the principles of relief does not meet the difficulty as the suffering populations would know nothing of the existence of the Allied Council and would think that the Allies had refused to co-operate in relieving their suffering populations. This aspect of the matter is of special importance, to the European Allies, France and Italy more particularly, who are contiguous to the distressed populations in Europe, and therefore the work of relief should be recognized everywhere as being joint in character.

There was general agreement on these views among members of the Committee.

With these considerations in mind and having regard to the high degree of confidence placed by the Allied Governments in the United States Food Administrator, the British, French and Italian Governments recommend that the present United States Food Administrator should act as a mandatory of the Allied and United States Governments in the actual administration of relief in accordance with the Council's directions, so that it may be shown to the relieved populations that the Allies and the United States are engaged jointly in the assistance given.

A representative of Great Britain, France and Italy, respectively, shall be appointed who shall be kept informed by the United States Food Administrator of the progressive execution of the relief programmes for each country.

The supplies of food allocated to liberated peoples and to neutral or enemy countries shall be placed upon arrival for disposal as directed by the Council. The distributions shall be watched by a representative of the United States Food Administrator as mandatory of the Allies and he shall maintain communication with

the diplomatic or official representatives in those countries of the Allied Governments, and keep them fully informed.

ENEMY TONNAGE

The necessity of bringing all enemy ocean-going tonnage into operation at the earliest moment was emphasized at the Conference and the members of the Committee were in general agreement upon this point. It was suggested that the most expeditious method of obtaining the German tonnage would probably be to convey a message to the enemy through the Armistice Committee or Marshal Foch. The suggestion was accepted and, in order to save time, steps shall be taken to bring the matter to the notice of the proper authorities.

It will be the duty of the proposed Council to lay down the principles on which enemy tonnage should be employed.

(12) All decisions of the Council are subject in the last resort to the approval of the respective Governments represented thereon, each Government retaining the final right to withhold assent.

N. B. It is understood that this Memorandum is subject to modification and revision after examination with experts. In any event it is merely intended as a report to the respective Governments.

LONDON , December 12, 1918.

27b *Ante*, p. 646 [*Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 535](#)*].

***Memorandum by Messrs. Hoover, Davis, and
Cotton*** 28

undated

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE PLANS OF PRESIDENT WILSON AND
THE PLANS OF THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES

The memoranda of the 12th of December, being a report to the Prime Ministers of England, France and Italy, is, of course, not intended as a reply to the President's proposal and is merely a recommendation to these members of the Supreme War Council for consideration at some future meeting. The recommendations contained therein differ from the President's proposal in very essential matters.

The President's plan contemplates a single-headed administration of relief and a confinement of scope of relief to the immediate problem during armistice so that human life may be saved and anarchy prevented without other objective, the cooperative relations of the United States to the Allies being preserved in the manner heretofore followed in such relations.

The Allied plan contemplates the widest control of the world's food and its use in political and economic objectives.

- (I) In more detail, the President's proposal embraced the following essential principles:
- (a) The sole object of relief should be humanity. It should have no political objective or other aim than the maintenance of life and order.
 - (b) It contemplates the feeding of neutral, liberated, and enemy territories as a special undertaking, to be administered as a relief measure and only for the period of the armistice.

- (c) The political issues involved therein to be subject to the Supreme War Council.
- (d) The independent control by the United States of its surplus food under the direction of the United States Food Administrator working in cooperation with the existing technical organizations.
- (e) The absolute necessity of single-headed administration stated as a fundamental requisite for efficiency, emphatically necessary in this emergency situation.
- (f) The principle that all enemy shipping should be used during the armistice for relief of the liberated and enemy peoples, either directly or through substitution, without commitment as to ultimate disposal.
- (g) The requisite and logical financial provisions to be determined by the joint Treasuries.

II. The Allied proposals amount to:

- (a) A complete world control of food by an inter-allied body, not limited to the armistice, and which involves a much broader control than has ever yet been granted to any inter-allied body. In any single matter, action would be possible only by unanimity of agreement or alternatively by total abandonment of inter-allied action.
- (b) Through control of "source", quantity and distribution to all European countries there would in effect be a total control of the world's markets, including the U. S.
- (c) The natural executive or administrative relations are minimised. Instead of confining the functions of the proposed Council or Board to the maintenance of associated co-operation and to the determination of broad legislative policies for the guidance of the United States Administrative official, it is proposed that this legislative board assume most important executive functions.
- (d) The principle that enemy tonnage is to be used for relief purposes is not accepted.
- (e) No definite proposal is made for finance, and the impression is conveyed that objection will be found to the cash payment by enemy for food. In fact, in various discussions, Allied representatives have called attention to the fact that payment in

cash or in exchange would result in depletion of German assets as against indemnities.

(f) The plan outlined would subordinate and jeopardise prevention of starvation until complete agreement of all four governments on every point—political, financial, transportation, and source of supply, instead of mere agreement on general policy as proposed by the President.

III. We are in entire agreement with the Allies in the assumption that it is necessary to preserve a unity of action against the enemy. This does not, however, apply in the same degree to liberated territories and to neutrals. In the discussion, we have at all times conceded this principle and have gone so far as to suggest that not only should the general associated action and policy be determined by the Supreme War Council or some body to be set up for the determination of such questions, but also that inter-allied commissions should be established in enemy territory in order to preserve even the appearance of complete unity of action. Our view has been that if a small Council or Board were set up for the sole purpose of determining the policy of relief to enemy territory and its conduct to liberated and neutral countries (with its functions limited to determination in advance of general policy) it would answer every legitimate criticism in this regard. The notion that such a council should dominate practically all supplies and distribution in the world is to our mind wholly unnecessary, as the Allied programs are already determined and under execution, and the relief body would deal entirely with the surplus not required by the Allies. There is, therefore, no conflict of interest which would subject the Allies to competition, and no real ground for criticism of the proposal of a separate body to deal solely with relief. Moreover, the emergency would mostly be over before such a grand world control could function. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the American people would consent to such a domination of her markets and trade by a body not responsible to their own government. Nor is it probable that the necessary voluntary support could be obtained in the procuring of supplies.

IV. There can be no question that there are situations in Europe requiring attention within days, perhaps within hours, and to obtain, with the political currents now flowing, inter-Allied agreement, in the sense expressed in this memorandum, on

complex problems of organization, etc., with the rapidity necessary to prevent starvation and anarchy, will be entirely hopeless.

V. This document is a memorandum of recommendation, and apparently cannot be acted upon until a meeting of the Supreme War Council, not now in session. In the meantime, there are certain situations, particularly in Vienna, German-Austria, Serbia, and other localities, where immediate action is required or starvation and a total abyss of anarchy will supervene. Our thought is, therefore, that rather than to attempt an immediate solution of these points of entire difference in fundamental principle, the President should propose that the American Government will take action independently to remedy these critical situations by furnishing such supplies as may be available and suggest to the Allies that they cooperate and take similar action. This will give ample time for consideration and development of common view.

²⁸ This statement as to the authorship of the memorandum is based upon a notation accompanying another copy of the memorandum filed under Paris Peace Conf. 862.5018/7.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Document 545]

The Chairman of the United States Shipping Board (Hurley) to President Wilson

PARIS , December 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I went into the various conferences with Mr. Hoover and the British, French and Italian representatives with reference to the shipping phases of the program for emergency control and distribution of food, but I found that it was not necessary to disclose my own anxiety for a postponement until your arrival. The British themselves felt that the plan proposed would create the impression among the peoples to be relieved that the Allies were holding aloof from relief work; that the American Food Administrator alone was feeding the liberated peoples and the enemy countries. Lord Beading argued that while Hoover should be at the head of the organization, the work should be carried on in the name of all the associated governments. Minister Clementel, of France, felt that the whole question should be held in abeyance until your arrival. Both the British and the French will submit their proposed modifications in writing.

In line with my cablegram to you,^{[29](#)} I have been convinced that no great harm will come from this relatively slight delay. Hoover has informed me that there is already in existence an agreement under which the neutrals are being supplied with food. There are some urgent services to be performed, but in working out the plan for general relief I felt that it would be a tactical error for any concessions to be made to the British and French except by you personally. In shipping as well as in food I have believed that concessions can and probably should be made, but that if these concessions were made before your arrival the larger solutions you have in mind would be more difficult.

In all the conferences I have had on this side, I have been impressed with the fact that it is not the League of Nations, nor an International Court, nor even the Freedom of the Seas that is feared by Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, Orlando or their associates. What they are thinking about, as you are probably already aware, is the increased power of our shipping, commerce and finance. In every conversation the commercial question has come to the front. France fears that she will not be able to get the raw materials she needs at the same price as other nations; Great Britain fears that we will have a bigger merchant marine than she will be able to build, and that our government will operate it, regardless of cost, so that we can capture the best markets in the world.

Sir Joseph Maclay, Shipping Comptroller of Great Britain; Lord Reading, and their chief shipping expert, Mr. Salter, all have told me with considerable feeling that they are planning to turn their ships back to private operation at the earliest possible date. They indicated, in feeling me out, that they presumed we would do the same thing. I gave them no reassurances whatever. I felt that it might be well for them to entertain their fears until you find it advantageous to state your position.

In the same manner, Clementel, Minister of Commerce and Transportation of France, formally proposed to me that we provide France with 800,000 tons of shipping in the next three years. Fearing that Great Britain and the United States will dominate the shipping of the world, the French are frantically anxious to have a merchant marine of 6,000,000 tons by the end of 1921. They had 2,000,000 tons before the war. They want to treble their pre-war tonnage. They point out that Great Britain has charged them exorbitant freight rates. They have placed an order for 500,000 tons of ships with England. It would be to our advantage to build them 800,000 tons, but they would regard it as a distinct concession. I have indicated to them my doubt about the feasibility of the project. My reason for this was that I felt that this, as well as all other concessions, should be reserved for you to make yourself.

The French want to be sure they will obtain their raw materials at the same price other nations receive theirs. They feel that domination of

shipping by the United States and Great Britain means domination of freight rates and, consequently, control of raw materials. The Italians are already trying to protect themselves by passing bills to establish government monopolies over various commodities. Both the British and the French are talking of nationalizing their oil, and other commodities, in order to make their markets as exclusive as possible.

Somewhere, in your larger plans, it may be possible for you to deal with these tendencies in such a way as to provide the reassurance of fair-play. Equalization of conditions on the seas, commercially, may be possible. Certainly I am convinced that it will be helpful if you can get what is in the back of the minds of the men who express any fear of the League of Nations. None of the European nations want another war. They are aware that if another conflict should come more thrones, and more governments would crash to the ground. They know, moreover, that their peoples will rally to the support of any proposal that you make, with a view to preventing future wars.

If there is any way in which the general principles you have in mind could be applied immediately to the relief problem in Europe, it would go a long way towards getting the League of Nations into practical operation and would shorten the period of abstract discussion. To a certain extent the various councils of the associated governments have illustrated the practicability of a League of Nations, but these councils have been exclusive. It may be possible to make some adaptation or extension of the idea immediately. If this could be done, it would be at once reported to the world that the League of Nations is already under way. It would be possible then to build around the nucleus thus provided.

Our shipbuilding capacity, which had not been exhausted by any means when the war ended, makes it possible for us to build ships for any nation in the world, and I think that you will find it advantageous, in your conferences, to recall that our present law prevents foreigners from placing orders with our yards without the government's consent.

I am convinced that the principles you have applied to American business are adaptable to the international situation. The European nations are really suffering from an attack of “nerves.” They have had a bad night, and the morning finds them depressed and worried. The British Navy was built largely to protect its merchant marine. The British are fearful that under a League of Nations the United States, with its present wealth and commercial power, may get the jump on the markets of the world.

If it can be made clear to them that the essence of the League of Nations is international fair-play, that membership in the League is dependent upon square-dealing, and that a nation becoming a member of it would not be able to put into effect retroactive and confiscatory legislation against foreign interests, as Mexico did to England’s disadvantage and our own, I am convinced that whatever opposition there may be will be swept aside.

I realize that your plans may contemplate only the discussion of the larger principles, but I am convinced that whatever commercial concessions or assurances are to be made should come directly from you, with a clear understanding that they do come from you, so that your larger task may be made easier. If either I or any of your lieutenants should make these concessions, the British and French and Italians would be quick to think that it is easier to deal with us than to deal with you. Your own influence, which has been the greatest asset of the whole world in this war of humanity, should not be frittered away by segregated groups.

At the first convenient opportunity I would like to present the shipping phases of the matter to you in greater detail. At any moment now I can arrange for sufficient tonnage for the return of our army, but Pershing tells me the effort to retain our troops here is very strong. Personally, I feel that we should get the larger portion of the troops back as soon as possible.

Faithfully yours,

EDWARD N. HURLEY

29 *Ante*, p. 642 [*Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 527](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 546]

The British Ambassador to the United States (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)

13 DECEMBER, 1918.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: As soon as you have had time to consider the document I sent to you through the good offices of M. Clementel,^{[30](#)} I should like to know whether you accept its terms or in what respects you disagree with it.

After you left we devoted ourselves to putting the result of our deliberations into formal shape and trust that the outcome will meet with your approval. Of course I bear in mind that when you left no document had been prepared and that in so far as you expressed assent it was in a conversation which was not as precise as in a document.

Until I hear from you I fear no progress can be made.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

^{[30](#)} See the report of the committee appointed by the Allied Premiers to consider victualling and supply of allied, neutral, and enemy countries, p. 654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of [Doc. 542](#) and [Doc. 543](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 862.5018/7

[Document 547]

The Secretary of the American Embassy in France (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , 15 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Hoover has asked me to send you herewith a dossier of memoranda and correspondence in regard to the proposed plan for the Relief of Europe.^{[31](#)}

As Mr. Hoover is to submit these documents to the President this evening, he is anxious that they should be laid before you as soon as possible.

Very respectfully,

HUGH GIBSON

^{[31](#)} Dossier included the letter of Dec. 1, 1918, from Colonel House to Mr. Balfour; the memorandum of the conference held in London, Dec. 10; the statement submitted to the conference by Messrs. Hoover and Davis, Dec. 10; the report of the committee appointed by the Allied Premiers, dated Dec. 12; and the undated memorandum by Messrs. Hoover, Davis, and Cotton; pp. 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 535](#)], 649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of [Doc. 537](#), [Doc. 538](#), [Doc. 539](#), and [Doc. 540](#)], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of [Doc. 540](#) and [Doc. 541](#)], 654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of [Doc. 542](#) and [Doc. 543](#)], and 658 [Pg. 658 includes portions of [Doc. 543](#) and [Doc. 544](#)], respectively.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/1¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 548]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 16, 1918—3 a.m.

6321. From Hoover to Rickard, Food Administration. 1234. We view with great alarm any demoralization of organization pending our ability to get settlements here. If we succeed in setting up European Relief Administration with approval of all Allies we should be able to convert major effort of the Food Administration under this title with abundant psychology and sympathy. It would appeal to us that it is desirable to withdraw marginal or price restrictions in every case where there will not be a reaction and county organizations are no doubt losing their vigor in enforcements; can you not throw greater responsibility on State and national inspection. We realize that it is desirable to reduce expenses all along the line. It appears at this distance that it should be accomplished step by step such as the withdrawal of millfeed regulations and therefore of all mill restriction except a percentage return on milling which competition will practically enforce; that meagre reports might be required which demand little enforcement so long as price changes do not disclose indications of profiteering and to remove every restriction that can be done without publicly advertising the abdication of the Food Administration. Such action would have the most unfavorable effect over the entire world and particularly here as it would indicate that the US does not propose to carry its share of the impending famine. You can make up statement in my name to the general effect that the world food situation can only be solved to next harvest through the continued support of the American people and that all Europe is today in the throes of readjustment from war; that there are millions of liberated mouths to feed and as soon as we can get organization of transport and finance for these people America's burden will become

more specific. In the meantime every atom undrawn from the national larder today will save some one next spring.

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/1: Telegram

[Document 549]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 16, 1918—10 p.m.

6317. From Hoover for Rickard. Food Administration. 1235. For the Board. The exact situation here is as follows: The establishment of a Director General of Relief occupying position like that of Marshal Foch in relation to the Supreme War Council was formally proposed by the President to the Allies; that he should have handed over to him all enemy shipping to be employed not merely in some degree for the enemy populations but to carry all relief of liberated European peoples. Objecting to this plan, various European Governments are trying to substitute Inter-Allied world control of food, which plan cannot have our acquiescence since it carries with it the transfer of American producers to the hands of an organization in which we have only one-fourth voice. It is a further consideration of ours that we would not be able to call upon the support and imagination of the people of America back of such a board. Political factors of deep meaning are also involved, conflicting with our national ideals. Our progress has not yet been appreciable after 2 weeks of negotiation in the hope of a solution. Meanwhile, the Jugo-Slavian, Servian and South European situations have become so acute that on the instructions of the President, given yesterday, (concerning which I will wire you in greater detail tomorrow) we are embarking on emergency relief that is independent of Allied cooperation, but at the same time we are requesting them to join with us. The real food situation in Europe is this: the German people are evidently better fed, because of the relaxing of Government restraints, than they were prior to the Armistice, but they are fast eating into their supplies. Their problem, in any event, does not become acute for 2 or 3 months. A question of hours rather than days, is the critical state of affairs in German Austria. Concerning

Servia and Jugo-Slavia the same can be said. Help by April or May will be needed by Bulgaria and Roumania. Acute situations obtain in Poland, parts of Turkey, also Baltic states and Finland, with Russia practically beyond help. My statement before leaving still applies to the world situation which is no different. As to conservation, while we need it, we experience great difficulties in locating enough transportation to care for our excess fat products during the major hog run. There are not enough fat supplies in the world to take care of European situations, but the markets will be broken now by the making of a definite call for conservation in fats. About February and from then on, the actual call for conservation in fats must come. In the complexity of these negotiations, it is hard for us to advise you from day to day, and until we have come to the milestones of conclusions it would but create confusion in your minds. For Northern France and Belgium we will not need charity with the exception of what incidentals may flow without effort. If we do not succeed on finance of such areas as the West and South of Europe, the Baltic States and Poland, a large appeal to the people of America for charitable assistance might have to be made by us. By means of governmental help, we are striving our utmost towards the solution of the problem. In general, great problems in the world's food supply will confront us before the next harvest, but the burden does not as yet press except in the case of special situations, and it is hopeless for us to request conservation of any specific food while awaiting the settlement of outstanding negotiations and the arrangement of shipping and finance. We do hope, in preparation for the effort we face, that the organization can be held together. We are desirous of having Swenson and Heinz³² proceed to Paris immediately.

SHARP

³² Magnus Swenson, appointed by Herbert Hoover to be his assistant at Copenhagen, and Howard Heinz, member of the executive committee of the American Relief Administration.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 550]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

PARIS , 16 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

SERBIAN RELIEF

In the matter of the relief of populations under the Serbian Government, I enclose herewith a letter from Mr. Norman H. Davis, who is, as you know, the special representative of the Treasury in matters connected with relief, which it is proposed to be despatched to the Secretary of the Treasury, if it meets with your approval, and I also enclose herewith, for your signature and delivery to Mr. Davis, a proposed letter which he has addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury.³³ These arrangements provide Treasury advances for this purpose.

JUGO-SLAV & SOUTH AUSTRIA

In respect to relief of other populations of southern Austria, as I recounted to you last evening, there are certain populations in South, or Old Austria, which as yet are of doubtful national destination whose food situation is extremely pressing and the relief of which we cannot financially see daylight through any normal government advances. Also, there is the expense of the Food Administration's activities in Europe to cover these relief measures. It is for this purpose that I requested from you an allocation from your fund for the National Security and Defense of \$5,000,000 to be paid directly to the Grain Corporation. I am in hopes that we can yet devise relief measures which will transform this fund merely into working capital which will be recoverable, and, in any event, we will take some kind

of obligations for it, except for such minor amounts as may be used in administration. I do not, however, wish to guarantee that we can save this entire sum, but the question of human life and the necessity of maintaining military stability is such that I am sure it is an entirely appropriate use of the funds appropriated. I therefore enclose herewith a draft cable for despatch to the Secretary of the Treasury, directing him to pay to the United States Grain Corporation this sum of money from your blanket fund.³⁴

U. S. ARMY OFFICERS

As to the use of United States Army Officers, I am informing General Pershing that you are in accord with his delegating to my service such officers as he can spare, they to remain for the present in the army service, their status to be cleared up at as early a date as possible after our organization is established.

WAR DEPARTMENT

In regard to War Department supplies, as you are aware, before I left Washington, Mr. Secretary Baker and myself arranged with your approval to ship a matter of 20 shiploads of foodstuffs to Europe temporarily for account of the Quartermaster General. These ships have begun to arrive at Gibraltar and I have temporarily arranged with the Quartermaster General to forward them to Adriatic ports, to be discharged at those ports for his account and his care. Mr. Secretary Baker has cabled that he approves this arrangement as to the boats arriving pending your arrival in Europe, and that it requires your authorization for him to continue this program. In accordance with our conversations last evening, I have drafted the enclosed cable for the Secretary of War, to be sent by you.³⁵ The effect of this is that the Quartermaster Department carries temporarily the financial load involved in the transit of these foodstuffs from United States to Adriatic ports and holds them in storage at these ports until such time as they are released for relief, and upon their release from the stores at Adriatic ports, they will be paid for by the Grain Corporation in the United States from the funds provided in the previous paragraphs, or from such moneys as we may be able to collect from the sale of these foodstuffs to such

positions as the City of Vienna. In any event, there is no real risk in the matter, because in the worst event, we can stop the flow of foodstuffs from the United States to Italy and divert these stocks to the Italian Government, that is, assuming the whole of relief measures were to break down. The great assistance of these matters is that it enables us to carry the relief of southern Europe with much less sum invested than would otherwise be the case.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure]

The Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe (Davis) to President Wilson

PARIS , 16 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Secretary of the Treasury requested me to come to Europe as special representative of the Treasury to take up with Mr. Hoover the various financial questions arising in relation to relief in Europe.

As you are aware, the only method by which the Treasury Department can give financial assistance even for such purposes is by way of the establishment of credits and subsequent advances to Governments at war with the enemy. The regular procedure, of course, is for the Secretary of the Treasury with your approval, to establish such credits and make such advances. Mr. Hoover has reported to me his conversations with you regarding the proposed emergency measures and has also informed me of the financial assistance immediately required in respect to Servia and the larger portion of Jugo-slavia, for which the relief would have to be furnished through advances to the Servian Government. On account of the urgency of the situation, I have drafted a cable to the Secretary of the Treasury, which is enclosed herewith, to be sent if it meets

with your approval. May I also ask that you sign the enclosed letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury if the plan proposed meets with your approval.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

33 For text of the letter, see the concluding portion of telegram of Dec. 16, 1918, midnight, from the Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe to the Acting Secretary of State, p. 670 [*Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 550](#), [Doc. 551](#), [Doc. 552](#), and [Doc. 553](#)*].

34 For telegram as sent, see telegram No. 255, Dec. 16, 1918, 11 p.m., p. 670 [*Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 550](#), [Doc. 551](#), [Doc. 552](#), and [Doc. 553](#)*].

35 For telegram as sent, see telegram No. 256, Dec. 16, 1918, 11 p.m., p. 670 [*Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 550](#), [Doc. 551](#), [Doc. 552](#), and [Doc. 553](#)*].

102.1/1521: Telegram

[Document 551]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 16, 1918—11 p.m.

[Received December 17—12:35 a.m.]

255. For the Secretary of the Treasury [from the President]: Please pay at once to United States Food Administration, Grain Corporation, \$5,000,000 from my fund for national security and defense. Woodrow Wilson.

EDWARD HOUSE

102.2/1766: Telegram

[Document 552]

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 16, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received December 17—12:33 a.m.]

256. For Secretary of War [from the President]: In respect to the foodstuffs being shipped by the War Department for direction of Mr. Hoover, I would be obliged if you would continue to forward foodstuffs to such ports as Mr. Hoover may direct and, if necessary, could continue to take care of the discharge and custody of these foodstuffs at these ports. The foodstuffs will not be released by the Quartermaster General's representative except as paid for by the Food Administration in Washington, arrangements for which are now being completed. Woodrow Wilson.

EDWARD HOUSE

872.51/135: Telegram

[Document 553]

***The Special Representative of the Treasury in
Europe (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*** [36](#)

PARIS , December 16, 1918—midnight.
[Received December 17—4:28 a.m.]

For Secretary of Treasury. Hoover reports that to meet urgent requirements for relief to Servia, including that portion Jugo Slavia under the Servian Government, would require 30 to 40 thousand tons of food per month until next harvest, but that internal transportation will probably not permit the execution of this whole program. In the meantime, however, in order to meet emergency and to start operations, he recommends that Treasury, upon request of Servian Government, establish a credit for \$15,000,000 to be paid through the Servian Minister directly to the Grain Corporation. Hoover's idea is that \$10,000,000 of this would be required for working capital, and \$5,000,000 as the value of the first month's food delivered, which food is already arriving at Adriatic ports at the risk of Grain Corporation or Food Administration.

In addition to above, he recommends the establishment of credit for \$5,000,000 monthly for 4 months, making a total altogether of \$35,000,000. At present it is impossible to be more precise. This entire amount may not be required but will only be used under the direction of Hoover who will direct and supervise distribution. He recommends that the Treasury Department have a representative over here probably in Servia to collaborate with his representatives. Agreement has not yet been reached with Allied Governments as to the general plan for food relief in Europe, but this situation seems extremely pressing and of great importance in order to save life and maintain stability in military situation. Whatever is done will be upon the understanding that any arrangement which may be later arrived at with the Allied Governments will be retroactive, so far as

any expenses or advances made by us are concerned, and upon the arrangements which may be made will depend, more or less, the use of the subsequent credits above referred to. I have submitted this cable to the President who strongly approves and who has handed me the following communication addressed to you:

“Paris, 16th December, 1918.

The Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Mr. Hoover informs me that situation in Servia and Jugo-Slavia is such that food supplies should be sent in there immediately in order to save life and maintain stability in the military situation and Mr. Davis has shown me his proposed cable to you explaining the situation and suggesting the establishment of a credit of \$35,000,000 in favor of the Servian Government proportionally used for relief of Servians and Jugo-Slavs under Servian Government, provided the Servian Government makes application for such credit and agrees to turn over the funds to the Food Administration or the Grain Corporation for the purchase, delivery and distribution of the supplies in question. If you therefore desire to establish this credit and to make advances thereunder as above indicated, you may consider this as my full approval. Cordially yours, Woodrow Wilson.”

[NORMAN DAVIS]

³⁶ This telegram was originally sent as telegram No. 257 from Colonel House. Telegram No. 16, Dec. 17, 1918, from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, stated that it should have been signed “Norman Davis” (Paris Peace Conf. 102.1/1).

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 554]

***Colonel E. M. House to the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)***[37](#)

PARIS , 16 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. BALFOUR: The President requests me to say that the discussions of his proposal of December 1st,[38](#) submitted through me, for the creation of a European Relief Administration and the appointment of a Director General of Relief, have been reported to him. He entertains no doubt that he will receive in due course from the Allied Governments a reply to that note, but it appears from the discussions that some time will be required to reconcile the differences of view involved in the undertaking.

The objects of the United States Government in connection with food supply—which concern only the Armistice emergency—are to save life, to preserve order throughout the liberated, neutral, and enemy territories, and to create an efficient organization to accomplish these purposes. In these purposes he feels assured of your entire sympathy and cooperation.

Pending further discussions of the entire problem, however, the situation in certain areas is of so critical a nature, and requires such immediate emergency action that he wishes me to inform you that he is instructing the United States Food Administration to take measures at once to furnish food supplies and to establish an organization to this end in certain places outside of Germany.

Taking it for granted that you will also be anxious to undertake immediate action in these matters through your various food departments, and in order that there shall be full coordination in this task, he has asked Mr. Hoover to indicate to you these situations and the points at which he proposes to establish representatives for the

administration of relief measures, so that if you see fit, you may also send your representatives to these points, and these gentlemen may mutually coordinate these various efforts.

I am [etc.]

EDWARD HOUSE

³⁷ Similar communications were apparently sent on the same date to M. Pichon and Baron Sonnino.

³⁸ *Ante*, p. 646 [*Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 535](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 555]

***The British Ambassador in France (Derby) to
Colonel E. M. House***

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to Colonel House and has the honour to enclose herein, for the information of the President of the United States, a copy of a note which he has addressed to the French Government, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, relative to the control of the mercantile shipping of Germany. The Earl of Derby is to express the hope that the President will see fit to instruct the American Representative on the Naval Armistice Committee at Wilhelmshaven to press Germany to place her mercantile shipping immediately at the disposal of the Allies for use by them on the conditions stated in the enclosed note.

PARIS , December 16, 1918.

[Enclosure]

***Copy of a Note From the British Embassy in France to the
French Ministry for Foreign Affairs***

His Majesty's Embassy has the honour, under telegraphic instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to call the attention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the urgent necessity of obtaining as soon as possible, control of the merchant shipping of Germany, and of placing it at the disposal of the Allies, that is, of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States: The armistice agreement contains no provision enabling the Allies to secure the shipping, and the Allied Governments would doubtless agree that the making of any arrangements with Germany whereby the Allies would undertake, in return for obtaining this shipping, to provide food and supplies to the extent of the carrying capacity of the German shipping thus acquired, is out of the question.

The desirable terms for the Allies for the surrender of these ships would be that they should be placed unconditionally at their disposal pending further arrangements, but if such terms were refused by Germany, unless accompanied by certain undertakings to be given by the Allies for the provision of relief, it appears advisable that such undertakings, which should not be definite, should be to the following effect:

The Allies intend to take steps to secure that Germany obtains such food supplies as in their judgment appear necessary; the quantities of such supplies, the terms on which they are to be provided, and other matters connected with the question, must be the subject of careful investigation and consideration. The essential condition to be proposed to Germany must be that she should at once, and without waiting for the settlement of the quantities and terms, place all available merchant ships at the disposal of the Allies. Germany should accordingly, in the first place, deliver all vessels now idle in German ports and ready for sea, in addition to those vessels which are to be delivered under previous arrangement in the matter of the repatriation of prisoners. Secondly, Germany should make ready for sea any vessels requiring repairs, with, a view to their delivery to the Allies; thirdly, she is to deliver to them such vessels in the Baltic and in neighbouring waters as the Allies may, on further consideration decide; and fourthly, she should take steps to facilitate the delivery to the Allies of German vessels in neutral ports.

The delivery of vessels under the first of the above cited conditions should be an essential prior condition of the commencement of measures of relief. It is intended that the vessels comprised under this first condition shall be delivered by the Germans at a meeting-place to be specified by the Allies, where they are to be manned by crews of the Allied nations in accordance with arrangements to be made by the Allied Naval Authorities, whilst the German crews are to be repatriated. The vessels, after surrender, are to fly the flag of the Ally providing the crew, in addition to the House flag of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. They will be employed under the direction of the Allies for any purpose, whether carrying supplies to enemy countries, to liberated areas, or to allied countries. The food sent to Germany, which is not to be based on any mathematical

proportion of the carrying capacity of the surrendered shipping, will be sent in either German or Allied vessels, as may be convenient.

In the making of the arrangements here suggested, it appears advisable that it should be clearly understood that such arrangements for the use and employment of German Merchant shipping during the armistice, have no bearing whatever on the ultimate disposition of the ships, the which is to be determined by the terms of peace.

In bringing the above suggestions to the notice of the French Government for their consideration at their very early convenience, His Majesty's Embassy is to ask that the French Government, if they see no objection, will instruct their representatives on the Naval Armistice Committee at Wilhelmshaven to press Germany to place her mercantile shipping at the disposal of the Allies for employment by them on the conditions indicated in this note.

PARIS, December 15, 1918.

Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)[39](#)

PARIS , 17 December, 1918.

MY DEAR LORD DERBY: Thank you for your memorandum of December 16th with which you enclosed for the information of the President of the United States a copy of a note which you have addressed to the French Government under instructions from your government relative to the mercantile shipping of Germany.

You state that you hope that the President will see fit to instruct the American representative on the Naval Armistice Committee at Wilhelmshaven to press Germany to place her mercantile shipping immediately at the disposal of the Allies for use by them on conditions stated in the enclosed note.

I have conferred with the President of the United States and he has asked me to communicate to you his views respecting this matter.

On December 1st, 1918 I communicated to Mr. Balfour, Baron Sonnino and Monsieur Pichon for the consideration of their respective governments a memorandum containing the President's views respecting the general question of furnishing relief to the civilian population of European countries affected by the war.[40](#) In this memorandum the views of the United States Government with reference to the use of enemy tonnage now in enemy and in neutral ports were presented for the consideration of the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy.

Up to the present time no answer has been received from these governments to this communication, though I have been advised by Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hurley that an informal draft memorandum which dealt with the general subject of the communication of December 1st was submitted to them by the representatives of Great

Britain, France and Italy, who had been charged with the consideration of the President's proposal.⁴¹ The views presented in this draft memorandum were almost directly contrary to the views set forth in my communication of December 1st and they involved the acceptance of principles of action which the President finds himself unable to accept.

The President is in entire sympathy with the desire of the Allies to secure from the enemy governments enemy tonnage now in enemy and in neutral ports and he will gladly give instructions to the United States representatives charged with carrying into effect the Armistice terms to join with their Allied colleagues in a demand that this tonnage be handed over unconditionally to the Allies and the United States. However, he wishes me to point out quite clearly that he is still of the opinion that if this tonnage is secured it should be used pursuant to the suggestions contained in the communication of December 1st, no objection to these suggestions having been communicated to the President by the Allied governments.

The President has requested me to say that his whole purpose in this matter is:—

- (1) To utilize the surplus food supply of the United States in relieving existing famine among the civil populations of Europe and in that way to help stem the tide of disorder rapidly sweeping westward.
- (2) To utilize enemy tonnage for the transportation of this relief, and as part of this tonnage is not adapted to food carrying, that it should be utilized for transportation home of American troops no longer needed in Europe, the American Government substituting more suitable food tonnage.
- (3) To carry on this relief work with the maximum of efficiency under a single leadership chosen from the country whose resources will inevitably have to be drawn on almost exclusively for this work and at the same time to secure to the Allies complete protection of their political interests among the populations of countries to be relieved, which populations must on account of their geographical positions remain the neighbors of the Allies in the years to come.

I beg, my dear Lord Derby, that you will bring these matters promptly to the attention of His Majesty's government and state that it is the President's hope that the general question of relief and the use of enemy inactive tonnage may be speedily settled by the Allies and the United States.

I am sending a copy of this note to Monsieur Pichon and to Baron Sonnino.

I am [etc.]

E. M. HOUSE

³⁹ Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 306.

⁴⁰ See letter of Dec. 1, 1918, from Colonel House to Mr. Balfour, p. 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 535](#)].

⁴¹ Memorandum dated Dec. 12, 1918, p. 654 [Pg. 654 includes portions of [Doc. 542](#) and [Doc. 543](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 863.5010/4: Telegram

[Document 557]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 17, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received December 18—1:25 p.m.]

39. Following received from Swedish Legation dated December 13, 1918.

“At the meeting of the neutral chiefs of Mission the Lord Mayor of Vienna gave the following statement on the coal question:

‘The coal supply of the gas works will only last 14 days even at the lowest possible rate of consumption. If gas coal cannot be brought before the end of this period from the mines now in the possession of the Poles or Czechs, or the Upper Silesia, from which mines all importation has been prevented by the Czechs in spite of lengthy negotiations, 200,000 homes only provided with gas last Tuesday will be robbed of every possibility to prepare hot food and there will be no lights in the streets or houses.

The electric works can with the lowest rate of consumption of their coal supply deliver electric current for another 3 weeks at the most. If no coal is sent from Bohemia or Germany, the electric tramways, the lighting and all motors must stop and the consequence of this will be enormous non-employment. There are in public stores supplies of lignite for the heating of houses to last a fortnight. If importation of coal cannot be effected the result will be disorder and pillage and probably the stopping of all

railway traffic and the food situation will become more complicated than ever. The inhabitants of Vienna have during the last political revolution in spite of all privations carried themselves with unparalleled calm and consideration but in the presence of such a catastrophe no authority can take the responsibility for the maintenance of order.

The only quarters wherefrom coal can be obtained for gas, electricity and domestic use is from and via Bohemia. There is still enough coal for their own use as well as Vienna's in spite of the want of labor. Up to the present time the Czechs have stopped all importation as well as transit from Poland and Silesia with the exception of an insufficient quantity of coal for domestic purposes.

It is true that France at the request of Switzerland has begged the government of Bohemia to supply coal for Vienna but up till now nothing has arrived. In conformity with other neutral ministers the Swedish Minister at Vienna has asked the Swedish Government to communicate the above to the Entente Powers praying in the name of humanity that these Powers will request the Government of Bohemia most insistently to allow Vienna coal for the most necessary consumption; and—to avoid that the transportation should be prevented by subordinates—allow the trains to go from Poland and Silesia under special guard.

If this request is not granted within the next few days Vienna will face a catastrophe.

Communicate the above to the United States.'”

Swedish Legation informed question has been referred to you.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 860c.5018/1

[Document 558]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Secretary of State

PARIS , December 18, 1918.

DEAR MR. LANSING: It is of the utmost importance that we should have some reliable information as to the food situation in Poland. The British have already sent a mission, and it seems to me vitally necessary that we should also dispatch some capable men for this purpose.

As diplomatic relations have been broken off between Poland and Germany, it seems impossible of access in that direction, the only possible manner of reaching Poland being by motor car from the Italian front, via Buda-Pesth, thus avoiding entrance into German territory.

I am anxious to send three or perhaps four men, being Dr. Kellogg for nutritional purposes, he being already well acquainted with Poland since the war, some Transport Army Officer who could study transportation conditions, and possibly one other American, together with an interpreter, for which latter purpose it would be useful to use Count Horodyski.

In order to accomplish this mission, I must have the delegation of two American motor cars, with drivers, from our American establishment in Italy, and the assistance of the American military establishment there.

Before undertaking anything on this line, however, I need your approval and authorisation to the various authorities to facilitate the movement of the Mission, and your request to the Commander-in-Chief that he should make the necessary dispositions in the matter.

I would be glad to know your impressions in the matter, and if you approve of it, if you could take the steps above mentioned.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/1

[Document 559]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to Colonel E. M. House

LONDON , 19 December, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I have received your letter of December 16th. I am sorry that the reply to your letter of the 1st instant forwarding the President's proposal for the creation of a European Relief Administration and the appointment of a Director-General of Relief was unavoidably delayed by the necessity for the discussions to which you refer in your letter of the 16th. The result of these discussions was, as you know, communicated to Mr. Hoover by Lord Reading, and Lord Reading was awaiting a reply to the letter which he sent to Mr. Hoover on the subject on December 13th.

I can assure you that the British Government are in complete accord with the objects of the United States Government as set forth in your letter though further discussion will be required for the purpose of arriving at a detailed plan of action. So far as I can judge from past discussions I do not think that any difference of opinion exists as to the necessity for the appointment of a Council of the four Governments to take charge of and deal with the question of Relief to Europe. I think that the best plan will be to set up this Council at once, without giving any special directions save that it is created for the purpose of dealing with relief, and for each Government to nominate its representatives on the Council and leave them to meet and deal with all questions including the extent of their own powers within the general limits prescribed in the document copy of which was sent by Lord Reading to Mr. Hoover. If this plan is adopted I would suggest that the procedure to be followed would be that Mr. Hoover should at the first meeting of this Council make a full report of any action taken by him, that the same course should be followed

by the representatives of the other Governments and that the Council would then get to work.

Perhaps you would kindly let me know whether this arrangement would meet the President's views. Then, if the French and Italian Governments also assent, His Majesty's Government would at once nominate their representatives with a view to enabling the Council to get to work at the earliest possible date.

Yours sincerely,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Paris Peace Conf. 860h.48/1: Telegram

[Document 560]

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 19, 1918.

31. The food situation in Serbia and extended Serbian territory, as disclosed by Mr. Hoover's investigations and confirmed by Mr. Dodge, displays the utmost urgency for immediate relief in order to preserve life and order. Communications have already been made to the Treasury with the President's approval with regard to extending loans to the Serbian Government, on condition that it be used solely for Relief purposes and under the direction of Mr. Hoover. Will you be good enough to urge Treasury on prime political grounds, to accede to these recommendations in order that relief may be immediately taken in hand?

LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 863.50/36: Telegram

[Document 561]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 19, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received December 20—8:53 a.m.]

59. Following received from Italian Embassy:

[Here follows the text of the Italian Ambassador's note of November 22, 1918, printed on page 635 [*Pg. 635 includes portions of [Doc. 520](#) and [Doc. 521](#)*].]

Wartraboard expresses himself [*itself*] as opposed to proposed shipments until necessary relief measures by Mr. Hoover are determined. Department assumes you will prefer to communicate your decision to Italian Government from Paris.

POLK

872.51/135: Telegram

[Document 562]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 20, 1918—5 p.m.

6698. For Crosby from Rathbone. Treasury 655. Ammission's 257 December 16 midnight, otherwise unnumbered.⁴² Please inform Davis as follows: On request of Serbian Government United States prepared to establish credit in its favor in the amount of \$15,000,000 to be advanced from time to time as required for purchase of food in United States and am informing Rickard and Serbian representative accordingly. Treasury is prepared if and to the extent found necessary and on like request to establish further credits of \$5,000,000 per month January to April inclusive for same purpose unless peace previously declared. Have no doubt we can arrange for payments through the Serbian representatives to the Grain Corporation much in the way that Belgian relief advances are handled. Understand that is what Hoover desires. You will understand first that our authority to establish credits ceases on the termination of the war, and second that advances after termination of war can be made only from credits previously established to take care of commitments necessarily made so as to insure regular and orderly supply of food needed for the purpose of prosecuting the war. It does not seem to us that a Treasury representative in Serbia will be needed. The information necessary to warrant the Treasury in making advances may be communicated to it from time to time by the Food Administration which will no doubt be kept fully informed of facts by its representatives in Europe.

POLK

⁴² See telegram from the Special Representative of the Treasury in Europe, Dec. 16, 1918, midnight, p. 670 [*Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 550](#), [Doc. 551](#), [Doc. 552](#), and [Doc. 553](#)*].

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Document 563]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

PARIS , 20 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Soon after the Armistice, you took one or two occasions to make clear that the maintenance of order in Germany by the German people was a prime requisite to food-stuffs and to peace, and that the necessity of feeding Germany arose not only out of humanity but out of its fundamental necessity to prevent anarchy.

It would seem that these warnings have a little worn off and I have a feeling that it would be desirable, if some joint and very pointed statement could be made by the four associated governments on the positive subject of Bolshevism in Germany.

As you are aware, there is incipient or practical Bolshevik control in many of the large centres; there is also a Separatist movement in progress amongst the German States, arising somewhat from fear of Bolshevism; there is also—apparently largely supported—a movement towards the election of a constitutional assembly of some kind.

Viewing the German Empire from a food point of view, there will be no hope of saving these people from starvation if Bolshevik activities extend over the Empire in a similar manner to Russia, with its sequent break-down in commercial distribution and in the control and distribution of existing food. The extremes to which such a situation can extend are well exemplified by the already practical depopulation of the cities of Moscow and Petrograd, and such a situation would not be confined to two cities as in Russia, but to thirty cities in Germany, and the saving of the German people would be absolutely hopeless if the normal commercial and distributive

functions and food control should cease, as it certainly would under a Bolshevik regime.

Again, a political Separatist movement amongst the German States would produce the same situation that we have in the old Austrian Empire, where some sections of the Empire have a surplus of food and by practical embargoes are creating food debacles in other centres. We must maintain a liquidity of the existing food stocks in Germany over the whole Empire, or again the situation will become almost unsolvable.

In order to visualize to you somewhat the problem, if we say that the normal consumption of the German people, without restraint, is 100, the German Empire within its old boundaries must possess to-day somewhere about 60% of this quantity. If there is distribution and control, the population can probably go through without starvation on something like 80% of normal, and therefore the problem is to find 20% by way of imports. If there is an extension of the Bolshevik movement or extension of the Separatist movement, so far as food is concerned, we shall have some localities consuming 100 out of their local supplies and feeding any surplus to animals. The problem will be unsolvable by way of the available supplies in the world for import because the total consumption under such conditions would run a great deal more than 80% and all this aside from the almost impossible completion of dealing with distribution in the hands of such highly incompetent agencies as Bolshevik Committees.

It would appear to me therefore that some announcement with regard to the food policies in Germany is critically necessary, and at once. If that announcement could be made something on the line that the United States and Allies could only hope to solve the food difficulties in Germany until next harvest through the hands of a stable and experienced government based on an expressed popular will, and a hint be given that the Allies cannot anticipate furnishing the food assistance to Germany through the hands of Bolshevik elements, it would at once strengthen the whole situation in Germany and probably entirely eliminate the incipient Bolshevism in progress, and make possible the hope of saving their food situation. I

realize that this is a suggestion of some delicacy but I feel that I should present it to you.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/152g: Telegram

[Document 564]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting
Food Administrator (Rickard)***

PARIS , December 21, 1918.

22. From Hoover. Telegram in Paris papers from Washington claim[s] that statements are appearing in the U. S. to the effect that serious differences have arisen between myself and the Allies on food measures. There is no difference with regard to measures to be adopted with regard to any specific country. We have been at serious difference because of proposal that an Allied Food Council should be established to dominate entire food resources of the world the effect of which would control American markets and destination of American food. This I have refused to entertain as I conceive no one has the right to hand the control of American producer and manufacturer and national resources to any body not responsible to the U. S. Congress or the American people, no matter how praiseworthy the object may be. If subject is receiving any discussion a statement by Glasgow^{42a} hinting at my attitude to this effect to the Press might be very useful. I expect we will eventually reach an agreement. Hoover.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{42a} William A. Glasgow, Jr., chief counsel to the Food Administration.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/3j: Telegram

[Document 565]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Chargé in Serbia (Dodge)

PARIS , December 21, 1918.

2. Pending completion of permanent Allied Relief for Servia, I have appointed Colonel Atwood Director of Relief for Servia and Jugo-Slavia on behalf of the US Food Administration, and he will arrive shortly in Belgrade. We have US Government vessels loaded with foodstuffs passing Gibraltar for the Adriatic and we are proposing to establish stocks of food at Ragusa, Cattaro, Trieste, possibly Fiume and Salonica, at an early moment. Our proposal is that foodstuffs will be sold by the US Government to the agents of the Servian Government at the above ports, and that the Servian Government will undertake the distribution, subject to the general approval of our representatives. We assume that the Servian Government will undertake to pay for foodstuffs for Jugo-Slavia and Montenegro as well as Servia proper and that in fact it will be advantageous for them to do so. In order for them to finance these operations it is urgently necessary that they instantly apply to the US Government at Washington through their Minister, for a loan of 15 million dollars to the Servian Government, to be advanced by the US to the Servian Minister at Washington and transferred by him to the US Food Administration or such other agency as I may designate. The Food Administration will furnish the foodstuffs at cost and expenses of delivery from storage at seaboard, and the accounts of the Administration in this operation will be debited to the advances received by the Food Administration in Washington from the Servian Minister. This arrangement is entirely for emergency purposes and in order to secure that relief be placed upon a permanent basis and to cover her other necessities the Servian Government should apply at once to England and France for advances equal to the above amounts and for these Governments to furnish to the Servian

Government commodities or cash for such value. In effect, our proposal is that we should take one-third of the burden of Servian Relief, but that we will serve the emergency purposes through the above arrangement. As we have only foodstuffs arriving from the US the Servian Government should secure clothing and other material which they desire from England or France, under the above plan. Bohemia has an excess of sugar which Servia should attempt to purchase. Colonel Atwood qualified to look into railway situation. Will wire later the date of his arrival. In the meantime I would be grateful if you would secure that the Servian Government take immediate action in Washington on the above lines as we shall be unable to release any foodstuffs from our seaboard stores until we have the above financial arrangements completed in Washington, and until Servian Minister in Washington has, under complete authority, signed necessary agreements with the American Treasury and with the US Food Administration or such other agency as I may direct.

HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/3n: Telegram

[Document 566]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 21, 1918.

48. From Hoover. Your 6664 December 17th 7 p.m.⁴³ ... We have certain cargoes en route for Trieste, we have moving appeals from Vienna where the situation is very serious, but have deferred dealing with this situation until Allies will agree to joint action with us as we are anxious to preserve a solid allied front in dealing with enemy situation. There is a delegation from Vienna in Berne and I am sending Cotton and Taylor to discuss matters with them. The President telegraphed more than 2 weeks ago through Colonel House a proposal to the three Allied Governments for an Inter-Allied Food Control under the executive direction of the American representative. You doubtless have access to this document. There has thus far been no reply to the President but the Food officials of the three Governments have made counterproposals which are quite unacceptable. Entire matter is still unsettled. In the meantime the situation is extremely critical in a number of places and the President has found it necessary to order American representatives sent to Serbia and other points to look into the situation and make such distribution as may seem wise of food stocks now in Trieste and enroute thereto as the situation may seem to require. He has at the same time requested the three Allied Governments to send their representatives to join ours and work for the coordination of Allied efforts.

I shall of course keep you fully informed as to developments.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

43 To the Ambassador in France, for Mr. Hoover, not printed.

***The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)
to Colonel E. M. House 44***

[Translation]

[PARIS ,] 23 December, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL: The French Government has always been in cordial accord with the principles and the propositions mentioned in your letter of December 1st,⁴⁵ regarding aid (revictualing) to be extended to the countries of Europe. The French Government accepts with equal willingness the proposition of the President that the Government of the United States should take the management of the administration of this aid (revictualing). The delay in making our reply arose solely from the necessity of holding various conferences in regard to the general questions raised by this proposition and for adapting the plan suggested to the following considerations which seem to us essential for the happy execution of the President's project.

- (1) We consider it of vital importance that the aid extended to the European peoples, who have suffered from the war, should be given by the associated governments acting as a body and that the enemy should not consider that divergence of view exists in the realization of a humane purpose as lofty as that which the associated governments, actuated by the same spirit, are pursuing.
- (2) While recognizing that a large part of the provisions, which will be necessary and available for the aid in question, must come from the United States, we think nevertheless that in many cases an appeal must be made to the resources of other countries and that, in fact, the balance of resources thus available will, to a certain extent, partake of the nature of a world's balance.
- (3) We consider it very important that the administration of this aid proposed by the President should be co-ordinated with the

organizations upon which the Allies have depended, and upon which they still depend for their revictualing. In other words, it will be necessary, in our opinion to consider the revictualing of the world as a problem in itself in order to co-ordinate conveniently the work of the organization charged with the revictualing of needy peoples with that of organizations which control the revictualing of the Allies.

We are moreover convinced that these are questions which will settle themselves if they are discussed frankly and completely by a competent organization as the general plan is gradually put into execution. Experience has shown us that the effective co-ordination of the efforts of the associated governments, as well as the solution of problems which have confronted them, have been reached by a daily contact established through common meetings without the necessity of defining the powers and the exact scope of such organizations or of delimiting problems which it was their duty to solve.

Considering that the Supreme World [*War*] Council is not in itself a mobile or specialized organization we suggest that a special organization be substituted for it, composed of two representatives of each of the four powers with the necessary powers for treating the aspects of the problems mentioned in your letter of December 1st, as well as those embracing the considerations above mentioned. We are therefore ready to name immediately our two representatives to this organization.

We recognize likewise that there may be urgent cases for aid, which it will be necessary to consider immediately. In accord with the suggestions made in your letter of December 16th,^{[46](#)} we have sent our representative to Berne to co-operate with the representatives of the United States and those of the British and Italian Governments for the aid to be extended to the city of Vienna. We have also given instructions to our administration for revictualing to associate themselves with any enterprise for the aid of Serbia and Jugo-Slavonia.

Accept [etc.]

⁴⁴ Reprinted from American Relief Administration, *Bulletin No. 1*, Mar. 17, 1919, p. 12. The following statement appears at the end of this document: “The reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy was identical with that of France.”

⁴⁵ See footnote 19, p. 646 [*Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 535](#)*].

⁴⁶ See footnote 37, p. 672 [*Pg. 672 includes portions of [Doc. 554](#) and [Doc. 555](#)*].

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Document 568]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to President Wilson

PARIS , 23 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In order to adequately handle the problem of European food relief, it is necessary that we should establish stocks of food, particularly cereals and fats, at certain strategic ports, these stocks to be drawn upon for the supply of different countries from time to time. Such an arrangement enables us to maintain constant transport and a regular drain of our food supplies from the United States. This arrangement, together with many political considerations involved, require that the foodstuffs in transit and in storage at these bases of supplies should remain in the name and possession of the United States Government. The War Department, with your approval, is now performing this function in respect to certain stocks in the Adriatic, but I assume that their action is only for the emergency, and beyond this it is necessary for us to establish further such stocks at points like Rotterdam, possibly at Gutenberg [*Gothenburg*], and even at German ports.

The United States Food Administration has the right to buy and sell foodstuffs as may be required in the common defense. The appropriations to the Food Administration for these purposes lie entirely in the Food Administration Grain Corporation, of which you are the sole stockholder. The Directors of the Grain Corporation feel that, as a corporation, they should have your approval to this extension of their operations outside of United States territory. There is no reason either in law or in the purposes of the United States to maintain the common defense that does not warrant such action, and there is abundant actual reason why this action should be taken as a part of the necessity of the United States to maintain tranquillity in Europe while its armies are entangled here.

It is not proposed to part with any of the foodstuffs thus belonging to the Grain Corporation without prior payment. There is, of course, some commercial risk in the matter, also there might be further outbreak of hostilities in Europe that some of our bases of supplies might be involved. This, however, I regard as a risk of war that cannot be avoided.

I would, therefore, be glad to know if you authorize the Grain Corporation to extend its operations to the extent of establishing these stocks and carrying them on the capital and credit which it possesses.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/2: Telegram

[Document 569]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , December 27, 1918—6:26 a.m.
[Received December 28—9 a.m.]

9. Department has received following telegram from American Legation Bucharest

“20. December 20th. In addition to telegrams 18 and 19^{[47](#)} which I have today sent from Her Majesty the Queen of Roumania to Mr. Davison^{[48](#)} and Mr. Anderson^{[49](#)} through the Department and also in addition to the telegram sent by the Allied Ministers here on the 18th,^{[50](#)} I beg to again plead for Roumania where, unless immediate help is received, hunger will most certainly press within 30 days. The most pressing need is for wheat after which comes linen, ready made clothing, boots, and cloth. If any Commission is sent by the American Red Cross it should be sent on the same steamer as the supplies.”

Please communicate to Hoover.

POLK

^{[47](#)} Neither printed.

^{[48](#)} Henry P. Davison, chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross.

^{[49](#)} Henry W. Anderson, American Red Cross commissioner in charge of relief work in the Balkan States.

^{[50](#)} Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 760f.63/1

[Document 570]

The Embassy in France to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

PARIS , December 30, 1918.

The American Embassy at Paris presents its compliments to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and has the honor to enclose herewith, for its information, copy and translation of a note received from Mr. Edward Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Countries, transmitting copy of a telegram received from Vienna by the President of the Council at Prague, which, Mr. Benes states, tends to demonstrate the inexactitude of the Viennese Government's allegations in regard to the Czechs' attitude relative to the revictualling of Vienna.

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs (Beneš) to the American Ambassador in France (Sharp)

B-397

PARIS , December 21, 1918.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to forward you herewith a telegram which has reached us from Prague, regarding the revictualling of Vienna by the Czecho-Slovak countries. This will very clearly prove how incorrect was the information given by the Government of Vienna to the Entente Governments when it claimed that the Czechs were opposed to the revictualling of Vienna.

Kindly accept [etc.]

DR. EDWARD BENES

[Subenclosure—Telegram—Translation]

The President of the Czechoslovak Council of Ministers (Kramar) to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs (Beneš)

[PRAGUE ,] December 17, 1918—3:30 p.m.

Yesterday we received the following telegram from Vienna.

His Excellency Doctor Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers at Prague. Reaching Vienna after accomplishing our mission near Your Excellency, we are happy to be able to recognize the humane dispositions which the Czecho-Slovak Government has been pleased to show in regard to the population of Vienna so sorely tried. We also hasten, Mr. President of the Council, to thank you particularly for the gracious welcome you granted us and for the numerous attentions we received at the hands of the population of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We seize this occasion to present to you the homage of our high esteem. (Signed) Bourcart, Minister of Switzerland, Ewerloeff, Minister of Sweden.

I send you my greetings.

KRAMAR

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/46c: Telegram

[Document 571]

***The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the
Ambassador in Italy (Page)***

PARIS , December 31, 1918.

10. Please communicate following urgent telegram from me to Signor Crespi, Italian Food Minister:

“I understand from London that the Italian representatives have withdrawn their order for Pork Products for the month of January. You will understand that these products are accumulated under the direction of the Food Administration, in preparation for shipment, to comply with indicated programs. Furthermore, I have made recommendations to the American Treasury to cover the finance of 20,000 tons of these products for shipment during the month of January. It is utterly impossible for us to withdraw such shipments without total demoralization of American industry and the repudiation of undertakings put forward on behalf of Allied Governments. This being the middle of the Pork producing season our warehouses are fully stocked and we cannot hold for provision later on after the completion of January shipments. If the Italian Government do not wish any pork products after this order and will inform me now, I will make the necessary provision for disposing of them elsewhere. I trust that you will see the fairness of this position and instruct your representatives in London to reestablish the order of 20,000 tons for January shipment, and advise me accordingly, and I should also like to have some indication as to your future dispositions in this matter. The English and French Representatives have been instructed by their Governments to execute the wheat contract between the Wheat Executive and the Grain Corporation, which has now

been under debate for over 2 months, for the firm purchase of 100,000,000 bushels, on which advances have already been made by American Government and your representative is awaiting your instructions. The American Treasury is demanding from me a definite conclusion in the matter and they are asking me to reply as to what this situation really is. All these arrangements have been entered into with a view of securing the Italian food supply and providing the necessary finance therefor, and it would seem to me desirable that these matters should be settled up in such a manner as to maintain the continuity of food supply and finance.”

HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/2a

[Document 572]

Colonel E. M. House to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)

PARIS , 1 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MONSIEUR PICHON: I am in receipt of your letter of December 23rd, in reply to my letter of December 1st, relative to the European Relief Administration, and am glad to note that the French Government accepts in principle the plan proposed by me on behalf of the President.

The President is gratified that you desire that the United States Government should take the lead in this undertaking.

The President asks me to state that he accepts your suggestion that a special Council of two members, representing each of the four Governments be substituted for the Supreme War Council.

In view of the urgent action required in some territories, the President suggests that it is most desirable that each of the Allied Governments designate its representatives at the earliest possible moment and that at the first meeting of the Council it would be desirable that the representatives of each Government be prepared to state what participation and resources they will be able and willing to contribute to the common object.

He has therefore appointed Mr. Herbert Hoover and Mr. Norman H. Davis as the American members on this Council, and has asked Mr. Hoover, as Director General of Relief, as soon as possible to call a meeting of the Council.

With regard to the other consideration raised by you, it appears to him that these are matters which will necessarily come before the Council for consideration from time to time and that while some

[*none*] of the Governments are releasing any freedom of action, all recognise that in setting up organisations of this kind there is a common desire to coordinate the activities of the different Governments in the directions outlined by yourselves.

I am [etc.]

EDWARD M. HOUSE

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3a: Telegram

[Document 573]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the
Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)***

PARIS , January 1, 1919—7:30 [p.m.?)

47. Following letter handed today to Lord Derby from Colonel House

“My dear Mr. Balfour: I enclose herewith a copy of a letter that I have this day sent to Monsieur Pichon in answer to his letter to me of December 23rd, a copy of which I understand that you have.

As the situation demands prompt action, I trust that the British Government will appoint its representatives at as early a date as possible. I am, my dear Mr. Balfour.”

Following is Colonel House’s letter to Monsieur Pichon:

[Here follows text of letter printed *supra*.]

Please hand the Foreign Office at once a memorandum containing the above quoted letters.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3c: Telegram

[Document 574]

***The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the
Ambassador in Italy (Page)***

PARIS , January 1, 1919—7:30 p.m.

13. The following letter was sent to-day by Colonel House to the Italian Ambassador in Paris:

“January 1, 1919. My dear Baron Sonnino: I enclose herewith a copy of a letter that I have this day sent to Monsieur Pichon in answer to his letter to me of December 23rd, a copy of which I understand that you have. As the situation demands prompt action, I trust that the Italian Government will appoint its representatives at as early a date as possible. I am, my dear Baron Sonnino, Faithfully yours, E. M. House.”

The following is the letter referred to addressed to Monsieur Pichon and signed by Colonel House.

[Here follows the text of the letter printed on page 689 [*Pg. 689 includes portions of [Doc. 571](#) and [Doc. 572](#)*].]

Please at once hand a memorandum to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his information, containing the above quoted letters. This matter is urgent.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Edward M. House Papers

[Document 575]

Copy of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in France (Derby), Dated January 1, 1919

January 1, 1919

Following urgent message for Colonel House:—

His Majesty's Government agree with suggestions put forward in French Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter of the 23rd ultimo to Colonel House commencing with words "with principles and objects stated in your letter of December 1st relative to relief in Europe". His Majesty Government agree that that letter may now be considered as embodying their views in reply to proposals made by Colonel House in his letter of December 1st to Mr. Balfour.

If President Wilson concurs in proposals contained in M. Pichon's letter and so informs His Majesty's Government respective Governments will then have to nominate their representatives and His Majesty's Government will appoint theirs at once.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/2

[Document 576]

***The Special Representative of the Treasury in
Europe (Davis) to Colonel E. M. House***

PARIS , 1 January, 1919.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I am enclosing herewith a proposed cable to Mr. Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, which I believe is a correct statement of the relief situation as presented to us and of the steps which it was suggested should be taken.^{[51](#)} As the Secretary of the Treasury can only establish credits with the approval of The President, it would be advisable, in order to save time, to have as soon as practicable the President's approval of the procedure indicated in the enclosed cable, but I presume this cannot be done now until his return from Italy. However, if the cable meets with your approval, may I ask that you have it forwarded.

Enclosed you will also find copy of a cable sent by Secretary Lansing on the same subject.^{[52](#)}

Cordially yours,

NORMAN H. DAVIS

^{[51](#)} For telegram as sent, see No. 132, Jan. 2, 1919, p. 693 [*Pg. 693 includes portions of [Doc. 577](#) and [Doc. 578](#)*].

^{[52](#)} Telegram No. 48, not sent until Jan. 2, 1919, p. 695 [*Pg. 695 includes portions of [Doc. 579](#) and [Doc. 580](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/3b: Telegram

[Document 577]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 1, 1919.

127. For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President.

Extended investigation and consideration of the food situation in certain parts of Europe discloses that especially the urban populations in certain areas are not only faced with absolute starvation during the coming winter, but that many of these populations are unable to find immediate resources with which to purchase their food. These regions have been so subjected to destruction by war, not only of their foodstuffs but of their financial resources and their power of production and export, that they are utterly incapable of finding any resources that can be converted into international exchange for food purchases. While the Secretary of the Treasury can accept obligations of certain governments and through these measures their situations can be cared for temporarily, there are still other areas through Eastern and Southeastern Europe where such arrangements cannot be made. This applies more particularly to the liberated peoples of Austria, Turkey, Poland and Western Russia. In these countries freedom and government will slowly emerge from chaos and require our every assistance.

The total shipments of foodstuffs from the United States to all parts of Europe during the next 7 months will be likely to exceed 1½ billion dollars, and from our abundance we can surely afford to offer succor to these countries destitute of resources or credit. The minimum sum upon which this work can be carried on for the next 6 months in the countries above mentioned will amount to at least 100,000,000 dollars, for such services and supplies as we can render, and even this sum contemplates the finding of resources by

so much of the populations as can do so and such assistance as can be given by the Allied Governments.

The high mission of the American people to find a remedy against starvation and absolute anarchy, renders it necessary that we should undertake the most liberal assistance to these destitute regions.

The situation is one of extreme urgency, for foodstuffs must be placed within certain localities within the next 15 to 30 days if human life and order is to be preserved. I, therefore, request that you should ask Congress to make available to me an immediate appropriation of \$100,000,000 for the broad purpose of providing foodstuffs and other urgent supplies, for the transportation, distribution, and administration thereof to such populations in Europe, outside of Germany, as may be determined upon by me from time to time as necessary.

I wish to appeal to the great sense of charity and good will of the American people toward the suffering, and to place this act upon a primarily humanitarian basis of the first magnitude. While the sum of money is in itself large, it is so small compared to the expenditures we have undertaken in the hope of bettering the world, that it becomes a mere pittance compared to the results that will be obtained from it, and the lasting effect that will remain in the United States through an act of such broad humanity and statesmanlike influence.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/2a: Telegram

[Document 578]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , 2 January, 1919 [4 p.m.(?)]

132. For Rathbone Assistant Secretary of Treasury from Davis.

1. Reports from Roumania indicate necessity of immediate relief to prevent starvation and anarchy. See various cables to State Department and Hoover's cables to Food Administration. While it is difficult to proceed in situation apparently requiring action before full information is had and adequate arrangements are made for meeting same, it was decided advisable, in conference with Colonel House, General Bliss, Hoover and others to take some temporary action to meet emergency before more definite plans and arrangements can be obtained.
2. Hoover states immediate situation could be relieved by an advance of \$5,000,000 for expenditure through Food Administration or Grain Corporation to pay for cost of supplies now enroute to Mediterranean which could be diverted to Roumania. This would only meet situation temporarily, but in meantime, other arrangements can probably be made including participation by England and France. In addition to food, Roumanian reports indicate need of clothes and shoes which they can probably get from England.
3. I explained the limitations of Secretary's power to establish credits, but Secretary Lansing is of the opinion that Roumania's present state of hostilities brings her within those limitations and is so cabling to Secretary through State Department, recommending importance of giving her financial assistance.
4. Hoover's information is that other sections of Europe will become desperate this winter unless assistance is furnished and if United States is to undertake this task, we should, it seems, obtain special

legislation and be prepared to assist wherever situation demands, or, as an alternative, get England and France to participate at least to the extent of making advances through Hoover's organization to those countries which we cannot finance by giving their currencies or obligations in payment of the supplies obtained in the United States. With or without legislation, it seems that in view of present limitation of advances to England and special situation as to France, there should be less objection to their assuming a fixed share in European relief and of meeting same with their own resources and currencies. Italy desires to participate in relief of contiguous peoples, but we could only use Italian currency for expenses in certain localities.

5. According to latest reports considered reliable, situation in Vienna is desperate, Austria's total gold stock being below \$50,000,000, or less than 1 percent of outstanding bank notes, and even this gold is claimed by Czechs and Jugo-Slavs to cover the notes held by them. Vienna has endeavored but failed to negotiate a credit in Switzerland and Holland, although offering the electric plant and waterworks as security. It is not considered advisable to mortgage the city to furnish relief, and in order to meet the immediate situation, Hoover has decided to send in 10,000 tons of flour paying for same out of funds supplied him by the President and to take obligations of the Vienna banks, payable 6 months after peace, with a claim against assets in hands of Enemy Custodian or such commercial security as they can give. Once the financial blockade is lifted, the Viennese bankers think they can obtain enough from Austrian emigrants and otherwise to tide them over and they have now about arranged to obtain 10,000 tons of wheat from an Austrian merchant in Argentina. Arrangements can probably be made also for them to obtain some food from Hungary.
6. Present chaotic situation has dislocated distribution, but once the emergencies are met, this can be no doubt assisted and most of the countries can begin to make commercial arrangements to obtain their food requirements without government loans.
7. Understand the President sent a message to the Secretary of the Treasury today to request Congress to place funds at his disposal for relief purposes,⁵³ and while I believe this cable is in accordance with his views and policy, it was impossible to submit it to him for

approval before he left for Italy tonight. If however you can and are disposed to establish a credit of \$5,000,000 for Roumania, I shall be glad, if you wish, to ask for the President's formal approval, and to assist in securing Roumania's obligation.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

53 Telegram dated Jan. 1, *supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/18a: Telegram

[Document 579]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , [January 2, 1919.]

48. [From Lansing.] Referring to various telegrams on condition of affairs in Roumania, inform Secretary of the Treasury every evidence here reinforces statement that immediate relief must be given if stability of Government is to be maintained and if country is not submerged in Bolshevism. As Roumania has no financial resources the one hope of relief is through advances by the various Governments. Hoover has some cargoes in the Mediterranean which he could forward at once and could probably obtain some food from Australian sources if such credits could be established. United States Government at one time made advances to Roumania. She is now at war with Germany. It is extremely urgent that advances should be provided at once and I am of the opinion that her present state of hostilities entitles her to come within the provisions of the law relating to Treasury advances. Separate cables to the Treasury with regard to the immediate advance of 5 million dollars for food relief go forward to-day from Davis.^{53a} Trust Department sees no legal obstacle to the proposed action. Robert Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{53a} Apparently only the telegram *supra* was sent on Jan. 2.

Hunter Miller Papers

[Document 580]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to Colonel E. M. House

PARIS , 2 January, 1919.

MY DEAR COLONEL: Please find enclosed herewith copy of letters which I have dispatched to the three Food Ministers. I believe it is desirable that you should send these under covering letter from yourself to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and ask them to draw the attention of their highest officials thereto.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

[Enclosure]

The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the French Minister of Provisioning (Boret)

PARIS , 2 January, 1919.

MY DEAR M. BORET: In personal conferences and communications which I enjoyed with members of the various Food Ministries in Europe, it was recognized that the pressure of the submarine warfare would drive the burden of the Allied food supply upon North America, and that it became of pre-eminent importance as a matter of safety of the entire Allied cause that the stimulation of the production of foodstuffs in the United States should be carried to the utmost. In accordance with these decisions, since demonstrated so correct, the United States Government undertook large policies of expansion in production. Price assurances were given and these were

formulated upon a much lower basis than the prices then being paid by the Allied Governments, but at a level necessary to secure the production. These policies naturally ripened into direct soil for the harvest of 1918 and in the increase of animal life parallel therewith. The undertakings were so eminently successful that it would have been possible to have carried the burden of Allied supplies from North America during the year 1919 had hostilities continued, which would have been of vital necessity, and the greatest satisfaction has been repeatedly expressed in Allied countries at this security to safety.

No guarantees of any character have ever been at any time required to produce foodstuffs for the supply of the American people and all guarantees have been solely for the purpose of creating surpluses for the European Allies. These guarantees not only apply to the existing food supplies but also extend to next year's wheat crop.

With the change produced by the Armistice, however, the markets of the Southern Hemisphere naturally open themselves to the Allied world and the restriction of marketing from that quarter over four years has necessarily produced a slightly lower range of prices than has been necessary to assure in advance the securing of the increase of production from the United States. Naturally, the Allies desire to seek the Southern Hemisphere markets with a view to securing the cheaper foodstuffs. The result of this, however, is to leave the United States with surpluses of certain commodities beyond the present demands of the Allied countries.

Viewing the world's food situation as a whole, there is manifestly no surplus, even of American production, if the import of food into enemy, neutral and liberated countries were released upon a normal scale. There would, in fact, be a shortage in some commodities.

This increase in food production in the United States is, therefore, still of the highest importance, for it becomes the supply through which the very life of many countries must be sustained, and the American people wish it used in a sympathetic manner for these purposes. With literally hundred of millions of underfed human beings in the world, the spoilage and waste of a large quantity of food

in the United States cannot for a moment be entertained, either by the American public or by the Allies. Many of the American surpluses are of perishable character, and instant action is necessary to prevent waste as well as hunger.

These foodstuffs, however, cannot at present reach many of these new areas freely, where they are so sorely needed, because of the blockade restrictions of many descriptions. The surpluses of American supplies are backing up and there is thus created a very threatening economic situation. Any failure to find solution to this position within the next few days would possibly precipitate financial difficulties in the United States, which would injure the hope of continued economic assistance to the Allies for a long time to come.

The American people are most desirous of safeguarding the supplies to the Allies and wish to extend to them the full need for which they may call. Our present surpluses, however, in wheat, flour, barley, rye, pork products, condensed milk and cotton seed oils and various seed meals, are above the demands of the Allied Governments between now and the next harvest. Other surpluses will develop later.

Therefore, I am directed to inquire if you will not recommend to your Government:

- (a) That you indicate as nearly as may be the amounts of these commodities which will safeguard your position from January 1st to the end of our crop year—July 1st, 1919.
- (b) That all restrictions upon neutral trading be at once removed in these commodities.
- (c) That no objection be raised by the Allied Governments to direct or indirect sale and transportation to enemy countries or to the necessary financial transactions involved.

It is our view that private trading will contribute materially to relieve the food situation in many parts of Europe, will relieve our various administrations of much responsibility, and effect its own solution of shipping and finance and, as such trading must be the ultimate solution of all these problems, we should advance it as rapidly as possible.

The United States of course wishes to fully cooperate in these matters and would, of course, coordinate with the Allied Governments in directing distribution to the various centers of need and would exert this through the control over its exports.

The President has directed me to present these recommendations as matter of the utmost urgency and the key to many settlements which are to be presently attempted.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/8a: Telegram

[Document 581]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 3, 1919—10 p.m.

142. For Secretary of the Treasury. Referring to 127 of January 1st to you from the President. The American Commissioners are deeply concerned over the chaotic political conditions in the Central Empires and the progress toward anarchism or at least communism. The peril to Western Europe if Bolshevism prevails in Central Europe is very real. It can only be met by aid from outside in relieving the food and economic situation. It is now exclusively a practical question of reestablishing sane governments capable of resisting the advance of Bolshevism from Russia and thus forming a bulwark to protect the west from coming into open conflict with the elements which frankly declare themselves enemies of all existing governments.

We cannot too strongly urge the action proposed by the President in his telegram or the vital importance of immediate action. Delay may be fatal if the authorization to use funds comes too late. This telegram is for your personal and confidential information solely.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/7: Telegram

[Document 582]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 4, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 5—6:50 p.m.]

98. Your 127 January 2nd [1st], For the Secretary of State. Sherley⁵⁴ had an interview with Glass in regard to appropriation for relief Balkan States in line with President's message contained in your 127, Jan. 2nd [1st]. Sherley advises me it would be difficult to get this money without facts. It is necessary to know how the work will be done and what security, if any, would be taken, and whether Great Britain, France and Italy are to contribute their share. He thinks it would be better not to move until he has this information. Please give me all you can for him which I shall transmit to him through Secretary of the Treasury.

POLK

⁵⁴ Representative Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Paris Peace Conf. 800.51/3b: Telegram

[Document 583]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 4, 1919—6 p.m.

154. For Glass from Davis. With further reference to your cable of December 31st^{[55](#)} and my reply of today [*yesterday*]^{[56](#)} I assume your position that all questions with reference to our foreign loans should be discussed and disposed of in Washington does not exclude a discussion study and recommendation in respect to the requirements and applications for loans for relief.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[55](#)} *Ante*, p. 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of [Doc. 457](#) and [Doc. 458](#)].

^{[56](#)} *Ante*, p. 552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of [Doc. 461](#), [Doc. 462](#), and [Doc. 463](#)].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/5

[Document 584]

Colonel E. M. House to the British Ambassador in France (Derby)

PARIS , 4 January, 1919.

MY DEAR LORD DERBY: Would you be good enough to cable to your Government that I acknowledge receipt of the message addressed to me and contained in a telegram to you from the Foreign Office dated January 1, 1919.

I note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government agree that the letter dated December 23rd addressed to me from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs may be considered as embodying an amplification of their views concerning the proposals contained in my letter of December 1, 1918 to Mr. Balfour.

On January 1, 1919 I sent you a letter addressed to Mr. Balfour⁵⁷ containing a copy of my answer to Monsieur Pichon's letter of the 23rd ultimo. I hope very much that it will be possible for you to advise me in the near future of the names of His Majesty's Government's representatives.

I note that Lord Reading in the telegram from him, which you handed me yesterday states:—

“I am of the opinion that this Council ought to be appointed to consider and decide questions of general policy, while Mr. Hoover as mandatory should be entrusted with the actual administration of relief.”

I agree with Lord Reading that the Council should deal with questions of policy and that Mr. Hoover should have general charge of the undertaking. The proposals that I have made at the direction of the President have never contemplated that the President's

appointee for this work should act as the mandatory of an Allied Council. It is, of course, understood that the Director General of Relief, in coordination of efforts of the various governments, will in practice act on behalf of the Council.

I shall be obliged to you if you would communicate the foregoing to your Government.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

⁵⁷ See telegram No. 47 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 690 [*Pg. 690 includes portions of [Doc. 572](#), [Doc. 573](#), and [Doc. 574](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[Document 585]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 4, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 6—8:10 a.m.]

103. For Secretary of State. Your 48 regarding loan to Roumania received through Navy.⁵⁸

Only legal difficulties are: [1] Whether Roumania is as matter of fact at war at the present time so as to be regarded as belligerent within meaning of the act of Congress; (2) whether representative of Roumania here has authority from duly constituted government to sign obligations for advances; (3) whether the loan is to be used for the purpose contemplated by the act of Congress. We have no information on first point other than following: Telegram from Minister Vopicka, dated November 9th, delayed 6 weeks in transmission states King was prepared to demand surrender of Germans and thus re-enter the war.⁵⁹ Cable from Ambassador Sharp, 6244, dated December 12, 5 p.m.,⁶⁰ quotes Mr. Pichon as saying that he understands no declaration of war could be made by the present government as now constituted, but he looks upon Roumania as to all intent and purposes an ally although not formerly [*formally?*] so recognized. Department has heretofore held Roumania not at war since Bucharest treaties were signed. Department assumes you have information showing that Roumania is in fact now in a state of war with Germany. If this assumption is correct first legal difficulty would be satisfied. Roumania no doubt would make a declaration of war upon suggestion of American representative who can now be communicated with by telegraph.

As to second difficulty there is no representative here who has authority of any kind to sign obligations. When former advance was

made Roumanian Minister here signed obligations, but he has now left. The Treasury says it has no information as to whether the advances formerly made by it have been used or for what purpose they have been. Department is not advised as to whether Roumanian Government as at present constituted can give valid constitutional authorization to representative here to sign obligations any more than Servian or Belgian Government could in the past.

As to third difficulty, act of Congress under which loans are made provides that they be made "For the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defense and prosecuting the war." The Government has recently refused to make loans to Montenegro for purchase of agricultural machinery, cattle, relief of war desolation, army expense, care of disabled soldiers, and to San Marino for railways, hospitals and schools.

Treasury Department unable to make loan proposed by you unless this Department will say it is satisfied as to all points; viz., all three points mentioned (which as indicated above it is not in position to do) or unless the President will direct the Treasury to make the loan proposed.

It is suggested that if you have the facts showing that Roumania is at war and that loan is to be used for purposes within act of Congress, Roumanian Government should instruct its representative here in its name and on its behalf to negotiate a loan agreeing to sign obligations thereunder and to perform any other necessary acts in the premises. If the President will then, on account of the uncertainty as to legal authority of the present Roumanian Government to make foreign loans or delegate authority to its representatives here, approve the loan, as a matter of policy, the Treasury can act. This is the procedure followed in the doubtful cases of Servia and Belgium.

POLK

⁵⁸ *Ante*, p. 695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of [Doc. 579](#) and [Doc. 580](#)].

⁵⁹ See telegrams No. 133 and No. 134, Nov. 9 and 10, 1918, from the Minister in Roumania, pp. 385–387 [*Pgs. 385–387 include portions of [Doc. 309](#), [Doc. 310](#), [Doc. 311](#), and [Doc. 312](#)*].

⁶⁰ *Ante*, p. 397 [*Pg. 397 includes portions of [Doc. 327](#), [Doc. 328](#), and [Doc. 329](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/6

[Document 586]

***The French Minister of Commerce (Clémentel) to
the Food Administrator (Hoover)***

PARIS , 4 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. HOOVER: The French press has, this morning, published a communiqué relating to the constitution of the Food Council as well as the undertaking by America of the supply of food to the liberated areas.

The announcement, as worded in the French press, and as presented by certain papers of opposition, caused a belief that America has undertaken the supplies to the liberated areas of France and Alsace-Lorraine.

This has already created a great deal of disturbance in the public mind and in political circles as, if it had been the case, it would be a clear proof of the inability of the French Government to deal with his [its] own problems.

I know that this is not what you had in mind and that what moved your announcement, was the desire to acquaint your own countrymen with the steps which are being taken.

While we fully appreciate your motives, I want you also to appreciate our position in this incident, which is only an illustration of how vital it is that the action which is now being taken, should be taken in common and in common council.

So as to clear up at once the misunderstanding which has already risen in the mind of a good many people in France, the French Government is bound to publish a communiqué explaining this morning's publication and I am herewith sending you what we will publish in to-morrow morning[s] paper.

On the other hand, so as to coordinate the action as is necessary, I propose that there should be a joint press bureau attached to the Council which will be entrusted with the work of any public announcement or publication which would be judged necessary in connection with the work which is now being undertaken, and I am now designating to be our representative on this press bureau M. Lefort, with whom your delegates can at once get in touch for any further announcement.

Believe me [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure—Translation]^{[61](#)}

[Copy of Statement by French Government for the Press]

A communiqué of American origin was given to the press this morning dealing with the victualling of the liberated areas, in which it was stated that the supplying of these regions had been entrusted to the Food Administration of the United States.

Several observations must be made on this communiqué:

The measures referred to in this note actually apply not to our liberated areas, but to various regions which have been freed from the enemy's yoke, to wit: Serbia, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Poland, for whose supply an Inter-Allied committee has been set up at Paris.

The general decisions concerning this work of relief will be taken by the Governments of the Allies in accord. It is the carrying out of those decisions which is entrusted to the American Food Administration.

^{[61](#)} Translation supplied by the editor.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/84a: Telegram

[Document 587]

***The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting
Food Administrator (Richard)***

PARIS , January 4, 1919.

Food 167. Following letter was sent to British Ministry Food January 2d and is transmitted for your information.

“The problem of taking care of the surplus production from the United States is becoming extremely acute and requires further solution or alternatively we will have an economic situation arising that will be a disaster to all the Associated Governments.

In further amplification of the letter which I addressed today to Mr. Clynes⁶² on this whole subject, I would like to point out the Pork Product situation as a case in point.

The original British program under war conditions called for an import, according to the various programs, of somewhere in the neighborhood of 50,000 or 60,000 tons a month of Pork Products and lard. The producing conditions in the United States were adjusted to this originally and from the necessity of advance manufacture preparations were made by the American packers to supply the particular cuts required by the British public. As you are aware, this curing has to be started 60 days in advance. The program of over 200,000 tons of these products for January–March was repeated and established as late as December 15th and confirmed to our Washington office.

On the faith of these programs the packers were assured by the Food Administration that they should go ahead and make

the necessary provisions, and they state that this advance curing was also confirmed by your representatives.

I am advised from Washington that they now find themselves with some 45,000 tons of Cumberland cuts and some 30,000 tons of Wiltshire cuts in hand, ready for delivery in January. With the reduction of British orders to the basis of 20,000 tons a month this, of course, produces an extremely critical situation.

It is the last of our desires to ask the British Government or the British public to take a product which they cannot consume and we are extremely anxious to come to some adjustment in the matter which will protect both sides. I cannot but feel that there would be the same desire on your part to meet the changed conditions produced by the war situation that there has been on our part to adjust supplies to the Allies' every need, and I would indeed be glad to know if you cannot suggest some further solution to this matter."

HOOVER

62 John Robert Clynes, British Food Controller.

Paris Peace Conf. 874.48/2: Telegram

[Document 588]

***The Chargé in Bulgaria (Wilson) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

SOFIA , January 4, 1919—12 p.m.
[Received January 8—2:33 p.m.]

11. Referring to telegrams exchanged between Mr. Hoover and Prime Minister regarding Bulgaria's urgent need for flour, Prime Minister estimates supply will be totally exhausted in 15 days.

Have had conversation today with French general commanding Allied forces in Bulgaria, chief of British and Italian military missions and Italian diplomatic commissioner. We all agree that the need is urgent and that the supply will be exhausted before end of month at latest. We also agree that there will almost inevitably be disorders when bread fails, and that it is for interest not only of Bulgaria, but for Allies in Balkans that present internal order and tranquility of Bulgaria remain undisturbed. I believe all foreign representatives will urge their governments to furnish Bulgaria with flour, but the important thing is to do it quickly or at least put Government in position to be able to announce that Allies have agreed to allow Bulgaria certain amount of flour. Please repeat to Department.

WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/88: Telegram

[Document 589]

***The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting
Food Administrator (Richard)***

PARIS , January 5, 1919.

Food 173. Your 118.⁶³ The British are already furnishing from army stocks food and clothing relief to Serbia and Syria, the Italians to South Austria, the British and French are advancing the money for transport Belgian Relief. Allies are willing and anxious to do all they can and have and will contribute to the full extent of their resources but must be borne in mind that most of the food must be purchased in the United States and American money would be used for such purchase and transportation. Your 107 as to using this for revolving fund.⁶⁴ It would in effect be such a fund but it must be borne in mind that it would ultimately be absorbed in giving credits possibly over long periods to such peoples and institutions as our Treasury could not properly advance under the law and some of it would be lost in sheer charity. This is not to replace Treasury advances to England, Belgium, France, Italy, Serbia and Roumania governments for the purchase of American food. The proposed appropriations would be entirely insufficient for these purposes. It might however later on be used to partially replace loans to Serbia and Roumania but their urgent needs must in any event be cared for by the Treasury pending this appropriation. The matter is most urgent and forms the foundation for any complete arrangement with the Allies fixing their participation. It would also furnish a large measure of relief to urgent surpluses if prompt enough. There needs be great emphasis to all American officials and Congress that the Armistice has left us large surplus of food, that if we are to dispose of it we must give credits and that as the nation trying to put peace on high level ideals on which we went into war we cannot be niggardly in the world's greatest problem today, that is, how to get food. I need not repeat that strong liberal relief is today the only hope of stemming the tide

of Bolshevism, without the expenditure of lives and vast sums on military action. While it is urgently necessary to dispose of our surplus foods in order to relieve congestion and protect the producers from disaster and the consequent chaotic results, it is most fortunate for the saving of human lives that we have this surplus and our country cannot afford to fail to meet both emergencies.

HOOVER

63 Not printed.

64 Not found in Department files.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/95: Telegram

[Document 590]

***The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace***

ROME , January 6, 1919.

[Received January 7—3:50 a.m.]

51. For Hoover.

“Appreciating your considerations I have telegraphed to accept 20,000 tons of pork for January and that Italy unites with England and France to take her share of the 100,000,000 bushels of grain. Cordial greetings. Crespi.”

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/7: Telegram

[Document 591]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 6, 1919.

177. Your 98 January 4, 5 p.m. See Hoover's 173 to Food Administration which explains situation rather fully. The relief for the Balkan States and other peoples of Europe is to be undertaken in cooperation with the Allies with American leadership. Hoover as Director General will be in charge of the undertaking and a Council composed of two representatives from each England, France, Italy and the United States which Council will decide all questions involving general policy such as to whom relief shall be furnished, the lifting of blockade, the amount of relief to be given and the manner of financing, as well as the contribution which each Government can make. The Allies are already furnishing relief but it is impossible to make any definite proposals or arrangements with them until we are in position to act. It is believed however that England, France and probably Italy would be willing to agree to participate in the relief for a fixed percentage of the whole—contributing to the extent of their available resources in transportation, clothing, expenses which can be paid in their currencies and such minor amounts of food as they may have in surplus provided we are prepared to agree to advance any dollars required to complete their fixed contribution—but understand Secretary of Treasury does not favor advancing funds to Allies for payment of American food to be supplied by them to other countries. Investigations are being carried out now as to the actual requirements in the different areas for submission to the council but the actual Relief already carried out and information obtained thereby lead to the conclusion that the need will be great. It is also realized that the temporary and inadequate character of relief in progress will not be sufficient to meet the situation. There are urgent

requests for help from dozens of sources, usually of the type of cables now in your hands. It would be well to impress upon Congress that there is in the United States at present a considerable stock of surplus food especially wheat and pork which was accumulated principally for supplying the Allies and which would have been required by them had the war continued but which must now be disposed of in order to relieve storage and financial facilities in the United States because the Allies are now able to purchase and transport food at lower prices from their own possessions. While it is most important for us to dispose of this surplus in order to avoid difficulties in the United States, it is most fortunate that we have this surplus which is necessary to save human lives and stem the tide of Bolshevism in Europe. The hundred million dollars fund asked for to be placed at the disposal of the President will in a way be a revolving fund. In most cases obligations of Governments or of the Municipalities or institutions will be taken in payment of food and supplies furnished from the United States but in some cases to a minor extent food will be furnished on a strictly charitable basis. While none of this fund will be used for advances to Germany, assistance may be tendered Austria and food may be sold to Germany on a cash basis, and it is well to impress upon Congress the fact that entirely aside from a humanitarian standpoint it is necessary to feed even Germany in order to prevent starvation and anarchy and the necessity of an extended military occupation with consequent greater and more expensive problems to deal with. It is estimated that the total surplus food produced in United States will amount to about \$1,500,000,000 on which there is a considerable profit to the country and the Congress is only being asked to appropriate \$100,000,000 or a portion of this profit with which to facilitate use of the balance of the food to be used for this humanitarian and expedient undertaking. The Relief organization with the approval of the Council will only furnish supplies to such countries where after investigation it is found urgently necessary.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

840.48/1915b: Telegram

[Document 592]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—3 p.m.

107. For the Secretary of State: It is imperative to get some sort of expression from you before question of loan for appropriation for food comes up in House tomorrow. House Committee this morning evenly divided. Sherley cast deciding vote. Situation in Senate possibly even more serious. Have been requested to forward following message to you.

“Considerable opposition in House and Senate to 100 million food appropriation requested. It is imperative we have immediate cable as to the extent of money England and France will now provide. Also information as to Italy. We urge haste in furnishing data. Thomas S. Martin⁶⁶ and Swagar Sherley.”

POLK

⁶⁶ Senator from Virginia, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Paris Peace Conf. 864.48/2: Telegram

[Document 593]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—10 p.m.
[Received January 7—12 noon.]

120. For Hoover. Following from French Chargé December 21st.

“As I recently had the honor to mention to you, Colonel House informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic that Mr. Hoover had sent to Trieste two ships with supplies intended to save the city of Vienna from anarchy resulting from the scarcity of food, and that with a view to protecting the cars needed for the purpose of transportation of the cargoes from attack by Italians or Jugo-slavs he intended to place them under the guard of American soldiers.

His Excellency, Mr. Pichon, answered that the plan met with no objection from the French Government; he added, however, upon Colonel House’s remarking about the straits to which the city of Vienna had been reduced by the lack of coal, that our humane feelings towards Austria should not lead us to forget that the Czecho-Slovak state is still laboring under her intrigues.

It appears from concurrent reports received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic that the German Austrians in the selfsame moment of applying to the Czecho-Slovaks for coal are negotiating with the Poles in Czecho-Silesia who have seized the mines of that province and are daily sending carloads of coal to Germany. Again the German Austrians are, it seems, unceasingly supplying their compatriots in Bohemia with arms and ammunition so that they may if occasion arises

use arms in claiming separation from the Czech-Slovak Republic.”

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3a: Telegram

[Document 594]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 7, 1919—3 p.m.
[Received January 8.]

6879. The following telegram is from Rathbone for Davis. Treasury No. 688. In reference to Mission's telegram No. 132, January 3d [2d], 4 p.m., your unnumbered. The Treasury is ready to advance \$5,000,000 against Roumanian obligations to pay for food-stuffs bought here, whenever;

- (1) We are advised by Department of State that Roumania is at war with the enemies of this country. The State Department apparently is not ready to give this advice.
- (2) Treasury is advised by State Department that resultant from investigations made, it can designate some certain person in the Treasury with the authorization to sign obligations in the name and on behalf of the Government of Roumania, which obligations, in the view of the State Department, would be valid and binding internationally and have its sanction to complete our records. The Treasury also should be advised by yourself or Hoover clearly pointing out Roumania's need for the character of the specified food-stuffs and the amount designated for use within her territories. Also please obtain President's consent for use of credits in favour of Roumania which was heretofore approved by him for meeting food requirements in Roumania. When you receive such approval, please cable us the text of it, and send the letter to the Treasury. It is by far preferable that Roumania's obligations be executed here. State Department has been requested to inform us whether or not the representatives of the Roumanian Government here have been given the proper authority. Unless it has already been done, it must not be delayed any longer. The Secretary of the

Treasury presented to Congress President Wilson's message regarding the \$100,000,000 fund.^{[67](#)}

POLK

^{[67](#)} House Document No. 1640, 65th Cong., 3d sess.

033.1140/119: Telegram

[Document 595]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 7, 1919—5 p.m.

6881. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury 687. Mission's 154, January 4, 6 p.m. Yours unnumbered to Secretary. All applications for loans concerning relief should receive your consideration and study. You are expected to discuss the same and to make recommendations to the Treasury.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/9: Telegram

[Document 596]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 7, 1919—6 p.m.
[Received January 8—5 a.m.]

131. For President from Glass. Transmitted to Congress your request for one hundred million dollar appropriation to relieve starvation in Europe. I took up matter in advance with Democratic leaders of Senate and House and am hopeful authority will be granted.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 597]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 7, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 8—1:30 p.m.]

138. For Secretary of State. Your 177, January 6th. Sherley, Chairman Appropriation Committee of the House, needs more information. He particularly wishes to know as to whether Great Britain and France are actually committed to contributing and how much they propose to contribute; also whether the appropriation could be used for relief in Armenia or whether it is limited to Europe. Sherley anticipates rather a hard time and would like all the information they could get.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/105a: Telegram

[Document 598]

***The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting
Food Administrator (Richard)***

PARIS , January 8, 1919—4:40 p.m.

Food 192. President has signed license cancellations list number 1 effective January 10th. Please announce with the simple statement that this step is taken in accordance with the President's policy to release trades from restraints of war legislation as rapidly as practicable. Wish you to carefully consider the bearing of following on commodity regulations still outstanding.

First. I am gradually coming to the conviction that Europe cannot buy our surplus food between now and harvest without much wider credits than America is likely to give.

Second. Owing to Allied opposition to draining Germany of prime assets and impossibility setting up credits readily, she will probably be able to buy less than her real needs.

Third. The Allies are transferring all their buying possible to Southern Hemisphere where prices are cheaper and where they have credits, and until they exhaust these resources, they will not return to our markets any more than their necessities absolutely require and during this period we may have great difficulties with many of our surplus foods.

Fourth. There is certainly an influential party advocating these policies hoping to lower our prices, thus increasing their buying ability, and at the same time, create prestige at home with their consuming classes.

Fifth. These conclusions naturally favor the abandonment of all conservation on practically all food until at least developments here make probable a wider consuming market and more urgent buying of American produce than now appears probable.

Sixth. Sugar requires special consideration, and in view above factors and the national policies to reduce expenditures here, I am convinced we should encourage exports freely. Switzerland and other neutrals should be given contract for full year's supply. If it should develop we had oversold, we could trust to purchases in other parts of the world, and in any event we could finally reduce consumption at home if necessary. If you agree, I would encourage refiners to export and grant export licenses freely, keeping only within our monthly supply.

Seventh. There seems to me now, in view of above, to be a positive world surplus of our products as to wheat, barley, rye, pork products, condensed milk, beans. There seems comfortable supply sugar. There appears a shortage of corn which cannot allow for export and a shortage of cottonseed meal. The vegetable oil situation is obscure, also rice.

HOOVER

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/11: Telegram

[Document 599]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , 8 January, 1919.

203. For Senator Lodge from Mr. Henry White. Feel I should no longer delay laying before you condition which has been gradually forcing itself upon our Delegation and which now dominates entire European situation above all else; namely; steady westward advance of Bolshevism. It now completely controls Russia and Poland and is spreading through Germany. Only effective barrier now apparently possible against it is food relief, as Bolshevism thrives only on starvation and disorder. Consensus of opinion is that joint military occupation which has been suggested by France for Poland, even if practical would not solve problem. Confidentially Paderewski has sent us a most urgent appeal for assistance in Poland where conditions he says are desperate. I consider it therefore of utmost importance that President's request for hundred million appropriation for relief be granted at once. Impossible to inaugurate Peace Conference under proper auspices without previous adequate provision to cope with situation. Aside from stoppage of Bolshevism, I understand there is in United States considerable surplus of food accumulated at high prices maintenance whereof guaranteed by our government or assurance under its auspices and that it is necessary to dispose of this surplus in order to relieve warehouse and financial facilities as well as prevent serious fall in prices with radical break in market which would cost our country more than the appropriation asked for. The appropriation is not for the purpose of advancing money to Germany which will pay on a cash basis for any food sent there. It is too late I fear to stop Bolshevism in Russia and Poland, but there is still hope of making Germany, Roumania and certain other areas effective barriers. Allies are already furnishing relief to liberated territories and are disposed to assist otherwise to extent of

their available resources but most of the food must come from United States. I cannot too strongly impress upon you urgency of meeting situation herein described. Please communicate this to John Rogers, Gillett and Root⁶⁸ as a confidential message from me and of course you are welcome to do so to any of your colleagues to whom you think it will be interesting, also in confidence. Henry White.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁶⁸ John Jacob Rogers and Frederick Huntington Gillett, Congressmen from Massachusetts, and Elihu Root, Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909.

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/12: Telegram

[Document 600]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON , January 9, 1919—4 p.m.
[Received January 10—9:40 a.m.]

163. For the Secretary of State. Sherley reports that the Committee on Rules refused by vote of five to three to grant him a special ruling for the bill appropriating \$100,000,000 for relief. He declares without further information he is powerless.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 871.48/3a: Telegram

[Document 601]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919—5 p.m.

215. For the Secretary of the Treasury from the President. Referring to cable from Davis to you relative to an advance of \$5,000,000 to Roumania⁶⁹ and the various communications to the State Department and Food Administration on Roumanian situation. The information from our authorities indicates an extremely dangerous situation which must be relieved in the next few days and one which, if cumulative, with others, may necessitate increased military effort on our part. In my opinion this would be in interest of National Defense and I strongly approve giving this advance so as to allow the shipment of urgent food pending the appropriation for relief now in Congress. The British are sending cargo of wheat and we must assist by forwarding cargoes now in the Mediterranean. I also wish to urge the desirability of the Treasury aiding in every way in the disposal of our surplus food products in order to prevent losses to our producers and to prevent consequent difficulties at home and disorder in Europe. Unless there is some legal obstacle I regard this of the highest importance.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁶⁹ See telegram No. 132, Jan. 2, 1919, from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 693 [*Pg. 693 includes portions of [Doc. 577](#) and [Doc. 578](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/12a: Telegram

[Document 602]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919—5 p.m.

216. For the Secretary of War from the President. The Food Administration will present to you the situation produced by army reductions in pork purchases and the situation generally arising out of changed currents of trade due to the Armistice and the action of the British authorities.

I have received the following letter from Hoover with its memorandum which latter I propose present to early meeting with Allied premiers. As this latter may not succeed, I would like at once the views of yourself and colleagues as to whether, in the interests of peace, the safety of our army from rising anarchy, and the protection of our producers, the War Department should not make the necessary purchases to protect the American situation and ship the material to Europe for distribution under their direction as a military measure.

“My dear Mr. President: I have cablegrams this morning, copies of which are enclosed, stating that the whole of the customary monthly orders from the British buying organizations on behalf of the Allied Governments have been withdrawn. I am informed by the French and Italian officials that it is untrue so far as they are concerned that they have not withdrawn their share of the orders, and I am endeavoring to restore them through the British organization in New York. The Allied Food necessities have been outlined from time to time by a series of programmes made up by the Inter-Allied Food Council, the latest of these programmes is as recent as the 15th of December and calls for our entire January surplus.

Our manufacturers have provided the particular types of manufacture required by each of these Governments and have enormous stocks of these materials in hand ready for delivery in accordance with the indicated programmes above mentioned.

While we can protect our assurances given producers in many commodities, the most acute situation is in pork products which are perishable and must be exported. We have in January a surplus of about 400,000,000 pounds, and the French, Italian and Belgian Belief and other customary orders when restored will cover 60 percent of such. The British orders, at the rate indicated in their official programmes, would have been 140,000,000 pounds and covered our deficiency plus some help I am giving from the Belief. The British position is that they have sufficient supplies to last them for some weeks and that they wish to reduce their stocks.

If there should be no remedy to this situation we shall have a debacle in the American markets, and with the advances of several hundred million dollars now outstanding from the banks to the pork products industry we shall not only be precipitated into a financial crisis but shall betray the American farmer who has engaged himself to these ends. The surplus is so large that there can be no absorption of it in the United States and it, being perishable, will go to waste.

You will recollect that measures are before the Congress providing for appropriations for further economic assistance to the Allied Governments and I am confident that with the disclosure of this situation and the apparent desire of certain parties in England to break the American market a reaction will follow in the United States that will destroy the possibility of this economic support. In the face of this, the demand of liberated, neutral and enemy populations in Europe as to fats is beyond the ability of the United States to supply, and the need from the point of view of preserving order and laying the foundations of peace is absolutely instant in its insistence.

Mr. Davis and I have endeavored for the last 6 weeks to arrive at some co-operative action with the British agencies to forestall this situation and, as indicated above, the final result has been the refusal on their part to co-operate. We have suggested that the British Government should join with ourselves in the purchase of the necessary amounts of fats at our assured price to be resold to the liberated and enemy territories in order to prevent the above debacle, and this they have finally refused. I wish to assure you again that the prices which we are maintaining are the very minimum on which our American producers can come out whole on the effort they have made in the Allied cause, and I cannot impress upon you too strongly the reaction that will arise in the United States if this situation falls to the ground.

With Mr. Davis I have prepared the attached memorandum which I would like to suggest should be presented by you to the Allied Premiers at the earliest possible moment, as I cannot conceive that men with their vision as to the present situation will tolerate for one moment the attitude taken. Herbert C. Hoover.”

“Memorandum for agreement with Allied Premiers to comprise a direction to their various Government Departments. It is impossible to discuss the peace of the world until adequate measures have been taken to alleviate the fear of hunger, its attendant anarchy and its danger of possible further military operations. Therefore, before these peace negotiations can be opened auspiciously, it is essential to have the better feeding of the liberated, neutral and enemy territories of Europe in actual progress as the foundation of stability in government antecedent to the settlement of the great problems that will come before the Conference. It is therefore agreed by the Allied and the United States Governments that each shall, without further delay, furnish every possible assistance and facility required for carrying out the undertakings as to European Relief.

The United States has, in order to support the Allied Governments in war, provided large supplies of foodstuffs, many of them perishable, which would have been required by the Allies had hostilities continued. In order to accumulate these supplies, the American Government has given assurances and guarantees to their producers. The Allied Governments, as a result of the cessation of hostilities and the opening of other markets, no longer require the same amount of supplies from the United States as they have from time to time indicated by their programmes.

This surplus is now required to meet the necessities of Europe and it is most fortunate that the surplus is available for these purposes. It would be a disaster to the objects of the Associated Governments if the congestion in the United States should not be relieved so as to save waste and to meet the assurances given by the United States Government, and the Allied Governments agree to at once direct their departments to co-operate with the United States Food Administration to support these assurances, and the application of these foodstuffs to the needs of liberated, neutral and enemy peoples.

Pending the more mature plans and settlements of the Relief Administration as to food, shipping and finance, it is directed that immediate provision should be made from any available source of food supplies for provisions to points of acute need in the Balkan States, the liberated peoples of Turkey, Austria, to Belgium and Poland, that such provision shall be retroactively the obligation of the four Governments pending more definite arrangements.

It is desirable that the Associated Governments should show their good will towards the neutral countries of Europe by the immediate increase in the permitted importation of the surplus food commodities to these neutrals at once, being such amounts as the United States shall declare to be in surplus.

That it is necessary to at once give evidence of progress in the matter of food supplies to Germany and South Europe, and to this end the British, French and United States Governments will each at once give cabled orders for the shipment during the month of January of 30,000 tons of such fats (in addition to their orders for home consumption) as the United States shall declare available for these relief purposes. These foodstuffs shall be subsequently offered to Germany, subject to payment therefor and on other conditions that the Associated Governments may impose. That the Allied Governments and the United States will co-operate in the securing of such payment in a manner acceptable to each of the Associated Governments, and for providing the transportation of such foodstuffs. Before these supplies can arrive, the Relief Administration is expected to be working and to decide the conditions of distribution of payment and of further supplies and shipping.

These arrangements are declared binding upon all departments of the Allied and the United States Governments and shall be given immediate execution.”

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 603]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

169. Secretary of State for Polk for Sherley. Your 138, January 7th, 8 PM. Hoover has received following from American Mission of Investigation to Czecho-Slovakia comprising Dr. Alonzo Taylor, Gibson, Captain Gregory and Dr. Kellogg.

“We recommend immediate supply to Czecho-Slovaks of another 6,000 tons fat and 1,000 rice and 500 tons soap and 500 tons coffee and 30,000 tons flour.”

Seven thousand tons fat have been already arranged. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 604]

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

170. For Polk for Sherley. Your 138 January 7th, 8 PM. Message today from Colonel Atwood USA representing Hoover in Serbia and neighboring territories states:

“Previous reports American naval officers on bad food conditions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina are very conservative. British Army have gotten through a relief train to Belgrade from Fiume. We need two or three cargoes of mixed provisions at once. Admiral Bullard has secured for us necessary storage and stevedoring conditions. Both Navy and Army giving every possible assistance.”

Please give copy to Food Administration.

LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 605]

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

172. For Polk for Sherley. Your 138. Have following telegram January third from Polish Government Warsaw.

“In view of the famine in Lithuania, Silesia and Lwow in order to satisfy the minimum needs of the indigent population of all Poland with Lithuania [and?] Silesia 60,000 tons of flour are needed immediately. There is a need of 45,000 tons of flour per month in January and February and 30,000 tons of flour per month in March, April, May, June and July a total need of 300,000 tons of flour. The below given indicated quantities must be comprised in the monthly needs. The duration of these monthly needs comprises 8 months that is beginning with January until month of August inclusively. 6,750 tons of peas kidney beans and oatmeal, 5,625 tons of sugar, 1,875 tons of rice, 8,400 tons of preserved meat. Above all lard. 2,250 tons of fish and herring, 600 tons of condensed milk, 15 tons of cheese. 180 tons of butter, 600 tons of vegetable and animal fats, 375 tons of tea, 90 tons of cocoa, 30 tons of pepper, 15 tons of saltpeter. In view of complete exhaustion of all storage there is a need of clothing shoes and underwear for 10,000 inhabitants counting per person a pair of shoes 3 meters of material for clothing and 6 meters of linen. There is a need of medicines and bandages we will communicate to you on occasion the great necessary quantity of same. For the transport of the above-mentioned cargoes of the ports of Gdansk, Krolewicz and Libawa 3,300 covered wagons and 110 locomotives are necessary. It is indispensable to give up as soon as possible to the Polish Government the railroads with

rolling stock; Gdansk-Mlawka, Gdansk-Torun, Libawa-Bialystok. Communication with the White Russian Regions of Lithuania and Podlasie is impossible in view of the fact they are still invaded by the Germans who clear the country of the last reserves and the Bolsheviks massacre the population. [”]

LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 606]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 9, 1919.

173. For Polk for Sherley [from Lansing]. Your 138, January 7th, 8 PM. Commission comprising representatives four Governments, among whom Dr. Alonzo Taylor representing us, telegraph from Vienna:

“Allied representative now authorized ship Austria 30,000 tons without regard to immediate financial arrangement. Italy offers 15,000 tons. Condition very urgent.”

LANSING
AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/10: Telegram

[Document 607]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 11, 1919—2 a.m.

239. [From Lansing.] Your 138, January 7, 8 p.m. For information see telegram from the Legation at Sofia number 11, January 4, 12 a.m. [p.m.], Embassy at Paris telegram number 6627 of January 4, 12 p.m. [*January 5, 10 a.m.*], and Hoover's telegram number 205 to the Food Administration.^{[70](#)}

Question of prorata contributions will be determined when Allied Commissioners on Relief meet in Paris. England is and has been contributing all of relief to Servia and is sending two cargoes of flour to Roumania, and Italy has already made contributions. In fact, the Allies recognize necessities and are willing to contribute anything they have available.

As regards relief for Armenia understand campaign now on in the U. S. to raise thirty million for this purpose, but see no objection to include Armenia, in appropriation, except for adverse effect this might have on campaign.

Please do not fail to furnish Mr. Sherley with information regarding appeals for assistance which may be received by the Department from sources other than the Peace Mission.

Cannot too strongly urge passage of bill. Refer Commissioner White's telegram to Senator Lodge.^{[71](#)} Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁷⁰ Telegrams No. 6627 and No. 205 not printed.

⁷¹ *Ante*, p. 711 [*Pg. 711 includes portions of [Doc. 598](#) and [Doc. 599](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/15: Telegram

[Document 608]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to
Negotiate Peace***

WASHINGTON [undated].

[Received January 12, 1919—6:30 a.m.]

198. For Auchincloss. Sherley proposes to bring up food fund bill Monday and is most anxious to know before then the names of representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy upon Hoover's Inter-Allied Relief Commission, also dates of their appointments.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 840.48/15: Telegram

[Document 609]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 12, 1919.

260. From Auchincloss. Your 198.⁷² Please inform Sherley that representatives interallied relief commission are Lord Reading Ambassador Great Britain to United States and Sir John Beale Chairman Wheat Executive London. We have no information regarding date of their appointment. They arrived in Paris January 10 and are already in conference.⁷³ French representatives are Clementel, Minister of Commerce, and Vilgrain undersecretary of State for Supply. Their appointments date from December 31. No official advice regarding names of Italian representatives other than that they are on the way. Signor Attolico of the interallied Food Council, London, is authorized to act for them until their arrival and is likewise in conference.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁷² *Supra.*

⁷³ The first meeting of this body, known as the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, was held at Paris on Jan. 11, 1919, at 3 p.m. On Feb. 25, 1919, the name of the Council was changed to the "Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council." For minutes of its meetings, see the records of the Supreme Economic Council.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/163: Telegram

[Document 610]

***The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace***

ROME , January 12, 1919.

[Received January 13—12:20 a.m.]

68. For Hoover.

“Only yesterday I have been informed of the European Relief Administration. I have delegated by wire Attolico to represent Italian Government at the first meeting. I shall ask President Orlando on his return to appoint the two permanent Italian delegates. I expect the new body will deal with matters included in your telegram of the 7th in regard Roumania. Crespi.”

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/15

[Document 611]

***The Special Representative of the Treasury in
Europe (Davis) to President Wilson***

PARIS , 13 January, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With reference to the cable which you sent to the Secretary of the Treasury regarding the establishment of a credit for \$5,000,000 in favor of Roumania⁷⁴ and to a cable which I also sent to the Secretary on the subject,⁷⁵ I am now in receipt of a cable⁷⁶ to the effect that the Treasury is ready to establish a credit of \$5,000,000 in favor of Roumania and to advance funds thereunder against Roumanian obligations to pay for foodstuffs bought in the United States, upon the following conditions:

1. That the establishment of the credit be approved by you,
2. That the State Department advise that Roumania is at war with the enemies of this country and that some person in Washington is duly authorized to execute the corresponding obligation on behalf of the Roumanian Government, and,
3. That a statement be furnished by Mr. Hoover clearly pointing out Roumania's need for the specified food for use within her territory.

Mr. Hoover is preparing the statement required and I understand that the State Department is clearing up the legal aspects of the question, and I respectfully request that, if it meets with your approval, you sign the enclosed letter for transmission by me to the Secretary of the Treasury.⁷⁷

I am [etc.]

NORMAN H. DAVIS

⁷⁴ Telegram No. 215, Jan. 9, 1919, 5 p.m., from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 712 [*Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 599](#), [Doc. 600](#), and [Doc. 601](#)*].

⁷⁵ See telegram No. 132, Jan. 2, 1919, from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 693 [*Pg. 693 includes portions of [Doc. 577](#) and [Doc. 578](#)*].

⁷⁶ See telegram No. 6879, Jan. 7, 1919, 3 p.m., from the Acting Secretary of State, p. 708 [*Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 593](#) and [Doc. 594](#)*].

⁷⁷ For the text of the letter as sent, see telegram No. 397, Jan. 23, 1919, 11 a.m. from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 723 [*Pg. 723 includes portions of [Doc. 615](#), [Doc. 616](#), and [Doc. 617](#)*].

871.48/89: Telegram

[Document 612]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 13, 1919—7 p.m.

6947. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury 701. Supplementing our 688.⁷⁸ President's message number 215 January 9, 5 p.m. has been received, which we regard as sufficient to authorize use of credits in favor of Roumania which President has heretofore approved. We now await necessary advices from State Department in order that requirements of act of Congress shall be observed.

POLK

⁷⁸ Telegram No. 6879, Jan. 7, 1919, 3 p.m., from the Acting Secretary of State, p. 708 [*Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 593](#) and [Doc. 594](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/9: Telegram

[Document 613]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 15, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 16—1:10 p.m.]⁷⁹

245. For President from Glass.

First. Your message regarding Roumania was received.⁸⁰ Advance to Roumania will be made when essential requirements imposed by loan statutes are met. Wired Davis several days ago particulars and that Treasury would make advance whenever put in position to do so legally.⁸¹ Understand that State Department has cabled on subject.

Second. Appreciate importance of food supplies in relation to your policies and anxious to use powers of Treasury to support them. Treasury has uniformly recognized supplies of foodstuffs to European Allies as a purpose for which loans could be made under existing law and will continue to do so until conditions change or you advise to the contrary. In no case has it refused to make such loans.

Third. Appreciate desirability of marketing our surplus products and that this is a collateral advantage of the policy of supplying foods to Europe. The question of Treasury's attitude on prevention of loss to producers has been raised here. Treasury has taken position that artificial upholding of prices was undesirable because of burden thereby imposed on commodity in general and the disadvantage at which our industries would be placed in international markets. Since the armistice many claims for indirect protection of prices have been put forward in regard to commodities the production of which have been stimulated to meet war needs. Treasury has maintained that any obligations of our government to producers of great commodities should be met

by direct appropriation and payment as is proposed by bills now pending. In the case of certain minerals I am convinced that to meet such obligations indirectly by using governmental powers granted for other specific purposes to prevent losses to the producers by artificial maintenance of price is both economically and politically objectionable. McCormick is familiar with, and I believe fully shares substance my views on these questions which I hope have your approval.

POLK

⁷⁹ Text printed from corrected copy received Jan. 19, 1919, 4:30 p.m.

⁸⁰ See telegram No. 215, Jan. 9, 1919, 5 p.m., from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 712 [*Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 599](#), [Doc. 600](#), and [Doc. 601](#)*].

⁸¹ Telegram *supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[Document 614]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 16, 1919—12:10 p.m.

305. [From Lansing.] Your 103 January 4th, 8 p.m. Answering your questions whether Roumania is as a matter of fact to be regarded as belligerent within the Act of Congress following information furnished me from military sources:

“On November 9th Roumanian Government with the knowledge of the Allies summoned the German troops who were in Roumania to leave the country within 24 hours. As they had not left at the end of 24 hours Roumanian Army was mobilized on the night of November 9th and hostilities were immediately begun which continued until all the German forces had either been taken prisoners or driven into Hungary. The Roumanian Government, as stated above, mobilized on the 9th, hence the Roumanian Government was once more in a state of war with Germany prior to the signing of the Armistice on the 11th”.

It is my understanding that the King of Roumania never signed the Treaty of Bukarest^{81a} and that the treaty was never promulgated. I am informed that according to Roumanian Law no treaty is binding until promulgated following the Royal signature. The Roumanian claim is that Roumania did not cease to be at war with the Central Powers and consequently no new declaration of war was necessary. It was not even necessary to resume fighting as they had never technically stopped.

In view of the fact that the Allied Governments have never recognized the Treaty of Bukarest and that its validity is doubtful,

that by the terms of the armistice the Germans were compelled to denounce the treaty and that from the point of view of the associated governments, the status of Roumania is the same as if the treaty had never been made which is evidenced by the fact that we have decided to grant Roumania two delegates to the Peace Conference and put her on the basis of Serbia, Belgium and other small Belligerent Powers, I consider that Roumania is in a state of war with Germany and should be regarded as a belligerent within the meaning of the act of Congress.

In view of the foregoing see no reason why you should not give the advice desired by the Secretary of the Treasury as stated in paragraph 1 of your telegram number 6879 January 7th 3 P.M. from Rathbone for Davis through the Embassy here.

Please advise me immediately whether Roumanian Representative in Washington has received full authority to sign obligations for advances.

As to question whether loan is to be used for the purposes contemplated by the Act of Congress, telegram from Treasury Department referred to above does not appear to require any such statement from the Department of State.

For approval of the President see Mission's Telegram number 215 of January 9th 5 P.M. transmitting message from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury through you. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{81a} [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771](#) .

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/12: Telegram

[Document 615]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 18, 1919—8 p.m.
[Received January 19—8:40 a.m.]

303. Your 305, January 18 [16], 1 p.m. [12:10 p.m.] Department is advising Treasury that Roumania should be regarded as a belligerent within the meaning of the Act of Congress. Roumanian authorities here are still without authority to sign obligations. Might not such authority be forwarded to [by] Premier Bratiano who is understood to be at present in Paris? For your information the following cable has been sent to the Legation at Bucharest:

“For your information only. In order to relieve urgent necessities President has recommended to Treasury immediate advance of \$5,000,000 to Roumania. Treasury before making advance must have a specified person designated as one authorized to sign obligations in the name and on behalf of the Roumanian Government, which obligations in the opinion of the Department would be valid and binding internationally and have its sanction. Roumanian Minister here formerly had such authorization but he has now left United States.

You are instructed to explain to the Roumanian Government that before any advance can be made by Treasury, the Roumanian Government should instruct its representative in United States to negotiate a loan agreement in its name and on its behalf, to sign obligations thereunder and to perform any other acts in the premises. Cable to Department at once an authentic copy of the full powers issued by Roumanian Government to its representative in the United States and

forward as soon as possible the original authenticated full powers in pouch.”

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/3: Telegram

[Document 616]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 20, 1919—10 p.m.

356. [From Lansing.] Your number 103. Legal difficulty number 1 is dealt with in my number 305.^{[82](#)}

Regarding difficulty number 2 I have now received and will send to you by hand an official document signed by Jean Bratiano president of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the kingdom of Roumania authorizing Nicholas Lahovary Charge d'affaires in the United States to negotiate and conclude loans, to execute obligations with the United States and to receive therefore in behalf of the Kingdom of Roumania such sums as shall be advanced to him in the exercise of such full powers. This document was prepared by Major Scott and Mr. Miller and I regard it as sufficient authority given by a duly constituted government.^{[83](#)}

Regarding difficulty number 3. Roumania is threatened with bolshevism and collapse of Army unless relief can be obtained. This would occasion the use of many more allied troops in eastern Europe than at present and would require renewed military operations. See Cable number 215 President to Secretary of Treasury.^{[84](#)} With these advices suggest you proceed at once to furnish Treasury Department with the information requested. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

^{[82](#)} *Ante*, p. 721 [Pg. 721 includes portions of [Doc. 613](#) and [Doc. 614](#)].

^{[83](#)} For text of the document, see Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 361.

84 *Ante*, p. 712 [*Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 599](#), [Doc. 600](#), and [Doc. 601](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/14a: Telegram

[Document 617]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , January 23, 1919—11 a.m.

397. D-9 for Rathbone [from Davis].

1. Before receiving your 701,⁸⁵ I addressed a letter to the President, in accordance with your 688,⁸⁶ requesting his consent for the use of credits in favor of Roumania, and have received a letter from him addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, which is being forwarded, reading as follows.

“Mr. Norman H. Davis has brought to my attention a cablegram of January 7, from the Treasury Department, containing the views of the Department concerning the establishment of a credit of Five Million Dollars in favor of Roumania and the advance of funds thereunder against Roumanian obligations, to pay for foodstuffs bought in the United States.

The situation now existing in that country, critical for Roumania herself, and attended with the possibility of consequences less purely local, persuades me, as a matter of national policy, and in the interest of national defense, to lend my strong approval to the establishment of the proposed credit, even though there may be some uncertainty regarding the legal authority of the present Roumanian Government to negotiate foreign loans or to delegate authority to its representatives in the United States.

My approval is, of course, conditioned upon the fulfillment of such other requisites as you may deem necessary or advisable.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Cordially yours, Signed
Woodrow Wilson.”

2. While the President’s letter refers to the establishment of a credit rather than advancing funds under credits previously established, I assume from your 701 that this letter is in fact not needed.

3. I am informed that the Prime Minister of Roumania has delivered to Secretary Lansing a document authorizing the Roumanian Charge d’Affaires in Washington to execute obligations and receive funds, and that Secretary Lansing is cabling his approval of same to the State Department for their action.⁸⁷ Please advise when funds are made available. Davis.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁸⁵ Telegram No. 6947, Jan. 13, 1919, 7 p.m., to the Chargé in France, p. 720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of [Doc. 612](#) and [Doc. 613](#)].

⁸⁶ Telegram No. 6879, Jan. 7, 1919, 3 p.m., to the Chargé in France, p. 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 593](#) and [Doc. 594](#)].

⁸⁷ *Supra*.

Paris Peace Conf. 871.51/16: Telegram

[Document 618]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON , January 25, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received January 26—6:50 a.m.]

414. For Davis from Rathbone. Treasury 742. Mission 397 January 21 [23] 11:00 A.M. Your 9.

1. Everything in order to establish \$5,000,000 credit in favor Roumania, and to make advances therefrom needed to pay for food stuffs purchased in United States when Roumania requests the establishment of such credit and such advances therefrom.
2. Everything in order to advance additional \$1,000,000 to Czecho Slovaks from credit previously established to defray cost of 5,000 tons of flour referred to in recent cable from Hoover to Food Administration when Czecho Slovaks request such advance.
3. Food Administration informed of foregoing and we anticipate requests from Roumanians and Czecho Slovaks at an early date.
4. Will cable you when respective advances are made.

POLK

The Blockade and Regulation of Trade¹

¹ For previous correspondence concerning trade regulations, see [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. II, pt. II](#) , *passim*, particularly the sections dealing with measures affecting neutral trade and black lists of neutral firms.

[\[619\] The Ambassador in France \(Sharp \) to the Secretary of State](#)

Paris , November 9, 1918—2 a.m. [Received 7:15 a.m.]

600.001/591: Telegram

[\[620\] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain \(Laughlin \)](#)

Washington , November 14, 1918—9 p.m.

763.72112/10613: Telegram

[\[621\] The Chargé in Great Britain \(Laughlin \) to the Secretary of State](#)

London , November 15, 1918—7 p.m. [Received November 16—1:45 a.m.]

600.119/1672: Telegram

[622] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 15, 1918—9 p.m. [Received November 16—1:35 a.m.]

763.72112/10777: Telegram

[623] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 16, 1918—7 p.m.

600.119/1775b: Telegram

[624] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 16, 1918—5 p.m.

811.731/599a: Telegram

[625] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 16, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/1719a: Telegram

[626] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)

Washington , November 18, 1918—7 p.m.

600.119/1775a: Telegram

[627] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 19, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/1719b: Telegram

[628] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , November 19, 1918—5 p.m.

600.001/606a: Telegram

[629] The Secretary of State to All American Missions and Consulates

Washington , November 21, 1918.

600.119/1713a: Circular telegram

[630] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 21, 1918.

600.119/1715a: Telegram

[631] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 22, 1918—8 p.m. [Received November 23—2:40 a.m.]

763.72112/10840: Telegram

[632] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 23, 1918. [Received November 23—5 p.m.]

103.96/1550: Telegram

[633] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin).

Washington , November 25, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/1723a: Telegram

[634] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin).

Washington , November 26, 1918—5 p.m.

763.72112/10777: Telegram

[635] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 26, 1918—7 p.m. [Received November 27—2:26 a.m.]

763.72112/10867¹/₂: Telegram

[636] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , November 27, 1918.

763.72112/10840: Telegram

[637] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 29, 1918. [Received November 29—8:19 p.m.]

600.119/1724: Telegram

[638] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London , November 30, 1918. [Received November 30—4:46 p.m.]

103.96/1607: Telegram

[639] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 4, 1918—7 p.m.

103.96/1550: Telegram

[640] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 5, 1918—4 p.m. [Received 11:53 p.m.]

600.119/1772: Telegram

[641] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 6, 1918. [Received December 7—5:20 a.m.]

103.96/1663: Telegram

[642] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 7, 1918—9 p.m.

600.119/1724: Telegram

[643] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 10, 1918—2 p.m.

600.119/1806a: Telegram

[644] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 10, 1918—3 p.m.

763.72112/10867¹/₂: Telegram

[645] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 10, 1918—10 p.m.

600.119/1803a: Telegram

[646] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 11, 1918—3 p.m. [Received 10:33 p.m.]

763.72112/11002: Telegram

[647] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 12, 1918. [Received December 12—2:42 p.m.]

600.119/1804: Telegram

[648] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 13, 1918.

600.119/1912b: Telegram

[649] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 13, 1918. [Received December 13—7:08 p.m.]

600.119/1807: Telegram

[650] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 13, 1918—4 p.m.

600.119/24551): Telegram

[651] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 13, 1918. [Received December 13—7:20 a.m.]

657.119/1070: Telegram

[652] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 14, 1918.

600.119/1912c: Telegram

[653] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 14, 1918. [Received December 14—2:45 p.m.]

600.119/1839: Telegram

[654] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 14, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/1852a: Telegram

[655] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Washington , December 14, 1918—4 p.m.

600.119/1912a: Telegram

[656] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 14, 1918—8 p.m.

611.006/843aa: Telegram

[657] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 15, 1918—12 a.m. [Received 6 p.m.]

600.119/2208: Telegram

[658] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

Washington , December 17, 1918—6 p.m.

103.96/1663: Telegram

[659] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 17, 1918. [Received December 17—2:57 p.m.]

763.72112/11040: Telegram

[660] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 17, 1918—4 p.m. [Received 5:16 p.m.]

663.119/orig: Telegram

[661] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 18, 1918. [Received December 18—12:55 p.m.]

600.119/1854: Telegram

[662] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 18, 1918. [Received December 18—5:19 p.m.]

600.119/1856: Telegram

[663] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 20, 1918—10 a.m. [Received 3:08 p.m.]

600.119/2209: Telegram

[664] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , December 20, 1918—3 p.m.

600.119/1839: Telegram

[665] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , December 20, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/1807: Telegram

[666] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 20, 1918. [Received December 20—12:48 p.m.]

103.96/1768: Telegram

[667] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 20, 1918—5 p.m. [Received 8:05 p.m.]

103.96/1774: Telegram

[668] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 20, 1918—7 p.m.

600.119/2208: Telegram

[669] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 20, 1918. [Received December 20—10:01 p.m.]

600.119/1883: Telegram

[670] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis).

Washington , December 21, 1918—4 p.m.

600.119/1794: Telegram

[671] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis).

Washington , December 21, 1918—4 p.m.

600.119/1839: Telegram

[672] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 21, 1918. [Received December 21—5:39 p.m.]

600.119/1887: Telegram

[673] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 21, 1918—5 p.m.

600.119/2208: Telegram

[674] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp).

Washington , December 21, 1918—6 p.m.

600.119/1906a: Telegram

[675] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Missions and Consulates

Washington , December 23, 1918.

600.119/1917a: Circular telegram

[676] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 23, 1918. [Received December 23—4:10 p.m.]

600.119/1893: Telegram

[677] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 23, 1918. [Received December 23—6:55 p.m.]

600.119/1891: Telegram

[678] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 23, 1918—6 p.m. [Received 10:28 p.m.]

600.119/1900: Telegram

[679] The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting Food Administrator (Richard)

[Paris ,] December 24, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/16a: Telegram

[680] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 24, 1918. [Received December 24—10:40 a.m.]

600.119/1899: Telegram

[681] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 24, 1918. [Received December 24—1:21 p.m.]

600.119/1895: Telegram

[682] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 24, 1918—4 p.m. [Received December 24—3:59 p.m.]

600.119/1894: Telegram

[683] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , December 24, 1918—7 p.m.

841.731 T 67/13a: Telegram

[684] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 24, 1918—9 p.m. [Received December 25—5:55 p.m.]

600.119/1907: Telegram

[685] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 25, 1918. [Received December 25—3:08 p.m.]

600.119/2214: Telegram

[686] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , December 25, 1918—noon. [Received 5:37 p.m.]

600.119/1906: Telegram

[687] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , December 28, 1918. [Received December 28—4:50 p.m.]

600.119/1917: Telegram

[688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington , December 30, 1918—4 p.m.

600.119/2209: Telegram

[689] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of the War Trade Board (Hale)

[Washington ,] December 31, 1918.

600.119/1917

[690] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , January 1, 1919—5 p.m. [Received 8:32 p.m.]

600.119/1931: Telegram

[691] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

London , January 3, 1919—12 noon. [Received 6:20 p.m.]

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/61: Telegram

[692] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , January 3, 1919. [Received January 3—10:42 a.m.]

600.119/1937: Telegram

[693] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , January 3, 1919—5 p.m.

658.119/770: Telegram

[694] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , January 3, 1919—6 p.m.

600.119/1897: Telegram

[695] The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Food Administration

[Paris ,] January 4, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/83: Telegram

[696] The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris , January 4, 1919—10 a.m. [Received 11:06 a.m.]

600.119/1953: Telegram

[697] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis).

Washington , January 4, 1919—4 p.m.

600.119/1895: Telegram

[698] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss).

Washington , January 6, 1919—8 p.m.

600.119/2214: Telegram

[699] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss).

Washington , January 7, 1919—8 p.m.

600.119/1996c: Telegram

[700] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State

London , January 7, 1919. [Received January 7—6 p.m.]

103.96/1868: Telegram

[701] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)

Washington , January 8, 1919—6 p.m.

600.119/1917: Telegram

[702] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , January 9, 1919.

763.72112/11394a: Telegram

[703] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , January 10, 1919.

600.119/2007b: Telegram

[704] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

Washington , January 13, 1919.

600.119/2009b: Telegram

600.001/591: Telegram

[Document 619]

***The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the
Secretary of State***

PARIS , November 9, 1918—2 a.m.
[Received 7:15 a.m.]

5779. War Trade Board [from McFadden]: Number 578. The following is submitted for your consideration:

First. In the event of the United States being unable, by discussion, to persuade the adoption by the Allies, of our interpretation of our principles or policies, at the peace conference, and in order to avoid undue postponement of the conclusion thereof, then what economic pressure can the United States exert which would lead to their acceptance?

Second. The importance of the military and naval support of the United States will hereafter be greatly diminished, but our economic, financial support will be essential to the Allies, in the post-war period. For example: (a) The United States and Great Britain, in the postwar period will be logical and vigorous competitors for the world's colonial and Far Eastern trades. The United States by reason of her supplies of raw materials, exportable surplus of certain characters of merchandise, merchant marine and financial resources should have the better of the competition as the United States will be independent economically of Great Britain (as we assume that Great Britain will be able to control the economic policies of her self-governing dominions), while Great Britain will be dependent upon the United States for certain food supplies (particularly wheat and fats), commodities especially cotton, oils, and certain metals, notably copper, not only for domestic needs but also in order to reestablish her foreign trade. (b) France, however, will not be a competitor for the world's trade, for the reason that France is a manufacturer of articles de

luxury in which the United States does not compete. France, in the post-war period will be economically dependent upon the United States for food, raw materials of all characters, metals, machinery merchandise and tonnage, together with the financial support necessary for the purchase thereof in America. As regards Italy, this nation will be even more dependent than France upon the United States in the postwar period for food, raw materials, metals merchandise, financial support.

Third. The economic dependence of the Allies upon the United States was fully realized by them, and in consequence thereof, in April 1916, a permanent Inter-Allied Council (Comité Permanent Inter-Allié Pour l'Étude des Questions Économiques), was established in Paris, for the purpose of considering this subject. This Council occupies itself with three characters of economic questions: (a) The consideration of reconstruction of devastated districts; (b) the consideration of a policy of boycott of the Central Powers by the Allies in the post-war period; (c) the consideration of preferential trade agreements between the Allies in the post-war period. The writer was instructed by the State Department to make a study of the functions of this Council, and as a result thereof, recommend[ed] that the United States should avoid representation; in consequence thereof, the activities of this council have been discontinued, as it was recognized that unless the United States was willing to cooperate, nothing effective could be accomplished by the council.

Fourth. The representatives of the British, French, and Italian Governments at the Versailles Conference last week recommended during the interval between the signing of the armistice and the official declaration of peace: (a) the continuation of the Allied programme committees, councils and executives also; (b) the control and administration of the enemy merchant marine to be exercised by the Allied Transport Council; also (c) the continuation of blockade as applied to enemy and neutral nations. In compliance with the above we venture to point out:

1. As [An?] international control especially as regards food will be necessary during the post-war period but the control and price fixing if any or [for?] commodities and merchandise for which Europe is dependent upon the United States should be determined in Washington not only on account of the best

political and economic [interests?] of the United States but also in order that same may be kept free of all prejudice.

2. Information received in Paris leads us to believe that it will be necessary for the Allied Governments to undertake a great relief work especially in connection with food supplies in enemy countries. It therefore occurs to us that the Belgian Relief might be expansion [*expanded*] into a great relief association, its administration being supplemented as might be necessary, and control and use of enemy tonnage being assigned to it for the transport of supplies for relief purposes from America to Continental Europe, together with the transportation of American troops and military materials on return voyages from France to the United States.

3. As regards the blockade it will be the desire of the Allied Governments to continue same for an indefinite period in order to regulate the quantities of foods, raw materials, etc., to be furnished enemy and neutral countries with a view to providing supplies only sufficient for their domestic requirements, and also with the object of delaying as long as possible the reestablishment of their export trade.

Fifth. We observe that the agreements between the Associated Governments and neutrals are to continue until the declaration of peace, but we are inclined to believe that it will be the policy of the Allied Governments to prolong negotiations with the object of delaying the final ratification of peace for the reasons: (*a*) They hope, during the interval between the armistice and the ultimate declaration of peace, that they will enjoy a decided advantage over neutrals and enemy countries in procuring the raw materials necessary to enable them to reestablish, in advance of enemy and neutrals, their domestic and foreign trades, and (*b*) they anticipate that, during this period, the American Army will remain in France, in consequence of which large sums of money must be expended in its pay and maintenance.

Sixth. The political destiny of a nation, especially at the time, is dependent upon its economic prosperity. The Allied Governments will endeavor to demobilize as rapidly as possible their armies; but as the men are released work must be found for them, otherwise strikes, labor troubles, and general social unrest will result and in consequence thereof the economic dependence of England,

France, and Italy upon the United States will be pronounced. Therefore we venture to observe that the influence and interests of the United States might be best safeguarded as follows: (a) Complete liberty of action as regards trade together with a noncommittal policy as to the distribution of raw materials, merchandise, et cetera controlled by the United States; (b) noncommittal policy as far as possible as regards blockade; (c) neutral agreements where necessary to be between Neutral Governments and the United States rather than between Neutral Governments and Associated Governments; (d) the expansion of the Belgian Relief into a relief association for the purpose of undertaking all relief work. Copy of this cable has been handed to Mr. Auchincloss. McFadden.

SHARP

763.72112/10613: Telegram

[Document 620]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 14, 1918—9 p.m.

2813. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1626. In reply to Embassy's 3276 Nov. 1, 11 a.m. from Owen.² Please repeat substance of following to Christiania, Copenhagen and Stockholm:

In view of the changed situation, we would like to have opinion of the A. B. C.³ as to changes which will simplify procedure in regard to Northern Neutrals. We consider that it will now be unnecessary to limit the imports of the Northern Neutrals for many articles. A desirable manner of handling the problem from now on would be to establish an agreed list, applications for which list should be referred to London for statistical reasons, this list to be made up of articles in which there may be a world shortage or which it would be undesirable to make available, except in accordance with the ration, pending the actual signing of peace. This list could be changed from time to time, but should in our opinion in the first instance include food stuffs and fodders, raw materials generally, including mineral oils. There would be thus left to go freely manufactured articles, iron and steel and products. If desirable for statistical purposes, applications granted outside of the list could be advised to London.

LANSING

² Not printed. William H. Owen was War Trade Board representative in Sweden.

3 Allied Blockade Committee.

600.119/1672: Telegram

[Document 621]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Secretary of State***

LONDON , November 15, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 16—1:45 a.m.]

3756. War Trade Board. For McCormick [from Sheldon]: Number 1882. With reference to the question of the continuation of Allied control of shipping, raw materials and generally the movement of commodities between Allies and Neutrals and among the Neutrals themselves which has been administered by the Blockade Authorities, I suggest you see Ship Mission cable from Tower to Gay, number 799, November 13th [15th].⁴ I strongly urge that a decision be arrived at by our Government at the earliest possible moment as unless this is done I fear we shall all drift into a condition of affairs which will make joint action more difficult should this be advisable. Conditions are changing rapidly and unless a policy be decided without delay, individual countries may start individualistic policies which once in motion would be difficult to arrest. I think even before the arrival of Hoover and Hurley that it would be useful if some intimation could be given the heads of missions on this side of the probable policy our Government will adopt even if at the present time it is not possible to make a positive declaration. I have found an almost universal consensus of opinion among Americans in charge of government work here that, as all the governments have had in their hands control of raw materials, shipping and trade for war purposes, the Governments should keep in their hands existing control at least long enough to direct the change away from war purposes into the channels for peace purposes.

LAUGHLIN

⁴ Not printed. Walter S. Tower was trade expert for the Shipping Board.

763.72112/10777: Telegram

[Document 622]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 15, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received November 16—1:35 a.m.]

3765. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 1879. Supplementing Frothingham's 1854 and 1864 of November 13th.⁵ Minister of Blockade today discussed with Allied Blockade Committee certain tentative proposals for relaxation of blockade. Will report definitely as soon as proposals are finally drafted and submitted to me for your views.

1. Censorship to remain in full force for those not on statutory list. Action taken with respect to stopping or returning letters and cables will be reduced to a minimum censorship. Action for nonstatutory list firms to be supervisory and for information purposes rather than punitive.
2. Bona fide neutral firms to be removed from statutory list; firms of enemy status, covers for such firms, banks, and covers for to be shorn of estimated reduction of list by one tenth.⁶
3. Confidential black list to be reduced as much as possible, principal offenders to be retained with object giving temporary advantage to white list firms. Black list restrictions to be withdrawn with respect to: (a) censorship disabilities, stoppage of letters, telegrams, et cetera to be eliminated; (b) financial disabilities to be removed and Allied bankers permitted to undertake such transactions as may arise; (c) facilities for imports from black list firms by traders in Allied countries to be given in full under this plan, only remaining disability attached to black list firms will be that of refusal of export license facilities.
4. Additions to both stat list and confidential black list to be remitted [limited?] to extreme cases.

5. Maintenance of blockade as such to rest almost entirely on control exercised by licensing of exports from Associated countries. Considered that sufficient blockade protection for present necessities can be maintained by requiring licenses for exports to Northern Neutrals of only such commodities as may appear on: (a) list of commodities rationed by agreement; (b) list of commodities distribution of which must be restricted for conservative reasons.

British will propose that Associated Governments agree upon a common list of (a) rationed and (b) conservation commodities which may not be exported to Northern Neutrals except under license and that later, after the foregoing lists are determined, all other commodities of a nonessential nature may be exported without requiring export licensing. In this connection confidential black list will be maintained in effect only in connection with such commodities as will have to be licensed for export. All other goods may go to confidential black list firms without restriction but in no case to any firm on official enemy trading list. Above program subject to confirmation. As soon as draft proposals are received will appreciate having your comments and approval at earliest possible moment. Since writing foregoing I have received your 1626 of November 14.

LAUGHLIN

⁵ Neither printed. Donald Frothingham was an agent of the War Trade Board at London.

⁶ Concluding phrase of this paragraph apparently garbled.

600.119/1775b: Telegram

[Document 623]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)⁷

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918—7 p.m.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1630. The conclusion of the armistice affords an appropriate occasion which the Board desires to take advantage of to express its appreciation of your effective service abroad, which the Board feels has contributed materially to the economic pressure upon Germany, which was so large a factor in inducing ultimate surrender. There still remains important work to be done and the Board hopes to be able to rely upon the maintenance, certainly during the armistice period and until the peace terms and Congressional action gives us information as to when our activities may properly cease, of its foreign organization serving with the same diligence, intelligence and vigor, as has been characteristic in the past. The Board would be glad to receive suggestions from you as to whether in your opinion any important change of blockade policy should be introduced during the period of the armistice. Unless you are otherwise instructed all blockade machinery will remain in force and be administered as heretofore. Please communicate this message to all members of your force.

LANSING

⁷ The same, on the same date, to Embassies in Argentina (for Burnett), Brazil (for Amory), Chile (for Kizer), France (for McFadden, No. 443), Italy (for Stewart, No. 42), Japan (for Rabbitt, War Trade Board No. 135), Mexico (for Clay), and Spain (for Chadbourne, No. 367); to Legations in Denmark (for Hurley), Greece

(for Weddell, No. 48), Guatemala (for Deverall), the Netherlands (for Edwards, No. 117), Norway (for Dye, No. 121), Portugal (for Carroll, War Trade Board No. 89), Sweden (for Owen, No. 107), and Switzerland (for Dresel, No. 176); to Consuls at Barcelona (for Harel, No. 382), Batavia (for Bairden), Kobe (for Wait), Shanghai (for Denby), Vladivostok (for Heid, No. 25), and Yokohama (for Weimer); and to Morgan at Havana (War Trade Board No. 243). The same, Dec. 1, 1918, to Consul at Archangel (for Cole, No. 11).

811.731/599a: Telegram

[Document 624]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918—5 p.m.

2854. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1637. Frothingham. Censorship Board unanimously decided continuation strict censorship exception press censorship which will be relaxed. War Trade Board reached unanimous decision continuation enemy trade restrictions including various lists. Fuller.⁸

LANSING

⁸ Paul Fuller, Jr., director of the War Trade Intelligence Bureau of the War Trade Board.

600.119/1719a: Telegram

[Document 625]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 16, 1918—5 p.m.

2855. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1634. The changed situation arising out of the signing of the armistice will make it possible for us to alter many of our regulations governing the exportation of certain commodities which the continuance of the war made it advisable to conserve much more strictly than is now necessary. For the war needs of ourselves and our Allies, we have accumulated a surplus of many commodities which we are now able to spare for export, as they are no longer needed for war purposes.

As the relaxation of our export restrictions might give rise to erroneous reports and a belief on the part of our Allies that we are altering our policy primarily for the purpose of gaining a trade advantage, we wish to inform them of the fact that many of our export regulations will be changed from time to time as changing circumstances make apparent the existence of a larger exportable surplus of domestic commodities hitherto conserved for our own war needs and those of our Allies. It should be clearly understood that this does not in any sense involve a variation of policy. Our policy has always been, and will continue to be, to permit the export of those commodities which we could spare.

We are fully aware that the tonnage situation is not altered by the signing of the armistice, and the tonnage available both for export and import trade will continue to be limited by the maintenance in principle of the restrictive policy. In the interest of maintaining the complete understanding between our Governments and of removing all suspicions regarding possible alterations of policy, we shall cable to you any relaxation of export and import regulations which the

limitations of conservation or shipping may properly permit. We have discussed this subject with Sir Richard Crawford⁹ who is cabling that his Government keep you promptly informed as to their relaxation of exports and imports regulations or allocations. We desire a frank interchange of information with the British representatives. You may use this with them as you see fit. Please inform Stevens, Rublee, Tower. Also repeat this cablegram to McFadden and advise him that he is likewise authorized to use it as he may see fit.

LANSING

⁹ British commercial commissioner at Washington.

600.119/1775a: Telegram

[Document 626]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)

WASHINGTON , November 18, 1918—7 p.m.

1843. For Stewart [from War Trade Board]: number 43. We desire to impress upon our foreign representatives the importance during the period of Armistice of maintaining close and sympathetic relations with the representatives of the Associated Governments. We trust that your relations with your British and French colleagues are marked by cordial cooperation and mutual frankness.

LANSING

600.119/1719b: Telegram

[Document 627]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918—5 p.m.

2904. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1655. Inference is made to our No. 1634.¹⁰ We have just read Ship Mission's cablegram No. 815, Nov. 17, 1918, from Tower to Gay, with relation to British relaxation of import restrictions.¹¹ We now feel that it is advisable to go further than outlined in our 1634 in the matter of giving notice of relaxations of import restrictions, and to notify our associates in the war of proposed relaxations 1 week in advance of the time when they are put into effect to the end that, if our associates so desire, there may be an opportunity for the receipt of comments upon, and a discussion of, each proposed relaxation. A mutual arrangement between ourselves and Great Britain providing for such notice would further insure a complete understanding with regard to action taken during the present transition period when tonnage is so short. We wish you would discuss this proposal with the British authorities with a view to completing this mutual arrangement for the advance notification of proposed relaxations of import restrictions. We are discussing the same matter with Sir Richard Crawford here.

As a first step in the carrying out of this arrangement, you should immediately notify the British authorities that we will announce and make effective on November 27th the following regulations which constitute a relaxation of prior restrictions upon the importation of hides and skins:

“During a period of 90 days from and after November 27, 1918, licenses may be granted for the importation of all grades of hides...

“Licenses for the foregoing imports will be allocated among importers by a committee appointed by the Board, which committee may, in its discretion, change the foregoing schedule of distribution among various grades.”

The foregoing is, of course, confidential until November 27, 1918. Please advise us promptly of any comments made by the British authorities. Please show this cablegram to Tower.

LANSING

¹⁰ Dated Nov. 16, 1918, 5 p.m., p. 735 [*Pg. 735 includes portions of [Doc. 623](#), [Doc. 624](#), and [Doc. 625](#)*].

¹¹ Not printed.

600.001/606a: Telegram

[Document 628]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
(Sharp)¹²***

WASHINGTON , November 19, 1918—5 p.m.

6338. For McFadden from War Trade Board. Your 578, Embassy 5779, November 9, 2 a.m. and your 582, Embassy 5783, November 9, 4 a.m.¹³ We are in general accord with the views expressed in your cables. It is our opinion that pending the conclusion of peace the blockade should be maintained along the same general lines and through the same instrumentalities as heretofore, subject to such alterations as circumstances may require from time to time. In dealing with the new problems which are arising you should be governed by two major considerations: On the one hand the prevention of any breakdown before peace of the spirit and practice of interallied cooperation; on the other hand the scrupulous avoidance of any commitments which would restrict our liberty of actions at or after the peace conference.

If the peace negotiations are to result in the constitution of a league of nations or of some closer cooperation of the nations of the world than has existed hitherto, we must not prior thereto create international jealousy and distrust. This would almost certainly result, were we now to abandon our participation in the international blockade organizations and to adopt an independent course of action. Irrespective of our real motives this procedure on our part would unquestionably lend itself to misinterpretation. At the same time, we need not and should not consent to any material enlargement of the powers and functions of these interallied organizations. In particular, great care must be exercised lest these bodies assume the role of semi-permanent organizations for the rationing and reconstruction of the world after peace. At the peace conference the economic power of the United States must be entirely

unrestricted, as this force in our hands may be of powerful assistance in enabling us to secure the acceptance of our views. If any international economic control is to be maintained after peace this will we assume be decided at the peace conference. We must not even by implication be committed to it now.

With reference to the various executives which have been set up, it will in many ways be desirable to transfer them to Washington, particularly those which deal with commodities largely controlled by the United States. Since, however, we do not contemplate the maintenance of these organizations after peace, we question somewhat the advisability of incurring at this time the disorganization which would be incident to the suggested transfer. Also feel that the executives must continue to be in close touch with the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

LANSING

¹² Repeated to the Chargé in Great Britain, Nov. 21, 5 p.m., as No. 2944 (for Sheldon, No. 1662) (600.001/591).

¹³ No. 582 not printed.

600.119/1713a: Circular telegram

[Document 629]

The Secretary of State to All American Missions and Consulates

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

[From War Trade Board]: Following is substance of press notice to be published here tomorrow, November 22nd.

“Signing of armistice makes possible considerable relaxation in exportation of commodities heretofore conserved for war purposes. Tonnage, however, continues to be controlling factor on account need of supplying troops abroad and of lifting commodities for foreign relief and reconstruction. Impossible, therefore, to determine now when there will be increase in tonnage engaged in unregulated trade.”

Important. Give publicity.

LANSING

600.119/1715a: Telegram

[Document 630]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)¹⁴

WASHINGTON , November 21, 1918.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1677. Following is the text of a press notice which will be published tomorrow, November 22.

“The changed situation arising out of the signing of the armistice makes it possible for the War Trade Board to alter many of their regulations governing the exportation of certain commodities, which the continuance of the war has heretofore made it necessary to conserve much more strictly than present circumstances require. For the war needs of the United States and the Allies, the War Trade Board have limited the exportation of many commodities which may now be spared for general export trade, as they are no longer needed for war purposes. In pursuance of this policy, the War Trade Board are now revising as rapidly as possible their rules of conservation, and in conformity with such revision, the Conservation List will be materially abbreviated. The War Trade Board are now in a position to grant many export licenses which heretofore have been refused for reasons of conservation.

“There are now, and for some time to come there will be, certain commodities the exportation of which must be carefully controlled because of the general world shortage, but even for the exportation of these commodities licenses will be granted as freely as possible. The issuance of licenses will be greatly facilitated if exporters will state on their applications whether the licenses are required for business which is

actually in hand, subject to export license, together with the dates of their orders.

“In connection with the foregoing, exporters should be advised that, while it is no longer necessary to conserve commodities for war purposes, it may become necessary to regulate the exportation of certain commodities essential to the rehabilitation of Europe and Siberia; and exporters should be further advised that it may become necessary to place restrictions upon the exportation of bulky commodities by reason of the scarcity of tonnage available. The return of troops, the carriage of supplies for troops not yet returned and the carriage of commodities required for relief and reconstruction abroad, make demand upon the world’s tonnage of such magnitude that it is impossible as yet to determine when there will be an increase in the tonnage engaged in unregulated trade. Tonnage continues to be the controlling factor, and when reconstruction is well under way, it may become necessary to subject certain raw materials to rationing.

“The War Trade Board also call the attention of exporters to the fact that the Trading with the Enemy Act still remains in full force and effect.”

Important. Give publicity.

LANSING

¹⁴ The same, on same date, to Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, France (for McFadden, No. 457), and Japan (War Trade Board No. 138).

763.72112/10840: Telegram

[Document 631]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 22, 1918—8 p.m.
[Received November 23—2:40 a.m.]

3944. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 1916 confirming our 1879, November 15. Following is formal draft of blockade and trading with enemy policy, proposals which represent views of Allied Blockade Committee and of the British Government now submitted to Washington, Paris, and Rome for approval. Would appreciate your reply, if possible, for presentation at the meeting of Allied Blockade Committee on Tuesday 26th.

“1. The policy on trading with the enemy, blockade, rations, and exports to neutrals, requires immediate consideration in connection with the position created by the armistice.

2. The major interests of the Associated Governments require that factories should be turned over from war work to peace work as soon as possible, so that their peoples may remain employed; therefore not [*now?*] absolute reliance should be placed on regulation of priority rather than on the prohibition of export of goods manufactured of that material, so that deferred delivery orders for manufactured goods should not be interfered with. Restrictions on export should be modified as quickly as possible.

Prohibited Exports.

3. The list of prohibitions of export should be reexamined and the prohibitions should be removed, except as regards articles which for military reasons or because of shortage it is

undesirable to export, where the shortage of material is relative and^{*}

Rations.

5. Rations for neutral countries are settled under ration agreements made with the Allies. These rations should be reexamined with a view to increasing the ration of manufactured goods.
6. The import of fertilizers by neutral countries was strictly limited in order that a surplus of agricultural produce shall not be created and available for Germany.
7. In view of the recognition by the Associated Governments of an obligation to revictual enemy countries, the rations of fertilizers should be reexamined, so that after providing fully for the Empire and the Allies, the largest possible production of foodstuffs should be made in neutral countries. It might be made a term of the increase of fertilizers that the resulting foodstuffs should come under Allied control.
8. All alterations in rations in export prohibitions to rationed countries in statutory list and black list policy should be made with the concurrence of the Associated Governments; and all such Governments should act on similar lines.

Statutory List.

9. Trade with enemy countries is prohibited but under French and Italian prohibitions, the general prohibition against trading with the enemy extends to persons of enemy nationality in neutral territory, so it is necessary, in order to maintain equality embargo Associated Governments to retain for the present the statutory list.
10. It is proposed that the statutory list should be reduced by retaining only the following classes:

- (a) firms of enemy nationality or close association;
- (b) firms known to act habitually as covers for the above;
- (c) banks or financial agents which have acted habitually for transfers of money or credits in enemy interest and the known covers of such banks and financial agents who are now on the statutory list.

Subject to the reduction secured by the retention only of these classes that the statutory list should remain in force.

General Black List.

11. The retention of the general black list, in order to prevent contraband, is now a matter of relatively slight importance, an importance which would be observable by the advantage derived from the removal of an obstacle to the export trade but it is desirable for a time to distinguish between firms in neutral countries who have been friendly with the Allies and others who for their conduct have been put upon the general black list.

12. It is proposed therefore that the general black list should be reduced at once, retaining thereon only enemy firms or firms whose records show that they cannot be trusted, including some names removed from the statutory list. The general black list, thus reduced, should be enforced by the refusal of licenses for export, and should not be enforced in regard to financial facilities or in regard to imports from such firms. The censorship should, however, be continued in respect to the firms on the statutory list and on the black list.

Action To Be Taken.

13. If the policy outlined above is agreed to, instructions will require to be given to the Ministry of Blockade, Board of Trade, Foreign Trade Department, and War Trade Department. The Ministry of Blockade should negotiate to obtain the agreement of the Associated Governments to the

policy. Therewith [*thereupon*] the other departments should carry it out.”

LAUGHLIN

^{*}
_ Item four apparently omitted. [Footnote in the original.]

103.96/1550: Telegram

[Document 632]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Secretary of State***

[Extract]

LONDON , November 23, 1918.

[Received November 23—5 p.m.]

3966. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 1924. The Rationing and Statistical Subcommittee in considering action along the lines suggested in State Department's number 2813, undated, your number 1626, received November 15, 1918,^{[15](#)} were of opinion that the compilation of a restricted list of imports to the Northern Neutrals which still required control could not be quickly agreed to under the rapidly changing conditions at present without considerable delay. Pending agreement on such a restricted list, they have recommended to the A.B.C. a temporary free list composed of articles over which control of any kind seems unnecessary. It is proposed that this list be adopted as soon as consent can be obtained from all Associated Governments and remain in force with possible additions pending completion of a restricted list after which all articles not enumerated on the restricted list would be able to move freely. Will you please notify me as promptly as possible if you can approve this procedure and the free list which is as follows:... It is proposed publish list December fifty [*fifth*] to go into effect December fifty [*fifteenth*].^{[16](#)}

LAUGHLIN

^{[15](#)} *Ante*, p. 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of [Doc. 619](#) and [Doc. 620](#)].

¹⁶ The list was published in the *Official U. S. Bulletin*, Dec. 16, 1918, p. 8, and a similar list was published in the *London Gazette*, Dec. 20, 1918, p. 14940.

600.119/1723a: Telegram

[Document 633]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)¹⁷

WASHINGTON , November 25, 1918—5 p.m.

3037. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1700. We should like to put into effect a blanket license for the export of all commodities except certain foodstuffs and possibly a few other articles for shipments to Great Britain, France, Italy and their colonies. We are advising embassies here. Please discuss with proper authorities and cable us their comments. We are putting into effect blanket license for the export of cotton to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan effective December 2nd.

LANSING

¹⁷ The same, Nov. 23, 1918, to the Ambassador in Italy as No. 1859 (for Stewart, No. 45) (600.119/1776e). A similar telegram was sent on Nov. 23, 1918, to the Ambassador in France as No. 6400 (for McFadden, No. 463) (611.5131/421).

763.72112/10777: Telegram

[Document 634]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 26, 1918—5 p.m.

3072. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1728. For Frothingham. Embassy's 3765, November 15, 9 p.m. Your 1879. Concur your recommendation paragraph 1 re censorship provided it remain in full force for confidential as well as statutory list. Your paragraph 2d favor removal statutory and confidential lists bona fide neutral concerns not mere covers enemy houses or in neutral Europe guilty serious breach agreements. This removal should be accompanied formal statement action taken in order to prevent unnecessary hardships towards neutral and other friendly governments guarantees to be obtained on removal to refrain trading allied goods or facilities enemy houses until conclusion of peace. To forestall further protests neutral and other governments announcement should include statement impossibility removal enemy subjects or enemy owned houses until radical change allied legislation and allied confidence *bonafides* German governmental and commercial reorganization. Reduction confidential list along lines above outlined statlist. Cloak list for names remaining statlist to continue where individual licenses required. Concur suggestion list controlled commodities all others no longer requiring individual licenses. Commodity lists so far as practicable shall be identical exceptions made by agreement. All present restrictions must be rigidly enforced for controlled commodities regarding firms continuing statlist including import restrictions as well as export restrictions. While individual licenses not to be required for non-controlled commodities statlist will remain hands customs officials as basis for refusal. Controlled commodities to require individual license as heretofore. Foregoing of course subject to allied agreement. Present bunker control to continue against houses

remaining revised statlists. In order to avoid competition houses now on statutory and confidential lists detrimental to allied supporters abroad War Trade Board proposes as regards Latin America to grant tonnage priority in favor licenses granted prior to November 11. This would prevent shipments to houses presently removed from list for considerable period. Advise Paris and Rome substance this cable.

LANSING

763.72112/10867¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 635]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 26, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 27—2:26 a.m.]

4078. War Trade Board [from Frothingham]: No. 1949. Fuller. Our 1916. Department's 2944 [*Embassy's 3944*], November 22, paragraphs 9 to 12 inclusive. Please advise quickest possible your views on reduction of stat. list and G.B.L.A.¹⁸ At today's A.B.C. meeting, French delegate stated his Government opposed to any reduction or relaxation of either official or confidential lists during next few weeks. Committee agreed:

1. Most desirable eliminate gray lists, G.B.L.B.¹⁹ cloaks, and any subsidiary lists other than official lists and G.B.L.A.
2. Also that problems of black list relaxation with border neutral countries were different, and might be treated otherwise than those in Spain and Latin America. Relaxation of latter might be more general in view of desirability of larger markets for existing exportable surpluses.

Our private feeling that unless desirable from political viewpoint, no strong reason operative for any black list relaxations with respect to border neutral countries except those mentioned in 1 above. Final discussion next week on receipt final word from respective capitals. Frothingham.

LAUGHLIN

¹⁸ Statutory list and general black list A.

¹⁹ General black list B.

763.72112/10840: Telegram

[Document 636]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , November 27, 1918.

3098. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1732. Department's 3072 Nov. 26 our 1728, sent before receiving Embassy's 3944, Nov. 22. Your 1916. From cursory examination your 1916 see no reason to modify views expressed our 1728. Your 1916 will, however, receive further immediate consideration if desired.

LANSING

600.119/1724: Telegram

[Document 637]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 29, 1918.
[Received November 29—8:19 p.m.]

4158. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 1963. Your 1700. Department's 3037 November 25. Board of Trade view here is substantially as follows. While your proposal is ultimately desirable attention is drawn to the following considerations: (1) The general license for imports into the United Kingdom of articles referred to in your 1706, Department's 3006, November 23^{[20](#)} is operative only until March 1st; (2) at present British import control still covers a number of important articles received from the United States such as cotton, hosiery, leather goods, boots and shoes et cetera. A blanket license such as is proposed would restore the former difficulties which were removed by the permit system; that is, difficulties arising out of goods being sent to United Kingdom without an import license having been promised and consequently had upon arrival. From this point of view it would seem preferable that until British import restrictions have been removed to a far greater extent than has hereto been found possible the War Trade Board, instead of a blanket license, should give general permission to export to this country only articles for which a general license to import has been issued on this side.

LAUGHLIN

^{[20](#)} Not printed.

103.96/1607: Telegram

[Document 638]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON , November 30, 1918.
[Received November 30—4:46 p.m.]

4185. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 1970. To Woolley and Gay from Peterson.²¹ Finally succeeded in seeing Sir Albert Stanley, President of Board of Trade. Had no trouble in arranging with him for reciprocal exchange of information concerning relaxation of import restrictions as nearly as possible. One week's notice is to be given by each to the other before public announcement is made, meanwhile such information to be kept confidential for governmental use. Only channel of transmission to be through Sheldon and Fontaine of Board of Trade. This becoming effective forthwith Board of Trade now appears most anxious for full cooperation with us in all matters affecting supplies of raw material, and is convinced of the necessity of control through licensing system for an indefinite period. Leave today for Paris.

LAUGHLIN

²¹ Fred B. Peterson, director of the Bureau of Imports of the War Trade Board.

103.96/1550: Telegram

[Document 639]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 4, 1918—7 p.m.

3224. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1771. Embassy's 3966 Nov. 23, your 1924. We agree to list you propose, but we believe it to be entirely inadequate. We propose the granting of licenses for the exportation to Scandinavia, Holland and Switzerland, reporting the same to London after granting, of iron and steel and products thereof, cotton goods, shoes and other manufactures of leather, agricultural machinery, and manufactured articles generally, referring to you before granting licenses for major foodstuffs and raw materials.

This procedure will continue the granting of licenses as scheduled in the Agreements for all articles and will enable us to make effective the entire statutory and confidential lists which are now in our possession. We believe that this procedure, under Agreements with these countries, will give ample blockade control under existing conditions. Please submit to A.B.C. and cable us their opinion.

It is our understanding that by the term "Free List" you mean a list of commodities, licenses for whose exportation need not be referred to London, and which may be exported only to approved consignees. Please confirm this understanding and also advise us definitely what is meant by the term "Free List".

POLK

600.119/1772: Telegram

[Document 640]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 5, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received 11:53 p.m.]

4330. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2000. Refer your number 1765, Department's number 3197 of December 3.^{[22](#)} Peterson telegram to Woolley and Gay. Our number 1970 Embassy's number 4185 of November 30 was sent in answer to your 1655 of November 19. Definite arrangements have now been made in accordance with your suggestion for an interchange of information between ourselves and the British authorities concerning all proposed relaxations of export and import restrictions, and your cables containing such information are being notified accordingly today. We have received a letter from the Board of Trade which says:

In acting [apparent omission] the arrangement made by Mr. Peterson with Sir Albert Stanley, I have to notify you that a general license will be given to import any quantity of the following articles viz.: gum copal and gum kauri to take effect from Thursday, December 12th on which day it will be notified to the public through the *Board of Trade Journal* and to remain in operation, in the first instance, till March 1st next. I have to ask that this information may be kept confidential until published. Any further decisions in regard to the removal of import restrictions will be similarly notified to you in future in advance of publication.

As regards export restrictions our policy at present is to free manufactured goods from existing restrictions as rapidly as possible. The export of all goods except printed matter and personal effects to countries on the C list 1 E to countries

bordering on the enemy, however, remains prohibited at present and no alterations in this principle will be made without submission to the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee. As you are of course aware, the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee has put forward a list of articles which could in their opinion be freed from all restrictions, but this list still awaits the concurrence of the United States Government. As regards other relaxations in export restrictions our practice is to publish a list weekly in the *Board of Trade Journal*, but in order to meet what I understand to be American wishes the relaxations so announced do not take effect until 8 days after publication.

LAUGHLIN

²² Not printed.

103.96/1663: Telegram

[Document 641]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 6, 1918.
[Received December 7—5:20 a.m.]

4385. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 2013. Refer your number 1771, Department's number 3224 of December fourth. Articles enumerated on the free list Q. N. 1 [sic], detailed in our number 1924, Embassy's number 3966 of November 23, will be released from restrictions for Northern Neutral destinations; that is to say, (1.) no certificates of guarantees will be required from the importer; (2.) no rations will exist for the list; (3.) no reference to London is required; (4.) export licenses for goods on this list shall only be required at the discretion of the exporting country. If no export license is required, these goods may be consigned to firms on confidential list because no preventative machinery will exist from U. K.²³ Export license will not be required for free list goods consequently these may go from here to firms on confidential list but in no case to a stat. list consignee. This list as approved by you will be announced on December 10 to be effective on December 15. As regards the four Northern Neutrals only the question of Iceland is being treated separately. As regards Spain and Switzerland action is required in Paris but this has been recommended by the A.B.C. Your suggestions to add largely to the scope of this list are now under consideration. It is proposed to include some of the commodities enumerated such as iron and steel and products thereof on a list of unlimited Q. N. I. [sic] ration. The distinction between commodities for which unlimited rations exist and commodities on the free list is that the former cannot be consigned to firms on the confidential list, otherwise there would be no distinction. The A.B.C. is entirely in accord with your views as to desirability of a controlled list consisting of commodities which must for the present be conserved and of

commodities of potential military value and such a list is being drafted. Delay however, is inevitable. Mr. Hoover will shortly confer with representatives of the Associated Governments here to consider what commodities shall be included. As an illustration of considerations that must be taken up the French Government is anxious that textile machinery shall remain on the controlled list until such time as requirements of France in this respect have been satisfied. It is however, hoped that a controlled list may be compiled within 1 month to 6 weeks time after which all commodities not included in this controlled list will be free to move under the conditions now proposed for the free list Q. N. I.

LAUGHLIN

23 United Kingdom.

600.119/1724: Telegram

[Document 642]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 7, 1918—9 p.m.

3334. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1814. Embassy's 4158, November 29, your 1963. The requirement of controlling exports to Great Britain in conformity with import regulations of that country was a necessary measure, while the war lasted, but there is practically no need of strict conservation of most articles in this country today, and public opinion will not permit us to continue in force any longer than necessary any restrictions other than those which are absolutely necessary. The only grounds on which we would feel justified in requiring individual licenses on goods destined to any country are: first, maintenance of the blockade, second, the prevention of enemy trade, third, the possible necessity of the conservation of a very limited list of articles, fourth, shortage of tonnage. The English, through the control of their own shipping can easily arrange for shipping preferences to be given to such articles as are immediately required, and we feel that the administration of import restrictions should now be executed by the country of destination.

We propose to make public announcement on December 12, effective the 16th, that on and after that date no individual licenses will be required for shipment to Great Britain, except as to a limited list which we are now preparing and will cable you later. In the meantime, in order to make immediately effective the relaxation on import restrictions of the list cabled some days ago, we are making the following public announcement:

“The War Trade Board announces that the Controller of Import Restrictions, London, has temporarily suspended all

import restrictions on—Here follows list approximately the same as that contained in cable No. 6744, November 14, from British Foreign Office to British Embassy here.

In view of the foregoing, the War Trade Board has issued a special export license, effective immediately, No. RAC 62 authorizing the exportation without individual export licenses of the commodities on the above list. Shippers should note, that it is unnecessary to apply to the War Trade Board for permission to export under special export license RAC 62, and no special document issued by the War Trade Board is necessary in connection with such shipments. It is only necessary to note on the package, if shipment is made through the mails, or on the export declaration, if shipment is made by express or freight, the following:

- (1) Shipped under special license RAC 62
- (2) Name and address of shipper.
- (3) Name and address of consignee.
- (4) Statement of contents.

Shipments under RAC 62 may only be made when the goods are destined to and for consumption in the United Kingdom, and it does not apply to any shipments to the colonies thereof. It should be further noted by exporters that while it is not at present necessary for them to procure British import license or British permit to purchase numbers on this list of commodities, that the British Government may at any time in future withdraw this privilege as to a part of or the whole of this list, and exporters should keep carefully informed as to the British import requirements before making shipments, as otherwise, if the goods are shipped in contravention of such import restrictions, the goods are liable to be confiscated on arrival. Information as to the British import restrictions may be obtained by applying to the British War Mission, Munsey Building, Washington, D.C.

Exporters would be well advised to make the necessary freight arrangements before moving exports of the above-mentioned

commodities to seaboard. A shortage of shipping still prevents a free exportation from here to Great Britain, and the fact that an individual license is not required should not by any means be taken by exporters as an assurance that shipping space can or will be provided.”

You will see from the foregoing that we are cautioning exporters that doing away with the necessity of obtaining individual licenses should not be taken by them as an implication that shipping space can be procured or that England will permit the free importation; and they should, before making shipments, always inform themselves on these two points. This will prevent, we think, the recurrence of the unpleasant instances referred to in Embassy's 4158, your 1963.

POLK

600.119/1806a: Telegram

[Document 643]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 10, 1918—2 p.m.

3354. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1815. Great pressure has been brought to bear upon the Board to facilitate to the fullest extent possible the exportation of cotton. This we desire to bring about. In this connection Nordvall²⁴ has requested an increase in the Swedish cotton ration, to which request we are fully disposed to accede. Furthermore, we feel that the time has come to increase the rations of all commodities for the neutral countries of Europe to an extent sufficient to meet the economic and industrial needs of these countries. We wish you would present this proposal to the Allied Blockade Committee and urge upon them the importance of arranging, at an early date, for the approval and effectuation of this recommendation. If you find difficulty in securing the adoption of this entire principle, we are particularly desirous that steps should be taken at once to secure the approval of the Allied Blockade Committee to the increase of the cotton rations of all the Northern Neutrals as there is no need whatsoever, from our standpoint, of restricting exports of cotton, and the continuance of any limitation upon the export of this commodity is productive of a distinctly unfavorable effect in this country. Please reply at once as to when you will be able to advise us definitely of the approval of the increase of the cotton ration.

In addition to the foregoing suggested modifications of rations, we feel that it is extremely important that some steps be taken at once to simplify the present cumbrous machinery, which controls the issuance of licenses for exports from the United States to the Northern Neutrals.

Reference is made to your 1984, Embassy's 4259, December 3.²⁵ From this cablegram and others that we are receiving, it would appear to us that the A.B.C. are adhering too strictly to a maintenance of very farreaching control of commerce with the Northern Neutrals, a control which does not seem to us warranted under the new conditions. At the present time it requires approximately 5 weeks between the time an exporter in this country secures an order before he is assured by the receipt of an export license that he may close his contract. Under present conditions this is unjustifiable and productive of a great deal of unnecessary irritation. The present practice of referring applications to London is responsible for a great part of this long delay and we are anxious to modify immediately this procedure, so that export licenses may be issued without such reference. The procedure has never been wholly satisfactory, and, although we were willing to follow it during the period of hostilities as affording a desirable control, we think that now it can well be dispensed with. To bring this about we propose the following procedure:

- (1) No commodities will be permitted to be exported to the Northern Neutrals without an export license.
- (2) No licenses will be issued for exportation to any person upon the statutory or confidential lists which are in our possession.
- (3) We will no longer refer applications to London, except applications to export commodities with respect to which we have received from the A.B.C. a warning by cablegram that the ration has been or is nearly exhausted.
- (4) For statistical purposes, we will cable to you daily the particulars of all licenses which have been issued without reference to London.

The following procedure will be followed with respect to particular countries:

- (a) Denmark. The Chamber of Commerce or Merchants Guild should cable the import numbers and full particulars direct to Danish Commercial Office here, who will immediately advise us and we will issue licenses on receipt of applications, if the parties to transaction are satisfactory.
- (b) Norway. If applicant is willing to ship to an Association, we will not require that we be furnished with the import number. If the

applicant wishes to ship to a private firm, then the Norwegian Finance Department must telegraph the number and details of the application approved to the Commercial Department of the Norwegian Legation here, from whom we will obtain particulars.

(c) Holland. We will consign everything to the N.O.T.²⁶ supervising of course the ultimate purchaser; and we will not require to be furnished with the number of the import certificate.

(d) Sweden. All goods will be consigned to the appropriate Association for the account of the ultimate purchaser, and we will not require to be furnished with the number of the import certificate.

(5) To the limited extent to which principles of conservation are still applicable, we will of course apply them.

The foregoing procedure appears to us to insure a control which is adequate under present conditions. Our daily cablegrams will furnish the statistical information necessary to avoid exceeding the rations and the existing control through the N.O.T. and other import associations will be maintained, although we will no longer require to be furnished in advance with the numbers of import certificates. The blockade should be adequately maintained by virtue of the existing agreements with the Northern Neutrals, particularly in view of the fact that the Baltic is now under Allied control. Enemy Trade restrictions will continue to be maintained through our examination into the character of the consignee.

Please secure as soon as possible the views of the Allied Blockade Committee with regard to this proposed modification of the existing machinery.

POLK

²⁴ A. R. Nordvall, Swedish special commercial commissioner at Washington.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ Netherlands Oversea Trust.

763.72112/10867¹/₂: Telegram

[Document 644]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 10, 1918—3 p.m.

3358. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1813. Frothingham. Embassy's 4078 November 26, 7 p.m. your 1949. Opinion War Trade Board in agreement British, French, Italian representatives in Washington undesirable at present undertake important revision statutory or confidential lists or changes enemy trade restrictions. Fuller.

POLK

600.119/1803a: Telegram

[Document 645]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 10, 1918—10 p.m.

3367. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1822. Please advise us what if any proposals have been formulated by the A.B.C. for shipments to Servia, Bulgaria Turkey including Syria.

POLK

763.72112/11002: Telegram

[Document 646]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 11, 1918—3 p.m.
[Received 10:33 p.m.]

4513. War Trade Board [from Frothingham]: No. 2056. Fuller. Your 1813 December 10th, Department's 3358. Does opinion expressed represent War Trade Board's considered views with respect to neutral Europe or does it apply specifically to a no-relaxation policy for Latin American countries as decided by delegates on the Washington Conference with full regard for the political situation with the respective Northern Neutral countries.[?] It is the opinion of the London Conference that names of bona fide neutral firms on stat. list in Scandinavia and Holland should now be withdrawn and transferred to G.B.L. and that with respect to the older weaker [cases?] and particularly the contraband cases on confidential list, removals should be made as expeditiously as possible. The one basic argument of the British Government with respect to the maintenance of confidential black list for Northern Neutral countries has been that the object of such a list was to prevent movement of any Allied goods to Germany and conversely of German goods outward from these countries. It is felt that to attempt to continue the Northern Neutral confidential black list in full force under the present conditions will place the Associated Governments in a position difficult to defend with particular respect to these [*the*] above contraband argument which has been the basis of maintaining confidential black list in Scandinavia and Holland. Whether such considerations apply to Latin America is felt to be entirely within the competence and decision of the Washington Conference.
Frothingham.

LAUGHLIN

600.119/1804: Telegram

[Document 647]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 12, 1918.
[Received December 12—2:42 p.m.]

4549. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2067. Your 1822, Department's 3367, December 10. A.B.C. yesterday agreed to approve resumption of trade with (1) Alsace-Lorraine, (2) Trieste, (3) Trentino, as soon as definite advices are received concerning decrees now being issued by French and Italian Governments covering respective territories. The question of (4) Luxembourg is under consideration but no trade facilities are to be granted pending further examination of subject. With regard to (5) Roumania, action is deferred until replies are received from enquiries now being taken up with Roumanian Government as to status of enemy trade interests and organization of governmental trade control. A similar enquiry is now under way with respect to (6) Serbia, pending receipt of which no action will be taken. Immediate resumption of trade with (7) Syria, and (8) Palestine was approved by the A.B.C. who suggest that the necessary proclamations be issued by the Associated Governments forthwith. With respect to (9) Bulgaria, and (10) Turkey proper, no resumption whatsoever is under consideration. Will report to you as soon as advices are received concerning decrees covering trade with Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste and Trentino.

LAUGHLIN

600.119/1912b: Telegram

[Document 648]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)^{[27](#)}

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1845. Circular No. 24, dated July 24,^{[28](#)} has been withdrawn. Representatives here of the neutral countries in Europe have been advised that purchases may now be made in the United States without restriction as to the obtaining of a license before purchase is made.

POLK

^{[27](#)} The same, on the same date, to the Embassy in Spain (for Chadbourne, No. 404); and to Legations in Denmark (for Hurley), the Netherlands (for Edwards, No. 138), Norway (for Dye, No. 140), Sweden (for Owen, No. 126), and Switzerland (for Dresel, No. 202).

^{[28](#)} Not printed.

600.119/1807: Telegram

[Document 649]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 13, 1918.
[Received December 13—7:08 p.m.]

4599. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2088. Your 1815. Department's 3354, December 10. Will advise you December 17 of proposed increase Northern Neutral cotton ration. A.B.C. agrees in principle and has submitted matter of rationing and [to?] statistical subcommittee for recommendations as to amount of increase. Suggest you examine political considerations in connection with proposition. French delegate on A.B.C. calls attention to need of protection by French and Belgian textile interests, whose mills have been destroyed or seriously crippled. French advise informally that they are in need of protection for their textile industries from competition which would arise in Netherlands were Dutch to secure heavy quantities of raw cotton.

LAUGHLIN

600.119/24551): Telegram

[Document 650]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 13, 1918—4 p.m.

3527. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1831. Please keep us fully informed as to any proposals with regard to the resumption of trade with enemy territory now occupied by the military forces of the Allies, particularly Alsace-Lorraine.

POLK

657.119/1070: Telegram

[Document 651]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 13, 1918.
[Received December 13—7:20 a.m.]

4600. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2089. Your 1815 December 10th. Second section, discontinuance X cable system.^{[29](#)} ABC concurs with your suggestion to discontinue submission of X application of [to] London at earliest possible moment, provided you are protected by the receipt of important [import] certificate numbers from all Northern Neutral countries in same manner as is proposed for Denmark. Considered here that unless neutral countries are permitted to continue exercise full power over imports by advising you in advance of such importations as have been licensed, difficulties will arise in arrival of shipments which they will claim have not been properly certificated. This reservation of course will not apply to goods which are now on free list and to commodities that may be added to free list. Will telegraph detailed plan tomorrow.

LAUGHLIN

^{[29](#)} The reference is to a system of communications between the Bureau of Exports of the War Trade Board in Washington and the War Trade Board office in London, to aid in determining the status of export license applications. For a description of this system, see telegram No. 6210, Jan. 10, 1918, 4 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. II, p. 939](#).^{[29](#)}

600.119/1912c: Telegram

[Document 652]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)^{[30](#)}

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1849. We will issue a general license, effective December 16, known as R.A.C. 63, permitting the exportation without the issuance of individual licenses of all commodities not on Conservation List to the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, including their colonies, possessions and protectorates.

POLK

^{[30](#)} The same, on same date, to Embassies in France (for McFadden, No. 497), Italy (for Stewart, No. 54), and Japan (for Rabbitt, No. 159).

600.119/1839: Telegram

[Document 653]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 14, 1918.
[Received December 14—2:45 p.m.]

4613. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2093.
Supplementing our 2089, December 13. A.B.C. concurs
discontinuance “X” cables subject to following safeguards:

- (1). No license will be issued to any consignee on stat. list or G.B.L. “A”.
- (2). Daily statistical cable reporting licenses issued be sent to London for records of Rationing and Statistical Committee.
- (3). In case W.T.B. has been warned that when any ration is nearly exhausted applications will be referred to London as in past.
- (4). Statistical Committee will continue as hitherto to report to W.T.B. all embargoes, preliminary warnings and their respective removals. It would also communicate to W.T.B. a special warning in any case where ration approached exhaustion.
- (5). British War Trade Intelligence will provide W.T.B. with special information concerning certain consignees now being refused facilities pending final determination of their status. For such consignees no facilities should be granted without prior reference to A.B.C. Such a special “stop” list would supplement stat. list and G.B.L. “A”. Unnecessary under circumstances pay any further attention to G.B.L. “B”, cloak lists etc.
- (6). With regard to procedure proposed for particular countries:
 - (a). Denmark. A.B.C. concurs.
 - (b). Norway. Import associations could not allocate and distribute ration without knowing whether shipments were being licensed in accordance import facilities they had issued. A.B.C. suggests that same procedure proposed for non-association commodities

namely cables to Commercial Department Norwegian Legation from Norwegian Finance Department be applied to import certificates issued by associations.

- (c). Holland. Procedure in Holland should be identical with that suggested for Denmark now. Should telegraph Washington numbers and details of all import certificates issued.
- (d). Sweden. A.B.C. considers Sweden should be subjected to special treatment in view of the determined attempts by the Swedes to break down black list and commodity control. Suggest that numbers and details of all certificates issued should be cabled by Handel's Commission to Swedish Trade Office, Washington, for communication to W.T.B. in addition to I.A.T.C.^{[32](#)} the [sic] Stockholm in connection their daily scrutiny of import certificates would at same time cable W.T.B. numbers of any certificates they disapprove and W.T.B. would act on this advice.
- (7). A.B.C. considers this concentration of license control in Washington should be made effective at earliest possible moment, especially with regard to Holland.
- (8). Accordingly I have telegraphed War Trade Board representative in each northern neutral capital summarizing the discontinuance proposals and have suggested that he discuss the matter immediately with his colleagues and with local trading association in order that the new direct system may be installed by December 23 if possible.

LAUGHLIN

^{[32](#)} Inter-Allied Trade Committee.

600.119/1852a: Telegram

[Document 654]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918—5 p.m.

3549. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1857. Repeat to Denmark and Sweden. We have informed commercial Representative that from the point of view of conservation we could now spare practically all articles and that we would recommend to our associates an increase in the ration to such amounts as Denmark (Sweden) might need under the new conditions, suggesting that any further needs be laid before the Inter-Allied Committee at Copenhagen (Stockholm) for transmission to the A.B.C. and thence to the various governments concerned.

POLK

600.119/1912a: Telegram

[Document 655]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918—4 p.m.

6629. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 498. We are advised by Major Grimpel³³ that contingents for following countries will be fixed by military authorities and inter-allied bureaus opened in Cattaro (Montenegro), Ragusa (Yugo-Slavia), Varna (Bulgaria), Constantinople (Turkey), Braila or Galatz (Roumania). Please advise us whether our military authorities will be represented on these bureaus and whether applications for exports to these countries will be referred to a central bureau in Paris or London or whether they will be referred directly to the bureau in country of destination. We have awaiting applications for many points, which we are holding pending notification of definite plan and organization. Please inform us fully and advise Sheldon.

POLK

³³ Member of French High Commission at Washington.

611.006/843aa: Telegram

[Document 656]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)[34](#)

WASHINGTON , December 14, 1918—8 p.m.

3420. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1861. The following is an expression of the present policy of the War Trade Board. The shipping facilities at the disposal of the Allies must be used first, to cover present military necessity and to provide the essential imports for the Associated Governments; second, to meet the needs of peoples in the devastated areas, liberated regions and of others toward whom there are allied obligations; and third, to re-establish the world's international trade. The first purpose must be accomplished almost completely by the Associated Governments individually; in the accomplishment of the second purpose, consistency and harmony of action can be secured through the Allied Maritime Transport Council or some similar body. To serve the third purpose, shipping not required for the first two purposes must be left as free as possible, though the conditions of the present transition period may make it necessary that complete freedom should be reached gradually. In freeing these ships for trade, we feel that it is of prime importance that the Associated Governments should act openly and frankly and in cooperation wherever practicable.

The War Trade Board's influence on the shipping of the United States has resided in its control of exports and imports through licenses. It has been clearly recognized that this control is indirect and does not lead to the most efficient use of ships, but at the beginning of the war the preponderance of free ships trading at our ports made it the only system of control which could be used. It is today, because of its inflexibility, a less efficient instrument than it was during war time.

We believe, therefore, that it will become rapidly more and more impracticable to continue to control the use of shipping through the restriction of imports in the face of great pressure from legitimate trade interests which are able repeatedly to show individual cases of available shipping, underloading of ships, and the like. Our tonnage suitable for trans-Atlantic trade is now practically all under the control of the Army; and it is by means of such controlled shipping that we can best do our share in meeting the military and common relief obligations of the Associated Governments.

The Army with its controlled tonnage stands ready to insure the performance of our full share of international obligations equitably adjusted by common agreement, with the understanding that such control shall be increased by additional allocation, if conditions so demand when all the requirements are known.

We can see no national or international interest which would be served by the maintenance of import restrictions which would merely control the character of the incoming cargoes of vessels not under Army control. The commodity situation in the United States is such that there is no warrant for the establishment of import priorities, and we propose to let the operations of these free vessels be governed by ordinary economic laws. Accordingly we intend to have the greater part of our import restrictions removed not later than February 1st, except those which it may be necessary to maintain for the protection of such allied interests as may be later agreed upon.

It should be clearly borne in mind that this freedom from import restrictions will apply only to the limited number of vessels freed from time to time from War Department control as constituting a temporary surplus over present military and world relief requirements, and that the War Trade Board still retains its power to restrict imports, which power will again be exercised if occasion should again arise to induce by this measure the restoration of these vessels to military or relief service.

We desire to have the opinion of the highest British officials on the above statement and ask that you take it first to Stevens and Rublee

for consultation. Repeat to McFadden.

POLK

[34](#) See last sentence for instructions to repeat to McFadden, in France.

600.119/2208: Telegram

[Document 657]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 15, 1918—12 a.m.
[Received 6 p.m.]

6292. War Trade Board [from Stetson³⁵]: Number 680. The occupation of German territory as far as the west bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads raises questions of economic policy of the greatest importance, which will last during the period of occupation. To deal with these questions the French Ministry of Blockade, acting on the request of Marshal Foch under whose control these territories are, have prepared a plan of which the general outline is, we are informed, as follows:

First, there shall be constituted to deal with these questions: (a) an Inter-Allied committee which shall sit at Paris under the chairmanship of one of the French Under Secretaries of State attached to the Conseil d'état, said committee to deal with general questions of policy; (b) an Inter-Allied committee which shall sit at place to be designated in the occupied territory, for example Treves, which committee, shall: (1) handle the administration questions arising out of the policies to be laid down by the Paris committee such as the granting of licenses etc.; and (2) supply the Paris committee with data upon which it may base its determinations of policy.

Second, the questions of policy to be dealt with by the Paris committee shall be in general the determination of: (a) how far the nationals of the Associated Governments shall be permitted to export to and import from the nationals of the enemy in the occupied territory raw materials, semi-manufactured and manufactured articles, et cetera; and (b) how far the enemy nationals in the occupied territory shall be permitted to have

commercial and other relations with the territories on the east bank of the Rhine.

Third, it is not at present the intention of the French to ration or fix contingents for the occupied territories, but to treat these territories as they have treated Spain. This will mean that all raw materials, semi-manufactured and manufactured articles will be permitted to go to the occupied territory provided: (a) same can be spared by the Associated Governments; (b) transport conditions allow; and (c) industries in occupied territory which desire to import are not competitors of similar in the Associated Governments. In connection with paragraph (c) a large German steel factory will not be permitted to receive raw material and machinery if their output competes with similar factories in the Associated Governments.

Fourth. The same policy will be followed with respect to permitting imports into the Associated countries from enemy nationals in the occupied territory.

Fifth. One of the French delegates on the Paris committee will be Seydoux of the French Ministry of Blockade.

Sixth. It is the opinion of the French that the Treves committee should by preference be comprised of military delegates. In this connection the French Ministry of Blockade will be pleased to place at the disposal of any delegates which the Associated Governments may appoint to the Treves committee all information and facilities in their possession on the questions and principles which may arise and will give such delegates an opportunity to spend several days in the Ministry to study same.

Seventh. The French would be pleased if the United States Government would designate the proper delegates for both the Paris and Treves committees as soon as possible. In this connection we draw your attention to the variety of questions involved: political, financial, transport, and import and export control.

Descriptive comments: (a) The foregoing was informally transmitted to us with the request that it be advised to the proper authorities in Washington, (b) The final draft of the plan which is not yet ready will be cabled you in the [a] few days, (c) We have communicated the foregoing to the Embassy, Generals Pershing and Bliss, Hoover and

Davis of the Treasury. We suggest your approving the plan in principle and taking the necessary steps to designate a delegate to represent the War Trade Board. Stetson and Taylor will confer with Seydoux on this subject within a few days and report further. Signed Stetson.

SHARP

35 Clarence C. Stetson, an agent of the War Trade Board at Paris.

103.96/1663: Telegram

[Document 658]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)

WASHINGTON , December 17, 1918—6 p.m.

3470. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1859. Embassy's 4385 December 6, your 2013. This cable was despatched only 4 days prior to December 10, the date of the publication in London and was received by us, after the usual delays attendant upon paraphrasing, etcetera, only on December 9. In consequence, we were given no opportunity to object before publication on the 10th. The abolition of the confidential list was contrary to the views expressed in our 1771 Dept's 3224, Dec. 4, 7 p.m. that goods were not to be permitted to go to anyone on enemy trade lists. We regret that A.B.C. has found it necessary to break enemy control, particularly in contiguous countries. We will not issue a general blanket license covering commodities on this free list inasmuch as we have, for the time being, abandoned the idea of granting such general licenses for other than allied countries. Therefore we will issue individual licenses on this free list. By reason of the precipitous action at your end, we are reluctantly constrained, in issuing such licenses, to disregard the confidential list. Cannot this so-called free list be withdrawn by the British and be made to conform to our procedure? We are strongly of the opinion that the granting of licenses to individuals on the confidential list should be discontinued. If this so-called free list cannot be withdrawn, we suggest that no further articles be added to it, and that any expansion of it should take the form of a non-ration list which would require licenses, but for which no ration would be specified. This was the kind of list that was set forth in our 1771. We propose that there should immediately be added to the list, when modified as above suggested, the following: Iron and steel and products thereof; cotton goods; leather and manufactures thereof; agricultural machinery; manufactured articles generally; foodstuffs

other than those in the ration; drugs and chemicals; allowing conservation in the various countries to determine those which will not be exported. We propose to publish on December 20, effective December 23, the above commodities as being contained in a so-called non-ration list, which, as explained above, will require licenses, but for which no ration will be specified.

POLK

763.72112/11040: Telegram

[Document 659]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 17, 1918.

[Received December 17—2:57 p.m.]

6336. War Trade Board [from Taylor]: No. 688. Attention McCormick. Laws of Allies permit of trading with enemy subjects within area of occupation and our rules should be modified to agree. Alsace, Lorraine are open as any French territory. Taylor.

SHARP

663.119/orig: Telegram

[Document 660]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 17, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received 5:16 p.m.]

6340. War Trade Board [from Taylor]: No. 692, attention White. We have made no agreement that consignments to Adriatic ports should depend on War Trade Board receiving import authorization from Inter-Allied Bureau and no such organization exists at present. War Trade Board must not sign away liberty of action. Taylor.

SHARP

600.119/1854: Telegram

[Document 661]

***The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 18, 1918.
[Received December 18—12:55 p.m.]

4701. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: 2121. Your 1831, Department's 3527, December 13. See our 2067, December 12. In addition to Syria and Palestine trade will be resumed with Mesopotamia as from January 1st. For all three territories proclamations are about to be issued.

LAUGHLIN

600.119/1856: Telegram

[Document 662]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 18, 1918.
[Received December 18—5:19 p.m.]

4720. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2127. Your 1815.
Department's 3354, December 10. Subject to confirmation by Cotton
Program Committee, A.B.C. agrees to increasing Scandinavian cotton
rations....

Decision on increase of Dutch cotton rations will be given next week.
French are disturbed over possibility of Dutch competition and are
protracting consideration pending final signature of N.O.T.
agreement.^{[36](#)}

DAVIS

^{[36](#)} Joint agreement between the Governments of Great Britain,
France, and Italy and the Netherlands Oversea Trust, Dec. 17, 1918,
adhered to by the War Trade Board, [Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1,](#)
[vol. II, p. 1584](#).^{[4](#)}

600.119/2209: Telegram

[Document 663]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 20, 1918—10 a.m.
[Received 3:08 p.m.]

6385. War Trade Board [from Stetson]: 704. Referring to Embassy's 6292 of December 15, noon, our 680. Following is translation of text of note of French Ministry of Blockade, dated December 18th.

“Economic organization of the left bank of the Rhine. The Marshal of France, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, entrusted with the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine has informed the Government of the Republic certain propositions relative to the economic regime to be set up in these territories.

The blockade is, by right, maintained on the left bank of the Rhine. However, it seems that a well defined policy ought to be inspired with the principle that the Allies (while not losing sight of the enemy character of the population) should accustom these populations to the occupation and, in consequence, not render the occupation unbearable to them. Furthermore it is necessary to maintain order in the district. The work and the economic life must be assured to it within certain limits. It is these limits which it is necessary to define and the Marshal Commander in Chief is qualified from the point of view of authority to regulate, according to circumstances and in conformity with the instructions of the Allied Governments given through the intermediary of a committee sitting in Paris, the economic relations of the Rhine countries with the rest of Germany, with the neutrals and with the Allied countries.

This Inter-Allied Committee should define the general lines of policy, acting in accordance with the interest of the states represented, and deciding what products of the Rhine countries may be permitted to be exported, whether towards the Allied countries (taking into account the import prohibitions made by each of these countries), whether towards the neutral countries (taking into account the existing agreements with them, N.O.T. and S.S.S.³⁷) or whether with Germany since it appears import trade³⁸ sever all relations between the two banks of the Rhine. The Inter-Allied Committee should also control importations into the Rhine district, the same being in principle forbidden, except such as shall appear upon the free list which the Allied Governments will publish and of which the exportation from these countries will take place without authorization. For all other products licenses should be asked for only in cases of extreme necessity. Products of supply “ravitaillement” should be imported only on the orders of the Commission Inter Alliée de Ravitaillement. The Committee should also see that the merchandise imported should not be reexported to Germany, each of the Governments regulating in accordance with its own legislation the authorization which it will give to its Nationals to do business with houses established on the left bank of the Rhine.

The Inter-Allied [Committee] of Paris will have as correspondent attached to the Marshal Commander in Chief a local Inter-Allied Commission, which will be executive. This is the same system applied for Switzerland and also for the Northern Neutrals of Europe.

The proposed procedure appears to be the best suited to the circumstances and one which permits a solution of each different case conformably with the necessities and without being compelled to establish principles which it seems impossible to define in the absence of any regulation. In any event the regime will have to be stabilized as soon as circumstances permit, that is to say, after the signature of peace or even after the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

The Ministry of Blockade, entrusted to [*by*] the Government of the Republic to create the Inter-Allied Committee, would appreciate if the Embassy of the United States would inform them at once of the name of the delegate designated by the Federal Government.”

Please instruct. Stetson.

SHARP

³⁷ Société Suisse de Surveillance Économique.

³⁸ This phrase apparently garbled.

600.119/1839: Telegram

[Document 664]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Great Britain (Davis)***

WASHINGTON , December 20, 1918—3 p.m.

3572. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1894. Embassy's 4613 December 14, your 2093. Referring to the stipulation concerning the discontinuance of X cables that no licenses will be granted here to consignees on the Statlist or GBLA, we assume that the foregoing does not apply to the "free list" for the Northern Neutrals with respect to which we understand that the British propose to refuse licenses to only consignees on Statlist.

Embassy's 4513 December 11, 3 p.m. your 2056. Department's 3358 December 10, 3 p.m., our 1813 expresses the opinion of the War Trade Board. Our feeling is that unity of action is the matter of fundamental importance and we feel that a complete understanding of the purpose underlying the modifications proposed by the British and the urgency of the British view in regard thereto is essential to enable us to keep policies in substantial accord.

POLK

600.119/1807: Telegram

[Document 665]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , December 20, 1918—5 p.m.

3580. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1899. Embassy's 4599, December 13, your 2088. We note that you will advise us on December 17 of proposed increase of Northern Neutral cotton ration. With reference to French view that the French and Belgian textile industries need protection, it is not our intention to confine the increase of the cotton ration to raw cotton. We are disposed to allow an unlimited ration of manufactured cotton to all neutral countries. Please refer again to Department's 3354, December 10, 2 p.m. our 1815. You have not replied generally to the suggestions set forth therein for increasing the rations of all commodities for the neutral countries of Europe to an extent sufficient to meet the economic and industrial needs of those countries. Is it not possible for you to take this matter up with the A.B.C. without delay? We are in receipt of Embassy's 4600, December 13, your 2089, Embassy's 4613, December 14, your 2093, approving discontinuance X cable system. We are replying thereto in separate cablegram.

POLK

103.96/1768: Telegram

[Document 666]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 20, 1918.
[Received December 20—12:48 p.m.]

4772. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 2140. For McCormick. Refer your 1859, Department's 3470, December 17, British, French and Italian representatives on A.B.C. are submitting urgent statement of their position and ask you to withhold action proposed in last sentence of your telegram until you receive their statement which is being telegraphed today.

DAVIS

103.96/1774: Telegram

[Document 667]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 20, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received 8:05 p.m.]

4781. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 2143, referring your 1859 Department's 3470, Dec. 17, 6 p.m. and our 2140 of today, following is statement of British, French, Italian delegates on A.B.C. after consideration of contents of your 1859:

“The memorandum on the War Trade Board's telegram submitted by the United States representatives was considered by the British, French, and Italian representatives with regard to the War Trade Board's objection to the decision that goods on the present “free” list may be consigned to firms on the black list. The Committee feels that in view of the relatively unimportant nature of the list, an unimportance to which the War Trade Board has specifically drawn attention, the War Trade Board's alarm at the prospective “breaking of enemy control” is quite unfounded. The Committee however holds no strong views one way or the other as to the consignment of free list goods to blacklisted firms and will gladly consider any suggestions for the modification of its decision which the War Trade Board desires to put forward, this point is, however, of minor importance and the Committee much regrets that the War Trade Board, merely because it did not agree with the procedure of the Allied Blockade Committee and because it considered that the very difficult questions connected with the partial relations [*relaxations*] of the blockade were not treated with sufficient expedition, should have issued at a date which did not permit the Associated Governments to take objection or to issue a

similar notice of a list of unrationed commodities containing articles of the first importance. The Committee feels that to allow the unrestricted import by the border neutrals of the articles specified in the United States list, even if immediate leakage to the enemy did not ensue, would be tantamount to permitting Germany to accumulate in the border neutral countries large stocks of any of these commodities which she requires for post bellum reequipment and thus seriously to weaken the economical pressure which should prove most potent factor for compelling her to accept the peace terms which the Associated Governments desire to impose. The Committee therefore feels that the question of policy raised by the United States "unrationed" list, involving as it does not only serious economic questions but also a departure from the agreement between the Associated Powers and the border neutrals, is of such importance that it ought to be considered specially by the Associated Governments. They would also point out that the question of extending as distinct from abolishing the rations of the commodities in question is now under active consideration by the Statistical Subcommittee which hopes very shortly to be in a position to recommend substantial increases aside from considerations of general policy. The Committee feels that the action of the War Trade Board in actually publishing this list in their press on December 20th has placed the other Associated Governments in an exceedingly awkward dilemma. The other Governments must either effect a great sacrifice of their export trade by declining to adopt the course taken by the War Trade Board, or they must follow suit to the War Trade Board at the cost, as the committee believes, of a considerable weakening of economic pressure on Germany.

The Committee considers that the War Trade Board ought to take every possible step to relieve this situation. They propose therefore to ask the United States representatives to telegraph forthwith to the War Trade Board pointing out that the action of the War Trade Board has placed the Committee in a position of extreme difficulty; that the British, French and Italian representatives are reluctant at present in the interests

of the blockade to advise their respective governments to take similar action and that in fairness to the other Associated Governments the War Trade Board, if not in a position to revoke the notice already issued, should for the time being nullify its effect by confining the actual issue of licenses within the limits of the agreed rations as extended from time to time by the Allied Blockade Committee.”

DAVIS

600.119/2208: Telegram

[Document 668]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 20, 1918—7 p.m.

6701. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 506. Embassy's 6292, December 15, 12 a.m., your 680. We are replying in separate cablegram. Meantime, please advise what organization is being set up for the object of controlling trade to countries under military occupation or control, including Luxemburg, Balkan States, Trentino, and other points referred to in our 498, Department's 6629, Dec. 14, 4 p.m. excluding Alsace Lorraine. We have had a cable from London indicating that the A.B.C. were considering problems coming within these territories. It appears to us that there is an immediate necessity of setting up in Paris some central bureau to keep allied countries informed, so that there may be simultaneous announcement in the various countries that may have trade relations with the territory involved. As long as the territories are under military control, it would appear to us that Paris would be the logical center. On the other hand, London, from the viewpoint of commerce, is more accessible. Please consult with our military authorities and Sheldon and the French authorities involved and cable us fully.

POLK

600.119/1883: Telegram

[Document 669]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 20, 1918.
[Received December 20—10:01 p.m.]

4789. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2146. Refer your 1859, Department's 3470, December 17th, 6 p.m. and our 2140 and 2143 of today. British and French representatives on A.B.C, feel that you do not wholly appreciate their earnest desire to cooperate fully with you in meeting the present changed conditions and wish us to point out:

1. That the free list was admittedly inadequate and contained only commodities the continued control of which was considered of no importance and was intended only as a temporary measure to meet in some slight degree the pressure brought to bear by traders in Allied countries;
2. That your suggestions regarding non reference to London contained in latter part of your 1815 Department's 3354 December 10, were largely acceded to as notified you in our 2089, Embassy's 4600 December 13th;
3. That the increased cotton rations to Scandinavian neutrals suggested by you have been approved with all possible despatch and that other increases are being considered and will be promptly reported;
4. That as a result of the foregoing measures within 6 weeks of the date of the armistice the blockade of neutrals has been very materially [relaxed] along lines for the most part suggested by War Trade Board.

DAVIS

600.119/1794: Telegram

[Document 670]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—4 p.m.

3595. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1902. Embassy's 4480 December 10, 4 p.m., transmitting Weddell's December 8, 7 p.m.³⁹ Repeat following reply to Weddell:

7 p.m.³⁹ Repeat following reply to Weddell:

“We believe that under present conditions there should be no unnecessary restrictions left upon commerce and cannot see that at the present time we are in any way interested as to the possibility of Greece obtaining more than her actual needs of any one commodity. It would be impossible to comply with your suggestion that ration details as fixed by the Commercial Bureau be maintained unless licenses are referred to Athens before granting. We therefore propose to make public announcement on December 26 that beginning January 1, 1919 licenses will be issued freely for shipments to Greece without prior reference to Athens. These licenses will be valid regardless of the flag of the steamer, will be unlimited as to time, and will be valid for shipment either direct or via any other country. We can see no object in cabling particulars of these licenses after granting.”

POLK

³⁹ Not printed. Alexander W. Weddell was War Trade Board representative at Athens.

³⁹ Not printed. Alexander W. Weddell was War Trade Board representative at Athens.

600.119/1839: Telegram

[Document 671]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—4 p.m.

3596. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1904. Referring further Embassy's 4613, December 14, your 2093. We approve the procedure suggested in your cablegram and will make proper announcements here on December 26 to become effective immediately. We have cabled to our representatives in Northern Neutral countries to this effect.⁴⁰ Applications heretofore cabled to you covering commodities other than those included in the specific embargo or statistical embargo lists or in the so-called free list set forth in Embassy's 3966, November 23, your 1924, concerning which we have not as yet heard from you, will be reconsidered and licenses will be issued according to the new procedure. We will continue to submit to London applications for commodities on the statistical embargo lists, which under the new procedure will become nil rations, on the theory that London is relaxing daily on these embargoes, or at least that she should do so. See our 1869.⁴⁰ In that connection see also Department's 2089 [3354], December 9[10], our 1815. The matter of increasing the rations for all Northern Neutral countries should be given immediate attention. You have not as yet replied to Dept's 3470 Dec. 17, 6 p.m. our 1859 in connection with the free list. Until we hear from you, and we should like to be advised immediately, we will not publish as being included in the suggested non-ration list commodities set forth in that cablegram but will include all applications covering the same in the new procedure until we hear from you.

POLK

40 Not printed.

40 Not printed.

600.119/1887: Telegram

[Document 672]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 21, 1918.
[Received December 21—5:39 p.m.]

4817. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2156. Refer your 1894 Department 3572, December 20, 3 p.m., and our 2154 of today.⁴¹ Adequate reply today is impossible but we can state:

1. Your understanding of the free list is correct, that is to say no individual export licenses from United Kingdom are required for commodities on this list. Customs officials prevent consignments to firms on statlist and shippers to such consignees are liable to arrest and imprisonment. In view of the objections on your part to permitting individuals on confidential list to receive free list goods we shall propose to A.B.C. at meeting to be held December 24th, to modify their previous decision in such manner that consignment of goods on free list to individuals on confidential list will be prevented in United Kingdom. This can be done by action on the part of customs officials thus obviating the necessity of reimposing export licenses for these goods. We are assured that the A.B.C. will act favorably on this suggestion.
2. Your understanding of important enemy trade modifications now adopted for Northern Neutrals is correct except as to (a) modification of free list conditions will in all probability be made as indicated above and (b) that proposed revision of statutory list is as you state except that it is not proposed to remove banks and financial houses. It is now understood however that no form of revision shall be made without your full accord.
3. The British do not feel strongly the desirability of relaxation of enemy trade restrictions by elimination of confidential list and elimination of individual export licenses for a large list of

commodities. In adopting the free list their motive was that unimportance of goods in this list rendered the considerable trouble entailed in preventing these goods from reaching firms on the confidential black list not worth while. The British view as to measures to be adopted for further relaxations is: (a) by additions to free list of only unimportant commodities concerning which there would be complete unanimity of opinion from all Associated Governments; (b) by creating of a non-ration list, articles on which would require individual export licenses from all Associated Governments; (c) by considerable increase of rations for goods remaining in ration lists except for a few vital raw materials.

4. That part of your telegram dealing with Latin America cannot be answered today because your telegram was received too late to arrange for interviews with heads of Departments concerned. Reply to this portion will be sent December 23rd at earliest hour possible and this will apply to further questions not answered in this telegram.

DAVIS

⁴¹ No. 2154 not printed.

600.119/2208: Telegram

[Document 673]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—5 p.m.

6713. For McFadden⁴² [from War Trade Board]: No. 509. Following for Taylor from McCormick. Referring further Embassy's 6292 December 15th, 12 a.m., your 680. As McFadden is expected here today, we should like to consult with him before taking any definite action with relation to policies affecting the territory on the west bank of the Rhine. To the extent, however, that it is necessary for the War Trade Board to state their policy in this matter, the Board place this matter entirely in your hands and you are authorized in your discretion to approve on behalf of the Board any matters which require immediate decision. You will also please act as our representative upon the Paris Committee so far as there is any occasion for such representation, keeping us fully informed as to all developments, particularly the extent to which enemy nationals in the occupied territory are permitted to have commercial relations with the Associated Governments and with neutral countries and with territories on the east bank of the Rhine. Our principal interest in the question is the extent to which exports and imports between the United States and the occupied territory are to be permitted. Referring Embassy's 6336 December 17th, your 688, under our Trading with the Enemy Act, all the occupied territory still has the status of enemy territory. The law makes no provision for enemy territory under military occupancy. Are we to understand that the laws of France permit a general resumption of trade between France and all portions of the occupied territory? Is there any distinction under the French law between Alsace-Lorraine and other portions of the occupied territory?

POLK

⁴² It was the practice to address cables dealing with War Trade Board matters and passing through the embassies, to the War Trade Board representatives by name, regardless of whether or not these men were at their posts.

600.119/1906a: Telegram

[Document 674]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 21, 1918—6 p.m.

6717. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 510. Embassy's 6340, December 17, 4 p.m. Your 692. For Taylor. Are we to understand that American shippers may consign to Trieste or other Adriatic points? We are also in doubt due to conflicting cable as to Alsace-Lorraine. Has public announcement of permission to ship goods to these territories been made in France? If so cable us fully so that we may make announcement here. We are up to the moment permitting no shipments to enemy territory now occupied by Allies except as such shipments may be sent through Allied countries without our knowledge. A clear statement should be made so as to inform our traders of the position. White.

POLK

600.119/1917a: Circular telegram

[Document 675]

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Missions and Consulates [43](#)

WASHINGTON , December 23, 1918.

War Trade Board. Supplementing circular telegram November 21. Nearly all commodities freely licensed for export, even if on Conservation List (which list is being rapidly reduced) though all carefully considered from enemy trade standpoint. The following constitutes practically complete list of commodities under limited restriction for conservation reasons on December 21. Country agreements limit exportation in certain cases of these commodities as well as all others. Linen Gill Nets and Threads; Wood Pulp; Arms and ammunition; Certain Foods; Films; Manufactures of Gold; Cinchona bark and derivatives; Red clover seeds; Coal.

POLK

[43](#) To all American Missions and Consulates except those in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

600.119/1893: Telegram

[Document 676]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 23, 1918.
[Received December 23—4:10 p.m.]

4831. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2157. Refer your 1894, Department's number 3572 of December 20th and our 2156, Embassy's 4817 of December 21st. The A.B.C. today modified conditions of free list by providing that consignment of such goods to firms on confidential list is no [not] permitted from U[nited] K[ingdom] and France. This will be prevented by control of customs officials over exports for which individual export licenses are not required. As a matter of fact British customs officials did put this construction on original order and we are informed that consignments to individuals on confidential list have not been made. Steps are being taken to give immediate effect to this revision of free list conditions.

DAVIS

600.119/1891: Telegram

[Document 677]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 23, 1918.
[Received December 23—6:55 p.m.]

4838. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: 2163. Department's 3604, December 21st, Your 1896.⁴⁴ A.B.C. consider that such reexport of articles on free list as would be likely to occur would not be seriously objectionable. Committee however consider that official position should be that such reexports are not permissible to Central Powers or at present to Russia or Finland and that guarantees against such reexport should be obtained insofar as practicable. Under existing agreements regarding Norway and Sweden, Committee understand that adequate guarantees against reexport can be obtained without difficulty. Regarding Denmark, Committee consider that, though War Trade Board agreement with Denmark does not clearly cover this point yet, for present position should be maintained that guarantees are required. Regarding Holland, Committee consider that guarantees cannot properly be [required] under new general agreement and N.O.T. agreement but it is suggested that I.A.T.C. should recommend removal from free list of any articles which they considered were being improperly reexported. Inasmuch as it is not expected that Central Powers would desire to import articles on present free list to any appreciable extent committee feel that question is largely academic.

DAVIS

⁴⁴ Not printed.

600.119/1900: Telegram

[Document 678]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS , December 23, 1918—6 p.m.
[Received 10:28 p.m.]

6439. War Trade Board [from Taylor]: No. 718. Attention White. Every day makes clearer five facts with reference to five neutral nations around Central Powers.

1. Restriction in foodstuff and manufactured goods has no military importance except to uphold theory that armistice is war.
2. Restriction in foodstuff and manufactured goods except for conservation for Inter-Allied needs and relief is a political injury to Associated Nations.
3. Such restriction is also an economic injury to all nations who have an exportable surplus and no injury to Allies who have no exportable surplus.
4. France and Belgium require consideration for devastated areas and Allies deserve protection against neutrals jumping into world markets with manufactured goods before Allies can recover from war industries and demobilization.
5. Tonnage scarcity is rapidly becoming a fiction and tonnage control unnecessary if not indeed injurious from standpoint of charter rates and efficiency.

Obviously these situations make Board more free except for number 4. Protection of devastated areas against Teutonic competition will be provided at peace conference. Protection against five neutral nations we must aid through control of raw materials. All commodities should be classified into two groups under 4 and treated accordingly. Taylor.

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/16a: Telegram

[Document 679]

***The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Acting
Food Administrator (Richard)***

[PARIS ,] December 24, 1918.

40. Will you release following to press as a statement by the Washington office.

Mr. Hoover has, with the authority of the President, strongly urged upon the Allied Governments the removal of the restrictions upon the shipments of pork products and condensed milk to all European neutrals including Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland. The production of these commodities in the United States promises—for the months of January and February—to rise to a volume greater than the needs of the Allies and those of the newly liberated territories such as Belgium, Northern France, Northern Italy, etc.

To secure the rapid disentanglement of the European Food situation, Mr. Hoover is proposing that the surplus should be divided over the European neutral countries at once. These countries have, for shipping and other reasons, been under stringent restrictions by the Allied Governments.

In order that conditions may be brought to normal as rapidly as possible he is proposing that normal trade be allowed to proceed in these commodities for the present. It is probable that later in the spring the seasonal decrease in production may necessitate return to rationing all countries, but for the present supplies are ample and storage in the United States insufficient to carry over the surplus.

Mr. Hurley has given directions that the Neutrals who have insufficient shipping of their own to carry these products should be assisted by the United States Shipping Board.

HOOVER

600.119/1899: Telegram

[Document 680]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 24, 1918.
[Received December 24—10:40 a.m.]

4839. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2160.
Supplementing our 2067 December 12. Proclamation about to be
issued makes trade resumption effective January 1st with (1) Alsace-
Lorraine and with (2) the new Italian territories included in line
defined by Austrian, Italian armistice of November 3d.^{[45](#)} Specific
reference to Trieste and Trentino will not be made.

DAVIS

^{[45](#)} For text, see p. 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 110](#)].

600.119/1895: Telegram

[Document 681]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 24, 1918.
[Received December 24—1:21 p.m.]

4841. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: 2162. Supplementing our 2156 December 21st in reply to your 1894 December 20th.

- (1) British proposal for relaxation in Northern Neutrals based on desirability of trade reconstruction and labour situation per paragraph 2 of our number 1916 of November 22nd.
- (2) British enemy trade control is based on licensing system which allows no shipments to go forward to stat. list, G.B.L. "A" or otherwise uncertain consignees. This in addition to the rationing control maintained on all essential commodities plus the further control exerted through the requirements of import certificates for shipments to the Northern Neutral countries. The only modification since the armistice has been in the publication of the "free list" which permitted free list commodities to be shipped to Northern Neutral consignees without the necessity for export license. In no case could free list commodities go to statutory list consignees. In accordance with your later representations arrangements are now being made so that such free list commodities may not [go] to G.B.L. "A" consignees. Control will be maintained by the customs who have orders to stop any shipments consigned to either stat. list or G.B.L. "A" firms.
- (2a) A great number of commodities are exportable from U[nited] K[ingdom] to Latin America without license namely all commodities on the "C" list as published in the British War Trade Department's periodical "list of goods the export of which is prohibited" for Latin America. The only commodities requiring

export license were those on the “A” list which corresponds to our conservation list.

- (2b) British customs officials are supplied with copies of general black lists and are instructed to stop any shipments addressed to any firms either on stat. list of [or?] G.B.L. “A” regardless of country of destination. To best of our information cloak list consignees have not been included in this publication. In addition, British War Trade Department has notified Chambers of Commerce in Manchester, Bradford, Nottingham and Glasgow of all names of G.B.L. consignees in order that such local chambers might inform manufacturers not to attempt do any business with such consignees. Further we are told that importing firms in Latin America are in habit of consulting British Consuls as to whether they may accept orders from other local firms in case of doubt. We have understood that ever since Washington Conference was instituted American, British and French Consular Officers in Latin America have coordinated such work and have made uniform recommendations to Washington respecting additions and removals.
- (3) The instruction which Foreign Office sent to British Consuls in Latin America relative to greater leniency in black list recommendations was reported to you in our number 1967 of November 30th⁴⁶ at the request of the Foreign Office. There was no intent to break down or make more difficult local operations by the dispatch of this circular message which went to all countries throughout the world where enemy trading lists were in operation.
- (4) Am investigating further with regard to question 2b in your 1894 of December 20 and will reply after further conference with officials here.

DAVIS

⁴⁶ Not printed.

600.119/1894: Telegram

[Document 682]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 24, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received December 24—3:59 p.m.]

4855. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2165. Subject to the approval of the Italian Government the A.B.C. added to the free list forthwith (1) pork and pork products, (2) iron and steel and manufactures thereof except high speed steel. The placing of these on the free list rather than on a nonration list is recommended because no precautions against reexport to enemy countries are thought necessary nor in the case of pork desirable. Hoover asked me especially to secure above ruling on pork owing to situation in America of this commodity. He fears unless Neutral orders are received immediately that the falling off in Allied demands may have an almost disastrous effect on American pork market. Notify United States Food Administration.

DAVIS

841.731 T 67/13a: Telegram

[Document 683]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , December 24, 1918—7 p.m.

3662. For Auchincloss from McCormick: In view of certain questions relating to the control of enemy trade which I would like to explain personally I hope that no change in the censorship will be made and that the *status quo* in that regard will be preserved until my arrival in Paris. The principal thing we have in mind is the maintenance of the Enemy Trading List and the enemy trade restrictions. While the maintenance of restrictions against enemy trade throughout the world is probably not properly speaking a blockade measure in the usual sense of that term, it does operate indirectly as a blockade by preventing the immediate revival of German commerce throughout the world and the consequent accrual of assets which will become available to Germany immediately upon the conclusion of peace. If it is desirable to continue these restrictions upon enemy trade in Latin America and other parts of the world, it seems essential that we continue the censorship.

POLK

600.119/1907: Telegram

[Document 684]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , December 24, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received December 25—5:55 p.m.]

6474. War Trade Board [from Stetson]: Number 723. Referring to the Department's number 6717, December 21st, 6 p.m. We are advised by the French Ministry of Blockade: First, that the Italian Government has, since November 29, allowed trade with the Trentino. The French are telegraphing to Rome to ascertain exactly what this means, with the intent of preparing a similar decree authorizing French nationals to have commercial relations with this district. We will keep you informed. In the meantime we are also telegraphing to Rome asking them to advise you and us in detail as to Trentino, Trieste and Adriatic points. Second, that French consider it necessary and we are in accord, that a committee be immediately created in Paris, as stated in your 506 of December 21st [20th], in order that simultaneous announcements may be made in the various Associated countries regarding relaxation of restrictions. This committee will probably be absorbed by the proposed Inter-Allied committees to be created in Paris to deal with trade relations between the Associated countries and the now and former enemy nations. Please instruct on this point. Pending receipt of instructions and the constitution of a formal committee, we will have informal meetings with the French in which we will endeavor to secure the cooperation of the British and Italians, so that we will be advised as to any changes that these countries may make in lessening the trade restrictions, and so that the announcement may be made as simultaneously as possible by all the Associated countries regarding the countries treated from Paris; that is, Spain, Switzerland, Morocco and those mentioned in your 498 of December 14th and your 50006 [506] of December 20th. Stetson.

BLISS

600.119/2214: Telegram

[Document 685]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , December 25, 1918.

[Received December 25—3:08 p.m.]

6490. War Trade Board [from Stetson]: Number 725. Referring to Embassy's 6292, of December 14 [15], 9 p.m. [12 a.m.], our 680, and Embassy's 6385 of December 20, 10 a.m., our 704. French Ministry of Blockade propose that the derogations or licenses to trade with the enemy subjects in the occupied territory under the jurisdiction of the proposed Inter-Allied committees shall be granted by the proposed Inter-Allied committee to sit in the occupied region. That is, that the actual administration of the granting of the licenses shall be done by the local committee. This does not in any way deprive the proposed Paris committee of its functions with regard to determination of policy and no licenses should be granted except after decision by the Paris committee as to the policy under which such licenses would be granted. Stetson.

BLISS

600.119/1906: Telegram

[Document 686]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , December 25, 1918—noon.
[Received 5:37 p.m.]

6489. War Trade Board [from Stetson]: Number 730. Referring to Inter-Allied committee in Paris, Seydoux wishes us to state that this will in no way interfere with Hoover-Clementel committee⁴⁸ but will act with it and help it in every way possible. Seydoux notified us today that he had been notified by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Hoover and Clementel had agreed and was preparing plan of committee; that Inter-Allied committee would be more or less an informal affair and not as complicated as the S.S.S. or N.O.T. Theoretic [sic]: that there would be one committee for all countries. Stetson.

BLISS

⁴⁸ Reference apparently is to Inter-Allied committee for food relief.

600.119/1917: Telegram

[Document 687]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , December 28, 1918.

[Received December 28—4:50 p.m.]

4910. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2186. Referring to our 2163, Embassy 4838, December 23rd and our 2165, Embassy's 4855, December 24. I personally am not in sympathy with the recommendation of the committee mentioned in our 2163 that reexports of free list goods are not permissible to the Central Powers and that guarantees against such reexport should be obtained insofar as practicable under existing agreements. You will remember that in many of the agreements concluded with the Northern Neutrals and Holland it was provided that a free list should be set up for which no guarantees of any kind should be exacted and when we discussed here in London the advisability of finding an outlet from the Associated countries of certain manufactured articles, it was suggested that a free list be set up which would permit of unrestricted export within the export license limits set by each Associated country and that no guarantee should be asked against reexport even though some of the commodities had previously been on the list of rationed articles. Hoover is very anxious to move large quantities of pork from the United States immediately, and in order to have this plan work successfully I think that we should let it be known through the I.A.T.C.'s in Holland and the Northern Neutrals that pork and also other articles on the free list can be imported freely into these countries and that there would be no objection to their reexport in any direction. If you approve of this, I would ask you to inform me immediately as any delay in making it clear to neutrals that they might reexport pork would have a serious influence in Hoover's programme of marketing the United States surplus of pork products; therefore rush answer.

DAVIS

600.119/2209: Telegram

[Document 688]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON , December 30, 1918—4 p.m.

6793. For McFadden⁴⁹ [from War Trade Board]: No. 530 for Taylor. Embassy's 6385, December 20, 10 a.m. your 704. Referring Department's 6713 December 21st, 5 p.m. our 509. After discussing situation with McFadden, we are of opinion that subject to your approval it will be proper for Stetson to represent the War Trade Board upon the Inter-Allied Committee at Paris. He should attend all meetings and keep in touch with all administrative questions and all procedural matters connected with such machinery as may be established for regulating trade with the occupied districts. He should consult with you in connection with all important questions of general policy.

POLK

⁴⁹ See footnote 42, p. 771 [Pg. 771 includes portions of [Doc. 672](#) and [Doc. 673](#)].

600.119/1917

[Document 689]

***Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of the
War Trade Board (Hale)***

[WASHINGTON ,] December 31, 1918.

Following is an extract from a preliminary draft of the Board minutes of December 30, 1918:

“Mr. White referred to cablegram No. 24 dated December 23, 1918, from Mr. Hoover,⁵⁰ recommending that all restrictions upon the exportation of pork products to Northern European Neutrals be removed, and further that all restrictions now imposed by the Associated Governments upon the exportation of pork and pork products from the Northern Neutral countries to the Central Powers be removed. Mr. White pointed out that pork and pork products had already been placed upon the “free list” of commodities exportable without limit as to quantity to the Northern Neutral countries. The Board proceeded to discuss at length the proposal of Mr. Hoover that pork products be permitted to be exported freely from the Northern European Neutrals to Germany. At the close of the discussion, on motion duly made and seconded, the Board adopted the following action:

Mr. Hoover shall be advised that it is the opinion of the War Trade Board that existing restrictions upon the exportation of foodstuffs from the Northern Neutral countries to Germany should be maintained, and that relief shipments of foodstuffs from the United States to Germany should be made directly to Germany, payment for such shipments to be made in a manner approved by the delegates at the Versailles Conference.”

50 Not printed.

600.119/1931: Telegram

[Document 690]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , January 1, 1919—5 p.m.
[Received 8:32 p.m.]

10. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 2214. Refer my 2165, Embassy's 4855, December 24, and 2169 Embassy's 4860 of December 24.⁵¹ The Italian Government has now approved the action of the A.B.C. on December 24, which placed pork and pork products on the free list. In the interval that intervened awaiting this approval, opposition to the action developed from a department of the British Government. I believe, however, that all opposition will shortly be withdrawn, and that the action of the A.B.C. can be confirmed, and that you may act on this supposition before the Department. A.B.C. has now modified its action of the same date placing iron and steel and manufactures thereof on the free list, and its recommendation included in my telegram 2169 placing machinery of all kinds, except textile machinery, on the free list. Instead the A.B.C. has placed on the free list iron and steel, excluding high speed steel, and has placed on the non-ration list the manufactures of iron and steel, including all machinery and parts, except textile machinery.

DAVIS

⁵¹ No. 2169 not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/61: Telegram

[Document 691]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Commission to Negotiate Peace***

LONDON , January 3, 1919—12 noon.
[Received 6:20 p.m.]

2. For Hoover from Sheldon. Following telegram has just been received from War Trade Board.

“3750. January 2, 4:00 p.m. For Sheldon, number 1968. Embassy’s 4910, December 28th, your 2136 [2186]. We are strongly of the opinion that the sifting of commodities on the free list including pork and pork products through the Border Neutrals into the enemy’s country should not be permitted. That would be in fact countenancing violations of the blockade, the principles of which under the terms of the armistice must be maintained. The free list must not be used as a device for rationing Germany. If any rationing of the enemy country is contemplated, it should be regularly and definitely prescribed by the Associated Governments as an out and out exception to the blockade. We agree with Hoover that an outlet must be found for our present large surplus stocks of pork and pork products, but if the Associated Governments should decide that pork and pork products or any other commodities on the free list should be permitted to go to the Central Powers, we are strongly of the belief the shipments of these should be made directly into those countries and not through the Border Neutrals, more particularly in the matter of pork and pork products. We do not believe that the sifting process would permit us to dispose of an appreciably large part of our surplus. Besides the Northern Neutrals should not be accorded the opportunity by exacting exorbitant prices to aggravate in terms of profits the German gold and German

credits that unquestionably will go to reimburse and indemnify the Allies under the terms of the Peace Treaty. White had cabled to Hoover in the above sense,⁵³ suggesting that if the Associated Governments should decide that shipments of pork and pork products or any other commodities on the free list should be permitted to be imported by the Central Powers, such shipments should be made to those countries direct and payments be made in gold or in other commodities almost exclusively produce. Should objections be raised to the acquisition of such gold in this country, probably a plan could be arranged through the Treasury for depositing such gold in Europe and for the ultimate collection therefor in specie, or otherwise. The point we wish to emphasize now is that the free list for the Northern Neutrals must not be used as a device for rationing or revictualing the enemy. McCormick leaves today and will take up this matter with you more in detail upon his arrival in Paris. Show him this cablegram. Meantime please get in touch with Hoover. Polk, acting.”

I have discovered that there was considerable opposition in some British Government departments to the arrangement that has been made to put pork and pork products on the free list for Northern Neutrals and the British Minister of Blockade stated that he would be obliged to reopen the recent decision of the Allied Blockade Committee on the ground that all questions affecting relief had, for the time being as far as Great Britain was concerned, been placed in Lord Beading's hands. I thereupon saw Lord Reading with Dulles, who is now in Paris, Hotel Crillon, but up to the time of the receipt of the War Trade Board telegram quoted above I have not been able to obtain a definite answer from Reading. He told me however that he expected that the main relief council ought to be set up in Paris and in working order within a few days, and, in view of the telegram from the War Trade Board quoted above, it would appear that the Board will probably not grant export licenses from America for pork on conditions which would permit transshipment into Germany, i. e. put it on the free list.

It would, therefore, seem that the best we can do here through the Allied Blockade Committee is to put pork and pork products on the unrationed list for the Northern Neutrals which means that these countries may import any amount but that the importers have to give guarantees against its reexport, leaving the question of shipment to the Central Powers to be taken up by the Relief Council as soon as it is set up. Consequently pork and pork products are now on the unrationed list.

DAVIS

53 Cable not printed.

600.119/1937: Telegram

[Document 692]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , January 3, 1919.
[Received January 3—10:42 a.m.]

45. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: No. 2221. At a meeting of the A.B.C. at which Sir Laming Worthington Evans⁵⁴ presided the following minute was adopted which modifies the Committee's interpretation of the free list as advised you in my number 2163, Embassy's 4838 of December 23rd.

“It was agreed that three principal lists, the free list, the nonrationed list and the rationed list should be adopted.

1. The goods upon the free list should not be allowed to be consigned to anyone on the statutory list or black lists but that in respect of them there should be no licensing or undertakings by the Importing Associations and that the arrangements with the Importing Associations should be modified where necessary. This list should be confined to unimportant articles and it is not anticipated at the present time it should be an extensive list, although from time to time after due consideration it should be added to from goods now placed upon the nonrationed list.
2. A nonrationed list should be established of goods not necessary to control as regards quantity, although control should be maintained as regards destination. These goods will be consigned to the Associations and subject to guarantees by the consignees.
3. The rationed list will be operated under the agreements as in the past with regard to financial facilities. It was agreed that no financial facilities should be permitted to firms on

the statutory or black lists in respect of any goods whether on the free, nonrationed or rationed lists, or in respect of general financial transactions and also as regards imports into any Associated country unless a license for this purpose is obtained through the usual channels.”

Existing arrangements for preventing financial facilities to black listers in the four Associated countries were enquired into and these were considered effective as they stand.

DAVIS

54 British Minister of Blockade.

658.119/770: Telegram

[Document 693]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , January 3, 1919—5 p.m.

3772. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1975. The following is for your information and to be repeated to the American Legation at Stockholm as an answer to Legation's 3357, December 18th, 10 a.m.^{[55](#)}

“The War Trade Board believe that the present control of imports into Sweden should not be immediately and wholly abandoned. Even if such relaxation did not result in the immediate resumption of exports from Sweden to Germany, it would nevertheless permit Germany to accumulate in Sweden large stocks of raw materials which Germany requires for post-war use, and would thus seriously weaken the economic pressure which we believe should prove a most potent factor in compelling Germany to accept the peace terms which the Associated Governments desire to impose. There are, however, a large number of commodities to which this objection is not applicable. These are principally manufactured articles and foodstuffs, and we have already recommended to the Allied Blockade Committee that these commodities be added to the so-called ‘free list’ which will mean that they may be exported to approved consignees in all northern neutral countries without limit as to quantity and without requiring a guarantee by the manufacturer.

“You have already been informed by Sheldon and by our No. 132 for Owen of December 21st^{[56](#)} of the simplified procedure effective December 26th, whereunder it is no longer necessary that applications for export licenses be referred to the Allied

Blockade Committee at London. The licenses will be issued here as soon as the import certificates have been issued by the importing associations in Sweden. It would therefore appear that any delay in the issuance of licenses in appropriate cases is attributable to the Swedish Associations.”

POLK

55 Not printed.

56 Not printed.

600.119/1897: Telegram

[Document 694]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , January 3, 1919—6 p.m.

3774. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1952. Urgent and important. Embassy's 4781, December 20, 5 p.m. your 2143. Department's 3470, December 17, 6 p.m. our 1859, was prepared on December 14 and was delivered the same day to Department to be despatched. Owing, no doubt, to the congestion of cable lines, it was not despatched until December 17. Had it been promptly despatched, ABC would have had 5 full days to consider the proposed publication, or 8 full days before the same would have become effective. On December 20, we prepared and delivered to Department to be despatched, Department's 3596, December 21, 4 p.m., our 1904. On the afternoon of December 21, Department delivered to us Embassy's 4772, December 20, your 2140. Embassy's 4789, December 20, your 2146, and Embassy's 4781, December 20, 5 p.m. your 2143, were received by us at noon on December 23. You will see from the foregoing that we had decided not to publish, as being included in a so-called non-rationed list, the commodities set forth in Department's 3470, December 17, 6 p.m., our 1859, before receipt of any protest from British, French and Italian representatives on A B C. Although we did not expressly so state in our 1859, we did not propose to make the publication on December 20 without having heard from you.

Although we did not approve, in principle, of the so-called Free List because of its abolition of the Confidential List, and although we believe that we should have been given notice earlier of the proposed publication thereof, it was not our plan to publish the so-called non-rationed list without giving ABC an opportunity to state their views. We regret that in stating that we proposed to publish it on December

20, we gave the impression that we intended to act without reference to the views of the other Governments. The list has never been published. Please explain the situation to the British, French and Italian Representatives.

And now, to clear up any ambiguities which may have resulted from the unavoidable, because necessarily hurried, correspondence that we have recently exchanged with you, and in order to make this cablegram complete in itself, we submit to you for consideration by A B C the following summary of our position with reference to exports to the Northern Neutral countries of Europe.

I. Rations. We adhere to the belief that the rations for the Northern Neutrals should be immediately increased to the needs of those Neutrals, except possibly in the case of certain raw materials. See paragraph captioned "Raw Materials". Such increase would not result in a considerable weakening of the economic pressure on Germany, inasmuch as we recommend such increase only to the extent of satisfying the actual needs of the Neutrals. Besides, an absolute physical blockade is now being maintained in the Baltic. Also, the agreements between the Associated Governments and all the Northern Neutrals should, at this time, more even than heretofore, operate as effective guarantees against re-exportation to Germany because of the prospect of the early re-establishment of Free Trade relations and consequent desire of the Northern Neutral countries to observe these agreements with the greatest good faith at a time when they will be seeking to obtain a fair balance of the world's trade with the Associated Governments.

II. Free List. In view of Embassy's 4831, December 23, your 2157, in which you state that the ABC have modified the conditions of the Free List and will no longer permit shipments of commodities to firms on the Confidential List, it appears that the so-called free list has now been practically assimilated to the non-rationed list set forth in Department's 3470, December 17, 6 p.m., our 1859, except for the fact that the commodities in the respective lists are not identical. In view of Embassy's 4831, your 2157, we have ceased issuing licenses for commodities on the Free List when consigned to firms on the Confidential List. We note from Embassy's 4855, December 24, 4

p.m., your 2165, that pork and pork products, iron and steel and manufactures thereof, except high speed steel, have been added to the Free List. Those commodities were included in the proposed Non-rationed List set forth in Department's 3470, our 1859. We therefore approve. We also approve the proposed addition to the Free List of the commodities set forth in Embassy's 4860, December 24, your 2169.^{[57](#)}

We now recommend, further, an immediate addition to the Free List of all the other commodities included in the proposed Nonrationed List as set forth in Department's 3470, our 1859, and also tobacco. We also strongly recommend that, with the exception of certain articles, particularly raw materials, all commodities, and especially all foodstuffs, be placed on the Free List. In making this last recommendation we are moved by the following considerations: As stated in our 1968, January 2, Department's 3750,^{[57a](#)} and for the reasons therein set forth, we are not in accord with the views of the ABC as set forth in Embassy's 4838, December 23, your 2163, and in Embassy's 4855, December 24, 4 p.m., to the effect that the reexportation from the Border Neutrals to the Central Empires of commodities on the Free List should not be viewed as seriously objectionable.

We believe, however, that sufficient safeguards exist to permit the Associated Governments and the Northern Neutrals to derive benefit from the Free List without concurrent benefit to the enemy. And it is because of that belief that we recommend the immediate and ultimate additions referred to above. The commodities now included in the Free List and the additions that we have either approved or proposed consist chiefly of foodstuffs or manufactured articles and do not include all raw materials. As for foodstuffs, the blockade and the agreements referred to above would seem to constitute sufficient guarantees against re-exportation. The only danger would seem to be a possible accumulation of stocks of foodstuffs by Germany in the Border Neutral countries for importation into Germany after a declaration of peace. That possibility is negligible in view of the current high market prices of foodstuffs, which, if ultimately importable into Germany, could, at the time of such future importation, be purchased by her at materially lower prices. As to

manufactured articles, the blockade in the Baltic and the existence of the agreements again appear to offer sufficient guarantees. Besides, in the matter of these manufactured articles, Germany is not a buyer, but, on the contrary, in time will be a competitor with the Associated Governments, and, unless we flood Northern Neutral markets with Allied manufactured commodities, Germany, immediately following a declaration of peace, will find those countries rich fields for exploitation. As to foodstuffs, and as to such manufactured articles as American industries produce, this country will have a sufficient supply to satisfy all of the needs of the Associated Governments, in addition to the supply which might be shipped to the Border Neutrals. In fact, we are seeking new markets for our present large surplus stocks of those commodities.

And so we approve of the Free List, but not for the purpose of revictualing or rationing the enemy country at this time, and we are also of the opinion that under any plan which the Associated Governments might formulate for rationing or revictualing the Central Powers, shipments should be made directly to the Central Powers and not through the Neutrals. In this connection, refer again to our 1968, January 2.

III. Controlled List. Inasmuch as additions are being made so rapidly to the Free List, and, in view of our recommendation that, with the exception of certain commodities, all articles should be placed on the Free List, we believe that much quicker progress will be made by eliminating the Free List and substituting therefor, as soon as possible, a Controlled List. We suggest that the only commodities which, from our point of view, should be included in this proposed Controlled List are the following:

1. Arms, ammunition and explosives.
2. Fodder, including oil cake.
3. Seeds.
4. Cotton, raw, waste, thread, yarns.
5. Flax, hemp, jute, tow.
6. Wool, including yarn, noils and tops.
7. Raw rubber.
8. Hides and leather, unmanufactured, and leather belting.

9. Tanning materials.
10. Rosin.
11. Turpentine.
12. Asbestos and asbestos waste.
13. Graphite and graphite crucibles.
14. Copper, plates, bars, pipes, wire and cables (except insulated copper cables), copper alloys.
15. Lead, pig, plates, bars and pipes.
16. Tin, not including tin and terne plates.
17. Nickel.
18. Textile machinery.
19. High speed steel.
20. Mineral oils.

This list, from our standpoint, has been compiled with due consideration to the first and second sections of the paragraph hereinbelow captioned "Raw Materials", but without regard to the third section of that paragraph. In fixing the minimum of these commodities, due regard, of course, must be given to the provisions of the various Agreements with the Northern Neutrals. We believe that the establishment of such a Controlled List will greatly assist shippers in Allied countries. The suggestion that such a Controlled List should be established does not, in any way, affect the principles under which we are now operating and does no more than to increase the commodities on the Free List.

IV. Raw Materials. In suggesting that certain raw materials be omitted from the increase of the rations and be excluded from the Free List, we have in mind the following:

First. All raw materials which Germany herself produces should be permitted to go freely to the contiguous countries, even to the extent of over-supply, so that Germany may not profit in Northern Neutral markets at the expense of the Allies. But exports of even those raw materials which Germany herself produces should be controlled to the extent required by the considerations set forth in the third paragraph below.

Second. Those raw materials which Germany does not produce should be limited by the ration schedules to the actual needs of the Neutrals to prevent accumulation by Germany for future importation.

Third. We have also had under consideration for some time the question as to whether we should exercise a control over the exportation to the Northern Neutrals of certain raw materials with a view to preventing the Neutral countries from competing with Allied industries until such time as those Allied industries, which have been crippled or destroyed by the war, shall have had an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and until the Allies have recovered from war industries and demobilization to such an extent that they are able to re-engage in industrial competition with Neutral manufacturers. No definite decision has been reached on this point, and McCormick proposes to discuss this problem with you in Paris. The argument against such control is that the revival of trade throughout the world depends to a large extent on an early return to normal trade conditions, and that such a control would eventually operate unfavorably in the case of the Allies and would not achieve the desired result.

You should emphasize the above considerations to the ABC, and advise us of their views with particular reference to the following:

- (a) The immediate increase of all rations to the extent of the needs of the Border Neutrals.
- (b) The immediate addition to the Free List of the commodities referred to above.
- (c) The ultimate addition to the Free List of all commodities, particularly foodstuffs, but omitting certain raw materials.
- (d) The ultimate elimination of a Free List and adoption of a Controlled List.
- (e) The use of the Free List as a device for a premature revictualing and rationing of enemy countries.
- (f) The control of raw materials for the purpose of protecting Allied industries.

Repeat to Paris for Hoover and Taylor from the words beginning “and now to clear up any ambiguities” to the end.

You should not submit to A B C our recommendations for placing all foodstuffs on the Free List, until you have consulted with Hoover. If he cables you his approval of our recommendation, then submit it to A B C. If he disapproves, cable us to that effect and state his objections.

This cablegram and our 1968, January 2, constitute a basic memorandum of our views with reference to exports to the Northern Neutrals. For purposes of future discussion or correspondence, it will be referred to as “W. T. B. Northern Neutral Memorandum.”

POLK

⁵⁷ Not printed.

^{57a} Quoted in telegram No. 2 of Jan. 3, 1919, 12 noon, from the Ambassador in Great Britain to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 782 [*Pg. 782 is part of [Doc. 691](#)*].

Paris Peace Conf. 103.97/83: Telegram

[Document 695]

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Food Administration

[PARIS ,] January 4, 1919.

Food 172. [From Hoover.] Your 111.^{[58](#)} Am convinced certain people in London trying to break our market. Wartrabord knowing nothing this situation directly played into their hands upsetting President's demand and our main salvation. At least unlimited amounts can be shipped neutrals for own consumption. Notify A P E C^{[59](#)} that you regard their orders as communicated to you as fixed. I am communicating with Italians. Aside from this the following is our present outlook.

One. Northern Relief 20,000 tons.

Second. Load 7,000 tons ultimately for Czechs per my 117.^{[60](#)}

Third. Confirm *Regonian* 5,000.

Fourth. Will settle Finn in a few days and sell from Northern Relief and thereupon will increase that order 5,000 tons.

Fifth. Swiss say have instructed Sulzer 15,000 tons mostly lard and fat backs.

Sixth. Learn that Swedes want 10,000 tons.

We are today officially protesting against any intervention A P E C in dealings. Should think packers could dispose of twenty thousand tons January shipments Northern neutrals. Total above about 120 million pounds which can be counted upon although may be some delay fixing technicalities. Does not slowness in filling December orders indicate you are overestimating January position. Do not give us more of a problem than exists. This is simply a question of time. Every pound will be absorbed if situation can be carried through while we argue about relief finance and shipping and control. Expect meeting President and Premiers about twelfth and hope to settle a

pool to buy surplus January and February for subsequent marketing for relief purposes. Do not weaken. Please answer my 104.⁶⁰ Hoover.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ Allied Provisions Export Commission.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

600.119/1953: Telegram

[Document 696]

***The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting
Secretary of State***

PARIS , January 4, 1919—10 a.m.
[Received 11:06 a.m.]⁶¹

6615. War Trade Board [from Stetson]: Number 751. Referring Embassy's 6474, December 24th, 9 p.m., our number 723. Following cable received from Rome.

“422, December 30th, 4 p.m. War Trade Board 20, your 28, December 24th. No decree yet issued by Italian Government authorizing trade between Italy and Trentino. Such decree, however, contemplated and will probably be issued shortly. Informed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, as now proposed, the Trentino, for ambiguous economic purposes, will be regarded as integral part Italy on same footing as other districts of Kingdom. Answering your questions: First. Trade of all kinds will be permitted between Trentino and other districts Italy, but firms on Black Lists excluded therefrom. Second. Boundaries of the Trentino for purposes of the proposed decree will be boundaries laid down in Austrian armistice. Third. Trieste and all Adriatic ports still under blockade so that safe conducts must be obtained before ships can enter them. In all other respects, however, after decree has been issued, American shippers will be able to consign goods for Trentino under same regulations as to other parts of Italy. Stewart.”

**Stetson
BLISS**

61 Printed from corrected copy.

600.119/1895: Telegram

[Document 697]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , January 4, 1919—4 p.m.

3797. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 1970. Frothingham. Embassy's 4841, Dec. 24. Your 2162. War Trade Board will continue through individual export license refusal all stat list, G. B. L. A. and cloak list consignees both for Spain and Latin America as well as northern neutrals as such lists now exist or as they may be added to hereafter by action binding on all associated governments. Report by cable first, important commodities if any requiring British individual export licenses for Spain or Latin America, and whether where individual licenses for those countries are required uncertain or suspicious consignees refused outside of stat, G. B. L. A. and cloak lists. Our understanding practically all commodities Spain and Latin America now requiring no export license and stopped only consignees lists above referred to. Is newsprint paper to Latin America handled as above? Second, British enforcement cloak list. Our understanding from British Embassy here cloak list prepared by Washington conference has been placed in hands British customs officials for same enforcement as stat and G. B. L. A. Investigate and report. We desire to continue pressure listed houses at least until changed circumstance require alteration our position. It is obvious that if policy is to be at all effective British must instruct their missions Latin America and Spain to cooperate with our representatives in the detection of cloaks or other houses serving as channels for delivery of American or British goods to enemy hands, that Allied conferences in those countries must be resumed and even if but few additions be made to the list we create the impression locally that the policy is alive and active. The British Embassy here has cabled the Foreign Office urging modification of its previous circular instruction, a course which you may urge as strongly as

possible upon British associates. It is obvious that equality of position must be maintained by British and American governments or justice to American merchants will compel abandonment of the policy. We feel strongly here that the result of the interpretation put by the British missions in Latin America upon the Foreign Office's circular telegram has been most unfortunate as tending to impress the public in those countries with the idea that this government alone is insisting upon the strict continuance of enemy trade measures. Embassy's 4678, Dec. 17, your 2114,^{[63](#)} answered by foregoing.

POLK

^{[63](#)} Not printed.

600.119/2214: Telegram

[Document 698]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 6, 1919—8 p.m.

6870. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 553. Embassy's 6490, December 25, your 725. We approve the proposal that licenses to trade with residents of the occupied territory shall be granted by the proposed Inter-Allied Committee in the occupied region, but only upon condition that such licenses are issued in accordance with the policies formulated by the Paris Inter-Allied Committee upon which we have a representative, and that such policies will be formulated subject to our approval. With this understanding we would issue here a general enemy trade license authorizing all persons in the United States to trade and communicate with persons residing in the occupied territory, provided they secure the appropriate permit from the Inter-Allied Committee which will sit in the occupied region. This would leave the details of the control of such trade and communication in the hands of said Inter-Allied Committee. We hope that no announcement with regard to the commencement of trade relations with persons in the occupied territory will be made by the French Government before we have an opportunity to adopt and announce similar action in this country. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, we were not notified until sometime after the issuance of the French decree of December 6. Please inform us in advance of any proposed announcement by the French Government and also advise us of the proper designation of the Inter-Allied Committee which will sit in the occupied region so that we may be prepared to issue our announcement with full details.

POLK

600.119/1996c: Telegram

[Document 699]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 7, 1919—8 p.m.

6884. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 564. For McCormick [from Beaver White]. We are having an increasing number of complaints regarding the embargo of foodstuffs, particularly to Europe. The Board is of the opinion that they have no justification for further withholding licenses since a surplus exists and the result is to prevent our merchants from doing customary and legitimate business. Board has delayed action only that Hoover might be made acquainted with position. Matter is urgent. Beaver White.

POLK

103.96/1868: Telegram

[Document 700]

***The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the
Acting Secretary of State***

LONDON , January 7, 1919.
[Received January 7—6 p.m.]

154. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]: Number 2255. In your 1952 of January 3, 1919, Department's number 3774, namely W.T.B. Northern Neutral memorandum, you expressed approval of proposed addition to the free list of the commodities set forth in my number 2169, Embassy's 4860 of December 24, 1918.⁶⁴ Your telegram was however despatched before you had received my number 2221, Embassy's number 45 of January 2nd [3rd], in which suggestions that the free list be confined to unimportant articles were set forth. Really the distinction between the free list and nonrationed list is that reexportation to Germany of articles on the nonrationed list can be effectively prevented whereas it will be increasingly difficult to prevent such reexportation of articles on the free list because the free list is now a no guarantee list as stated in my 2221. Complaints have already reached us from Scandinavian capitals of the inefficacy of the physical blockade exercised by the fleet in the Baltic and in respect to many commodities there is no existing machinery by which exports from neutrals to Germany by rail can be prevented; therefore it is essential to continue to obtain guarantees against reexport from Associations. If any real control in this respect is desired it seems to me that your views would best be accomplished by the eventual establishment of a controlled list as you suggest leaving all commodities not enumerated therein to go upon the nonrationed list with the exception of those on the free list already announced and set forth in my 1924, Embassy's 3966 of November 23, 1918. Such a procedure would remove all doubt of ability to prevent reexport to Germany because guarantees would be obtained for all commodities except the small free list above referred

to. Unless, then, you consider the proposed additions to the free list set forth in my 2169 to be of such unimportance that export to Germany from the neutral importer is unobjectionable or would not be attempted because of lack of demand in Germany for these articles, I would suggest that you approve the placing of this list on the nonrationed rather than on the free list and I have not notified the A.B.C. of your approval pending receipt of a reply from you. Please advise me promptly.

DAVIS

64 Not printed.

600.119/1917: Telegram

[Document 701]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in
France (Bliss)***

WASHINGTON , January 8, 1919—6 p.m.

6900. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]: No. 566. For McCormick. Referring to Department's 3750, January 2, to Sheldon, our 1968.⁶⁵ While we favor sales of pork abroad to relieve over-supply in this country, we do not favor artificial means of keeping up the price of pork to American consumers, which only tends to keep the cost of living here at an artificially high price. We are therefore opposed to forcing pork shipments for purpose of maintaining domestic price. As to any pork or other commodities that A.B.C. considers it necessary for Central Powers to receive, we think such shipments should be openly permitted.

On second thought, our suggestions for methods of payment by the Central Powers contained in our 1968 do not seem to us well considered. Please consider these conclusions as modifying our 1968 to Sheldon.

POLK

⁶⁵ Quoted in telegram No. 2 of Jan. 3, 1919, 12 noon, from the Ambassador in Great Britain to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, p. 782 [Pg. 782 is part of [Doc. 691](#)].

763.72112/11394a: Telegram

[Document 702]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

WASHINGTON , January 9, 1919.

3973. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 2018. We have issued the following announcement to the public.

“The War Trade Board announce that all persons in the United States are authorized, subject to the rules and regulations of the War Trade Board, to trade and communicate with persons residing in the States of Alsace and Lorraine. In accordance with this authorization, applications will now be considered for licenses to export or import all commodities to consignees or from consignors in the States of Alsace and Lorraine. For the exportation to Alsace and Lorraine of articles which are not on the Export Conservation List, individual export licenses will not be required. Applications for the exportation to Alsace and Lorraine of commodities which are on the Export Conservation List should be filed in the same manner as applications for licenses to export to France. For importations into the United States from Alsace-Lorraine, individual import licenses will be required under the same conditions as for importations from other European non-enemy countries, except where the shipments are covered by the list of general import licenses previously announced.”

POLK

600.119/2007b: Telegram

[Document 703]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Great Britain (Davis)***⁶⁶

WASHINGTON , January 10, 1919.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 2026. It is no longer required as a condition of our export licenses to Northern Neutrals that shipment must be made in vessels flying the flag of the country of destination.

POLK

⁶⁶ The same, on same date, to the Embassy in France (for McFadden, No. 576), and to Legations in Sweden (for Owen, No. 139), in Denmark (for Hurley), in Norway (for Dye, No. 164), and in the Netherlands (for Edwards, No. 154).

600.119/2009b: Telegram

[Document 704]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Great Britain (Davis)^{[67](#)}***

WASHINGTON , January 13, 1919.

For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]: No. 2050. Applications for export licenses to Allied countries are no longer being referred to the Allied Missions here.

POLK

^{[67](#)} The same, on same date, to Embassies in France (for McFadden, No. 587, for Taylor) and in Italy (for Stewart, No. 62).

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